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EDITORIAL Today is again going to be as great as the United WORLD was. Russia under Putin is a nimble giant able to make decisions on its own and face the consequences of the same. Lost in space as a super power, today it is back in the reckoning as a country that matters in international relations and can take care of itself. With Russia getting OPEC nations to agree to cut oil production and getting Iran and Saudi FOCUS Arabia to work together and reducing oil output production by almost about 2 % and stabilising oil price at about $ 50 per barrel, INDOCENTRIC FOREIGN AFFAIRS MONTHLY JOURNAL singlehandedly, thus winning the respect of all oil producing nations. Volume XXXVIII Number 1 January 2017 Russia today is largely responsible for maintaining the current oil prices G . Kishore Babu and not letting it to fall. Russia today is willing to play the commercial Editor game to its benefit, and to others as a large oil producer. Investment bankers from the west are making a big bet on Russia and Bhabani Dikshit so are the rich Sovereign funds of the Middle East, after Syria and Managing Editor flexing its diplomatic strength to fix oil prices. Russia today is the flavour of the Middle East that is good for the entire region. After Stuti S. Mandala Syria, Russia can guarantee the Sovereign Integrity of a regime in any Associate Editor country in the Middle East with all it takes to make it happen, a great Arundeep Singh feeling for the wealthy and oil rich Middle East. Today Glencore an Manager iconic western company along with Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund are buying an $ 11 billion stake in Rosneft a giant Russian oil producer WORLD FOCUS takes up every month one also investing big in India. international issue and gives an analysis of its various Professor Putin’s Russia is one party nation with two leaders Vladimir aspects by persons well known for their Putin and who rotate jobs of President and Prime specialisation in the subject. The issues covered are Minister between themselves with a perfect understanding of issues topical or near topical, but of an abiding interest. facing Russia and one another. The analysis is simple enough to interest even an Putin’s thesis was “The Most favoured nation trading principle in initiate to world affairs, but without sacrificing depth. international law”, he is more a professor first, than anything else The aim is to present an Indocentric view on a having, taught students in Russian universities. He has also written a particular issue currently facing the world. dissertation in Economics. “The strategic planning of regional re- Opinions expressed in the articles are personal views sources under the formation of market relations”. A versatile personal- of the author and in no way reflect the opinion of ity understanding Economics and commerce with a knowledge of busi- World Focus. The author is solely responsible for the contents in his/ her article and the World Focus ness, a career in intelligence with a long professional career in Ger- takes no responsibility in this regard. many, fluent in German with a good understanding of German excel- lence in workmanship, all have made President Putin one of the most The Contents of this magazine cannot be reproduced in any form with out prior permission from World learned and versatile leaders the world has today. Focus. Any legal issues pertaining to World Focus Seizing , from the , living through sanctions and coming will be settled in NCT region of Delhi only. out good has given Russia a lesson in adversity management. Rus- Unsolicited articles will not be returned or sian military intervention in the Syrian civil war, siding with the exist- acknowledged. World Focus reserves the right to ing government, helping stabilise them against the rebels, has tremen- edit articles for brevity and clarity before publication. dously increased Putin’s standing in the Middle East and in Russia, it has again given Russians the pride of being a country that decides Edited, Owned, Published and Printed by and does what it wants and does not have to follow any country. G. Kishore Babu from B-49 (Ground Floor), Joshi Colony, I.P. Extension, Delhi-110092 at Meenakshi Press, 4857/24, First Getting the great Siberian oil and gas sector going with Chinese money Floor, Ansari Road, Dariyaganj, New Delhi - 110002 and a guaranteed offtake of supplies to China will get good oil revenue to Russia and asking for American participation in the difficult Artic Total number of Pages 138, including Covers area with money and technology, now more possible than before with Copy Right : World Focus Donald Trump to be US President, strained relations with the US will Our Address: improve. Pragmatic Professor Vladimar Putin is all set to take Russia World Focus through all its troubles successfully and make it a great country. B-49, (Ground Floor) Joshi Colony, I P Extension We are extremely thankful to Professor Arun Mohanty, SIS, Jawaharlal Delhi - 110092, India Nehru University for his planning, guidance and co-ordination to bring Tel. / Fax : 22246905, Mobile No. 8130754555 out this special issue as the Guest Editor. Email: [email protected] New Delhi G. Kishore Babu Website: www.worldfocus.in January 2017 Editor 3 RUSSIA & THE WORLD Contents Russia in Global Arms Trading Prof. Arun Mohanty...... 5 The Reunion of Crimea with Russia as a Socio-Political Process Prof. Tatiana Senyushkina...... 11 Russia in Global Energy Scenario Prof. R.G.Gidadhubli...... 22 Russian Military: From Slump to Resurgence Prof. P. L. Dash...... 29 Georgia-Russia Military Conflict: The Experience of Multilevel Psychological Warfare Prof. Evgeny Pashentsev...... 36 Russia’s Soft Power in Kazakhstan: Instruments and Institutions Dr. Lessya Karatayeva & Kanat Sakhariyanov...... 43 Eurasian Ideology as the Basis of the New National Landscape in Contemporary Russia Dr. Anna Popova...... 52 The Semi-Presidentialism: Russian Style Dr. Kharitonova Oxana...... 56 De-Facto States and Effects of Partial Recognition: The Abkhazia and South Ossetia Case Dr. Irina Kudryashova and Elena Meleshkina...... 65 The Russian Model of Federalism and World Experience: General and Specific Dr. Marianna Abramova...... 72 Russia’s Nuclear Strategy in the New Geo-Strategic Paradigm Dr. Roshan Khanijo...... 77 : Narratives of A Russian and Mongol Matrix Suchandana Chatterjee...... 86 Russia’s Stand on South China Sea: Is it Appeasement, Accommodation or Support to China? Dr. Alok Kumar Gupta...... 91 Russia and Mongolia: Strengthening Strategic Partnership Dr. Vaishali Krishna...... 99 Fight Against Islamic State: Russian Policy Towards Syria Dr. Manabhanjan Meher...... 106 Russian Media in Contemporary World Dr. Bishal Das...... 111 Resurgence and Redefinition of Russia’s Soft Power – Issues and Contestations Tahira Batt...... 118 Russia-US Relations Post Trump Victory: A Turning Point? Sukanya Kakoty...... 126 Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union: Potentials and Pitfalls Nivedita Kapoor...... 132 4 World Focus January 2017 Russia in Global Arms Trading Prof. Arun Mohanty

21 st century began with strengthening of the area and stabilizing departmental structure in the Russian position in the global arms market, system of military technical cooperation, which was notwithstanding the fact that arms trade in general subject to numerous restructuring, re-organising in declined in the world. President has course of preceding one and half decades. For described it as a stable tendency of Russians arms example in 1990s , the leadership of Rosvoruzheniye export. “We are expanding our position in Asia , , the main trading agent of Russian military–industrial particularly in South-East Asia. We are conducting complex changed six times in five years. According successful talks for returning to the market of Latin to Russian experts, the structure of military-industrial America. We are continuing our cooperation with complex was re-organised as many times.( 4) Some European partners on supply of new items, and on stability came to military-technical cooperation only repair of military equipments supplied to these in the year 2000 when President Putin attempted to countries in the past.”, said President Putin.(1) bring political and economic stability to the country. Only towards 2005 military supply corresponded to Russian Federation from the middle of first the reality of the time. decade of 21srt century reached a record level of military–technical cooperation by executing orders Political leadership of the country took active from 60 countries in all continents, including even interest in advancing the cause of military-technical Australia. Russia’s premier arms export organization cooperation with foreign countries. This reinforced ‘Rosoboronexport’ has set up its office In 43 the trust of arms importers in the potential of Russian countries. According to the information of Federal military-industrial complex. The buyers started Service on Military-Technical Cooperation, in the year believing that Russia can fulfill the contracts on time 2005 Russian arms export reached 6 billion 126 and in full volume. Presidential order No 363 dated million usd. This figure has reached around 15 billion 10th august, 2004 required from Russian participants usd in the year 2015. Approximately 70 % of these of military-industrial cooperation to ensure exports reached India and China. The two other big ‘unconditional fulfillment international obligations of buyers of Russian military hardware are Vietnam Russia in the sphere of military-technical cooperation and NATO member-Greece. The export orders for with foreign countries’ and not to permit decline in military hardware over the years have grown twice volume of export of military hardware.(5 ) It is reaching 23 billion usd (2 ). Russia exported military important to note that for the first time in many years hardware worth of 6 billion usd in 2006 and this figure the Russian economy regained the possibility for reached 7.5 billion usd in 2007. After this export buying several kinds of military hard ware for its own earning from arms sale slowly declined reaching 5.5 army. Because, it is necessary to have the minimum billion usd, but finally it reached 7 billion usd (3). capacity utilized for the survival of the factory . If it Russia virtually accounted for one third of global does not happen, it means it is already not possible arms export with 31 % of global arms market under to manufacture the final product or its cost increases its control against America’s 30%. several times.

This success could be achieved as a result The perspective of Russia in global arms of number of steps taken by Russian government. market would depend on how Russian military- First of all, it was possible by bringing order to the industrial complex is overcoming its systemic crisis. military industrial complex. The government A lot remains to be accomplished in this direction. succeeded in halting the exodus of specialists from According to experts more than 89 percent of the

Russia in Global Arms Trading 5 leaders of military-industrial complex which means renewing cadre potential of the sector. According to 70 percent of the corresponding intellectual potential the General Director of Rosvoruzheniye one of the of the country, negatively look at the affairs in Russian most serious problem remained in ageing of basic military-industrial complex at the beginning of the production funds of Russian military-industrial century. It was the result of the fact that production complex. This did not permit to manufacture of certain military hard ware declined below the equipments of fourth generation at a time when buyers critical minimum possible level after which begins were less and less interested in buying the military the collapse of technical processes and cooperation hardware of third generation. So far the production of production. base of enterprises remains at the level of 1980s and renewal happens only in 1, 5 -2% areas instead of More than that the structure of management required 8-10%. On the eve of 1960-70s innovation of military-industrial complex was not only weak lagging in arms production of US from that USSR and ineffective, practically did not exist, which often constituted 10-12%.Unfortunately in 1990s this led to technological failure. For example, in 2002 lagging continued unabatedly. in course of several months the ‘Tverdokhimikovolokno’ enterprise which The solution to the problem lies in systemic manufactures organic fibr with unique physical- projects of technological re-equipment as conscious mechanical property came to a halt. In the current purchase of some ,even the most modern Lethe century, Russia continued to export products which machines, for improving situation entirely because with rare exception, were designed and had that does not change technological process as a undergone serial production in 1970-89s in best cases. whole. It is required to renew bank of innovative So far many kinds of these military hardware are ideas and discoveries because nobody would bring compared with best products manufactured abroad such ideas to Russia from abroad. This may sound as a result of use of high class tactical- technical as paradox but the fact is that the increase in arms properties , simplicity of exploitation and service of supplies to would facilitate high reliability. However, everything has its limit. growth of Russian arms exports abroad . It is easy Notwithstanding the fact that Soviet-made arms were for Russian producers to ascertain how their very sophisticated, its reserve is getting exhausted equipments fair in military and field conditions or gradually or has already exhausted. It requires at during tests at home rather than in foreign countries. least serious modernization. The seller side should have full control over specifics of use of native weapons. Russian military-industrial complex for its successful operation in international arms market Both sides are interested In such cooperation as well as in the sphere of military hardware supplies because it is only export earnings that could help to Russian army itself needs serious revamping , financing the scientific research as well as extend particularly in the sector of scientific research and necessary support to domestic arms manufacturers . designing work. State arms manufacturing As a result mass production of new type of arms programme for the period 2001 to 2010 was the first could be possible by Russian military-industrial successful move of its kind in this direction. In the complex.(6) For example ,In 2004 before completion first three years of the programme the expenditure of state tests of new tactical rocket “Iskander’ on designing, purchase and repair of military and official approval for its supply to the armed equipments grew by three times.Significant part of forces, the export modification of Iskander-E became these funds were directed towards scientific research one of the most sought after products of Russian and designing work , that means for creation of basis military –industrial complex. Countries like India, for those kind of military hardware that would be China and states of Middle-east immediately showed required by Russian armed forces in the subsequent interest to buy it. For some countries this rocket five- ten years and those that would enjoy demand complex was considered not as operational- tactical in the international arms market. However, the major weapon but strategic weapon in terms of its problem remained in the sphere of retaining and technical characteristics .

6 World Focus January 2017 It has its leaders. However , part of Russian military The announcement of Russian military- hardware still lags behind their foreign analogues in industrial complex about the completion of scientific terms of reliability and quality, and as a result –research work on the project named as ‘ “ increases reclamation in terms of quantity. Samoderzhavets “evoked lot of resonance. According According to -based “ Nezavisimaye to the thoughts of the designers this work would voennoye obzreniye” their growth in recent years be the basis for taking the decision about the creation has been 10 times where as from the foreign countries of ‘ single zenith rocket system’. In other words it it is 20 times. Thus the country might begin to lose is expected to develop a universal system for all the market and billions of dollars . One of the serious branches of armed forces, at least for military and reasons for this kind of situation is that with the anti-air defense system and also for defense of existing lathe machine park of the Russian military separate large objects. The Tula construction bureau industrial complex it is not possible to get normal has completed the work over modern rocket- artillery quality of products , not to speak of international complex “ Pantsir”. standards. However, reclamation from domestic consumers differ from external ones by the way in As a result, for the first time Russian arms which the later always delivers a blow to Russia’s manufacturers , according to the American defense prestige as an international arms manufacturer. weekly “ Defense News”, became part of 100 leading producers of military hardware in the world. Small quantity of purchase of military In 2004, 7 Russian arms manufacturers found place hardware by Russian armed forces and other defense in the list. Russian has the potential to strengthen its departments of the country in course of more than position further in the global arms market. Russian a decade is just one side of the problem. The other government, leaders of military –industrial complex side is practical absence of large scale serial and military –technical cooperation service have to production ; and technology and experience are lost put serious effort for resolving certain problems In where there is no serial production. Russia sold the area. First of all, a massive task in the sphere non-serial military equipments, produced on the basis of restructuring military supplies has to be of orders received from foreign importers in the undertaken. At present the very dynamics of external market. Scientific research also was military production provides testimony about the conducted according to their order. (7) company that produces aviation equipments , losing its position . However, Russia ensured itself with Possibly, the issue of radio-electronic foreign orders particularly in this sphere It happened products, which is most important intellectual as a result of several factors , first of all, because of component of any modern military hardware , saturation of the market. Beginning from 2000, exports stands out sharply in this respect. For example , cost showed growing interest for military naval- arms, of radio-electronics, which is used in the modern which accounted for two thirds of export in place of supersonic fighter jet constitutes 40 to 50% of the 15-20% in the past. The equipments of anti-air defense total cost of the aviation complex. It is this system has better perspective though Russia has its component that to a large extend determines the problems in the sphere. Leaders of military-industrial quality of the product. However, imported complex and state mediators well understand the components might put national security of the state changes in the global arms market. From 2006 , under threat. It has to be taken note of the fact Federal Service on Military-Technical Cooperation import of electronics for equipping indigenous (FSMTC) started changing the structure of its export military hardware might create uncontrollable , reducing its volume of aviation techniques from situation , in which mal-functioning may take place 60% to 35% and correspondingly raising the military- secretly planned by the potential opponent-supplier. naval component to 50%. This is not just hypothetical discussion. It is early to think that Russian military- According to the information received from the chief industrial complex has overcome the systemic crisis. of Federal Service on Defense Procurement

Russia in Global Arms Trading 7 general A.S. Molyakov, 40 minutes before US attack Nevertheless, the branch is still dependant on Iraq, the US completely blocked Iraqi anti-air on imports. Certain components of indigenous defense system, because the electronic system of military hardware still depend on imported electronic these complexes was produced by US companies.(8). micro-system. The aircrafts meant for export still get These methods in certain extent were used in equipped with imported avionics. If this is still Yugoslavia. All this shows that use of imported permissible in case of exported aircrafts, this is not elements for Russian nuclear forces present huge at all permissible for domestic armed forces for security risk. At some stage it might turn into fatal reasons of national security. mistake. India and China are the major importers of Russia’s electronics production base at the Russian military hardware, But experts predict a moment not in a position to resolve the issue decline in Russian exports to these markets because completely . The production base under Soviet of the above problems. The apprehension is real ministry of electronic industry with more than one because these countries are going for licensed thousand enterprises had come to a standstill during production, often with Russian assistance. For years of perestroika and particularly in its aftermath example, Russian military aircrafts, tanks of latest . Volume of production in the sector was reduced modification are produced In India under Russian almost by 90% , which led to loss of many unique license. There is talk about possible competition technologies .For lack of attention, the branch could from these countries. That is why it is imperative to not work for civilian electronics as well. The sector retain technological superiority for Russian needed huge amount of financing for conversion manufacturers, more so because export to third world where as the enterprises, mainly oriented towards countries technologically is not limitless. military production did not have funds “We to a large extent lost technology that we had 20-30 years back, In conditions of huge number of players in because there was no demand for it , in those years”, global arms market and growing competition, Russia stressed G. Kazlov, general director of Russian has to adopt serious approach for participation in the agency on management systems. For example tenders to which large buyers resort to. International integral systems were produced without any problem competition: The international arms market is highly in micro-electronics but now the scientific –research competitive, to which Russia is not very used to. US centres are left with old equipments , old cadres, is the major competitor for Russia in the global arms without funds. market. US is working in the market very actively and complicates problems for Russia. Enterprises do not actively use not only new technology but also modern system of labour US and other arms exporters in their organization. In 2007 certain enterprises of military- competition with Russia use later’s even small industrial complex could not fulfill state military orders mistakes in this fight . For example , in 1992 agency because they did not have cadres and as a result low for defense research of Great Britain purchased labour productivity. Situation improved in the single Russian tank T-80y, which was presented in beginning of the current century when some civilian the western media as good will gesture of President sectors of radio-electronics expanded and emergence Boris Yeltsin on the eve of his visit to London. Very of digital equipments, new computer programmes, soon western media launched a campaign about ‘ which led to improvement of things in military soft discrimination’ of this tank. It was declared production. After creation of Russian agency on that during the test of possible impact on it by British management systems ( RASU), designed to ensure anti-tank weapons in order to ascertain serious advanced micro systems and other products of defects in its defense system and the engine. Such microelectronics manufacturers of anti-air defense information was designed with two objectives. From systems , control system, digital techniques , control one side , it was a chance to provide advertisement over air movement, radio-electronic system, radio- to its anti-tank weapon system, being supplied at that electronics apparatus etc, the sector witnessed moment to Middle East, and from other side, this growth. 8 World Focus January 2017 was an attempt to break the possible deal for supply Along with this direct pressure is exerted on of Russian tanks to this region. Here the western the importers of Russian military hardware. In this competitors were successful In their attempt. connection , the statement made by US defense minister D. Ramsfeld is interesting . The US defense US government does everything possible to secretary in March 2005 said , “ I can not understand break Russian cooperation with international why Venezuela needs 100 thousand rifles AK-47 , organizations, particularly UNO. In 1990s when which she wants to buy from Russia. I cannot there was a possibility for supply of arms to UN understand what Venezuela is going to do with these peacekeeping forces, US authorities did not permit rifles. I hope, Venezuela won’t buy these rifles. I am representatives of Rosvoruzheniye to open their very disturbed by the deal.”(10)In 2008 the Georgian representative office in UN head quarters at New forces started using US-made rifles in place of York. US authorities denied visa for representatives Russian-made Kolashnikov .(11) Washington uses of Russian state company for arms export to visit every occasion to make noise about Russian New York. organization and enterprises dealing with arms export. it is not necessarily that Russian export organizations Commenting the action of US authorities, the or manufacturers violate some rule. US simply uses then head of Rosvoruzheniye A.Katyolkin said ,’ the Russian cooperation with any so-called rogue country fight is going on for 500 million usd earmarked for as pretext for imposing sanctions on Russian purchase of arms for UN peacekeeping forces. organizations and enterprises dealing with arms Russian helicopters, BTR, artillery are better, and manufacture and export. their cost is less by one and half and two times. The forces used In peacekeeping operation are essentially US State Department has time and again troops from third world countries. Their level of imposed sanctions on Russian organizations and training is not always very high. That is why Russian enterprises using the pretext that they provide arms for UN are more profitable. However, assistance for development of Iranian missile emergence of representative office of Russians arms programme or nuclear programme. Baltic state export company at UN headquarters for US Technical university , scientific –research centre administration means recognition of Russian right Grafit, scientific-production centre Inor, scientific to sell its arms in the western hemisphere and in the research Institute Polyus, Glavkosmos, Moscow entire world.’(9) Aviation Institute have been subject to sanctions for their apparent association with Iranian missile and If Russia ultimately succeeded to have nuclear programme. As the experience shows cooperation with this international organization it Americans first of all try to block the activities of had to overcome serious resistance from US those Russians organizations and companies , whose authorities. During last several years, Washington products or designs are most advanced and capable policy in the global arms market did not undergo any of competing with us products. change. US not only proposes but also pushes her arms export deals using all means. Washington exerts Example of anti- Russian discriminatory political and economic pressure on potential buyers actions are sanctions imposed by State Department as well as potential exporters treating them as against Russian state companies Rosvoruzheniye competitors and opponents in the global market. and Sukhoi Design bureau. These sanctions were Washington at the outset proposes military-political slapped apparently for violation of US domestic law guarantee for security as ‘bonus’, and subsequently promulgated in 2000 stipulating prohibition on using her financial and other resources begin arms cooperation with Iran on creation of weapons of supplies practically on any condition, giving credit, mass destruction. using barter , leasing , promising to re-invest part of the profit from the arms sale in the economy of the Representative Rosvoruzheniye noted that buyer country. such sanctions are not accidental. “Americans seriously thought that a serious competitor has

