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Applying Irregular Warfare Principles to Cyber Warfare

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Applying Irregular Warfare Principles to Cyber Warfare Soldier from 3/187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, out of Fort Campbell, Kentucky, sets up SATCOM to communicate further with key rear elements as part of search and attack mission in area of Narizah, Afghanistan, July 23, 2002 (U.S. Army/Todd M. Roy) Applying Irregular Warfare Principles to Cyber Warfare By Frank C. Sanchez, Weilun Lin, and Kent Korunka he cyberspace threat exists in a cyberspace and cyberspace threats that and can foresee, rapidly respond to, realm that does not conform to are initiated by faceless, borderless, and and counter cyberspace threats, the T the physical limits of land, sea, sometimes nationless enemies. These U.S. military’s strategy and approach to air, and space. Unlike these traditional enemies manifest in a domain neither cyberspace must adapt and incorporate domains, cyberspace fosters an unpre- confined nor governed by the tradi- unconventional approaches and hybrid dictable threat that can adjust, morph, tional norms and rules of war, which warfare into its operational capability. and reproduce without a national the broader military has no experience Despite its importance, the Nation’s identity or face.1 The challenge of the undertaking. To ensure the United leaders, strategists, and military planners military is to posture its approach to States maintains cyberspace dominance struggle to understand how cyberspace operations (CO) fit into national security as an instrument of national policy. A Commander Frank C. Sanchez, USN, is an Action Officer on the Joint Staff J32, Intelligence, significant shortcoming is due to the Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations. Major Weilun Lin, USAF, is Chief of the Central and leaders’ lack of experience and basic South Asia Branch, Joint Cyberspace Center, U.S. Central Command. Lieutenant Colonel Kent Korunka, USA, is a Joint Intelligence Planner, Joint Planning Support Element, Joint Enabling understanding of what cyberspace is and Capabilities Command, U.S. Transportation Command. what effects can be achieved in the cyber JFQ 92, 1st Quarter 2019 Sanchez, Lin, and Korunka 15 Table. Conventional, Cyber, and Irregular Warfare Conventional Cyber Irregular Gaining political, economic, ideological, social, and Assisting in gaining political, economic, Assisting in gaining political, economic, Purpose (why) religious dominance via geolocation dominance ideological, social, and religious dominance; ideological, social, and religious dominance; for a period of time gaining information for competitive advantage gaining information for competitive advantage Using overt operations and/or covert operations; Using overt operations and/or covert operations; Using covert operations; attribution through Strategy (how) showing might; little attribution issue attribution issue intelligence State and nonstate actors, adaptive adversaries Involvement Some people such as military or paramilitary Everyone who has a device connected to affected such as terrorists, insurgents, and criminal (who) personnel networks networks Mainly intangible items such as information or Humans; mainly tangible objects; directly Humans; mainly tangible objects; directly Targets (what) tangible items such as information systems; may affecting human life affecting human life indirectly affect human life in cyber physical cases Anywhere with respect to geolocation if Space (where) Limited geolocaion Global connected Ongoing, but one attack is usually within a short Duration (when) A limited period of time Very limited period of time period of time Preparation time Relatively long period of time Relatively short period of time Relatively short period of time (when) Cost (what) Expensive Relatively less expensive Relatively less expensive Characteristics Relatively more transparent Relatively opaque and in stealth mode Relatively opaque and in stealth mode (what) Attribution (what) Relatively easy to find out May be hard to find out Relatively difficult to find out Rules of engagement Relatively clear Not clear Not clear (what) Less severe if not life or death situation; Less severe if not life or death situation; Impression (what) Always severe or brutal; obvious sometimes not felt sometimes not felt Damage (what) Severe with physical casualty Severe with information loss Sometimes severe Direct impact Everyone/every business connected to affected Someone/some businesses Someone/some businesses upon (who) networks Impact based on Geolocation Connection Geolocation (where) Deterrence (what) Obvious and forceful Limited currently Subtle Dominance (what) Could be achieved Hard to achieve Hard to achieve Result/Gain Obvious May not be very clear May not be very clear (what) Winner (who) Clear to identify May be hard to decide May be hard to decide Time for Relatively long Relatively short Relatively short recovering (when) Source: Adapted from Jim Chen and Alan Dinerman, “On Cyber Dominance in Modern Warfare,” in Proceedings of the 15th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, ed. Robert Koch and Gabi Rodosek (Reading, UK: Academic Conferences and Publishing International Limited, 2016), 54. realm. Unlike the younger generation, special operations. The many similarities warfare and cyber warfare are similar and who are considered digital natives, the shared by IW and cyber warfare (CW) providing the critical framework for using majority of national and military leaders can establish a foundation to guide U.S. IW principles to approach, define, and and military planners are considered leaders in the execution of cyberspace op- integrate cyberspace operations across all digital immigrants. Popularized by Marc erations to maintain cyber superiority. domains and Services, U.S. leaders can Prensky, the phrase digital natives refers Early cyber power theorists generally begin to understand how cyber power to the generation who grew up using dig- recognized three key terms: cyberspace, can increase the effectiveness of the ital technology, and digital immigrants cyber power, and cyber strategy.3 As the cy- broader U.S. military cyber force. refer to the generation born before the berspace domain matures, cyber theorists advent of technology (circa the 1980s) and thinkers still have not reached the Irregular Warfare and Cyber but later adopted its use.2 While digital appropriate definitions of these key terms. Warfare Interlinked immigrants lack cyber knowledge, many An understanding of irregular warfare Special operations have a long, storied, of them understand irregular warfare fosters a rudimentary knowledge of cyber and varied history within the U.S. mil- (IW) and the value and importance of warfare. By highlighting how irregular itary, including, for example, Roger’s 16 Forum / Applying Irregular Warfare Principles to Cyber Warfare JFQ 92, 1st Quarter 2019 Rangers, the assault of Pont-du-hoc, criminal organizations, and small groups and IW. A key difference, low personal and Operation Eagle Claw. Colonel to operate in the cyberspace environment risk, is the greatest strength of cyber Joseph Celeski, USA (Ret.), noted that on a similar level as nation-states and warfare. Cyber attacks can be conducted the Joint Special Operations University transnational organizations. The anonym- from almost anywhere while still within Special Operations Forces (SOF)-Power ity and lack of attribution afforded actors the confines and relative safety of a Workshop concluded that special oper- in the cyberspace domain resemble the nation-state’s geographical boundaries. ations is “a multi- and cross-domain covert or clandestine aspects of SOF. The low personal risk of CW lies in stark force, capable of conducting or sup- The cyber domain threatens regional contrast to the high personal risk assumed porting conventional or unconventional and national security in ways that are un- by SOF personnel conducting missions operations on various levels leading common in the other traditional domains in highly contested environments or deep to or supporting military and political of land, sea, air, and space.11 As a result, behind enemy lines. The low personal outcomes.”4 Members of the workshop bad actors in cyberspace range from in- risk of CW is further supported by the listed the following characteristics of the dividual hackers and criminal enterprises ease of entry into cyberspace and the lack SOF operational environment: to violent extremist organizations and of attribution so long as appropriate steps nation-states. Bad actors steal information are taken to conceal identities. A complex operating environment • for personal or national gain for reasons Many core activities of special opera- marked by instability and ambigu- that include profit, intelligence, denial of tions seamlessly fold into the context of ity; acts of violence, influence, and services, or to inflict damage on critical cyberspace missions. Offensive cyberspace leverage are conducted in a nonlinear infrastructure. Within the traditional do- operations are similar to the intent of spe- and often indirect way and include mains, these types of actions are relatively cial operation’s direct action, countering low-level operations of subtlety and recognizable and easier to classify as acts weapons of mass destruction, military in- guile.5 of war, but in cyberspace the underlying formation support operations, and special A high-risk, highly sensitive environ- • intent and attribution of a cyber attack reconnaissance missions. Likewise, the ment, in which there is high personal are difficult to discern. intent of special operation’s
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