THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS IN KOREAN AND CONGO CRISES

ABSTRACT THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF potior ai pjttlosnplrrjr IN

By FASIH RAGHIB GAUHAR

Under the Supervision of Prof. B. Rahamathulla

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH (INDIA) 1999 1

ABSTRACT

The beginning of 195ns witnessed an era whereby both the United states and United Nations deeply involved in promotion of international peace and security as an agenda of post-Cold war besides ensuring to expedite the process of decolonization and thus big or small nations to have equal rights

in international affairs with a particular emphasis

on the right of self-determination and assertion of newly independent nations. The task, however , had been difficult yet, the United States and United

Nations authorities resolutely carried out the set

objectives to a successful conclusion by venturing

into two major intractable cases like the Korean

and Congo crises in 1950s and 1960s. The two

crises have taken as a test case in the thesis to

arrive at exact and accurate results as wai

anticipated *by the United States and United

Nations.

The clash of interests of the United 2

States and former Soviet Union was over the US controlled South-Korea and Soviet Union controlled

North-Korea indicating infact the ideological warfare which ultimately resulted on June 25,1950.

The Congo case was more complex as it got formal

independence on June 30,1960 but the political

control was still in the hands of Belgians. The

United States under the aegis of United Nations

could able to defuse tensions both in Korean

peninsula and Congo and eventually restored the

confidence of member states in the Charter of the

United Nations.

With the post world war II division between the communist bloe and the West, the United States quickly emerged in the security Council as a leader of the democratic nations in the UN and Fought the diplomatic battle to promote the right of self-determination of every nation and determined to stop the communism by every means not only in Europe but in Asia and Africa well. A large majority of the 3

US public was in favour of the general support to the

United Nations for achieving these goals. The former

Senator Barry Goldwater eloquently once expressed the

Americans willingness to support the functioning of

the United Nations in these words : "The United

Nations —is at best an instrument of international

accord. It is useful to the West now for a special

reason; it provides a forum in which to discuss

communist violation of the Charter."

Controversies arising in the Cold War

situation had been dominated by direct and serious

conflict between the major communist and non

communist powers because the interest of the United

States had been adversely affected by such disputes.

The United States was compelled to move to the United

Nations. Wherever feasible to maximize support for

its own strategy and to confound the communist enemy.

But because of the intense hostility and massive 4 power involved, it became difficult for the United

States to mobilise strong support for its position in

these cases within the United Nations. Despite the

difficulties, the United States and its allies

considered advantageous to use the United Nations as

a major instrument for dealing with some of the most

dangerous Cold Mar conflicts . The study is concerned

with two major cases of international crises in

Korean and Congo. During the intense Cold war period

of first two decades of the formation of the United

Nations the Korean crisis (1950-53) and Congo crisis

(1960-64) lingered for very long duration. Congo was

the largest military operation which the UN had been

involved, not only the largest militury operation,

but the largest financial operation as well. The UN

maintained a force of some 2 0,000 (ONUC) at the cost

of over $ 1000,000,000 a year. The budget for

maintaining the UN forces in the Congo had been greater than the total normal budget of the UN prior to that activities. In the operation in Korea, it was involved with a larger number of forces. But it was somewhat questionable whether it could be called a UN operation. The UN had delegated authority in the

Korean matter to the United States and the forces were in large measure from the United States forces and the forces from the South Korea. Infact the

United Nations came nearest to establishing a fighting force. It did create a United Nations

Command and requested members to make forces available to it. But this was a mere an extension of existing command of the United States in ^ar Eastern military operation under the command of General Mac

Arthur. The action taken by the Arthur and his forces was in fact United Nations action and of course

justified norms of international law.

The Secretariate of the UN had no part in operation or even deployment of troops. By the end of 1950, the only foreign ground troops fighting by the

American side were from the United Kingdom,

Australia, France, Greece, Turkey, the Netherland, the philipines, Thailand and Turkey . The Unified

Command in Korea consisted of about a quarter of million American compared with only about 36/000 troops from all other Member States combined.

Korean crisis had got special significance as

it had extended the dimension of the moral authority

of the General Assembly. The General Assembly became

a definite alternative to the Security Council for the

first time in Korean crisis. The United States was

successful in shifting the discussion from the

Security Council to the General Assembly which was

dominated by Anglo-American majority in 1950s and

60s. It was noticiable through Uniting for Peace

Resolution of 1950 which demonstrated for the

empowerment of General Assembly as the generation of 7

international peace and security in case the consensus fail in the security Control. The Security

Council had been unable to act owing to acute differences among its permanent members. The Assembly was able to play a complementary role by endorsing the resolution of the Security Council . The lesson learnt from the Korean experienced proved fruitful in resolving the Congo crisis. When the then secretary

General proceeded to recruit forces he emphasised the need that the conditions for the forces to be sent

should be that they should include no forces from any

of the great powers. It was realised that to have a

genuine UN forces it ought to be recruited from a

good many of the smaller countries or from countries

at least which were not the major protogonists in the

Cold war. It was also recognized that it would be

desirable to have a large number of forces from Africa

and this was one of the provisions made in the

recruitment of froces. At the same time it was also 8

provided that there should be some troops from outside Africa, so that it could be regarded, as

United Nations universal operation . This shows a tremendous influence in strengthening the UN against the opinion of one protogonist or other in the Cold

War, could be exercised by the uncommitted states.

The uncommitted-tatesconsisted a large proportion of the members of the General Assembly and it appeared that these states had expressed their solidarty with the UN mission in Korea as they felt that United

Nations also could protect their interests in the

World.

US officials, who frequently

offered technical, military and political advice, as

did the officials of other interested states. The

United States acted as a balance wheel between the

sometimes irreconcilable positions of the militant

Afro-Asian leaders and more conservative European 9 Spokesmen. Tt was precisely this mediating role that drew criticism from both sides. Nevertheless, the

United States and the United Nations established the credibility of ensuring peace and security whenever and wherever threatened. Both Korean and Congo crises gave a new impetus to the American policy makers in the Ptate Department that the United

States had responsibility towards the world community to promote the rights of self-determination and self-assertion either be in political/ social, cultural or economic spheres of any nation in any parts of the world. THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS IN KOREAN AND CONGO CRISES

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF Matter erf pifilostffrlty IN political J^tience

By FASIH RAGHIB GAUHAR

Under the Supervision of Prof. B. Rahamathulla

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH (INDIA) 1999 Q§&!5 3£C.,o*

) 7 JWL zOQQ

T5305 CONTENTS Page No. CERTIFICATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS i - i i i PREFACE iv-vii CHAPTER-I AMERICAN-KOREAN RELATIONS: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND •„. 1-39 The Early Relationship 2 The Liberation and Allied Occupation of 2fi Korea Relations nuring the Crisis 31 CHAPTER-II UNITED NATIONS IN KOREAN WAR 40-60 Rackground of the Crisis 40 United Nations Involvement 51

CHAPTER-III UNITED STATES' PEACE STRATEGY IN 61-112 KOREAN PENINSULA United States Initial Response £4- Use of UN for collective Action 68 Objections on the Action 85 Justification of the Action 98

CHAPTER-IV CRISIS IN CONGO 113-138 Relgian Domination 113 Declaration of Independence 12 6 CHAPTER-V UNITED NATIONS ROLE IN CONGO CRISIS 139-169 Super Powers'Unanimity 139 Breakdown of Understanding 152 The United Nations' Force in Action 159

CHAPTER-VI UNITED STATES' RESPONSES TO THE 170-2 01 CONGO CRISIS American Association with Belgian Congo and Process of Decolonization 170 Formulation of US Policy 179 United States in the United Nations 190 CHAPTER-VII CONCLUSION 2 02-22 0 Management of Korean Realities 208 American Experience in Congo 215 APPENDICES 216-283 RIBLIOGRAPHY 284-300 DEPARTMENT OF POUTICA. SCICENCE Trof. 'B. %ahamathulia ALIGARH M JSLIW UNIVERSE AUGARH-202 002 INDIA M A (Eco ) M A . (Poi Sc ). V Phil Ph D

CA.> 00-' 5~'-A"?-~-~ Hate: May 1, 19Q9

CFRTIFICATE

This is to certify that Mr. Fasih Raghib

Gauhar is a bonafide research scholar in the

Department of Political Science, Pligarh Muslin

University, Aligarh. Mr.lauhar has pursued

research on the topic entitled : The United

States and United Nations in Korean and Congo

Crises under my supervision and guidance, "is

work is indeed original and in my openion is

suitable for submission for the award of Ph.n.

degree. i

ACKNQWLKDGEMFNT.S

nuring the course of my research a number of academics and scholars of political science and

International Relations inspired, assisted and directed me to locate the source materials at the research centres and the libraries of the New Delhi and Hyderabad. Of all, I owe a great debt of gratitude to my supervisor prof.*.Rahamathulla for constantly encouraging and supervising my thesis.

Without his guidance, it would not have been possible to complete the stupendious task of writing this analytical thesis.

I'm equally grateful to my teachers Prof.

H.A.P.Jafri, currently Pro-Vice Chancellor, Aligarh

Muslim University, Aligarh, Prof. M.A.Kishore,

Chairman, Department of Political Science, Prof.T.A.

Nizami, Prof. Murtaza Ali Khan, Dr.A.P.Vijapur, Dr.

Aarif Hamid and Dr. Asmer Beg whose assistance and support helped me a great deal in incorporating the needed materials. ii

I'm highly indebted to my parents nr. Syed

Abdul Mannan and Ms.Atia Rano who gave me the

financial and moral support at the every stage of my

research and encouraged while I was depressed in the prolong period of never ending research. My brother

S.M. Afaque Jauhar, elder sister Ambarin brother in

law Farrukh Alam Firdausi, and younger sister Samrin

all too joined with my parents to boost my morale.

My friends Md.Mohibul Haque, Khurram Zaidi, Shadan

Zeb Khan, Shafiuzzaman Aazmi, Naushad Aatir, Md.

Fahimuddin, Md.Firoze Alam, Aftab Alam, Iffat

Bano, Rachna Kaushal, Ahmad Iqbal, Fhtesham, and

S.M.N. Aarif Kirmani deserve my special thanks and

admirations for the constant advice to resolve the

intricate issues of project.

I would like to record my thanks and

apreciation to the staff of Maulana Azad Library,

Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, .American

Centre, United Nations Information Centre, Indian

Council of Social Science Research, Indian Council iii

of World Affairs, Indian Society of International

Law, Nehru Museum Library, Parliament Library,

Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, Ratan

Tata Library, National Documentation Centre and

Jawahar Lai Nehru University, Library, New Delhi for their help and cooperation while I was tracing out the materials in the respective libraries.

I gratefullyacknowledge the services rendered by the staff of American Studies Research Centre,

Hyderabad during my stay in the centre. Finally/ I would like to express my thanks to Mr.Mohd. Asif for typing the manuscripts in time.

Place : Aligarh

Dated : May 1,1999 (Fasih Raghib Gauhar) i v

PREFACE

The hpcjinning of 1950s witnessed an era whereby both the United States and United Nations deeply involved in promotion of international peace and security as an agenda of post-cold war besides ensuring to expedite the process of decolonization and thus big or small nations to have equal rights in international affairs with a particular emphasis on the right of self-determination and assertion of newly independent nations. The task, however , had been difficult yet, the United States and United

Nations authorities resolutely carried out the set objectives to a successful conclusion by venturing into two major intractable cases like the Korean and Congo crises in 1950s and 1960s. The two crises have taken as a test case in the thesis to arrive at exact and accurate results as was anticipated by the United States and United

Nations.

The clash of interests of the United

States and former Soviet Union was over the US controlled South-Korea and Soviet Union controlled

North-Korea indicating infact the ideological warfare which ultimately resulted on June 2 5,1950.

The Congo case was more complex as it got formal independence on June 30,1960 but the political control was still in the hands of Belgians. The

United States under the aegis of United Nations could able to defuse tensions both in Korean peninsula and Congo and eventually restored the confidence of member states in the Charter of the

United Nations.

Seven chapters, four appendices, select bibliography and analytical methodology constitute as an important segment of the thesis. Chapter I deals with the historical background of the

US-Korean relations. The official diplomatic and commercial relations have been traced back to the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce on May

22, 1882. Initially, American government shoved only a causal interest in Korea. The United States, however, became increasingly involved in the affairs of the Korea following the termination of world war vi

T. The United states and its allies fought the

North Korean and Chinese communists and preserved

the Republic of Korea.

Chapter II examines the role of the United

Nations in acordance with the provisions of the

Charter with referenceto collective, security.

Chapter III highlights the United States

strategy during the Korean crisis. Strategies kept

changing and finally USA decided to intervene

militarily to prevent communists takeover of

peninsula and administration reversed early policy

decisions that accorded low priority to Korea in

its defence calculations.

Chapter IV analyses the historical

background of the .Co-n-v3 crisis including the

Belgian colonialism and the factors leading to

independence.

Chapter V attempts to explain the involvement of United States in 'Ory^5 crisis, which vii

ultimately resulted in granting independence to

Congo. The role of super-powers during the crisis are adequately dealt.

In Chapter VI the position of the United

States taken in the United Nations are fully discussed and the circumstances concerning the post independence turmoil and the role of Eisenhower administration are presented. The kennedy administration and its anti-colonial bent is further assessed.

Chapter VII draws the conclusion of the thesis which adequately focussed the joint roles of the United States and United Nations in preservation of international peace and security not only for the

Korean and Congo people but for the entire humanity as well. "Our American Policy is a policy of friendly partnership with all peaceful nations and of full support for the Dnited Nations Organization. It is a policy that has the strong backing of the American people.. It is a policy around which we can rally without fear or misgiving".

President Harry S.Trueman Navy Day Address (October 2 7, 1945) CHAPTER-! AMERICAN-KOREAN RELATIONS:

A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

official diplomatic and commercial relations between America and Korea began with the signing of the Treaty of Amity and commerce in spring of 1882.

1. The treaty was signed at Inch on 22 May, 1882. The US Senate advice and consent to ratification with an understanding, came on 9 January, 1883. It was ratified by the President of the United States, with an understanding, 13 February, 1883. The US "understanding" reads as follows. "It is the understanding of the Senate in agreeing to foregoing resolution, that the clause, Nor are they permitted to transport nature produce from one open port to another open port in Article VI of said treaty, is not intended to prohibit and does not prohibited American ships from going from one open port to another open port in Korea to receive Korean cargo for exportation, or to discharge foreign cargo".

The treaty was ratified by Korea on 18 May, 18R3 and the ratifications were exchanged at Seoul 19 May 1883. Tt entered into force the same day. it was proclaimed by the President of the United States 4 June, 1883. The treaty was terminated on 2 9 August, 1910, the date of the Japanese annexation of Korea.

See, Spencer , J.Palmer, Korean-American Relations; Documents pertaining to the Far- Eastern Diplomacy of the United States, Vol. (Rerkelay and los Angels, 1963) p.l. 2

However, the hard-won diplomatic and commercial relationship between the two countries was abruptly terminated in November 1905. Korea quickly became a forgotten nation sc far as the vast majority of

Americans were concerned, and its cry for help was ignored by the American government for nearly a half century. Ironically, the United States fouyht a costly war to free the Korean people from

Japanese colonial rule, and restored new relations with the people of Korea.

The Early Relationship

As early as 1834, Edmund Roberts who visited

Japan in 1832 to open trade was convinced that the relationship between Korea and the United States would be established soon or later. Efforts made by the American government to open relations brought about a more or less satisfactory result in 1854, but Korea remained the "hermit kingdom". Meanwhile,

Congressman Zedoc Pratt introduced, and the House adopted a resolution on February 15, 1845 calling 3

for the extension of American commerce to the Far

East because it was important "to the general interests of the United States" to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with Korea and

Japan.

Although a treaty was signed with Japan

March 1854, opening two Japanese ports for American ships in distress, no overtures were made to Korea at that time to open the "hermit kingdom" . It was not until Secretary of State William H.Seward, who was convinced that "the Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and the vast region beyond (would) become the chief theater of events in the world's great hereafter", took the initiative to open Korea in 1867 in cooperation with France following the occurance of the case of the General Sherman in the summer of 1866.

While a bloody anti-Christian persecution was in progress, the persecution which caused the death of nine French Catholic priests and several 4

thousand Korean converts in 1866, an American merchant ship named the General Sherman, sailed up the Taedong River toward Pyongyang in defiance of

Korean officials, and grounded near Yanggak Island.

Ostensively it came to trade, but the Koreans were suspicious that the real objective of the trip was to rob the tombs of their ancient kings. Moreover, the General Sherman' crew (mainly Malays and

Chinese) probably provoked the local inhabitants.

In any case, the Korean inhabitants attacked the ship, burned her, and massacred her crew. The dispatch of a point force of Americans and French to Korea was contemplated by Secretary Seward.

No joint expedition of American and French forces was sent to Korea, but Secretary Seward's nephew George F.Seward, who was U.S. Consul at

Shanghai, was instructed to proceed to Korea to secure a treaty in 1867. Secretary Seward wrote to his nephew stating that his mission was to be a friendly one, "reserving the question of force, if 5

found necessary, for ultimate consideration".

"You will however give notice to the Korean government," Secretary Seward instructed, "if you find it expedient, that this government cannot condone the outrage committed in the case of the

General Sherman to remain indefinitely without receiving proper guaranty of adequate and ample

2 redress.

Seward' expedition to Korea was not undertaken when it became clear that it was not likely to be a successful mission. The case of the

General Sherman, however, had to be settled. As a result, in 1868 Secretary Seward launched a diplomatic move while preparing to dispatch an

American search party to Korea. At the same time, he sought Japanese assistance in settling the case of the General Sherman and establishing proper

2. Quoted in Dennett, Tyler, Americans in Eastern Asia, (New York: Barnes and Noble. 1963),p.420. 6

3 diplomatic and commercial relations with Korea •

When the Japanese were unable to achieve their

objectives in Korea, the United States decided to

settle the Korean question alone, and instructed

its minister to China, Frederick F.Low and Admiral

John Rogers to undertake the mission.

The American expeditionary force consistiny

of five warships proceeded to Korea in May 1871,

and in the words of the New York herald Tribune

"Our Little War with the Heathen" began. The

American expedition, like that of the French in

1866, failed to achieve its objectives and withdrew

from Korean waters in July after demolishing Korean

forts on and around the island of Kanghwa and the

3. US,House Executive Documents, 28th Congress, 2nd Session., no.138, "Extensions of American Commerce-Proposed Mission to Japan and Korea" (Washington, 1845) as quoted in M.Fedrick Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia (New York, 1967), P.111. On 17 April 1878, Senator Aaron A.Sargent of California purposed sending a US mission to Korea to initiate diplomatic relations.The resolution never reached the main floor of the senate. See Chong Yong-Suk, Muguk is fachan chongch'ack, (American Policy towards Korea, 1845-1980.(Seoul, Chogak,1981). pp.33-35. 7

Han River . The American expeditionary force, while accomplishing nothing positive, led the Korean government to adopt an official anti-Western policy in 1871.

Following the conclusion of the Korean-

Japanese treaty in 1876, American interest in the opening of Korea revived. As a result, in 1878,

Secretary of State William M.Everts and Secretary of the Navy R.W.Thompson instructed Commodore

Robert W.Shufeldt, who had been sent to Korea in

1866-67 to investigate the General Sherman affair, to make efforts to open Korea by peaceful means. He was assured that "a moderate and conciliatory course toward (Korea) would result in opening the ports of that country to American commerce" with the help of the Japanese.

4. For details, see "Our Little War with the Nahm, American Heritage, XIX, 3 (April, 1968),pp. 18-2 3, 72-75. R

The efforts made by the Japanese, however, brought about no satisfctory results for the

Americans. The timely incitation extended to

Commodore Shufeldt by Li Hung-chang, one of the most prominent officials of the Peking government, prepared the way for the establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations between the

United States and Korea on May 22 , 1882 .

Ironically, Secretary of State James G. Blaine had said in his instruction to Shufeldt dated November

14, 1881, that the United States had "no political or commercial interest" in Korea,but he hoped that

"the advantages resulting from the growing and friendly relations between (China, Japan) and the

United States will have attracted the attention and awakened the interest of the Korean government". Be that as it may, the Korean government signed the first diplomatic and commercial treaty with a

Western nation, a treaty which professor Tyler

Dennett pointed out to have "set Korea adrift on an ocean of intrigue which it was quite helpless to 9

control."

Cordial relations between the United States and Korea were cultivated despite the reluctance and disinterest displayed by the State Department.

The first American Minister to Korea, General

Lucius H.Foote, the Naval Attache, Ensign George C.

Foulke, Dr. Horace N. Allen, a Presbyterian medical missionary, and otehrs who arrived in Korea shortly after the signing of the 1882 treaty contributed much to the growth of friendly attitudes on the part of the Korean government toward the United

States. The first Korean diplomatic mission was dispatched to the United States in September 1883, and a Korean diplomatic office was established in

Washington in 1887 despite strong Chinese objections.

In a sense, the relationship between the two countries may be viewed as a one-sided affair of

Korea for the United States, the reluctant partner.

5. Dennett, n. 2 pp. 461-462. in

By and large, the Korean leaders displayed their romantic view in American-Korean relations. Many official and unofficial writings of American diplomatic personnel to Korea offer certain clues for us to detect Korean attitudes toward the United

States. On the whole, Korea expected much more from the United States than the latter was willing or able to offer, resulting in extreme disappointment, disillusionment, or even anger on the part of the

Korean government.

Some Koreans viewed the Shufeldt treaty as a wedge to free Korea from Chinese domination. and when General Foote arrived in Korea in May 1883 as the fifth American minister to Korea, the Korean

6. McCune, George M.and John A. Harrison, ed. ,

Korean-American Relations: Documents Pertaining

to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United

States. Vol. I: The Initial Period, 1883-1886,

(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University

ofCalifornia Press, 1951) p.3. 11

7 king "danced with joy, " for he along with others regarded the United States as the "symbol of a beneficient power that would indisputably guarantee the integrity of the Korean nation". Believing that the United States was a friendly and beneficient power capable of protecting Korea's independence, the Korean king took positive steps to promote close ties with the United States: he promoted confidential relationship with American ministers, he sought American drill masters for his army, he employed American teachers for the school for the o children of the nobility , he employed Americans in

7. Foulk to Secretary of the Navy, enclosure to No.

12 8, Foots to Frelynghysen, December 17,184.

8. They wre Reverends Dr.H.Bunker. Homer B.Hulbert,

and George W.Gilmore. 12

very important government positions, he made special grants to American-sponsored educational institutions, and he stood firm on his decision to establish diplomatic offices in the

United States despite the strong Chinese opposition.

On the other hand, the American government

showed only casual interest in Korea at best, despite the fact that Minister Foote felt that tHe influence of the United States should become a permanent factor in the progress of Korea. Neither the U.S. government, nor the American people knew much, or cared to know about Korea, her culture, history and people. Even the usual colleye graduate

9. Among them were: Drs. William B.Scranton, John W.Heron, Horace N.Allen, horace, G.Underwood, and Henry G. Appenzeller, a nurse Annie Ellers, H.F.Merrill, O.N. Denny, William M.Dye, and William F.Sands. General Charles W.LeGendre and Clarence R.Greathouse were employed as foreign affairs advisers. 13

knew more about the moon than he did about Korea.

Meanwhile, the casual interests of the Americans in

Korea turned into indifference. Occasionally, some

Americans reacted intensely and emotionally to developments in Korea, with sudden fluctuation of feelings ranging from sympathy to contempt.

The Korean policy of the United States was to maintain a position of impartial neutrality towards the international disputes evolving around the peninsula kingdom and its neighbouring countries while securing special rights and privileges for the

Americans in Korea. In reality, the role of the

United States was "little more than a sympathetic and detached on-looker". All American representatives in Korea were opposed to Chinese domination over Korea, while some of them showed their preference of the Japanese over the Chinese, nearly all of them were mainly concerned with the securing of special concessions for American missionaries and businessmen in Korea. Some, like

Minister John M. B.Sill, misread the intentions of ] 4

the Japanese and Russians, while others, like Durham

White Stevens, actively promoted Japanese interests and domination in Korea. Some, such as Drs. Allen and Underwood, say the steadily growing Japense influence and domination in Korea, and made attempts to strengthen the cause of the Korean nationalistic reformers Dr.Allen, who went to Korea as a medical missionary, and later became in 1890 Secretary of the American Legation, and then the U.S. Minister to

Korea in 1897, wrote in 1899 that "Japanese have become aggressive here until they now seem to regard

Korea as their own peculiar sphere of action and all others to be more interlopers." Meanwhile, he endeavored industriously to secure electric, pearl and timber concessions for American firms, and made successful efforts to secure gold mine and railroad concessions for an American promoter Janes R.Morse.

10. Quoted in Harrington, Fred H., God Mammon and the Japanese. (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1944)p.302. 15

Korea received little political assistance from the United States. The United States maintained

its strict neutrality in the Sino-Japanese War of

1894-9?, and in 1899 when the Korean emperor asked

the American Minister Allen to solicit his government's aid to establish Korea's political

neutrality to protect its independence, President

McKinley refused to act.When the Russo-Japanese War came in 1904 over the Korean and Manchurian issues, the United States, not only refused to help Korea,

but actually approved the Japanese actions in Korea.

Korea became a Japanese protectorate in November

1905.

Neither Minister Allen, nor William Sands,

an American adviser to the Korean emperor, had any

love for the Korean emperor or the Koreans. Sands

saw the Korean emperor as "confused politically, weak in personality", and was obsessed by his

"life-long and well-grounded fear of personal lfi

violence." Korea was "so corrupt, and the country is in such a state of misrule and disrule", wrote

Minister Allen, "that it seems necessary at times to speak of practices while will, if unchecked, become beyond control to the severe detriment of interests 12 purely American." Allen even complained that "The

Koreans have the idea that we don't count any ,,13 more. '

While the Americans in Korea were expressing negative and unfavourable views about the Korean government and the state of the Kingdom, policy makers in the United States showed their preference for Japanese control in Korea over either that of

Russia, or "a state of misrule and disrule" under the Koreans themselves. As early as 1900, president

11. Sands, William, F., "Korea and the Korean

Emperor", Century LXIX (1905), p. 581; Sands,

William F., Undiplomatic Memoires. (New York:

Whittlesey House, 1930), pp. 54-56.

12. Quoted in Harrington, n. ]0 ., p. 308.

13. Ibid., p. 309. 17

Theodore Roosevelt favoured Japanese control over Korea. He wrote to a German friend of his, Speck von Sternburg, that he would "like to see Japan have Korea", because Japan deserved it in order to check Russia.14 When, in 1903 Minister Allen expressed his view that the United States should help Russia against Japan, William W. Rock-hill, the author of

American "Open Door" policy in China, told Allen that the Japanese should not only be supported, but also should be allowed to swallow Korea and should be

helped to check the Tsarist drive to get

Manchuria.15 Rockhill, who was director of the

International Bureau of American Republics, was

regarded as the Far Eastern expert of the State

Department. Roosevelt called him "the author of and

sponsor of our Asiatic policy." Soon after the

outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Roosevelt told

14. Beale, Howard K., Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power.(Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966) p. 314.

15. Quoted in Harrington, n.. 10 . ,p.314. 16. Ibid. lfi

Sternburg to inform the Kaiser that the United 17 States was willing to see japan take Korea.

Shortly before the Japanese launched a war against the Russian empire, the Japanese minister to the United States communicated Japan's wish to provide "protection, supervision, and guidance" to 1 o

Korea.The American president fully concurred.

Roosevelt justified the American policy on the ground that the United States "cannot possibly

interfere for the Koreans against Japan when the

Koreans could not strike on blow in their own

17. Beale, n- 14 ., p. 314.

18. See Japanese foreign Minister Komura's

instruction to Minister Takahira in Washington,

January 22, 1905, and a record of Takahira's

conversation with Roosevelt on January 2 4,

1905, in Japan. Gaimusho„ Nihon gaiko bunsho

(hereafter cited as NGB), XXXVII, Part I,

216-217. 19

defence."

Witnessing the gathering war clouds over

Korea, and being uninformed of American attitudes toward Korea, the Korean emperor sought American assistance in maintaining the independence of

Korea.AlTen wrote: "the Emperor always turns to me and the more they (Japan and Russia) scare him the more eager he is to turn everything over to the

2 0 Americans." But, Allen was powerless to help him, for his voice meant nothing to the policy-makers in

Washington.

In February 1904, the Russo-Japanese War broke out, and when the Japanese carried out their military occupation of Korea, neither Great Britain

19. Dennett, Tyler, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War. (Gloucester, Mass., peter Smith, 1925) p.110 See also Komura to Takahira, January 8, in NGB, XXXVII, Supplement on the Russo-Japanese War.

V, 203-204, 206-207.

2 0. Quoted in Harrington, it. 10 ., p.309; Sands, n. 11 p. 48. 20

which had concluded an alliance with Japan in 1902), nor the United States lodged any protest against such a gross violation of international law. What was more, in July, Secretary of War William Howard Taft negotiated with the Japanese in Tokyo a secret agreement which sealed the fate of Korea. In Tokyo,

Taft talked with Prime Minister Katsura Taro of

Japan and exchanged views, and in a secret "agreed memorandum" the United States approved Japan's suzerainty over Korea in return for Japanese disavowal of any aggressive intentions toward the

Philippines.2 1 . Roosevelt approved the action taken

22 by Taft. It was a typical diplomatic quid pro quo

21. The secret agreement was concluded without the

knowledge of Lloyd C, Griscom, American Minister

to Japan. For text of the agreement, see

Dennett, Roosevelt, pp.112-114; NGB, XXXVIII,

part I, 450-451.

22. Roosevelt wired Taft on July 31, and said: "Your conversation with Count Katsura absolutely correct in every respect. Wish you would state to Katsura and I confirm every word you have said". Beale, n. 14- , p. 157. 21

arrangement between two imperialist powers, a

Japanese Korea for an American Philippines.

Ironically, the United States had to fight a costly war to free Korea, as well as the Philippines from the Japanese who had taken it over in the early stage of World War II.

As Korea encountered critical problems in the midst of the Russo-Japanese War, the United States showed no intention of becoming her guardian. "Our interests (in Korea were, "said Secretary of State

John Hay to the Korean envoy in 1905, "rather commercial than political" when the Korean envoy

sought American aid to protect Korea's sovereign rights and independence.2 3 A similar statement was made by William W. Rockhill, who had been charge d'affaire in Korea, in his letter to Minister

Allen. "I cannot see any possibility of this government using its influence 'to bolster up the

Empire of Korea in its independence,"

2 3. Rockhill to Allen, February 2 0, 1904, Quoted in Harrington, n. 10., p.324. 22

"I fancy that the Japanese will settle this question when the present war is finished. The annexation of

Korea to Japan seems to be absolutely indicated as the one great and final step westward of the extension of the Japanese Empire. I think when this comes about it will be better for the Korean people

2 4 and also for the peace in the Far East."

The policy makers in Washington knew that it was the Japanese intention to establish a protectorateship of Japan over Korea, and eventually to annexure. Early in November 1905 Katsura informed

Roosevelt through Takahira Kogoro in Washington in strict confidence that Japan planned to take charge of Korea's external affairs, and received American

2 5 approval . This was not necessary, for Roosevelt had not only realized that such a step would be taken by the Japanese earlier, but also encouraged the Japanese to do so. During the peace negotiations at Portsmouth, Roosevelt said to Baron Kaneko

Kentaro, one of his close friends and a member of

24. Ibid.,

2 5. Katsura to Takahira, November 6,1905, NGB, XXXVII, Part I, 52 9. 23

the Japanese delegation, "sooner or later it will be better for Japan to take-over Korea. I rather think that Japan should take-over Korea for the sake of 2 6 the Koreans and for Asia. Not now, but soon." "I was pro- Japanese before," wrote Roosevelt to Rock- hill in August 1905, "but after my experience with the peace commissioners I am far stronger pro-Japanese than before."2 7

2 6. Unpublished secret memoirs of Kaneko Kentaro: "My Activities in the United States Related to the Japanese-Russian Peace Negotiations." Japan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Research Division. First Section.January 1934. Special Edition, No.5. The Japanese title of Kaneko's memoir is: Nichi-Ro kowa ni kanshi Beikoku ni koeru yo no katsudo ni tsuite. Roosevelt believed that "Japanese suzerainty in Korea would...be best for the Koreans as well as Japanese." Esthus, Raymond A., Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, (Seattle: university of Washington Press, 1967 )pp. 110-111.

2 7. Roosevelt to Rockhill, August 2 9, 1905, quoted in Griswold, A. Whitney, The Far-Eastern Policy of the United States. (New Haven, and London: Yale University Press, 1938) p.120. 2 4

With the signing of the Treaty of Protection dated November 17, 1905, Japan forced Korea to accept its guardianship. The United States was the first Western power to withdraw their legation from

Korea. Korea mourned along. Following the establishment of the Residency-General of Japan in

Korea, the Japanese step by step took away the

sovereign rights of the Korean monarch as they

tightened their grip, and they reduced the Korean

emperor to a protesting but powerless figurehead.

