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Maritime terrorism naval bases, offshore oil and gas facilities, other By Emilio Bonagiunta, Maritime Security Consultant critical infrastructure, or the maritime trade itself.ii Operations of this kind are reportedly part of Al-Qaeda's maritime strategy.iii Past here are two main forms in which attacks against oil facilities and tankers in Saudi terrorist groups benefit from the Arabia and Yemen demonstrate that terrorist T vastness and lawlessness of the sea: by networks in the region have ambitions to conducting attacks against sea-based targets and severely disrupt energy supplies from the by using the sea to transport weapons, militants Arabian Peninsula. A successful series of large- and other support means from one place to the scale attacks against the oil industry would have i other. In both cases, the low level of control and tremendous impacts on international energy law enforcement provides a beneficial markets and the global economy. It is from this environment for preparation and conduction perspective that Al-Qaeda poses a serious threat terrorist operations in the maritime domain, against maritime trade.iv unthinkable of on the ground. Yet, the fact that these fears have not Along with this, offshore assets and critical materialized can be attributed to a variety of infrastructure on the coast are seen as high-value factors: greater vigilance and measures adopted targets for terrorist groups. Operations against by sea-users and maritime security providers, the USS Cole (2000) and the tanker Limburg lack of confidence by terrorist groups in the (2002), attributed to Al-Qaeda, are good success of major attacks against sea-based examples of maritime terrorism in the Arabian targets due to insufficient expertise and Peninsula, where small crafts laden with experienced militants for conducting such explosives have proven successful in causing operations. Most probably, Al-Qaeda is serious damage, including numerous human unwilling to carry out attacks that could lead to losses, to sizable floating vessels. The fears higher levels of law enforcement, therefore raised by such operations led to the formulation compromising its current freedom of movement of catastrophic scenarios featuring large-scale in the maritime space. While it is difficult to seaborne attacks, including the use of estimate which factor has played a greater role in waterborne improvised explosive devices preventing the threat of maritime terrorism from (WBIEDs) against floating vessels transporting evolving into a palpable reality in the Arabian hazardous cargo, of the kind of liquefied natural Gulf, there is agreement that the absence of gas (LNG), in order to harm coastal populations,
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large-scale attacks results from a combination of serious vulnerabilities unattended. For example, all of the factors mentioned above. the Code does not cover all categories of vessels, as no certification and monitoring regulations Given the familiarity of terrorist groups with apply to fishing boats, which in many cases are operations on the ground, the threat of attacks bigger in size and handle greater crews than against critical infrastructure ashore, such as port commercial vessels under ISPS regulations.vi facilities, oil storage sites, and refinery plants, Port facilities not serving international appears to be higher and more immediate than destinations also fall outside the ISPS for sea-based assets. A successful attack against regulations, increasing security concerns in this kind of facility would cause suspension of small and largely unguarded seaports for their the traffic, severe economic losses, and a rise in potential use for malicious purposes. the price of oil and other commodities. Overcoming these challenges implies filling the Therefore, the security of port facilities in the gaps of the international maritime security UAE, through which most of the maritime traffic regime with robust national regulations. is channeled and regulated, remains a significant Additionally, the implementation of security challenge for the protection of the country's measures stipulated by 2003 amendments to the maritime trade. Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) convention are not required on domestic trade vessels and on According to information retrieved from the any ship under 500 gross tonnage. Yet, it is an International Maritime Organization (IMO), all uncontested fact that small vessels are the most of the UAE seaports seem to have complied with likely to be used for terrorist operations because the security regulations stipulated by the of their reduced size, wide availability and easy International Ship and Port Facility Security maneuverability. Furthermore, small vessels (ISPS) Code, including the conduction of Port offer the advantage of being widely used and Facility Security Assessments and the therefore more difficult for authorities to track.vii appointment of Port Facility Security Officers.v Underwater threats to harbor security should not However, the ISPS Code and other legal be underestimated either. Indeed, there is instruments which constitute the current potential for underwater terrorist activities in maritime security regime, present some port facilities, as sub-surface activities cannot be shortcomings, to the extent that their full easily detected by ground surveillance systems implementation does not ensure the safety and and surface patrolling in and around harbors. security of seaports in the UAE and leaves some These operations could include, for instance, the
