Asia Programme Meeting Summary Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific 12 February 2015 The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the speaker(s) and participants do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/ speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication or details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an event every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions. The published text of speeches and presentations may differ from delivery. 10 St James’s Square, London SW1Y 4LE T +44 (0)20 7957 5700 F +44 (0)20 7957 5710 www.chathamhouse.org Patron: Her Majesty The Queen Chairman: Stuart Popham QC Director: Dr Robin Niblett Charity Registration Number: 208223 2 Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific This is a summary of an event held at Chatham House on 12 February 2015, made up of a keynote speech by Ambassador Yoshiji Nogami and three sessions. At the first session, James Przystup, Ryo Sahashi and Sam Bateman discussed the main security challenges – traditional and non-traditional – in the Asia- Pacific. At the second session, Masayuki Masuda, Thang Nguyen Dang and Douglas Guilfoyle spoke about the rule of law in the region and how it can be upheld; and at the third session, Ren Xiao, Ambassador Rakesh Sood, Sir Anthony Dymock and Alessio Patalano extended the dialogue to beyond the Asia-Pacific. John Swenson-Wright gave concluding remarks. Keynote speech Japan’s basic principles for maritime security in the Asia-Pacific are very simple, according to Ambassador Nogami. He identified these as: security based on international law; refraining from force or the threat of force; and seeking peaceful solutions to conflict. These principles require that an open, rule- based system is in place for international shared spaces. China is currently perceived as failing to follow these principles and as threatening the Asia-Pacific status quo, maintenance of which is Japan’s priority. However, China does not want to be seen as a direct challenger, and the time is thus right to create a rule- based system that will provide a solution for all maritime disputes. Chinese military spending continues to rise and its naval activity in the region is expanding, but the most controversial policy area, with far-reaching consequences, is island reclamation – mostly in the Spratly and the Paracel Islands – on which harbours will be built. It is likely that the next step will be the announcement of a further Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the disputed islands by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The littoral powers of the South China Sea (SCS) have been unable to find a unified solution to this problem because of their preoccupation with territorial disputes, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) framework for finding resolutions has met resistance from several landlocked countries. Meanwhile, the maritime capabilities of these states are fairly minimal, despite assistance from Japan and the US. In the future, a multilateral scheme may be needed for enhancing this work. Nogami rejected the implication that Japan’s resources may not support an increased maritime security role in the future. In budgetary terms, Japan’s projected maritime security spending is not exorbitant, and has the backing of roughly 70 per cent of the population. Meanwhile, Nogami noted, Japan’s relations with the US have strengthened as part of the US ‘Rebalance to Asia’ policy and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), while Australia–Japan and India–Japan ties are also good. Japan’s supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG) relies on maritime routes, further increasing the importance of its maritime security. Session One: Traditional and non-traditional maritime security challenges in the Asia- Pacific Traditional challenges James Przystup characterized the traditional security challenges of the past decade in the Asia-Pacific as mainly emanating from China. The current situation, in which minor incidents in ‘grey zones’ could easily escalate into grave situations, may be exacerbated in the future by the intensification of Chinese activity in the airspace and waters around Japan and the modernization of the PLA. The serious nature of this challenge is shown by the large number of Chinese territorial incursions into the waters of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands (41 in 2014), or cases such as the 2013–14 PLA navy exercises without prior 3 Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific notification in the vicinity of the Malaysian exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In response, many states in the region have increased their military budgets and expanded ties with the US. Such developments come at the same time as the US administration’s 2011 announcement of its ‘rebalance’. So far, the military angle of the rebalance has been overstated, at the expense of its economic side, and Przystup emphasized that the policy is not anti-China, despite China’s exclusion from the TPP. Its aim is to move China towards the position of a responsible stakeholder that supports an open international order. Confidence-building measures are needed between China and other regional/international powers. Eventually, a binding code of conduct and ways of preventing the use of force will be needed, but this is a distant prospect. Non-traditional challenges Ryo Sahashi discussed non-traditional security challenges in the Asia-Pacific, with a focus on natural disasters – to which the Asia-Pacific is particularly vulnerable. The damaging effects of natural disasters – large numbers of killed, injured and displaced persons, and stunted economic growth – can be exacerbated by poor governance and a lack of coping mechanisms in many littoral countries. Some recommendations for coping with natural disasters in the Asia-Pacific are as follows: • Littoral countries should make better use of US and Japanese military assets designed for disaster-relief, and Japanese naval assets need a mandate to cooperate with other governments in natural disaster zones without needing formal permission. • Japan, the US and Australia should support development in littoral countries that will promote long-term disaster management objectives. • Guidelines, to be followed by military bodies and NGOs carrying out disaster relief, should be created and promoted, or, where they already exist, enforced. • A good exit strategy in place for relief operations is essential; and participating nations must be sensitive to the legacy of colonialism, which can cause antagonism towards humanitarian intervention in affected countries. • Hosting nations must cooperate with relief operations, and provide such operations with intelligence and protection. • A mechanism for regional cooperation is needed; a combination of an ASEAN-based regional security architecture and the US–Japanese alliance could be viable. • A balance between inclusivity and efficiency must be found for determining the number of participants to be included in the security architecture. There is an argument that the use of military assets to cope with non-traditional challenges such as natural disasters creates a security dilemma between powers, but Sahashi countered that this is not necessarily the case, and that US and Japanese military cooperation for disaster relief has been very cautious in order to avoid provoking China. Capacity-building and cooperation Sam Bateman advocated increased security cooperation at both national and regional level on institutional arrangements, legal frameworks, and resource usage in the Asia-Pacific. Traditional security concerns (e.g. sea lines of communication [SLOC] protection) are unlikely to provide opportunities for increased cooperation in the short-term because of a high degree of mutual distrust between regional powers, often stemming from competing territorial claims. Cooperation on non-traditional issues such as civil maritime activities, including resource control and marine ecology, could provide a basis for building 4 Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific eventual trust on traditional security issues. At present, the region risks becoming heavily navalized, with a lack of management strategies in place in case of an international incident. Moving forward, the profile of regional forums on civil maritime issues needs to be strengthened, and there should be a clearer division of labour between different forums and agencies. A framework for cooperation is required that will reflect the concerns of all stakeholders, and EU experience on this front could be utilized. Capacity-building must be depoliticized and operationalized. Finally, more effort should also be made to consider the problem from Beijing’s point of view, otherwise China’s security dilemma will continue to spiral. In addition to confidence-building measures, the importance of Track II diplomacy was noted. Despite some cynicism being raised as to the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific’s track record for getting initiatives through to Track I, it is important for ensuring future cooperation. It was suggested that the best hope for future generations might lie in the Track III educational diplomacy dimension. Capacity-building