The unhappy Korean emperor made fruitless

efforts to protect his sovereign rights and the

independence of his empire. In October 1905 when the

intentions of the Japanese had been clearly shown,

the Korean emperor sent Dr. Homer B.Hulbert to

Washington to seek American help. But he was unable

to see Roosevelt who "completely ignored the appeal"

of the Korean emperor. In December Min Young-ch'an,

a special envoy of the Korean emperor, arrived in

Washington to make a plea for American support in 26

The Liberation and Allied Occupation of Korea

In constrast to the period between 1910 and

1945, during which the United States paid scant attention to the difficult situation of the Korean people under Japanese colonial control, the United

States became increasingly involved in the affairs of the Korea following the termination of World VJar

II. The decision made by the Allied Powers at Cairo,

Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam between 1943 and 194 5, thrust the United States into a dominant role in Far

East affairs. The development and application of

American foreign policy for Asia fundamentally changed by the antecedents, the circumstances, and the results of World War II.As for American policy towards Korea, the United States which had been either unable or unwilling to render assistance to the Korean Rationalists who were fighting at hone and abroad for Korea's freedom and independence, at last officially declared in the Cairo Declaration of

December 1, 1943, which was cosigned by Great 27

Britain and the Republic of China, that it was

"mindful of the enslavement of the Korean people" by the Japanese and it was "determined that in due 29 course Korea shall become free and independent."

Certainly, the Koreans viewed the United

States in August 1945 as their friend and liberator,

and the regenerator of their hopes and aspirations.

However, they were destined to drink bitter cups

once again. Their friend and liberator came as

conqueror, their "libberated" land became

partitioned and occupied by foreign troops, and the

southern half of Korea was put under an alien

military rule again. They narrowly escaped the

five-year trusteeship of the Allied Powers, but they

witnessed the growth of the Cold War in Korea and

the emergence of two states in their land, each

claiming legitimacy and jurisdiction over the entire

29. For a full text of the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, See U.S.Department of State, In Quest of Peace and Securi ty: Selected Documents on American Foreign Policy, 1941-1951.

(Washington: 1951,) p.10. 28

peninsulai . 30

The partition of Korea brought about many tragic consequences, including the Korean War and subsequent problems related to the relaxation of tension of the peninsula and the growth of autocratic rule associated with the national

security question. Well documented studies showed

that it was the opinion of President Roosevelt that

the liberated Asian colonial people would not be

ready to enjoy their freedom and national

independence at the end of World War II.

Consequently, he insisted that they "should be put

under the tutelage of the Great Powers and be

educated in democratic institutions. In other

words, the colonial peoples, such as Korean should

enjoy their freedom and independence only after "a

30. Cho,Soon Sung,Korea in World Politics 1940-1950:

An Evaluation of American Responsibility. (Berkeley and Los Angeless: University of California Press, 1967)p.l7. 31. Franklin D.Roosevelt' speech on November 15, 1942 in Samuel I.Rosenman, ed.,The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D.Roosevelt.(New York: Harper and Brothers,1950J194 volume*pp.473-376. 29

period of training as the 38th parallel line which had been established as a "temporary military demarcation line" between the two Allied Powers became a political boundary of two Korean states.

Under the decision made by the United Nations

General Assembly in November 1947, the first democratic and free elections were carried out only

in the south in order to establish a government of

Korea. 32 Following the May elections of 1948, the

National Assembly of Korea was established, and the

Republic of Korea was inaugurated on August 15,1948,

33 ending American military rule in the south.

32. U.S.Department of State.Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Paper, Conference at Malta and Yalta, 1945, hereafter cited as Conferences at Malta and Yalta, (Washington, 1945.)p. 770.

33. Hull, Cordell The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. 2 Vols, (new York: The Macmillan Co., 1948.) II, 1984; Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 360. For details on U.S. policy toward Korea, see Cho, n. 30. ., pp. 29-55. 30

The American occupation of South Korea accomplished little, except that it prevented mass starvation and total collapse of public order. The

American occupation of South Korea was destined to be a failure. There were many reasons. For one thing, as an authority on Korea pointed out, "Aside

from an expressed intention to further the establishment of a Korean government, there seemed

to be little underlying continuity in American

34 policy during the three-year period." As a matter

of fact, there was no American policy toward Korea with the exception of that which aimed at the

removal of the Japanese from their colony. The

United States was destined to confront in Korea

immense problems, but "the almost impromtu way in

which the occupation was undertaken with very little

prior preparation' made the failure of the American

occupation virtually inevitable. George McCune

34. McCune, George M.and Arthur L. Grey Jr., Korea Today. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950]p. 269. 31

remarked.

The production of a viable democracy in a

country which had been politically dead for thirty-

five years demanded more positive encouragement than

the occupation force was prepared to give. In the

absence of uninterrupted and definitive guidance

upon matters of policy by Washington, the occuption

authorities were often so uncertain and cautious

about inaugurating definite policies as to appear

dominated by the situation.

Be that as it may, with the establishment of

the Republic of Korea in the south, a new

relationship between the United States and the newly

created republic developed.

Relations During the Crisis

After a brief period of uncertainties from

1948 to 1950, cordial relations developed between

the United States and the Republic of Korea despite

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid. 32

many problems which caused difficulties on both

sides. Unlike in the 19th century, the United States

demonstrated its positive interest in domestic and

foreign affairs of Korea, while the Korean

government and people displayed their traditional pro- American sentiments. The United States and its

allies fought the North Korean and Chinese

Communists and preserved the Republic. The American commitment to South Korea' national security after

1953, and U.S. economic and other forms of aid not only sustained the life of the nation, but also helped South Korea to achieve what it calls "the

Miracle on the Han River" during the past decade .

The American contribution to cultural and educational development in South Korea was incalculable.

Close cooperation between the two countries, while promoting the national strength of South

Korea, maintained a stable international situation in East Asia. Strong economic ties between South 33

Korea and the United States also developed. Such

close ties not only benefited the two countries, but

may have prevented another war in Korea while

enhancing the security of Japan. The recent problems

related to the Korean attempts to buy Congressional

influence notwithstanding, the American-Korean

relationship is likely to take deeper roots.

Following their issuance of a statement on

August 12 in which the United States government

stated the Korean government which was established

under the United Nations sponsorship was the

Government of Korea, Washington named John J. Muccio

as its first ambassador to the Korean republic, and

with the inauguration of the Republic of Korea on

August 15,1948, the American military rule was 37 terminated. The United Nations General Assembly

recognized the Republic of Korea on December 12, and the United States accorded de jure recognition of

37. McCune George M. Korea Today (Cambridge, 1950), p. 3 . 34

the Republic on January 1, 1949.

An American spokesman stated in 1948 that the inauguration of the Korean republic was not a final step in the execution of American commitments to establish a "free and independent Korea", but would have to be followed by economic assistance of a character which would enable the Republic to become a "solvent trading partner in the world economy and to withstand communist ideological penetration from within as well as attack from without." But/ in reality the United States had no Korean policy other than the prevention of a collapse of the Korean economy. The United States seemed to withdraw completely its political and military commitments from Korea as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had resolved that "under no circumstances would the United States engage in the military defence of the Korean 38 peninsula. Undoubtedly, the fall of the

38. Koo Youngnok, "The Conduct of Foreign Affairs", Korean Politics in Transition, (London,1975), pp.211, 213. 35

Nationalists in China had a direct impact on

American policy towrd Korea. Secretary of State Dean

Acheson told a Congressional committee that the

American line of defence in the Far East extends from Alaska through the Aleutian chain, Japan, and

Okinawa to the Philippines and made no mention of

Korea. In his remarks of January 12, 1950 in a speech before the National Press Club, he reiterated that the United States defense perimeter runs along the Aleutian islands to Japan, and from Japan to the

Philippines, and again he made no reference to

Korea.

The United States signed on December 10, 1948 an economic aid agreement with the Republic of

Korea, and in June 1949 President Trunan requested the sum of $150 million for Korea for the 1949-50 fiscal year.His message to Congress reflected the fear of Acheson that if no new economic aid was provided to Korea, the Republic would fall "within three months." But it was not until December 19 that an amount if $30 million for the period ending 36

February 15,1950 was voted in the House, and in

February 1950 the House approved a $60 million appropriation extending economic aid for Korea until

June 30, 1950.

Despite strong objections of the South Korean government, the United States withdrew its troops from Korea by the end of June 1949, leaving behind poorly indoctrinated, trained, and supplied soldiers of the newly created Korean army and a small United

39 States Military Advisory Group (KMAG) . However, a bilateral agreement was concluded between the

United States and Korea on January 2 6,1950 so that

Korea could receive United States Military aid under the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of October 6,

1949. Under this agreement, South Korea received $10 million out of the total of $1,314 million (or eight-tenth of one percent) which was appropriated to implement the Mutual Defence Assistance Act. The

39. Truman, Harry S., Years of Trial and Hope, 3946-1952, Vol.2 (Garden City, 1956) P.333. 37

American military aid was mostly for maintenance material and spare parts for American military

equipment left behind in Korea. KMAG repeatedly warned that "Korea is threatened with the same 40 disaster that befell China."

South Korea, which seemed to have been

abandoned by the United States, was invaded by the

North Korean Communist troops of June 2 5, 1950. As

many had feared, the Korean War finally came. The

general concensus of opinion was that the North

Korean Communists had miscalculated American

intentions when they launched the war. "The Korean

war began in a way in which wars often begin," said

Secretary of State John Foster Fulles in 1953, "a 41 potential aggressor miscalculated."

The devastating war in Korea was brought to

an end, thanks to a high price paid by the United

40. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relation, Hearings on the Mutual Defence Treaty with Korea, 83rd Cong, 2nd Session, 1954, p. 52 . 41. Dulles, John Foster, "Korean Problems," Department of State Publication, 19 50. Far Eastern Series, 62,1953, p.l. 38

States and other nations which repelled the aggressors, with the signing of the Korean armistics on July 27, 1953. The sixteen nations which had fought in Korea signed a Joint Policy Declaration concerning the Korean Armistice in which they pledged that if there were a renewal of the armed attack, they would be prompt again in resisting aggressors. On August 7, 1953 the United States initiated a draft of the mutual security pact with the Republic of Korea and guaranteed the security of

South Korea which refused to become a signator in the Korean armistice.

Following the signing of the armistice, a joint statement was issued by the United States and

Korea in which they pledged continued cooperation and agreed that in the political conference of the signatures of the Armistice which was to follow within three months, according to the terms in the

Korean armistice, they would "seek to achieve the peaceful unification of historic Koreaas a free and 39

independent nation." They added that if it appeared, after ninety days, that attempts to achieve mutual objectives were fruitless, both countries would make

"a concurrent withdrawal from the conference" and then would "consult further regardiny the attainment of a unified, free and independent

Korea..."

42. Press release. Joint Statement of President Syng-man Rhee and Secretary of State Dulles, August 7, 1953. 40

CHAPTER - II

UNITED NATIONS IN KOREAN WAR Background of the Crisis

Korea since long has been the centre of

power politics because of two important reasons —

its strategic location and commercial viability which often led involvement of the powers like

Japan, Tsarist Russia, China in different degree at

different time.

The Korean war that erupted on June 25, 1950

was not a matter of surprise rather the first

onslaught of a storm which had long been

gathering. The tension between the U S -controlled

South Korea and the Soviet-controlled North Korea

had been acute ever since the Cold War began. In

the summer of 1948, the United Nations Temporary

Commission on Korea, (UNTCOK) had stressed the

dangers to peace from the divided Korea. A year

1. GOAR, Third Session, Supplement No. 9, Second Part of the Report of the United nations Temporary Commission on Korea, vol. 1 (A/57 5/Add 3) pp. 131-14. The Report of the UNTCOK, which contains fairly exhaustive study of the Korean problem Contd.. 41

later, the UN Commission on Korea reported

"military posturings" on both sides of the 38th 2 Parallel with repeated border incidents. On both sides of the frontier there had been official threats that force would be used to unify the whole country.

The dangerous situation within Korea was not primarily Korean in origin. Ever since the later part of the 19th century the helpless country had been the victim of Great Power Conflicts and ambitions. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 settled the issue in japan's favour and with the American and English concurrency Korea had passed into 3 Japanese control in 1910.

Contd..1 was issued in two parts. The first part issued in three volumes (Doc. A/575 and add. 1 and 2) in two volumes (Doc. A/575/Add. 3 and 4), from May 25 to October 14, 1948.

2. G.A.O.R., Fourth Session, Supplement No. 9, Report of the UNTCOK (Doc. A/9 36), vol. 1, pp. 33-34.

3. For historical background to the ambitions and conflicts of major powers which engulfed this unhappy country, See, M. Frederick Nelson, Korea and the Old Order in Eastern Asia (Louisiana, 1946). 42

From 1910 down to Pearl Harbour, there was no inclination on the part of other Great Powers to challenge Japan's position in Korea. A challenge

came, however once Japan became an active belligerent on the side of Germany and other Axis

powers. By the Cairo Declaration of December, 1943

the United States, the United Kingdom and China

pledged their determination that Korea would, "in

due course become free and independent". The pledge

was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of July

26, 19 45, and was subscribed to by the Soviet Union

when it declared war against Japan on August 8,

1945.4

When Japan went down under, the Russians

occupied the northern part of Korea-north of

latitude 38 and American forces the Southern part.

4. For a detailed and documented account on the war-time and post-war commitments of the major powers. See Korea's Independence, Department of State Publication 2933 (Washington DC, 1947). 43

Although agreement was reached at the Moscow conferences of Foreign Ministers in December, 1945, on a procedure to be followed for achieving an independent and democratic Korea, subsequent negotiations between the United States and Soviet military commands brokedown. In fact, the course of these negotiations strongly suggested that as world relations between the United States and the

Soviet Union deteriorated, each government became more insistent on a solution of the Korean problem which would prevent the other from bringing the whole territory with it phase of dominant influence. The crux of the disagreement stemmed from the fact that for both Russia and the USA,

Korea was of vital strategic importance. The Soviet

Union wanted to ensure that no hostile power should

5. See the text of notes exchanged between the two controlling powers reproduced in Ibid., pp. 20-41 and 50-59; also, Korea 1945 to 1948, A Report on Political Development and economic Resources with Selected Documents (Washington DC, 1948), pp. 43-48. 44

had invasion bases within the reach of the

Russian soil. As Japan was already in American possession, Soviet strategy was guided to mark

Japan with a line of Russian held bases. This already included the military air bases in

Siberia, the Kurila Islands and Sakhalin. To complete the circle and to consolidate her hold on the Asian mainland, Korea was essential. On the other hand, Korea for the USA, was of great strategic value, if it wanted to keep its hold in the pacific, and to carry out its policy of containment against the Soviet bloc. When Soviet

American negotiations on Korea were deadlocked, the United States, on September 17, f947, referred the Korean problem to the UN General Assembly. In

6. UN Doc., A/BUR/85, September 17, 1947; also, see the address delivered by US. Secretary of State, George C. Marshall on September 17 before the General Assembly, GAOR, Plenary,

82nd Meeting, September 17, 1947, vol. I, pp. 21-22. 45

the debate that ensued both the contending parties 7 reiterated their respective positions. The United

States proposed that the occupying powers should hold elections in their respective zones under the observation of the United Nations, "as the initial steps reading to the creation of a National

Assembly and the establishment of a National government of Korea", and the Korean Government, thus elected, should take over the administration

from the controlling power should withdraw and that thereafter it should be left to the Korean people themselve to establish a national

government of Korea. The Soviet Union further

proposed that a representatives supporting him,

maintained that consultation with representatives

of the Korean people should take place in Korea

itself and notably by the United Nations Korean

7. See the Summary of the General Assembly

discussion in Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-48, pp. 81-88. 46

Commission. The United States point of view was upheld by the majority in the firslt committee as well as in the plenary of the General assembly.

On November 14, 1947, by a vote of 40 to 0 with 6 absentions, the General Assembly adopted a

US sponsored resolution creating a temporary commission on Korea to facilitate establishment of a Korean national government, through nation-wide elections, which were to be followed by withdrawal of all occupation forces. The Soviet resolution concerning simultaneous evacuation of the US and

Soviet troops from Korea at the beginning of 1948, failed of adoption, having obtained 7 votes to 34, 9 with 16 abstention.

8. General Assembly Resolution 112 (II), November 14, 1947.

9. GAOR, Second Session, Plenary, 112th Meeting, vol. II, p. 856. 47

The Soviet Union adopted a "negative attitude" towards the temporary commission and refused it permission even to enter North Korea.

Consequently the commission was authorized to implement the original resolution "in such parts of Korea as are accessible to the commission".

10. See the Soviet Union's Representative, Mr.

Gromyko's Statement before the General

Assembly, Ibid, 111th Meeting, pp. 823-32.

11. See the Resolution of the Interim Committee of the General Assembly adopted on February 26, 1948 (UN Doc. A/583, July 22, 1948).

It should be noted that the Interim Committee was established on November 13, 1947, by the General Assembly as a subsidiary organ which would function between the Assembly's regular sessions. The problem of Korea was the first case that it handled. It was composed of all members of the United Nations, but the Soviet Union and other socialist states regarded the creation of the interim Committee as contrary to the Charter and never attended its meetings.

The committee could not function as a real interim Assembly, though renewed at intervals, it was given less and less to do, and since 1955 has been adjourned sine die. 48

In South Korea, in May 1948, elections were organized and conducted by the United States Army

Military Government in Korea under the observance of the UN Commission. In the elections, which were boycotted by quite a number of political groupings, there were as many as 134 parties participating. 12 Out of 200 deputies elected to the National Assembly, 170 were supporters of

Syugman Rhee "favoured by landowners, police force and the USA". On the basis of commissions report to the effect that elections were held in "a

reasonable degree of free atmosphere" and the

results were "a valid expression of the free will

of the electorate", the newly elected Government

with Syngman Rhee as president, was recognized by

UN General Assembly as the lawful Government,

having effective control and jurisdiction over

12. Second part of the Report of the UNTCOK (A/575/Add. 4) pp. 22-23; Also See, Korea : 1945-48, US Department of State Publication 3305 (Washington DC, 1948). 49

that part of Korea, in which temporary commission observed elections. 13 Since the unification all

Korea had not been attained, the Assembly established a United Nations Commission of Korea of seven member-states to lend its good offices to

14 that end.

Meanwhile, in the North, the Soviet Union

got established a government with Kim II Sung as

Prime Minister and on September 18, 1948, informed

the Uniteld Nations that it would withdraw troops

by the end of the year. Soviet troops left by

December, except for a military training mission.

On the other side, the United States withdrew its

troops by July, 1949, except for a military

training mission.

13. General Assembly Resolution 195 (III), December 12, 1948.

14. The Commission consisted of Australia, China, el Salvador, France, India, the Philipinese and Syria. 50

The establishment of new governments representing conflicting ideologies only aggravated the ready existing, tension between two parts. Each of the two governments laid claim not only to being the only lawful government in Korea, but also to being the lawful government of "all"

Korea Border Skirmishes, Sabotage and riots in both parts were frequent.

From 1948 to June, 1950, the efforts of the

United Nations through the General Assembly and the UN Commission on Korea were directed towards alleviating this conflict and paving the way for unification. However, these efforts were thwarted by the growing seriousness of the world-wide struggle between the West and the Soviet Union.

Recognizing the danger to peace, the General

Assembly, in October 19 49, assigned to the UN

Commission on Korea the additional task of observing and reporting developments which might lead a military conflict in Korea.

15. UN DOC., S/1505, June 27, 1950. The documents initially reproduced in S/PV. 474 was superseded by Doc. 1505/Rev. of august 21, 1950. See SCOR, Fifth year, Supplement for 51

United Nations' Involvement

In the afternoon of June 27, when the

Security Council met, it had before it four

cablegrams from the United Nations commission on

Korea. In sum, these cablegrams stated that the

Commission had no evidence to justify in any

respect the North Korean allegations that South

Korea had precipitated the conflict by launching

an invasion across the 38th parallel; all the

evidence continued to point to a calculated,

coordinated attack prepared and launched in

Secrecy, and that, judging from the military

operations in progress, "the northern regime is

carrying out full-scale invasion of South Korea.

In all the messages received to date, the only

suggestion for action made by the Commission was

that the Security Council give consideration to

unifying both parties to agree on a neutral

mediator or member governments undertake immediate

16. UN Doc., S/1507, June 27, 1950. 52 mediation". 17

The Security Council, however went along with the United States' plea that the situation required military action by the United Nations. It adopted a US draft resolution by a vote of 7 to 1

(Yugoslavia), with one Member absent (USSR), and two members (Egypt and India) not participating in the voting. By the same margine of vote, it rejected a Yugolav draft resolution for a renewal of the cease-fire call and mediatory efforts by 18 the Council.

The resolution adopted declared that urgent military measures are required to restore

international peace and security" and recommended

17. UN DOC., 3/1503, June 26, 1950.

This is not said here by way of belittling

the seriousness of North Korean attack. The

point in emphasis is that council's resolutions were not so much based on the report of the on-the-spot Commission of the United nations as or the information conveyed and the pressure exercised by the United States.

18. SCOR, Fifth year, No. 16, p. 14. 53

that Member-states, "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as might be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore

19 international peace and security in area" .

Consequently, the unilateral action of the

United States to give military aid to South Korea was turned into a UN Coercive action. Ten days later, the Council completed the formality by requesting that military assistance by Member

States be "made available to a unified command under the United States", and that "the United

States designated the commander of such forces". 20

The Soviet Union and the other four communist Members of the United Nations denounced the action of the Security Council as "illegal". 21

19. UN Doc., S/1511, June 27, 1950.

20. UN Doc., S/1598, July 7, 1950.

21. See the note from the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, to the Secretary General. UN Doc. S/1517, June 29, 1950. 54

Other Member nations - 51 out of 59 - supported the Council's resolution. However, only 15, besides the USA, sent their combat forces to

Korea. The burden of resisting the North Korean

attack was mainly borne by the United States which

supplied equipments and suffered nine-tenths of the

22 casualities.

Consequently, the United States, without

the effcetive participation by other Member

States, did all the military planning, took

political decisions armistic negotiations. It is

difficult to say whether the United States would

22. For tables of individual contribution of

Member States, See Yearbook of the United

nations 1950, pp. 226-28.

It may be noted that the United States did not notify the United Nations of the nature and size of its assistance until June 8, 1957. The US government, in response to the Secretary-General's note communicating the Council's resolution of June 27, only informed the Secretary General that the US forces were already giving cover and support to the Korean Government troops. 55

have permitted substitution of its own leadership by a collective leadership. In the first week of

July, 1955, the Secretary General took the initiative of instituting a committee on co-ordination with the purpose of keeping the

United Nations "in the picture to promote continuing United Nations participation in, and supervision of, the military security action in

Korea"

The Korean military enterprise under the UN flag was generally hailed in the western world "as the first enforcement action against an aggressor that the organized community of nations had taken

in accordance with the principles of collective

security. 23 An objective analysis, however, would

show that such a characterization was somewhat conceited. (The military action was taken not by

23. Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Seventh Report, Collective Security under the

United Nations, New York, July, 1957, p. 7. 5fi

the organized community of nations but in the name of that organized community. The direction and control of the military measures was not undertaken by an international military staff but by one-member nation alone. It will be truism to say that the UN force, as it was constituted and as identified by the right to use the UN flag and other devices was not in fact a UN force, but rather a US force with other national units placed at its disposal.

2 4. Military situation in the Far East : Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Forces and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Washington D.C. : 1951, Part 3, p. 2075.

It should be noted that the United Nations command for the Korean operations, that was set up in Tokyo under General Mac Arthur, was practically identical with Far Fast Command of the United States. General MacArthur was in charge of both. It is chain of command was through the chief of Staff of the Army to the joint chiefs of staff, to the Secretary of Defence, to the President of the United States.

The responsibility of making decisions as implementing them naturally rested with the

Contd.. 57

Again the Korean action was not in conformity with the Charter theory of collective

security. The framers of the Charter had spelt out a system for collective measures which envisaged the availability of armed forces under

Article 43, and adoption and coordination and direction of such armed forces by the military staff committee. Since Article 4 3 had not been implemented, the Council could not act under the system.

In the case of Korea, faced with a situation of a breach of the peace and unable to act under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Members of the Security Council, led by the United States,

Contd...24 US government. At the weekly conference in Washington DC, of representative of those United Nations Member governments who had their armed forces in Korea, was usually provided over by the US Assistant Secretary of State. The Members were briefed on the military and political developments. Little information regarding plans for future military action was given out. This was largely because of security reasons. 5R

took recourse to what may be termed the League theory of collective security. The Council established the fact of a breach of the peace without making reference to Article 39, and recommended (not ordered) to Member themselves wide discretion in determining the nature and extent of their participation.

The Charter lays down that any decision for enforcement action by the Security Council is binding on all Members of the United Nations. In the case of Korea, none of the Security Councils resolutions of June 25, 27 or July 7, 1950, appear by their terms to be such decisions for enforcement action as impose obligations on

Members under the Charter to carry them out or even to afford mutual assistance.

It may, however be noted that the mere fact that the Security Council's recommendations for enforcement action in Korea were not actions under chapter VII does not mean that such actions were lawful. Indeed, the Korean action may be 59

described as action which the Members of the

United Nations as individual states are permitted

to take, as distinct from either obliged to take

or prohibited from taking under the Charter. The

"permission" or "licence" or "liberty" to use

force has its base in inherent right of individual

or collective self-defence against attack (Article

51). A guideline to Member States is found in

Article 19(i), which declares a purpose of the

United Nations to be "to take effective collective

measures - for suppression of acts of aggression

or other breaches of peace".

As such, the military action taken in

pursuance of the Council's revolutions of June 25

and 27 was adequately in keeping with the

purposes of the United Nations, although it could

be criticized on the ground that the revolutions

leading to the action were adopted when the Soviet

Union was absent from the meetings and China was 60

not properly represented. 25

25. See, in particular, Hans Kelsen, The Law of

the United Nations (London : Stevens, 1950) p.

239 and Leo Gross "Voting in the Security

Council : Abstention from voting and Absence

from Meetings". Yale Law Journal, LX (1951),

p. 209.

The opinion of the most of the

commentators and the previous UN practice,

however,inadequate that neither abstention nor

absence of a Permanent Member of the Security

Council constitutes a veto. fil

CHAPTER-III

UNITED STATES' PEACE STRATEGY IN KOREAN PENINSULA

Soviet moves in Furope in the aftermath of the Second World ffer created apprehension anon^

American policy makers about its design in Asia.

Communist victory in China was construed by

Washington as an event of far reaching significance portending an extension of Soviet influence in that region. US policy of containment, designed initially to check perceived Soviet expansion in

Europe was pursued in Asia too in the 1950s. The physical proximity of two giants communist powers to Korea, Japan, Taiwan and their offshore Islands, made American policy planners believed that these countries were vulnerable to communist attack. As a consequence, with the outbreak of the Korean war in

June 1950 the policy of containment was extended to

China as well. From then , American policy became one of the preserving a balance of power in

East-Asia by supporting an independent Korea, free from the control of China or Russia. 62

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities Korea was considered as a strategic liability by the

State Department. In a policy statement made before the National Press riub on 12 Jan, 19,50, Secretary of State Dean Acheson excluded Taiwan and Korea from the American defence perimetre in the

... 1 pacific.

Dealing more specifically with Korea, he stated :

"We have given that nation great help in getting

itself established. We are asking the congress

to continue that help untiTl it is firnly

established, and that legislation is now

pending before the congress. The idea that we

should scrap all of that we should stop half

way through the achievement of the

establishment of this country, seems to me to

be the most utt£r defeatism and utter madness

. 2 in our interest in Asia.

1. Department of State Buletin (Washington DC, 2 3 Jan 1950) Vol.2, p.116.

2. Ibid, p. 117 63

The Secretary's statement was infact a plea to win support for a $60 million economic aid bill for South Korea which was held back by the lower

House. The measure, however, was defeated, the same month as a reaction to the Administrations failure

3 to aid the Nationalist Government of China.

Clearly it was an indication of the Low

Strategic importance accorded to Korea, for the US was concerned more in safeguarding its interests in

Japan and Europe. The limited build up of the

South-Korean Army trained by the US Military

Advisory Group was designed essentially to maintain internal order than to fight a war. Again the $10.2 million committed to Korea for the year 1950 was not intended for rearmament rather it was for the maintenance of the equipment left behind by the US forces following their withdrawal from Korea in mid

1949.

3. See Glenn D.Paige, The Korean Decision: June 24-30,1950 (New York, 1968), p.68. 64

Dnited States* Initial Response:

Within a year of US troops withdrawal, Korea became an area of intense super power rivalry with war breaking out between the North and South. For, on June 1950, the North Korean Forces crossed the

38th parallel and advanced to the South, capturing

Seoul within a few days.

North Korea action left the US with two alternatives - either to withdraw its military mission from South Korea or else, intervene, militarily to prevent communist takeover of the

Peninsula. Under the circumstances, the US opted for the Second and declared to intervene. And thus, the Administration reversed its early policy decisions that accorded low priority to Korea in its defence calculations. Both Presidjeit Truman and

Secretary, Acheson have remarked in their memories that the North Korean offensive was "insighted by 4 the Soviet Union . According to President Truman

4. Harry S.Truman Memoirs; Years of Trialand Hope (New York, 1956), p.335, Dean G.Acheson, Present at the creation: My Year in the State Department (London, 1969) P.405. 65

Korean offensive was launched by the Soviet Union to test US capacity to resist communist forces .

Upon that premise he has argued that if communism was not checked in Korea, then Japan, Okinawa and

Formose could have been the next targets of communist attack . in Order to protect US interest,

5. Some of the Scholars who hold this view are Tony Tsou, American's Failure in China, 1941-50 (Chicago, 1963), P.555: Allein S.Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu; The Decision to enter the Korean war, (New York, 1960) pp. 37-40 : Adam B.Ulam, Expansion and Co-existence; The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967 (London, 1968), pp. 514, 578: Care Berger, The Korean Knot: A Military Political History (Philadelphia, 1957), p.183: Alexander L.George. "American Policy making and the North Korean Aggression" World Politico (Prinecton), Vol.7, January 1955.pp. 2 09-3 ; Robert T.Oliver", Why war came to Korea", Current History (Philadelphia) vol.19, September 1950, pp. 139-43.

6. Truman, n.4, p.335. 6f.

the defence of South Korea and Taiwan he says was imperative.

Some analysts arguec that Russia's Premier, Joseph

Stalin, Started the war in Korea with the object of engaging the US and the Peoples Republic of China in 7 a long conflict, leaving him free in Europe . Yet, another hypothesis claims that it was South Korea that attacked first. Since establishment of the

7. John Gunther, The Riddle of Mc? Arthur: Japan

Korea and Far East (New York, 1957), P.172 For a

contrary vice see, wilbur H.Hitech Cock, "North

Korea Jumps the Gun" Current History, Vol.2 0,

March, 1957, pp. 136-44, The writer is of the

view that invasion of South Korea was planed by

Premier Kin II Sung, not only without

instructions from Mosion, but without its

•knowledge as well. The Korean war has also been

characterised as a Civil War. See Robert

R.Sumon, The Strained Alliance: Peking,

P.Yonaqyanq; Mosion and the Politics of the

Korean civil War, (New York, 1975). 67

Republic of Korea, President Syngman Rhee in his eagerness to attain a forcible unification of Korea resorted to an attack on North Korea .

It appears that the US though aware probably of an attack from North Korea, failed to prepare 9 South Korea to face such an eventuality .

In Tokyo, General Dougles Mac Arthur's Chief of intelligence, Major General, Charles wiloughby wececonvinced that Korean communists were engaged in a massive build up across the 38th parallel. He was sure that they would be prepared to strike by the beginning of the summer of 1950. His warninys however, were ignored both by his own headquarter and the authorities in Washington as well

Similarly Admiral Roscos H.Hillenkoetter, Director

8. Karunakar Gupta, "How did the Korean war Begin"?

China Quarterly (London). No.52 October-

December 1972, p. 5. 9. Gunther, n.7, p.166. 10. S.L.Murshall, The Military History of the Korean War, (New York, 1963) p.14. 68

of Central Intelligence Agency told the press on the eve of the attack that the Agency was awarded

that "Conditions existed in Korea that could have meant an invasion this weak or next".

On 2 7 June, the Senate Apropriation

Committee, called Hillenkoetter to hear his opinion

regarding the North Korean attack. Prior to his

hearings, he was summuned by President Truman. The

statement he gave before the Committee was different from the one given to the press. He said

that "the North Korean forces have had the

capability of invading the South force year but

that it had been impossible to prpdict the time

12 table under which they would march if at all

Dse of United Nations for Collective Action

The United States was successful in invoking

the collective provisions of the Security Council

under the Charter, it has been remarked by some

11. As quoted in I.F Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War (New York, 1952) P.-?0

12 . Ibid.pp . 2-3. 69

that American SuppDtton behalf of South, Korea in the United Nations" was a part of a bolder 13 conceptualization of US global geopolitics

An emergency meeting was convened on the same day of the North Korean offensive, 25 June

1950, passed a resolution which condemned the North

14 Korean attack at called for a ceasefire . On 2 7

June President Truman ordered the dispatch of

Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan Strait . He declared that the Seventh Fleet would repel an attack of Taiwan and also instructed chiang-Kai

Shek not to attack the mainland. Me also declared the strengthening of American forces in the

Phillipmes

13. Samuel S.Kim "Korea: The last Frontline Damino", Asia and US Foreign Policy, (New York, 1981), p.51.

14. UN, Document S/1501, 25 June, 1950.

15. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23,3 July. 1980, 8.5. 16. Ibid. 70

Thus, the Korean war set off series of defence measures by the US on its Far East

outposts.