Russia in Global Arms Trading 9 emerged for them in the global level , and such accounted for 70-80 % Russian exports. At the same sanctions are some sort of warning that do not forget time expansion of Russian client base faced certain who is the master in the world.” problems. The other problem lied in the fact that buyers came out with growing demands in terms of The members of the former Warsaw Pact quality of price of the military products. Finally the do their best to deliver blow to Russian interests in reliability of supplier is very important. It is important the global arms market. Their activities concern how reliable are Russian partners and how far they sale of Soviet arms supplied in the past and remaining can go to hammer out compromise while making on their territory after Soviet break up and dissolution deals. of Warsaw Pact. They provided their production capacity for assembling Soviet weapons to the These aspects have not lost their relevance western companies for introducing their products . even today .Russian arms exporters seem to be In some cases they emerged as competitors to giving serious attention to these issues. Russia can Russia for arms supply by offering the products not achieve what USSR could in the sphere of supplied by USSR in the past at lower prices. military-technical cooperation by signing friendship , peace and cooperation treaties . The leadership of It must be said that in global arms market , Federal Service on Military-Technical Cooperation complicated relations happen not only between is well aware of the fact that many buyers of Russian competitors but also between past and present military hardware need some sort of security partners. Export of certain types of sophisticated guarantee from the supplier-country ,that means soviet –arms , reflecting peak of Soviet achievement Russia, but its economy can hardly afford it at present in scientific research began by fraternal socialist (12) . countries even during years of cold war, much before Soviet break up. There was unscrupulous trading of There is an understanding about global arms Soviet military secrets even at state level. market that the major arms buyers in the present stage have completed equipping and modernizing In the competition for position in global arms their armies. No new major buyer is seen in the market, apart from price and quality, bribing state horizon. All this shows that Russian leadership in officials plays an important role. According to UN global arms market is not guaranteed for ever; estimates in the middle of 1990s, the annual bribe for Russian military-political leadership has to work hard striking arms deals surpassed four billion usd or in order to firmly retain its position in the mid term 15% of the export value. among leading players of global arms market. For this Russia needs a well-conceived strategy for the On the eve of the 21st century, famous global market. This concerns Russian military- American expert on military-industrial cooperation industrial complex, state–run mediator companies and Y. Antony drew attention to the fact of declining external political mechanism as a whole. arms export by US for several years while Russian arms export gradually grew. He predicted that if the References tendency sustains Russia would sooner than later beat 1. (Nezavisimoye voennoe obrazovaniye), no46, 3-9dec, 2004. 2. ( Nezavisimaya Gazetta, 10 Feb 2006 ) US in global arms market. This prediction came true 3. ( Oruzhei.ru 13 Nov, 2007 ) and in 2001 Russia emerged as number one exporter 4. (Otechestveni VPK , p-40 ) in global arms market. 5. ( , 13 august, 2004 ) 6. ( Vremy Novosti, 24 Dec, 2003) 7. ( Nezavisimaye Voenoye Obozreniye , 18-24 June, 2004, Antony did not provide any answer to the No22) question how long Russia’s leading position in global 8. ( Vremya Novosti, 9 june , 2004) arms market would continue and how long 9. ( Argument I fakti, No16, 1997 ) 10. ( Izvestia, 25 march, 2005) Americans would tolerate this. Russia significantly 11. (Kislov A.K. A.B. Frolov , Russia I mezdunorodni rynok increased its export to global market, first of all thanks oruzhiya, p442) to massive imports by India and China., who 12. Expert, 5-11 Dec, 2005

10 World Focus January 2017 The Reunion of Crimea with Russia as a Socio-Political Process Prof. Tatiana Senyushkina

In the article one analyses the geopolitical modern Crimean discourse: 1) the reunion of Crimea processes connected with the reunion of Crimea with Russia as cultural and historic as well as political with Russia and the local community integration precedent; 2) peculiarities of the political and legal into the Russian social and economic as well as as well as socioeconomic development of Crimea at political and legal framework. The Reunion of the modern stage in the context of its influence on Crimea with Russia is interpreted as culture and the social and political processes in the region. historic as well as political precedent. There are revealed the peculiarities of the political and legal The peculiarities of the modern social and as well as social and economic development of political also as ethnic and cultural processes in the Crimea in the context of its influence on the Crimea are conditioned by the presence in the local social and political processes. One has analyzed community of the inner ethnic conflict potential, the processes, conditioned by the reformatting of connected with the coexistence and interaction of the authorities and changes in the system of the three ethnic groups dominating in the quantitative state administration in the . characteristic: Russians, Ukrainians and Crimea There have been identified the peculiarities of the Tatars. According to the results of 2014 Census in constitutional process, activities of the public the Crimea (including the City of ) there organizations and mass media, interethnic and live 1 mln 492 thsd Russians, 344 thsd Ukrainians, inter-confessional relations. One has researched 232 thsd . The indices slightly differ the influence of the All-Crimean Referendum on from the results of the previous census, which was March 16, 2014 on the state of the interethnic held in 2001 (the number of Russians made up then 1 relations in Crimea, the reaction of the mln 180,4 thsd people, Ukrainians — 492,2 thsd representatives of the Crimean Tatar ethnos to the peopel, Crimean Tatars — 243,4 thsd people)1. Reunion of Crimea with Russia. There is considered the inner conflict in the community of For better understanding the social and the Crimean Tatars, conditioned by the competition political processes, happening in Crimea, one should of the political ideas, referring to the future of take into consideration the fact that before 1954 the Crimea. One has researched the peculiarities of Crimean Peninsula had been a part of the Russian the activities of the bodies of the state power and Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), and local authorities under the conditions of Crimea then was given to Ukraine as a new administrative adaptation to the Russian national policy. There unit. The process of transfer did not refer to the City are outlined the prospects of the social and of Sevastopol, which was directly subordinated to political development of Crimea. One has defined Moscow and till the USSR collapse was the city of the potential of risks and threats, connected with the Union subordination along with Moscow and the possible radicalization of the Islamic factor Leningrad (). Within the framework in the region. of the single state the act did not have considerable political consequences, but with the USSR collapse Social and political processes, connected with the situation became a conundrum: all ethnic groups the Reunion of Crimea with Russia, and also with of Crimea turned out to be national minorities. the integration of the local community into the Russian Besides, Russian population of Crimea used to treat social and economic as well as political and legal the act of Crimea transfer to Ukraine as an illegitimate framework should be considered in the context of political event2 (Ñåíþøêèíà, 2015, ñ. 104). the analytic comparison of two projections of the

The Reunion of Crimea with Russia as a Socio-Political Process 11 As each of the ethnic groups demonstrates its version responsibility. The Presidium appealed to the Crimean of the collective memory, quite often the conflicts, people with a row of statements. To provide the having as main ones the economic and political prompt response at the inner and outer challenges reasons, led to periodic aggravations of the inter- there was made the reformatting of the representative ethnic tension on the peninsula. The gravest struggle and executive power in the Autonomous Republic of was connected with the problem of citizenship among Crimea. At first the Crimean parliament with its Crimean Tatars (solved by the end of 1990-ies), and decision of February 27, fired Anatoliy Mogilyov and also with struggle for the access to the land resources, his team from the post of the Chairman of the Crimean mainly on the maritime territories. Not so grave at government and at the same time appointed for this present, but important from the point of view of its position the deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the consequences one can consider the problem, Autonomous Republic of Crimea, leader of the party connected with the presence of the supporters of the «» Sergey Aksyonov. At the radical Islamic movements on the peninsula, such as extraordinary session on March 11, 2014 the deputies «Moslem Brothers», Hizb ut-Tahrir, Salaphites of the Supreme Soviet of Crimea and Sevastopol City (Wahhabis). Council adopted the Declaration of Independence of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of The starting point, or the accelerator of the Sevastopol. social and political processes in the current history of Crimea one can consider the clashes, which The further events connected with quick happened on February 26, 2014 in the City of mobilization of local population and creation of the , when the Crimean Tatar Mejlis organized Crimean self-defense allowed to provide holding a five-thousand meeting near the building of the referendum on March 16, 2014 for the organization Supreme Soviet of Crimea for the purpose of of which the Supreme Soviet of Crimea made the preventing from returning into effect the Constitution decision on formation of the special election of 1992, which the Crimean parliament was planning commission3. The referendum showed the voter to passed by its decision. The similar in size number turnout unprecedented earlier for Crimea (83,1%). of the «Russian Unity» supporters was gathered at For comparison it is possible to provide data on the the same time, on the same square by Sergey turnout during the last Ukrainian parliamentary Aksyonov. elections which took place on October 28, 2012, when the voter turnout in the Crimea was record-breakingly Before the meeting on February 26 in low, having made 49,46%. Simferopol, three days earlier, on February 23, 2014, in Sevastopol there was held a three-thousand meeting, Considering the reunion of Crimea with at which a famous Sevastopol entrepreneur Aleksey Russia as the act of restoration of the historical justice, Chaliy was elected the people’s mayor of the city. the major part of the population of Crimea approved The meeting in Sevastopol was peaceful, though A. the inclusion of the Republic of Crimea into the Chaliy was able to take up his duties only after structure of the Russian Federation (96,7% of the persistent local population’s support, which demanded number people who participated in the Referendum). that authorities of Sevastopol in power should support Along with it the number of votes of the participants dwellers’ will expression. In Simferopol such of the all-Crimean Referendum given to support the unanimity was not observed, at the meeting there alternative question of restoration of operation of the were protestants’ clashes, as a result two people died, Constitution of the Republic of Crimea of 1992 and and further development of the situation could lead for the status of the Crimea as a part of Ukraine to ethnic conflict unfreezing in Crimea and made up 2,51 % 4. unpredictable consequences for the whole region. With respect to this it is possible to draw a After the meeting on February 26, 2014 the parallel with the first all-Crimean Referendum which Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Crimea headed took place on January 20, 1991. Not accidentally voting by Vladimir Konstantinov took the political at the all-Crimean Referendum on January 20, 1991

12 World Focus January 2017 and at the all-Crimean Referendum on March 16, Presidium of the State Council of the Republic of 2014 yielded almost equivalent results — 93 and 97% Crimea on the formation of the Constitutional «yes» respectively. In the Referendum of 1991 the Commission on preparation of the draft constitution Crimean people were offered to answer a question: of the Republic of Crimea. On April 11, 2014 the “Are you for a reconstruction of the Crimean ASSR Constitution of the Republic of Crimea was adopted. as the subject of the Union and the participant of the According to it the Republic is a subject of the Russian Union agreement?”. Despite the declaration of will Federation. of residents of the Crimea which had been before the collapse of the USSR, the results of the Adoption of the new constitution brought the Referendum of 1991 weren’t publicly announced and contribution to the constitutional history of the Crimea implemented5. which begins with the Constitution of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in its pre-war Practically at once after the Referendum of variant according to which the Republic for the first 2014 the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Republic time found the status of territorial autonomy. After of Crimea was transformed into the State Council. the Great Patriotic War the autonomy was liquidated After it by the decision of the State Council the and Crimea became a usual area within the RSFSR Autonomous Republic of Crimea was transformed structure, and in 1954 it was transferred to the into the Republic of Crimea as independent state structure of Ukraine. formation education according to the Resolution of the State Council of March 17, 2014 No. 1745-6/14 On May 6, 1992 the first Constitution in the “About the Independence of Crimea”. Later these contemporary history of the Crimea was adopted. In solutions became a legal basis for transition of the connection with this document the Republic had the Republic of Crimea to the structure of the Russian Supreme right concerning the natural wealth, material, Federation. cultural, spiritual values, performed on its territory all powers, except for those, which voluntarily had On March 18, 2014 on the basis of results of delegated to Ukraine. In fact, it was first Constitution the Referendum held in the Autonomous Republic of of the independent state. Together with it the law on Crimea and in the City of Sevastopol in the Kremlin the differentiation of powers between the authorities there was signed the Treaty between the Russian of the Crimea and authorities of Ukraine was adopted. Federation and the Republic of Crimea on the In 1994 presidential elections were held, at which acceptance of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Yury Meshkov won — the first and last president of Federation and forming two new federal subjects the Crimea. within the structure of the Russian Federation. The treaty was adopted by the Federal Constitutional Law Already in March, 1995 the of March 21, 2014 “About the Acceptance to the of Ukraine because of the arisen legal collisions Russian Federation of the Republic of Crimea and annulled the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea Forming within the structure of the Russian Federation and the institute of presidency. In 1998 the new New Subjects — the Republic of Crimea and the Constitution of the Crimea was adopted. It is often City of the Federal Importance of Sevastopol”, called “The Constitution of Compromises” or approved by the State Duma on March 20 and the “Grach’s Constitution” as Leonid Grach at that time Federation Council — on March 21, signed by the was the chairman of the Crimean parliament and was Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 21, 2014. conducting negotiations with the Ukrainian politicians On April 11, 2014 the Republic of Crimea gained its on the creation of the main law of the Republic. This own Constitution and became the 84th subject of the Constitution significantly limited the independence of Russian Federation. the Crimea, and finally the rights of autonomy were emasculated after the adoption of the amendment of On March 18, 2014 the Crimea became a the People’s Deputy of Ukraine Ivan Zayats who part of the Russian Federation as the state. And on suggested that the norms of the Ukrainian legislation March 21, 2014 there appeared the decision of should be considered paramount in case of legal

The Reunion of Crimea with Russia as a Socio-Political Process 13 collisions. It is remarkable that even the name of the Deputies were elected on the mixed system for a highest award of the autonomy was changed: instead period of five years. In Crimea and Sevastopol there of “The Honorary Citizen of the ARC” the title of were registered regional branches of the Russian “The Honourary Crimean” appeared; besides, the parties, including “the ”, Liberal Crimean parliament was deprived of the right to Democratic Party, Communist Party and “Just initiate legislation. Thus, the Constitution of the Crimea Russia”. Both party candidates and independent ones of 1998 became the result of political compromises, took part in the elections. In the result of the elections but this is the document where the possibility of holding 70 deputies from the party “United Russia”, 5 — a local referendum was provided, in the result of from Liberal Democratic Party entered the State which there was a reunion of the Crimea with Russia Council of the Crimea. In the Legislative Assembly in the spring of 2014. of Sevastopol 22 mandates were received by the representatives of “the United Russia”, 2 — Liberal The constitution of 2014 differs from the Democratic Party . Vladimir Konstantinov was previous constitutions in the fact that this document elected the Chairman of the State Council of the confers to the Republic the powers which had not Crimea, and Aleksei Chalyi became the speaker of been in one of earlier accepted Constitutions of the in the Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol. Crimea. The Crimean parliament returned itself a power to initiate legislation and adopt its own laws. In the autumn of 2014 the vice admiral in Besides, any problem which arises in the Republic, if resignation Sergey Menyaylo, who had been heading it is within its jurisdiction, can be settled in the region. before the State Enterprise “Crimean Seaports”, was elected to the post of the governor of Sevastopol. The Constitution of the Republic of Crimea Since March, 2014 in the Crimea the process of at the legislative level fixes the status of the Russian, formation of the territorial structures of the Russian Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages as the state federal executive bodies began. There were formed ones. This constitutional norm about the equality of the regional Ministry of the Internal Affairs with using the state languages in the Republic has been territorial subdivisions, the Division of Ministry of put into operation to decrease the interethnic tension, the Internal Affairs for Sevastopol and its district concentrated in the local community. structures, and also the Simferopol Transit Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of After the reunion of Crimea with Russia the Russia on Transport subordinated directly to the legislative body of Crimea — the Supreme Soviet Federal Ministry. The Head Department of the was renamed into the State Council, the Sevastopol Emergency Situations Ministry in the Republic and City Council — in the Legislative Assembly. Besides, the Department of the Emergency Situations Ministry the new structure of Cabinet of Ministers of the in Sevastopol were included into the single system of Republic led by Sergey Aksyonov was approved, and the Emergency Situations Ministry of the Russian in October, 2014 S. Aksyonov was elected the head Federation. of the region for a period of five years. In May, 2014 the made a decision about Also there were formed territorial authorities creating the second post of the vice-chairman to which of the Ministry of Justice, Migration Service, the the representative of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar Service on Control of Drug Trafficking, Service for People Remzi Ilyasov was appointed. Till February, the Execution of Sentences, Russian Border, and the 2013 he had headed the permanent commission on Service of the State Statistics. The Crimean Customs the interethnic relations and deported citizens. was set up, which includes eight customs posts. Also the Departments of Treasury and Pension Fund of On September 14, 2014 in Crimea and the the Russian Federation also work on the Peninsula. City of Sevastopol the first elections of deputies to the parliaments took place. More than a half of Integration of the Republic of Crimea into Crimean voters took part in the elections. political and legal space of Russia revealed the problems connected with transition to the standards

14 World Focus January 2017 of the existing Russian legislation. For the solution of In the general massif of public organizations these problems the State Council of the Republic of of Crimea there attracts attention the emergence of Crimea accepted a number of the laws and special new all-Russian social movement of Crimean Tatars resolutions allowing to provide legal regulation of the — the Interregional “Kyrym” Movement of the arisen unusual situations in the legal sphere. Special Crimean Tatar People, which was registered problems are connected with receiving the Russian according to the Russian legislation and can be passports by the Crimean people. Within nine months considered as an alternative to the kurultai. Remzi the issue of passports of the citizen of the Russian Ilyasov who has a wide experience of work in bodies Federation was made. 1 million 56 thousand Crimean of state power headed movement. The main program people became citizens of Russia, including the goals of the movement are assistance to the solution overwhelming number of the Crimean Tatars. of the Crimean Tatars’ problems, connected with the According to the Office of the Federal Migration integration into the Russian social and political space. Service, only about 3,5 thousand residents of Crimea of different nationalities wished to preserve the Procedures of registration continued, and as Ukrainian citizenship. Such swift execution of of February 10, 2015 the number of non-profit passports became an unprecedented action in the organizations made up 482. The political domain of history of the Russian statehood (by estimates of the the Republic of Crimea for this date was represented head of Department of the Federal Migration Service by 21 regional branches of the political parties. on the Republic of Crimea Pyotr Yarosh, in the regular mode the process would take about 5-7 years). Characterizing the state of the Crimean society under the conditions of integration into the With inclusion of the Crimea into structure Russian socio-political space, we will emphasize that of the Russian Federation before all the entities in in all bodies of the state executive authority of the the Republic of Crimea there was a task of Republic of Crimea there were created Public reformatting, transition into the Russian standards and Councils. The feature of this period can be considered official registration according to the legislation of the emergence of Public Chamber of the Republic of Russia. This process was joined by public authorities, Crimea which performs its activities on the basis of enterprises, establishments and organizations, Law No. 1 “About Public Chamber of the Republic entrepreneurs (both legal and physical entities), and of Crimea”, adopted on May 15, 2014. The priority also the institutes of the civil society — party, public, activities of Public Chamber of the Republic of Crimea religious, national and cultural and other non- are determined by its main functions, purposes and commercial structures, mass media. The first non- tasks: ensuring the interaction of citizens, public and profit organizations created in the Crimea, were other non-profit organizations with authorities; forming regional branches of the All-Russian Movement public opinion and informing the authorities about it; “People’s Front “For Russia”” in the Republic of etc. Crimea and Sevastopol. According to Head In the conditions of integration of the Crimea Department of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian into the Russian socio-political space a special role is Federation in the Republic of Crimea, at the end of played by mass media. In the Republic of Crimea for 2014 in the Republic of Crimea according to the the end of 2014 there were registered 117 mass media, Russian legislation there were registered over 300 39 more submitted the relevant documents. By public organizations, 30 charitable funds, 15 political February, 2015 the number of the registered media parties and 39 cultural-national autonomies. It is (printing, television mass media and radio) constituted remarkable that among the national and cultural 167, from them 107 are Crimean ones, others are autonomies and societies some ethnic groups branches of federal mass media. The reregistration registered two organizations, in particular the was made by about a half of printing editions of the Azerbaijanians, Belarusians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Jews Crimean municipalities. For comparison it is possible and Germans. to specify that, according to the Ukrainian register, in the Crimea there were registered about 3 thousand mass media, however there were about 300 really

The Reunion of Crimea with Russia as a Socio-Political Process 15 functioning from them. Thus, a reregistration was illegal fact of the deportation from Crimea of the made by nearly a half of the really functioning mass representatives of five ethnoses living in Crimea. It media of Crimea. is also important that the Decree aims at necessity to restore the historical justice, to eliminate the Special attention in the analysis of the consequences of illegal deportation and the allowed researched problem needs to be paid to the reaction violations of the rights, including the property and of the Crimean Tatar community to the reunion of cultural ones. the Crimea with Russia. The all-Crimean Referendum on March 16 and its consequences for the state of Estimating the value of this Decree, we will the interethnic relations on the peninsula divided the pay attention to its role in a depolitization of the ethnic Crimean Tatars into two parts. Among the Crimean factor in Crimea that can form a basis for safe and Tatars the internal conflict escalated connected with steady development of the region from the economic the competition of the political ideas about the future and political point of view. At the same time the crucial of this ethnic community. The problem is that the role will be played by efficiency and effectiveness of national ideas of the Crimean Tatars and their realizing the state national policy in Crimea6. by elite groups are heterogeneous. For the last years the leading role in ethnic self-organization of the Under the conditions of adaptation of Crimea Crimean Tatars was played by the Majlis, which to the Russian national policy the public authorities in Moustapha Dzhemilyov had been heading for many the Republic of Crimea, and also the authorities of years. He delegated the powers to . the federal level, perform the national policy in the region according to the current legislation, and also Along with it in previous years the force taking into account the local features. Special attention opposite to the Mejlis had been forming. On the one is paid to the completion of constructing numerous hand, it was represented by the supporters National objects of the Crimean Tatars’ life necessities living Movement of the Crimean Tatars, who created the in places of their compact resettlement. It is expected Millie Firka Organization, the alternative one to the that about 10 billion rubles will be allocated for these Majlis, and on the other hand — a number of public purposes in the next five years from the federal budget organizations; the most active from them — the Sebat (in 2014 within the Federal Target Program for Crimea Organization, and also a part of the Crimean Tatars for 2015-2020 more than 300 million rubles are who had an experience of the constructive cooperation allocated for the problem resolution of the deported, with the authorities and had held in different years and in 2015 it is planned to allocate 1 billion 117 million important posts in the Crimean parliament and rubles). government. The latter in June, 2014 created a new public organization “Kyrym Birligi” (the Unity of the For ensuring the process of integration of the Crimea). Crimea into the social and economic space of Russia at the federal level there was created the Ministry on The crucial role in forming the loyalty of the Affairs of Development of Crimea which existed for Crimean Tatar population in relation to the future about a year, and then was liquidated. On August 11, development of the Crimea as a part of the Russian 2014 the Government of the Russian Federation Federation was played by Decree No. 268 “About approved the Federal Target Program “Social and Measures for Rehabilitation of the Armenian, Economic Development of the Republic of Crimea Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar and German People and Sevastopol till 2020” (Resolution No. 790) with a and the State Support of their Revival and total amount of financing of 681,2 billion rubles. On Development”, signed by the Russian President financing of the program from the federal budget there Vladimir Putin on April 21, 2014. is allocated 658,1 billion rubles, from non-budgetary sources — 23,1 billion rubles. The Program Purpose The special value of this Decree is that in it deals with the integration of the economy of the actually for the first time at the level of the highest into the economic space of state power there is performed the recognition of the Russia, ensuring the transport availability, removal of

