AMERICANIZING AFRICANIZATION: THE CONGO CRISIS, 1960-1967 _______________________________________ A Dissertation presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School at the University of Missouri-Columbia _______________________________________________________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy _____________________________________________________ by WILLIAM T. MOUNTZ Dr. Carol Anderson, Dissertation Supervisor MAY 2014 © Copyright by William T. Mountz 2014 All Rights Reserved The undersigned, appointed by the dean of the Graduate School, have examined the dissertation entitled: AMERICANIZING AFRICANIZATION: THE CONGO CRISIS, 1960-1967 Presented by William T. Mountz, A candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy And hereby certify that it is worthy of acceptance. _________________________________________ Professor Carol Anderson _________________________________________ Professor Robert M. Collins _________________________________________ Professor Theodore Koditschek _________________________________________ Professor Michelle Morris _________________________________________ Professor Minion Kenneth Chauncey “K.C.” Morrison ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would first like to acknowledge the generous funding I received from the Truman Library Institute, the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation, and the Thomas J. Dodd Research Center as well as from the History Department, the Black Studies Department, and the Graduate School at the University of Missouri. I also thank the archivists at the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Presidential Libraries, the UN archives, the National Archives II, and the Dodd Center as well as librarians Rachel Brekhus, Marie Concannon, and Delores Fisher at Ellis Library at the University of Missouri for helping to facilitate my research. Archivist Jennifer Cuddeback at the Johnson Library deserves special recognition for creating an exceptional finding aid for documents relating to the Congo and Africa in general. I would like to thank members of the 2011 Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) Summer Institute for Graduate Students hosted by Emory University and directed by Carol Anderson and Tom Zeiler, and the 2012 Clinton Institute Summer School hosted by the University College Dublin and directed by Brian Edwards, Liam Kennedy, and Don Pease for their comments and advice for my project. Similarly, I would like to thank my fellow panelists and comments made by Will Bishop, Phil Cantrell, John Kent, Phil Muehlenbeck, and Tim Scarnecchia at the annual meetings of SHAFR, the World History Association, and the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa. I was fortunate to have a talented cohort of graduate students at the University of Missouri and in SHAFR who encouraged me, and were willing to read portions of my ii project or endure conversations about it. Thank you Emily Backes, Joe Beilein, Tom Bridewell, Daniel Conner, Chris Deutsch, Aaron Dowdall, John Huntington, Terri Keeley, Moe Labelle, Kris Maulden, Mike Marden, Victor McFarland, Josh Nudell, Angela Rehbein, Leroy Rowe, Steve Smith, Simon Stevens, Seth Torpin, Adam Wilsman, and Patrick Witt. Of this group, Kristin Henze and Jonathan Jones deserve special recognition for having read several drafts of the project in its entirety, and for making our “Office of Awesomeness” in the basement of Read Hall exactly that. Special thanks as well to Jason Tyler, who prepared the map for this dissertation. I also benefitted from a distinguished dissertation committee and faculty mentors who encouraged and inspired me as well as offered guidance on my project. Thank you Gretchen Adams, Tatiana Carayannis, Shirley Eoff, Justin Hart, Ted Koditschek, Ron Milam, Catherine Miller, Kerby Miller, Michelle Morris, KC Morrison, and Dolly Wilson. Enough kind words cannot be said about my adviser Carol Anderson, a great historian who brought (demanded?) the best out of me. And thank you Robert Collins, a consummate professional who cheerfully stepped in to handle administrative matters when Carol left for Emory. I would also like to thank my extended family, close friends, and mom and dad who provided unwavering support and much needed R&R. Most importantly, I say thank you to the other Dr. Mountz, Betty, my wonderful wife, whose love and partnership sustains me and keeps me grounded. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................ ii ABSTRACT .........................................................................................................................v INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 Chapter 1. Background to Crisis and the Origins of U.S. Involvement ..............................9 2. Formation of the Adoula Government .............................................................44 3. Battle for Katanga, Round 1 ............................................................................70 4. Battle for Katanga, Round 2 ............................................................................95 5. Nation-Building .............................................................................................133 6. The Rise of Mobutu .......................................................................................169 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................199 APPENDIX 1. Map of the Congo, 1960 .................................................................................208 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................209 VITA ................................................................................................................................236 iv AMERICANIZING AFRICANIZATION: THE CONGO CRISIS, 1960-1967 William T. Mountz Dr. Carol Anderson, Dissertation Supervisor ABSTRACT This dissertation provides a concise account of U.S. intervention in the Congo between 1960 and 1967, explaining the decisions made by U.S. policymakers and their Congolese counterparts. It argues that the intervention occurred not only because of a commitment to contain the communist threat, but also because of a commitment to a liberal ideology, one devoted to remaking the world in the image of the United States. By confining the meanings of liberty, equality, and development to an American framework, however, the United States found itself in competition with local leaders’ visions for their own country. As a consequence, the intervention not only failed to deliver freedom to the Congolese people, but tragically abetted Mobutu Sese Seko’s rise to power, a dictator whose kleptocratic rule removed any hope for meaningful development over a thirty-year period. v INTRODUCTION U.S. intervention in the Congo Crisis (1960-1967) marked an unprecedented projection of American power in sub-Saharan Africa. As conventional narratives have argued, fears of a communist takeover provoked the United States to intervene. American policymakers believed Soviet control of the Congo, a country roughly the size of Western Europe and strategically located in the heart of Africa, would lead to the loss of central, if not all of, sub-Saharan Africa. The effects on Europe, and the Western economy at large, would be devastating. In 1959 the Congo alone produced seven percent of the West’s tin, nine percent of its copper, forty-nine percent of its cobalt, and sixty-nine percent of its industrial diamonds.1 John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, accurately referred to Africa as “the hinterland of Europe.”2 But Cold War concerns were not the only factor given consideration by American policymakers. Decolonization had changed the dynamics of the international system. As empires ended, a North-South dimension emerged alongside the East-West competition that had dominated the international scene since the end of World War II. Leaders of Third World nations sought assistance in their quest for political, economic, and social freedom, placing the United States, the so-called leader of the “free world,” in the limelight on issues such as self-determination, development, and racial discrimination.3 1 These minerals, in particular cobalt (used in jet engines), had contributed to the rise of American airpower. Henry F. Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Africa since 1960 (New York: W. Morrow, 1982), 23; Alfred E. Eckes, The United States and the Global Struggle for Minerals (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), 172, 233. 2 Memorandum of Conversation, 8 October 1958, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter, FRUS) 1958-1960, XIV: 251-253. 3 Some pertinent examples of scholarship that have addressed this changing dynamic include: Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image 1 This dissertation seeks to provide a clear and concise account of U.S. intervention in the Congo, explaining the decisions made by U.S. policymakers and their Congolese counterparts.4 Like traditional diplomatic histories, it is concerned with the nature and effects of U.S. power.5 It argues that U.S. intervention in the Congo ended in tragedy (American support for a right-wing dictator) not only because