The same day of second resolution of the

Security Council on the Korean Crisis, called on

all members of the United Nations to help South

Korea repel the attack

Closely following the President Truman's

orders, commanding US ground, air and naval forces

into action in Korea, the Security Council adopted

its third resolution on 7 July.It called for a

Unified Military Command in the Korea, under the 18 . President Truman appointed command of US

General Douglas to move further,, as the Commander in

19 Chief of the UN forces.

One authoritative assessment had attributed

the policy reversal to Washington's awareness of

the political as against the strategic importance

17. UN Document, S/15iJ.,27 June, 1950. 18. Ibid, S/1588, 7 July, 1950. 19. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 23, 17 July, 1950, p.83. 71

of South Korea

President Truman ordered General Mac Arthur 2 1 to proceed north of the 38th parrales . On 1st

October the South Korea Forces crossed the parallel. In the meantirie Chou En-Lai issued his strongest Warriing of the intention of the peoples

Republic to enter the war if this UN forces other than the South Korean troops crossed into North

22 Korea . These were apparently not taken seriously.

On 7 October, the General Assembly adopted a resolution endorsing President Trumon's proposal to cross the 38th parallel to achieve the unification

2 3 of Korea . It also set up a new commission for the

Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) to carry out relief and reconstruction work in

24 Korea.

20. Alexander L.George and Richard M.Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy; Theory and Practice (New York, 1974), pp.146,148, 21. Truman, n.4, p.36 3.

22. Ibid, pp.363-64, Also See K.M.Panikar In Two China; Memoirs of a Diplomat, (London 1955). 23. UNGAOR, Fifth Session, Resolution 376, 7 October, 1980, Supplement 20, pp.9 n.10. 72

On 9 October, General Mac Arthur in a radio broadcast called upon the North Korean troops to surrender and cooperate with the United Nations in setting up a Unified and democratic government in

Korea. Receiving no response, the UN forces crossed the thirty-eight parallel into North Korea. Thus with the help of the United Nations, the United

States mobilized world openion in support of US

2 5 "Police action" in Korea . It is significant to note that the UN resolutions became possible only because the Soviet delegate was boycotting all the

2 6 meetings of the Security Council

2 5. Also see articles by Arnold Wolfers, Collective

Security and the war in Korea "in young Hum Km,

Twenty Years of Crisis: The Cold War Era (New

Jersey, 1968), pp.78-81. The authors expla­

nations showed. American intervention in Korea

through the UN served Washington's security

interest.

26. For a detailed study of the Korean problem in

the UN See, Leland M.Goodrich, Korea A study of

US policy in UN (New York, 1956). 73

On 15 October, President Truman conferred with General Mac Arthur on wake Island in the

Pacific, when asked about the possibility of

Chinese or Soviet intervention in the war, Mac

Arthur replied that there was very little chance of

2 7 the two intervening at that stage. He may have been right about the Soviets but very wrong about the Chinese who struck with full force against the

Eight Army of the US on 25 November.

According to the intelligence reports of the

CIA, Central Intelligence Agency the Chinese communist troops popularly known as "volunteers" had moved into North Korea in mid. October. Towards the end of October the presence of Chinese communist troops on a large scale was reported

2 8 among the North Koreans

With the entry of Peoples Republic of China, the Korean war assumed the shape of a Sino American

27. Truman, n. 4, pp. 365-66.

28. Ibid. p. 372. 74

conflict. Earlier General Mac Authur had suggested an all out war with China, which included bombing

2 9 Chinese bases on Yalu and elsewhere

However, President Truman and the chief of

Staff favoured in settlemnt of the question of

Chinese intervention in Korea through political measures. Washington apparently had to wish to reenter the Chinese civil war from which it had extricted itself after much difficulty. It favoured a limited war without appeasement and was opposed to carrying the war to the Chinese territory.

Some of the policy decisions gave the republicans in the Congress an opportunity to

criticize the Truman. Administration. They urged

the President to adopt a tougher attitude towards

peking and give more aid to Taiwan.The war also

aided and abetted Senator Joseph Mc Carthy's attack

on communism sympathizers within the Government.

Many important officials in the State Department

29. For the text of this statement see, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 2 3, Oct<5rJeT T75TT7 pp.643-44, Also see, Allen S.Whilting, China Crosses the Yaln; The Decision to Enter the Korean War, (N.Y., 1960) .pp. 15-162.

30. Truman, n.4, pp.378-79. 75

were dismissed from their jobs as bad security risks. Over and above the Congressional elections

of November 1950 showed a marked cb cline in the

number of Democrats in the Congress.

The European allies of the US also express

their grave concern over the developments in Korea.

Great Britain was alarmed over President Truman's

press comments of 30 November on the possible use

32 of the atom bombs . By that time the communists

had recovered major parts of North Korea. It appear

that this threat was used more to deter further

Chinese Communist attack.

The US would not have used such a device

without obtaining prior concurrence from its

European allies.Their support was a considerable

importance because of their help and effort in

containing communism on global level. Priority was

given to Great Britain and France because they held

the second and third position in the NATO, on

31. Richard Rovers, Senators Joe Mc. Carthy (N.Y, 1959).

32. Department of State Bulletin, Vol.23, 18, Dec.1950 pp. 959-61. If,

account of the military and political status in

Europe. They also controlled all the American bases

from which attack could be launched at the Soviet

Union and other places.As such it was decided that

the war in Korea be localised and ended by means of

a negotiated settlement.

US decision to abondon its objectives of

Uniting Korea by force was largely influenced by

the Course of war itself. In a meeting of the

material Security Council it was pointed out that

an extension of the war to Manchuria as proposed by

Mac Arthur might prompt the Soviet Union to

intervene either in Korea or Europe and that would

33 certainly be determinated to America interests

Moreover, public openion at home was

sufficiently alarmed over the extent of American involvement in the Korean war and heavy loss it

caused on American lives. Again there was a yeneral

desire among the members of the UN toresojlve the

33. Trumai, n.4, pp. 385-88. 77

crisis peacefully. Thus in view of these factors,

America policy shifted from a confrontation with

the Chinese Communists and North Korea to that of

stabilizing its line of military enforcement and

from these negotiating for the cessation of

hostilities.

Following the adoption of a resolution by

the General Assembly on 14 December, 1950, a ^eace

proposal was drafted 34 . However, Peking turned it

down and on 17 Jan 1951, but forth a ceasefire.

Important among these were the expulsion of

Nationalist China from the UN and the administration

of Peoples Republic as well as evaluation of all 35 American personnel from Taiwan. When initial

attempts armstice failed, the US urged the UN to

condemn peoples Republic as a aggressor on the

place that it refused to come to terns with the UN

3 6 and continued its attack on South Korea.

34. For details fee, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 24,15 Jan. 1951, p.113. 35. Ibid, vol .2 4,2 9 Jan, 1951, p; 167^:777""" -.

36. Ibid, pp. 166-69. J_ /' % V \'\ 7-153Q5" "4 78

On 1 February 1951, the General Assembly passed a resolution "branding the people's Republic

37 as an aggressor. This percipitated a large-scale attack on Chinese Communist forces on the UN troops. They not only crossed the 38 parallel, but also recaptured Seoul. Through the UN forces recovered the capital of South Korea and pushed back the Chinese forces, the prospects of a armistice seemed rather break.

The dramatic dismissal of General MacAthur on 15 April, 1951, was a pointer to the fact that the US favoured a cautious approach to the settlement of the Korean question and wanted to

38 localise the Korean war . Truce negotiation began again on 10 July 1951, first at Kaesong and later at Panmunjon. The UN command delegation was headed by Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, while the North

Korea side was led by Nam II.Agreement was reached

37. UN, GAOR, Fifth Session, Resolution 498, 1 January, 1957, Supplement 20,A.

38. Mathew B.Ridgway, The Kore

on the agenda on 26 July 1951

Negotiations soon got stalled over issues like determination of the demarcation line and the exchange of prisioners of war. The latter seemed to be the most different issue. The UN command took the position that personnel should not be forced to return to the communist side. While the communist side the stand that all Chinese and North Korean

Sodiers in UN custody be repatriated.

The period from July 1951, to 1952 was spent

in fruitless negotiation over the issue. Proposals

and counter proposals were presented but without

any positive agreements. Meenwhile fighting

continued throughout the remaining months of the

Trumans Presidency.

The deadlock was finally broken with

election of President Dwight D.Eisenhower to the

white House. The new President and his Secretary of

39. Department States Bulletin, Vol.25, 6 August, 1951, pp.231-32. 80

State John Foster Dulles had commitment to briny the Korehn War to an end and also to extend the containment policy to the Peoples Republic. Third policy with regard to Korea did not differ much from that of the previous administration. To yet the truce talks moving against President Eisenhower threatened to use nuclear weapons. This policy later came to be known as the "massive retaliation" strategy 40 . As a display of its intention the US dispatched nuclear weapons to Okinawa. Dulles informed Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru that the war would be extended to Chinese unless

Korean armstice was signed. This information was duly passed to peking.

According to President Eisenhower, the threat to use nuclear weapons was largely response for the breakthrough in negotiation which finally resulted in the agreement of exchange of sick and wounded prisoners on 11 April 1955 41

40. Dright D.Eisenhower, The Mandate for Change, (New York, 1963) p.181.

41. Ibid. 81

There were other strategic reasons apart from the one given above for a resumption of truce negotiation. The Death of Stalin, the leader of

Communist world in March 1953, coupled with heavy losses incurred by Chinese Communists eventually led the later to recommend negotiations.

On 8 June 1953, the final agreement regarding the exchange of prisoners of war was reached 42 . However, the signing of the armistice was blocked for sometime as a result of President

Rhee's action in ordering the release of thousands 43 of anti-communist prisoners on 18 June 1953 . This was done despite President Eisenhower's assurance to arrange for a bilateral security pact with the 44 Republic of Korea

The crisis was resolved when President

Eisenhower sent waiter Robertson, Assistant

Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to meet

42. Department of State Bulletin, vol.28,22 June, 1953, pp.366-68

43. See Care, Poeyer, The Korean Knot,n.5.pp.166-67 44. Eisenhower, n.40 p.183. 82

who .- assured that he would not wreck the time talks and would give up his demand for the 45 withdrawal of Chinese troops from North Korea.

The Armistice agreement that was finally signed on

46 • v

2 7 July 1953, marked the end of the war in Korea .

The truce was to be folowed by a peace conference within 3 months to dial with political problem of Korea.

The United States Urged the sixteen UN members who had contributed armed forces to the war in Korea to reaffirm their support in the bent of a 47 recurrence of communist attack on South Korea . At the same time it signed the mutual Defence Treaty on 1 Oct. 1953, with the Representation of Korea.

Unlike other American treaties, such as with

Australia, Newzealand and the philipiness designed primarily to restrain Japan the one with Korea aimed at containing communist expansion in East

Asia. Article 3, which is the heart of the treaty

45. Department of State Bulletin,Vol. 29,3,Aug.1953 p.141. 46. For text of truce See, Ind, PP.132-40. 47. Text in Department of State, America Foreign Policy 1950-55, Basic Documents, (Washington, D-C, 1957) p.2662 . 83

stated that an armed attack on Rok would be considered by the US as "dangerous to its own peace and safety" and "that it would act to meet the common danger it accordance with its constitutional

48 processes

Unlike its treaty with Japan, this was no obligation to take part in the internal security of

the Korean Republic or take any military measures

in the event of a coup et *1 * snail US

military force with supporting air and ground units

was stationed in Korea after the treaty. An

American Military Advisors Group supervised the

training of the South Korea army.

It is often said that the workings of treaty

were somewhat ambiguous. For instance the treaty

envisaged that if any attempt to unify Korea by

force was undertaken without the prior sanction of

the UN, the US would be under no obligation to

48. Department of State, Bulletin, Vol.29,17 August, 1953, p.204. 84

support such initiative- However, if American interests were threatened in Korea, the US would

force appropriate action, whatever the treaty

.49 obligation

The political conference that was to follow

the armistic was held in Geneva on 2 6 April 1954.

It failed to produce a final settlement of the

problem of Korean Unification. President Rhee's

request to the US for a forcible unification of

-• ,50 Korea was also ignored

Thus, the Korean war gradually led to the

globalisation of US containment policy. The Told

«ar in Europe begining ever since the end of the

Second World War had kept the US involved in that

area. Moreover the constraints imposed by the

Congress on defence expenditure also prevents

Washington from extending military support to

countries in Asia. Again as result of the imbalance

between ideological commitment and military power

49. Glaude A.Buss, The US and Republic of Korea: Background for policy (Stanford, 1982) p.57. 50. Deter Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945, (London, 1968), p.272. "as demonstrated in China up to 1949, Americas Asia policy pivoted around Japan. The Korean war in fact served to globalize civil war politics. It stimulated immediately a increase in military spending, signing for the defence treaties 1 c?d to

US deeper constraints in Asia in the 1950s. The conviction that the expansion of Commission in Asia was deterimental to its national security because the Keynote of American foreign policy and dominated Washington's Asian policy for years to come.

Objections on the Action

The United States submitted the "Korean

Question" to the General Assembly on 17 September

1947 following the failure of its negotiation with the USSR in regard to the impelementat ion of the cairo, Potsdam, and Moscow agreements. The

Communist group held that the actions of the

General Assembly were contrary to the previsions of the Charter and were invalid and that the Genera] 86

Assembly did not have the right to take action with regard to Korea as that matter had been covered by the Moscow agreement. Korea was clearly a subject * which should have been dealt with by the Allied

Governments concerned. The establishment of the

Temporary Commission was illegal, and it was a 51 violation of international agreements

The Soviet Objection was based on Article

107 of the Charter, according to which the governments primarily responsible for defeating an

Axis power were to determine the terms of the peace settlement. Even at San Francisco a distinction had generally been accepted between the functions of peace-making and functions of peace maintenance, the former being regarded as the special responsibility of the powers primarily concerned with the defeat of the enemy states and the latter 52 as the responsibility of the United Nations . The

51. GAOR, Session 2, First Cttec, mtg. 87,pp.250-1.

52. L.M.Goodrich, Korea: A Study of US Policy in US

Policy in the UN (New York, 1956) p.44. 87

United Nations was ask'ed to "candidate or preclude

"any action which members of the war-time coalition

might take in their Relations with the enemy

states. The making of the peace following the

Second World War was to proceed indepencb ntly of 53 the Charter, ie as if the Charter did not exist.

The pommunist group, therefore, did not want the

United Nations to deal with the disposition of the

territories formerly occupied by the enemy states.

A.M.Beranovasky of the tyrain USR referred to a

Statement made by Senator vandenberg at the San

Francisco conference, to the effect that the

"General Assembly of the UN should make

recommendations with regard to peace treaties and

problems concerned therewith and to Article 107 of

54 the Charter, which was fully applicable." This

meant, he pointed out that the General Assembly

should not make recommendations in such matters.

53. Goodrich and Hambro, Charter of the UN (New York, 1969), p.633.

54. GAOR, Session 2. First Cttoe mty, 89,pp.258-91. RR

Further, the Soviet bloc argued that the activities of the UNCOK were contrary to the principles of the United Nations. Far from protecting Korea from possible foreign interference, the UNCOK was intervening in the domestic affaire of Korea and prepetuating that interference. It was an "obedient foot of US 55 Department of State • . The Communists characterized the activities of the UNCOK as a" brazen expression of the bandit colonization policy of the American imperialists in Korea" . Their main objection was that it was a violation of

Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. Which dealt with non-intervention in the domestic affairs of any nation. The Soviet representative.

Vyshinsky, told the General Asembly: The provisions of Charter VII were illegally applied to the civil war whereas these provisions do not relate to civil

55. GAOR, Session , First Cttee mtg. 92.p.290.

56. Ibid, Session 4, Supplement Vol.2, Annex/DC. 89

War, to internal conflicts that were between two sections of the people of one and the same state, of one and the same country, temporarily splitiinto two hostile governmental camps but to war between states. 57

The Korean war was a war fought between two sections of the Korean people.

Thus, the establishment of the UNCOK and its functions were illegal, and besides, they violated international agreements.

Vyshinsky held that the unification of Korea and the establishment of a unified democratic state should be left to the Korean people themselves. He further stated that the General Assembly should have invited the representatives of both North and

South Korea, so that thoy could express their view; on the question. Any discussion without them" would violate the provisions and principles of the

Charter and in particular Article 32, which

57. Ibid, Session 5,Plen Mtg.293, p.219..

58. GAOR, Session 5, Plon .mty .2 92 , p.193. 90

provided for the participation of non-member states in any discussions held under the conditions laid down by the Council. This was accepted practice of the General Assembly and Secretary Council. The decision of the First Committee to hear the representative of the Syngman Rhee Government was one-sided and not impartial. It was in contravention of the principles of the Charter and

the right of self dj termination of people. It would

not help in working out a settlement of the "Korean

Question"

The Soviet representatives also made the

charge that there was an American conspiracy to

establish a puppet government in Korea. This, if

permitted to take its course would be a gross

injustice to the spirit and latter of the Charter.

He warned the General Assembly that if any decision

on Korea was taken without any participation of the

Korea people, his country would not abide"by that

decision. He challenged the validity of the

58. GAOR, Session 5, Plen.mtg.292, p.193. 91

Security Council resolution of 2 7 June and 7 July

1950, on the ground that they were legally

59 intenable . The resolution had been adopted by only six votes, the seventh being that of the

Kuomintang representative, Tincfu F. Rsiang, who had no legal right to represent China, Article 2 7 of the UN Charter required that the djecisions of the Security Council on all matters (not considered as procedural) should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. The resolutions concerned had not secured the five concurring votes required by the Charter, as China had been represented by Taiwan and the Soviet representative had not voted.The representatives of poland charged the government of the United States with undertaking a military adventure in Korea without waiting for the consideration of the matter by the

59. Ibid., Session 2, First trttee mtg.91,p.91.

60. Ibid, Plen, mtg.293,p.219. 92

61 lawful organ of the United Nations ,. the Security

Council. He mad? it clear that the United States had undertaken a unilateral action contrary to the

Charter.

Besides, the Charter provided that Member

States should try to settle their disputes through negotiations, inquiry, mediation, conciliation,

arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. In Korea the steps taken to promote a peaceful settlement of the problem were contrary to this provision of the

Charter . The Communists charged the United States and its allies with complying only with those provisions of the Charter that suited them and neglecting the other, proper Articles. The Security

Council was bound by the provisions of the Charter

61. UN yearbook, 1950, p.225.

62 . Ibid, p. 226.

63. GAOR, Session 5, Plen.mtg. 293,p.219. 93

to invite the interested parties to participate in the discussion of the questions affecting then. The whole thing was an American couspiracy against the

•Communist Russia.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the

People's Democrate Republic of Korea declared that this government did not recognize the decision of the Security Council because it was not a party to it as legally binding on itself. Moreover, representatives of the USSR was absent from the

Security Council, and the Peoples Republic of China

* A 65 was not represented.

The Communists took the position that the aggressive and imperialistic desiyn of the United

States against the People' Democracies constituted the root cause of the war in Korea. They challenged the constitutionality of the" United Action for

Peace." "The UN was created as the Charter puts

64. Ibid.

65. UN Docs, S/152 7 and S/1554, 94

it", to be centre for harmonizing the actions of the nations in the attainment of common ends. The unit for Peace" resolution was contrary to this basic principles of the United Nations. The real aim of that resolution was to shift the centre of gravity from the Security Council to the General

Assembly and to subotage the principle of unanimity which was the cornerstone of the structure for

67 peace

The communists further maintained that the resolution would empower General Mac Arther,

Commander of the UN forces in Korea, to occupy the whole territory of Korea with foreign troops on the pretext of establishing an independent denonctratic state in Korea.

According to the American representative, the RussianVeto was the root cause of the failure of the Security Council. But Vyshinsky pointed out

66. GAOR Session 5, Pl#n .mtg .2 79 , p.28.

67. Ibid, Plen.mtg. 293, p.219.

68. Ibid i First Cttee mtg.357,pp. 81-85. 95

that the veto was simply an instrument for attempting to settle differences.Ke asserted that the Security Council failed not because of the

Russian Veto but due to the stand taken by the majority which allied itself with the United

States.Again he claimed that in such a situation the minority needed the veto in order to defend itself against the hostile majority , and the

Security Council was paralysed because in a number of cases the Agio-American group could not force decisions favourable to its own interests and purposes on the Security Council.

The "Uniting for Peace", in the opinion of the USSR, was a device invented to make the veto meaningless. This was inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the Charter. It could hrdly have any effect on the course of action for maintaining peace and Security. If there is no agreement amony the Great powers on fundamental matters affecting

69. Ibid, Plen. mtg.301. p.331. 96 international peace, the threat to peace would remain whether the General Assembly considered these questions in the absence of the veto or whether the Security Council decided them with the veto.

The Soviet representative insisted that all matters concerning the use of force were reserved exclusively for the Security council. This view was based on Article 11(2), 24,43 and 47 of the

Charter.The General Assembly could not be a substitute for the Security Council because if lacked the competence of the Security Council. The

Communists believed that the transfer of competence would place the armed forces at the disposal of the

General Assembly and it would be in contravention of the provisions of chapter VI, VII, VIII, and

XIII of the Charter and would amount to an amendment of the Charter.

70. H.F.Haviland, Jr. The Political Role of Generally Assembly (New York, 1957) pp.1-2.

71. Repertory of Practice of UN Organs,Vol.1,p.309. 97

Czechoslovakia asserted that the sanctions

enforced against the peoples Republic of China and

the Korean People's Democratic Republic constituted

another attempt to violate the Charter of the

United Nations, because what the UN action involved was not the application of the general principles

of Article 2 , pargraph 5 of the Charter but the

actual imposition of sanctions under Article 41 of

the Charter, which stated that the authority of the

Security Council was beyond dispute. The Communists

blow stressed that the United Nations was not

legally entitled to authorize the use its flay,

establish a UN command, or cb signate the United

States as its agent, it held that the Actions of

the General Assembly and the Security Council with

regard to Korea were null and void according to UN

Charter. This opinion w?..s based on the belief that nothing was lawful unless expressly authorized by the Charter. The General Assembly had been used as an instrument for mobilizing political and psychological pressures of the world community on the Soviet Union. 98

Justification of the Action

The Anglo-American group rejected all the allegations made by the communist bloc against the validity of the UN action in Korea. It held that the actions taken by the General Assembly and the

Security Council were valid and within their competence under the Charter.

Alexander Cadogan to the United Kingdom said that he could not agree with the Communist bloc that "Article 107 barred the General Assembly from making recommendations in regard to the problem of independence of Korea" 72 . This Article enabled the

Allied Governire nts to deal with only the enemy states, but then Korea was not an enemy country; on the contrary, it was a victim of Japanese aggression. The UP government had submitted its proposal to the General Assembly after two ye^rs when it was found that the Joint Soviet, American

72. GAOR, Session 2, First tftteo mtg. 88.p.256. 99

Commission could not reach any agreement. The only alternative left was that of referring it to the

General Assembly which extended its cooperation to achieve Korean independence and unification as the

Mosco agreement could not be materialized. And the

UN commission on Korea was a legitimate organ of the General Assembly to achieve the said purpose.

The Russian objection that the United Nations had not right to intervene in the domestic affairs of any state was baseless and it was "a clear-cut, preplanned attack of North Korea". These actions of the General Assembly were not in contravention of the provisions of Article 106. As lester Pearson of

Canada put its "Article 106 had been intendj d to apply to the initial transitional period, prior to the creation of Security Council and the Military

Staff Committee .Nov; the General Assembly is the principal force to consider such matters 73 ".

73. Jbid, Session 5, Pleri, mtg. 301. P.338. 100

The objections based on Article 32 were not secret as it was difficult to establish identity of the true representatives of the Korean people. The

American representative, Dulles observed that his delegation was also in conplete ayreement with the

USSR that the matter should have been settled only after consulation with true representatives of the

Korean people. However, the USSR had failed to indicate the method of finding out the true representative of Korea. In fact, for eighteen months both the USSR and the United States had failed to agree as to who should be recognized as 74 the true representative of divided Korea . It was impossible for the General Assembly in such a situation to make the choice . The Communist

Government of North Korea had not allowed the UN

Commission to operate its territory and refused even to recognize it. That was why the Interim

Committee advised the Commission to hold elections

74. Ibid. mi

in south Korea and recognized the Rhee government as the only legal government of the whole of

Korea

Another objection was raised in the First

Committee invited the representatives of North

Korea. It would amount to granting recognition to

that government. This would be contrary to the will

of the Assembly

The Anglo-American group tried to rebuild the

communist argument on the validity of the actions

of the Security Council in Korea. The

representative of the United States, Ernest

A.Gross, observed: "The absence of the Soviet

Union's representative will not prevent us from

conducting the business to which we are pledged".

The absence of a permanent member from a meeting of

the Security Council would in no way diminish its

powers or its authority of act. The charter

75. GA.Resolution 1195 (HI)

76. GAOR, Session First jCttoo.July-89, pp.2601. 1C2

provide? in Article 28 that the Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuousli y 77

It was further argued that the Soviet

Representative, Malik, violated Article 2 7 of the

Charter by remaining absent fron the meetings of the council. A practice had already been adopted by the Security Council by 1980 whereby the abstention of a permanent member fron voting was still deemed to be a concurring vote within the meaning of the said Article. It meant that a decision of the

Security Council which received the support of at least seven members was not rendered legally ineffective by the abstention of a permanent member. The Soviet Union itself had clearly favoured this interpretation of the legal effects on abstention, and the practice had found favour 78 with all the permanent members. Thus, the absence

77. SCOR, yr.5, mtg, 461, p.14. 78. Repertory of Practice of the Security Council, 1946-951 (1954) pp.170-5; suplenent for 1952-5 (1957), pp. 67-68, Supplement for 1956-8(1959), p.64; Suplement for 1959-63 (1965) p.96. 103

of the Russian representative should be regarded as deliberate abstention from the vote incapable of preventing the passage of a resolution within the

79 terms of Article 2 7. The Anglo-merican group stressed that it was not an intention of the

Charter that the voluntary absence of a permanent member should stultify the role of the Security pouncil the essential structure of which was based on rapid and effective action for the maintenance of peace and security. Therefore, the opinion of their group, the accuration of illegality locked any legal foundation and could not be maintained. 80 The rule of unanimity was not an end itself but simply ameans to an end. It was only a hypothesis and not the fundamental basis of the

United Nations, and it could not be allowed to stand in the way of smooth working of the Security

Council.

79. Resolyn Higgins, UN Peace-Keeping (London, 1980), Vol. 2,p. 175.

80. GAOR, Session 5, Plei mtg 2 92, p.201. 104

The other important objection related to the representation of Communist China in place of

Nationalist China. The Soviet delegate wanted to add a word to the list of the permanent members in

Article 2 3 of the Charter. That one word "Peoples" before the words "Republic of China" was enough to show that the USSR was attempting to rewrite paragraph 1 of Article 2 3 of the Charter which 81 would be a violation of the Charter.

The question of the representation of

Communist China could only be decided by the vote of the General Assembly.

The Anglo-American group also challenged the allegations made by the Communist bloc against the validity of "Uniting for peace* as the Charter had provided for three basis security needs: a) Prompt and dependable action; b) reliable means of information; and c) a backing of adequate power ready for action

81. Ibid, pl#n. mtg. 302, p.343. 105

In these three respects the Security Council had primary responsibility" as mentioned in the

Charter.But if the Security Council was not able to act because of obstructive tactics of a permanent member, it did not meant that United Nations was important. The obligation of all Members to take action to maintain or restore peace did not disappear because of the veto. The Assembly should step in by invoking its residual power of

82 recommendations

The primary responsibility of the Security

Council was not exclusive, and the General Assembly could, under the provisions of the Charter, more appropriate recommendations in case of any breach of peace, threat to the peace or act of aggression.

This authority sprang from the broad power of the

General Assembly under the Charter, from the inherent right of the United Nations to survival and from its supreme responsibility to the peoples

82. GAOR, Session 5, Plen mtg• 2 92, p.197. 106

of the world in the maintenance of peace . The

Assembly was competent to deal with the maintenance of international peace and security. The uniting for peace" resolution was within the framework of the basic rules adopted at San Francisco. The

Security Council remained the sole organ in the event of a threat to peace and was empowered to

take decisions legally binding on the rtembers of the United Nations. However in their view the

resolutions had not changed the basic principles of

Charter. Only the General Assembly was given powers

in a particular situation to preserve the principles and purposes of the United Nations in accordance with Articles 1 and 2 , notwithstanding the powers conferred on the General Assembly by

Article 10 to 15 and the provision laid down in paragraph 2 of Article 11. The jurisdiction of the

General Assembly was complete in this respect uncb r

Article 11(2) and was limited only by Article 12,

83. Ibid. 107 which states that an issue on the agenda of the

Security council could not be discussed by the

Assembly simultaneously. If the Security Council was given primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter, the General Assembly had secordary responsibility in matter of this nature 84 . The General Assembly had clear and direct responsibility in this sphere under Articles

10,11,13 and 15, and consequently it was fully competent to assert its authority or to delegate it so long as it limited itself to the functions described to it. Its authority was partly exclusive, partly prallel, partly residual and secondary 85

It was further argued that Article 10,11, and 14 empowered the General Assembly to recommend whatever measures it deemed necessary to connection

84. Ibid, plen. mtg.301. p. 322.

85. Repertory of Practice of UN organs,vol.1, p.300 108

with any matter within the scope of the Charter,

including questions connected with the maintenance

of international peace and security. The limitation

in Article 11(2) did not in any way prevent the

General Assembly from excercising powers to make

recommendations conferred upon it by Article 10

since Article 11 (4) envisaged that the General

Assembly's power of recommendation was not united

by the provisions of Article 11. If the provision

of the last sentence of Article 11(2) was to be

reconciled with Article 10, the term "action" was

not to be defined as recommendation. This was a

reason for making the distinction between "action"

and "enforcement action". The General Assembly was

not empowered to order or to take direct

enforcement action, but it could recommend action

of a certain character including the use of armed

force. For this reason, it would be justifiable to

adopt the point of view that whenever the Security

Council was unable to take action, the General

Assembly had the responsibility to act under 109

Article 10. Obviously a recommendation by the

General Assembly did not have the force of a

decision of the Security council taken under the

provisions of Chapter VII. Therefore the General

Assembly could not have the power to make decisions

which would automatically impose commitments or

enforcement obligations or the Members of the

United Nations

If the Security Council had implemented

Article 43 of the Charter, there would have been no

need to authorize the general .Assembly to recommend

action. The draft resolution did not diverst the

Security Council of its process, it only provided

that whenever the five permanent members of the

security Council were not able to achieve unanimity

on special agreements provided for in Article 43.

member states could cause no delay in discharging

their obligation to maintain with their natural

armed forces contingents to be held available for

86. Ibid.p. 310. 110

the United Nations. The above provisions therefore might constitute a step towards implementing

Article 43. The authority of the General Assembly in the matter of peace and security was not confined to Article 10 to 15, but it also included

Articles 55, 56, 59 and 60, which referred to joint action under the authority of the General Assembly with a view to assuring friendly and peaceful relations in the field of economic and social cooperation, a question directly related to the maintenance of integrational peace and security.

Article 73, 76, 85, and 87 also referred to action by the General Assembly for the maintenance of international peace and security in case of non-self governing and Trust Territories.Article 35 provided that the General Assembly might be seized of a dispute, and Article 51 rtealt with the self-defence, individual or collective, Untill the

Security Council has taken the measures needed to maintain peace. If, therefore, the Security Council Ill

was prevented from excercising its functions and powers with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, the General

Assembly could very well adopt measures for collective self-defence 87

The Communist bloc had claimed that the resolutions of the General Assembly amount to an amendment of the Charter without going through the procedure laid down for Charter amendments in

Article 108. But in opinion of the majority of these resolutions did not amount to an amendment of the Charter at all. If the Security Council failed to fufils its paramount responsibility for want of unanimity, the majority had only two courses open before it could either remain inactive and allow the world to rush headlong tow.ards chaos and disaster or provide an alternative course of action. Through the "Uniting for Peace" resolution to General Assembly had only enabled itself to

87. Ibid.p. 318 112

peace and security, without violation any of the

great principles of international law and the UN

Charter. The international Court of Justice had

also supported this view. 88

The majority helfl that the use of UN flag

was not illegal as it had already been used in the

Balkans and in Palestine by the UN Commission the

United Nations had itself decided to use to flag

thus the Anglo-American bloc maintained that UN

in

action Korea was valid and according to the demand

of the situation and the Chartershould be flexible

enough to meet the exigencies of any situation. 113 CHAPTER-IV CRISIS IN CONGO Belgian Domination

The territory of Congo had been created by two men, king Leopold II of Belgium and by an

English explorer named Henry Morton Stanley in the

area south of the Congo river in equaterial Africa.