16 World Focus January 2017 infrastructure restrictions for the purpose of Till March, 2014 in Crimea more than 180 Ukrainian sustainable economic development. The main tasks banks worked. The Privatbank was the largest one, of implementation of the Federal Program: elimination the departments of the affiliated Russian organizations of restriction of transport and engineering also worked: Sberbank, VTB Bank, Alfa-Bank, etc. infrastructures, improvement of quality of power After the reunion of the Crimea with Russia and prior supply of the region, development of the social sphere, to the beginning of 2015 for the financial organizations ensuring interethnic concord. the licenses granted by Ukraine continued to work. All liabilities of the Ukrainian banks before were kept The important factor influencing a social and by investors. Also deposits of the Crimeans and economic situation in the region can be considered residents of Sevastopol fell under guarantees of the the establishment of a particular legal regime and free Deposit Insurance Agency of the Russian Federation. economic zone in the territory of the Crimea. The organizations which wanted to continue work on According to the provisions of the Federal Law of the peninsula had to receive the Russian registration. November 29, 2014 No. 377 since January 1, 2015 Practically right after the reunion of Crimea with on the territories of the Republic of Crimea and the Russia Privatbank stopped work with physical City of the Federal Importance of Sevastopol there persons. And in May, 2014 the National Bank of has been functioning a free economic zone which is Ukraine forbade the Ukrainian banks to have activities created for a period of 25 years with a possibility of in the Crimea. prolongation and assumes a specific mode of implementation of business and other activities, Licenses of the Bank of Russia were obtained including the preferential taxation and application of only by two Ukrainian credit institutes — the the customs procedure of a free customs zone. The Sevastopol Sea Bank and the Development federal law is aimed at providing sustainable social and Reconstruction Bank. The liabilities of other banks, and economic development of the region by means and also their branches were assigned to these banks of investment attraction into the operating productions and other Russian organizations, including “Russia” and in creation of new ones, development of the Joint Stock Bank and to the Russian National transport and other infrastructures, tourism, Commercial Bank. As of the beginning of February, agricultural industry and the sanatorium and health 2015, on the territory of the Crimea 26 banks with resort sphere. 516 branches worked. Because of sanctions of the USA in the Crimea there were problems with Along with positive tendencies in social and processing of bank cards of Visa and MasterCard. economic development of the Crimea there are To provide uninterrupted clients’ carrying out obvious risks in financial and bank spheres. After payments, the banks of the Republic began card issue signing of the Federal Law about taking Crimea and of the Russian payment service provider PRO100. Sevastopol into structure of the Russian Federation there were a number of problems in the financial Transport communication with the continent sphere. The ruble became a monetary unit on the became one of the most notable problems for the peninsula. Initially the authorities of the peninsula Crimea. Earlier all automobile and railroads lay decided that Ukrainian hryvnia will exchanged at the through Ukraine. At the end of 2014 Kiev in the fixed rate of 3,8 Russian rubles. Since May, 2014 unilateral mode stopped the land transport link with hryvnia exchange rate became a market one. Since the peninsula, and the ferry crossing through the Kerch June the circulation of hryvnia was stopped, and to Strait became the main transport corridor. As the exchange the Ukrainian currency for rubles became ferry is not meant for big transport flows, during the possible only in affiliations of banks. At the time of resort season in 2014 and 2015 there were vital issues the reunion of Crimea with Russia in the storages of connected with long expectation of the ferry boat in the National bank in the territory of the peninsula Kerch for individual and load freight transport. As there were 3,7 billion hryvnias. In January, 2015 this the solution of this problem it is planned to build the money was returned to the Ukrainian side. combined automobile and railway bridge across the Kerch Strait, however there are a number of risks

The Reunion of Crimea with Russia as a Socio-Political Process 17 which are caused by the mobility of the soil Crimea more than 300 hectares of young gardens conditioned by the seismicity of the bottom of the has been laid out. Black Sea. Nevertheless, preparation for designing and construction was begun already in 2014. It is A special role in the economy of Crimea is expected that the bridge will be handed over at the played by tourism, however in the last two years there end of June, 2019. Besides, it is planned to start a have been a decrease in general tourist flow which construction of the new Taurida highway from Kerch has happened due to the reduction of a share of tourists to Simferopol and Sevastopol. Along with it for the from Ukraine and foreign countries. Along with it if solution of a transport problem the reconstruction of to judge by the number of the sold air tickets, the the passenger airport in Simferopol is being performed. Crimea has become one of the most popular destinations among the Russians. It is expected that Under the conditions of integration of Crimea on the Crimean peninsula there will be created 11 into the Russian social and economic space the special tourist and recreational clusters, 6 of them — in value has the analysis of the situation which has Crimea (including in and in the area of developed in the industry and agricultural industry as Chokraksky Lake), 5 — in Sevastopol. these spheres first of all provide the level of economic solvency of the Republic. In March, 2014 the Supreme Special problems arise in connection with Soviet of Crimea decided to nationalize everything providing Crimea with energy resources and water all the enterprises belonging to Ukraine in the territory resources. Before reunion of Crimea with Russia of the peninsula. The republican authorities started Crimea and Sevastopol for 75–90% depended on to control the oil and gas-producing companies, electrical supplies from Ukraine. In 2014 the including “Ukrtransgaz”, “Chernomorneftegaz”, interruptions in supply of electricity began: since June, Feodosiya Petroleum Storage Depot, and also the 2014 electricity to Crimea at market value was ports, telecommunication companies delivered by «Ukrinterenergo» Company. The (“Krymtelekom”). In February, 2015 the corporate situation with rolling blackouts appeared for the first property of “Ukrtelecom” Company, belonging to time at the end of 2014. In December, 2014 the , was nationalized. At the same time contract on energy supply to Crimea signed by “Inter many large enterprises had old owners, for example RAO” and “Ukrinterenergo” came into force: as “the Crimean TITANIUM” (the owner — Dmitry compensation Russia during 2015 delivered the Firtash). The ship-building entities of the peninsula electric power and coal to Ukraine. However the were included into the system of state defense order, new aggravation of the situation occurred at the end the program for upgrading the Crimean shipyards is of November, 2015 when on the territory of the being discussed. Kherson Region there was performed blasting two power lines by means of which Ukraine transferred Agricultural industry is one of primary the electric power to Crimea according to the signed branches of economy of Crimea which constitutes contract. On the night of November 22 the Crimea about 35% of the gross regional product. Taking into was completely deenergized as a result of blasting in account droughty climate characteristic of the the Kherson region the transmission pylons Crimean peninsula, overlapping by Ukraine the North Kakhovskaya — Ostrovskaya and Kakhovskaya — Crimean Canal became a critical problem for Dzhankoy by means which the electric power was agricultural production on the irrigated lands. For this delivered from Ukraine. Before, on the night of reason in Crimea rice production has actually been November 20, in the same way there were destroyed stopped, however the grain crop was gathered with other two transmission pylons (Melitopol — the better results than in previous years. Also the Dzhankoy and Kakhovskaya — Titan). Nobody took livestock and poultry stock have increased, production the responsibility for blastings, however the area near of meat and milk has been reduced by several percent, the destroyed constructions was blocked by the and production of eggs has grown more than by 8%. representatives of the “” and the Majlis. In the Chernomorskiy and Belogorsk Regions of One of four pylons (Kakhovskaya – Titan) was repaired, however power supply was not restored7.

18 World Focus January 2017 The power supply system of the Crimea assets were worn-out for 70%. Since spring of 2014 worked more than a week in the isolated mode. In in Crimea and Sevastopol the programs of upgrade the Crimea emergency mode, schedules of emergency of health care aimed at carrying out capital repairs in shutdowns of electricity were introduced. To decrease 18 medical institutions have been working. Crimea the dependence of Crimea on supply of electricity and Sevastopol have become a part of the system of from Ukraine on the peninsula 13 mobile thermal the compulsory health insurance. power plants were established, the construction of two new thermal power plants in Simferopol and For the beginning of 2014 in Crimea there Sevastopol began, the first stage of the power bridge lived about 700 thousand pensioners who receive the from Krasnodar Region through the Kerch Strait was pensions recounted according to the Russian laid that allowed to connect the peninsula with the legislation. More than 100 thousand families of the Russian Federation power pool system. peninsula have the right to maternity capital.

According to the federal target program The Crimea and Sevastopol have been “Social and Economic Development of the Republic included into all Russian programs including provision of Crimea and Sevastopol till 2020” in the power with housing for veterans of the Great Patriotic War, complex of Crimea it is supposed to eliminate network and the programs in the housing sector. During 2015 restrictions, to create own generation and to provide Crimea joined the Russian format of administering reliable and regular power supply. In an engineering apartment houses; the local legislation was adapted complex it is planned to finance actions for ensuring for the Russian regulations. water supply, water disposal, coast protection. In May, 2014 in Crimea the reform of the The critical situation arose also in the sphere education system began. The Republic joined the of providing the Crimea with water resources, most Russian standards of education. Before it all teachers sharply it was shown in east areas of the peninsula, of the region had undergone retraining, and the where there are practically neither surface, nor Russian textbooks had been admitted to schools of underground waters. For water supply of east regions the Crimea. In 2014 and 2015 for Crimean graduates of Crimea the drainage system was built from the additional budget places in the Russian higher Nizhnegorsky Water Storage Basin 200 km long. As education institutions were allocated, the prospective a result the water from Nizhnegorsk began to arrive students from Crimea entered out of competition. to the North Crimean Canal, and further — along the existing drainage system in east part of the Crimea. In system of the higher education the most important events are connected with uniting several Besides, in Crimea there is observed the higher educational institutions as a result of which growth of level of pollution of surface and underground the Sevastopol State University and the Crimean water what influences quality degradation of drinking Federal V. I. Vernadsky University have been created. water. Practically in all settlements there are problems The most difficult situation was with the Crimean with removal and treatment of the sewage: about a Medical Institute, employees of which disapproved half of the treatment facilities dump sewage in natural of including the medical institution of higher education reservoirs. into the Crimean Federal University.

Development of the social sphere in the A special number of problems are Crimea is concentrated on implementation of actions characteristic of activities of law enforcement for a construction and reconstruction of health care agencies. Before the reunion of Crimea with Russia facilities. Till 2014 on the territory of the peninsula on the peninsula the Chief Division of Ministry of 175 health care facilities functioned (hospitals, Internal Affairs of Ukraine in the Autonomous polyclinics, etc.). Inventory count showed that in Republic had been engaged into the protection of these organizations for a long time the material and public order and had fought against crime. In March, technical resources had not been updated: the fixed 2014 in Crimea there were created the Russian law

The Reunion of Crimea with Russia as a Socio-Political Process 19 enforcement bodies — the Ministry of Internal Affairs stopped its existence in Crimea. However it is of the Republic Crimea and the Division of MIA of impossible to claim that the influence of this the Russian Federation for Sevastopol. They were organization on the Crimean Muslims has stopped, included into structure of the Ministry of Internal especially in the rural zone and among young people8. Affairs of Russia. According to the Russian legislation the divisions of migratory service and service of On the basis of the analysis of the considered execution of punishments were removed from processes we will formulate the conclusions. The structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the main content of the social and political processes Crimea. At present both in the Republic of Crimea, which are observed in the Crimea is connected with and in the City of Sevastopol the units of the Ministry the fact of the reunion of the Crimea with Russia and of Internal Affairs are fully completed. The regional the integration of local community into the Russian battalion of special policy group “Berkut” which had political, legal and social as well as and economic earlier been in the structure of the Ministry of Internal space. Affairs of Ukraine also became a part of the Crimean Division. According to statistical data of law Estimating a state of the ethnopolitical enforcement agencies in 2014 crime rate in the situation in Crimea at the present stage, we will note Crimean Federal District dropped almost by 44% in a general tendency of a depoliticization of an ethnic comparison with 2013. factor that can form a basis for the development of the region, safe and steady from the economic and In the religious sphere of the Crimean political point of view, in the future. At the same time community there were also changes. For the the crucial role will be played by the efficiency and beginning of 2014 on the territory of the ARC there effectiveness of the state national policy both at the were 2083 religious organizations from which 1409 federal, and at the local level, including the preventive had the status of the legal entity and 674 had the right activities directed to the prevention of the ethnic and of religious activities without the state registration. religious conflicts. In the City of Sevastopol 137 religious organizations were registered. After the reunion of Crimea with In spite of the fact that most of residents of Russia the religious communities had an opportunity Crimea and the City of Sevastopol supported the to be re-registered according to the Russian Russian vector of development of Crimea and legislation. expressed the support to this decision at the Referendum on March 16, 2014, in the local Nevertheless some religious communities did community the conflict situations connected with the not show willingness to undergo registration and as a presence of the opposite opinions of as for the future result stopped the work on the peninsula. In particular, of Crimea had been observed. In particular, among on March 16, 2014 the Crimea was left by the priest the Crimean Tatars there was a separation into of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church Nikolay supporters and opponents of the reunion of Crimea Kvich who was arrested by the representatives of to Russia therefore the ethnoconflictual capacity of law enforcement agencies and accused of extremism. Crimea gained a new phase. At the same time it is During March, 2014 there was observed the departure necessary to emphasize that the Crimean Tatars for from Crimea of the priests of the Ukrainian Greek years of repatriation already had got access to the Catholic Church, and also of Roman Catholic Church key resources of the peninsula, including the most and Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev valuable resource — the earth on the Southern and patriarchy. In particular, Roman Catholic parish in South-East Coast of Crimea. Besides, real social and Simferopol was left by his prior Father Pyotr economic status of the Crimean Tatars actually is Rosokhatsky, the citizen of Poland who had been higher than the officially declared one. The problems working in Crimea for the last five years. in education and cultures of the Crimean Tatars are generally solved, and their actualizing in the previous Formally the religious organization of Hizb years had manipulative character. Under these Ut-Tahrir forbidden by the Russian legislation has conditions open and long opposition to the political

20 World Focus January 2017 course which is supported by the majority of the The results of the population census in the Republic of Crimea. peninsula population, for many representatives of the Available at: http://crimea.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_ts/ middle class and the Crimean Tatar elite means the crimea/resources/1f72198049859f4b9205f22d12c3261e/pub-04- 01.pdf. direct economic and political loss, which they will try The results of the referendum in Crimea. Available at: http:// to avoid. oncrimea.ru/ru/news/politics/results-of-referendum-2014.html (accessed: 10.05.2015). (In Russian) In case of noticeable improvement of the Senyushkina Tatiana. Analysis of the sociopolitical processes economic and social situation in Crimea the political in the Crimea // Ethnopolitical situation in Russia and the context of the internal opposition among the Crimean Neighbouring States in 2014. The annual report of the Network of Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning Conflict. Ed. by Tatars will fade into the background, and extent of V. A. Tishkov, V. V. Stepanov. Moscow, IEA Publ., 2015, pp. the influence of the Majlis will decrease gradually 104–114. (In Russian) provided that alternative political forces are Senyushkina Tatiana. The problem of the sovereignty of the consolidated and gain the authority among most of modern Russia. Conf. Proceedings, June 6, 2014, Moscow. the Crimean Tatars. In general positively estimating Science Center of political thought and ideology. Moscow, Science the prospects of ethnopolitical development of the and Politics Publ., 2014, pp. 182–191. (In Russian) Crimea, one should not exclude the possibility of Senyushkina Tatiana. Ethnopolitical situation in Crimea: analysis, forecasting, trends]. Problems of development of the escalation of the ethnic conflict in Crimea as a result Crimea. Issue 16. Crimean regional community: genesis, current of the external impact with use of the Islamic factor status and prospects. Simferopol, Sonat Publ., 2012, pp. 373– in case of involvement of the international network 379. (In Russian) structures which already have their representatives on the peninsula. Footnotes 1 The results of the population census in the Republic of Crimea. Available at: http://crimea.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_ts/ In the analysis of an ethnoconfessional crimea/resources/1f72198049859f4b9205f22d12c3261e/pub-04- situation in the Crimea it is necessary to pay special 01.pdf. attention to the distribution of the ideas prohibited on 2 Senyushkina Tatiana. Ethnopolitical situation in Crimea: the territory of the Russian Federation the Islamic analysis, forecasting, trends]. Problems of development of the State (ISIL) among the Crimean Muslims, and also Crimea. Issue 16. Crimean regional community: genesis, current to the availability in local community of people with status and prospects. Simferopol, Sonat Publ., 2012, p. 378. (In Russian) combat experience in hot spots. 3 Grigor’ev Michael, Kovitidi Olga. Crimea: the history of return. Moscow, Kuchkovo pole Publ., 2014, 400 p. – P. 171. The main risks and threats for ethnopolitical 4 The results of the population census in the Republic of Crimea. development of the Crimean society are caused by Available at: http://crimea.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_ts/ the state and opportunities of use in the geopolitical crimea/resources/1f72198049859f4b9205f22d12c3261e/pub-04- purposes of the internal conflictual potential which 01.pdf. 5 Senyushkina Tatiana. Analysis of the sociopolitical processes requires urgent development and use of controling in the Crimea // Ethnopolitical situation in Russia and the mechanisms the ethnoconfessional conflicts. Among Neighbouring States in 2014. The annual report of the Network such mechanisms — the system of information and of Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning Conflict. Ed. by analytical ensuring of taking management decisions, V. A. Tishkov, V. V. Stepanov. Moscow, IEA Publ., 2015, pp. creation of the system of the state and public control 104–114. (In Russian). P.105. 6 over the incitement to hatred and hostility in the Senyushkina Tatiana. Analysis of the sociopolitical processes information space, use of the education system and in the Crimea // Ethnopolitical situation in Russia and the Neighbouring States in 2014. The annual report of the Network upbringing for forming the interethnic and interfaith of Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning Conflict. Ed. by trust. V. A. Tishkov, V. V. Stepanov. Moscow, IEA Publ., 2015, pp. 104–114. (In Russian). P.109. References 7 The Vice Premier: energy blockade of the Crimea fell. Available The Vice Premier: energy blockade of the Crimea fell. Available at: http://ria.ru/society/20151202/1334658842.html. at: http://ria.ru/society/20151202/1334658842.html. 8 Senyushkina Tatiana. The problem of the sovereignty of the Grigor’ev Michael, Kovitidi Olga. Crimea: the history of return]. modern Russia. Conf. Proceedings, June 6, 2014, Moscow. Moscow, Kuchkovo pole Publ., 2014, 400 p. (In Russian) Science Center of political thought and ideology. Moscow, Science and Politics Publ., 2014, pp. 182–191. (In Russian) P. 190.

The Reunion of Crimea with Russia as a Socio-Political Process 21 Russia in Global Energy Scenario Prof. R.G. Gidadhubli

Russia is one of the major players in global reserves made available for the first time by the energy scenario. Hence an effort has been made in Russian Natural Resources Minister Sergey Donskoy, this article to highlight potentialities and production recoverable reserves of oil in Russia under category of energy resources with special reference to ABC1 (equivalent to proven reserves) were 17.8 Gazprom; policies pursued to meet domestic needs billion tons and category C2 reserves (equivalent to and exports; issues connected with politics and probable and possible) were 10.9 billion tons. This economics of pipelines for energy exports. This possibly included reserves of East and West Siberia article also contains analysis of case study of energy and Arctic region. rich Caspian region. West Siberia, Ural-Volga, East Siberia and At the outset it may be worthwhile to make Far East (Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, Yakutia, and Sakhalin) an overview of the current status of Russia in energy are major regions for Russia’s oil production. Even sector in the world partly highlighted by energy expert as oil production has declined after the Soviet Jude Clemente. In 2015 Russia was the third largest breakup, there was a major shift in Russian oil output oil producer with average liquids production of 11.0 that began in 1999, which was due to several factors million barrels per day (b/d) and consumed namely policy of privatization, application of Japanese domestically about 3.5 million b/d giving the benefit technology and rising oil prices in the world which of exporting about 8 million barrels per day; second rejuvenated oil fields rising to about 9.8 billion barrels largest exporter being fastest growing supplier to all- per day in 2007 from about 6 million barrels per day important China; as per Russian Energy Ministry in the mid 1990s. data, largest exporter of natural gas and leading in proven reserves and exported 70 pc of its oil, 30 pc During the last decade production from East of its natural gas produced, 35 pc of coal; major Siberia, Russia’s Far East, and the Russian Arctic supplier to the European Union with 33 pc of the has been increasing. In fact, untapped oil reserves in bloc’s natural gas and 35 pc of its crude oil; the third- the Russian Arctic region are likely to play a larger largest generator of nuclear power in the world and role in the long run. Moreover, the Russian sector of has the fifth-largest installed nuclear capacity; signed the Caspian Sea and the predominantly undeveloped a $400 billion, 30-year gas pipeline deal with China areas of Timan-Pechora in northern Russia also may that could hurt U.S. and Canada LNG export hold large hydrocarbon reserves and major producers opportunities for the critical, higher-priced Asian of oil. In 2016, Russia has emerged as the third largest markets; enjoys a regional pipeline dominance in the producer of oil in the world. region that limits development in the other energy- rich former Soviet states. Natural Gas With estimated reserves of 1,700 trillion cubic meters Resource Potentialites and Production natural gas, Russia has the largest reserves Russia is richly endowed with all categories of energy accounting for about one-third of global resources. resources, namely oil, natural gas including LNG, coal Majority of natural gas reserves are located in eastern and nuclear fuel. Russia with 103.2 billion barrels of Siberian regions of Russia and Far East. With the oil is the seventh among the 20 largest countries in addition of Northern Russia’s Shtokman natural gas the world with proven oil reserves. It is important to field in the Barnets Sea, there is no project of note that estimates of proven oil reserves vary in comparable magnitude in the world. It is of great Russia. In July 2013 as per official estimates of importance that at present Russia is the largest

