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Russia's Seat at the Table: a Place Denied Or a Place Delayed?

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Russia's Seat at the Table: a Place Denied Or a Place Delayed? haslam russia 10/12/97 1:50 pm Page 119 Russia’s seat at the table: a place denied or a place delayed? JONATHAN HASLAM The simultaneous expansion of NATO and enlargement of the EU raise ques- tions as to the proper place for Russia in Europe. Judging by the statements emanating from both sides of the Atlantic, acknowledgement of Russia’s signal importance to the future of the region is uncontroversial. US Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe insists that ‘Russia’s development, both internal and external, is perhaps the central factor in determining the overall fate and future of European security.’ Britain’s new prime minister Tony Blair has reassured one and all that ‘good future cooperation with Russia is vital for Europe’s security’; and Lieutenant-General Wesley Clark, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Office of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, tells us that it is ‘the highest requirement of diplomacy, led by the United States, to find the appropriate role for Russia in the security structure of Europe after the end of the Cold War’. Words are not deeds, however.The plain fact is that both the enlargement of NATO and the expansion of the EU relegate Russia to the margins of Europe. For all the casuistry associated with the negotiations sur- rounding both processes, no one has convincingly made the case that either is in Russian interests. Russia itself has, indeed, expressed its dissatisfaction and, in some quarters, outright opposition to what is happening. Does Russia’s obvi- ous present weakness mean that its view does not matter? The question that requires to be addressed first is not how much Russia’s atti- tude matters, but rather what exactly has prompted the move to expand NATO.This is a crucial question, yet it has received very little public discus- sion in either Britain or the United States.The contrast between public silence and private conflict could not be greater. Both Washington and London found their Russian specialists lined up in virtual unanimity, regardless of past Testimony, April , in The future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): hearing subcommit- tee on Airland Forces of the Committee of Armed Services, US Senate, th Congress, first session, April (Washington DC, ), p. Speaking July : see Hansard, no. (London, ), col. Testimony, The future of NATO, p. International Affairs , () – haslam russia 10/12/97 1:50 pm Page 120 Jonathan Haslam differences during the Cold War, against those pressing the case for expansion. The views of knowledgeable professionals are, however, for good or ill, seldom decisive in international relations. More than half the art of influencing gov- ernment is the ability to catch and sustain the attention of those in political power. In this instance the receptivity of those in power in Britain and America was not enhanced by the fact that both capitals were distracted by events in the Middle East and Bosnia. As if this were not enough, Downing Street was also beleaguered by the destructive and paralysing issue of EMU membership. In this environment, several factors appear to have overridden more cautious and discerning counsels and prompted the decision in favour of NATO expansion, come what may: first, the evident determination of the countries of central and eastern Europe to enter NATO; second, Bonn’s desire to curtail its own freedom of choice in foreign policy through an extension of an integrated European security structure so as to reassure anxious neighbours; third, NATO’s concern to perpetuate its own existence; and, last but by no means least, the pressure of US domestic politics. The collapse of Soviet power in the wake of the coup against Gorbachev in August ended the international system brought into being by the allies in . In the West it was never intended that Russia be marginalized from that system. On the contrary, it was rightly assumed that Moscow’s support would be essential to any arrangements made. That assumption was not merely a natural concomitant of sentiment arising from Moscow’s critical contribution to victory over Nazi Germany, but was based upon a realistic assessment of the enormous preponderance of Soviet military power. Precisely what Russia’s role would be was not agreed upon, not least because the Russians themselves gave no clear oral or written indications of their true intentions, though their behaviour almost as soon as Soviet troops entered Poland, Bulgaria and Romania in the summer and autumn of had already given rise to serious concern.Views in the West as to what could be expected varied. Optimists like E. H. Carr, writing Times leaders from the lofty vantage-point of Printing House