With relentless ambitions, full of energies as well

as fixity of purposes both these personalities had

accomplished the objectives of colonizing the

African territory. In course of time king Leopold

was able to impose his personal rule over the

African colony and had got it ratified by the

European powers at the Congress of Berlin in July

1885 . The Belgian parliament on 15 November, 1908

had terminated the personal rule of the Belgian

king due to constant criticisms from foreign

quarters and especially from the governments in

England, US and Germany that the ruler had

prepetrated severe attrocities on the native

population and also that he had granted sweeping

concessions to foreign companies in the

1. For details see, Parker Thownas Moon, Imperialism and World policies (New York, 192 6) pp.79-80. 114

'2 Colony • The status of the Belgian Congo, however

remained as such till it received its independence

on 30 June 1960.

The Belgian policy towards the Congo had

been described as "Paternalism". This denoted the

fact that all the Congolese population, except for

those belonging to the administration had been shut

out completely from getting any information about their country. The Belgian had followed a highly centralized policy and had been averse to the idea of providing higher education to the Congolose, because of the year of demand

for independence. Their over.all objective had been aimed at insulating the Congolese from the

"Wars of national liberation" and the "winds" " of change" that had taken place in various parts of

Africa .

At the same time the colonial government had concentrated its efforts towards economic development and social upliftment of native people

2. P.B.Harris, Studies in African Politics (London, 1990), p.23. 3. Department of State, 1965 "as cited in Report of the Special study Mission to Africa, November 27- December 14, 1965(Washington ,D.C1966) .p. 65 . 115

because of their belief that the Conglase would only crave for higher economic standards and not for their intellectual development as well as 4 . . political participation . With this perspective in mind they had sought for the exploitation of

Congo's vast natural resources. The Belgians had encouraged foreign private investment, by providing them with special protections, incentives and concessions in this regard. As a result of this policy large scale investment by Belyian and other outside corporations had been established jsuch as the societe Generate de Belgique (The Societe

Generate), the Union Miniere due Hanut Katanga

(Union Miniere). The Tanganyika concessions (TANKS),

Sociate Internationale Forestiere Miniere due Congo

(For miniere) the Compag&i-e Contonneira Congolese

(Contonco) as well as the American Congo Company.

In the social sphere, the Belgiam had adopted a cautious but step-by-step approach to

4. Dorthy Doge, African Politics in Perspective, (New York, 1966) p.44. llfi

acquaihtthe native people with modern standards of western civilization. To facilitate this process they had encouraged the migration of rural population urban centres and especially to mining and industrial areas. This, however, had resulted in an increase in social tension as well as a breakdown in the traditional African life. The colonical government had further entrusted the

Catholic missions with the task of providing primary as well as technical education to the huge

Congolose population . In the process the Congo had been able to reach almost a saturation point with regard to primary and technical education. The country, however, had to face several shortages in the areas of trained political leaders, civil servants, industrial managers as well as professionals. The hall-mark of Belgion policy had, thus been to create a prosperous native- working class in the Congo which would be content with prosperity rather than with votes.

5. See Catherine Hoskyns. The Congo Since Independence (London, 1965), p. 19. 117

The reality of the Congo is that it is located at the strategic and geographic heart of

Africa and is richly endowed by nature . For instance, it produces 7 per cent of world's copper,

67 per cent of cobalt and one third of world 'j industrial diamonds, besides large quantities of cadmium, gold, silver, zinc, iron tungston, casseterite, maganese, uranium and radium . The geo-political situation, as well as richness of the country had prompted a competition betv/een the cold war antagonists for the control of region.

It has, therefore, been aptly remarked that "the

Q Congo is a bride every body wants .

6. Ernest W. Crisis in the Congo : A UN Force in Action, (Washington, D.C. 1965), 8.6.

7. Unity International; (New Delhi) Vol. . No.l January 1978, p.3.

8. G.Mennenm Williams, Africa for the Africans (Michigan, 1969) p. 86, Menon williams was Assistant Secretary of State For African Affairs from 1961 to 1966. 11R

A second Congolose reality is the divisive factor of tribalism. In a country comprisinq more than 2 00 tribes who spoke .some 2 00 principal languages and dialects, tribal loyalities as well as ancient enmities had formed characteristcs features of Congolese societies as elsewhere in

Africa which however, had impeded and • fc-hwarted the 9 growth of national unity in the country .

The tragedy of the Congo episode, however, had revolved around the main fact that the Belgians had proved themselves to the totally "unfit" to shoulder their responsibilities as a colonial power. They had not only refused to address themselves seriously to the question of decolonization, but had also failed to initiate measures of political reforms on the pattern of other European colonial powers.

9. Stephen R.Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo (New York, 1974), p.15.

10. Ernest W.Lefaver, Crisis in the Congo: A UN Force in Action (Washington, DC 1965), p.6. 119

Details of the Congo tragedy are beyond the scope of this study. However one may portray some of the historical developments in the Congo that eventually provides the factual setting for the

United Nations intervention and the TJnited States involvement.

Congo had been a vast territory possessed by a Belgian company which established trade

stations on the lower Congo between 1879 to 1884, and had formally given it over to the Belgian

government Congress of Berlin recognized it as a

"Congo Free State".

This so called "Free state" remained under

the Belgian colonialism from November 1908 to 1960.

Untill 1908, for more than four centuries the Congo had been subject to ruthless exploitation of

11. Rubert Fmerson, Africa and the United States Policy (Mew Jersey, 1967 p.62. 12 0

12 African labour . Approximately more than thirty million people were made slaves and traded abroad under Belgian sovereignty . The barbarious personal rule of the Belgian king who had taken

12. So heavy were the levies of rubber that the

natives had no time to cultivate their patches

of grain, famine found its victims and infant

mortality, always high, became apalling; many a

phosperous village fell into decay and some

parts of the crown domains (travellers tell)

became deserted wilderness, where the silence

of the forest "broken only by occassional

trampling of the elephant and buffalo, the

chatter of whilemaned monkeys, the screams of

the grey parrot", see, Peter Thomas Moon,

Imperialism and world polities. New York 1926.

13. Kwame Nkrumah, Challenge of the Concho (New

York, 1967), pp.2-13. 121

over the control of the land from portugal in the last quarter of the 18th century, aroused widespread public outcry in Europe and eventually forced the Belgiam government to assure full colonial responsibility for the Congo in 1908. The kind of the rule that followed did introduce some humanitarianism like the establishment of some hospitals and schools.

The Belgian Colonial system had its own sophistication. In one sense, the Congo was the most developed colony and was administered by a 14 bureaucracy of 10,1000. Belgian Officers , who established a highly developed system of economic exploitation involving international cooperation and enormous investments (and profits) with complex rail, water and transport systems. But on the other hand, the Belgian approach to colonial management was merely a policy of paternalism , after brutal

14. K.P.Saxena, The United Nations and Collective Security, (New Delhi, 1974), p. 17.

15. Ibid. 12 2

traditions under the earlier personel regime of

leopaldvitXe. The difference between the new and old government may be illustrated by one instance . In

1912, a Congo official was arbitrarily executing

seven native men, for women and a child. In old days such executions would have passed without notice. But humanitarianism of the new type was

less profitable than Leopoldian methods. Throwing the colony open to internatonal trade, abolishing of forced labour, relinquishing the profitable

leopoldian monopolies and assuming the debts of the

Free State, left the Belgian government with a colony whose revenues were inadequate to defray the administrations expenditure. Its approach to colonialism was to short sighted that it did not anticipate the fast growing advancement of African nationalism and established a very differend kind of relationship between coloniser and the colony.

No attempt was made to provide for participation or

16. Peter Thomas, n.l pp. 88-89. 12 3

even association of the Congolese people with the administration of the country. By 1950, more than

10,000 Belgians held all unparelal positions in highly advanced bureaucratic structure and not a single doctor or engineer was Congolese. Only 17

Congolese were graduates at the time of independence and there were only two universities in the whole of the Congo. Administration was highly centralised and administered by Belgian

Officers.

The resources of the Congo were exploited by the Union Miniere a company, formed in 1906, jointly by the British and Belgian governments, which enjoyed exclusively mining rights over

Katanga by agreement with Belgian government untill

1990. The sudden decision to give independnece to the Congo in 1960 disturbed the earlier agreements

17. This Union Miniere was formed in 1906 as a stock company with the million fromes capital, half Belgian and half British and obtained the right to exploit all copper mines in a zone about half large as Belgium untill the year 1990 as well as to built railways and roads and to exploit coal mica, iron and gold mica. For details see, Peter Thomas More, n.l p.9 . 124

and provoked a strong reaction. The Belgium and

British finance was closely involved in mining in

Katanga. Soon after the independence of the Congo katanga seceded from the Congo Republician with the packing of Western colonial powers and became a complicated problem for the United Nations peace

Keeping Operation.

Being extremely rich economically the

Congolose were politically backward. They were

devided into various tribal groups. Political parties and their leaders emerging after the

independence were purely based on tribal loyalty.

The tribal structure was highly complex which led

to disunity and wide differences between two

regions. No single group was dominant in the whole

country. Some important tribal groups which became

powerful at local level because of their numerical

strength or strategic situation or their 12 5

tradition and political culture- The Ba-Katanga

Ba-Mongo, Ba-lunda, and Ba-Luba. The Ba-Kongo

dominated the narrow strip of land between

Leopoldville and the sea, and were also found in

adjacent areas of free Congo and Angora covering

nearly fifty percent of African population of

Leopoldville. Joseph Kasavubu belonged to the

group. The Ba-Mongo group was found in the Northern

part of the old province of leopoldville and the

southern part of the Congo river, Ba-Luba was in

the Northern province of Katanga, whereas the

Ba-Lunda acquired strength in North. Moise Thomba

belonged to Ba-Lund group.

The traditional conflicts were common

before the advent of the Europeans and were put

down during Belgian administration. But the lack of

18. The Prefex "Ba" or "Bena" when added to some

tribal name means "people". It is often

omitted. Ouoted from B.Charavasty, Congo

Operation (Ministry of Defence, Govt of India,

1976) p.5. 12 6

concidence between ethnic and administrative boundaries often led to popular conflicts within ethnic groups themselves. Declaration of Independence Since the 1950s, a political awareness was sweaping across the whole Africa, including the

Congo. In december 1955, Professors van Bislen's thirty year plan for the political emanicipation of

Africa cought the imagination of some educated

Congolese in the form of published manifesto in an

African paper of Leopold-vdlle. ,.. "La consience

Af ricaine". This manifesto became the ideological basis for a tribal group called Ba-Kongo, which mostly constituted Abako party led by Kasavubu. The manifesto was call "to all type of discrimination and establishment of a democratic government based on equality of man. After a year of this manifestoes publications the municipal elections were held for the first time in the history of

Congo in three main cities. Elizabethville,

Leopoldville, and Jodotville, which gave rise to political parties and strengthened the demand for interim autonomy, and self rule. Otherwise untill

1957 Congolese did not know about "election".

Most of the Congolose parties were based mainly on tribal affinity. The Abako party 12 7

represented the Ba-Kongo of lower congo region, the conkat party of Tshome was suported by the Bafunda of .Southern Katanga. Albert Kalonji's branch of MNC represented the Bafcunda of South Kesai and Jeson

Sendues Balubakat party was explicify based on bribe of northern katnaga patrice Lumumba founded a national centrist party, unique in cutting across tribal and regional lines. His Movement National

Congolose obtained wider support from people, although it was strong in province of Kasai, and in

Stanleyville in the orientale province-. All four cyrille Aeloula, Joseph, Ileo and Joseph Mobutu including Lumumba who became Prime Minister belonged to this party.MNC was only radical party regarded uncomfortable for Belgian authority. Anothe important party was formed when Neo opposed Lumumba in 1957 and formed MNC (K) with the support of

Albert Kalongi; the President of Kasai branch of

MNC. Anoine Gizenga led the separatist party ie

Party Solidaire Af ricai> ( PSA) .

The interactions among emerging political party leaders to strengthen the demand for autonomy 12 8

and independence cane through many events like

speech of President General de Gaulle, delivered at

Brazzaville on August 24, 1958 and Pan Africa

Conference held in Accra in December 1958 which was

attended by Patric Lumumba . After his return to

the Congo, he raised the Accra Conference call for

immediate independence for the whole of Africa.

Untill 1957 no significant political activity by

African leaders had been permitted in the Belgian

Congo and the very idea of independence was hardly

discussed.

20 The first serious anti-colonial activity

occurred during the first week of January 1959,

when riots at mass scale broken out the

leopoldville. The interest in riots were first

responded by suppressive measures when more than a

hundred of the Congolese national demonstrators

11. He also established contact with Nkrnah and Nassar who saw in him a champion of left-win^ anticolonialism. 2.1. B.Urquhart, Hammerskjold (London, 1973) P.390. 12 9

were killed and many of its leaders arrested. A

Commission of Enquiry was set up by the Belgian government which found that discrimination unemployment and changing international environment were responsible for wac and violence. No longer could the Congo be isolated from world

2 1 happenings and especially from neighbouring countries.As early as January 1959, king Baudoin announced that it was the Belgian policy to prepare the Congo for indepence. But Congolese politicians,

suspicious of Belgian intentions began to build political support for the future. During April

7-12, 1950, Lumumba organised a meeting in

Luluabourg to demand self-government by January,

1961 and to determine the date for independence of the Congo. It was followed by meeting in

21 . From 1950 to mid 1960s events moved at hectic phase in the whole colonial Africa. The

Belgians were facing a flood. By mid 1060s more

than 15 African colonese already had or were

scheduled for independence in time for

admission to United Nations in the General

Assembly session Sept;; 1960. 130

Leopoldville in June which alsc called fresh negotiation, with political leaders. In early

November 1959 street rioting broke out in

Stanleyville which was again suppressed at the cost of many Congolese lives and with arrest of

Lumumba. When elections were held in December many political leaders boycotted them. During the course of these happenings, at last king

Buadoin visited the C^ngo in the month of

December. Immediately after his visit, invitations to a Round Table Conference.

Leaders who attended a conference were Kasavuba

(Abako) rizenga (PSA), Kalongi (MNC-K) and

Lumumba (MNC). At the end of conference, independence was announced to be in effect by the end of the six months since conference. The

Conference also worked out for a constitution system. In the absence of long tern preparations for independence of the Congo much hope was placed on a Treaty of Friendship and 131

Cooperation which was never ratified by the

Congolese legislature after independence.

According to the term of the treaty, the

Belgian Administration officers and technical personnel were to stay back in the Congo after independence. The Law and order was to be in the hands of the "force publique* which required the officers (all Belgians) to stay for sometime.

All this showed that the independence to the

Belgiaum. This was soon realised by Congo after independence.The dream of the Congolese for a happy and prosperous Congo after independence. The dream of the Congolese for a happy and properous Congo after independence was dashed, thanks to their administrative experience, inter tribal and personal rivalries and international involvement leading to recession. No one in Congo was prepared either emotionally or otherwise for such 132

consequences of independence. There were widespread chaos, fear and mutual recrimination of few political leaders expected to hold the reigns of governmental were without experience of public life, all of them too young and inexperienced and many of them short sighted and parochial in perspective. During Belgian administration the position held by Congolese were only of clerical nature

Belgium officers continued to occupy the same positions which they had held before independence, thus the whole administration was run by Belgians. There were no changes in the administrative structure except the new positions of the Prime Minister and the President. If Belgium officers were to leave their respective ports, it would have created a vacum in the country because the£e were no educated and administratively trained man power to fill the vaccura after Belgian

22. Patric Lumumba born in 192 5 spent most of his

youth in Stanleyville / where he became

Contd... 133

departure.The history of Congolese independence was too short, in absence of any pre-arrangement for administrative training by one previous government although the history of brutal exploitation was too old. Belgian colonial intentions left the Congo in

a state of chaos, conflict and fear, where no one

except the expatriates were expected or equipped to

excercise any control.

Similarly, the newly born Congo did not

have its own armed forces for its protection. Even

the Chief Commander was a Belgian national. The

same conditions remained even after two or three

years of independence.

The Congolese army mutined within a week

after the declaration of independence, the reason

being that the soldiers were not getting increase

a postal clerk and at 34 years of his age became Prime Minister. Kasavabu who was President at the age of 42 years was a government clerk. Tshombe educated at the American Methodist Mission was grocer before associating himself with Unions Miniere of Katanga. The dangerous of all Colonel Mobotu born in 1930, sevrved as NCO in Belgian colonial army and became Chief of Staff of Force Publique (was supported by US and Belgium) . He created problem for Lumumba as well as the Republic of C6ngo. 134

in emoluments in Leopoldville and saw little chance of getting officer's rank. The mutiny also underscored the attitude of the Congolese nationals who found it difficult to continue to be commanded even after independence by the same officers as before independence. In the mutiny the Congolese

soldiers captured the means of communication and terrorized the Europeans to the street at gun point.The situation was beyond control, since maintenance of law and order was under Belgian

Officers who themselves were the targets. Thus the whole administration became paralysed.

Soon after the incident, at the suggestion of the United States Ambassador Timberlake, the

Congolese Government appeared to the United Nations for UN Technical and Military Assistance, including military advisors, experts and technicians to assist in developing a national army for the Congo to maintain national security and law and order.

But before UN could reach to help the Congo, more than 300 troops of Belgian army landed at 13S

Elizabethville airport in Katnga , admittedly to protect the Belgian lives and property, occupied military camps2 3• The brutal fighting and

counterattack by Congolese mutineers aggravated the

situation. By July 13, the Belgium troops expelled

the Congolese forces and occupied the European

areas of leopoldville where parliament situated.

Lumumba, the Prime Minister of Congo reacted very

angrily at the violation of the Treaty of 24 Friendship between Belgium and Congo . Mois

Tshombe soon declared the secession of Katanga from

Congo and when President Kasavubu and Prime

Minister Lumumba visited Katanga, they were not

allowed to land in Elizabethville on the airport

was controlled by Belgium troops. Tshombe was

supported by the Belgium and this was anticipated

by the Congolese government. Thus the Congds

national integrity was threatened by an external

aggression in this situation Congo government

23. Rosalyn Higgin, United Nations keeping 1949-1967. Documents and Commentry (London, 1971) P.12 of n.30.

2*. Ibid. 136

changed their original apeal from technical assistance in military field to mantain law and order, protection of territory of the Congo from

Belgian aggression. While appealing from United

Nations intervention against the external aggression, Prime Minister lumumba also warned that

if the UN assistance failed to come immediately the

Congo would be obliged to seek assistance from other sources.

Thus the Congo crisis as then developed with the breakdown of Law and order because of the absence of Congo's own force to control the situation and presence of Belgian troops in Congo at very large scale after independence, the threat to territorial integrity of the Congo because of

Tshombos proclamation of independence of Katanga and the impanding danger of involvement by a third power which was likely to pose a threat to the UN capability to deal with the situation. To meet this deteriorating situation as noted already, Kasavuhu and Lumumba first appealed to the UN for technical 137

assistance of a military nature including technicians, experts and advisors to assist its own government in developing and strengthening its national army, for twin purposes; a) national

2 * security and b) the maintenance TJ3W and order strangely enough they also appealed to the US for

assistance on July 12 (The appeal was made by

Gizenga, the Deputy PM of the Congo). Subsequently

enough they also appealed for assistance of military rather than technical assistance of a military nature and they would be obliged to seek assistance from Bandung Powers if the aid was not 2 6

forth coming immediately . The essential purpose of the request for military was to protect the

nationalist territory of the Congo external

25. Brian, Urquhart, Hammersjold (London, 1973) P. 393.

2fi. SCOR, S/4382, July 13, 1960 (Telegram of July 12 ). 138

27 aggression

27. Brain urquhart, n.24, p.396, on July 3, 1960

Belgian para troops expelled Congolese troops by

force from the main airport a Leopoldville and

occupied the Furopean area of the town in which the

government and parliament buildings were situated.

Lumumba informed Ralph Bunche, that Ghana had been

asked for military aid pending arrival of UM

Force. 139 CHAPTER-V

THE UNITED NATION5ROLE IN COHGO CRISIS

Super Powers Unanimity

Belgian rule in the Congo had for fifty

years been based on the assumption that a

paternalistic concern for the physical well being

and economic needs of the indigenous population

would prevent thevoiGe of a nationalist movement.

When in January 1959, violent nationalist riots

erupted in Leopoldville, the Congolese capital, it

became clear that these assumptions had been

incorrect. The Belgian Government, interpreting

these riots as a harbinger of impending disaster,

decided to end its coionial rule as rapidly as

possible. Independance for the Congo was stated for

June 30,1960. During the last year of Belgian

colonial rule, little attempt was made to prepare

an indigenous elite for the imminent

responsibilities of self - government. Since the

Congolese were not trained in self-rule and the

overwhelming majority of 14 million people were 140

illiterate, the central government faced serious difficulties from within and from without .

Thus, on June 30,1960, the Colony of the

Belgian Congo was suddenly transformed into an independent nation, a newborn infant left on the world's doorstep. The government that took over the

Congo was headed by President Joseph Kasavubu and premier Patrice Lumumba. Both had been members of the Congolese National Movement. Kasavubu the more conservative of the two, was not excessively hostile toward Belgium and the Western powers. The office of the presidency which he came to occupy 2 was largely an honorific post .

Lumumba, the premier had been a more ardent nationalist than Kasavubu and was resolved to severe all relations with Beyium after independence. Both these men were challenged in

1. New York Time, 10 July, 1960.

2. G.Mennen Williams, "The US objectives in the Congo", Africa Report (Washington D.C., August 1965) p.13. 141

their views by Moise Tshombe, Premier of the provincial government of Katanga.Tshombe had been backed by the Belgian government during the colonial period. He was a wealthy man, conservation, and pro-Belgian. Thus the n«?w

Conglese leadership held political views along the entire spectrum-f rom lumumba'i uncompromising anticolonialism to Tshombe's pro- Belgian

Sentiments.

A few hours after its Declaration of

Independence, the new government faced a crisis which threatened its very survival. The Congolese

Army, which had never had an African officer corps, rose up, demanding the ouster of its Belgian officers and pay increases for the enlisted men.

Many disappointed civilians who had expected to inherit all Belgian prossessions on independence had joined in the mutiny . During the following days the mntiny spread through the rest of the

3. Sharma, D.N. Afro- Asian Group in UN, (Allahabad, 1969), p. 149. 142

Congo. In the major cities lawlessness prevailed, and thousands of Belgians fled. On July 11, Tshombe declared that Katanga was seeding from the rest of the country and forming a new state allied with 4 Belgium . Since Katanga province was the wealthiest port of the Congo, possessing the country's richest mineral deposits, this act of secession threatened the life of the new state. Moreover the provincial government of Katanga requested Belgian military help in order to suppress the violence that was

engulfing it along with the rest of the Congo.

Belgian troops reentered Katanga for the purpose of

restoring order. But on the following day, the

Belgian government charged that since the new

Cojiglese government of premier tumumba had been unable to protect the lives and interests of the

remaining Belgian population Belgian troops would march into leopoldville as well. When the Belgians

reentered the capital, shooting broke out between

4. UN yearbook, 1962 (New york, P.52. 143

them and Congolese solidiers.At this point the

.Lumumba regime began to blame riots not on the

Africans but on the Belgians. The premier accused

Belgium of aggression and stated that the colonial

power had conspired with Tshombe to engineer the

secession of Katanpa province in order to find a

justification for the reimposition of colonial rule

what had started as only a local conflict thus

quickly took on the dimension of a major struggle

between nationalism and colonalism.

On July 13, 1960, members of the Lumumba

regime cabled the US government for aid, but both

premier Lumumba and President Kasavuba immediately

disavowed this appeal and stated that it had been

meant as a request for a UN force composed to

military personnel from neutral countries,

Nvertheless, the earlier request touched off a

sequence of events that turned the Congo into a

battleground for the superpowers. Soviet premier

5. Ibid. 144

Khruschev immediately announced that the Congolese

soldiers had been perfectly right in their mutiny

against the Belgian Officers. He also claimed that

the United States and the Western colonial powers

in NATO had conspired to send Belgian troops into

the Congo to reimpose colonial status under the

pretext of restoring order. UN Secretary General

Dag Hammarskjold called an emergency meeting of

the Security Council and urged authorization for

the dispatching of a HN military force to the

Congo.During the Council Session the Soviet Union

condemned Belgian earned aggression" and accused

the United States of collusion with colonialism.

The United States denounced the Soviet accusation

as" outrageous and untrue*'. The Security Council,

in an 8 to 0 vote, called on Belgium to withdraw

its troops from the Congo and authorized the

Secretary General to organize a UN Operation in the

Congo ONUC to be patterned on the model of the

6. Everyman's United Nations, 8th Edition, 1968, p.168. 145

Middle East Force established during the Suez

Crisis of 1956. Both the Soviet Union and the

United States voted for the resolution, while

Britian, France, and Nationalist China abstained.

Thus, the first UN resolution of the Congo reflected at least a temporary consensus between the super powers. It was in the national interests when he announced that Soviet Union was considering direct intervention in the Congo. He stated that this might become necessary, since he had received a telegram from President Kasaurber and Premier

Lumumba staking their lives were in danger and that they might be compelled to ask for intervention by the Soviet Union if the Western camp [did] not desist from aggression against the sovereignty of 7 the Congo Republic" . The Soviet leader pledged

Russion support to lumumba and told the west "hands off the congo!" on July 2 4, the Soviet delegation to the United Nations demanded the evacuation of

7. New York Times, 2 4 July, 1960. 146

the Belgian "aggressions" within three days. The US representative.-Henry cabot lodge, countered with the declaration that the United State "would do whatever may be necessary to prevent the intrusion of any military forces not requested by the United

Q

Nations." The Security Council barred unilateral intervention and urged the speedy withdrawal of

Belgian troops. The two super-powers were carefully excluded from the international confident. Almost

2 0,000 troops from twenty nine nations including

Moreover, Tunisia, Ghana, Ethiopia, Mali, Guinea,

Ireland, Sweden, and India', all under the UN flag- was, deployed through the Congo to prepare the way for the more ardous task of building a responsible and viable conferese government.

Even while UN troops were arriving in the

Congo, further complications developed. Tribal antagonisms erupted into local wars; South Kasai, following the example of Katanga secured from the central government ; and Moise Thonmbe not only

8. Ibid. 147

refused do dismiss his Belgian advisers and troops

but announced that he would meet with forces any

attempt by the United Nations to enter Katanga .

Since the Republic of Congo was not yet a

member of the United Nations, the Security Council

met at the instance of the Secretary General under

Article 99 of the Charter. The proposal which

Secretary General Hamerskgold outlined for the

Congolese assistance was quiet positive and was

pased on the premise that the only lasting and

permanent solution to the crisis was to create

conditions in which the Congolese government would

be able to pursue its interests and to take care of

the situation by itself. The nature of the United

Nations action would be neither an inforcement

action within the meaning of Articles 41 and 42 of. g

The United Nations Charter nor the Korean type. But

it would be like all otehr operations where the

United Nations acted as a soldier and not as a fireman.

9. SCOR 9D0C S/4387), July 14,1960. 148

The Security Council called upon the

Belgians to withdraw from the Congo and authorised the Secretary General to take necessary steps in consultation with the Government of the Republic of

Congo to provide the government with such military assistance as may be necessary untill through the efforts of the Congolese Governments with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the

National Security Forces might, to the opinion of the government be able to fully meet their task.

The Secretary General's mandate was vague and blank and it led to diverse interpretations. The

Secretary-General reported b?ck to Security Council on July 18 indicating the following implications of his mandate as he understood it.

1) Restoration of order was the main task.

2 ) The United Nations Forces should be

regarded as "Temporary Security Forces" in

the Congo with Congolese consent.

3) It might ^e considered as serving as an arms

of the government for the maintenance of 149

order and protection of life, but would

exclusively be under the UN command and

could not be permitted to become a party to

any international conflict.

4) The Security council'^ permanent members

would be sought from States of Africa and

Asia. Seven African battalians were

requested and airlift specialised units and

equipments had been made certain to non

African states.

5) The UN troops would apply force only in

self-defence, any initiative in the use of

force on its part was prohibited

Evidently, the mission of the UN operation in the Congo (the organization des nations Unies du

Congo) was not the name as was the United Nations

Emergency Force (UNEF) and Uinted Nation Obervers

Group (UNOGIH). In none of the latters operations, the United Nations was not put in charge of the low and order within a nation and this by its very

10. SCOR, 15th year, supplement for July, April, September, 1996, Doc, A/4389. 150

nature became the main fource ofttouble for the

UN in the COg°. This raised new questions about

United Nations'role in democratic conficts in -tW

country. Although it was denied that the

United Nations had any role in the internal

conflicts of the Congo; the nature of relation

between the central government of the Congo or

the Congo operation was unclear further if the

UN Operation were to be non-intervening,

non-partisan and without initiative the

question was how inactively was the operation

to succeed in the face of the law and and order

situation in a vast country live the Congo.

In the light of all these developments,

Hamarskjord thought it necessary in early

August to return to the Council for a

clarification of his mandate. The consensus

between the super-powers continued to hold.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union

Voted for a resolution sponsored by Tunisias

and Ceylon which declared that the entry of the

United Nations Force into the province of 151

of Katanpa (was) necessary" and demanded the

inwddiate withdrawal of Belgian troops from the province .The resolution was adopted by a vote of

9 to 0, with France and Italy abstaining. The

United States voted for the resolution with some misgivings because of the strong action against

Belgium1, the Sovet Union.' Which wanted even stronger action had introduced a draft resolution that would have imposed upon the Secrectary

General the obligation "to take decisive measures, without hesitating to use every means to that end" to remove the Belgian troops. But in the end, the

Soviet Union, too, supported the Ceylon-Tunisia resolution.

11. UN Doc. S/442 6 (August 9, 1960). 152

Breakdown of Understanding The consensus between the super powers broke down when, in the autuirn of 1960, the new

Congolese government disintegrated into factions. A power struggle between Premier Lumumba and

President Kasavuba erupted. In September, the two leaders fired each other from their respective positions. In the Melee, a young pro-Western coloneL -Toseph Mobutu, took command of the armed

forces. As a result the position of the political

leader most sympathetic to the USSR was undermined.

Under Mobutus rule, many Belgian administrators

returned to the Congo as unofficial advisers.

The sup'er powers now took opposing positions on the two rival factions in the Congo government.

The United States passed the United Nations to

recognize the Kasavubu-Mobutu Government, while the

Soviet Union begam to support the deposed Lumumba with aircrafts and trucks. The UN representative who was in charge of this Crifc-i-oal phase of ONUC 's operations in the summer and fall of 1960 was 153

Andrew W.Cordier, executive assistant to Dae,

Hammarskjold; Cordior's overriding concern was to uphold the Charter and the resolve law and order in the wartorn Congo. In order to stop both Kasavubu and Lumumba, from inflaming popular feelings even further and to prevent the outbreak of civil war, he decided to close all Congolose airports, to immobolize troops, and to shut down the national radio in Leopoldville. Three years later, Mr..

N.T. Fedorenko, the Soviet delegate in the

Administrative and Budgetary (fifth) Committee of the General Assembly, was to declare that by this action, "Cordier had adopted a decision that broke

Lumumba's back" and had thus started the United

Nation* on its pro Western course in the Congo. 12

Similarly, many highly placed US officials later pointed to Cordier's decision as having stopped the

Russians" . Cordier himself defended his action on the grounds that it had not been taken against one of the rival factions or against one of the superpowers but for the law of the United Nations and the Charter. 154

After the closure of airports and radio

stations by the United Nations, the Soviet Union accused the United Nations of neocolonialism and proposed a draft resolution directing the United

Nations to cease any interference in the internal

affairs of the Congo and to hand over the airports

and radio-stations to the Central government. Only

Poland supported this resolution. Ceylon Tunisia

abstained and proposed a substitute resolution

which endorsed the policies and notions of the

Secretary- General. This resolution was vetoed by

13 the Soviet Union . The consensus between the

superpowers had now broked down completely,

paralyzing the Security Council. The General

Assembly was immediately called into emergency

session.

The superpowers now attempted to line up

majorities for their opposing positions in the

General Assembly. The United States led to the

13. UN DOC, S/4526 (September 17, 1960). 155

forces seeking "to affirm and strengthen the

Mandate already given to the Secretary General by

the Security Council". The Soviet Union on the

other hand, took position that "the United Nations

Command and the Secretary-General personally have unmasked themselves as supporters of the

colonialism." 14 After intensive and often

acrimonious debate, an overwhelming majority of the

Assembly supported the Secretary Generals policy

appealed to members to refrain from unilateral

action in the Congo, and created a Oonciliatign

"Commission made up of African and Asian

representatives in order to pacify the internal

dissensions in the Congolese government

The General Assembly also considered

another important matter at this time: who should

represent the Congolese government in that body?