22 World Focus January 2017 producer and exporter of natural gas in the world. Soviet era all energy companies were owned and Moreover, Russia has a single operating liquefied managed by the state. After the Soviet breakup, in natural gas (LNG) export facility, Sakhalin LNG. This the 1990’s during Boris Yeltsin’s presidency Russia facility has been operating since 2009 with an original adopted policy of privatization of oil industry inviting design capacity of 9.6 million tons (mt) of LNG per foreign capital and technology and as a result British year (approximately 460 Bcf of natural gas). The Petroleum (BP) and TNK were able to hold majority of the LNG has been contracted to Japanese substantial share in joint ventures. Thus by 2003, BP and South Korean buyers under long-term supply had invested in TNK, forming TNK-BP with 50-50 agreements. joint venture and one of country’s major oil producers. But this policy was reverted by Vladimir Putin during Coal his presidency reducing their role and share in Russia’s Russia has sizeable coal reserves and is the world’s energy sector. His objective was that the Russian third-largest exporter of coal. With 177 billion short state should dominate this strategic sector. With rising tons of coal at the end of 2014, Russia held the world’s international prices for oil and gas during the last second-largest recoverable coal reserves, behind the decade, Russia was immensely benefited by huge United States. So far as production is concerned, in inflow of petrodollars by exporting to global markets. 2014-15 Russia ranked sixth in the world with 394 But in 2012 -13, the TNK-BP partnership was million tons behind China, the United States, India, dissolved, and Russia’s state-controlled Rosneft Indonesia and Australia. Almost 80 pc of Russia’s acquired nearly all of TNK-BP’s assets. For its share coal production was steam coal, and slightly more in TNK-BP, BP received cash and an 18.5 pc share than 20 pc was coking coal used by metallurgical of Rosneft. Hence during the last decade, Rosneft plants. In 2014, Russia consumed more than 60 pc of emerged as Russia’s top oil producer following the its coal production exporting the rest. Although coal liquidation of Yukos assets, which Rosneft acquired. accounts for a relatively modest share of Russia’s total energy consumption, coal is a more vital part of While Russian leaders have adopted policy consumption in Siberia, where most Russian coal is decisions in their national interest, as opined by some mined. Hence about 45-50 pc of coal is exported to western analysts there has been lack of consistency countries of Asia. in policies being pursued from time to time. Hence there is trust deficit between Russia and the West on Nuclear Power several issues including policy of privatization. The Russia has enormous nuclear fuel urea resources in Western political leaders and capitalists expected the world and hence has an installed nuclear power greater consistency, transparency and security for capacity of more than 27 million kilowatts, distributed investment in Russia including energy sector. across 36 operating nuclear reactors at 10 locations out of which nine plants are located west of the Ural During the last two-three years Russian Mountains. The only exception is the Bilibino plant economy has been badly hit by global recession and in the far northeast. Russia’s nuclear power facilities due to declining demand and declining oil prices. are aging as working life of a reactor is considered to Hence the Russian government has been adopting be 30 years. Yet Russia has an active life-extension policy measures to boost the role of energy sector. program. As opined by experts Russia’s current Hence the Russian government has offered special federal target program envisions a 45 pc to 50 pc tax rates or tax holidays to encourage investment in nuclear power share of total generation by 2050 and difficult-to-develop resources, such as Arctic offshore 70 pc to 80pc share by 2100. To achieve these goals, and low-permeability reservoirs, including shale the rapidly aging nuclear reactor fleet in Russia needs reservoirs. It is important that attracted by the tax to be replaced with new nuclear power plants. incentives and the potentially vast resources, many international companies entered into partnerships with Policy Perspectives Russian firms to explore Arctic and shale resources. The Russian government has adopted an active policy For instance, ExxonMobil, Eni, Statoil, and China for the development of the energy sector. During the

Russia in Global Energy Scenario 23 National Petroleum Company (CNPC) all partnered Fourthly, cost factor has played an important with Rosneft in 2012 and 2013 to explore Arctic fields. role. The Middle East countries produce oil at less than $ 10 per barrel, which is far lower than that so Moreover, it is important to note that a number far as Russia is concerned. The cost of exploitation of new projects are in development stage which might and transportation of oil and natural gas in Russia’s offset declining output from aging fields in the near Eastern Siberia and Arctic region is more than twice term. Moreover, the use of advanced technologies as compared to that of Middle East. and the application of improved recovery techniques have resulted in increased oil output from some Price Factor on Russia’s Energy Sector and existing oil deposits. Economy It is important to note that the Russian economy has Constraints been over dependent on energy sector since nearly Notwithstanding enormous resource potentialities, half of GDP is generated from petrodollars earned Russia has certain constraints in the global energy by exporting oil and gas to various countries in the sector. Firstly, it needs to be noted that as per data world. During the last decade there was huge inflow given in Table 1, oil reserves of Venezuela are nearly of petrodollars when oil prices in the world increased three times that of Russia which is ranking 7th amongst from about $ 50 per barrel in 2003 to over $ 145 per largest oil rich countries in the world. Moreover, as it barrel by 2007. This brought prosperity to the country is well known major part of the global needs for oil and to majority of Russian citizens and popularity to are met by the Middle East countries namely Saudi the Russian president Vladimir Putin. Arabia, Iraq, Iran and Kuwait. In terms of reserves, OPEC countries play an important role with 80 pc of Global oil prices have declined during the last proven oil reserves in the world and 66 pc of which few years from $ 112 per barrel in 2012 to $ 101 per are in the Middle East. OPEC’s proven oil reserves barrel in 2014 and below $ 50 per barrel in 2016. This stand at 1,199.71 billion barrels in 2016. has been due to increasing supply of oil from non- OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Secondly, the position of energy rich Countries) countries. Moreover, as opined by countries has been changing with explorations that Mallinson a Western energy expert, the US shale are going on in various parts of the world and new boom was a factor behind the recent oil price collapse estimates of recoverable oil and gas are being made. that toppled the Brent crude benchmark from a mid- This is evident from the reports of the Oslo-based 2014 high of $115 a barrel to below $30 earlier in group which regularly conducts analysis of 60,000 early 2016. fields. For instance, it was stated on 5th July 2016 by Anjili Raval in the Financial Times that Rystad Energy This decline in global oil prices has very estimated recoverable oil in the USA from existing adversely impacted Russia’s state budget. Hence to fields, discoveries and yet undiscovered areas enhance state revenue in January 2015, the Russian amounted to 264 bn barrels which surpassed government announced its intention to sell some of estimated reserves of Saudi Arabia’s 212bn and its shares in several Russian companies, including Russia’s 256bn. Thus while USA was behind Saudi Bashneft and Rosneft. The Russian government Arabia, Russia and Canada three years ago in terms currently owns 69.5 pc of Russia’s largest oil producer of proven resources, its rank has changed with new Rosneft. It intends to sell up to 19.5 pc of the company, huge reserves of unconventional shale oil as per latest retaining a controlling interest. estimates. Russia is not a member of OPEC countries Thirdly, major part of Russia’s energy and has been adopting policies to suit its national reserves are located in the eastern part of Russia in interest. On 16th Nov 2016 the Russian news agency the Siberian plains and hence cost of extraction and reported that the Russian Energy Minister Aleksander transportation is relatively high both for meeting the Novak was in agreement with proposal of the OPEC domestic needs and exports to Western markets. countries to reduce output of oil to prevent further

24 World Focus January 2017 decline in oil prices. He said “Reaching such of goods, services, or technology in support of agreements is a positive signal for the market, and deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects. The non-OPEC countries, including Russia, will participate European Union imposed sanctions, although they in making collectively the decision on market actions”. differ in some respects. Moreover, on 24th November 2016 Novak went to the extent of stating that Russia was working with Hence while Ariel Cohen was candid in Kazakhstan and Mexico on joint output cuts to freeze stating that Europe was addicted to Russian gas, the output and prevent decline in oil prices as it suited reality is that there has been mutual dependency the interest of Russia as well. Russia has its own between Russia and European countries on energy national interest to support OPEC. issue. This is all the more evident from the proposed meeting at the end of November 2016 between Exports Russian minister Novak with EU head to open up the Russia has been a major exporter of oil and natural Opal pipeline that connects Nord Stream pipeline with gas in the world. Oil and gas exports account for Europe bypassing Ukraine to supply gas to Europe. over 65- 70 pc of Russia’s total export revenue. Under Thus in reality European Union and Russia energy prevailing conditions of and economic ties are highly complex and sensitive. sanctions by the West on Russia, there have been considerable changes in the energy export market of During the last few years eastern countries Russia. Looking back, for Russia Europe had been particularly China and Japan have emerged as the major market for export of oil and natural gas. important markets. In fact during the last over a Among them , Netherlands, Poland, , decade Russia has adopted ‘Look East’ policy Hungary apart from Ukraine, Belarus were the main focusing on strengthening political and economic customers. As opined by Russian analysts during the relations with China. Apart from entering into 30 last decade there was mutual cooperation and economic agreements signed between the two reciprocity between Russia and Germany in the counties in 2006, Vladimir Putin expedited completion energy sector and hence some German firms were of long delayed pipeline to China by constructing a working as partners in the Joint ventures in some spur on Russia-Japan oil pipeline (East Siberia-Pacific Russian projects. The bilateral relations were close Pipeline). Thus China was able to get 30 million tons and in a major Siberian gas project while Gazprom of oil every year. Moreover, Russian firms Rosneft, had 51.5 pc share, German firm BASF had 24 pc Gazprom signed deals with Chinese Oil Company share and E.On 24.5 pc share. Germany not only (CNPC) for a joint venture to construct pipeline reiterated strategic partnership with Russia but also costing $ 10 billion to supply annually 80 billion cubic wide ranging economic ties. Therefore, it was a meters of natural gas to China. In 2015, Sakhalin LNG matter of shrewd diplomacy that Vladimir Putin exported slightly more than 500 Bcf of gas, which appointed the former of Germany Gerhard went to Japan 72 pc, South Korea 24 pc, Taiwan 2 Schroeder as the CEO of the North European Gas pc and China 2 pc. In fact Russia’s Energy Minister Pipeline (NEPG) in 2006 which was connecting Russia Viktor Khristenko stated in 2010 that the country has with Germany bypassing Ukraine and Poland to worked out a long term plan for development of East ensure energy supply to Germany and other European Siberian and Far Eastern gas resources, which is countries. expected to produce about 150 billion cubic meters of gas by 2030 to cater to Asia-Pacific markets in Since 2014 Russia’s export of oil and natural addition to China and Japan. gas to the West has declined sharply due to sanctions by the USA and West European countries for alleged Russia has liberalized policy of exports to annexation of Crimea. Moreover, the sanctions limited become a major player in the very fast-growing LNG Russian firms’ access to U.S. capital markets, business, having as many as six big new projects that specifically targeting four Russian energy companies: could expand production 6-fold to 60 mtpa by 2020, Novatek, Rosneft, Gazprom Neft, and Transneft. 25 pc of the current market. In 2013, Russia modified Additionally, sanctions prohibited the export to Russia its Law on Gas Exports to allow Novatek and Rosneft

Russia in Global Energy Scenario 25 to export LNG, breaking Gazprom’s monopoly on all been adding major new pipelines to accommodate gas exports. There are a number of proposals in new sources of supply, including fields in Yamal and various stages of planning for new LNG terminals in Eastern Siberia, and new export routes, including Russia, including a second LNG liquefaction facility exports to China and new pipelines to Europe that is under construction. Yamal LNG, which began bypassing Ukraine. It needs to be mentioned that construction in 2013, is owned by a consortium, led Russia has been at a disadvantage to export to the by Novatek with a 50.1 pc interest. Total and CNPC west as it had been dependent upon pipelines passing each have 20 pc interest, and the Silk Road Fund (an through Ukraine and Baltic States and has been trying investment fund established by the Chinese to evolve pipelines bypassing Ukraine and the Baltic government) holds the remaining 9.9 pc interest in States. In fact even prior to the current conflict with the project. The first of three liquefaction trains is Ukraine, there were problems between Russia and scheduled to be online in 2017. The three trains will Ukraine on issues relating to charges for pipeline to each have a capacity of 5.5 mt of LNG per year, and be paid by Russia and allegation of pilferage of oil by they will draw gas from the South Tambeyskoye Ukraine. natural gas and condensate field located in the northeast of the Yamal Peninsula. While Russia has for its own national geopolitical and geo-economic interest in retaining Pipeline Policy and Diplomacy control by the state over the network of pipelines, for Pipelines for transporting oil and natural gas from energy rich Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan also energy Russia to global markets have assumed geopolitical export has become a major source of income to earn and geo-economic significance. While during the petrodollars as for Russia. Hence they are interested Soviet era, pipelines were owned and managed by not to depend upon Russia for energy exports and the state, Russia has continued this policy to retain keen for alternative pipelines. Equally important is control and influence over this infrastructure not only that the Western powers have supported ‘Multiple in Russia but in neighboring countries to reach out to Pipeline Policy’ not only to have access to energy domestic consumption and exports. For exporting oil resources of Central Asia and Azerbaijan but also to in all there are 11 pipelines out of which 10 are in bypass Russia. Hence there is investment by some operation and one more is under construction. western countries and even China in investment for Russia’s domestic and export pipeline network is developing new pipelines. As opined by some Western nearly completely owned and run by the state-owned analysts there is resistance to Russia’s policy, which Transneft. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) is using energy as an instrument to exert political is an exception which is owned by a consortium of pressure on smaller countries to for its own objectives. companies. Even in this pipeline, the Russian Hence pipeline issue has assumed international government has 24 pc share of represented by significance. Transneft. KazMunaiGaz which is the state-owned oil and natural gas company of Kazakhstan has 19 Gazprom pc share. The Chevron Consortium Company has Gazprom plays an important role in Russia’s energy 15 pc share. Similarly, another exception is the sector since it holds the world’s largest natural gas TransSakhalin pipeline, owned by the Sakhalin-2 reserves. This is evident from the fact that Gazprom consortium, in eastern Russia. enjoys 17 pc of global reserves of natural gas and 72 pc of Russian domestic reserves. As of 31st Russia is a major exporter of natural gas to a December 2014, Gazprom Group’s A+B+C1 reserves large number of countries and has network of eight reached 36 trillion cubic meters of gas and 3.3 billion pipelines linking Russia with European countries in tons of oil and condensate. It is appreciable that the West and four pipelines on the East linking mainly Gazprom has worked out a roadmap for further China. In 2015 Russia’s natural gas transportation expansion. Thus in order to replenish its resource system included about 100,000 miles of high-pressure base, Gazprom Group has been carrying out geological pipelines and more than 20 underground natural gas exploration both in Russia and abroad. storage facilities. Since the late 2000s, Gazprom has

26 World Focus January 2017 It is important to note that to enhance its geo- For instance, if it is declared as sea then under the economic power Gazprom, with close linkages with Law of the Sea, each country will have equal share the Kremlin bosses, continuously monitors new of 20 pc. As opined by analysts, Iran has reason to projects and assets eligible for purchase. Hence the be uncomfortable since at present it gets only 13 pc. state-run Gazprom dominates Russia’s upstream Apart from that technically none of the countries natural gas sector, producing almost 70 pc of Russia’s should be developing oil and gas fields until all five total natural gas output at present. It needs to be states agree on the legal status of the Caspian. But in mentioned that Novatek, Rosneft , LukOil are other reality all have interest in exploring and exporting oil firms producing and exporting natural gas. to earn hard currency. Moreover, there are also some Hydrocarbon development on the Russian continental joint ventures. For instance, as part of the Russian- shelf is a part of Gazprom’s strategic interest and Kazakh agreements for the division of their mutual activities. Hence the Company has worked out a boundaries, both countries have cooperated and long term plan for hydrocarbon resource development continue to cooperate on a number of joint ventures on the shelf of the Russian Federation until 2030. to exploit deposits that are on the Caspian offshore. During the last 20 years the Caspian littoral states It is important to note that complying with have been holding meetings from time to time the existing contract obligations, the Gazprom Group including the latest one held on 23rd and 24th October continues to implement its ongoing projects in many 2016 to solve the problems of sharing the Sea. Yet countries in the world such as Vietnam, India, Libya, there is no acceptable solution. As per available Algeria and also in the Central Asian countries namely information the issue of sharing of sea has been Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan which are its worked out by Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan in southern underbelly. According to some analysts their adjoining areas. Thus about 70 percent of the Gazprom invested about 5.4 billion Rubles in 2014 Caspian has already been divided leaving about 30 for geological exploration projects. Gazprom has 38 pc, which is in the area of Iran, Azerbaijan, and projects jointly with its associated companies for Turkmenistan. exploration and production activities. This will benefit both Gazprom and the countries concerned. In a few There is a major issue concerning the politics countries Gazprom Group has succeeded in of pipeline for exporting oil from the Caspian Sea to implementing projects in production stage. Mention the rest of the world. During the Soviet era, Caspian may be made of the Wingate project on the North Pipeline Consortium (CPC) connected western oil Sea shelf, the Shakhpakhty field in Uzbekistan, and fields of Kazakhstan with the Russian port of the Junin-6 project in Venezuela, which is implemented Novorussik on the Black Sea. After the Soviet in cooperation with Rosneft. Together with breakup, the USA and European countries started a Wintershall, Gazprom produces oil and gas in Libya Great Game by their entry in newly sovereign and as part of the C96 and C97 oil concessions. In the independent states in Russia’s underbelly with two- second half of 2014, Gazprom Group started fold objectives namely to meet their energy needs producing hydrocarbons from the Badra field in Iraq. and laying pipelines to meet energy needs bypassing Russia. Thus Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) linking Caspian Sea Azerbaijan with has assumed great The Caspian Sea contains some of the largest significance during the last over a decade. BTC has reserves of oil and natural gas in the world. It is unique assumed significance being part of the European since this is the only energy rich region which Russia Union’s Southern Corridor strategy to diversify its has been sharing with four other Caspian Sea states gas import markets and more importantly bypassing namely Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan and Russia. With success of this pipeline, the Western Kazakhstan. The Caspian Sea faces three problems countries have been active in the pipeline issue and namely, legal status, sharing of the Sea and politics of have proposed to construct ‘Trans-Caspian Sea pipeline for exports. The fact that the legal status of Pipeline connecting Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan the Caspian – sea or lake- remains unresolved during to Baku in Azerbaijan bypassing Russia and Iran. As the last two hand half decades has major implications. expected both Russia and Iran have been opposing

Russia in Global Energy Scenario 27 this project, under the pretext of environmental Caspian ‘a Sea of Friendship and Peace’. According concerns. Moreover, to justify its stand Russian to this Declaration which comes with clear experts even contended in 2006 that undersea pipeline formulations on the delimitation of the seabed, every posed risk such as seismic tremors in the Caspian country will have exclusive sovereign rights to a 15- Sea region to which Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan did mile area. not agree. As opined by Bruce Panner, export of energy resources from the Caspian Basin to world Caspian region has considerable relevance markets requires cooperation. But each of five for India in the long run for two reasons. There is a countries hoping to export oil and gas for its own strong possibility that Caspian Sea will be linked to benefit, it is not surprising that agreement is often India from Turkmenistan through the proposed TAPI difficult to reach. Thus politics of Caspian energy pipeline being supported and developed by the Asian exports is complicated and there is a good deal of Development Bank. The objective is to transport politics and hypocrisy involved as stated by some natural gas from the Caspian Sea from Turkmenistan analysts. It important to note that some time back through Afghanistan, Pakistan and then to India. As landlocked states of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and reported by Wikipedia, the construction on the project Azerbaijan tried to increase security over their oil started in Turkmenistan on 13th December 2015. The and gas fields by seeking support of some western pipeline is expected to be operational by 2019. But countries. Not supporting this policy initiative and with tense political situation prevailing in Afghanistan against involvement of ‘Third Party Military Forces’ and Pakistan, the project though ambitious seems to in the region, Russia beefed up its military presence be less realistic to be operational in the near future. in the Caspian region. Secondly, there is scope for North-South Corridor Table 1 linking the Caspian Sea from Iran in the North to Countries With The Largest Proven Oil Reserves Indian Ocean in the South. India should be able to Rank Country Barrels (bbl) meet its energy needs not only from Iran but also 1 Venezuela 298,400,000,000 from other Caspian Sea States including Russia. With 2 Saudi Arabia 268,300,000,000 close and cordial relations with all these states, India 3 Canada 171,000,000,000 should put efforts through political and economic ties 4 Iran 157,800,000,000 to ensure that this becomes a reality. Russia can play 5 Iraq 144,200,000,000 a critical role in making this project a success since 6 Kuwait 104,000,000,000 Russia has already been making efforts to export oil 7 Russia 103,200,000,000 from Caspian Sea to West Europe linking with pipelines. Hence as opined by Luke Coffey, the director of the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at In conclusion it may be stated that Russia is the Heritage Foundation, Washington, the fact that one of major energy resource rich countries in the the status of the Caspian Sea and sharing of the Sea world. To overcome constraints in mobilizing remain unresolved has worked to the advantage of potentialities and sustain production, Russia has Russia. For instance, to serve its own national succeeded in developing resources in Arctic region. interest, Russia built the Blue Stream pipeline under Russian economy being over dependent upon energy the Black Sea to export oil to Turkey and Europe, exports to earn petrodollars, is hit by current oil price and according to some western analysts including decline. While major global oil giants have invested energy expert Robert Cutler from Canada, Russia in Russia’s energy sector, there is lack of consistency does not discuss environmental and ecological issues. by its leaders with regard to policies of privatization But the issue is raised when Caspian affairs are the resulting in trust deficit. Russia is playing pipeline subject of discussion. Thus the subject of extraction politics to retain its influence in the region. Not being and export of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea has member of OPEC, Russia has adopted policies to become more political and less technical. One positive suit its national interest. Being hit by sanctions by the development in the summit held in 2014 was the West, Russia has evolved ‘Look East’ policy to reach leaders of all the five states agreed to declare the export targets.

