Counterinsurgency Operations
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Counter-Insurgency, Human Rights, and the Law of Armed Conflict Federico Sperotto
Human Rights Brief Volume 17 | Issue 1 Article 3 2009 Counter-Insurgency, Human Rights, and the Law of Armed Conflict Federico Sperotto Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Sperotto, Federico. "Counter-Insurgency, Human Rights, and the Law of Armed Conflict." Human Rights Brief 17, no. 1 (2009): 19-23. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Human Rights Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Sperotto: Counter-Insurgency, Human Rights, and the Law of Armed Conflict Counter-Insurgency, Human Rights, and the Law of Armed Conflict by Federico Sperotto* introduCtion ounter-insurgency is the dominant aspect in the United States-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in CAfghanistan, and, since the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has assumed growing respon- sibility throughout insurgents’ sanctuaries, also a mission for Europeans. According to the U.S. military, insurgency represents an intermediate step in the spectrum of conflict, which ranges from stable peace to general war.1 The frame in which military opera- tions are conducted is known as irregular warfare, a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over a population.2 This form of conflict is charac- terized by three principle activities: insurgency, counter-insur- gency, and unconventional warfare, referring to the avoidance of Association of the Courtesy of the Revolutionary Afghanistan. -
Meserole Brookings CV 2021
CHRISTOPHER O. MESEROLE 1775 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington DC 20036 (202) 797-6180 | [email protected] POSITIONS Director of Research and Policy, Brookings AI & Emerging Tech Initiative (2020-) Deputy Director, Brookings AI & Emerging Tech Initiative (2019-2020) Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution (2017-) Post-Doctoral Fellow in Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution (2016-2017) Pre-Doctoral Fellow in Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution (2015-2016) AFFILIATIONS Co-Facilitator, GIFCT CAPPI Working Group (2020-) Co-PI, Brookings High-Level Working Group on Disinformation (2019-2020) Member, Christchurch Call Advisory Network (2019-) Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University (2019-) Member, Research Advisory Council, RESOLVE Network (2019-) Member, Digital Freedom Forum, CNAS (2019-) EDUCATION A.B., highest honors in field, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2002 M.Div., S.T.M, Yale University, NeW Haven, CT, 2009, 2010 Ph.D., University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 2017 RESEARCH Artificial intelligence, emerging technology, international security; digital INTERESTS authoritarianism; counterterrorism and countering violent extremism; nonparametric machine learning, interpretable machine learning, differential privacy and homomorphic encryption, decentralized ledger technology WRITING “Exporting Digital Authoritarianism,” Brookings Institution, September 2019. (With Alina Polyakova.) “HoW Big Tech Can Fight White Supremacist Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, August 2019. (With Daniel Byman.) “Terrorist Definitions and Designation -
Uncertainty and Civil War Onset
Uncertainty and Civil War Onset Iris Malone∗ Abstract Why do some armed groups escalate their campaigns to civil war, while others do not? Only 25% of the 960 armed groups formed between 1970 and 2012 became violent enough to surpass the 25-battle death threshold, often used to demarcate \civil conflict.” I develop a new theory that argues this variation occurs because of an information problem. States decide how much counterinsurgency effort to allocate for repression on the basis of observable characteristics about an armed group's initial capabilities, but two scenarios make it harder to get this decision right, increasing the risk of civil war. I use fieldwork interviews with intelligence and defense officials to identify important group characteristics for civil war and apply machine learning methods to test the predictive ability of these indicators. The results show that less visible armed groups in strong states and strong armed groups in weak states are most likely to lead to civil war onset. These findings advance scholarly understanding about why civil wars begin and the effect of uncertainty on conflict. ∗Department of Political Science, 100 Encina Hall West, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. ([email protected], web.stanford.edu/~imalone). 1 Introduction Why do some armed groups escalate their campaigns to civil war, while most do not? Using an original dataset, I show that only 25% of the 960 armed groups formed between 1970 and 2012 became violent enough to surpass the 25-battle death threshold, often used to demarcate \civil conflict.”1 Only 8% of armed groups surpassed the higher \civil war" threshold of 1000 fatalities per year. -
Highlights of Recent RAND Research on Counterinsurgency
