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War Psychiatry, Chapter 1, Morale and Cohesion in Military Psychiatry

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War Psychiatry, Chapter 1, Morale and Cohesion in Military Psychiatry Military Families and Combat Readiness Chapter 1 MORALE AND COHESION IN MILITARY PSYCHIATRY FREDERICK J. MANNING, Ph.D.* INTRODUCTION The Meaning of Morale The Meaning of Cohesion The Meaning of Esprit-De-Corps Related Concepts DETERMINANTS OF MORALE Individual Factors Group Factors COHESION Esprit de corps ASSESSING MORALE AND COHESION Horizontal Bonding Vertical Bonding Commitment Command Climate SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS *Senior Program Officer, Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, 2101 Constitution Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20418; Colonel (ret), Medical Service Corps; U.S. Army, formerly, Director, Division of Neuropsychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Washington, DC 20307-5100 1 Military Psychiatry: Preparing in Peace for War INTRODUCTION One of the enduring legacies of World War II involved a sudden change in the soldier’s relation- military psychiatry was the recognition that the ship to his group. Somehow he had lost his place as incidence of psychiatric casualties in various units a member of the team, whether it was he who had more to do with characteristics of the unit than changed or the team. In either case, alone, he was with characteristics of the casualties themselves.1 overwhelmed and disorganized. Present day writers might use the term social support Additional support for the assertion of Glass1 instead of group identification, group cohesiveness, or that began this chapter came from some of the many group bonds, but nowhere in civilian life is the social pioneering survey studies of Stouffer and colleagues5 group of such major and crucial importance in the in the Research Branch of the War Department’s life of the individual as it is for the soldier in com- Information and Education Division. They ques- bat. tioned men from over 100 companies undergoing This was apparent to Spiegel2, a psychiatrist in- pre-D-day training and compared the subsequent advertently assigned as an infantry battalion medi- nonbattle casualty (all medical losses except cal officer during the very first American combat wounded in action and killed and action) rates of action in North Africa in World War II. It did not these same companies in Normandy. Their data take much first hand experience for him to puzzle showed a correlation of -.33 between nonbattle ca- not about why some men broke, but how so many sualties and pre-invasion morale. For heavy weap- could push on for so long in such miserable condi- ons companies, the correlation was -.41. A division tions. He rejected the notion that these men were commander could in fact have used preinvasion peculiarly tough characters who loved to fight, and morale scores to sort his rifle companies into thirds. he noted that they expressed very little real hate for The lowest scoring third ultimately suffered 62% the enemy. Instead, Spiegel suggested that it was more nonbattle casualties than the highest scoring regard for comrades, respect for leaders, concern third. for their reputation with both of those groups, and As a result of these World War II observations, an urge to contribute to the success of the unit that morale, and group identification suddenly emerged kept them fighting. These cohesive forces, which as concepts of great importance to military medi- Spiegel called the basis for the X factor underlying cine, but practitioners and students of warfare have good morale, “was something that often decided known for more than 2,000 years that “. .not whether or not a man became a psychiatric numbers or strength bring victory in war; but which- casualty”.2(p116) ever army goes into battle stronger in soul, their Other psychiatrists came to similar conclusions enemies generally cannot withstand them”.6(p3) from their experiences with casualties. Weinstein Tolstoy, like Spiegel, used the term “an unknown for example described the typical “combat-induced quantity, x” to indicate “. .the spirit of the army, neurosis” case as “a frightened, lonely, helpless the greater or less desire to fight and face dangers person whose interpersonal relationships have be- on the part of all the men composing the army... come disrupted . He had lost the feeling that he .”7(p198) Morale, cohesion, and esprit de corps are the was part of a powerful group and had become terms that this century’s military have given to this instead a lonely and frightened person whose ef- unknown X, and it is these terms that provide the forts to protect himself were doomed to failure.”3(p307) frame of reference for this chapter. A special commission of civilian psychiatrists The first part of this chapter will lay out in some headed by Menninger pointed to the nature of pre- detail the ways in which influential authors, civil- cipitating incidents as confirmation