28 World Focus January 2017 Russian Military: From Slump to Resurgence Prof. P. L. Dash

Introduction ters were bewildered and the generals were utterly Few countries in the world have the tradition of main- indecisive because the Soviet disintegration had landed taining and sustaining a mighty military. Since the time all of them together and each of them separately in of Peter the Great, Russia has an established mili- an incredible limbo they had never imagined. For the tary tradition of a great power. With the tide of time first time since the reign of Peter the Great, Russia it has fought many wars; won some and lost others, shrank in territory. Its Naval might became no force but the tradition is transcendental and continues to to reckon with. When fifteen countries came into inspire young Russians in the ethos of their military existence without their defence ministries, for a while generals. The war with Napoleon in 1812, the it was not known what was happening. Boris Yeltsin’s of the early 1850s, the Russo- Japa- pleas for keeping the defence, foreign policy and single nese war of 1905, the First World War of 1914-1918 currency for the CIS fell on deaf ears. All constitu- and the Second World War of 1939-1945 are few of ent republics of the former Soviet Union, including them. Beyond the Second World War, Russia pos- the Russian Federation, did not have their defence sessed too the glory and glamour of a military super ministry. What they all had was the Soviet Defence power whose status was struck down to nothingness Ministry and began sharing the resources of that min- by Soviet sunset. Without any visible signs of a pre- istry by possessing whatever military facilities of the cipitous decline, leading to collapse of a great power, army, air force and Navy were located on the terri- when the Soviet Union fell apart in December 1991 tory of each republic across the country. While all with the weight of its own internal contradictions, republics created their Defence Ministry, the Soviet Ronald Reagan’s ‘evil empire’ suffered setbacks of bequeathal facilities remained their inceptive acqui- its own follies. Gorbachev’s Perestroika and Glasnost sition. All military bases from Karshi Khanabad in proved ineffective in salvaging the Soviet system. Uzbekistan to Manas in Kyrgyzstan to Kurgan Tyube Dissentions and divisions wrecked the Russian rul- in Tajikistan were inherited military facilities of So- ing elite all of whom were communists, the product viet yesteryears. And when leased out to the Ameri- of the same CPSU, which they funded, nurtured, cans, they created new regional security frictions for endeared and now eschewed. However, cataclys- Russia. Newly independent countries were pitted mic events of the last decade of past century re- between Russia and the US for the latter’s strategic mained forever etched in Russian memory. The worst gains with China peeping in-between to preserve its sufferer was the – the leviathan of the own national interests in its backyard. superpower – that perished without a murmur. For the first time in world map so many independent coun- The Soviet Navy had shrunk incredibly. A tries had appeared without any war, albeit not en- single instance of the Black Sea fleet could elucidate tirely peacefully, due to pervasive ethno-national bick- the deleterious impact of disintegration. The fleet ering all over the dilapidated Soviet Union. Soviet suddenly landed to be with Ukraine instead of Russia Union passed into history. Russia, the biggest and because its headquarters was located in Ukraine. The the most powerful republic among the fifteen, be- unified command system broke down. The fleet main- came its successor, but what happened to the army? tained two mighty flotillas – the Mediterranean and the Caspian flotilla- that lay shattered and did not know Splintering Effect whom to report. Port facilities were also in disarray Chaos continued to visit all three major branches of with Poti going to Georgia, Novorossisk remaining the Russian army. This was for the first time in So- with Russian Federation and Oddesa belonging to viet years, the army was nonplused, the political mas- Ukraine. As Russia, Ukraine and Georgia continued

Russian Military: From Slump to Resurgence 29 to squabble over the Black Sea fleet, the fleet itself posal to assuage the gravity of the situation that was mal-administered and mismanaged. Although plagued the army for almost a decade. Russia maintained some operational forces in all ports, the never ending war of how to split the fleet led to a The Slump piquant situation Russian military had never witnessed The glamour and glory of the Soviet army evapo- earlier. Precisely, Russia remained maimed because rated; the Russian army was bereft of the super- the Black Sea fleet went to Ukraine, the Baltic Fleet power status. It struggled to barely survive through went to chaos between three Baltic countries, the the Yeltsin years. The Russian military industrial com- Northern Fleet largely remained in the Perma-froze plex was plagued by political indecision, bureaucratic Artic zone. It sprang to prominence in news head- lethargy, lack of funds, widespread corruption, inad- lines when Russia planted a flag under the sea to equate research and innovation and loss of export claim its right to northern polar territories that has led opportunities. Despite all efforts by the Russian lead- to squabbles among all those five countries, who bor- ership, it was well nigh impossible to arrest the slump der the North Pole along with Russia. Thus the arc in defence production. Alone in 1992, a year after of chaos was evident along the fringes of Russia from Soviet collapse, procurement by the Russian Defence the North Pole via the Baltic and Black Seas through Ministry from Military industry was cut by 70 per- Caucasus to Central Asia. The Russian military had cent. And in 1993 a Moscow based economic agency to confront this disarray. The only viable fleet that Novecon estimated that defence production fell by remained active with Russia was the Pacific Fleet 33.4 percent.1 headquartered in Vladivostok in the northeastern flank of Russia. During this time, MiGs were lying unclaimed in the factory because delivery schedule was shat- On the human front the splintering union cast tered. The factories went bust, employees did not a catastrophic shadow. It shattered families of mili- get their salary, wage arrears piled up and workers’ tary men that lay helter-skelter and led to an unprec- despondence was at its peak. By the fall of 1995, edented displacement hardly seen anywhere in Ministry of Defence’s debt to the MiG producing peacetime history. A Kyrgyz or Uzbek serving in Nizhnyi Novgorod factories peaked at 42 billion Vladivostok, whose families were living on native soil Rubles. 400 defence enterprises stopped production lost legality to existence because their nationalities altogether and another 1500 plants were working part and countries were different. Similarly soldiers and time. The situation with other weapons producing officers from the Baltic area who served in units was no better. Russia’s military industrial com- Vladivostok yearned to go back to join their families plex had passed through as much difficulties as did in their eponymous countries. A marine from Geor- civilian enterprises across the country in the wee gia or a pilot from Azerbaijan serving the Soviet army years of independence. However, the only difference found himself equally unwanted in the place of his was that industrial enterprises in the civil sector were work simply because the territory he was living be- privatized; in the military sector they remained yet came a foreign country. Meanwhile the newly inde- nationalized. But the government had no wherewithal pendent countries appealed to the army men of their to pay adequate attention to their falling impasse. nationalities to return to their home country to raise the defence system. The nemesis was widespread Unable to arrest the slump in military pro- and its impact incredibly harrowing. All through the duction, the Kremlin authorities time and again laid Yeltsin years as Russia continued to grapple with a emphasis on having a small, effective and modern difficult transition process the army suffered the most. army equipped with all modern amenities and tech- It had to share space with those who returned from nology. For that to achieve, technological innovation Eastern Europe, Angola, Ethiopia, Cuba and else- in the arms industry was as much essential as to where. And space was unavailable. Soldiers lived in downsize the cadre component in army, navy and the barracks in winter or in heavily crowded dormitories. air force. Force cut was essential at a time when They also did not get their salary. The authorities had sprawling Russia was busy in military engagements no physical and financial wherewithal at their dis- in the Pre-Dnestr, Caucasus, Central Asia, and be-

30 World Focus January 2017 yond. The inefficiency of the Soviet army was evi- Gasprom to the Defence dent in the war adventure in Afghanistan with no less Few countries in the world have the distinction of than 15000 Soviet soldiers losing their lives and thou- possessing gas pipeline three and half times the length sands of them being maimed for life. There was no of the equator, but Russia has. With a total length of gain but only loss, not even any geopolitical gain as gas pipelines running to about 156 000 kilometers, imagined in the context of 1979, when one fine De- and yet increasing with passage of every year, cember evening Soviet soldiers had just crossed the Gasprom’s gas distribution network is really stunning. Tajik and Uzbek borders with Afghanistan and moved Finland 100 percent, Austria 75 percent and Germany into that country allegedly on the friendly request of 45 percent are dependent on gas from Russia. De- Afghan government - a reason which was not be- spite all American efforts George Shultz put in the lieved by anyone. Afghanistan never became a geo- early 1970s to scuttle a proposed gas pipeline from political anchor for the Soviet Union neither in West Russia to Germany, it was Willy Brandt, who ensured Asia; nor in South Asia. In turn, the Afghan war ad- that gas from Russia must flow to Europe. He pre- venture meted out a body blow to the Soviet army vailed upon America and provided the Soviet Union from which it never regained its lost glory. The de- with pipes of bigger diameter so that the Siberian gas cline in Russian military pride following withdrawal pipeline would connect Europe to Baikal and beyond. from Afghanistan after a decade continued with The Brezhnev-Brandt dreams materialized when at physical military withdrawal from East Europe and 13.15 hours on 1 October, 1973 Soviet gas from disbandment of the Warsaw pact as a counterweight Gasprom flowed to Europe for the first time. to NATO. Despite a mutual Bush-Gorbachev agree- ment in 1988 for simultaneous dissolution both mili- Much water has flowed under the bridge tary blocks, NATO remained to expand eastward, since then. Russia has replaced the Soviet Union, but causing concerns and consternation in Russia in the it continues to hold the key of gas supply to Europe. 1990s. The Russian military prowess suddenly stood Gasprom is one of the most feared institutions in declined, slimmed and denigrated despite the country Russia. Due to its economic strength it has been able spending 15-17 percent on an average on the military to spread its wings to such fields as football clubs, every year since 1992 and planning to spend 19 tril- newsprint business, insurance companies, pension lion Rubles in the upcoming till 2020.2 The following funds, banking business, television broadcast and avia- table shows in a nutshell how the Russian army had tion companies.3 The intricate Gasprom network and slimmed down in the two decades following Soviet its influence on the society are too intricate to fathom. breakup. Has anyone ever thought why the Soviet Union disintegrated, but Gasprom did not? Why all state Russian Army: Slimdown of Two Decades owned properties were privatized, while Gasprom 1991 2011 remained under state control? What was behind this Total Strength 3.7 million 1.1 million mystery? When the whole country passed through Tanks 63,900 13,000 the chaos of transition, Gasprom continued as usual, Fighter jet 3800 2500 churning profit for the state and virtually sustaining Military Bases 1200 350 the state with that profit. When the country’s 87 Fighting machines percent of the GDP came for sale of oil, gas and Fitted with guns 76,500 15,000 metals in post-Soviet Russia, it is commonsense to Marine fleet 4 1 gauze what role Gasprom played in the crucial years Subs fitted with of Russia’s transition from Soviet to Post-Soviet Rockets 62 9 system.4 Gasprom continues to serve the Russian Tanks with 1000mm cause in a sense that it is the biggest defence Russia Guns 13,800 12,000 has against any enemy and its profits continues to oil Warship 110 12 all other Russian industries, including the military industrial complex. Source: Argumenti I Fakty, No.2, (1627), January 2012, p.5.

Russian Military: From Slump to Resurgence 31 Past and Present discussions and media reports were regularly In the aftermath of the Soviet disunion, popular appearing in the Russian press about “Status-6” for newspaper ‘Komsomolskaya Pravda’ published a over a year, its launch was a significant milestone in cartoon on the predicament of the then Soviet Army. resurgent Russia’s military might. It is undoubtedly a It was in Uzbekistan, the soldiers were dinning and brand new asymmetrical response deployed by Russia chatting about the multi-national character of their in answer to the US global missile defense system. army. Caption written below the cartoon said: “the For the first time the creation and successful launch Army is Soviet, the land is Uzbek and the language is of a giant nuclear torpedo put Russia in the frontline Russian.” Across the post-Soviet space this was the of weapons manufacturers worldwide. Status-6 can situation that the cartoon depicted. A quarter century cause irreparable damages to the enemy by creating later one finds substantial changes in the composition an extensive zone of radioactive contamination, by and character of the Russian Army. As the Russian rendering human life unfit to live in for its explosion military struggled to overcome the post-Soviet chaos ensures the destruction of all living things. The and the country’s political leaders avowedly stood by negative side of Status-6 is deleterious for the their military leaders, Russia has come up a big way. biosphere. However, such a bomb and torpedo, It has once again emerged from the shadow of gigantic as its means of delivery, can be used as a disarray, started manufacturing world class fighter weapon of deterrence - with standing on alert system, jets and subs, began selling weapons systems in world which guarantees to render ineffective the application market in competitions with others and proved that of all other power of retaliation. This is the most Russia has an indomitable military history and the recent achievement of the Russian military. Russians are capable of holding onto it, come whatever. The result of the past 25 years of Russia’s As the menace of ISIS rapidly grew in recent military resurgence has been significantly awe years, Russia has engaged the ISIS forces with fierce inspiring in many ways. battle to decimate them on the ground in Syria. Primarily, it has used airpower to strike at the base of Two factors that have created jitters in the ISIS, where Tupolev Tu-160 Blackjack and Tu-95MS US in recent days were the launch of Status -6: a bombers have played a prominent role although huge thermonuclear warhead torpedo with terrifying majority of the attacks on ISIS was conducted by the firepower. The second is successively menacing supersonic Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers. A squadron posturing of the Russian Federation in Syria in its of Tu-22M3 long-range bombers made airstrikes fight against the ISIS in favor of the existing Asad against 6 ISIS facilities in the provinces of Raqqah regime. The second factor is well known since 2011, and Deir-ez-Zor and destroyed depots with weapons when the civil war in Syria began; but the first is little and ammunition, mass concentrations of military known. When the nuclear torpedo was launched on hardware, training camps and workshops producing 27 November 2016 from aboard the B-90 Sarov explosives. These bombings have broken the special purposes submarine, the Pentagon confirmed backbone of the ISIS. Sustained bombings have it as a “very bad news”. It is indeed bad news in a ensured the imminent fall of Aleppo and the rebels sense that Russia has finally proven to have ended face collapse of their last urban bastion. On 28 its agonizing phase of military doldrums and resurged November, pro-government forces backed by Russian as a power to be reckoned with. It has a torpedo bombers finally punched through rebel lines in Aleppo now with a nuclear power plant, which is capable of and ensured that fall of the city looks almost certain.5 moving at a speed of 90 knots at a depth of up to a kilometer. Status-6 has a range of 10 thousand Resurgence kilometers. Given the 6.5 meters size of the warhead, Major financial allocation began to flow for the Americans feel, it may have a thermonuclear restructuring the Russian army under Vladimir Putin. charge capacity of 100 megatons. And exploding it Unlike his predecessor and mentor Yeltsin, Putin anywhere close to the US coast, it will cause a giant quickly understood the importance of the Russian tsunami that wipes out coastal states with naval bases, army, its hugeness in terms of space and the time airfields and military factories facilities.Although required to rebuild a fallen morale and ruptured ego.

32 World Focus January 2017 As commander-in chief of the Russian armed forces, Kurile islands. Russia and Japan have been locking he underscored the significance of its revival, horns over four disputed islands – Habomai, particularly after the Kursk submarine tragedy that Itorofu,Shikotan and Kunashiri – over which Russia buried Russian marines in watery grave in the Barents had regained control after end of the Second World Sea and Putin watched helpless. His resurgence plan War. Japan had occupied these islands since its victory had four components: downsizing the leviathan to an in Russo-Japanese war of 1905. In the welter of time, effective force, modernizing the military’s a series of events preceding a century, the Kurile technological prowess, boosting the falling morale of chain of islands has alternated possession between the soldiers in all rungs of the military from soldiers Russia and Japan. Currently under the Russian to Generals and from marines to Admirals and revive possession, the chain of islands, lying between the the social prestige of the armed forces. There were southern tip of Russia’s Kamchatka Peninsula and widespread dodging of the conscripts since the Afghan northern tip of Japan’s Hokkaido, is a protective war and it was necessary to arrest the trend. Parents security barrier in accessing the Sea of Okhotsk from were unwilling to send their children to the war front the Pacific Ocean. The divide lay open: Russia’s in and the Chechen war continued to take political and military leaders do not wish to eschew its toll in various guises that Russia could not chase control over the Kurile and their Japanese until Putin succeeded in ensuring relative peace counterparts insist on getting the island back; the through a Kremlin orchestrated election that put the stalemate continues. Three months after Medvedev’s king warrior of Chechnya, in power visit, in February, 2011, Russia announced to arm after assassination of his father, Ahmad Kadyrov. The these islands to bolster its security arrangement in Kadyrov-Kremlin combine has received brickbats the Far East – a clear indication of its resurgent from black widows, who have been randomly military status. bombing strategic transport hubs across the capital to drive home their demand for an independent Russia’s endeavour to assert its military Ichkeria that meets with outright rejection by Moscow. presence extends to the North Pole too. In June 2007, Chechnya and Georgia have made the security fabric Putin surprised the world by staking Russian claim to of the Caucasus fragile and the Russian military has the North Pole. The saga of this astonishing claim no easy escape route to disentangle itself from either. began thus. A group of Arctic expert, who spent 45 days in the polar zone, came out with evidences that Yet Russia’s action in Georgia in August 2008 the Lomonosov ridge has a direct underwater, demonstrated the might of a resurgent military, no continental shelf extension to the North Pole. As per more meek, no longer weak and powerful enough to UN maritime convention, the physical extension of impose Russia’s will on others along the erstwhile continental shelf would allow a country to stake claims prefectures on any exigency. A swift blitzkrieg of six to the Polar zone. The Russian claim created an days sobered Georgia from its euphemism of international furour with US Senator Richard Lugar becoming a NATO member to remain grounded to claiming that the US will be at the receiving end the reality of its own military potential. The Russian because it has not ratified the UN maritime convention army sent a clear message to an expanding NATO that has been pending since 1982. Other three polar that meddling on its backyard would cause bloodbath countries Canada, Norway and Denmark expressed and not peace. The message has had its positive anguish over the Russian claim. Before the Russian effects both on NATO and Tbilisi. claim came, all five countries had a 200 mile permissible economic zone from their coast toward If this is so with Caucasus, in the Far East, the pole, but none ever reached it. Medvedev’s visit to Kunashiri, one of the four Kurile islands, in the wee days of November 2010 elicited Undeterred by the criticism of throwing sharp reaction from Japan. This was first such visit territorial pretensions at its polar neighbours, Russian by a Russian president to the remote border areas in polar expert, Artur Chillingarov, went in a submarine, the Far East that accentuated a fresh flurry of descended down to 14000 feet below the seabed and debates on the already unsettled dispute over the put a titanium cast Russian tricolor firmly below the

Russian Military: From Slump to Resurgence 33 North Pole. This symbolized final Russian claim to country, talented people get all opportunities for self the vast territory many times larger than many small realization. For this purpose a thorough overhaul of European countries. This also symbolized Russia’s the Russian education system from primary to higher growing military prowess, its resurgence, ambition education level is under way and a lot of funds are and finite desire to treat the country in superlative allocated.”7 military parlance. The North Pole has 10 billion tons of oil and gas below the seabed and plenty of diamond. The second announcement concerned According to a New York Times report, the “US information availability and freedom of expression in Geological Survey has estimated that about 30 percent Russia. The president is acutely aware of the closed of the world’s untapped natural gas reserves(about Soviet system of yesteryears, when he grew up. 509 trillion cubic meter) and 13 percent (about 90 Information monopoly by the state and media muzzling billion barrels) of untapped oil reserves lie in the are quickly dissipating, thanks to digital television and Arctic.”6 Russia became cynosure of all eyes, when proliferation of internet that would be accessible to all these underwater wealth supposedly passed onto almost 90 percent of the Russian population. Wider it by a single valorous act. It earned Putin the glory accessibility of information in the hands of the common and the country its lost pride as a superpower. The Russians, Medvedev hoped, would help fight the act was symbolic of Russia’s resurgent military might biggest enemy of Russia- corruption. that sent a clear message worldwide that Russia would not always take things lying low. It can flex Medvedev’s third thesis relates to property muscle, if need be. From Georgia to Kurile to North rights in Russia. The president exhorts that Russian Pole Russia has demonstrated its stern presence in property laws are modern, but inadequate to address recent years and desires to be felt important all related issues; hence the urgency for a recast of everywhere. these laws. The fourth point Medvedev touched upon was his most favoured refrain about technological Ten Commandments innovations. Medvedev feels that Russia must be a On a visit to the US silicon valley on his way to the leader of technological innovation thanks to which G-8 summit in Canada in the last week of June, 2010 Russia can create plenty of jobs for people in the the Russian president Dmitri Medvedev personally scientific and service sectors. Fifthly, Russia requires saw how in California’s working ethos constituted a a strong financial system that would provide resources melting pot that has assimilated workers and IT for modernization of the country. Given the country’s professionals from all over the world. It was very strong base of natural and mineral resources, it has much unlike Russia that has not so far migration savvy huge possibilities of FDI to develop and there will be laws for foreigners settling in for work. Medvedev no dearth of money. was too candid to admit his country’s frailties by saying: there is a need to learn, learn how science Sixthly, Medvedev draws attention to the and success go in consonance. There is nothing to health of the Russian population, increase birth and get embarrassed.” However, Russia is not the US. decrease death rates. For years since the Soviet Union Russian Ivan is not the US Sam. Both countries stand broke apart, Russia was treating death as a way of diametrically opposed to each other. Yet it is from life and losing out a million people every year. Thanks here came the Russian president’s wish list to emulate to the many efforts undertaken by Putin, this sinister a model for his dream city of innovation at Slokovo in tendency has been arrested and it is only in 2009 that the micro-borough of Moscow. Russia registered an incline in the rate of new born numbers in many past years. Hopefully greater The president’s ten commandments for attention to demography will help the nation stabilize Russia’s progress and prosperity came from this far its population decline. off California apparently because he was highly impressed by the US achievement. Medvedev’s Seventhly, the president dwelt on Russian pronouncements put enough emphasis on education. democracy and frankly admitted that “Russia is not The very first point states: “we wish that in our insured for political mistakes, but will work in the

34 World Focus January 2017 direction of bettering its political system without any The fourth requirement for this innovation prescriptions from abroad.”8 city garden is careful gardeners and consumers, who buy the products on the basis of their quality rather The president highlighted the need for stability than bribes. A garden is to be crossbred to have good in the country. The past two decades were fairly and healthy trees to bear good fruits and Medvedev’s mindboggling. The transformations were incredible. innovation city will crossbreed plenty of such plants This was a period of flux and the country has slowly in the dream garden. Finally and sixthly, it requires come out of it. The citizens sincerely wish to maintain bright sunshine- a fundamental requirement for any stability because stability is fundamental to progress garden to grow and greater transparency in managing and development. Drawing attention to the unstable this garden. situation in the Caucasus, Medvedev called upon all those present in his Stanford University lecture to A critical look at Medvedev’s innovation city work with Russia to ensure stability. project at Skolkovo underscores high government patronage, tax holidays for interested entrepreneurs The Ninth and tenth points of the president’s and investors, competitive environment for all to trade, concerns were on Russian foreign policy, the to produce, to sell, to generate profit- and all this in unchanged and predictable course it would take in an environment free of red tape. How and when future. He assured that Russia would be partner to Russia will achieve this is unknown. Shrouded in all who are interested to work with it in joint ventures mystery because of many inherent societal, political and projects, invest in Russia and trade with it. Russia and security lacunae that any good idea is fraught will be a partner in all major international events and with, Medvedev’s brainchild is a commendable flicker play its role for stability and success of the country. of idea, which would supplement the Russian military His ten commandments are sincerely about human in many ways. In order to provide a sustainable security of the Russians, ensuring which the configuration, both Putin and Medvedev have done conventional security system would be much homework together to streamline the course and healthier. process of its functioning and provide it a lasting lease of life and interconnectivity from the civil society to Six More Points the military. On high spirit with his innovation city project in mind, emulating whatever good he saw in the US, the Endnotes Russian president received support of the Californian 1 Alexander A.Sergounin and Sergey V.Subbotin, governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger, who backed him Indo-Russian Military Cooperation: Russian on his mission. Journalists in Russia critically treated Perspective, Asian Profile, Vol.24, No.1, February, Medvedev’s brainchild - Skolkovo. The innovation 1996,p.24. city project is compared to a garden to be carefully 2 Argumenti I Fakty, No.2, (1627) January 2012, p.5. tended, watered, looked after and allowed to grow. 3 Valerii Panyushkin, Mikhail Zygar, Irina Rejnik, All ingredients required for raising a garden are Gasprom: The New Russian Weapons, Zakharov elements of growth for this mega project of the Publishers, Moscow, 2007, pp.6-7. president. Firstly, the president promised that there 4 Ibid.,p.12. should not be any killer weed in this new garden. 5 Syria: Aleppo Falls Apart, The Economist, Decem “Entrepreneurs must be free from blackmail, ber, 3, 2016,p. 39. expropriations and other shakedowns.”9 Secondly the 6 Asia Pacific Defence Forum, Vol.35, Issue 3, 2010, garden requires healthy seeds. This refers to attracting p.16. most intellectually oriented entrepreneurs with 7Vladimir Kuzmin, Here and Just Now, Russiskaya excellent ideas of innovation. The third requirement Gazeta, 25 June, 2010, p.2. for this garden is nutrient in the soil. This has to have 8 Ibid. fecund ground. The place must bring together good 9 Esther Dyson, Growing a Silicon Garden, The managers, businessmen, marketing and sale talents. Moscow Times, June 24, 2010, p.8.