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use of underwater improvised devices through maritime shipments across the Gulf of (UWIEDs) against ship hulls below the surface. Aden. The threat of UWIEDs can be lowered by equipping main and post vulnerable UAE ports The threat of maritime terrorism in the with underwater maritime security systems that surrounding waters of the UAE will exist as long detect eventual intruders in areas where air and as Al-Qaeda and its affiliated outfits continue to surface radar cannot. be based and operate from countries such as Yemen, Somalia and Saudi Arabia. The use of Oil refineries, water desalination plants and the sea as supply line will be privileged, power plants, often located in port areas, in their although sporadic attacks causing brief maritime proximity or elsewhere on the shoreline, also trade disruptions, material damage, human represent likely targets for terrorist attacks. casualties and environmental disaster cannot be Assessment of their vulnerabilities should be ruled out considering past records in this regard. conducted within the frame of a comprehensive Lasting interruption of maritime shipping lines strategy to protect critical infrastructure from is not anticipated. Improvised explosive devices maritime terrorism. In particular, as the UAE and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices embarks on a civilian nuclear program, nuclear are the tools most likely to be used in future power plants and other nuclear facilities will be scenarios of maritime terrorism.viii Should located along the coast and are expected to attacks of this nature occur, the commercial integrate the list of potential targets. The interests of the UAE could be significantly preparation of Design Basis Threat (DBT) undermined. Targets would probably include assessments for nuclear facilities should merchant or naval vessels, offshore oil facilities, therefore encompass seaborne vulnerabilities port facilities, and naval outposts on the and threats. shoreline. The impacts on UAE trade would also be notorious following attacks of similar The use of the maritime space for transportation magnitude conducted in the UAE's surrounding has been critical for conducting terrorist waters against the commercial or strategic operations. The Mumbai attacks in November interests of third countries. 2008 are a clear evidence of this. Militants from a Pakistan-based cell reached Mumbai from It is unlikely that the threat of maritime terrorism Karachi by sea. Similarly, terrorists and will be eliminated or neutralized, as the insurgents in Yemen are thought to be receiving magnitude of sea shipping activities render total weapons from African illicit arms markets protection of the maritime supply chain literally
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4 impossible. On the other hand, comprehensive measures for prevention and interdiction by all MR-1695-JRC, 2003, http://www.rand.org/randeurope/digest/seacurity stakeholders can significantly complicate plans .html ii of attacks and compromise supply routes. The Richard Farrel, "Maritime terrorism: focusing on the probable", Naval War College Review, best defense against this threat remains profound Volume 60, Issue 3, Summer 2007, p. 50. iii vigilance by maritime users, capacity building of ³7KHVHDLVWKHQH[WVWUDWHJLFVWHSWRZDUGV controlling the world and restoring the Islamic maritime security providers, as well as inter- FDOLSKDWH´, Al-Qaeda e-journal, in Islamist state and inter-agency intelligence sharing on Website Monitor, Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), 1 May 2008, terrorism and maritime-related issues. http://www.menriwmp.org iv Gurpreet S. Khurana, "Maritime Terrorism Off the Arabian Peninsula. A Post-Limburg Security The adoption by the UAE of multilateral, Assessment", pp. 95-112, in N.S. Sisodia, Ashok West Asia in Turmoil, Implications bilateral and government-to-private safety and K. Behuria, for Global Security, Academic Foundation, New control regimes for enhanced security across the Delhi, 2007. v maritime shipping sector is believed to be of "UAE ports certified ISPS Code compliant", Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, 7 July 2004. considerable help in reducing vulnerabilities. Additional information on UAE compliance to On this point, we shall mention the Proliferation ISPS is available from the IMO's Global Integrated Shipping Information System Security Initiative (PSI) for WMD interdiction, (GISIS), http://gisis.imo.org/Public (user the Megaports Initiative for radiation detection, registration required). vi F.A.Anstey, "The maritime security and the Container Security Initiative (CSI) for regulations: do they go far enough?", in Dmitry World Maritime Excellence the screening of containerized shipping to or Zhukov (editor), , Odesa National Maritime Academy, 2007, pp. from the United States. Amendments to the 195-208. Available on SOLAS adopted in 2003, especially the ISPS www.onma.edu.ua/iamuaga8/proceedings.pdf. vii "Smart Vessel Security Strategy", Department Code, stipulate key security-related requirements of Homeland Security, April 2008, p. 8. Report and guidelines for public and private maritime available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/small-vessel- users. These instruments play an important role security-strategy.pdf . viii in meeting the threat of maritime terrorism and Peter Lehr, "Maritime Terrorism: Locations, Actors, and Capabilities", in Rupert Herbert- WMD proliferation alike.ix Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr, Lloyd's MIU Handbook of Maritime Security, Taylor & Views expressed in this article are not necessarily those of SAG E Francis Group, 2009, pp. 58-59. ix International "Export Control and Combating Terror Finance", Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in the United States, Factsheet April 2009, http://uae-embassy.org . i Marteen van de Voort, Kevin A. O'Brien, "SeaCurity. Improving the security of the global sea-container shipping system", RAND Europe,
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