Highlights of Recent RAND Research on Counterinsurgency For more information, contact Shirley Ruhe, Director of Congressional Relations, at 703-413-1100, x5632 or [email protected], or Kurt Card, National Security Legislative Analyst, at 703-413-1100 x5259 or [email protected] As the leading research authority on counterinsurgency, the RAND Corporation has developed a wide selection of materials for policy makers. With multiple insurgencies operating in several theaters this research was developed to provide a historical, geographical, and functional understanding of past and present insurgencies and counterinsurgency operations. Social Science for Counterterrorism Putting the Pieces Together Darcy Noricks et al., 2009 This report from an interdisciplinary project to survey and integrate the scholarly social- science literature relevant to counterterrorism answers questions related to why some individuals become terrorists, how terrorists generate public support, how terrorist organizations make decisions, and why individuals disengage. A Stability Police Force for the United States Justification and Options for Creating U.S. Capabilities Terrence K. Kelly et al., 2009 Establishing security is the sine qua non of stability operations, since it is a prerequisite for reconstruction and development. Security requires a mix of military and police forces to deal with a range of threats from insurgents to criminal organizations. This research examines the creation of a high-end police force, which the authors call a Stability Police Force. 1 Underkill Scalable Capabilities for Military Operations amid Populations David C. Gompert et al., 2009 The battle for Gaza revealed an extremist strategy: hiding in cities and provoking attack to cause civilian deaths that can be blamed on the attacking forces. -
Modeling and Analysis of Resolve and Morale for the `Long War'
Air Force Institute of Technology AFIT Scholar Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works 12-5-2007 Modeling and Analysis of Resolve and Morale for the `Long War' Michael J. Artelli Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons Recommended Citation Artelli, Michael J., "Modeling and Analysis of Resolve and Morale for the `Long War'" (2007). Theses and Dissertations. 2648. https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/2648 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF RESOLVE AND MORALE FOR THE ‘LONG WAR’ DISSERTATION Michael J Artelli, Major, USAF AFIT / DS / ENS / 07-02 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY IR ORCE NSTITUTE F ECHNOLOGY AF I O T Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United States Government. AFIT/DS/ENS/07-02 MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF RESOLVE AND MORALE FOR THE ‘LONG WAR’ DISSERTATION Presented to the Faculty Graduate School of Engineering and Management Air Force Institute of Technology Air University Air Education and Training Command in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Michael J. Artelli, B.S., M.S. -
The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence, Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Impact of National Politics by Zachary Abuza
STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 6 The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence, Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Impact of National Politics by Zachary Abuza Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Complex Operations, and Center for Strategic Conferencing. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, and publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: Thai and U.S. Army Soldiers participate in Cobra Gold 2006, a combined annual joint training exercise involving the United States, Thailand, Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia. Photo by Efren Lopez, U.S. Air Force The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence, Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Impact of National Politics The Ongoing Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Trends in Violence, Counterinsurgency Operations, and the Impact of National Politics By Zachary Abuza Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 6 Series Editors: C. Nicholas Rostow and Phillip C. Saunders National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. -
The Deserter and the Enemy Party