Russian Military: From Slump to Resurgence 35 Georgia-Russia Military Conflict: The Experience of Multilevel Psychological Warfare Prof. Evgeny Pashentsev

Local armed conflicts that face the special focus is on the involvement of senior collision of interests of great powers usually lead officials in psychological warfare, the role of the to serious geopolitical consequences. In this case, mass media in the conflict, methods of influencing the coverage of the events in mass media goes the public consciousness (information channels far beyond the countries directly involved in the blocking, misinformation, counterpropaganda, conflict. The public assessment of the situation the use of psychological effects of cyberattacks, without doubt becomes a field of acute the management of the foe’s decision-making psychological warfare. The Georgia-Russia process, etc.). military conflict of 2008 was no exception in this respect. In spite of its short duration and the Introduction relatively small number of victims, it became the The Georgia-Russia conflict, but not its geopolitical focus of international attention and was consequences, has become a subject of history. It is accompanied by a high level of confrontation in critical to understand the mechanism of the global the information environment. The conflict was, and long-term impact of the small-scale and short- firstly, a phase of sharp aggravation of the term military conflict in August 2008 on the public Georgia-South Ossetia conflict within Georgia, conscience under the conditions of the increasing secondly, the direct interstate military conflict politico-social and economic instability in the world between Georgia and Russia, and thirdly, an and severe crisis in international relations in indirect conflict of interests between Russia and connection with the events in Ukraine. the U.S. and their NATO and the EU allies (only slightly related to the events in Georgia). This That was essentially a four-sided conflict: multilevel nature of the conflict involves the Georgia backed by the USA with South Ossetia imbalance of economic and military-political backed by Russia. Only because of the limitations of potentials of Tbilisi on the one hand, and the this paper volume, it is not considered the role of the opposition to the central authorities in South EU, as well as China, Israel and some other states Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other hand. It is (or non-state actors on that moment like Abkhazia) necessary to take into account the asymmetry of in Georgia-Russia military conflict. the potentials of Russia and Georgia, Russia and NATO, the EU (the latter one is only partially A one-sided presentation of the conflict in offset by the support of Russia on behalf of China 2008 by the mainstream Western media (that, we will and several other countries). The existence of the try to show it on the corresponding examples later) above-mentioned asymmetry of potentials of direct was not accidental, taking into account not nearly a and indirect participants of the conflict naturally virtual participation of the USA on all levels in the raises the question about the difference in conflict, except for direct involvement of the armed objective opportunities of the parties in the field forces of this country into the military operations for of psychological warfare. This idea shaped the Georgia. The USA supported the regime of Mikhail author’s approaches to the solution to the research Saakashvili in the light of methods of coming to power, tasks, and the structure of the paper itself. The the ways and purposes of power retention and the paper analyses specific circumstances when false, activities results within the framework of the common but professionally fabricated information or dangerous strategy of NATO expansion to the East. factoids dominated and to a certain extent The last became the decisive factor of geopolitical controlled the public opinion in this conflict. A consequences of the conflict and its representation 36 World Focus January 2017 in the international mass media. Even in some last Key leaders engagement (KLE) in the PSYWAR researches of the US scholars one can see such The theory of psychological warfare teaches that some approach. As Ch. R. Eidman and G. S. Green major operators of effect-based actions in may be emphasis in their thesis: “This conflict also served as high-ranking officials and even heads of states. The a proxy for the ongoing friction between NATO and latest dealings were a direct confirmation of that rule. Russia with regard to NATO expansion into former Soviet satellite states…” (Eidman, Green, 2014, p. Georgia: Georgia (with the supporting global efforts 28). of the USA) has dominated the psychological playing However, the standpoint of Russia in the field from the beginning. The conduct by Mikhail conflict in 2008 should not be idealized, taking into Saakashvili was in full agreement with the Pentagon- account a significant property and social stratification developed concept of psychological warfare. There due to the criminal privatization in 1990-s, when Boris are however here certain specific features suggesting Yeltsin, ruling the country at that time, was expressly the development of even higher order effects. Mikhail supported by the USA. The Russian oligarchic groups Saakashvili kept saying in his statements during and also have their economic interests in Georgia and after the military conflict in South Ossetia that all of Trans Caucasus region in general. But taking into that is the work of Russia. Georgian leaders were consideration the fact, that the economic opportunities making collect calls to just about every influential of Russia are many times lower than those of the person on Wall Street, convincing them that Georgia USA, the closer integration of Russian economy into was the victim of Russian aggression even as the system of world economic relations, overseas asset Georgian rockets were fired at Tskhinvali. And that placing of Russian oligarchs, the steps taken by Russia was before Russia officially entered into the fray. before and in the course of the conflict can be Saakashvili then made himself available for round- regarded as responsive and limited, and in can’t the-clock CNN and BBC interviews. He repeated constitute a threat to the national security of the USA the same simple lines in near-perfect English, and at all. always flanked by an EU flag: “Russia is an aggressor. We are a small democratic country. Please help us.” There is a considerable part of research today, (Levine, 2008). touching upon the main reasons and course of the Georgia-Russia conflict, including the role of the mass South Ossetia: There was a relatively low presence media in it (Asmus, 2010; Barabanov, ed., 2009; of South Ossetian leaders in the media scene of Cohen, Hamilton, 2011; Cornell, Starr, 2009; Russia and almost absence in that of the West, while Niedemaier, 2009; Van Herpen, 2014etc.). Some of it was quite possible to evoke the natural compassion the papers, articles are dedicated to various aspects to the hard destinies of people of this self-styled state of information warfare including its psychological at the background of unjustified rough attitude of aspect (Deibert et al, 2012; Grinyaev, Voskresensky, Saakashvili to the South Ossetians. However, it worth 2008; Panfilov, 2011; Thomas, 2013; Tsyganok, 2011; noting that South Ossetia possesses scanty physical Zharov, Shevyakov, 2009 etc.). resources and finance (even with Russian support) and almost no specialists skilled in information and The article is based on comparative analysis psychological warfare in such extremely small country, of the psychological warfare during the conflict. CA even in comparison with four million people of Georgia. is grounded upon different sources of open information: among them documentary sources and Russia: The Russian government represented by the academic studies, often, reflecting opposite positions President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime-Minister during the 2008 events. A systematic approach to the Vladimir Putin clearly condemned the aggressive subject of research is intended to help to avoid actions of Georgia, but they were not active in unilateral estimates, to give the objective analysis of communication with the global mass media. This was some essential aspects of psychological warfare noticed by the specialists both in Russia and abroad. during the conflict. “You can’t fail to notice that Russian leaders are ignoring the opportunity to convey their point of view

Georgia-Russia Military Conflict: The Experience of Multilevel Psychological Warfare 37 to the world,” wrote the Moscow pundit, Aleksei thrown in for active broadcasting, including live Arbatov. “Saakashvili is really never off American coverage from hot spots. There was a professionally TV screens. I suspect that if [Russian president] conducted Georgian information action involving the Medvedev decided to talk to foreign journalists, they Russian pilots that ejected over Georgia, as well as would, of course, respond.” (Trainor, 2014) the Russian armored column assaulted by Georgia’s special forces units and the attempt of taking prisoner Perhaps Kremlin suggested there was no the Commander of the 58th Army, North Caucasus option to rely on the unbiased presentation of such Military District (U.S. Department of State, 2008, p. meeting, as the global media of the West were 16). influenced by the oligarchic system of control over the information flows. On the contrary, first, such Arguably, the Georgian side generally used system is not total, and secondly, it reflects too many efficiently its media resource, in close cooperation different approaches to the social problems deployed with the American side, assisting Georgia when by the oligarchic groups of influence, allowing necessary. promotion of the progressive and alternate point of view on matters of social value and interests “outside Mass media of South Ossetia and Abkhazia were the Western” oligarchic clans, by playing with their less developed and not the significant news supplier conflicts and discrepancies. for Russia, not to speak of the West. Some websites of South Ossetia in English language were created USA: The statesmen of the USA were quite active basically by the non-pros and didn’t posed a threat to in public assessment of the Georgia-Russia conflict. the general version of events speaking about The top officials from Washington qualified the aggressive Russia in the mainstream media. Russian activities as “aggression”. Soon after starting the conflict Vice-President Dick Cheney told M. Western mass media: Just in the very first days of Saakashvili that “Russian aggression must not go the conflict (at once after an obvious rapid failure of unanswered,” according to his press secretary. attack by the Georgian army on Tskhinvali) Briefing reporters traveling with President George mainstream Western mass-media, have accused Bush, Deputy National Security Adviser James F. Russia of aggression against Georgia. Oksan Jeffrey would not rule out the use of American force Bavulgen and Ekim Arbatlie investigated the links to assist Georgia but said that was not the current between media, public opinion and foreign policy. In focus of U.S. efforts (Abramovitz, Lynch, 2008). their content analysis of the coverage in two major US newspapers, they found that the framing of the On September 23, 2008, the President of the conflict was anti-Russia, especially in the initial stages USA, George Bush said in his speech during the 63rd of the conflict. Their survey results demonstrate that session of the General Assembly of UN:”The United an increase in the media exposure of US respondents Nations Charter sets forth the «equal rights of nations increased the likelihood of blaming Russia exclusively large and small». Russia’s invasion of Georgia was a in the conflict (Bavulgen, Arbatli, 2013, pp. 513 – violation of those words” (U.S. Department of State, 527). 2008). Many experts witness a lot of facts of media Role of mass media during the conflict presentation of the military conflict in South Ossetia Georgian media during the conflict: Since the first in «the necessary key». According to a co-editor of a hours of the conflict the office of the TV Company Moscow based tabloid Yasha Levin Exile “Georgia “Trialeti” in Gori city established a Media Center was putting the “CNN effect,” as the military types providing round-the-clock service to Georgian and like to call it, to extremely good use. The pro-Georgian overseas journalists. A number of Georgian electronic CNN effect was so strong, in fact, that CNN used media, particularly “Georgia Online”, the telecompany footage of Tskhinvali for a report on the destruction “Rustavi-2”, the Georgian information agency in the Georgian town of Gori (Levine, 2008). “Interpress News”, the Georgian radio “Imedi” were

38 World Focus January 2017 The world watched the conflict by the eyes mass media were waging “information war” against of Tbilisi. The explanation is simple – Russia had none Georgia. In this concern Georgia stopped broadcasting of the political and information toolkit, used by the all Russian TV channels in its territory since August USA and the states of the Western Europe. The USA (Levishenko, 2014). At the same time, “The Voice of had enough political influence to turn their own version America” was to double broadcasting in Georgia in of events into the dominating public opinion and, which connection with the Georgia-Russia conflict in South is more important, into the opinion of international Ossetia” (Grinyaev, Voskresensky, 2008, pp. 20 – 21). official organizations (Tsyganok, 2009). Russian party did not let the Western journalists to the conflict area, which can hardly be deemed to be Russian mass media: The daily press conferences a right decision. ‘I agree we lost the information war held by Colonel General Anatoliy Nogovitsin, Deputy in the first few days, but we have nothing to hide Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the here’, Russian Defence Ministry spokesman Andrei Russian Federation, were the main source of official Klyuchnikov told journalists. Klyuchnikov said the information on the course of the armed conflict. The APCs were to keep journalists safe from ongoing special correspondents of Russian TV companies Georgian sniper fire (De Carbonnel, 2008). November began working in Tskhinvali since August 3, 2008. 2015 in Syria about 50 journalists from 12 countries On the night of August 8, the crews of Channel 1, visited the Russian airbase Hmeymim in the TV channel “Russia”, NTV, REN TV, TV Centr, framework of a press tour in order to learn more Channel 5, television and radio broadcasting company about its work (Sputnik, 2015). Evident change in the “Mir”, Russia Today worked in the capital of South behavior of Russian Defense Ministry. Perhaps they Ossetia. The only international crew, working during follow George Bernard Shaw words: “Success does the “War of five days” in the city was that of Ukrainian not consist in never making mistakes but in never TV channel “Inter” (Levishenko, 2014). The teams making the same one a second time”. of TV channels were formed by experienced journalists and their concentration in Tskhinvali Misinformation: reflected the understanding of the big risks of Both parties used widely the misinformation capable aggression coming from M. Saakashvili regime very to disseminate the self-distrust. The publications of soon. It also worth noting that a number of influential both parties in open media were exact opposite. For media groups and news agencies in Russia showed example, the Georgian party used widely the their oppositional attitude to the government from the overestimated figures of losses, which is evidenced first days of conflict (despite of the USA (all the more by the losses of fighter jets. There were more than Georgia). Among those: www.gazeta.ru, 20 “shot down Russian jets” according to information www.lenta.ru, www.gzt.ru, www.newsru.com. The of Tbilisi media, but no supporting videos or news coverage of those agencies showed adherence documents were provided. During the rally of August to the Western pro-Georgian directivity. (Grinyaev, 14 Saakashvili said that 1200 Russian tanks had come Voskresensky, 2008, p. 20). to Georgia: “1200 Russian battle tanks it’s not a trifle!” That does not speak well for support of the Russian However they just couldn’t be so numerous. official position in conflict, of course, but evidences According to flank limits of Treaty on Conventional clearly the absence of totalitarian dictator regime in Forces in Europe, Leningrad and North Caucasian Russia, what was an important circumstance both military commands could have jointly not more than for the Russians and the whole world. But in general 1300. Russia didn’t place even such number of tanks the mainstream TV channels in Russia supported the there. This well synchronized “information official line in the conflict. aggression” met the goal, at least, for the people of Georgia. If only every fourth Georgian spoke in favor Some directions and methods of psychological of war by the beginning of 2007, then more than 80% warfare of Georgian population supported the force solution Cutting the information channels: of Georgian-Ossetian crisis by the President Alexander Lomaya, Secretary of the National Saakashvili by the beginning of such war (mid July Security Council of Georgia, stated that the Russian 2008), according to polls data. The Georgian media

Georgia-Russia Military Conflict: The Experience of Multilevel Psychological Warfare 39 convinced the people from day to day that their army bombardment of Tskhinvali, the most part of South was “tempered in battle with Iraq” had Ossetian websites experienced cyber attacks. Further “comprehensive and extended experience”, and the on the Russian media, particularly Russia Today President Saakashvili was a “brilliant military channel, broadcast in English language, were attacked commander” (Tsyganok, 2009). as well. The response by Russia cyber partisans served willingly to the needs of the state in propaganda Counterpropaganda: war against Georgia weren’t long in coming: websites As soon as Russia started sending reports that of the President Saakashvili, Georgian Parliament, Georgia’s shelling of Tshinkvali might have led to more Government and Ministry of foreign affairs were than 1,000 casualties started appearing, Georgia went hacked. The website of the President Saakashvili on the defensive. Their brutal drive to retake the city underwent the DDOS attacks from 500 IP addresses was quickly forgotten and replaced with Georgian at the same time» (Tsyganok, 2009). Georgian attacks reports of Russian air raids on civilian targets. Georgia on Russia were less successful but still merited was now the victim of a Russian military invasion. consideration in the Russian press for their ability to When Russia accused Georgia of ethnic cleansing in shut down some services (Thomas, 2013, p. 278). S. Ossetia, the Georgians countered with claims of Russian genocide against the Georgians. Pictures of Since the war with Georgia marked the first dead bodies, taken by Western journalists, appeared use of cyber warfare and information operations in in every Western newspaper (Levine, 2008). To drive conjunction with a conventional military operation, this the point home, Saakashvili himself went to the city. area proved fertile ground for Russian lessons learned. The PR event was cut short (YouTube, 2008), In the area of cyber warfare, Russian denial-of- however, when Russian jets were spotted above. services attacks on Georgian websites were effective Cowering in fear, Saakashvili was bundled into a early in preventing the Georgian government from civilian Humvee and whisked away. The debacle getting its message out (Cohen, Hamilton, 2011, p. convinced Russian viewers that Saakashvili was a 55). coward, the same by many Georgians but to a Western audience it was more proof that Russian jets were Management of decision making by the opponent: attacking Gori and the Georgian president is a victim The science and art of management of opponent by of Russian military activities on the territory of communications refers particularly to the creation of Georgia. a kind of toolkit of alternate behavioral models, providing the option to choose between the bad and When Russia tried to reiterate that it was very bad decisions from the point of view of influence not attacking civilian targets, Georgians claimed that on the target audiences. The USA generally managed Russian jets were bombing Western-financed oil to create such choice for Russia before and during pipelines deep inside Georgia proper. It was a lie, but the conflict. It stands to reason that the passive that didn’t stop the headline from hanging up on reaction to the attack of Georgia and tacit acceptance Drudge Report for two whole days (Levine, 2008). of killing of peacemakers were the inadmissible response option for the Russian Government as they Cyber war and its psychological impact: The would inevitably break their domestic and foreign division of technical aspects of information warfare political standing, Georgia and Ukraine would become (radio electronic warfare, network warfare etc. the members of NATO within short term, and the directed against a material infrastructure of the foe) stage of the “controlled segmentation of Russia” from PSYWAR is quite natural. But damage (or threat would come like in case the USSR before. President of such damage) to material infrastructure seriously Dmitry Medevedev said during his meeting with influences moods and behavior of the foe as well as Russian officers: “If we stagger in 2008, we would of neutral and friendly audiences. face the other geopolitical situation today and the whole range of countries, which were attempted to The Georgian party struck first in the field of pulled to the North Atlantic Alliance, would be likely cyber attacks. On August 8, concurrently with the to be its part now” (Georgia Online, 2011). Such

40 World Focus January 2017 obvious show of lack of determination would couple of remarks about the August 2008 Russia- eventually result in regime change. The successful Georgia war. The Russian media seized upon these repelling of the assault and liquidation of opportunities the very same day, amply quoting Ivanishvili in articles to repeat it, with inevitable coming of the Russian with such catchy titles as: “Georgia admits to having troops to the adjacent to South Ossetia regions of the started the war in 2008”, “Georgia acknowledges rest of Georgia would be represented as aggression being wrong in the 2008 war with Russia”, and the of the nuclear power against its small neighbor. like. His statements made no interest to the Western mainstream media and especially one where Georgian Who is the winner and who is the loser? military units “had started combat actions before the Several prominent Russian authors discussed the good Russians crossed the border”. (Batashvili, 2014) But and bad features of Russia’s information warfare of course such statement was met with indignation (including its psychological aspect) months after the by the supporters of M. Saakashvili. conflict ended. ‘I agree we lost the information warfare in the first few days, but we have nothing to So finally the strategic communication of the hide here’, Russian Defence Ministry spokesman former governments of Georgia and USA lost in Andrei Klyuchnikov told journalists (De Carbonnel, substantial degree the credibility not only in the 2008). In March 2009 the head of the Institute for international arena but in Georgia itself. At the same Political and Mili-tary Analysis Center of Military time the mistakes of Russia in psychological warfare Forecasting, Colonel Anatoliy Tsyganok also wrote challenged the whole system of internal and external that, at the preliminary stage of the conflict, Georgians communications of this country. won the information warfare. In Tsyganok’s opinion, every agency was unprepared to conduct information Conclusion warfare against Georgia. This included the Security The multilevel nature of Georgia-Russia military Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the press conflict determines a multilevel psychological warfare center of the Ministry of Defense (Thomas, 2013, p. system at all stages of its development. Different 282). potentials of psychological warfare, with not always common goals and objectives, various approaches to The deputy chief of the Russian Armed the implementation of psyops, different degrees of Forces General Staff, General Anatoliy Nogovitsyn, involvement in the conflict raise difficult questions of is representative of someone who was not at all coordination of the allies’ activities and arouse the negative about Russia’s information warfare desire to use similar problems to demoralize the performance during the conflict. He said that “Russian opponents. journalists stood united with the Russian army as never before, displaying hero-ism in covering the events in The conflict proved that modern South Ossetia”, and that journalists helped “finding psychological warfare combines all the elements of the words and evidence to rebut torrents of lies and warfare in one more or less unified mechanism to rejection, and helped the West to view our operations influence and to some extent control and manage with understanding” (Thomas, 2013, p. 283). Colonel different audiences on a global level. As a result, to George T. Donovan from U.S. Army War College is gain a victory even before the kinetic warfare starts very positive on the effect of strategic surprise or to achieve an evident moral superiority over their achieved by Russian Armed Forces (Donovan, 2009, foe during the kinetic phase of the warfare. pp. 11 – 12). The Georgia-Russia Military Conflict was to One can find now quite opposite evaluations some extent the manifestation of the world system of the August 2008 conflict but rather important fact crisis continued by the events of ‘Arab Spring’ and that even the new government in Georgia finds the Ukraine. Ad hoc solution can hardly ever help when roots of the conflict in the policy of M. Saakashvili. the problems are so deeply fundamental. No country During a press conference held on 10 April 2013, can deal with the crisis of this depth and magnitude Georgia’s Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili made a alone.