14. UN General Assembly, Official Records, 4th Emergency Special Session, 858th Plenary meeting (September 17,1960).

15. General Assembly Res. 1474 (ES-IV) (September 20,1960). 15fi

The Republic of the Congo had been administered to membership on September 2 0, but the question of seating its representatives had been left to the

Credentials Committee. Several days later, Guinea proposed that, pending a decision of the

Credentials Committee, representatives of the lumumba government should be seated. This proposal was supported by Ceylon, Ghana India, Indonesia,

Mali, Moroe'eo and the United Arab Republic, all of which had troops in th4? Congo. It was also vigorously defended by the Soviet Union.

The Guinean proposal brought a sharp protest from Kasavubu who immediately set out to plead his case at UN Headquarters in New York. On

November 8, he appeared on the rostrum of the

General Assembly and demanded the seating of his representatives. He was supported in this demand by the United States, which claimed that Lumumba government did not have effective and stable control of the country or the ability to fulfills its international obligations. The Assembly debate 157

was adjourned briefly, pending the return from the

Congo of the Conciliation Commission. But on the

Credential Committee, which had been given a

seperate mandate after the vote of the Congo';, membership, the west had a clear majority. The

United States proposed the accridiation of the

Kasavubu delegation, and after two days of heated

debate, the motion was adopted in Committee by a

vote of 6 to 1. Lumumba's supports now had to bring

their fight into the General Assembly.

Both super powers lobbied intensively for

their positions, especially among the African

members of the Assembly. The United States was

backed solidly by all the NATO power, most of the

latin American states, and a majority of the French

Speaking African members, althogh a considerable

number of African and Asian states which had

endorsed the Congo policy of the Secretary-General

not badked and either abstained or voted against

it. The final vote on the critical condition

issue was 53 in favour of sealing the Kasavubu 15R

delegation, ?>4 opposed, and 19 abstentions. The US position emerged victorious.

The Congo operation continued, but now it was clear that one of the Superpowers no longer felt that it served its national interest. Though it could still be said that ONUC was impartially assisting the legitimate government of the Congo to restore order; it was obvious that the Soviet Union believed the Kasavubu government to be pro-Western.

For the reason the USSR vetoed the continuation of

ONUC in the Security Council and, when the

Secretary General carried on the operation under

Assembly authority, mounted the attack against him and his office. The United States, of course, insisted that it was supporting a disinterested UN

Operation that thought to restore peace and order

in the Congo. On wonders, however, what American policy might have been had the credentials

Committee and the General Assembly seated lumumba instead of kasavubu. 159

The United Nations' Force in Action On February 13, 1961, it was announced that

Patrice- Lumumba had been killed by hostile tribesmen

in Katanga. This event which convulsed the Congo

and threatened to plunge its into civil war, led to

a partial restoration of super power consensus in

the Security Council. On February 21, the Council,

in a 9 to 0 vote with the Soviet Union and France

abstaining passed its strongest resolution to date,

urging that "the United Nations take immediately

all the appropriate measures to prevent the

occurences of civil war in Congo, including the

use of force, if necessary in the last resort."

The resolution also called for" an immediate and

impartial investigation" of lumumba's death. The

United States had some misgivings about the

implications of the use of force, even "in the last

resort" but the fact that most of the Africa and

Asian states delegation to vote for it. The Soviet

Union also fearful of alienating the African States

16. UN DOC, S/4741 (February 21, 1961). 160

of vetoed the "force in the last resort" resolution, abstained. Thus with the reluctant approval of one of the superpowers and the full consent of the other, the Security Council - no

longer veto-bound resumed political direction of the Congo operation. The African resumed political direction of the Congo operation. The African

States had thus been instrumental in restoring a partial consensus between the superpowers.

During the spring and summer of 1961, the

Congo presented a picture, of extreme confusion.

Kasavubu had oppointed Cyrille Aboula as Prime

Minister of the Congolese Government, but Adoula

Government was unable to control the entire country

Lumumba's vice Premier, Antonic Gizenga,

established the "legitimate Government" of the

Congo in Stanleyville. And ONUC Forces in their

efforts to integrate Katanga into the control

government, ran into mounting resitence not only

from the Katangese forces of Moise Tshombe but from

French, Belgian, and South African mercenaries. lfil

There were numerous casualities on all sides.

Finally, on September 17, in an effort to pursuade

Tshombe _ desist, the Secretary-General decided to

go himself to Kantanga but was killed during a

night flight when his airplane crashed near Ndola,

in Northern Rhodesia. The tragic event imperiled

the entire operation. Nevertheless, top officials

in UN Secretariat continued Hammarskegold's work.

On September 21, a provisional cease fire was agreed upon, but ratification did not follow untill five weeks later. The Security Council met on

November 13, year days after the election of Othant as Acting Secretary General. The continuing need to revolve the problem of Katanga resulted in an even stronger resolution than the one on February 21, with no negative vote and only France and the

United Kingdom abstaining, ONUC was who authorized

"to take vigorous action, including the use of the requisite measure of force for the immediate apprehension of all foreign military personal and 162

political advisors not under the United Nations

17 Command, and mercenaries . Both the suporpowers strongly supported this antisecessionist resolution. The United Nations was now clearly committed to support Adoula's central government against the seccessionst efforts of both Tshomba and Gizenga.

In early December, Acting Secretary-General

Ufhant directed UN Forces to reestablish law and order in Elisabethvilla, the capital of

Katanga.This initiative resulted in heavy fighting.The United Nation moved in heavy reinforcements for an all out offensive to gain control in Katanga. But some Western powers notably

Belgium and Great Britain, still hesitated to see

Tshombe suppressed. Apart from the considerable financial interest both countries had in Katanga,

Tshombe was considerd the only pro-Western anti- communist, whereas Gizenga was seen as a serious communist threat to the congo, and the control

17. UN DOC, S/PV 982 (November 24, 1961) 8 p.71-75. 163

government as beig at best merely neutral. There were supporters of the Tshombe reyime even in the

United States. Britain refused to supply bombs to the United Nations to be used against Katarjya. Some

Western openion Viewed the danger of communist influence as the greatest threat, while the anti-colonial African and Asian nations saw Tshombe as the tool of "imperialism" and therefore the major danger. The Soviet Union backed the anti-

Tshombe forces

The United Nations was now determined not 18 to stop untill the secession was ended . UN Forces supported by the jet fighters, pressed on; and on

December 2 0, Tshombe signed the Kitona Agreement, acknowleding the authority of the control government and promising to comply with the UN resolutions requesting the removal of foroign mercenaries. But talks to implement this agreement

• 18. Lovis B John, "The Role of UN in civil war", Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at the 5fc*ithe Annual Meet, 25-27 April, 1963.(Washington, DC 1963) p. 15. Ifi4

were not began untill March 1962, and in June, after a second breakdown of discussion, it appeared that Tshombe still had no intentions of ending his secession. Sec .General UThaiffc Submitted a plan for the reunification of the Congo, consisting of a

50-50 sharing of revenues from Katangese mines, integration of the Katangese Army with that of central government, and discontinuance of separate representation abroad, in return for which Katanga would receive considerable local autonomy. UThant intimated that if this plan was not accepted economic pressures would be used, possibly extending to a complete trade and financial boycost.But neither Belgium, Britain, norths United

States wanted pressures to go beyond the economic sphere, and Tshombe conditional acceptance of the plan suffered to overt any economic sanctions. In

October, the West became pre-occupied with the

Cuban crisis and secured content to let Congolese matters drag on. But the Chinese attack of\ India gave rise to Indian pressures to obtain the release 165

of her jtroops in the Congo, numbering over 5,000 men, to fight in the Himalayas. Moreover, the weakening of Premier Adoula's position, occassioned by the central government's mobility to enforce its authority in Katanga, created a need for the early settlement of the Katangese secession. Finally,

•ONUC, which cashed ,$ 120 million a year, was leading the United Nations into serious financial difficulties.

By December 1962 , UThant'S plan to incorporate Katanga into the central government had not yet been carried out. Thus the pressure for economic measures against Tshombe increased.Adoula had been requesting such measures since August, but at that time both Britain and Belgium had been opposed.Nor had the United States actively supported such a move. Now Belgium shifted its stand, in return for a promise from the central government to grant Katanga a large share of the mining source. The United States too, threv its support behind Adoula. But Britain and the union 167

Minere still refused to go along. Fighting again broke out in late December but Elisabethville was

captured by UN Forces on December 2 8, and the

important mining centre of Jadotville. fell a week

later.At first it appeared that Tshombe was going

to fight to the end and pursue a scorehed earth

policy which would ruin Katanga, but he surrenderd

his last stronghold at Kolwezi in return for a

general amnesty for Katanga's officials. - By the end

of January 1963, the resistance was ended, but the

situation continued to be tense throughout the rest

of the year19. In mid-1964, the last ONUC

contingents were withdrawn from the Congo, and the

problems of reconstruction and reconciliation among

the many warring factions reverted to the Congolese

Govt* Ironically, Moise Tshombe emerged as the

new premier of the Congo after the withdrawal of

UNUC.

The only UN presence remaining in the Congo

after June 1964, was the UN civilian operation. This

19. James Mayall, Africa : The cold war and After (London, 1972) 1 p.119. 168

undertaking had begun in July 1960 side by side with

the UN's peace-keeping function. It aimed to keep

infact transport and communications , sustain a

decent level of public health, further education

and public administration, and develop industry and

agriculture. During the later part of ONUC's work,

the civilian operation become almost

indistinguishable from a large and very ambitious

teachnical assistance program. Most of the

operation was financed from the UN Congo Fund. This

Fund was supported by voluntary contributions from

twenty governments. The United States at first

contributed almost three-fourth and later about

one-half of the expense. The remainder was paid by

other Western countries. The Soviet Union made no

contribution.

The problem of putting the Congo back on

its feet politically and economically had been a

staggering one. Indeed, maintaining ONUC in the

Congo for four years had nearly bankrupted the

United Nations. Like the kings men the United 169

Nations could not put Congo back together again. But the presenceof the organization had at least brought a solution within reach. And it had prevented a major clash between the superpowers in the heart of Africa. 170

CHAPTER-VI

UNITED STATES'RESPONSES

TO THE CONGO CRISIS

Process of Decolonization

The history of American association with the Belgian Congo could be traced as far back as,

1894 when the US government had established a

Consulate in response to the efforts made by

Belgian king Leopord II to harness the rich resources of his colony with the help of foreign private companies. In the process, one of the

American companies namely to American Congo company had engaged itself in developing the rubber plantations in the Congo. The treatment meted out to the Congolese native by the Belgian king had produced severe criticisms in Britain as well as in the United States. The Senate, for instance, had moved a resolution in 1893 urging Belgium to improve the conditions of the Congolese natives.. It may be recalled that American Blacks had also reacted violently to the atrocities committed against the nativ-e population and had formed an organization 171

called the Congo Reform Association to take up their cause. Also the eminent Black leader william

Edward B.Du Bois had urged at the firm Pan-African

Conference held in 1900 at Paris that the Belgian

Congo should become "a great Negro State of the world" and at its prosperity should be counted "not simply in cash and commerce, but in happiness and true advancement of its Black population."

The name of Congo, however had not figured in American circles for a long time untill the advent of second World War. But the Congo, in the meanwhile had, received wartime prominence because of the fact that President of Belgian Union

Miniere, Edgur Edouard Sengir had provided the

American scientists with Uranium from the Congo which had helped them in the production of the

first nuclear bomb that had been dropped in the

Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

1. Phillip Forner, W.F.B. DU Bois Speaks: Speaches and addresses (Newyork, 1970) P.127 . 172

Art the end of the war and especially after the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO). Americans had prefered not to criticise Belgium for its colonial policies. On the other hand Statements had been made by prominent Americans highlighting the impressive role played by Belgium in the Congo. For instance, Senator Allan J.Ellender (Democrat,

Loisiana) after his visit to the Qongo in 1953 had stated;

" Even Belgian government got out of this territory the natives would suffer. To my way of thinking it will require years of schooling and training before the natives are able to govern themselves. Darkness would return here, if the settlers leave and permit the natives to take over entirely"...

2 . See Report on United States Foreign Operations Africa, By Senator Allen J.Ellender, 1962 (Washington D.C., 1963) P.17. 173

Chester Bowles a former under Secretary of

State, at the end of an African tour in 1955 had commented "Not even the most optimistic Congolese patriot dreamed that in five years his country 3 would be an independent state" .

Despite these adverse remarks, the process of decolonization in the fongo had been initiated with the independence of Ghana in 1957. Kweme

Nkrumah, who had led the Ghanian movement to its successful outcome, had begun the process in Africa by hosting two international conferences at Accra called the First Conferences of Independent African

States (April, 1958) and the All African Peoples'

Conference (December, 1958). In the wake of hosting the latter the Ghanian leader had invited two prominent Congolese politicians, namely patrice

M.Lumumba, and Joseph Kasavubu to attend the conference, it may be stated that both the leaders

3. Chester Bov.O »s, Promises to Keep My years in Public Life, (New Delhi, 1972) p.419. 174

after their return had organized public

demonstration against the Belgian rule. In fact,

Lumumba had been instrumental in organizing a

successful riot at Starflayville in 1959, which had

followed by riots at various places led by Kasavubu

and other Congolese leaders. It had been

described as to how those developments had prompted

Belgi'um to invite the Congolese leaders to a Round

Table conferences in January I960, as well as to

announce the intention of its withdrawal from

Congo on 30 June 1960 after holding parliamentary elections in May 1960. The Belgian government also

had promulgated a constitution called the "Loi

Fundamentalte"or the "Basic Law".

The response of the UF.. government to the

political developments had been one of open support

for Belgium during this period. This is evident

from the testimony provided by the Secretary of

State for Africa, Joseph Salterthwaite before the

House Sub-Committee on Africa on 5 March 1959. The

Assistant Secretary stated: 175

"... The Belgian government has carried on a very enlightened policy in the Belgian Congo atleast to the extent of educating the Congolese to become good artisians and raising their standard of

living to the extent that it is probably higher 4 than in any other dependent area "

The US government had also been careful in respecting the sentiments of Belgium in respect of

its colony. This was evident from the fact that the

State Department had not allowed some American

blacks to visit Congo, left that "might

encourage the African natives to press for main

independence" Also it may be stated that in May

1960, the US government had extended an invitation

to a group of Congolese leaders for a visit to the

United states and curiously enough, the Belgian

government in response had sent only its own

4. See Briefing on Africa, 1959, Hearings Before the sub Committee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (Washington DC, 1989) P.8.

5. Phillip Forner, n.l. p.44. 176

nationals on this trip to represent the African

country.

The reaction of the Congress towards the

process of decolonization had been marked by

expressions of "caution" and "moderation". Senator

Leverett Saltonstall(Republican, Massachusetts) for

instance, had stated that the African states while

striving for their independence, should not indulge

in "breaking friendship and assistance with their

former masters" Saltonstall however had gone

onto add that United States should adopt a balanced

and creative middle path approach towrds emerging it should initiate ste^s African States" and that| to induce both Europe and

Africa to work together as partners" .

With regard to the process of

decolonization, however, Americans had been on the

horns of a dilemma. While the US had felt committed

to the principle of self-determination in general,

at the same time it had been obvious of the fact of

6. Congressional " Vol.116,, pp.15304-15305. 177

its alliances with European colonial powers in a global defence net wort, for its own security as well as survival. In the circumstances, the US policy makers h^d found it hard to challenge the

African possessions of European powers as any such move might weaken or undermine their alliance system and endanger the western unity against

„ . . 7 Soveit expansionism .

A powerful section in the Onited States however, had urged the Administration for a more positive stance towards the issue of decolonization. The American Blacks, for instance had highlighted the issue by calling upon the US government to adopt a more dynamic policy towards the colonial question. Another powerful section namely, the American Corporations also had a stake in the process of decolonization, as it had the possibility of opening up opportunities for them once colonial ties had been disolved and that the

7. See Hans J .Morgenthan, The Impasfi€ of Power (Chicago, 1967), p.301. 178

privileged positions of their European competitions

had been removed. Also, military planners, drawiny

upon the experiences of the Second world war had

been interested in the potential use of African facilities in a possible war against the Soviet

t)nion. Further the Captains of industry and

American resources palnners had been alive to the

importance of ensuring continued access by the US

to the critical raw material of resources of Africa

during the period of the Cold War. In the

circumstances, these interests had urged upon the

US Administration to respond quickly, if an

oppening had been created, in the direction of

decolonization by any of the European powers. 179

Formulation of PS Policy

The crisis in the Congo and the Gold War competition that had followed on its wake had provided the American policy-markers with the basic stimulus to formulate the United States policy towards the central African state. The request for military assistance, as mentioned earlier, had prompted them to go ahead with that task in a sense of urgency, as things had been getting out of hand in Oongo. But the formulation of American policy towards Congo had to be conceived within the broad frame.work of its over all policy towards

Africa evolved since world war II. Infact, Africa did not constitute a "priority area" since the

Second Would war, as it had regarded as the

"responsibility" and "preserve" of European colonial powers which had been the allies of the

United States in the Cold War against the Soviet

Union, American policy-makers, had therefore sought to refrain themselves from indulging in acts of 180

interference in the affairs of the Black p continent . The factors which had prompted to

invoke a change in the US attitude had been the

Cold War, the process of decolonization, American

Strategic interests and the need to have access to

African raw materials, the provention of extension

of Soviet influence, and building of economic, political and cultural relations which had been

aimed at inducing the African countries to remain

oriented towards the west in general and to the

United States in particular.

The Cold War had prompted the US government

to think pragmatically in terms of the advantages

which a friendly Africa had offered as against a

situation in which the countries of the Black

Continent had taken into Soviet orbit. The manifestation of this situation had already become

evident in the Middle East as well as in the North

8. Andrew M . Kamrack, The Fconon ics of Africans of .^African Development (New York, 1967) P.2 64. 181

Africa. In the existing scenario the US policy makers, had naturally sought to resist any further extension of Soviet influence from these areas to infiltrate in to Black Africa. The advent of Nikita

Khrusch^v to power in the USSR as well as the skillful policies followed by him to ,Woo the emergent Afro-Asia states had prompted America policy makers to adopt policies calculated to him the goodwill of the elites of emerying Black Africa

States and thereby to prevent the growth of soviet influence.

The formulation of American policy towards

Africa, had been a by product of the East-West

Struggle and by its overall objectives of continent. As a global policy, the United States had proceeded along two levels namely the military and the ideological. Militarily, the United States had sought to prevent the Soviet Union from

"Stepping over the lines of demarcation which had been established at the end of the world War II" whereas ideologically, American interest had 182

consisted "in the denial of African continent to military and ideological conquest by the Soviet

Union" .

Within this over all framework, the US government had responded to the crisis in the Ponc,o by advising the African government to look for UN support in order to maintain law and order in the country. Reflecting on the development, President

Eisenhower in his memoir had ruled out the deployment of US troops in the <~ongo even as part of the UN contigent. He had mentioned, however, of his decision to place a US naval attack carrier on the month of the river Congo for its possible use

in the case of emergency. The position of US

Administration had been reflected in the action by

its officials. The US Ambasador to the UN, Henry

Cabot lodge, for instance, had spoken energetically

in favour of a UN Force and had pledged American support for the same in the form of transport, communication as well as food for the Congo. The US 183

Ambassador Timberlake, also had urged upon his government to send 100 tons of flour to the conyo immediately, "less hunger riots in Leopoldville 9 should turn into anti-white riots" .

The Administration however had been

confronted with the problem of providing security as well as safety for about 2000 Americans who had

been left stranded in various danger zones of the

country. Ambassador Timberlake in this regard had

sought for permission from the Leopoldville government for possible use of American helicopters

to evacuate its citizens from the rongo. After the

permission had been granted, the US government had

undertaken a massive airlift and had succeeded in

evaluating about 1500 American citizens

As regards the reasons as to why the US had

acted through the UN, former Secretary of State

Dean Rusk had stated:

9. New York Times, 14 July 1960, p.6. 10. For details on the US airlift see Ibid, 9 July, 1960, p.6. 10 July, 1960, p.13, 16 July, 1960,p.3. 184

"...Why was this decision taken? The alternative

to United Nations intervention would have been

evidence and chaos and a ready-made opportunity

for Soviet explanation which the United States

would have been compelled to encounter"

According to Assistant Secretary Mennen williams, the United States had decided to support the Congolese government economically but had refused to provide troops in order to "avoid a direct

East-West confrontation in the Congo" Former US

Ambassador to the UN, Adlai stvenson had maintained that direct intervention would have been

interpreted as an attempt by the United States to reimpose colonial rule.

After receiving the Congolese request for

American Military support the discussion within the administration had revolved round three options namely (1) to do nothing (2) direct US intervention

(3) to work through the UN. Cleveland, had gone on

11. Ibid. 17 July, 1960. 1R5

to add that after careful thinking the option 12 number (3) had been accepted for implementation

The first two options had not been considered

seriously since the UN option had been "the

instictive reaction of Eisenhower and top echelon-s

of the state. The UN option had been accepted

becuse of one common perceptions that had shared

by key members of the Eisenhower Administration

namely, that the Congo had not been vital to US

security and that the Soviets would not intervene

unless the UN efforts had been discredited as well

as that a success in the multilateral effort would

enhance the viability and effectiveness of the UN.

The former UN chief representative in Katanga,

Coner Cruise 01 Brien had been of the opinion that

"though the decision to turn to UN was a gamble",

the US had been confident that it would" win its points by a kind of parliamentary diplomacy which

it had successfully negotiated with Afro-Asian

12. Ibid, 20 July, 1960, p.14. 1RF

nationg"

The decision regarding the response to the

Congo crisis had been taken after a series of meetings between top officials of the US

Administration, namely, Secretary of State,

Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary of State

Livingston Merchant and Assistant Secretaries of state Francis O. Wilcox (International

Organization) Foy D.Kohler (European Affairs) and

Joseph C. Satterthw^ite (African Affairs). There had been no evidence of a bureau level dispute on the issue, as the unanimous consensus had been in favour of the UN option.

This unanimity had been reflected in the reported remarks of Herter that "if the UN did not exist, one would have to be created", 14

13. Conor Cruise O' Brien, Conflicting Concept of United Nations (Leads, 1964), p.6.

14. Pisano, Jane G., "Policy Making and Policy Type, Six cases of US-African Policy", (New Delhi, 1972 ) p. 92 . 187

The absence of controversy on the UN option could be attributed to the fact that European view had predominated within the Administration. It may be pointed out in this connection that the bureau of Africa under the Eisenhower Administration had been staffed largely by officiers who had spent long years on European assignments. Also prominent officials like Secretary Herter, Under Secretary

Douglas Dillon as well as an influential advisor to the President Eisenhower namely Robert Murphy had all shared a common European like . President

Eisenhower himself had a strong European bias, which could be found from the remarks made in his memoir that he had been specially interested in the development of close ties between the Oongo and her former European ruler. Though the decision had been largely influenced by the combined efforts of the bureau of Africa as well as international organization the options of several veteran

15. New York Time, 24 July, 1960.p.10. 1RR

Furopeanists had been taken into account at the policy-formation process

The UN option might have appeared satisfying also to the NATO partners of the United States despite the fact of their strong sentiments and bias in favour of Belgium. This is evident from the

Statement made by the British Prime Minister Harold

McMillan on the floor of the Parliament, that the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo before the arrival of a UN force would have left "a complete vaccum in the unsettled new republic."

The option of French government, however was that

"the Belgian forces had not only the right but the duty to protect lives when public order had broken 1 8 down in Congo." It may be stated in this connection that while France and Britain had been supporting

16. Ibid. 15 July, I960, p.3.

17. Ibid, 16 July, 1960, p.3.

18. Ibid. 17 July, 1960. p.8. 189

Brussels openly, the US government had been working behind the scenes through the UN to protect the

19 Belgian interest in the Congo.

Thus, the US government had approached

Congo problem in the initial phase of the crisis by turning to the United Nations in order to avoid the

Cold War conflagration in Black Africa. It had to remain watchful, however, with regard to the evolution of political developments in the Congo.

The UN option, had been considered as apropriate since the American policy makers had probably made the calculation that it would be possible on their part to keep the political developments in th«

Congo under control through interventions by friendly UN officials working in the ONUC.

19. Ibid. 16 July, I960, p.3 i qn

The United States in the United Nations

The United States on its part and its

Western supporters did not in the beginning want any bold steps for the withdrawal of Begians from the

Congo, as proposed by USSR. Later, however USA along with some European and Afro-Asian states

supported vigorous steps for the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops and other foreign

elements from the "ongo, for the Congolese unity

20 and to preserve peace in Tongo

During Eisenhower period Lumumba who was

firescely anti-Belgian had held the stage in

^•ongo as the central figure and that the US

Administration had been severaly affected and

plagued by his charismatic personality. As he

wanted a speady withdrawal of Belgian troops from

his country, he made appeals to the governments of

Soviet Union as well as radical African states.The

20. Hoffmann Stanley, "In Search of a Thread: The United Nations in the Congo". The United Nations Political System; (New York, 1967). 191

United States in the circumstances had felt greatly concerned as the Soviet Union had responded energetially to Lumumba's request and had actually pledged to intervene along with the troops belonging to the radical Affrican States placed under the UN command. The matter/ had headed for a tense situation for the United states as it had gathered concrete evidence of active Soviet involvement in the form of ^supplies, of arms as well as military and technical assistance to poster up Lumumba's efforts in the congo2 1

In the meanwhile the situation had aggrevated in Congo by the power struggle that had ensured between Kasavufcu. and Lumumba as each one of them had dismissed the other through radio broadcasts to the nation. On 12 September I960, however, no Congolese Parliament in a surprise move had voted to support Lumumba.

21. New York Times, 2 0 August, 1960. 192

The next stage in the struggle for power,

had taken place at the UN in New York as both

Kasavubu and lumumba had moved over there to press

for their respective recognition. The matter,

however, had been discussed and votel upon first in

the Credential Committee and final in the General

Assembly on 22 November I960. The voting at the UN

had been marked by hectic UR lobbying in favour of

Kasavubu, which had eventually resulted in ensuring

victory for the Congolese President over Lumumba.

The UN voting had finally sealed the

political fate of Lumumba as soon after his return

to Leopoldville, Congolese leader had been arrested

and put inside prison under the orders of the

Mobutr> government which could be characterized as

"anti-communist" " anti-Lumumba" as well as

22 "pro-west"

The whereabouts of Lumumba after his arrest

could not be traced untill February 1961, when

22. Ibid, 30 September, 1960. 193 reports were received to the effect that he had been murdered at the hands of his unknown enemies somewhere on the way as he was proceeding towards

2 3 Stanleyville after escaping from the Jail

When John F.Kennedy assumed the Presidency he had also encouraged 'American initiatives in the form of behind the scene activities for reconvening of the Congolese parliament, as well as for the formation of a federal government consisting of all

Congolese factions. At the same time he had

authorized the Defence Department to draw up a

"contingency Plan" with a view to prevent the

Soviet Union from providing military supplies to

the Gizenga Government in Stanleyville and had in

this regard altered a Naval Task Force operating in

the Gulf Guienea for a possible "emergency" role in

the Congo. The Aministration had further encouraged

the efforts made by the UN Concitiation Commission

and President Kasavubu for a series of meetings

2 3. John Stockwell, In Search of Enemy, ACTA Story (Newyork, 1978). p. 105. 194

between Congolese leaders which had eventually resulted in recovering of the national parliament the loihvanium University, near

2 4 Leopoldville on 27 June 1961

The more challenging task that remained before the ONUC and the US government following the submission of Gizenga had been the presence of

Belgian troops as well as the "assorted white mercenaries" recruited by Tshombe from Belgium,

Rhodesia and South Africa. It had been further complicated by the fact that Tshombe had continued with the issue of his own currency and also that he had successfully prohibited any efforts at hoisting of the Congolese national flag over katanga.

The UN operation was commenced on 2 7 August

1961 under the title "Rumpunch" to disarm and case out no Katangan gendarmes. It had been supplemented by another military operation called "Round one".

These tough actions had caused huge uprottrs in

24. Congressional Record, Vol. 108, p.15546. 195

British, French and in NATO circles, which had

prompted in UN Secretary General Dag HammarskjoId

to undertake a trip to Katanga to review the

situation as well as to make an attempt to soften

the feelings of the NATO members. But while

travelling to Ndola in Rhoi^esia to discuss the

Katanga situation with Tshombe Hammarskjold had met

his tragic end. His death, however, had forced the

UN Authorities to sign a ceasefire agreement with

Ts;hombe on 30 September 1961.

The United States government had provided

its solid backing to these UN operations despite

strong words of denunciation that had been voiced

by its NATO allies. Ambassador Stevenson, for

instance, had maintained that the "UN operations

would go down in history to the credit of the UN"

and also Assistant Secretary Harban Cleveland har*

hailed the UN action as" the most dramatic 2 5 illustration of the UN power for peace " Further

2 5. New York Times,18 September, 1961. 196

Assistant Secretary williams had stated that the US government had recognised the need of "seeing through the UN operated to a successful . • „ 26 conclusion .

By way of a concrete measures of support, the US government had provided four transport planes to the UN for the movement of its troops as well as the equipments inside the Congo.

Being authorized by a fresh resolution of the Security Council on 25 November 1961, the UN representative in Katanga, O'Brien had once again launched another military operation called "Round

Two" for the expulsion of Katangan gendarmes and mercenaries. The operation which had taken place at the disposal of the UN Command in the Congo. The US government had also provided the UN Operation with its most vocal and strong support which had been evident from the remarks made by under Secretary

George Ball that "if Katanga is not peacefully

26. Ibid. 19 September, 1961. 197

integrated the Congo will face Civil war and anarchy and be open to communist penetration.2 7 UN had become largely dependent on US support during these operations in view of the strong hostilities that had been demonstrated by its NATO allies towards "Round Two*

In the final showdown between the UN troops and the Katanga forces, called the "Round Three" started on *4 December 1962 and had continued till

2 1 January, 1963, Tshombe had made the announcement of his surrender as well as the termination of his two and half years of secession.

Though the response of the congress to the military measures taken in Katanga (Round Three) had no been favourable, the number of supporters for the American policies in Congo had increased considerably and that their views could be turned up in the words of Senator Joseph S.Clark: that the UN and US policies in the Congo had been a

27. Ibid. 11 December, 1961. ]9fi

"striking success". The UN offensive against

Katanga and the involvement of active support as

provided by the United States, however, had

represented a stormy chapter in President Kennedy's

active involvement in the affairs of the Congo.

"Thus, the year 1963 had started rather

auspiciously for the Central government with the

reintegration of South Kasai in the fall of 1962 as

well as the successful completion of Round Three on

21 Janury 1963. The integration of Katanga, however had prompted Tshombe and a group of his suporters to

leave the breakaway province as they had been

fearful of reprisal at the hands of the control

Government. The Leopoldville government, however,

had adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the

2 8 whole situation in Katanga

President Johnson inherited from the Kennedy

Administration a "troubted Congo", with the

immediate prospects for the country being "not-too

28. Congressional Record, Vol. 109, PP 4564-4566, p.4331. 199

promising" despite the integration of Katanga.In fact, the President had been confronted with the immediate problem of the withdrawal of the UN troops from the Congo scheduled for 31 December

1963, owing to the fact that UN had been faced with almost financial backruptcy due to the refusal of

France and the Soviet block countries to meet their

contributions arising out of UN dperations in the

Middle East and in the Congo. While the Soviet

Union had demanded that the US and NATO powers should meet the entire cost of both the UN

Operations, the Western powers led by the United

States had requested the UN Secretary Geneal, U.

Thant to reconsider his decision with regard to the withdrawal of UN troops. They had requested the UN to maintain at least a "token" presence in the

Congo. A compromise agreement had eventually been worked out by which the tenure of the ONUC had been extended for six months still 30 June 1964.

The prospects of UN troops withdrawal had the most demoralizing effect on both Adoula and the US 2on

governments.As for the Adoula government it had to

confront with the immediate threat of

disintegration due to the two factors, namely the

lack of enthusiasm on the part of political leaders

and factions in the country towards process of

national reconciliation. As far as the United

States was concerned, it had not only been worried

about the "internal security gap" in the Congo, but

also because the UN had become the "deterrent" to

political violence" and a "dependable military arms

2 9 for the Adoula Government." Thus on the make of

UN troop withdrawal the US government had given its

major attention to the reorganization of the

Congolese army and had entrusted the task of its

military mission in Congo (COMISH) established

in August 1963.

The US Government had helped to reorganize

the Congolese police with an assistance of

$538,000, following the police mutiny at

29. G.Menneh William, n.2. p.800. 201

Leopoidvilla in May 1963. Further it had provided

178.6 million in the form of economic assistance of the Congo government apart from sustaining Adoula in power. It may be stated that the Congolese treasury had become practically barren during his three year tenure as the Prime Minister. In the words of Catherine Hosky^np by 1964 Congo had become the first country in Africa to be solely 30 depended on American assistance". As the events had unfolded, the US government had succeeded in the UN to assume a new role for itself as the

» protector* Df Adoula regime through its generalizd support and specific interventions" in

Congo.