of the critical ian and military, have used these terms, provide importance of “the soldier’s position in the constel- consensus definitions, and propose a set of rela- lation of his social group, the combat team”.4(p369) tionships among them. The next part of the chapter The actual event which finally overwhelmed the deals with the individual and organizational deter- psychiatric casualty’s defenses varied widely, but minants of morale, and the final part of the chapter the common denominator, according to the com- deal with methods of assessing morale in military mission, was not so much that they were the last units. Most of the examples and evidence are fo- straw in any quantitative way, but rather that they cused on land warfare, but the general principles 2 Military Families and Combat Readiness involved are applicable to sailors and airmen as colleagues of the, Army, Navy and Air Force, to well. Last, the chapter is predominantly descriptive deduce specific advice appropriate to their particu- rather than prescriptive. This is a consequence of lar situations from a comprehensive description of my faith in the ability of my military mental health general truths. KEY CONCEPTS The Meaning of Morale maintained that morale is the capacity of any group of people to pull together consistently for a com- The term morale is one which has appeared in an mon purpose. Lord Moran14(p95) described morale as ever-growing number of contexts, industrial, edu- “the ability to do a job under any circumstances to cational, and medical as well as military. Unfortu- the limit of one’s capacity.” He contrasted the sol- nately, the term seems to have sharply different dier with high morale, who does his duty without meanings in each of these contexts. In more recent the constant threat of punishment, to those of the applications it often seems to refer primarily to a Peninsular War, who did their job “because the fear person’s sense of well-being, happiness, job or life of flogging was greater than the fear of death.”14(p162) satisfaction. The U.S. Army, for example, provides Shibutani13 provided a picture of a military unit such a definition of morale in its Field Manual on with high morale in his study: Leadership: An organized group is characterized as having high Morale is defined as the mental, emotional, and morale when it performs consistently at a high level spiritual state of the individual. It is how he feels - of efficiency, when the tasks assigned to it are car- happy, hopeful, confident, appreciated, worthless, ried out promptly and effectively. In such units sad, unrecognized, or depressed.8(p228) each member is likely to contribute his share will- ingly doing what he believes to be worthwhile and 9 Bartone has argued, persuasively, that if morale assuming that his associates will do their part. When is just a synonym for happiness or mood, then it necessary, the men help one another without even probably serves no useful purpose. Earlier concep- being asked. Mutual encouragement is common- tions of morale, both military and industrial, in- place, and those whose zeal is exemplary are singled cluded an element of mood or emotional state, but out for praise. The few who do not share the prevail- tied it closely to a goal-oriented group. Munson, for ing orientation feel pressures to comply: those who example, organized the Morale Branch of the U.S. fail repeatedly to live up to expectations are scorned as “slackers,” and efforts may be made to expel Army General Staff during World War I, defining them from the group. The successful completion of morale as the “determination to succeed in the each transaction occasions no surprise; it is the purpose for which the individual is trained, or for expected thing. Members of such groups usually 10(p97) which the group exists.” In his classic study of place a high evaluation on themselves. They often the Second Scottish Rifles, Baynes devoted 16 pages develop a strong sense of identification with each to the definition of morale, which he called “the other; they develop pride in their unit, become con- most important single factor in war.”11(p1) He con- scious of its reputation, and take pleasure in dis- 15(p4) cluded with the following dictionary definition: playing emblems of belonging to it. A confident, resolute, willing, often self-sacrificing Motowidlo et al16 attempted to summarize defi- and courageous attitude of an individual to the func- nitions of both industrial psychologists and mili- tions or tasks demanded or expected of him by a group tary writers by arguing that most definitions in- of which he is a part that is based upon such factors as pride in the achievements and aims of the group, faith clude some aspects of satisfaction, motivation, and in its leadership and ultimate success, a sense of fruit- group membership. While the industrial model has ful participation in its work, and a devotion and certainly become relevant for peacetime garrison loyalty to the other members of the group.
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