Georgia-Russia Military Conflict: The Experience of Multilevel Psychological Warfare 41 This means that mankind must overcome 13. Grinyaev S., Voskresensky G. (2008) “Information War in the st together the present crisis and its extremely grave Caucasus, or How Black Was Made White”, 21 Century, ¹2 (in Russian). dangers. For if the current systemic crisis is not 14. Jugaste A. (2011) Communicating Georgia. Georgia’s properly addressed, the current and emerging conflicts information campaign in the 2008 war with Russia. A Master’s are able to become the final mistake in the human Thesis, Department of Journalism, Media and Communication, Stockholm University, Stockholm. history. This calls for new constructive solutions, for 15. Levine Y. (2008) “The CNN Effect: Georgia Schools Russia in which, however, an effective model for development Information Warfare”, The Exiled, exiledonline.com/the-cnn- in the 21st century is needed as well. Old solutions do effect-georgia-schools-russia-in-information-warfare. 16. Levishenko E. (2014) “Role of Mass Media in the Coverage not work, the new ones are hidden in the fog of the of August 2008 Events in South Ossetia”, Chair of Mass crisis. The ability to listen and understand is perhaps Communication’s Lecturers’, PhD Students’, Graduates’ and one of the main conditions for finding the way out Friends’ Club, www.kafedramk.ru/content/rol-smi-v-osveschenii- sobytij-v-yuzhnoj-osetii-v-avguste-2008-goda (in Russian). from the current extremely difficult and dangerous 17. Mosk M., Birnbaum J. H. (2008) “While Aide Advised McCain, global situation and for moving ahead together. Under His Firm Lobbied for Georgia”, Washington Post, August 13th, such circumstances, more and more powerful www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/12/ AR2008081202932.html?nav =rss_politics. instruments of psychological warfare based on new 18. Niedemaier A. K. (2009) Countdown to War in Georgia, technologies should be used with all responsibility for Russia’s Foreign Policy and Media Coverage of the Conflict in national and global security. On the contrary being South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Minneapolis. 19. Panfilov O. V. (2011) Russia – Georgia: Information Warfare used by national and transnational egoistic groups of (August 2008), Tbilisi (in Russian). interest they can only aggravate the global crisis. 20. Shynkaruk A. L. (2008) Crisis Communications in Global Politics, Research Project, Erasmus Mundus External Cooperation References Window, Pultusk Academy of Humanities, Rivne Institute of Slavonic studies. 1. Abramovitz M., Lynch C. (2008) “Bush, Cheney Increasingly 21. Sputnik (2015) “International Journalists Impressed by Critical of Russia over Aggression in Georgia”, Washington Post, Hmeymim Airbase in Syria”, Sputnik, November 11th August 11th. 22. Svanidze T. (2014) “Goga Aptsiauri: “Georgian Media Rarely 2. Asmus R. (2010). A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Makes Stories on Positive Facts, Taking More Interest in Negative Russia, and the Future of the West, St. Martin’s Press, New York. and Scandalous Events”, Media.Ge, March 05th, www.media.ge/ 3. Barabanov M. S. (ed., 2009) August Tanks, Moscow (in en/portal/articles/302318 Russian). 23. The Moscow Times (2014) “Son of U.S. Vice President Biden 4. Batashvili D. (2014) “The war we did not start”, Tabula, Joins Ukraine Gas Company”, The Moscow Times, May 13th, www.tabula.ge/en/story/71077-the-war-we-did-not-start. www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/son-of-us-vice- 5. Bavulgen O., Arbatli E. (2013) “Cold War redux in US–Russia president-biden-joins-ukraine-gas-company/500062.html relations? The effects of US media framing and public opinion of 24. The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and the 2008 Russia–Georgia war”, Communist and Post-Communist Implications – Ukraine and Crimea, NATO and EU, Putin and Studies, ¹4. Obama, S-300 Missiles, Yushchenko, Yanukovich, Abkhazia, South 6. Cohen A. A., Hamilton R. E. (2011) The Russian Military and Ossetia, Progressive Management, 2014. the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications, Strategic Studies 25. Thomas T. L. (2013) “Russian information warfare theory: Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pa. The consequences of August 2008”, Blank S., J., Witz R. (editors) 7. Cornell S. E., Starr S. F. (2009) The Guns of August 2008: The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Memory of Russia’s War in Georgia, Routledge, New York. Mary Fitzgerald, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, Pa. 8. De Carbonnel A. (2008) “Analysis: Propaganda supplants 26. Trainor I. (2014) “Plucky little Georgia: Saakashvili’s PR reality in Russian-controlled Georgia”, Deutsche Presse Agentur, agency wins on second front”, The Guardian, August 16th, URL: Georgian Daily, August 19th, web.archive.org/web/ www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/16/georgia.russia 20080820033808/http://georgiandaily.com/ 27. Tsyganok A. D. (2009) “Information Warfare against Russia: index.php?option=com_content How It Was”, Segodnia.ru, April 7th, www.segodnia.ru/content/ &task=view&id=6237&Itemid=65 18043 (in Russian). 9. Deibert R., Rohozinski R., Crete-Nishihata M. (2012) 28. Tsyganok A. D. (2011) 08.08.08 War. Georgia’s Compulsion “Cyclones in cyberspace: Information shaping and denial in the to Peace, Moscow (in Russian). 2008 Russia–Georgia war”, Security Dialogue, February. 29. U.S. Department of State (2008) “Statement by President 10. Donovan G. T. (2009) Russian Operational Art in the Russo- George W. Bush before the 63rd regular session of the UN General Georgian War of 2008, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks. Assembly”, September 23rd, www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 11. Eidman, Ch. R., Green G. S. (2014) Unconventional cyber 134787.pdf warfare: cyber opportunities in unconventional warfare. Thesis, 30. Van Herpen M. H. (2014) Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. New Imperialism, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham. 12. Georgia Online (2011) “Medvedev Named One of the Reasons 31. YouTube (2008) “Saakashvili Hides From Russian Air Attack”, of the Aggression in August 2008”, Georgia Online, November YouTube, August 12th, www.youtube.com/watch?v=FiSZH318IFc 21st, www.apsny.ge/2011/conf/1321912589.php (in Russian) 32. Zharov M. Shevyakov T. (2009) Chronicles of Information Warfare, Evropa, Moscow (in Russian).

42 World Focus January 2017 Russia’s Soft Power in Kazakhstan: Instruments and Institutions Dr. Lessya Karatayeva & Kanat Sakhariyanov

The globalization promoting the growth of future, one should expect Russia to accelerate the interdependence of states that makes relying on the efforts to promote its positive image that would focus “hard power” increasingly ineffective. Due to on the Asia Pacific. This trend in the foreign policy is increase in competition for the spheres of influence clearly articulated in the official discourse of Russia and the capacity to involve individual states and (Putin, 2016). regions in the sphere of one’s economic and political interests is still on the agenda. In this context, the Diversification of the actors engaged in and concept of “soft power” has been becoming impacting the contemporary international relations has increasingly popular. been an additional factor that increases the weight of “soft power”. Therefore, the national ideologies have Russia’s attempts to go beyond its status of had to compete not only among themselves but also a regional power are being taken amidst the with the ideology of the non-traditional actors such ideological tensions with the Western countries that as various religiously-motivated terrorist and resulted in a new round of the competition. The focus extremist organizations, jihadi movements, and so on. of “soft power” policies of Moscow is gradually In particular, the propaganda currently exercised by shifting towards Asia in general and Central Asia and the ISIS, with the main task being to attract more Kazakhstan in particular. The article surveys of the foreign fighters, offers an alternative reality based instruments of Russia that have been applying to on a different understanding of social justice as well exercise its “soft power” in Kazakhstan such as the as the principles and mechanisms for its achievement media, support of the and higher and maintenance. Promotion of an idealized image education and the institutions that have been of the model of the organization of social life, which established to enhance this endeavor. The analysis is they have been able to maintain in the territories under supported by the data received from a number of their control, becomes the focus of the ISIS social attitude surveys conducted in Kazakhstan. information policy (Winter, 2015).

Background The Central Asian region is one of the key The globalization, on the one hand, promotes the places in the Russian foreign policy. A number of growth of interdependence of states that makes factors may be considered as the reasons for that. relying on the “hard power” approaches ineffective. Firstly, Central Asia is important for Russia because On the other hand, the increase in competition for of its geopolitical position as the region that borders the spheres of influence within the framework of Russia on the North, China and Afghanistan in the international relations has been apparent; this is East and South; moreover, some states have the principally about having the capacity to involve access to the Caspian Sea. Secondly, the region’s individual states and regions in the sphere of one’s importance for Russia is predetermined by the fact economic and political interests. In this context, the that Central Asia is included in the zone of the concept of “soft power” developed Nye (2004) has interests of its main rivals (EU, 2016). Finally, the been becoming increasingly popular. interest in Central Asia is not only the consequence of its geopolitical position, it also may be explained The objects of Russia’s interests may be by the abundant resources in the region. As a result, individual countries, such as the countries of the EU’s here we are facing the strategies of a number of states “common neighborhood” or entire regions, such as colluding and conflicting. Moreover, all of them are Europe, Asia-Pacific, and Africa. Besides, in the near belonging to different civilizations each with its own

Russia’s Soft Power in Kazakhstan: Instruments and Institutions 43 appeal. Central Asia, due to its inherent itself, while building its own system of values, in its characteristics, is quite a complicated case in terms foreign policy focused on the creation of a new format of the influence that is made or can be made on the of the relations with the West and sought to restore region. It is characterized by the ancient cultures and the status of a European power. traditions, but the lack of knowledge about them, however, may lead to rather negative results. A number of events of domestic political Moreover, the relations in Central Asia are much nature that occurred in the first decade of the 21st impacted by the clan and tribal factors that makes century had a negative impact on the image of Russia the task to apply the traditional tools of “soft power” in the West. This, largely, predetermined the “return” even more complicated (Lebedeva, 2014). of Russia to the countries of the former Soviet Union, the move that, in its turn, gave rise to a number of Importantly, the foreign policy doctrine of serious tensions in the interstate relations. Russia does not treat Central Asia as a separate item of particular priority, on the contrary this is the It is important to remember, however, that to CIS countries in their entirely that are designated as have “soft power” and to exercise it shall not be the priority in regional terms, which include the considered as the same thing. The discussion within Central Asian countries among others (Foreign Policy the Russian expert community on that issue clearly Concept of the Russian Federation, 2016). Each of demonstrates this difference. In particular, it has been the states of Central Asia has its own specifics numerously noted that an actor may have “soft including those that affect its relations with the Russia. power” but not use this potential. At the same time, This article focuses on the application of the Russian the opposite situation is also possible when an actor “soft power” in the relation to Kazakhstan. Particular who does not have any “soft power” simulates its attention is paid to the role and significance of the possession. In this case, it is impossible to speak of Russia’s, specialized agencies, higher education, the “soft power” per se (Lebedeva, 2014). Russian language, and the media. It is clear that Russia has a great potential in Despite the fact that the Soviet Union, as a this respect but, although the official discourse is full predecessor of modern Russia, had enormous “soft of “soft power” implications, in fact, there have not power” in certain periods of its history - in 1945, after been enough efforts taken in this area. In addition, the victory over Nazi Germany or in the beginning of Russia was quite late to include “soft power” in the space exploration era in the 1950-1960s – the arsenal of its foreign policy. At the official level, the capacities of “soft power” were overlooked in Russia importance of “soft power” was first clearly for a long time. This is even more apparent when articulated only in 2013 (Foreign Policy Concept of analyzing the relations with the Central Asian the Russian Federation, 2013). countries. On the contrary, after the collapse of the USSR in the 1990s the Russian Federation started to Theoretical and Practical Approaches to lose rapidly its appeal for the post-Soviet countries. Exercising “Soft Power” There may be a number of reasons for that. Firstly, Socio-political discourse of “soft power” in Russia the socio-political space of the post-Soviet states was embraces a number of narratives, which sometimes undergoing the period of deideologization. Russia still may conflict each other, on feasibility of its continued to be associated with the Soviet past for application, the main focus areas and priority policies, quite a long time. The vacuum in the deideologized and the mechanisms to increase the attractiveness space was quickly filled with the values of religious of Russia in other countries. However, almost all and ethnic character. Secondly, the 1990s were researchers agree that Russian’s success in terms of characterized by the rapid increase of the impact of “soft power” has been rather modest so far. At the the “soft power” of the USA and Western Europe. same time, the growing significance of ideas and The Post-Soviet states, including Russia itself, became images in the foreign policy is not at all questioned the places where the values of economic = liberalism (Karaganov, 2012). and democracy were actively promoted. Third, Russia

44 World Focus January 2017 The current debate on Russia’s “soft power” importance of “soft power” in the contemporary covers a wide range of issues, from the linguistic ones, international relations on the equal footing with military, which are concerning manly the adequate translation economic, and political power factors. of the “soft power” term, to the issue of the correlation the “soft power” concept with those of In practical terms, Russia realizes its “soft the “country’s brand”, “country’s image”, “culture” power” potential through the following parameters: etc. The debate on concepts creates additional space the reputation of the exported goods produced in where the experts try to evaluate various “soft power” Russia on the external markets and, therefore, higher ratings. This seemingly simple question brings the demand for them; the morale of the population; experts’ attention to a rather problematic issue of tourism; historical heritage; science, culture, and indicators and mechanisms for evaluating the language; popularity of the media. In terms of policy, effectiveness of the action taken and, therefore, the Russia, mainly, relies on a number of the specialized resources expendable. The controversy surrounding agencies such as: the practical application of the “soft power” measures reveals the differences in the general philosophical The “Russian World” Foundation that understanding of the issue. focuses its activities on the development of the Russian language. There are three offices of the According to Parshin (2014), the “soft “Russian World” Foundation in Kazakhstan. power” debates in Russia are currently conducted Preventing the Russian language from narrowing of around the two major premises. The first is so-called the range of its use a priority task for the Federation. “constructive criticism”. The proponents of this Importantly, the Russian language is the main resource position agree that all thing that we are committed to allowing Russia to exercise its “soft power”. At the has the power over us and suggest that such power same time, the Russian language is rapidly losing its is realized in the sphere of international relations position in the post-Soviet space. In the Soviet Union, (Parshin, 2014). For the supporters of this position 286 million used to speak Russian. To date, among the main question is how this power is configurated 140 million people living in all the former Soviet Union and how one should talk about it (Ivanchenko, 2016). Republics (except Russia), only 63.6 million are able Within the “constructive criticism” it is possible to to communicate in Russian. Another 39.5 million argue that there is a uniqueness of the Russian case. understand but do not speak Russian. Nearly 38 In particular, Kosachev pointed at a sort of million people living throughout the CIS do not speak presumption of the guilt of Russia has been developed Russian (Zubov, 2016). in the world today (Kosachev, 2012). The “Rossotrudnichestvo” Federal The proponents of the second premise are in Agency has had its mission in facilitating the social the principled opposition. This second premise is engagement and communication among the conventionally called the “destructive” position. “compatriots”; it also contributes to the development Experts sharing the main premises of this position of the humanitarian cooperation including that in the believe that there is no such thing as “soft power” in sphere of higher education (Panova, 2011). In international relations and therefore the whole Nay’s Kazakhstan, there are two representative offices of idea of “soft power” can be disregarded as a “Rossotrudnichestvo” in Astana and Almaty “chimera.” The stronger appeal to ethics is respectively. Higher education is considered to be characteristic for the latter. one of the strengths of the “soft power” of Russia exercised towards Kazakhstan. The Ministry of In general, despite the heated debates within Education and Science of the Russian Federation the academia and expert community of Russia annually allocates quotas to educate for free foreign regarding the application of “soft power,” the official students in Russian universities through the Russian discourse reveals the intention to increase its capacity Centre of Science and Culture. In 2016, 300 quotas in this area. In particular, in the Russian Federation were allocated for the students from Kazakhstan. Foreign Policy Concept stipulates for the high

Russia’s Soft Power in Kazakhstan: Instruments and Institutions 45 This is a two-fold increase of the quota allocated by various case studies carried out by the research compared to 2014, (Forbes, 2016). teams working in the framework of both national and transnational projects. At the same time, the creation of the conditions for three-lingual environment in Kazakhstan The study, which has been conducted for - meaning that the Kazakh, Russian and English several years since 2012 by the Centre for Integration languages shall be used on equal footing (Tulegenova, Studies of the Eurasian Development Bank in 2015) changes the situation on the market of cooperation with the “Eurasian Monitor” Research educational services. The gradual expansion of the Agency and resulted in the “EDB Integration use of English in Kazakhstan reduces the level of the Barometer” project, is a perfect example (EDB, demand for the Russian education in the field of the 2016). social and political sciences and the humanities. Gradually an understanding has been formed in According to the survey, during the entire Kazakhstan of the fact that the bulk of the scientific period, Russia consistently maintains the place of the knowledge has been accumulated in the English- “most friendly power”. The share of the respondents speaking space. Today, the Russian education perceiving Russia as the “most friendly power” have maintains its position in the field of technical sciences never been below 80% (Ileuova, 2015). The second and engineering. Trying to maintain and even increase key component of the political affinity between the the attractiveness of the Russian education and to countries is the willingness to render military support. consolidate the common cultural and scientific space, According to data, (EDB, 2016) in 2016, 59% of Russia is actively using the potential of network of respondents named Russia among the countries universities of the CIS and SCO. Kazakhstan could provide its military support if needed. For comparison - the second country that Alexander Public Diplomacy people of Kazakhstan are willing to support militarily Fund is also widely present in Kazakhstan, focusing is Belarus, but this time the figure is only 20%. In its attention, among other things, on the youth, the turn, Kazakhstan should be ready to accept military expert circles, and the non-governmental sector aid from Russia if necessary according to 69% of organizations. The analytical support of the foreign respondents. The other top three countries also policy of Russia is one the Fund’s priorities. One of include Belarus (15%) and Kyrgyzstan (6%). Thus, the important aspect of Gorchakov Fund’s activities we can say that Russia is perceived as the preferred in in Kazakhstan is popularization and promotion of political partner by the overwhelming majority of the the Eurasian integration. people of Kazakhstan (EDB, 2016).

The Russian Orthodox Church has Given that consumption is one of the most traditionally played an important role in the common forms of economic behavior of the maintenance of “soft power” of Russia. According population, one may assume that consumer choices to the data received during the official census in are the most apparent indicator that clearly reflect Kazakhstan, more than 90% of citizens consider the existing stereotypes and attitudes about the themselves to be believers. Kazakhstan is the home availability, quality and attractiveness of the goods for 18 faiths. Christianity is the second largest religion imported from a particular country. According to the in Kazakhstan in terms of the number of believers EDB Integration Barometer, almost half of and associations (about 27% of the citizens of respondents (49%) pointed to Russia as the country Kazakhstan). To date, there are nine dioceses of the whose products they preferred. Additionally, just over Russian Orthodox Church in Kazakhstan. a third of respondents referred to Russia as the preferred source of investment in the economy of Popular Attitude towards Russia in Kazakhstan Kazakhstan (EDB, 2016). The efforts that have been taken by Russia ae reflected in traditionally good Russia’s image among The current socio-political discourse reveals the citizens of Kazakhstan. This fact is well illustrated the growing importance of scientific and technological

46 World Focus January 2017 factor in the development of states. Scientific and those in Germany and 5 times more often than with technological achievements are among the most the citizens of the neighboring Kyrgyzstan. Russia is important resources. It is not only the scientific also the most frequently visited country by discoveries per se that matter, but the way they have Kazakhstan’s people. been achieved. It is obvious that the development of science cannot take place in the confined space of As it has been mentioned above, the Russian the national frontiers and shall involve a higher degree higher education is one of the main resources of “soft of international cooperation. People of Kazakhstan power”. Almost all specialized entities that promote think that the most preferred countries with whom “soft power” in one way or another are aimed at the research institutions and companies should promotion of the Russian educational institutions in cooperate are Russia (41%), Japan (31%) and the education market of the target countries. In this Germany (23%) (EDB, 2016). At the same time, the context, it is important to know what Kazakhstan attractiveness of Russia as a major scientific partner people thinks of the possibility of getting higher has dropped from 49% in 2015. education abroad. Despite the efforts made in Kazakhstan in order to improve its national education Migratory intentions in Kazakhstan are also system, receiving higher education abroad is usually interesting as the indicators of the image of particular welcome on both official and unofficial levels. At the countries among the general population. People in same time, there are no any specific regional Kazakhstan have demonstrated rather cautious preferences among people of Kazakhstan. Education attitude towards labor migration. Although it is in the CIS countries, the European Union as well as commonly believed that Kazakhstan is not a donor in countries in the other regions are almost equally country in terms of migrant workers, it cannot be popular. However, among other educational argued that people from Kazakhstan do not go to opportunities abroad, the Russian education is in the other countries to work (Sadovskaya, 2016). highest demand (EDB, 2016). According to sociological survey, the most attractive countries in terms of work for the people of The findings of the Eurasian Monitoring are Kazakhstan are Russia (24%), Germany (11%) and indirectly confirmed by the sociological studies the USA (10%). These countries are also considered conducted over several years by the Institute for as preferable destinations for long-term emigration. Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan (KazISS). In particular, the public opinion on the The formation and maintenance of social and priority directions for Kazakhstan in terms of further cultural attraction is one of the important indicators integration have shown that the such directions as of how efficient the use of “soft power” is. In these “countries of the former USSR” and “Belarus, Russia terms, Russia also holds the leading position. In and Ukraine” are not only the most approved (57.5% particular, despite the common historical past of a and 46.8%, respectively) but the most desirable (46% rather complicated character, Russia still attracts and 37.9%) (KazISS, 2014). Kazakhstan by virtue of its history, culture and natural features. At the same time, since 2012, the interest Opinions of Kazakhstan’s experts on the has been decreasing gradually. Similarly, there has impact of the Russian “soft power” on Kazakhstan been a slight increase in the interest in non-CIS differ considerably and assessment of the presence countries, first of all, Turkey. However, the interest of Russia in the information space of Kazakhstan towards Russia is still twice as high as the interest in are less optimistic. By itself, Russia’s “soft power” is Turkey (EDB, 2016). We can assume that the interest not the subject of Kazakhstan’s socio-political in the history and culture of Russia can be explained discourse. Traditionally, the issue of “soft power” by the existence of the kinship relationships with the arises in the context of the debates concerning the Russians that a considerable number of Kazakhstan’s principles of the nation-building that should be applied citizens still have. The data shows that people living in Kazakhstan, the issues of revival of the Kazakh in Kazakhstan maintain regular communication with language and the formation of the national identity. the citizens of Russia 3.5 times more often than with As the representatives of the nationalistic-patriotic

Russia’s Soft Power in Kazakhstan: Instruments and Institutions 47 circuses are the main generators of the debate and companies that engaged in the monitoring of the those who articulate the problems of the Russia’s information space have confirmed this argument. presence in Kazakhstan, it is understandable that the expert discourse on Russia’s presence in Kazakhstan Demand for Russian Media in Kazakhstan is characterized by higher level of criticism. The activity of specialized agencies established specifically to promote “soft power” of Russia may This criticism is not so much directed towards be assessed as effective. However, the analysis of Russia, since there is an understanding and the articulated goals and objectives as well as of the acceptance that Russia is pursuing its national direct activities of these agencies shows that the interests by all means available, on the contrary it is efforts are focused on the relatively narrow target Kazakhstan’s government that is the major subject audience, namely university students, expert of scrutiny. Those who oppose the position of community, academia, representatives of the non- nationalists in Kazakhstan are so-called “vatniks”. governmental sector. At the same time, Russia Noteworthy, the term “vatnik” was borrowed from possesses the tools to influence a wider audience. the Russian political discourses. In Kazakhstan, These tools may enable Russian to ensure the however, the “vatnichestvo” has acquired presence of the messages and narratives in the fundamentally different meaning than that in Russia information space of Kazakhstan. These tools are (Sultangaliyev, 2016). While in Russia “vatniks” are offered by the media. It is the presence of Russian mostly focusing their attention on the contemporary media in the information space of Kazakhstan that topics such as the Crimea, the sanctions, the may push for greater engagement and sense of confrontation of Russia and the West, Donbass, and belonging and interconnectedness among significant Syria as well as everything that is concerned to numbers of Kazakhstan’s citizens as well as their Russia’s status of the great power, the vision of the knowledge and interest in the processes occurring in “vatniks” in Kazakhstan is mainly a retrospective one. Russia. They also pay a lot of attention to the preservation of inter-ethnic harmony in Kazakhstan and the issue of As for the context of the question of this the Union of Kazakhstan and Russia. Vigorous article, it would be appropriate to speak more about resistance to re-interpretation of the events World the role played by the Russian media on the general War II, which is in their view an unjustified and background of the information space of Kazakhstan, distortive endeavor, is also one of the most debated particularly about what the demand for the Russian issues. information products is.