30. Hoskynes,Catherine The Congo Since Independence, (London, 1965) p. 471. 2 02

CONCLUSION

Every President,beginning with Harry S.Truman who assured the first General Assembly on October

2 3,1946 that the policy of the United States would be to"support the United Nations with all the resources we posses not as a temporary expedient but as a permanent partnership." indeed had a profound impact

on the subsequent Presidents who further reiterated

to defend the cause of international peace and

security in every corner of the world.

With the post world war IT division between

the communist bloe and the West, the United States

quickly emerged in the security Oouncil as a leader

of the democratic nations in the UN and fought the

diplomatic battle to promote the right of

self-determination of every nation and determined to

stop the communism by every means not only in Europe

but in Asia and Africa well. A large majority of the

1. The United States and the United Nations Report,

by president to -Congress for the year 1946, (Washington, 1947). 203

US public was in favour of the general support to the

United Nations for achieving these goals. The former

Senator Barry Goldwater eloquently once expressed the

Americans willingness to support the functioning of the United Nations in these words : "The United

Nations —is at best an instrument of international accord. It is useful to the West now for a special reason; it provides a forum in which to discuss 2 communist violation of the Charter."

Controversies arising in the Cold War situation had been dominated by direct and serious conflict between the major communist and non communist powers because the interest of the United

States had been adversely affected by such disputes.

The United States was compelled to move to the United

Nations. Wherever feasible to maximize support for its own strategy and to confound the communist enemy.

But because of the intense hostility and massive

2. "My proposal for a 'can win' Foreign Policy", Life, January 17,1964 . 204

power involved, it became difficult for the United

States to mobilise strong support for its position in these cases within the United Nations. Despite the difficulties, the United States and its allies considered advantageous to use the United Nations as a major instrument for dealing with some of the most 3 dangerous Cold War conflicts . The study is concerned with two major cases of international crises in

Korean and Congo. During the intense Cold war period of first two decades of the formation of the United

Nations the Korean crisis (1950-53) and Congo crisis

(1960-64) lingered for very long duration. Congo was the largest military operation which the UN had been involved, not only the largest militury operation, but the largest financial operation as well. The UN maintained a force of some 20,000 (ONUC) at the cost of over $ 1000,000,000 a year. The budget for maintaining the UN forces in the Congo had been

3. H.Field Haviland, "The United States and United Nations" International Organization (Boston, 1965), Vol.20 p.644. 205

greater than the total normal budget of the UN prior to that activities. In the operation in Korea, it was 4 involved with a larger number of forces. But it was somewhat questionable whether it could be called a UN operation. The UN had delegated authority in the

Korean matter to the United States and the forces were in large measure from the United States forces and the forces from the South Korea. Infact the

United Nations came nearest to establishing a fighting force. It did create a United Nations

Command and requested ftiembers to make forces available to it. But this was a mere an extension of existing command of the United States in Far Eastern military operation under the command of General Mac

Arthur. The action taken by the Arthur and his forces was in fact United Nations action and of course justified norms of international law.

The Secretariate of the UN had no part in operation or even deployment of troops. By the end of

4. Quincy wright "Legal Aspects of UN Action in Congo

"Foreign Affairs Report, Indian Council of World

Affairs (New Delhi,March 1962) p.2 3. 5. Guenter Weisberg, The International status of United Nations (New York, 1960) pp. 78-77. 206

1950, the only foreign ground troops fighting by the

American side were from the United Kingdom,

Australia, France, Greece, Turkey, the Netherland, the philipines, Thailand and Turkey . The Unified

Command in Korea consisted of about a quarter of million American compared with only about 36,000 troops from all other Member States combined.

Korean crisis had got special significance as it had extended the dimension of the moral authority of the General Assembly. The General Assembly became a definite alternative to the Security Council for the first time in Korean crisis. The United States was successful in shifting the discussion from the

Security Council to the General Assembly which was dominated by Angf '-American majority in 1950s and

60s. It was noticiable through Uniting for Peace

Resolution of 1950 which demonstrated for the empowerment of General Assembly as the generation of

6. In 1951, group troops were also furnished by Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, Luxemburg and New Zealand. 207

international peace and security in case the consensus fail in the security Control. The Security

Council had been unable to act owing to acute differences among its permanent members. The Assembly was able to play a complementary role by endorsing the resolution of the Security Council . The lesson learnt from the Korean experienced proved fruitful in resolving the Congo crisis. When the then Secretary

General proceeded to recruit forces he emphasised the need that the conditions for the forces to be sent should be that they should include no forces from any of the great powers. It was realised that to have a genuine UN forces it ought to be recruited from a good many of the smaller countries or from countries at least which were not the major protogonists in the cold war. It was also recognized that it would be desirable to have a large number of forces from Africa and this was one of the provisions made in the recruitment of froces. At the same time it was also

7. GAOR, Session 7, Plen. mtg. 431. p.747. 208

provided that there should be some troops from outside Africa, so that it could be regarded, as

United Nations universal operation . This shows a tremendous influence in strengthening the UN against the opinion of one protogonist or other in the Cold

War, could be exercised by the uncommitted states.

The uncommitte^-tateFoonsisted a large proportion of the members of the General Assembly and it appeared that these states had expressed their solidarty with the UN mission in Korea as they felt that United

Nations also could protect "heir interests in the

World.

Management of Korean Realities The United States had pursued two major

objectives in Korea: first, to achieve the

establishment of a Unified, independent and

democratic Korea in accordance with the promise of

the Cairo Declaration and secondly pending or failing

the achievement of that goal to contain communist

8. Quincy weight, n.6. p.30. 209

expansion and prevent the communists from taking over the whole of Korea. During period September 1947 to

June 1950, the emphasis at least in the public statements was on achieving the first objectives, a satisfactory settlement of the whole problem. From

June 1950 on the defeat of communist military aggression became a dominant motive in invoking

United Nations action, though the desirability of achieving a satisfactory political settlement was never lost.

When the Soviet Union entered the war against

Japan on August, 1945, which posed the US government the question of where to draw the dividing line for the US and Soviet occupation zones on the Korean peninsula. Some American diplomats, seeing through the Soviet manoeuvre recommended that their government speed up military actions of the Far East and US troops accept surrender of the Japanese troops at least in the entire peninsula to prevent 2in

governmental forces entry into Korea. But when Soviet troops promptly initiated direct military action against Northern Korea after their entry into the war, on Aug. 9, the nearest American forces were on

Okinawa Island.

Under the circumstances that UN government accepting a recommendation from Colonels G.H.

Bonesteel, who later seved as commander in Chief of the United Nations Command in Korea and Dean Rusk

(Later Secretary of State) of the war Department

General Staff on August 11,1945 decided that Soviet

Union would be authorized to receive the Japanese

surrender north of the 38th Parallel and the U.S

would receivetKe South of that lint . On August 13,

the Plan was transmitted to and accepted by the

government of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and

9. Harry S.Truman, Year of Trial and Hope, (New York, 1956) Vol.2, p.317. 10. US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1945; The British Commonwealth and the Far East (Washington, DC, 1969). 211

China. It was sent on August 15 to the Mac. Arthur

Command for immediate implementation of General order Order No.l. The |provided that after the US and USSR occupation commandery of the Korean peninsula received the surrender of Japanese troops in their respective areas, the civil administrative function should be integrated and turned over to a committee of commanders from these countries taking part in the occupation of the Korean peninsula to place the entire area of Korea under integrated control. The order on the other hand helped turn the military division by stipulating that during the receipt of surrender period the US and USSR occupation commanders would be responsible for the administration of civil affairs in their respective areas . The Soviet forces, who entered northern

Korean ahead of the America landing in South Korea, had no time embarked on a carefully prepared scenario to build a communist society in their occupation area of North Korea.

11. Ibid. 2 12

At 4 a.m. Sunday, June 25,1950, the North

Korean forces unleashed an unprovoked attack all

along the 38th parallel. Before the invasion many

reports on the impending invasion were filed to the

Army Headquarters from frontline divisions. But Army

Generals did not take them seriously. Unexpectedly

the United States took speedy action to repel the

aggressors. On a US initiative, the United nations

Security Council adopted a revolution on June 27,

1950 in the Soviet delegates absence, which stated

the armed action by north Korea was by express act

of aggression. Counter to the UN Charter and

called upon the members of the United Nations to

furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as might be necessary to repel the armed attack.

On July 7th Security council resolved to

establish a Unified Command Under the United States

for the integrated control of forces which UN member

countries dispatched to Korea and requested the US

to designate the commander of such forces. Accepting 213

the resolution the United States established the

United Nations Command in Tokyo on July 8 with

General Douglas Mac. Arthur as its Commanding

General.

On the battlefield, the North Korean invasion forces advanced as far as the Poyong-Taeyu-Masan

Poimeter. But the tide of war soon turned aside.

Seoul was recaptured on September 28. The UN forces and the South Korean Army pushed the retreating

North Korean forces beyond the 38th parallel and captured Pyongyang on October 2 n. The South Korean

6th Division reached the border town of Chosan along the Yalu River on October 26, 1950. The unification of the Korean people was certainly within sight as the Communists were driven back and were badly disarmed both by the United Nations and

United States troops. General Mac. Arthur declared that all UN forces could return home before

Christmas after successfully ending operations.

Towards the end of October, however the situation began to change. 214

Red Chinese forces intervened in the war as

"peoples volunteer Army" and began to push the UN forces back to the South in "human wave" tactics.

The UN forces/ heavily outnumbered by more than one million Chinese troops, retreated South of the 38th

Parallel. For a period of roughly years thereafter, bloody battles ragged along a line cutting across the central part of the peninsula in hot contest for each mountain peak and every inch of land.

Truce talks began July 10,1951, between the

United Nations Command and the communist forces

(North Korea and Red Chinese Armies). The ceasefire negotiations dragged on for about two years before the artimistice was finally signed on July ?7, 1953, by ONTj'c Commander General Mark Clark, North Korean

Commander kin II-Sung and Chinese "Peoples volunteer

Army" commanding peng Te-huaian. Three years war Was thus brought to a halt but it could not unify the divided Korea. 215

American Experience in Congo American Policy in Congo crisis was designed to support the principles of national Unity and indepence, internal security, and territorial integrity. The United States faithfully and consistently supported the central government of the

Congo since June 1960-under President Eisenhower, under President Kennedy, and under President Lyndon

B. Johnson-and under Congolese President Karavubu and his Prime Minister, Iko, Adoula, and Tshombe. The US

Administration devoted more attention to the rest of

Africa Combined because of the immediate dangers, commercial opportunities and available expanding market. Wayne Fredericks of the State Department's

African Bureau, said: "if we don't have a Congo 12 Policy1, we don't have an African Policy".

Washington was deeply concerned with the lawlessness and disorder that followed the July 1960 mutiny of Armee Nationale Congolaise (ANC), Prime

Minister Patric Lumumba's dismissal of its Belgian

12. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. A Thousand Days (Boston, 1965) pp. 635. 216

Office corps, and exodus of Belgian administrative and technical personnel from the Congo.

The Department of State feared that the Soviet Union woulo exploit the chaos for purposes inimical to stability and the best interests of the Congolese, and regarded Moscow, not, Brussels, as the chief threat to the Congo's independence. Although the

United States was the only government to receive a

formal invitation from Leopofdville to provide military assistance of restore law and order,

Washington from the outset and for a variety of reasons channelled its aid through the United

Nations .

Direct US military aid was quickly ruled out

lest it be used as a pretext for more substantial

Soviet intervention on behalf of Lumucba which could lead confrontation of the two great powers. T'he

leaders did not feat a political contest with the communist bloc in Congo, but they wanted the contest to be conducted by acceptable rules and at minimum risk. 217

Given these considerations, US Ambassador- designate clare H.Timbes^ake advised President

Joseph Kasuvubu and Prime Minister Lumumba to appeal for UN aid. This was on July 10, arid, on July 12, 1960a group of Congolese cabinet members asked Timberlake to request 3,000 American troops to restore order. At his insistence they formalized the request in writing. Since the matter was already before the

UN Secretary, General, President, Eisenhower declined to act unitaterally on the invitation. Two and a half years later Assistant Secretary of State

Harlan Cleveland summed up the initial US response:

"Should the Congo's chaos be attacked by a hositility assembled international peace force; or should we send in a division of United States

Marines; or should, we just sit on our hands and wait for our adversaries to exploit the situation?"

We wisely decided, he continued, "not to risk a confrontation of nuclear powers in the Central 13 Africa." We believed, he added, that a UN force would serve the national interest of the United

States. 13. US Department of State Press Resease 34, January 17, I9fi3 p.34. J 2 18

By virtue of its power and active involvement, the United States had a greater impact on the Charer, effectiveness and duration of the UN

Congo operation than any other government. Though it sent no troops and was not a member of the Secretary

Generals Congo Advisory Committee, the opinion could not have been authorized without Washington's assurance of political and financial and logistical support. Had American support been withdrawn at any point, the efforts would have collapsed or been greatly reduced in size. The widespread assumption of consistent US support made possible the political, financial and manpower support from many other states. Especially important were the troops contributions of India and Ethiopia, each of which made available more than 100,000 men.

Washington became the informal leader of a relatively stable coalition of states that supported, each for its own reasons, the UN 219

resolutions and their interpretation and implementation by Hamersk Ford and UThant. As the only great power and the only permanent member of the Security Council that steadfastly backed the operation, the United State was inevitably thrust into a position of influence and responsibility.

This leadership role was further strengthened because there was substantial concurrence between the US goals of stability in Central Africa and the prevention of communist penatration, and the

Security Council resolutions calling for the restoration of law and order and prohibiting states from unilateral intervention.

Washington turned both as a generator and a balance wheel. It generated ideas and plans and constantly sought to achieve a working consensus among the associated states. The Secretary General, the senior members in the "Congo Club" and UN officials in Leopold vjTie and Elizabethville frequently sought American counsel. US officials,vho 220

offered technical, military and political advice, as did the officials of other interested states. The

United States acted as a balance wheel between the sometimes irreconcilable positions of the militant

Afro-Asian leaders and more conservative European

Spokesmen. It was precisely this mediating role that drew criticism from both sides. Nevertheless, the

United States and the United Nations established the credibility of ensuring peace and security whenever and wherever threatened. Both Korean and Congo crises gave a new impetus to the American policy makers in the Ftate Department that the United

States had responsibility towards the world community to promote the rights of self-determination and self-assertion either be in political, social, cultural or economic spheres of any nation in any parts of the world. 221 APPENDIX-I* SELECT ON RESOLUTIONS O KOREA RESOLUTION S/1501, 25 JUNE 1950

The Security Council, Recalling the finding of the General Assembly in its resolution of 21 October 1949 that the Government of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established government "having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; and that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such government in Korea"; Mindful of the concern expressed by the General Assembly in its resolution of 12 December 1948 and 21 October 1949 of the consequences which might follow unless Member States refrained from acts derogatory to the results sought to be achieved by the United Nations in bringing about the complete independence and unity of Korea; and the concern expressed that the situation described by the United Nations Commission on Korea in its report menaces the safety and well being of the Republic of Korea and of the people of Korea and might lead to open military conflict there; Noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces > from North Korea, Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace,

I. Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities; and calls upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel;

II. Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea (a) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay, (6) To observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel, and (c) To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this reso­ lution;

III. Calls upon all Members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.

* Rosolyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping- 1946-1967/ Documents and Commentary, Vol.2, Oxford University Press, London, 1970. 22?

RESOLUTION S/11511, 27 JUNE 1950

The Security Council, Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace, Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and Having called upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38 th parallel, and Having noted from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor with­ drawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security, and Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security, Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assis­ tance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

RESOLUTION S/1588, 7 JULY 1950

The Security Couticil, Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace, Having recommended that Members of the United Nations . furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area, 1. Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to its resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area; 2. Notes that Members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea; 3. Recommends that all Members providing military forces and other as­ sistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States; 4. Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces; 5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against Norh Korean forces con­ currently with the flags of the various nations participating; 6. Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command. 223 UNITING FOR PEACE RESOLUTION'317 (V), 3 NOVEMBER,1950

The General Assembly, Recognizing'that the first two stated Purposes of the United Nations are:

"To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to die peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means* and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settle­ ment of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace", and / "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace",

Reaffirming that it remains the primary duty of all Members of the United Nations, when involved in an international dispute, to seek settlement of such a dispute by peaceful means through the procedures laid down in Chapter VI of the Charter, and recalling the successful achievements of the United Nations in this regard on a number of previous occasions, x Finding that international tension exists on a dangerous scale, Recalling its resolution 290 (IV) entitled "Essentials of Peace", which states that disregard of the Principles of the Charter of the United Nations is pri­ marily responsible for the continuance of international tension, and desiring to contribute further to the objectives of that resolution, Reaffirming the importance of the exercise by the Security Council of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the duty of the permanent members to seek unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto, Reaffirming that the initiative in negotiating the agreements for armed forces provided for in Article 43 of the Charter belongs to the Security Coun­ cil and desiring to ensure that, pending the conclusion of such agreements, the United Nations has, at its disposal means for maintaining interna­ tional peace and' security, Conscious that failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsi­ bilities on behalf of all the Member States, particularly those reponsibilitics referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, does cot relieve Member States of their obligations or the United Nations of its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security, Recognizing in particular that such failure does not deprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve it of its responsibilities under the Charter in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, Recognizing that discharge by the General Assembly of its responsibilities in these respects calls for possibilities of observation which would ascertain the facts and expose aggressors; for the existence of armed forces wt\ich could be used collectively; and for the possibility of timely recommendation by the General Assembly to Members of the United Nations for collective action which, to be effective, should be prompt, 224

1. Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity ot the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making ap­ propriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by,the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations; 2. Adopts for this purpose the amendments to its rules of procedure set forth in the annex to the present resolution;

3. Establishes a Peace Observation Commission which, for the calendar years 1951 and 1952, shall be composed of fourteen Members, namely: China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Paki­ stan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Uruguay, and which could observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Upon the invitation or with the consent of the State into whose territory the Commi­ ssion would go, the General Assembly, or the Interim Committee when the Assembly is not in session, may utilize the Commission if the Security Council is not exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter with respect to the matter in question. Decisions to utilize the Commission shall be made on the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members present and voting. The Security Council may also utilize the Commission in accordance with its au­ thority under the Charter; 4. Decides that the Commission shall have authority in its discretion to appoint sub-commissions and to utilize the services of observers to assist it in the performance of its functions; 5. Recommends to all governments and authorities that they co-operate with the Commission and assist it in the performance of its functions; 6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and faci­ lities, utilizing, where directed by the Commission, the United Nations Panel oT Field Observers envisaged in General Assembly resolution 297 B (IV); 7. Invites each Member of the United Nations to survey its resources in order to determine the nature and scope of the assistance it may be in a position to render in support of any recommendations of the Security Council or of the General Assembly for th; restoration of international peace and security; 8. Recommends to the States Members of the United Nations that each Member maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained, orga­ nized and equipped that they could promptly be made available, in accord­ ance with its constitutional processes, for service as a United Nations unit or units, upon recommendation by the Security Council or the General Assembly, without prejudice to the use of such elements in exercise of the right of indi­ vidual or collective self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter; 22S

9- Invites the Members of the United Nations to inform the Collective Measures Committee provided for in paragraph II as soon as possible of the measures taken in implementation of the preceding paragraph; 10. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, with the approval of the Committee provided for in paragraph 11, a panel of military experts who could be made available, on request, to Member States wishing to obtain technical advice regarding the organization, training, and equipment for prompt service as United Nations units of the elements referred to in paragraph 8; II. EstaHishes a Collective Measures Committee consisting of fourteen Members, namely: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Egypt, France Mexico, Philippines, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, and diiects the Committee, in consultation with the Secretary-General and with such Member States as the Committee finds appropriate, to study and make a report to the Security Council and the General Assembly, not later than I September 1951, on methods, including those in section C of the present resolution, which might be used to maintain and strengthen inter­ national peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, taking account of collective self-defence and regional arrange­ ments (Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter); 13. Recommends to all Member States that they co-operate with the Com­ mittee and assist it in the performance of its functions; 13. Requests the Secretary-General to furnish the staff and facilities neces­ sary for the effective accomplishment of the purposes set forth in sections C and D of the present resolution;

14. Is fully conscious that, in adopting the proposals set forth above, endur­ ing peace will not be secured solely by collective security arrangements against breaches of international peace and acts of aggression, but that a genuine and lasting peace depends also upon the observance of all the Principles and Purposes established in thr Charter of the United Nations, upon the imple­ mentation of the resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and other principal organs of the United Nations intended to achieve the main­ tenance of international peace and security, and especially upon respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and on the establishment and maintenance of conditions of economic and social well- being in all countries; and accordingly. x5- Urges Member States to respect fully, and to intensify, joint action, in co-operation with the United Nations, to develop and stimulate universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to intensify individual and collective efforts to achieve conditions of economic stability and social progress, particularly through the development of under­ developed countries and areas.23 226

For the purpose of maintaining international peace and security, in accor­ dance with the Charter of the United Nations, and, in particular, with Chapters V, VI and VII of the Charter, The General Assembly Recommends to the Security Council: That it should take the necessary steps to ensure that the action provided for under the Charter is taken with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression and with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes or situations likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security;

That it should devise measures for the earliest application of Articles 43, 45, 46 and 47 of the Charter of xhz United Nations regarding the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council by the States Members of the United Nations and the effective functioning of the Military Staff Committee; The above dispositions should in no manner prevent the General Assembly from fulfilling its functions under resolution 377 A (V).

The General Assembly Recognizing that the primary function of the United Nations Organization is to maintain and promote peace, security and justice among all nations, Recognizing the responsibility of all Member States to promote the cause of international peace in accordance with their obligations as provided in the Charter, Recognizing that the Charter charges the Security Council with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, Reaffirming the importance of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council on all problems which are likely to threaten world peace, Recalling General Assembly resolution 190 (III) entitled "Appeal to the Great Powers to renew their efforts to compose their differences and establish a lasting peace", Recommends to the permanent members of the Security Council that: (a) They meet and discuss, collectively or otherwise, and, if necessary, with other States concerned, all problems which are likely to threaten inter­ national peace and hamper the activities of the United Nations, with a view to their resolving fundamental differences and reaching agreement in accord­ ance with the spirit and letter of the Charter; (6) They advise the General Assembly and, when it is not in session, the Members of the United Nations, as soon as appropriate, of the results of their consultations. 227 SELECT ON RESOLUTION ON CONGO*

A/4510, RESOLUTION 1474, REV. I (ES-IV), 20 SEPTEMBER i960

The General Assembly, Having considered the situation in the Republic of the Congo, Taking note of the resolutions of 14 and 22 July and of 9 August of the Security Council, < Taking into account the unsatisfactory economic and political conditions that continue in the Republic of the Congo, Considering that, with a view to preserving the unity, territorial integrity und political ir.dcpcndcr.ee of the Congo3 to protecting and advancing the wel­ fare of its people, and to safeguarding international peace, it is essential for the United Nations to continue to assist the Central Government of tht Congo, 1. Fully supports the resolution of 14 and 22 July and of 5 August of the Security Council; x 2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take vigorous action in accordance with the terms of the aforesaid resolutions and to assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order throughout the territory of the Republic of the Congo and to safeguard its unity, territorial integrity and political independence in the interests of international peace and security; 3. Appeals to all Congolese within the Republic of the Congo to seek a specd> solution by peaceful means of all their internal conflicts for the unity and integrity of the Congo, with the assistance, as appropriate, of Asian and African representatives appointed by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, in consultation with the Secretary-General, for the purpose of conciliation; 4. Appeals to all Member Governments for urgent voluntary contribu­ tions to a United Nations Fund for the Congo to be used under United Nations control and in consultation with the Central Government for the purpose of rendering the fullest possible assistance to achieve the objective mentioned in the preamble; 5. Requests (a) All States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the unity, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of the Congo; (b) All Member States, in accordance with Articles 25 and 49 of the Charter, to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council and to afford mutual assistance in carrying out measures decided upon by the Security Council; * Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping- 1946-1967, Documents and Commentary/ Oxford University Press, New York, 19R0. 228

6. Without prejudice to the sovereign rights of the Republic of the Cor.30, calls upon all States to refrain from the direct and indirect provision of arms or other material of war and military personnel and other assistance for rrjli- tary purposes in the Congo during the temporary period of military assis­ tance through the United Nations, except upon the request of the United Nations through the Secretary-General for carrying out the purposes of this resolution and of the resolutions of 14 and 22 July and of 9 August i960 of the Security Council. [This resolution was adopted by 70 votes to i, with 11 abstentions (Alba­ nia, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Poland, Ro­ mania, the Ukraine, Union of South Africa, and the U.S.S.R.). Bolivia wng absent.]

S/4741, 21 FEBRUARY 1961 (ALSO IN DRAFT FORM, S/4722, 17 FlHRUARY I 961) t A

The Security Council, Hewing considered the situation in the Congo, Having learned with deep regret the announcement of the killing of the Congolese leaders, Mr. Patrice Lumumba, Mr. Miurice Mpolo and Mr. Joseph Okito, Deeply concerned at the grave repercussions of these crimes and the danger of wide-spread civil war and bloodshed in the Congo and the threat to international peace and security, Noting the Report of the Secretary-General's Special Representative (S/4691) dated 12 February 1961 bringing to light the development of a serious civil war situation and preparations therefor, 1. Urges that the United Nations take immediately all appropriate mea­ sures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrange­ ments for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort; 2. Urges that measures be taken for the immediate withdrawal and eva­ cuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and para­ military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Com­ mand, and mercenaries; 3. Calls upon all States to take immediate and energetic measures to pre­ vent the departure of such personnel for the Congo from their territories, and for the .denial of transit and other facilities to them; 229 B

The Security Council, Gravely concerned at the continuing deterioration in the Congo, and the prevalence of conditions which seriously imperil peace and order, and the unity and territorial integrity of the Congo, and threaten international peace and security, Noting with deep regret and concern the systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the general absence of rule of law in the Congo, Recognizing the imperative necessity of the restoration of parliamentary institutions in the Congo in accordance with the fundamental law of the country', so that the will of the people should be reflected through the freely elected Parliament, Convinced that the solution of the problem of the Congo lies in the hands of the Congolese people themselves without any interference from outside and that there can be no solution without conciliation, Convinced further that the imposition of any solution, including the forma­ tion of any government not based on genuine conciliation would, far from settling any issues, greatly enhance the dangers of conflict within the Congo and threat to international peace and security, i. Urges the convening of the Parliament and the taking of necessary pro­ tective measures in that connection; 2. Urges that Congolese armed units and personnel should be reorganized and brought under discipline and control, and arrangements be made on impartial and equitable bases to that end and with a view to the elimination of any possibility of interference by such units and personnel in the political life of the Congo; 3. Calls upon all States to extend their full co-operation and assistance and take such measures as may be necessary on their part, for the imple­ mentation of this resolution. [This resolution was adopted by nine votes to zero, with two abstentions —France, the U.S.S.R.]

S'5002, 24 KOVLMUHR 1961

The Security Council, . Recalling its resolutions S'4387, S/4405, S/4426 and S'4741, Recallitig further General Assembly resolutions 1474 (ES-IV), 1592 (XV), 230

1599 (XV), i6oo (XV) and 1601 (XV), Reaffirming the policies and purposes of the United Nations with respect to the Congo (Leopoldville) as set out in the aforesaid resolutions, namely: (a) To maintain the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo; (b) To assist the Central Government of the Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order; (c) To prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo; (d) To secure the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all foreign military, para-military and advisory personnel not under- the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries; and (e) To render technical assistance, Welcoming the restoration of the national Parliament of the Congo in accordance with the Loi fondamentale and the consequent formation of a Central Government on 2 August 1961, Deploring all armed action in opposition to the authority of the Govern­ ment of the Republic of the Congo, specifically secessionist activities and armed action now being v carried on by the Provincial Administration of Katanga with the aid of external resources and foreign mercenaries, and completely rejecting the claim that Katanga is a "sovereign independent nation,' Noting with deep regret the recent and past actions of violence against United Nations personnel, Recognizing the Government of the Republic of the Congo as exclusively responsible for the conduct of the external affairs of the Congo, Bearing in mind the imperative necessity of speedy and effective action to implement fully the policies and purposes of the United Nations in the Congo to end the unfortunate plight of the Congolese people, necessary both in the interests of world peace and international co-operation, and stability and pro­ gress of Africa as a whole, 1. Strongly deprecates the secessionist activities illegally carried out by the provincial administration of Katanga, with the aid of external resources and manned by foreign mercenaries; 2. Further deprecates the armed action against United Nations forces and personnel in the pursuit of such activities; - • 3. Insists that such activities shall cease forthwith, and calls upon all concerned to desist therefrom; 4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to take vigorous action, including the use of requisite measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate appre­ hension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and .mercenaries as laid down in paragraph A-2 of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961; 231

.$. Further requests the Secretary-General to take, all necessary measures to prevent the entry or return of such elements under whatever guise and also of arms, equipment or other, material in support of such activities) 6. Requests all States to refrain from the supply of arms, equipment or other material which could be used for warlike purposes, and to take the necessary measures to prevent their nationals from doing the same, and also to deny transportation and transit facilities for such supplies across their territories, except in accordance with the decisions, policies and purposes of the United Nations; 7. Calls upon all Member States to refrain from promoting, condoning, or giving support by acts of omission or commission, directly or indirectly, to activities against the United Nations often resulting in armed hostilities against the United Nations forces and personnel; 8. Declares that all secessionist activities against the Republic of the Congo are contrary to the Loi fondamentalc and Security Council decisions and specifically demands that such activities which are now taking place in Katanga shall cease forthwith; 9. Declares full and firm support for the Central Government of the Congo, and the determination to assist that Government in accordance with the decision of the United Nations to maintain law and order and national inte­ grity, to provide technical assistance and to implement those decisions; 10. Urges all Member States to lend their support, according to their na­ tional procedures, to the Central Government of the Republic of the Congo, in conformity with the Charter and the decisions of the United Nations; 11. Requests all Member States to refrain from any action which may directly or indirectly impede the policies and purposes of the United Nations in the Congo and is contrary to its decisions and the general purpose of the Charter. 2.':!2

APPENDIX-II*

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT N X [This 'basic agreement* between Secretary-General Hammarskjcld and the Congo was initialled on July 29, i960. It was circulated as document v Sl4389\Add. 5.J

i. The Government of the Republic of the Congo states that, in the excer- cise of its sovereign rights with respect to any question concerning the pre­ sence and functioning of the United Nations Force in the Congo, it will be guided, in good faith, by the fact that it has requested military assistance from the United Nations and by its acceptance of the resolutions of the Security Council of 14 and 22 July i960; it likewise states that it will ensure the free­ dom of movement of the Force in the interior of the country and will accord the requisite privileges and immunities to all personnel associated with the activities of the Force. 2. The United Nations takes note of this statement of the Government of the Republic of the Congo and states that, with regard to the activities of the United Nations Force in the Congo, it will be guided, in good faith, by the task assigned to the Force in the aforementioned resolutions; in parti­ cular the United Nations reaffirms, considering it to be in accordance with the wishes of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, that it is prepared to maintain the United Nations Force in the Congo, until such time as it deems the lattcr's task to have been fully accomplished. 3. The Government of the Republic of the Congo and the Secretary- General state their intention to proceed immediately, in the light of para­ graphs 1 and 2 above, to explore jointly specific aspects of the functioning of the United Nations Force in the Congo, notably with respect to its deploy­ ment, the question of its lines of communication and supply, its lodging and its provisioning; the Government of the Republic of the Congo, confirming its intention to facilitate the functioning of the United Nations Force in the Congo, and the United Nations have agreed to wrrk together to hasten the implementation of the guiding principles laid down in consequence of the work of joint exploration on the basis of the resolutions of the Security Council. 4. The foregoing provisions shall likewise be applicable, as appropriate, to the non-military aspects of the United Nations operation in the Congo. *M.v. Naidu, Collective Security and the United Nations, Macmillan, Delhi, Bombay,Calcutta, Madras, 1974. 233

APPENDIX-III* ONUC: LOCATION AND STRENGTH STATEMENT

A. ONUC location itattment

Serial So. Nationality Unit/Sub-Unit Location Remarks

I ONUC Headquarters Lcopoldville 2 Canada .Signal squadron Leopoldville 3 India .Supply platoon * Lcopoldville - , Ordnance company Lcopoldville 5 Ghana Brigade of 3 battalions and 1 Leopoldville police companies 6 Sudan Battalion HQ.and 2 companies Lcopoldville 7 Tunisia .. , . 1 company Leopoldville 8 UAR . 1 company Leopoldville 9 Morocco ... Brigade HQ. Leopoldville 10 HQ.ist Battalion Thysville 1 platoon in Boende II Company HQ_and 1 platoon Borru 12 Platoon Tshela ij Platoon Lukula M Platoon KLitoru •5 Company Matadi ib Company HQ.and 1 platoon Songololo 17 Section Lufu iS Platoon Lukala 19 Platoon Moerbcke 20 HQ_2nd Battalion KiWit 2 companies in Katanga 21 Company Levcrville ^^ Platoon Banga -3 Platoon Kizia 24 Company HQ_and 2 platoons Popokabaka 25 Guinea Battalion HQ. Banningville 26 Company Dimi =7 Company HQ.and 1 platoon Mushie 2S Platoon Kwamouth 29 Platoon Bolobo 3° Company HQ_and 2 platoons Inongo 3' Platoon Kin r- Company HQ.and 1 platoon Kutu 33 Platoon Oshwe 34 Platoon Nioki 35 Platoon Mabenga 36 Morocco .. .. Parachute company Coquilhatville 37 Platoon Boende 38 L'AR Battalion less 3 companies Gemcna 1 company in Leopoldville 39 Company less 1 platoon Lisala 40 Company Bumba 4' Company- Libcnge 42 Ethiopia Brigade HQ. Stanleyville 43 HQjst Battalion and 2 companies Bunia 44 Platoon Aba 45 Platoon Mambasa 46 Company HQ. Paulis 47 Platoon Poko Moving to Paulis 48 Platoon Watsa 49 HQ_2nd Battalion and 2 companies Yangambi 50 Company HQ.and 1 platoon Isangi