Square, blindly argued for a division of Europe into spheres of influence, the easy assumption being that Moscow had dropped its ideological commitments and was prepared to act in the manner of ‘normal’ Great Powers—no better, but no worse.This somehow made the prospect of Soviet hegemony over the countries of eastern Europe, some of which had played a willing hand in Hitler’s game, more palatable to its advocates. The kind of influence envisaged was more that of the United States over Canada or Mexico, or of Britain over Greece, than what actually occurred. Stalin and Molotov’s view was not at all that envisaged by Carr in London, Walter Lippman in Washington or, indeed, Maxim Litvinov in Moscow. Colonization might more accurately describe that tragic and often brutal process. To those who suffered as a result, the argument that Russia, after defeat in the Cold War, should be readmitted and reincorporated into the twenty-first cen- tury’ s equivalent of the Concert of Europe naturally seems not only an affront haslam russia 10/12/97 1:50 pm Page 121 Russia’s seat at the table but dangerously naive—though in present circumstances they will not say so publicly,at least not in English.They argue that Russia is not properly a part of Europe; yet ironically, the insistence in Warsaw—accepted by the West—that Poland is a central European and not an east European state does not lend much credence to this line of approach: if the Poles are in central Europe, what exactly constitutes eastern Europe? Soviet tanks on departure left behind not only pools of polluting fuel but equally noxious memories. It is therefore only to be expected that self-respecting representatives of formerly subjugated nations should demand maximum protection against their one-time masters. That is why they have always been so eager to join NATO. Poland’ s foreign minister Andrzej Olechowski told the Frankfurter Rundschau on January : ‘We are not afraid of Russia, but of objective situations that could provoke her to behave in a way threatening to Poland. Such a situation is the security vac- uum that now exists in Central Europe.’And Olechowski was naturally partic- ularly alert to the ‘signals of imperial thinking’ flashing from Moscow during the Chechnya crisis. Germany, being so close to these countries, is corre- spondingly sensitive to such feelings.‘It is important to acknowledge’, noted Karsten Voigt, SPD spokesman on foreign affairs and President of the North Atlantic Assembly,‘that a primary reason for countries of Central and Eastern Europe to seek membership of the Alliance is to secure its protective mantle.’ We should not delude ourselves as to the stark reality of such fears, however misplaced they may be. The second factor explains an otherwise cryptic comment from Voigt that ‘there is a conceptual linkage between the enlargement of the EU and of NATO’ and that ‘enlargement of NATO and the EU will complete Germany’ s multilateral integration, already carried out in the West.’ Further elucidation can be found in a CDU–CSU policy paper of : Now that the East–West conflict has come to an end, a stable order must be found for the eastern half of the continent, too.This is in the interest of Germany in particular since, owing to its position, it would suffer the effects of instability in the East more quickly and directly than others.The only solution which will prevent a return to the unstable pre-war system, with Germany once again caught in the middle between East and West, is to integrate Germany’s central and eastern neighbors into the West European post-war system and to establish a wide-ranging partnership between this system and Russia. Never again must there be a destabilising vacuum of power in Central Europe. If Western European integration were not to progress, Germany For evidence of this in public opinion polls, see G. Cunningham,‘ EU and NATO enlargement: how public opinion is shaping up in some candidate countries’, NATO Review (webedition) : , May–June ,pp.–. New York Times, Oct. K.Voigt,‘ NATO enlargement: sustaining the momentum’, NATO Review (webedition) : , March ,pp.–. Ibid. haslam russia 10/12/97 1:50 pm Page 122 Jonathan Haslam might be called upon, or be tempted by its own security constraints, to try to effect the stabilization of Eastern Europe on its own and in the traditional way.8 The idea that Hitler’s aggression can be explained in such forgiving terms takes one’s breath away. Clearly the authors of the document did not believe Germany was really a victim in the s, since their entire philosophy may be summed up as a strategy for self-containment designed precisely to prevent a repetition of such events. ‘A long-term bilaterally oriented policy on the part of Germany towards its partners in Eastern and Central Europe would proba- bly very soon cause the same old problems of imbalance which existed in the past,’ Voigt argues.
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