chapter 3 The Deserter and the Enemy Party There are many circumstances under which deserters could find themselves in the power of the enemy during an international armed conflict. They might be captured by enemy troops while abandoning their own military unit, or get caught while in hiding days, weeks or even months after the desertion. In other cases, deserters might place themselves voluntarily into the hands of an adverse party, either because they hope for better conditions on the enemy side and safety from punishment by their home country, or because they wish to defect, i.e. join the enemy in fighting against their own state. Whether deserters will actively try to reach the enemy will largely depend on the treatment that they can expect in a given conflict, both from their home country and from the other belligerent. Would they face the death penalty at home? Would they be enslaved, or treated humanely in captivity by the enemy? Would they be accepted into the army of the enemy, or would they risk being handed over for ransom?1 The answers to these questions depend on the politi- cal and legal regimes in the respective belligerent countries and the extent to which these countries respect the rule of law during the conduct of hostilities. But they also depend on the nature of the armed conflict itself, i.e. whether the lines of battle are mostly drawn along the lines of ethnicity, geo-political inter- ests, or fundamental ideological beliefs. Desertions Welcome, but not Deserters Belligerents have long recognised the tactical and psychological benefits that individual and mass desertion from the enemy forces can bring to their own war effort.2 As such, propaganda appealing to the ideological convictions of the soldiers, or promising good treatment or rewards in order to encourage 1 See also Afflerbach and Strachan, who point out the the overlap between the question of surrender to the enemy and the treatment of prisoners of war, in: Holger Afflerbach and Hew Strachan, A ‘True Chameleon’, Some Concluding Remarks on the History of Surrender, p. -
MORALE Assignment
127 MANAGING MORALE ON THE BATTLEFIELD: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE MC van ’t Wout South African National Defence Force GAJ van Dyk Stellenbosch University Abstract From historical writings to current day, morale has always been regarded as a major determinant of success on the battlefield. The management of morale is thus also important in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) for ensuring combat readiness. Numerous studies have been done in the past in various countries to investigate the factors influencing morale. A summary of the factors identified in the literature was used in the study on which this article is based, to compile a psychological plan to manage morale on the battlefield. Some recommendations for possible actions toward improving morale are included. Introduction Since medieval times and Sun Tzu’s writings well over two thousand years ago, many things have changed in how wars are fought, but just as many things have remained the same. In the current South African National Defence Force (SANDF), some aspects of military life are so ingrained in military culture that the purpose thereof has been forgotten and thus neglected. Examples of such aspects are marching, show of respect and saluting, strict discipline, teaching uniformity of behaviour such as wearing of uniforms and even physical training. Humans are subject to a dichotomy between individualisation and wanting to belong to a group – the need for inclusion and the need for differentiation.1 In the military environment, it is important for all to have a strong group feeling in order to achieve military objectives. Having soldiers Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol train together, live together, wear the same 43, No. -
Warfare Issuing an Order to Order a Unit to Attack, Select the Attacking Unit and a Legal Defender (See the Order of Battle Below)
Warfare Issuing An Order To order a unit to attack, select the attacking unit and a legal defender (see The Order of Battle below). Attacking The attacking unit makes an Attack test against the target units Defense. Roll 1d20, add the acting unit’s Attack bonus. If the result equals or exceeds the defending units Defense, the attack is successful, move to the Power test. Attacking exhausts a unit. Exhausted units cannot attack. Once all units are exhausted, all units refresh. Power In order to inflict a casualty, you must make a Power test against the target’s Toughness. Roll 1d20, add the acting unit’s Power bonus. If the result equals or exceeds the defending units Toughness, you inflicted a casualty! Decrement the casualty die! Casualties Once a casualty die reaches 1, another casualty removes the unit from the battle. Each unit can be Rallied once at this point. Rally A unit about to be removed from battle can be Rallied. Their commander makes a Morale Test, DC15. If successful, the unit remains in the battle, but cannot be Rallied again. Diminished Once a unit is at half strength (for instance, 3 or less on a D6), if it takes a casualty, it must make a Morale test against DC 15 or suffer another casualty. The Order of Battle All units belong to a Rank specified on their unit card. A unit’s rank determines who they can attack, and who they can be attacked by. There are six ranks; Infantry (incl. Levies). Anyone can attack these units. Archers. -
The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency
THE DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND INSURGENCY Putting Principles USAID POLICY into Practice BUREAU FOR POLICY, PLANNING AND LEARNING SEPTEMBER 2011 USAID THE DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND INSURGENCY POLICY SEPTEMBER 2011 i Message from the Administrator USAID Policy /The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency MESSAGE FROM THE ADMINISTRATOR President Obama’s National Security Strategy and Global Already today, close to 60 percent of State and USAID’s for Development Policy both stress that successful development eign assistance goes to 50 countries that are in the midst of, is essential to advancing our national security objectives. or trying to prevent conflict or state failure.This policy is crit ical to supporting our staff on the frontlines of our greatest Consistent with these broader strategic frameworks, this pol national security and development challenges. Our Agency’s icy provides USAID with a clear mandate and specific renewed emphasis on learning, innovation and risktaking guidance on the development response to violent extremism means we will study and improve our work in exactly those and insurgency.This policy comes at a critical time; develop areas that have proven most difficult. ment assistance is increasingly called upon as an integral component of the interagency response to complex national With this policy, the Agency and its field Missions can now security and development challenges. rely on a clear set of common concepts and definitions, engagement criteria, and programming principles to support In line with our USAID Forward reform effort, this policy rep and guide our work, enhance its impact and ensure we resents an ongoing drive to use our long experience and vast deliver sustainable results. -
Law of War Handbook 2005
LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK (2005) MAJ Keith E. Puls Editor 'Contributing Authors Maj Derek Grimes, USAF Lt Col Thomas Hamilton, USMC MAJ Eric Jensen LCDR William O'Brien, USN MAJ Keith Puls NIAJ Randolph Swansiger LTC Daria Wollschlaeger All of the faculty who have served before us and contributed to the literature in the field of operational law. Technical Support CDR Brian J. Bill, USN Ms. Janice D. Prince, Secretary JA 423 International and Operational Law Department The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School Charlottesville, Virginia 22903 PREFACE The Law of War Handbook should be a start point for Judge Advocates looking for information on the Law of War. It is the second volume of a three volume set and is to be used in conjunction with the Operational Law Handbook (JA422) and the Documentary Supplement (JA424). The Operational Law Handbook covers the myriad of non-Law of War issues a deployed Judge Advocate may face and the Documentary Supplement reproduces many of the primary source documents referred to in either of the other two volumes. The Law of War Handbook is not a substitute for official references. Like operational law itself, the Handbook is a focused collection of diverse legal and practical information. The handbook is not intended to provide "the school solution" to a particular problem, but to help Judge Advocates recognize, analyze, and resolve the problems they will encounter when dealing with the Law of War. The Handbook was designed and written for the Judge Advocates practicing the Law of War. This body of law is known by several names including the Law of War, the Law of Armed Conflict and International Humanitarian Law. -
The Strategic Paradox of Truly Autonomous Weapons
The strategic paradox of autonomous weapons ZIPAR Policy Brief February 2018 Marko Kovic ZIPAR About ZIPAR The Zurich Institute of Public Aairs Research is devoted to identifying and addressing the major challenges for humankind in the short-term, in the medium- term, and in the long-term future. ZIPAR is an independent nonprot think tank based in Zurich, Switzerland. Recommended citation Marko Kovic (2018): The strategic paradox of autonomous weapons systems. ZIPAR Policy Brief. Zurich, Switzerland. Copyright This document is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivatives 4.0 International license. You can freely distribute this document and reference it in other works. For any questions about copyright, feel free to contact the author ([email protected]). 2 The strategic paradox of autonomous weapons ZIPAR Policy Brief Abstract Progress in articial intelligence makes the technology increasingly relevant to military applications. In particular, autonomous weapons could be of great military use: Autonomous weapons could achieve goals more ef- fectively and more eciently than humans or human-operated weapons. In this policy brief, the potential impact of implementing autonomous weapons on the behavior and decision-making of the military is discussed. The most probable positive impact, greater adherence to humanitarian law on the battleeld, is outweighed by the most probable negative impact, a disruption of the military chain of command and the security risks that follow from that disruption. This creates a strategic paradox: Even though autonomous weapons could help the military achieve goals more eectively and more eciently, autonomous weapons would strategically undermine the military by disrupting the chain of command and by creating a great security risk.