•Rosalyn Higgins,United Nations peacekeeping- 1946-1967 ',r>ocuments and Commentary Oxford University Press, New york, 1980 234

5' Platoon Elisabctlu 52 Company HQ^and 2 platoons Ponthicrville 53 Platoon Banalia 54 HQ_3rd Battalion and 2 companies Stanleyville 55 Company HQ_and 2 platoons Buta 56 Platoon ALeti 57 Company Bambesa 58 Tunisia , Brigade HQ_ Luluabourg 59 HQ.ioth Battalion Luluabourg 1 company in Leopoldville 6o Company HQ_ Bakwanga 6i Platoon Kabinda 62 Platoon Dibaya 63 Section Kaulu 64 Section Kalala 65 Platoon Lusambo 66 Company HQ_and 1 platoon Mwene Ditu 67 Platoon Gandajika 68 Platoon Luputa 69 Company HQ.and 1 platoon Kadima-Diba 70 Platoon Dimbelenga 7' HQ_9th Battalion and 1 company Tshikapa 72 Company Port Francqui 73 Company Mweka 74 Platoon Lubami 75 Platoon Katumba 76 .Battalion HQ_and 1 company- Luluabourg On railway protection duties 77 Platoon Tshimbula 78 Platoon Kalu 79 Platoon Kcle 80 Platoon Muscnga Banza 81 Platoon Luputa 82 HQ. ONTJC . .Sub-Command Elisabcthville for Eastern Provinces (Katanga- Kivu) 83 Sweden Battalion HQ_and 1 company Elisabethville 1 company in Kamina 84 Platoon Kasenga 85 Platoon Sakania 86 Platoon Manono On temporary assignment 87 Morocco ... .Company HQ.and 1 platoon Jadotvtlle From and Moroccan Battalion 88 Platoon Kambove 89 Platoon Mitwaba 90 Company HQ^and 1 platoon Lubudi 9i Platoon Tcnke 92 HQ_3rd Battalion Kolweri 93 Platoon N'zilo 94 Company HQ_and 1 platoon Dilolo 95 Platoon Mutshatsha 96 Platoon Kasaji 97 Platoon Sandoa 98 Platoon Kapanga 99 Sweden . . 1 Company Kamina 235

A. ONUC location statement (cont.) Serial No. Nationality Unit/Sub-Unit Location Remarks

100 Ireland a Companies Kamina 1 company each from 32nd and 33rd Battalions 101 Ethiopia HQ_ath Battalion Kamina 102 Platoon Kaniama 103 Platoon Malemba 104 Platoon Bulama 105 Platoon Luena 106 Ireland HQ_33rd Battalion Albcrtville 107 Platoon Kabinda > 08 Platoon Bcndera 109 Platoon Baudouinville no G>mpany HQ^and 1 platoon Nlinono 111 Platoon Piana > 12 HQ_32nd Battalion Goma 1 • 3 Company Kindu • • 4 Company Bukavu 115 Mali Battalion HQ_and 1 company Kabalo 116 Company Nyunzu • > 7 Company Kongolo 11S Company Kabongo 23fi APPENDIX-TV* Mo. l LETTER FROM SYNGMAN RHEE TO CHO BYUNG- OK, AMBASSADOR PLENIPOTENTIARY AND PER­ SONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, DATED APRIL 10, 1949*

April 10. 1949

Dear Dr. Chough: I thought your radiogram inquiring as to the advisability of openly ask­ ing for military aid was very timely. However, 1 did not wish to proceed openly in the matter for fear it might spoil some confidential arrangements made by Mr. Muccio, who was reported to have secured "something."** When he came to see me with Mr. Drumright, I quietly asked him what had been accomplished, and he said this: "The military aid has been granted .ind the President has signed certain documents relating to it." I am not sure whether lie referred to the President's signature on the military aid request or on the ECA agreement. He further said that the publicity regard­ ing a direct request for further military aid might hurt the plan. I thought he was right. There are lots of people who oppose giving arms to Koreans as they would oppose giving sharp knives to children. Our enemies have spread propaganda to the effect that the ignorant, thoughtless Koreans might attack the Soviet Union, thus bringing about a clash between Russia and the United States. This idea is prevalent among some Americans in Korea even now. For such reasons, the thought of giving military aid to Korea is considered dangerous to the United States.

* This document was found in the archives of the president's office ot the Syngman Rhee Government. Copy. ** The words "to have secured something" are underlined in ink in the original.

*Facts Tell, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang 1960. 237

What you and I are trying to do is to convince the world that we are not as foolish as we have been represented to be. We must make it known that we can manage our own affairs as well as any other well organized nation can. It is in this respect that publicity work is most important. The Americans are beginning to learn more about us and their estimate of our strength and capability is rising higher every day. But unless we can be sure of having the support of some of the leading newspapers in the United States, it would be too risky to make an open demand for arms and am­ munition. This is why I have thought it best to keep your mission confi­ dential. Now on the other hand, I want to tell you why we need feel no timidity when we have the opportunity to make our sentiments on this matter known to the proper authorises. We are perhaps in greater need of arms and am­ munition than any other nation, largely because of conditions imposed upon us by the Great Powers themselves. At the same time, there is more reason for the United States to arm us than to arm any other people, because of the obligation it owes us. * We have more justifiable grounds for demanding arms than any other nation in the world. It was the United States that invited the Soviet Union to occupy northern Korea, and it was the United States that prevented us for two and a half years from arming ourselves. Despite these facts, among the nations of Northeast Asia, Korea is the only one that has been fighting the Communists successfully. While the United States as the Arsenal of Democracy was freely grant­ ing Lend Lease aid z-nd military equipments to every Allied nation, we were the only people denied the privilege^of securing any aid. During all •.he past years we have had to fight the common enemy alone and unaided. Now as the Americans are withdrawing their occupation forces from Korea, would it not be a gross crime to leave us alone and unaided, ill equipped for national defense, while the north Korean Communist force is armed and aided by the Soviet Union? It the northern army should invade our country .and force us to accept a Communist rule, would not the United States be responsible for it? Ever since the attack on Pearl Harbor we urged and begged the State Department to give us military and economic assistance, so that after the defeat of Japan we would have an army of our own to defend our own homeland against Communist attack. We told them plainly that if the Com­ munists were allowed to occupy Korea a situation would be created disad­ vantageous not only to Korea but also to the United States. This statement was made repeatedly, both orally and in writing, as is fully evidenced in the contents of the State Department files. They turned a deaf ear to our 23R appeals, and you know the result Both the United States and Korea are paying the price for the mistakes made by the State Department at that time. Now we are asking for arms both for our own defense and for the se­ curity of the United States. If they fail us again, both Korea and the United States will suffer. We might as well go on record to this effect, to show that we see in advance what is coming and to warn against a repetition of the earlier mistake. Whether our American friends realize it or not, it is up to us to make plain the warning and the appeal. I think you should frankly discuss this situation in fullest confidence with high officials of both the United Nations and the United States. In a strictly confidential manner tell them what plans we have for the unifica­ tion of north and south. As a matter of fact, we are ready for the unifica­ tion now in every respect but one; namely, we lack arms and ammunition. A large proportion of the Korean Communist Army is ready to mutiny and help us chase out of the country such Communist hirelings as Kim II Sung and others. And the civilfan population in the norlh will join with them in cleaning up and keeping under control all the terroristic Communist ele­ ments. They are all ready to do it without our aid. They have asked us to give them the signal by radio or by other secret message, setting the time and dale. In fact they are urging us to do it. However, we are urging them to wait for the simple reason that we do not have sufficient arms and ammunition for the next necessary step. Sup­ posing we do clean up the north and settle everything quietly to our satis­ faction? Who is there to keep the Chinese Eighth Route Army, the Yenan group, and the Siberian forces from moving in again? We have to be pre­ pared with a sufficient military force so that we can proceed into the north to join with our loyal army there, and to move the Iron Curtain from the 38th parallel up to the Yalu River, and there to guard it against infiltra­ tion from without. For this operation we need two naval vessels of 8,000 tons each, with 18 inch guns, for the defense of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. We need fast running patrol boats to guard against Communist underground movements along our coasts. We need 200,000 soldiers trained and organized for de­ fense along the northern border. We need planes for defense and anti-air­ craft guns. And we need them now. Some Americans worry about the lack of technicians, but they do not know that we have ten or twelve aviators who were among the best in Japan, three of whom were accounted the best in the Orient. We have sea captains who can direct our merchant marine. For our army, we can Or- 239

ganize a force of 200,000 men in a short iimt. We have several hundred thousand returned soldiers who were forced to join the conscript army dur ing the war. They are, in fact, veteran soldiers. They were put into the Iront lines by the Japanese, and many of them were killed in the South Pacific Island and Manchurian operations. Most of the officers. were trained in Japanese universities. People do not know much about them for they keep quiet for fear they may be branded as pro-Japanese. They are loyal citizens and are ready to give their lives for their country. If we get suffici­ ent arms, we can prepare them in no time. This outline will show you why I wish you to keep the request con­ fidential, and also suggests the line of approach you may find effective in your talks with United States and United Nations officials. Our need is great, and it will be disastrous for both Korea and the United States if it is not heeded. The mistake of withholding arms from Koreans must not be made again, as it was made during the war. I shall expect your confidential reports on the reactions you receive from the high officials, and we shall try to help in all ways we can from here.

Sincerely yours, (Syngman Rhee) Dr. Pyung Ok Chough^ Washington DC

• In some places Pyung Ok Chough is spelled as Clio Byung-ok. 240 April 10, 19*9 uear Dr. Chough: I thought your radiogram Inquiring as to the advisability of openly asking for military old was very tlxely. However, I did not wish to prooeed openly In the matter for fear it might spoil some confidential arrangements made by ter. Kuoo.lo, wlio wes reported to have seoured ^something." Whan he oesa to eoe me with Mr. Drumright. I quietly asked hln what had been aoocmpllsh- ed, end he said thl6: "The military aid ha6 been granted and the President has signed oertaln dooument6 relating to it." I am not sure whother he referred to the Pre3iaent'6 sl'jnati-.re on the mllltery aid request or on the £CA agreement. He furthor 6aid that the rubliolty regarding a diroot request for further military aid might hurt the plan. I thought he APE right. There are lots of people who oppose giving arm6 to Koreans as they would oppose giving sharp knives to oMldren. Our enemies have spread propaganda to the effeot that trie ignorant, thought­ less Koreans might attack the Eovlet Union, thus bringing about a olaah between Russia and the United Staten. This idea is prevalent among some Americans la Korea oven now, for euoa reasons, the thought of giving military eld to Koreaio ID considered dangerous to the United States.

Vtfhet you and I are trying to do Is to oon7ince the world that we ere not as foolish as we have boon represented to bo. We /nuBt make It known that we oan linage oar own off aire ua well ao any other well organized nation oan. It io in thl3 rocpoct that publicity work is most important. The Axorioaus are bogln- ning to leern Jiore about us and their estimate of our strength and oapubility is rl6lng higher every day. But unless we;oan be 6ure of having the support of some of the leading newspapers in the United States, It would be too risky to make an open demand for arms and ammunition. This la why I have'thought it 6o6t to Keep your nlasioa confidential. Now on the other hand, I want to tell you why we need feel no timidity when we have the opportunity to u&ke our sentLxeuts on this matter known to the proper authorities. We are perhaps in greater need of arms and ammunition than any othor nut ion, largely beoause of conditions imposed upon us by the Orc'ot Powers thoaselres. At the caao time, there is core reocon for the United StatC6 to ara ue than to era any other people, beoause of the obligation it owes UB.

Photosiatic copy of the 1st page of Document \'o. I 241 No. z

LETTER FROM SYNGMAN RHEE TO DR. ROBERT T. OLIVER, AN AMERICAN PROFESSOR, DATED SEPTEMBER 30, 1949*

September 30. 1949

To: Dr. Robert T. Oliver From: President Syngman Rhee I received your letters and thank you for them. I do not want to register Mr. Krock as lobbyist or anything of that kind. Please contact Mr. K.** and Mr. Mead in a very confidential way and find out all what is necessary. In case you think that it would not be advisable to em­ ploy Mr. K. in regard to what Mr. W.*# told you we may have to drop the matter. In my last letter I asked you to find out from the National Press Club more about K. We simply cannot engage anyone who has not a good business reputation. Please be very careful in dealing with this matter. There is some criticism about the work we are doing. But I wrote to them that you are doing all right, so do not let that worry you but be on friendly terms with everybody and carry on your work at your best ability. The more I think of your work Uie more I feel convinced that you can be more helpful here in Korea. I need someone to take care of my important work and I am thinking seriously of asking you to come at the end of your term of service in the university. Do not whisper it to anybody but keep it in mind and as soon

• This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government. Copy. * * As in the original. 2 42 as you can get out I wish you would come and work for me right in my office How often I wish wc had you here. I wish I had time to write out from time to lime some of my thoughts (dating to the changing events both here and in America. So far it has been impossible. 1 will try however. One thing is that 1 want to tell you briefly concerning our situation. I feel strongly that now is the most psychological moment when we should take an aggressive measure and join with our loyal communist army in the north to dean up the rest of them in Pyongyang. We will drive some of Kim II Sung's men to the mountain region and where we will gradually starve them out. Then our line of defense must be strengthened along the Tuman and Yalu Rivers. We will be in a 100% better position. The natural boundary line along the river and the Paikdoo Mts can be made almost impenetrable with sufficient number of planes and two or three fast running naval vessels standing at the mouths of the two rivers with fighting planes defending all the coast lines including Oeju Island. What Koreans of old did repeatedly during the last 2,000 years in defending their nation against great invasions of Emperor Tang, Emperor Soo, the Mongols and the Japs. I believe we are leady to repeat the successful defense of our nation against foreign invasions. All the Chinese, Japanese and the Korean communist army in Manchuria and Siberia may do all they want to but we will be able to fight them off. We want to do regardless of what outside nations may do against us. I believe the Soviet Union will not be foolhardy enough to start invasions at the present t:me. Our people are clamoring for it. Our people in the north want us to let them do it now but we are doing everything we can to quiet them down and it is a mighty difficult task. I want you to express tills situation very clearly and convincingly and show a copy to Ambassador Chang and Ambassador Chough. We will all quietly work together, you in Washington and in New York and our two Ambassadors and other friends, and we here in Seoul and Tokyo toward one end; that they agree to our cleaning up and setting our house in order. Use the old phrase that Churchill used once, "Give us the tools and we will do the job." Convince the American statesmen and the general public and let them quietly agree that we go ahead and carry out our program and give us all the material backing we need. The longer we drag along the harder it will be. Soviet's cold war is always a winning war. First they give the communist agitators money, weapons and propaganda literature to stir up the people to fight among themselves. Then later they get the communist converts into a gang of terrorists, assassins and robbers by killing, and burning and making the whole human society hell. So long as they continue robbing they have enough to support themselves. They do everything to make trouble for others. By so doing the communists are 243 strengthening themselves'and spreading wider and digging deeper all the tfme. The more robbery they commit the more money they get With the money they carry on their killing and burning activities. But the nationalists everywhere have no one to count on for help. They have to use every means of their own to defend themselves and these sort of things continue herein hereout. They cannot keep fighting. They are forced sooner or later to give in and that is what happened in China and everywhere else. What the Americans are doing now in the so-called cold war is a losing battle and if we continue in this losing battle by sitting still and warding off these gangsters no human flesh and nerve can hold on very long. When the Koreans are willing to get up and clean them up once and for all it is the most psychological moment to do-it now. I am.sure we can settle this question within a reasonable short time if we are only allowed to do it. Please put this whole story in a very convincing statement and quietly approach some influential people here and there and let us get their support If you could get this story into President Truman's ear I think it will have some desired effect. 244

September 30, 1%9

To : Dr. Robert T. Oliver From : Prosidont Syr^Man Rhee

I roeeived your letters and thank you for tnen. I do not want to register Mr. Krock as lobbyist or enythin£ of that kind. Please contact t*r, K. and Mr. Head in a very confidential way and find out all what Is necessary. In caee you think that it would not be advisable to enploy Vy. K. in regard to whet Mr. W. told you we may hove to drop the matter. In njy last letter I aeked you to find out from the National I .-ess dun more about K. We simply cannot engage anyrne who has not a good business reputation. Please be very careful in dealing with this matter. There is aomc critlciza about the work we are doing. 8ut 1 wrote to thoo that you are doing all right, so do not let that worry you but be on friendly terns with everybody a,nd carry on your work at your best ability. The moro 1 think of your work the nore 1 feel convinced that jrou can be •ore helpful here in Koroa. I need eonsone to take care of my important -•ork and I a» thinking seriously of asking you to corae at the eoi of your term of sorvice In ti;a university. Do not whisper it to anybody but keep It in mind and as tco-i as you can get out I wish you would come and wcrx for i*e rl£ht in isy office. Mow often I wl6h we had you here.

I wish 1 had ti"* t:» write out fro* tloe to tiie some my thoughts relating to tne changing events both here and In Africa. So far it has been impossible. 1 will try hovevor. CS".e thins is th»t I want to toll you briefly concerning our situation.

I feel strongly tl-at now ia the isost psycholnjiccl boosnt when we shr.uld take an aggressive censure and Join with our loytl coururvlst arwty in the north to clean up the rest of them in Pyongyiuig. Ho will drlva 6ouc of Kin 11 dung's *on to the roountaln region and where we will gradually starve th«a out. Then our line of defense eaut bo tt-engthenod a Ion ft tho Tunan onrt Yelu pivors. We will bo in a 10C# hotter position. The naturcl boundary line along the river and the PaiWoo Hta can be mado aL^st impenetrable with sufficient nuriber of planes and two or three fast running naval vosselo standing at the souths of the two rivers with fighting planes defending ell the coast lines including Cheju Island. What Koreans of old did repeatedly' during the last 2,000 years in defending their nation against great Invasions of £jp«ror Tang, ijvptrrr Soo, th» Mongols and the Japs. 1 belicvo we are ready to repeat t.">«i au&Sessful L^fenos of our nitior. agaiwat

Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document

Confidential* *

KOREAN EMBASSY Washington D.C.*»*

January 11, 1950

Your Excellency: This letter is being prepared just before the pouch leaves for the airport so that I may give you some encouraging news which I have received con­ fidentially from a top level, reliable source in the Pentagon. I am informed that the State Department and the Pentagon are planning a firm stand with respect to the U.S. Oriental policy. In this anti-Communist plan Korea will occupy an important position. I have every hope that we will get much more help, militarily speaking, as a result. 1 have had word from a confidential source in the State Department that President Truman will sign, very soon, authorization which will grant permission for armament for Korean ships and planes. Thus I am confident that there will be no delay at Pearl Harbor in installing guns on the Bakdusan, for the President's order will remove the principal and important obstacle. The Turkish representative on UNCOK has met with me and I found

• This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government • This is hand-written and underlined in ink in the original. •** Letterhead. 246

him to be a strong and sympathetic person. I feel sure he will make a good Commission member.

With sentiments of loyalty and esteem, I am

Respectfully yours.

John M. Chang*

His Excellency Dr. Syngman Rhee President of the Republic of Korea 247 C**>f*/6*~&*£> KOREAN EMBASSY WAHUINOTON. D.O.

Usury 11, 1950

Ton* Excellencyi This letter is being prepared just beforo the pouch leaves for the airport so that I nay give you coca encouraging r.-zzs which I hare received confidentially frcn a top level, reliable source in the Pentagon. I aa Informed that the State Dopa-toent and the Pcr.ta^cn cro planning a fira stand with rospect to the U. S. Oriental policy. In this anU-Cosaunist plan, Korea will occupy an lnporta*. position. I heve every hope that we will get such noro halp, militarily opolicing, as a result.

I hive had word from a confidential source in the State Depcrtaeni that P-csldunt Trusan will eign, very soon, authorization cMchwill grant peraisalon for armaxent for Korean ships and planes. Thru I aa confident thst there will bo no delay at Pearl Harbor in installing guns on tfae Bak« dusan, for the President's order will removo the principal and important obstacle.

Tha Turkish representative on UNCOK has rat with ce and I found him to be a strong and syepathetic person. I feel sire be rill sake a good Concaission oezber.

With sentiitents of loyalty and esteea, I aa Respectfully yours,

X/john M. Chang J

His Excellency Or. Syngaan Rhee President of the Republic of Korea

Photostatic copy of Document No. J 248 No. A LETTER FROM REAR ADMIRAL SOHN WON-IL, SOUTH KOREAN CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, TO ADMIRAL RADFORD, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, U.S. NAVY, DATED JULY 18,1949*

REPUBLIC OF KOREA MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE**

Washington Embasy Muccio Tokyo Admiral Sohn***

Office of Chief of Naval Operation July 18, 1949 My dear Admiral Radford: The Government of the Republic of Korea desires to express to you its sincere appreciation for the friendly visit made by a unit of your fleet con­ sisting of the Cruiser Manchester and the auxiliary destroyers under the command of Admiral T.H. Binford. This visit has greatly enhanced the already existing good feeling be­ tween the United States and Korea. We particularly appreciate this signifi­ cant manifestation of your friendship for us. and we are desirous to express our gratitude in return. We have learned to respect and admire the noble spirit shown by Admiral Binford and by the officers and enlisted men under

• This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government. Copy. •• Letterhead. •** These four lines were inserted in ink, presumably for distribution. 249

his command. This Government hopes that this unit, in its present form or enlarged grouping, will call on us again and oftqn. Indeed, we shall be glad to afford the facilities of our several ports, including Inchun, Pusan, Yosu, Mukho and the Naval Base of Chinhae, as temporary Mobile Bases of any such a unit of your Fleet. - Such an arrangement as this will not only further solidify the friendly relationship between our two nations but also be a source of encouragement to all tlie peace-loving democratic nations, in and around the Pacific. We cannot convey this suggestion to the Secretary of the United States Navy. We may not be able to offer you all the conveniences and facilities for the comfort of our visitors but we shall strive to be genial hosts. I take this opportunity to convey to you the high esteem of our President, Dr. Syngman Rhce, and the hope that you will also honor us by a personal visit in a near future.

Most sincerely yours, Won II Sohn Rear Admiral Chief of Naval Operation

Admiral A. W. Radford Commander-in-Chief United States Pacific Fleet United States Navy 250

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Idalral A. W. Ha^fbrd 'CoBOondorolo-Chiof < ^UcUtod Statu P«eirio MMt '^Uoltod SUtao Savy

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Photostatic copy of Document A'o.

NIMUMNT O— WW OF 1** HCFK^JC O* «CW»«A 10 we* uwito us**©** e-r»T*

•ovaaher ), 19b9

•ear *>. President! I haws the honour U ask* a brief report covering tha followl**; eubjectai TW lagMl PWCTIPI MP TW COIPUI aSSPClT

la rla* of tha fact that I ba*a made telegraphic raporta at the vaj-lma etaeaa of tha deliberations, that yoa mast hate heard a detailed report from Harold Noble and that various official dooaonta of tha On J tad *aUona co*arlng proceedlnge »« the Korean dlacuaalon are to ba aaat «e tha Foreign Minister, I etiall not «»»11 aueh opoo datalla of tha dallbaratlona. I want only to point oil UJI w T*nr Poaera draft resolution eas pasted by tha Caaaral aasoafclr 07 an ovtnrtxlalnc majority; that la to say, W to 6, la aplta of tha oppoaltlon fro* U>« Jorlat Bloc- It ke gratifying to nota thoee friendly natlona ehleh Had supported Koraa'a ease In Parle lsnt jaar are still steady and atronc In eymnathy tcaard Korea, u> aplte of the cor— tlnuoua and trag Ic development la China since thaa.

THE W rMTTTRSS OF TIC HESOLOTiah

Tha characteristic difference boteeaa tha December l?th, 19US resolution an) the preaant four Poaora draft-resolution Ilea la the feet that toe preaant reaolutlon emphasises tha organey of oboerratloo on (be security situation axlatlag la lore* awe, and lit the future. That la tha reason any Military «cperta ara to be akUuwl to the United Nations Coaadsaloa am Korea. with tha unification of Korea aa tha ultimate objective, tha Coaalaslan'a chief ruoctlon thla year la to aaka observa­ tions 00 the security altBatloa. Tha aeoood difference la found In that the existence ef tha Coanlsslon la Indefinitej It will continue lta aerk until the problem or unification haa been achieved. • THE CGRTiTVTlOW OF THE CCIWgSICT 1 ad) happy to report that aa the ratal! of atronc prasenUU.cn cade by car Delage- tlon, tha Onltad State* Delegation and tha Steta Department, the Prejldent of the General Aaaeably and the Secratary-Oaneral of the Secretariat aeeaad to bate gives duo attention to the need of etranthenlng tha Coandaaloo. Syria la dropped and Turkey, la nominated la Ilea of that former trooblaaooa mezber cocntry. Secretery- Ceaerai Lie has farther aatarad ma ha had requested various oeador governments on tha United* Nations Comnisslcn on Korea to nonlnate their represses* tlvee from amove persona of atronc conrlcUon and high experience'end rank, with a 'lea of baring a eyatea,6f permanent chairmanship that'till Intare etetdy and sUMUsed fanctlanl.-^ «f the CommUalau T» atttfizmcst cr TB txamrauT trlTbjpOTted to 700 by radiogram, *>. Bartll memborg was appointed aa the na« prln*- Opal SCgimtary in lieu of Dr. merthelmar. Tha aeereUry-Oeaeral and Mr. Cordiar fanartC*n)» Executive Aaalatamt to Secretary-General Trygve Lie, hare aatarad ma \hat>kr. Ranborg la a man of atrccg conrlctlam end leadership. Ba la a overfish •Alison and has been In charge of tha Division, of CbaajonicaUcrii and aecorla. He had tan yeare' experience la the foreign aarrlea of the Swedish Oorertaent. Tbay farther have aaaurad ma that thoaa five objectionable persona) neatly, &hanbas, Ktta, and three othara mlU ba r*iingor1 and that ao entirely new and sound aeeratarlat «U1 **, constituted.

I.S. Dr. Syngaaa Rhta rVaaldant of tb* Republic of term. Seoul, Korsa. 2 52 No. 5 MEMORANDUM OF SYNGMAN RHEE TO CHANG AIYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, AND CHO BYUNG-OK, AMBASSA­ DOR PLENIPOTENTIARY AND PERSONAL RE­ PRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, DATED JULY 18, 1949"

July 18, 1949

•MEMORANDUM

To .'Ambassadors Chang and Chough From: President Syngman Rhee

Ambassador Chang's letters of 13th with the enclosures and the Ko­ rean letter, and Ambassador Chough's letters of July 7 and 12 have arrived. 1 will make my answer to you both in the form of a memorandum so that jt will answer both of your letters. -;'-. Since Ambassador Chough represents this government to the UN with complete authority to take up any matter 1 wonder whether it is necessary for you to get separate authorization in making membership application to Various organizations belonging to the UN. If necessary, we will make Separate credentials each time. But you have the authority to apply after being authorized by your government for memberships to UNWHO and UNESCO. ' I feel that you should have someone to be in charge of the office dur­ ing your absence. The young man you suggest cannot be adequate to act

• This document was found in tr>e archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government. 253

Jn your behalf, He is young and his qualifications are limited altogether. He is not the person for such a position. Roy Kim who was serving in AMG* as one of the officers in the Property Custody is now visiting with the Businessmen's Goodwill Party. We have used him In our office for some lime and he proves himself very helpful and careful. He speaks and writes English very well and takes shorthand. If you care to use him, wire me at once and we will arrange to have him remain there to help you. I am sure your trip to Canada will be highly successful and hope you will find it enjoyable as well. Ambassador Chang's report on the interviews made together with Dr. Chough came together with Ambassador Chough's report covering the •nearly same although your report is more in detail from which 1 gather more of the true aspects. 1 thank you for them. I am so happy that our two Ambassadors in America are working in such complete cooperation. Very few representatives of other countries have shown such good spirit. I have nothing to worry about at that end and that harmony alone is sufficient to increase the prestige and solidity of our people and government. As you will find my answer covering the general topics in my memoran­ dum a copy of which will be sent to Dr. Chough, I am answering several questions relating only to the matters of personal interest. I am sorry to disappoint you but th-ej chancery building project is far beyond our limit. In the first place we have no money to meet this obligation. If we can pay in Korean Won we can meet it but since we have to pay in dollars we cannot pay $50,000 for the building with the equipments and the architect and all that. If you want to build it half a year or so later when we have some of our gold mines developed and some commodities exported we may be able to consider it, but at the present time it is a matter of physical impossibility. Why don't you make a temporary arrangement for the chancery to be accommodated in the Embassy building and get along as best as you can. The architects do not have to be so high-priceid people. We can get some smaller companies 2 or 3 companies be invited to submit their bids and if their plan is satisfactory we agree to pay so much. I do not think we have to pay 10 per cent fee for the plan alone, and that building also need not be so complete. Please do all you can to minimize the obligation on dollar basis as much as you can. It seems to me that J.J. Williams is taking more time in our service than I thought he could spare. If he keeps up as he is doing now please quietly ask

* "American Military Government*' 254 him what his railroad fares are and we might grant him expenses on a diem basis if he is in Washington. I am afrafd if we ask him to present his bills we might not bo able to pay for it.

REGARDING STAGGERS

We are not paying him anything for his service or even the time he spends. Ask him confidentially how much you should give him not as com­ pensation but actually for the time he uses in serving us—if he does any im­ portant work you ask him to do. We do not want him to have a hand in everything but what you think is important. Everything should be itemized so that it will go on our files. All these things must be understood so that you are to decide what expense to pay and what not. That is to say, when you deliberately ask them to do certain things you must clearly state that their carefares* and hotel bills you will pay. No one in the Embassy's service Ko­ rean or foreign should decide so much for one trip. Sorry I had to take this paragraph out** We received the papers for the SS Washington bought by the ECA. About the Washington mail. We are still trying to make the ECA pay for it because the boat was not chartered by the Korean . Government. Please do not pay unless you have direct orders from mi

REGARDING NATIONAL DEFENCE We declare that our defense program consists of the following figures: 100,000 standing army; 200,000 reserve force and 100,000 police force; total of 400,000 arc to be trained and equipped for our national defense. We have now 35,000 police and it will take a long time to reach that maximum number, but that is our aim. I do not think anybody can interpret it as militaristic expansion project. The American officials in Washington are of the information that 50,000 fully armed, 15,000 lightly armed, and 35,000 police reasonably armed. These are the information furnished by General Roberts and we cannot give full credence to his reports. We are going to check these. Since the beginning of the arms discussion I appointed our govern­ ment representatives to sign the receipt of every item that we receive from the Americans and ask them to get the signature of the American

* As in the original, evidently misspelt. •• The preceding paragraph (regarding the steamship Washington) has been crossed out in the original and is omitted here. 2 55 officials showing what they are turning over to us. and what we are receiving. There will be no disagreement in the reports , regarding tiie quantities of arms and ammunition we receive. You have already received one list of* the materials turned over to us. As soon as we have another list we shall not fail to forward it to you. MILITARY AID The ECA bill should be passed before we take up the military aid I am glad our Ambassadors and our friends have done so well that the ECA bill is progressing very nicely and I hope this will be adopted by the end of ihis month. However, the military aid is the most important one. If things come out as I hope 1 am sure we will get a large portion of the military aid appropriation of 1 billion 4 million dollars requested by President Truman for several European nations and Korea. These funds will be handled solely by President Truman, and I hope we can convince the President that Korea needs a lion's share, and I believe we deserve it America's investment on Korea will pay more dividend to the United States than all the' other receiving nations can yield. However, we must pave the way and if there is any obstacle we must leave no stone unturned until such obstacles are removed. General Roberts, head of the military mission was chosen by Gen. Hodge because Roberts' idea regarding Korea are just about the same. Roberts has no sympathy whatever for the Korean people or for the government. The best way to handle this question is to use Dr. Chough's suggestion that we ask for an official of a higher rank to head the mission. I am confidentially sending word to Gen. MacArthur asking him to appoint Gen: Coulter to head the mission. Whether Gen. MacArthur is in a position to do il or not is more or less uncertain. At any rate the presence of Gen. Roberts here at this time is not helpful to say the ( least, and if we can possibly get him out of Korea our case will be won hundred percent. Of course, we do not make this an open issue just as China did about General Stilwell. If we can succeed in quietly replacing him it would all be the better. If not we may have to make open demand which we are trying to avoid. It was very wise of you and friends in Washington to advise us against any attempt to purchase weapons of war or planes at this time. 1 was so mad when they said we had more weapons than necessary and we did not need planes or naval vessels since the United Statco planes could be here within four or five hours, and I told them that we are going to arm ourselves sufficiently for our protection either with or 256 without United States aid. We inquired all around and we have offers of all kinds of weapons but we have postponed it. We arc appointing competent men to survey the entire field of our defense program and make n complete list of things wo need ;md let you have it as soon as wc can. LOAN PAYMENT

We have mailed you the minutes of my conversations with Ambassador Muccio. Please go over carefully the part covering the loan of $25,000,000 the payment for the U.S. war surplus materials as both cf you know the circumstances surrounding the signing of this loan are highly questionable. Although the agreement was signed by the Representative Democratic Council and was also included in the financial settlement agreement, none of us ever thought that we would be asked to pay it and 1 had to be quite frank with Ambassador Muccio regarding it. They told me that we had to sign and I told them that wc would rather pay it out of our aid fund and forget it. They can do as they please with the money which is supposed to be spent for the educational work of Americans. The Fulbright Act regulations are such that we have little voice in the matter. We are to spend money for the educational purpose in Korea and pay the expenses for American professors to come and lecture here and all that. They said that the Committee is composed of four Americans and four Koreans with the American Ambassador here as Chairman. That is not all. They asked us to sell the Banto Hotel together with a number of some important buildings in Seoul. As a matter of fact wc do not want to go on the record that the Korean government sold any of our properties to any foreign government and we would rather offer them as a gift with the understanding that when they are through with the buildings sooner or later they will give the Korean government the lirst opportunity to purchase it back according to the prevailing market price then. And we made the deeds including the words "free gift" and the paper was beautifully made and presented in a ceremony in presence of American and Korean officials. Now they told me that Washington declined to accept it as a gift. They want to deduct several million dollars as their price out of the $25,000,000 loan. I do not know if 1 should ask you to take it up with the State Department and find out iheir definite reply regarding this or let it go as it is. I am requestea to sign the Fulbright uronosition and as I do not wish to show my ugly face I am inclined to'sign it wnatcver it is. 257

REGARDING OFFICIAL STATEMENT

I know that the June 8th statement was meant to be the guarantee that we asked them to make but it was not at all sufficient and our newspapers make quite a headline. If such a statement has any value st all the publicity about it in America should make it worth any. Time and again we found out that any such statement regarding interna­ tional situation does not mean much unless the American people are informed of the fact that their nation is committing itself to certain obligations. Whether the State Department will make it known to America to that extent I do not know. The treaty of commerce and amity is rather urgent. American businessmen are so anxious to open trade. We cannot afford to make an open door to everybody without any rules or regulations and therefore we are very anxious to get this commerce treaty signed soon.

REGARDING CHINHAE BAY

We had another visit by a unit of the United States Pacific Fleet under the command of Rear Admiral Binford. We had a little conversation with him and he is so impressed of the Bay and of our situation in general that he suggested wc address a letter to the commanding officer of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to accept our olTcr of the privilege of using all our open ports as temporary mobile bases. That means they can visit and stop or stay any time at our invitation, and I think it would be helpful for both countries in safeguarding peace and security of the Pacific. Such a letter will be sent soon. Since no naval or air officer of high rank can be employed by the Korean Government as it being against the law of the United States—we may have to find some other way of securing the services of able, experienced United States officials. Whether we should ask President Truman or the State Department autlioritics I do not know. If you think it available please quietly call on Admiral Yarnel and give him the best regards from Mrs. 'Rhee und myself to him and Mrs. Yariwl. They are our good friends.. I would like you to tell him that we should like him to come and visit us as our guest sometime in the near future, if he would accept our invitation. When he comes we could ask him to stay and he may suggest some plan. However, it should be done as top secret. Of course; we do not want to create any impression that we are giving any of our naval or air base to the United States or any other 25R

foreign power because that will create bad impression .ill around. You understand that, I am sure. Noble's article seems to reflect the ulc;i of the officials in the SUitc Department. These arc all the views of the pro-Japanese sentiment. We strongly object to the Japanese possession of Manchuria. If Japan had to have it she may be allowed to take north of Mukden up to Harbin and Vladivostok. But from Mukden to south Korea we will not allow any other nation to occupy it even temporarily. We will fight to the nail, and this idea should be gradually made known, although at present people may misunderstand our motive and the result may be hurtful to us. We might as well let the world know that we are strongly opposed to the Japanese occupation of Aianchuria or any oilier part especially the part adjacent to Korea. We will never allow Japan to occupy that par: of Manchuria without our opposition. From Noble's article in the Saturday Evening Post you will see that he is propagandizing that Japan should be included in the Pacific Periphery Alliance which each state is bound to defend Japan. If you would particularly read Page 82 you will see that arming Japan is the main purpose of this article and is sugar-coated enough to make the American people take it. Particularly on the second column of Page 84 he outlined that the first half of the Pacific Periphery Alliance should be strong precise military alliance. The second pact is the Asiatic Pacific Pact which includes Korea, should be etc. etc. 259 No. fe REPORT OF CHO BYUNG-OK, AMBASSADOR PLENIPOTENTIARY, PERSONAL REPRESENTA­ TIVE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND PERMANENT OBSERVER TO THE UNITED NATIONS, TO SYNGMAN RHEE, DATED OCTOBER 12, 1949*

TELEPHONE CABLE ADDRESS LONGACRE 3-4420" • KORUNMISON" PERMANENT" OBSERVER OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS Rd»** EMPIRE STATE BUILDING ROOM 6010 350 FIFTH AVENUE . NEW YORK 1. N.Y." October 12, 1949 Dear Mr. President: THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY Heated discussions are going on now at Lake Success on such important problems as the Greek problem, the Italian Colonies, Human Rigtits and Religious Freedom, the China question and Atomic Energy Control. As for our problem it will probably come up before the General Assembly in the latter part of next week even though there may be usual delay tactics rhat will be employed by the Soviet Bloc. The resolution affecting Korea

* This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government. •• Letterhead. •••• Marked in pencil by Syngman Rhee personally, presumably an abbreviation of "read." 260 which had been adopted at the Special Political Committee will certainly pass through the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority. AS REGARDS JOHNSTON In compliance with your wishes, I had taken up the case of Dick Johnston with General Adlcr of The New York Times and he had assured me that he would not make an immediate change of position for Johnston, which fact was indicated also in General Adler's letter to me. I have made an appointment with Mr. Sultzbcrger for today to deliver personally your letter to him. YOUR LETTER TO OLIVER It was with great care and interest that I read your letter to Dr. Oliver with regard to the question of unification, rather the disposal of the puppet regime in the North. The proposals you expounded therein are, under the circumstances prevailing, the only logical and ultimate method of bringing about our desired unification. However, after taking into consideration all the factors involved I am inclined to view that the time is not opportune as yet to carry out such a project. In the first place, I seriously question our preparedness, and the international opinion will not approve of such an action to be taken. It must be recalled that the Greek Government itself has been persuaded by the friendly powers from taking military steps against Albania. I do not see what or how Oliver can do under the present circumstances in connection with this serious problem. I am sure he cannot publicize such ii proposal as our fixed government policy. Nor do I think that it would be wise for him to make public such matters of secret import. I have discussed it with Ambassador Chang and Dr. Oliver and we unanimously agree that this matter should be regarded as the basic plan of our Government that should be carried out when we are ready and the time is opportune. Dear Mr. President, please forgive me for laying before you such outspoken views but I should like to assure you that I have felt that it is my bounding duty to be candid in order to be of loyal service to you. PACIFIC PACT Ambassador Chang and I have had a full exchange of views on the subject matter. In view of the situation existing, which was described in my last report, we do not see how the proposal you have in mind can be effected as a reality. The matter of the Pacific Pact is entirely entrusted by Quirino in the hands of Romulo and he in turn has a program somewhat different from that which you, Generalissimo Chiang and President Quirino had in 261

Tti.rw—i. Htll M i^*G*0Rfs-

pciowNCNT oaanrv*:* ©»> TN* RPUKX or KOMCA V 1 TO tHC UMTKD NATION* ^"Seaf ami «v»v« aw

Dear Mr. President! THE tiHirtn wn*5 QEiepjg kisaa.1 Heated dlsmsttons ara going on no* at lake Success eo such lesertant prohlexa as the Oreek or obi en, the Italian Color.iea, H.uxan Rlghte and Bali flaw) rreodoa, tie China quaatloo and Atonic toargy Control. as for our problea it will probably com* up befdre the General Assembly In the latter part of next week aran though there may be ueual delay tactics that will be employed by the Soviot Bloc. The rasolulion affecting Korea "Men had bean adopted at the Special Political Coojelttee will certainly pass throuc;. the OeneraJ aassahly by an overwhelming asjority.

A3 WEfUmS J0W3T0H

ID ooapllsnte with your wishes, 1 had taken up tfc* case of Me* Johr.stcn with Central Adler of The New Tors. Tines and he had assured aa that he wail.1 not Bake. an IsaadiaU change of position for Johnston, which fact was indicated also In Oeneral Adler'a letter to aa*.

I hare aada an appointment with Mr* Sulzberger for today to deliver personally your latter to hla.

Toot ITTTCH TO cirvm It wae with rreat care and Interest that I read your latter to Dr.iOllver with regard to the question of unification, rather the disposal of the puppet racisM in the North. The proposals you expounded therein ara, under the clrcuaaUncee prevailing, the only logical and ultimate aathod of bringing about our desired unlflcatiu). However, after taxing into consideration all the factors involved I MI inclined to new that the tlaa is not opportune as yet to carry out such a project. In the first place, I seriously question our preparedness, and the in­ ternational opinion will not approve of such an action to be taken.. It rust be recalled that the Creek Covamaant itself has bean persuaded by the f rler.dly powers frox taking unitary a taps against Albania.

I do not aao what or bow Oliver can do under the present circumstances In con­ nection with this serious problea. I a* aura he cannot publicize auch a proposal as our fixed govarnaant policy. Nor do I think that It would be alee for hia to sake public such oatVira of secret laport. I have discussed it with Ambassador Chuig and Dr. Oliver and we unanimously agree thai this natter should be regarded as the basic plan of our Ooveraoent that abould be carried cut when we are ready and the tlaa la opportune.

Dear l(r. President, pleaaa forgive aa for laying before you such cutspcicen views but I should Ilka to assure you that I hare felt that It is ay bsuollcs dJt7 to be candid la order to be of loyal service to you.

TACmC PACT Aabaaaador Chang and I have, had a full exchange cf views on the subject matter. In view of the situation existing, which was described in ay laat report, we do not saw how the proposal you have in mind can be affected aa a reality. The aatter of the Pacific ract la entirely entrusted by Qulrlno in Oe hands of Resale sne he In turn has a progran aoaeahat different fry* that which you, (.oneralisalao Chiang and President Quinno bad In Bind. Ke has linad up already auch lspo.-ta.it countrtea as India, Australia, Thailand, Bona, PeVlztaa, etc. P.ia fceoulo r'sn

Photostatic copy of the 1st po^c of Document Xo. *S 2 62 MO.? REPORT OF CHANG MYUN, SOUTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON, TO SYNGMAN RHEE, DATED JULY 13, 1949*

Confidential* * H.E. the President* v WEEKLY REPORTS.

J. Regarding interview with Gen. Wedemcyer and Brig-Gen. Timberman. On July 8th, in the afternoon, I and Dr. Chough visited the War Department and had an interview with Gen. Wedemeyer and Brig.-'Gen. Timberman, a member of his staff. We explained to them that at present our country is in urgent need of reinforcement of the armed forces on account of the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces, and asked them what measures the U.S. Military authorities would take. Brig.-Gen. Timberman*•* answered. "As far as we American authorities can see, Korea has nothing to worry about. Because: 1. Taking into account the international situation, the Soviet Union wi'l certainly not attack Korea with hex own troops. 2. The Chinese Communist Army, too, will not possibly invade Korea. 3. As the North Korean Communist Army is inferior to that of South

• This document was found in the archives of the president's office of the Syngman Rhee Government. The original is in Korean, written in ink by Chang Myun personally. •* "Confidential" stamp in Chinese ideographs. ••• In the original the name of "Gen. Wedemeyer" was written first, then crossed out and "Brig. Gen. Timberman" was inserted in its place. 2 63

Korea in its numerical strength as well as in its equipments, it will certainly rot itself start the expedition against the South. 4. The South Korean National Army is splendid in its numerical strength i-nd in its equipments. 5. When the U.S. Forces pulled out, they left a large quantity of weapons; and munitions, too, must be sufficiently reserved. 6. As for further military aid to Korea, as soon as the sum of aid is fix­ ed by Congress, we will decide on kinds and quantities of weapons to bz delivered, taking account of the opinion of the Chief of the Military Advisory Group in Korea." (Lieut.-Gen. Wedemeyer could not abide the interview very long as he did not have much time). We said, we were told that we were very short of ammunition, and in the event of an actual warfare it would last only for a couple of days; and wc asked him, if that was true. He answered: "We haven't received any such report from Brig-Gen. Roberts, and we don't think you are short of ammuni­ tion." He said further: "It was a matter of course that the U.S. troops pulled out this time." He said, anyhow it was an established fact that the United States would militarily assist Korea; and after the decision by Congress, further aid would be itemized in accordance with the recommendations by the Military Advisory Group, etc. It is certain that American military aid in the future will depend a great deal on the will and attitude of Brig.-Gen. Roberts, Chief of the Military Advi­ sory Group—a fact which Your Excellency will have to consider. It seems to be adequate to make a confidential proposal for the change of his post through Ambassador Muccio. As for the ammunition, 1 also had a talk with Mr. Bond of the State Department. They say here that there are about fifteen million rounds in all, of which not the whole quantity will be handed over to the Korean National Army, but will be kept by the U.S. Military Advisory Group and delivered occasionally. We insisted that the whole quantity should be handed over to the Korean National Army so that we could use them as occasioa demand­ ed. Any way, for the sake of further negotiations, too, we need an itemized table of weapons and munitions we received when the last troops of the U.S. Forces withdrew. I hope Your Excellency will send me the table. We asked both Generals to do their utmost for the military aid of our country. Mr. Staggers will have an interview with A\r. Wedemeyer this af­ ternoon, and appeal to him again. 264

2. Regarding interview with Acheson, Secretary of State. On July 11th. at 3.00 p.m.. I and Dr. Chough made a call on Mr. A- cheson. Dr. Chough conveyed to him the following three points as Your Ex­ cellency's message: 1. For the Korean National Army and the security forces, at least 100.000 standing army, 50.000 reserve force, 50.000 police force and 200.000 militia must be equipped and be ready for any emergency. The United States shall supply us with arms sufficient to meet this. 2. It must be clearly mentioned that in the event of invasion of foreign forces or of the North Korean Communist Army under command of a cer­ tain foreign power, the United States shall positively come to our military assistance or back us. 3. The United States shall take an active part -in supporting a Pacific Pact or a similar union of Asiatic countries for their common security. Thereupon, Mr. Acheson answered as follows: 1. As for the first item, it will be carried out by decision of Congress; 2. As for the second item, though no specific statement can- 'be made concerning any individual state, we think measures for Korea, as was declared by the State Department on June 8th, can fully comply with the demands (Original enclosed); 3. As for the third item, for the time being, the United States cannot officially take part in it Though the United States hesitates in officially taking part in the mat­ ter of the 3rd itqm, we can gather from yesterday's statement of Mr. McDer- mott. official reporter of the State Department, that for the first time the United States is deeply Interested in a union of Asiatic countries against the communist influence; and we can expect that in due time she will take an active part in it. The press here published a good account of Mr. Chiang Kai-shek's inter­ view with the President of the Philippines concerning the Pacific Pact as well as Your Excellency's statement. Herewith I enclose selections of them for Your Excellency's reference. I made a . statement concerning the so-called September Elections in North Korea, which I am also enclosing.' Mr. Staggers has just come back, having had a confidential talk with 26S

Gen. Wedemeyer for two hours concerning the situation in our country. Gen. Wedemeyer's attitude is through and througli sympathetic and co-operative, by which we are very much enlightened. The talk includes Brig-Gen. Roberts' case, question of establishing a Korean-American Joint Commission concerning the arms etc. I cannot make reports on it this time; but Mr. Staggers will make a detailed report by the next mail.

Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the United States of America. Seal#

* A square seal, "Uic seal of the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the U.S.A." in Chinese ideographs. 2fifi

Photostatic copy of the 1st page of Document No. > 2 fi7

No. 8 SCHEME (A) OF INTELLIGENCE WORK FOR THE YEAR 1950, PREPARED BY SECTION III, INTEL­ LIGENCE BUREAU OF THE SOUTH KOREAN ARMY HEADQUARTERS*

(STRICT MILITARY SECRECY)*• SCHEME OF INTELLIGENCE WORK FOR ; THE YEAR 1950. Section III, Intelligence Bureau, Army Headquarters.

Policy: In consideration of the tense international situation at home and abroad fundamental policy of the intelligence work shall hinge upon execution of matters of importance. Extermination of puppet organizations of North Ko­ rea shall be aimed at by means of secret warfares, and with might and main successful intelligence works shall be carried out for a rapid frustra­ tion of the said organizations for the restoration of lost territories. INTELLIGENCE: TARGETS: J. Military intelligence: 1) Formations and equipments of the stationed units; 2) Movements and defence of the 38th parallel line; 3) Ideological tendencies of the People's Army officers; 4) Attitude of the Army towards the government and the people;

• This document was found in Section III, Intelligence Bureau of the South Korean Army Headquarters. The original is in Korean. This document is divided into A and B Sections by the editor in view of the difference in their contents. •• Stamp. 2fiR

How far the Army participates in politics; How much the population has confidence in the" Army; Relations between the Army and political parties • and social organizations; 8 Morale and discipline; 9 How far the Soviet military advisers have a hand in the North Ko­ rean affairs; . 10 Relations with the Eighth Route Army in Manchuria; 11 Operation plans; 12 Anti-army and anti-war sentiments of the Army personnel; 13 Military finance and funds; 14 How the Army is supplied; 15 Military intelligence work versus the South. II. Po itical, economic and ideological intelligence: 1 Popular rumours about the lower administration officials 2 Collection*, labour service, requisitions, taxes; 3 Complaints of the civilians against the officials; 4 Political co-operation of the people; 5 Industrial conditions; 6 Rehabilitation of business and industry; 7 How far the communist regime is understood; 8 ' How transportation facilities are being operated; 9 Foreign trades; 10 How far the international situation is understood; 11 Propagandas at home and abroad; 12 Education and culture; 13 Ideological tendencies of the students; 14 Materials delivered to the Soviet Union.

ESSENTIAL POINTS: Main points of the intelligence work: I. The main point of the intelligence work lies in getting the mainstay of secret agents as follows, and equipping them with the qualifications of best workers through a thorough-going training: 1) One who has knowledge of military affairs, is interested in getting wind of secrets, and predisposed to adventure; 2) One who is clever, has sound judgement and knows the art of social intercourse; 3) A quick witted. Lold and self-possessed person; 260

4) A shrewd person with a wealth of common sense and who is skilled in techniques; 5) One who has a strong lust for fame and money; II. Together with the permanent secret agents, liaison agents shall also be used, and through their intimate connections informations shall be transmitted; liaison agents shall be selected as follows: 1) One who is skilled in feigning a pedlar, also skilled in arts and techniques; 2) Beggars who hang about the taverns, and give performances of dancing, singing and musical instruments; 3) Barbers, photographers, train conductors and engineers; 4) Pedlars of miscellaneous goods, motorcar drivers, fishermen, etc.; 5) Cooks, bar-maids, waitresses and day-labourers. Powerful nets of intelligence service shall be laid with the above-men­ tioned permanent and liaison secret agents; they must assume an ever­ growing dimension, and at the same time they shall have cells as follows: III. Cell organizations: 1) Cells, up to 5 in number, shall be organized around a leading agent; each cell shall consist of 3 to 5 persons, and they shall incessantly bring in informations; 2) In each cell, the person who is in charge shall have direct contacts with the permanent agent, and other cell members shall work by themselves; 3) One who is in charge of the cell shall give only partial orders io the agents under him, and the full account of an affair shall not be revealed; IV. To bribe persons in important positions in various organs: 1) To make use of officers and men of the Army, who are prone to conversion, and pilfer confidential documents; 2) To infiltrate into important organs such as police stations, Counter-intelligence Bureaus, etc., and steal confidential documents or obtain secrets; 3) To buy off workers and purveyors of prohibited military areas for sketches of Important buildings.

INTRIGUES: TARGETS: I. Intrigues for Destructions: 270

1) Concerning railroads: a) To destroy bridges and tunnels; h) To derail and overturn military trains; c) To destroy freight cars and station buildings; d) Collision; c) To destroy main railway factories. 2) Heavy industry, firms and factories: a) Munitions factories of the People's Army; b) Various important factories of the Army; c) Public buildings; d) Aerodromes; e) Power plants and transformer stations; f) Broadcasting stations; g) Cylinder-press of newspapers. II. Incendiarism: To set afire 1) Public buildings, 2) Dwelling houses, 3) Public halls. 4) Military barracks and school buildings. 5) Buildings of political parties and other organs, 6) Aerodromes, ' 7) Power plants and transformer stations, 8) Broadcasting stations, 9) Various factories of the Army, III. To infect with bacteria: 1) Army kitchens, 2) Dining rooms of the police, 3) Banquet halls of the Army, government, party, etc., 4) City reservoirs, rivers, 5) Houses of the leaders of the Army, government and the party. IV. Propaganda: 1) To distribute leaflets; 2) To post wall newspapers; 3) To scribble on walls; 4) To circulate sensational rumours; 5) To inspire liberalistic ideas; 6) To stir up people against the war, against military service; 7) To instigate anti-communist, ideas; 8) To provoke revolts and nationalistic uprising; 271

9) To instigate strikes; 10) To instigate sabotages; 11) To propagandize the might of the National Army of the Republic of Korea; 12) To instigate migration to South Korea; 13) To propagandize freedom in South Korea. V. Economic intrigues; 1) To corner and hold back main goods; 2) To waste d^ily necessities; ..•) 'lo counterfeit North Korean bank notes; •1) To hinder collections of provisions. VI. Assassination: 1) The biggest ringleaders of North Korea; 2) Higher officers of the People's Army; 3) High-er officers of the Home Ministry; 4) Leaders of the political parties and social organizations; 3) Persons in charge of cultural organizations; G) Highest cadres of the ministries; 7) Highest cadres ar.d those of middle rank in ch'arge of intelligence work on South Korea; 8) Bad elements in the intelligence service, policemen and officials; 9) Previous officers of the National Army who have deserted to the north, and the ringieader in the desertion of s/s Smith to the north.

E-'SSENTIAL POINTS: 1) Bold and valiant persons shall be selected from the agents in service, and they shall receive sufficient remunerations; at the same time orders shall be given in accordance with their specific characters; 2) Agents shall personally and secretly take up the execution of destroying main buildings; at the same time they shall pick up adequate collaborators on the spot of their actions; 3) Prior to destroying the objects, thorough-going study of the situation shall Le done; 4) In setting buildin.js afire, employees in the buildings shall be bribed, but the agots shall personally make a careful survey of the matter beforehand; 5) In assassinations, cell members shall bribe waitresses or kitchen workers, and have them poison the persons in question; 2 72

6) Skilled agents shall manage to be near the leaders, and poison them during meals or at drinking parties; 7) Employees at the city reservoirs shall be bribed into poisoning the water; 8) Kitchens of the Army and public organizations shall be poisoned; 9) Purveyors and pedlars who regularly visit the Army or main organs shall be utilized for mixing poisons in food supplies; 10) In propaganda intrigues, circulations of leaflets and northbound broadcasts, which have already been in use, shall be intensified; 11) Students who harbour patriotic ideas shall be utilized for posting wall newspapers or scribbling on walls; 12) Propaganda leaflets shall be dispatched to youth organizations through mails; 13) In the main cities secret senders shall be set, and counter-pro­ paganda shall be broadcasted as occasion allows; 14) Songs in praise of the Republic of Korea shall be propagated among' the primary school children; 15) Dynamite, etc. shall be buried at aerodromes or main bridges.

MAIN POINTS OF COMMUNICATING INTELLIGENCE: 1) Secret ink-cloth shall be used if there is no wireless set; 2) Colourless letters shall be used in newspapers or magazines; 3) Ciphers shall be used in disguised mails; 4) Bacteria shall be disguised as ordinary drugs; 5) Other tools and materials, mentioned in the instructions, shall be obtained from the spot if possible, and shall be sent over only when they are not obtainable there.

UTILIZATION OF ENEMY SPIES: TARGETS: 1) North Korean secret agents who have reliable guarantors in South Korea; 2) Members of the South Korean Workers' Party, who are disposed to conversion; 3) To select adequate persons from converted captives; 4) To select adequate persons from businessmen who trade between the north and south; 5) To utilize spies who live permanently in south Korea; 6) To utilize north Korean ships now in south Korea for smuggling; 7) R.H. special service; R.C.K. special service; N.N. special service; 2 73

R.I.W. special service; K P. special service.

ESSENTIAL POINTS: 1) To take advantage of criminal acts, i.e. weaknesses of the person in question, pretend to pardon him leniently, fully protect him and utilize him; 2) To double the pay, when employing spies of north Korean intelligence organs, and try to get accurate informations; '<) To train North Korean spies for not less than a week how to give false informations, when sending them Lack; 4) The person who manipulates an enemy spy must be very careful that the latter does not know that the southern authorities are aware of his double-dealings. He shall keep his eye on the enemy spy in strict secret.

WORK FOR CONVERSION: TARGETS: 1) On officers and men of the People's Army; 2) On officers and men of the Police; 3) On leading cadres of various political parties and social organiza­ tions; 4) On technicians in heavy industry; 5) On leading railway cadres as well as engineers and assistants; 6) On offioers and men of the Air Fore* 7) On officers and men of the Marines; 8) On cadres in freight vessel service; 9) On leading intelligentsia in the organs and magazines of com­ munist hordes; 10) On higher officials in administrative bodies.

ESSENTIAL POINTS: 1) To send back patriotic young men from the North, and send them to the People's Army, to influence those who axe prone to ideological conversion or those who have joined the army by force, and to persuade them to desert or revolt; 2) To praise incessantly the might of the South Korean National Army by means of leaflets; 3) To allure the person in question into conversion through his relatives, schoolmates and other friends. 274

r3 ; ^V-^ '' ..„•>. > *<••. tV'^ji-.13

i'» - • -<•• y «t i , • ~^ZUBM> • - - -JT: •.

Photostatic copy oj the cover oj Document So. g 27^

No. °i STRATEGIC MAP FOR ATTACK ON NORTH KOREA

EXPLANATORY NOTES.

This is a U.S. military map found in the South Korean Army Headquarters, published by Army Map Service, U.S. Army in 1941 (Scale 1:1,000,000) Lines, arrows and other conventional signs indicated in this map show the plan drawn up by the American imperialists and the Syngman Rhee clique for an attack on north Korea. This map shows that there were to be two South Korean armies stationed along the 38th parallel for the attack on the north. The first army was to begin military operations against north Korea between the Yellow Sea coast and Kolangpo, north-east of Kaesung; whilst the second army was to begin operations between Kolangpo and the east coast. The first army was to deal the main blow from its right flank in Kaesung area, directly opposite Pyongyang; whilst its left flank was to attack from Ongchin area on Sinchon and afterwards on Sariwon. In addition, a landing under air cover in Hanchon area was to be carried out from Inchon, and to advance towards Pyongyang. The first army was to consist of two echelons. The first echelon was to be composed of the 1st and 2nd divisions and one regiment, and the second echelon was to be composed of the 5th division, three independent regiments and several A.A. gun companies. The second army was io start an attack on the north from Tongduchon, Chunchon and Hanchi areas, and a landing under air cover in Dyengpyeng area was to be carried out from Chumunjin, to cut off communications between Pyongyang and South and North Hamgyeng. The second army was also to consist of two echelons. The first echelon was to be composed of the 7th and 8th divisions, and the second echelon 276

Was to be composed of the Gth division, independent regiments and AA. gun companies. In addition to the 1st and 2nd armies there were to be reserve units consisting of the 3rd division (5 regiments) and mechanized divisions. In the area along the 38th parallel, about ten divisions were to be concentrated for star-ting the offensive against North Korea. 277

m

->^^r ; «.--.:•• •.. V.-- v ~ -*# -A'

Photostatic copy of Strategic Map for Attack on \'orth Keen M3 . <\ PERSONNEL AND EXPENSE FOR OUTSIDE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN VARIOUS PLACES

Permanent Secret Agents:

Expense per Expense per Expense per year Place Personnel person in won month in won in won

Pyongyang 15 pe r. 50,000— 750.000— 9.000,000— Sinijoo 10 , 50,000— 500,000— 6,000,000— Haejoo 10 . 50.000— 500,000— 6,000,000- Nampo 5 . 50.000— 250.000- 3,000.000— Namchun 3 , 50,000— 150,000— 1,800,000— Sunchun 3 . 50,000— 150.000— 1,800,000— Sariwon 4 . 50,000— 200.000— 2,400,000— Hamheung 10 . 50,000— 500.000— 6,000.000— Chungjin 10 . 50,000— 500,000— G. 000,000— Wonsan 8 . 50,000— 400,000— 4,800,000— Heungnam 5 , 50,000— 250,000— 3.000.000— Chulwon 5 . 50,000— 250,000— 3.000,000 — Sungjin 5 . 50,000— 1 250,000— 3.000.000— Najin 5 . 50,000— 250.000— 3,000.000 — Hoeryeng 5 . 50,000— 250.000— 3,000,000— Total 103 per. 750,000—wons 5,150,000—wons 61,800,000—wons LIAISON SECRET AGENTS:

_ . 1 Expense per Expense per Expense per year Place Personnel person in won month in won in won

Pyongyang 5 per. 30,000— 150,000— 1,800,000—wons Sinijoo 4 . 30,000— 120.000— 1,440.000— Haejoo 5 .. 30,000— 90.000—• 1.080.000— Sariwon 4 . 30,000— ^ 90,000—* 1.080,000— Namchun 3 . 30,000— 90,000- 1.080.000— Nampo 4 , 30.000— 90,000-• 1,080,000- Sunchun 3 . 30.000- 90,000- 1,080,000- Hamheung 5 , 30.000— 150,000- 1,080.000— Chungjin 5 30.000— 150,000— 1,080.000— Wonsan 4 30.000— 120,000— 1,440,000— Sungjin 3 . 30,000— 90,000— 1,080,000— Chulwon 3 . 30,000— 90,000— 1,080.000— Najin 3 . 30,000— 90,000— 1,080,000— Heungnam 3 . 30.000— 90,000- 1,080.000— Hoeryeng 3 . 30.000- 90,000— 1.080,000- -

Total 57 per. 450,000—wons 1,590,000—wons 16,920,000—wons

• This is precisely the figure given in the original.—Ed. FOR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AT HOME

IN SEOUL:

Expense per Expense per Expense per year District Personnel person in won month in won in won

Mapo 3 per. 15,000— 45,000— 580.000- Yungdeungpo 3 .. 15.000— 45.000— 580,000- Yongsan 3 ., 15.000— 45,000— 580.000- West Gate 3 ., 15.000— 45,000— 5SO.O00— East Gate 3 .. 15,000— 45.000— 5S0.000— Choonggoo 3 .. 15.000— 45.000— 580.000- Sungdong 3 .. 15.000— •15.000— 580.000- Sungbook 3 .., 15.000— 45.000— 580.000- Chongno 3 ..'. 15,000— 45.000— 580.000- In the Province: Inchun 5 per. 15.000— 75.000- 900,000- Poosan 5 .. 15.000- 75.000- 900,000- Pohang 5 .. 15.000— 75.000— 900,000— Yusoo 5 „ 15.000— 75.000- 900,000- Koonsan 5 .. 15.000— 75.000— 900,000— Choonchun 3 ,. 15.000— 45.000— 580.000- Total 55 per. 185,500—wons* 825,500—won s 10,300,000—wons

* As in original.—Ed FOR UTILIZATION OF ENEMY SPIES

Expense per llxpense per Classification Target month in won year in won

R.H. Special Serv. 500,000— 6,000,000—

R.C.K. South Korean 200,000- 2.400,000— Workers' Party

N.N. Supreme People's 200.000- 2.400.000 — Assembly

R.U.N. Counter Intelligence 100.000— 1.200.000— Bureau

K.I.P. Special Service 300,000— 3.600,000—

Total 1,300.000—wons 15,600,000-wons •

GRAND TOTAL: ONE HUNDRED AND FOUR MILLION AND ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND WONS. 2R2

6

KOREA Scile of miles %r f &o IOO

July, 1953 2 R3

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC SUDAN

CAMEROUN ORIENTALS

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KATANGA ANGOLA Qt > EUSABETHViLLE ,tv> >*' _• BtNGUELA i+* N. RHODESIA

No-imbu I'42 ?84

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