Some experts in Kazakhstan argue that According to the TNS data, 99% of the intensification of the Russia’s efforts to promote “soft households in Kazakhstan have at least one TV set, power” in Central Asia and in Kazakhstan in particular 24% of the households have two TVs, and 5% have is a necessary measure prompted by the competition more than three TVs. At the same time, in up to 82% for the regional influence between the United States, of the household, the radio is listened to least once a China, and Russia. The change of the methods applied month while only 28% of respondents listen to the to exercise the influence on the part of Russia have radio on a daily basis (TNS, 2015). According to the been observed by many. If previously, the major Committee on Statistics of the Ministry of National subject of influence used to be the elites, after the Economy of Kazakhstan, the share of Internet users developments in Ukraine there is the understanding aged 6-74 years is currently 72.9% (MNE, RK, 2016). that this is not enough and Moscow needs to work with the population (Omarova, 2016). The above figures suggest that the television is of the greatest demand among Kazakhstan people In turn, the opponents of Russia’s increasing for consuming both information and entertainment. presence raise the questions of the risks it may pose Kazakhstan citizens spend 205 minutes a day to the information security of Kazakhstan. The data watching TV (about three and a half hours); compared obtained by various Kazakhstan and foreign to the three world leaders in terms of the TV viewing

48 World Focus January 2017 time as such the USA (282 min.), Japan (264 min), have had to socialize in the environment of the Italy (262 minutes). Taking into account the global independent Kazakhstan. Although the television trends of declining importance of the print media and retains the leading position in terms of its popularity radio and the continuous high level of the demand among the social groups that are excluded from the among Kazakhstani’s people for the television, it work place, namely pensioners, housewives, would appear logical to focus directly on the television temporarily unemployed, and disabled, the demand as an instrument of “soft power”. for television among the employees of the various government agencies and public sector workers is For the 25 years since the independence, rather high. The “conventional” television is least Kazakhstan authorities have been consistent in their watched by students. Importantly, the demand for policies aimed at preservation of openness of the the Kazakh-language or Russian-language channels information space (“Information Kazakhstan-2020” depends on the purpose of the content consumption. State Program). As a result of the policy, today in The Kazakh-language media prevail as a source of Kazakhstan there are 111 254 officially registered information on the current events of social and political domestic and foreign television channels (MID, 2015). nature. In 2014, the Ministry of Investment and Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan (MID RK, 2014) conducted a large-scale study on the demand for the national media among people living in Kazakhstan (see Figure 1 below).

The patterns of consumption of television production in Kazakhstan varies across the various demographical groups. For example, the emergence of new forms of consuming of informational and Figure 1 - Preferred sources of information about entertainment content has led to a reduction in socio-political events (% of the entire population) television viewing among the youth. This trend of Source: “Demand for Domestic Media. Survey Report shrinking of the role of television is characteristic for 2014”, Ministry for Investment and Development of the the audience of 17 to 24 years of age. As for children Republic of Kazakhstan, Astana and adolescents, their share is as large as that of adults. However, it does not mean that the young Russian channels are attracting the viewers have stopped to watch TV altogether, rather the trend above all by their interesting and high-quality products is of steady decrease in term of the frequency of of various entertainment genres and TV series. The television viewing. Yet, the pattern for the older age other factor of attractiveness of the foreign-made groups is that they still remain frequent television channels (including Russian) is a greater share of the viewers. The motivations behind the television viewing programs of educational nature. The importance of of the younger people and the older age groups also the foreign channels as a source of international news differ. The older the respondents are the more they is gradually increasing. The poor quality of turn to the television as a source of information. On Kazakhstan-made television product attracts rather the contrary, the younger they are the higher is the harsh criticism by Kazakhstan’s people. demand for entertainment. Therein lies one of the reasons for the decline in popularity of the television Table 1 - “Why do you prefer foreign among younger people: television is increasingly losing television?” the competition in terms of entertainment content to Reason (%) variety of other formats that are provided by the Russian channels broadcast more interesting 35,6 Internet. At the same time, older viewers tend to be programs, TV series and shows Kazakhstan channels almost exclusively broadcast 30,2 those who have the experience of living in the Soviet in the Kazakh language which I do not understand Union so that their interest in the events taking place I (we) watch Russian and other foreign TV 26,2 in Russia is higher than that of younger people who channels to learn about international news

Russia’s Soft Power in Kazakhstan: Instruments and Institutions 49 Russians broadcast more programs of 23,7 in the decrease of the number of the citizens of the educational character neighboring countries who care about the I (we) watch entertainment shows on the Russian 17,9 channels and the news on the Kazakhstan channels developments occurring in Russia. Moreover, the Source: “Demand for Domestic Media. Survey Report 2014”, number of those who positively assesse the domestic Ministry for Investment and Development of the Republic of and foreign policy of Russia is being decreased. Given Kazakhstan, Astana the emerging patterns of how the Russian citizens’ attitude towards the other post-Soviet countries As Table 1 shows, for almost a third of changes, it would be sensible to assume that positive respondents who prefer to watch foreign TV assessment of Russia’s foreign policy will continue channels, the language is the determining factor. The to decline. The process is nothing but natural and is study of the language preferences of the different directly dependent on the demographic changes taking types of media audience shows that the popularity of place these countries. Kazakhstan is a country where information products in Russian exceeds demand for Russia has the highest rates of positive attitude. the Kazakh-language content. However, Kazakhstan is not an exception to the general pattern: the level of Russia’s attractiveness Although there are a number of the factors for Kazakhstan’s people has also been gradually that contribute into the promotion of the Russian declining. Interestingly, all these occur on the content in Kazakhstan’s information space, there has background of accelerating of the efforts to promote been a decrease in the demand for the Russian TV Russia’s “soft power”. channels in recent years. All these leads to suggestion that the existing Figure 2 – “What are the channels you watch positive image of Russia in Kazakhstan is not so much most frequently?” the result of the currently pursued policies to enhance Russia’s “soft power”, but rather because of the number of factors that correlate with the “soft power” endeavor. One of the most important of such factors is the widespread dissemination of the Russian language in Kazakhstan. Despite the lack of the status of the “official language of the Republic of Kazakhstan”, the Russian language retains a strong position as the means of public communication in Source: “Demand for Domestic Media. Survey Kazakhstan. Another factor is the existence of the Report 2014”, Ministry for Investment and common historical experience. Because Kazakhstan Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Astana had been a part of the Soviet Union, a number of values penetrated into the mass consciousness and Conclusions remain relevant even today. Additionally, the existence Over the past years, the importance of “soft power” of the common historical experience is also manifested as a resource for Russia’s foreign policy has been in another aspect, namely the fact that greater number growing. As the tensions in the relationship with the of people living in Kazakhstan today retain their family West, has become more apparent there was an ties with the citizens of Russia. The fact that understanding that the need for creating a positive Kazakhstan people have relatives in Russia has image of Russia in the countries of the nearest become a significant factor and contributes into neighborhood was the pressing issue. increase of the attractiveness of Russian education. For example, students who go studying to Russia from The data received from the public attitude Kazakhstani are most likely to have a sort of security surveys and various ratings shows that the image of net there of friends and relatives. The frequency of Russia is still quite attractive for the people living in the visits people of Kazakhstan pay to Russia may the post-Soviet space. However, the fact that “soft be also explained by the fact that they have relatives power” had been overlooked for quite a long resulted there; the second most important factor is business

50 World Focus January 2017 interests. One shall also remember that the two reduce are numerous and complex. Some of them countries are engaged into a number of regional are obvious enough such as natural decline in the integration projects, namely the CIS, EAEC, CSTO, share of the ethnic Russian in particular and Slavic SCO; these also affect the image of Russia in people in general, the changes in the overall structure Kazakhstan. of the population of Kazakhstan; introduction of the policies aimed at building of the tri-lingual Kazakhstan The trends about the demand for Russian TV that leads to increase of the number of people who channels in Kazakhstan are directly interrelated with speak the Kazakh and English languages; gradual but three factors: the demographic composition of the inevitable generational change that means the increase population, dissimilation of the Russian language, and of the numbers of those who mainly consume their the quality of Kazakhstan’s media products. The information via the Internet; and finally improvement reasons why the importance of the media as an of the quality of the products offered by Kazakhstan’s instrument of “soft power” of Russia in Kazakhstan media industry.

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Russia’s Soft Power in Kazakhstan: Instruments and Institutions 51 Eurasian Ideology as the Basis of the New National Landscape in Contemporary Russia Dr. Anna Popova

While analyzing the theory of Eurasia, at (Eurasianism) became the response to the Bolshevik the end of the 1920s as a new ideology of Russia destruction of this identity; it was an attempt to after the 1917 October Revolution, the author acquire for Russia a local-civilizational image having arrives at the conclusion that at the present stage clearly defined and understandable prospects of its of the lawful development states in the globalizing place and role in human civilization. Russia faced a world, Russia stands at a special stage of her principally new task: to create a new Russia, and development, i.e., she realizes her civilizational ultimately – a Russian ideology, having its own idea- role, as well as her national identity. Neo- based potential, adequately fitting in with the ethno- Eurasianism today is regarded as an ideology of cultural facets of Russia and the nationalities living in restoring the integrity of the post-Soviet space on it.Such an approach was aimed not only at fully the basis of Slavic-Turkic integration. comprehending everything that had occurred in Russia, and with Russia at the beginning of the XX At the present stage of development of the century, but also at comprehending the new values world community, particular attention is being given of the identity, the goals and meaning of life, new to Russia’s role and place in this process. All these methods and new modus operandi in history that political events once again demonstrate that mutual were formed on this basis. relations with members of the European Union are not the only possible vector for further developing The new Russia had to become new in a Russia statehood. The unipolar world is terminating NEW way. However, in this newly acquired status, its existence, and because of this, the confrontation she (Russia) was not to contradict her history and between our country (Russia) and Western Europe culture, or the essence of her deep-lying identity. On along with the USA, is acquiring evermore timeliness the contrary, all that was new in the NEW Russia for world civilization, in general. Russia today stands was to become even more adequate to the historical at a special stage of its development, i.e., the and national essence of Russia – to its national realization of its civilization and national identity, the substratum (or foundations). And as a logical result, basis of which could be a return to Eurasian ideology the new Russia had to acquire a new national self- that crystallized among Russian emigrants in the 20’s awareness with a profound and sweeping civilizational of the XX century. mode of thinking and identifying herself as Russia. However, the solution of all these tasks depends on A more specific configuration and broader how one understands the phenomenon of Russia itself; publicity of Eurasia views were achieved in Sofia this depends on what civilizational foundations Russia (capital of Bulgaria) in 1921 with the publication of a identifies herself with, and also on how she (Russia) Review of collected articles “Heading Eastward. understands the essence of these foundations. Premonitions and Materialization. Claims by Eurasianists” penned by P. Savitsky, P. Suvchinsky, Eurasians view Russia as “Eurasia” – as a N. Trubetskoy and G. Florovsky. Eurasianism (the synthesis of Europe and Asia; the result of this Eurasia concept) can be viewed as one of the synthesis is a kind of “third world” having the responses of Russian national self-identity to the features characteristic of a peculiar cultural type. The historical upheavals that took place at the beginning adherents of Eurasian views (or Eurasionists) of that the last (XX) century; it was a response to the need period were profoundly disappointed with the to seek and find truly genuine historical and local- achievements or accomplishments of Western civilizational identity of Russia. In fact, it civilization (first of all, in the spiritual field).

52 World Focus January 2017 The representatives of that way of thinking the state. Such obligations (guaranteed by the state) believed that Eurasia was Russia’s “place of are to be viewed as a positive mission – a mission development” which, to considerable extent, which in the present-day world can be defined by the determined its history and the national character of following principles. the Russian people. “Russia is a specific world. The 1.The targeted goal or objective of the state is to destinies of that world proceed, in the main, separately establish a maximally developed material-and- from the destinies of the counties to its West (Europe), technical base for normal human life; to organize and separately from those to Russia’s South and East efficient production of the basic goods and services (Asia). And it is possible to call this world Eurasia. for ensuring the public’s wellbeing; to provide the The peoples and nations living within the limits of conditions for ensuring an average lifestyle, and to that world are capable in achieving such a degree of totally do away with poverty and destitution (the mutual understanding and such forms of fraternal principle of maximally improving the lifestyle level). coexistence that could hardly be attained by them in 2.The state pledges to efficiently direct the budget respect to the peoples off Europe and Asia.”1 allocations for upgrading society’s “culture” infrastructure for satisfying educational requirements The concept of law and the statehood of all citizens (the principle of harnessing the national occupies an important niche in Eurasianism. Nikolai economy for the needs of society). Alekseyev played an important role in developing this 3. The state creates the maximal number of cultural concept. The state and legal aspects of the Eurasian facilities for satisfying the needs and requirements of doctrine were defined in his scientific papers in the society as a whole, as well as those of each and every ‘20s and ‘30s of the XX century. When building his member thereof (principle of exercising freedom of ideal model of a Eurasian state, Alekseyev proceeded choice). from the real and actual condition that Russia was in 4. The state strives to create the highest level of - after the Bolshevik Revolution (1917). The liberation culture – one that includes within itself the idea of of Russia from Communism , in his opinion, would common human dignity, and at the same time, a level not be complete simply by “negating” the Soviet state that maximally serves all manifestations of national, (USSR or the Soviet Union), but rather by the further tribal and local peculiarities of the peoples and ethnic development of the positive elements inherent in it, groups of the Eurasian cultural world (the principle by merging or combining them with the even higher of organizing culture as a supra-national entity on a potentials of state-and-legal development lying within multi-national basis). the historical experience of Russia. A typical feature 5.The state strives to involve the maximal number of of the Eurasia doctrine was its conscientious citizens in the process of economic, political, social opposition to the Western liberal paradigm of law2. cultural construction and development (the principle of demotism)3. One more aspect of the politico-legal doctrine of Eurasianism is closely linked up with the teachings The Eurasian model of a guarantee state is on demoty and ideocracy - this aspect may be referred broader than a simple political form of society’s to as “a guarantee state.” In the opinion of organization. The problem of perceiving the future Eurasianists, such a state is one that “ensures” (or state structure of Russia within the Eurasian doctrine guarantees) the implementation of certain standing concerns all aspects and all spheres of life of Russia’s goals and tasks, i.e., it is a state pursuing a positive society, beginning with its cultural-and-historical mission.” A guarantee state was the opposite of a aspects and ending with political-legal aspects. The relativistic state, i.e., one that has no positive tasks Eurasian model of a guarantee state is seen as a before it. The majority of present-day democracies universal system that includes its closely are seen as belonging to the latter category. A interdependent components: the religious and guarantee state bears certain definite obligations in geographic peculiarities of Eurasian culture; principle respect to the nation. Human rights are not denied, of establishment and formation of nationalities in the but they (these human rights) remain only on paper if Eurasian continent; the historical principle which found they are not backed up by obligations guaranteed by its expression in the crystallization of the ideas in legal

Eurasian Ideology as the Basis of the New National Landscape in Contemporary Russia 53 and religious thinking in Russia, and which are to be political, humanitarian and military integration. The found in traditional folk culture. highest level of interdependence among the member- states in all spheres of activity and humanitarian unity Proceeding from Eurasian ideology, Russia stemming from their singular historical past can be is to become a state possessing “demos” authority, viewed as supplementary conditions towards this end. i.e., preserving its ties with the people, and also In its ultimate shape or form, the Eurasian Union may representing their ideals. Such authority differs, in imply a singular, united economic, political, military principle, from European democracy which is based and humanitarian space, including a single currency on a formal majority of votes cast for this or that and single army, as well as a singular or harmonized representative of the authorities, whose links with the domestic legislature, yet preserving state or republic people, in the majority of cases, ends there. Many sovereignty of the member-states. The economic followers of Eurasian ideology wrote that “from now foundations of such a Union have been unified with on, Russia’s interests dovetail with the interests of the principles of the WTO (World Trade Organization) Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, India, perhaps China and and the European Union (EU). Therefore, it may be other Asian countries. And in this manner, “Asia said that the Eurasian Union also performs the function orientation is becoming the only possible way for a of integration at the highest mutually advantageous true Russian nationalist.”4The Eurasian project conditions for the member-states within the concerning Russia’s civilizational identity, as well as framework of the European and international division the Eurasian approach to comprehending her place of labor. in civilization were once again accentuated by the processes of the disintegration of Russian society at As for the concept of the Eurasian World, it the end of the XX century - processes having may be said that quite a peculiar civilization consensus numerous analogues with the civilizational catastrophe has evolved in relations between the world and that took place in Russia in October of 19175. Neo- Russia. Russia does not seem “to fit in” with any of Eurasianism today is viewed as an ideology that the existing local civilizational worlds. When dealing implies restoration of the integrity of post-Soviet with Russia, the world encounters not simply a kind space on the foundations of Slavic-Turkic integration. of civilizational and cultural “bridge,” not simply as a Contemporary Eurasianism can be described as place for making a connection and for interpreting consisting of ideas concerning supplemental ethnic certain cultural values and thoughts into other groups, harmony of nationalities and religions, mixed dimensions’ in Russia, the world encounters quite a market systems in the economy, representative peculiar and different lifestyle that lends itself to democracy and equity in the political sphere. interpretation quite often only by resorting to Russian terminology. Here, I feel it is necessary to stress one There are, however, several geopolitical other point. Not a single local civilization in the world, versions of Eurasiansim: - Russia-Eurasia as the pivot by itself, either by its national aspect, and of the heartland, “the Eurasian Confederative Union” consequently, or by itself, in its cultural aspect, can and “the Eurasian World” with the axis passing through be considered homogenous or uniform. For example, Germany-Russia-China, each of which has its own there is the American West, but there is also the specific features. The Eurasian Union can be viewed English West. There is the German West, but there is as a project for establishing a confederative or also the Italian, French and Spanish West. The decentralized federative alliance consisting of Belarus, recently emerged Baltic States also consider Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine (or including also themselves as the West. And what is indicative here other post-Soviet states) that is to be built on the basis is the following: practically each western nation, in of the principles of democracy, equal rights and mixed one way or another, is “sizing up”, or at least, believes market economy. The main goal of the Eurasian it “is fit” for carrying the banner of a civilizational Union is to provide the people residing in these bridge. The Germans – as a bridge between West republics with a maximally higher standard of life. and East Europe; the Poles and the Baltic peoples – The main instruments for attaining this objective shall as a bridge between Europe and Russia; the be to achieve the best possible effects from economic, Romanians – as a bridge between Romanic and Slavic

54 World Focus January 2017 worlds; the Spaniards – as a bridge between Europe As we see it, such a policy of external and Latin America; the Englishmen – as a bridge governance is aimed at destroying national between Europe, North America and Australia. And development and pushing these countries back into if we continue in this line, the perception of Russia as “barbaric statehood,” i.e., a state in which the human a kind of “linking bridge” between Europe and Asia being is both apolitical and asocial, when he is unable is, by no means, an indication of Russia’s to take upon himself responsibility not only for his exceptionalism or exclusiveness – it is only an own personal development, but also responsibility for indication of its geopolitical and civilizational scope6. the further positive evolution of a law-governed state. Foisting so-called “democracy” upon other people not Russia is, in principle, an open civilization that only by way of armed intervention, but also through a is quite capable of coping with the entire gamut of wide range hybrid wars, including financial and spiritual and cultural challenges of mankind. economic pressing, as well as through the propaganda Nonetheless, the center of such a civilizational model campaigns by the mass media and others – all this should be Russia, rather than Europe, and all the more has led not to the blossoming of a Western-styled so, rather than Asia. As a historical and national entity, representative democracy; on the contrary, all this Russia is not a Eurasian, but it is precisely a Russian has led to social regress that can be defined as “pre- civilization. Having a powerful European cultural and state archaism,” or “a war in which everyone is spiritual stratum, deep roots in European civilization, fighting everyone” as T. Hobbes wrote in his time. A Russia, throughout its entire history, assembled, vivid example this can be seen in the form of a quasi- developed and grew more powerful as a separate state DAESH (a terrorist organization that is outlawed civilization. in Russia, and which calls itself ISIS whose super- goal is to annihilate the national states that exist on Evidence of this can be seen everywhere – the present-day political map of the world. in each and every sphere of daily life activity throughout the whole of Russia, and consequently, in What is needed here is a force to counter all the most diverse fields, beginning with fairy tales and this. Such a force, as we see it, could be the Eurasian myths, literature and poetry, and ending with religion World in which its member states, still preserving their and history, lifestyle and system of values, symbols own national identity will be able to develop as of faith, modus vivendi in different periods of history independent civilizational powers opposing the and in history itself. All of this bears definitive specific western world and checking the growing armed features of Russian civilization, first of all, because confrontation. In this sense, Russia whose territory any and all cultural and civilizational influence in lies practically in equal measure both in Europe and Russia underwent and undergoes transformation into Asia could become one of the world centers for Russian culture and civilization. Each local civilization establishing and developing the Eurasian civilization. is backed by its own system of thinking that gives birth to its own special spiritual world that has its Bibliography 1. Popova A. V. Eurasia and Asiope as the prospect of development of Russia in works of the Russian own system of values and thoughts concerning how neoliberals//the Bulletin of the Russian-Armenian (Slavic) university. Series humanitarian and social sciences. 2014. No. 2. P. 32-37. a person should live his life, and through this life, his 2.Alekseev N. N. Eurasians and state//Euroasian chronicle. Issue IX. Paris, 1921. 3.Skuratov Yu. I. The Euroasian doctrine of the garnatiyny state and its value for modern jurisprudence or her own history. // Scientific notes of RGSU. 2013. ¹. 6 (121). P. 5-11. 4.Russian philosophy: Sketch of classical eurasianism.//URL: http://www.gumilev-center.ru/russkaya- filosofiya-ocherk-klassicheskogo-evrazijjstva/. 5.Nazarbayev N.A. Euroasian union: from the idea to future history//News. 2014. 3 Apr. URL: http:/ /izvestia.ru/news/504908. And this is, by no means, a coincidence. An 6.Morozov A. N. Implementation of decisions of the Euroasian economic commission in systems of law of the State Parties of the Customs union//the Magazine of the foreign legislation and comparative analysis of the political events that unfolded at the jurisprudence. 2013. No. 4. P. 35-44. end of the XX and beginning of the XXI centuries Footnotes clearly demonstrates that the USA and West 1 Popova A. V. Eurasia and Asiope as the prospect of development of Russia in works of the Russian neoliberals//the Bulletin of the Russian-Armenian (Slavic) university. Series humanitarian and social European counties have been trying to implement sciences. 2014. No. 2. P. 32-37. 2 Alekseev N. N. Eurasians and state//Euroasian chronicle. Issue IX. Paris, 1921. their policy of external governance as is evident in 3 Skuratov Yu. I. The Euroasian doctrine of the garnatiyny state and its value for modern jurisprudence // Scientific notes of RGSU. 2013. ¹. 6 (121). P. 5-11. 4 Russian philosophy: Sketch of classical eurasianism.//URL: http://www.gumilev-center.ru/russkaya- Libya and Iraq; this is also seen in the threat to Ukraine filosofiya-ocherk-klassicheskogo-evrazijjstva/. 7 5 Nazarbayev N.A. Euroasian union: from the idea to future history//News. 2014. 3 Apr. URL: http:/ and other sovereign countries . /izvestia.ru/news/504908. 6 Morozov A. N. Implementation of decisions of the Euroasian economic commission in systems of law of the State Parties of the Customs union//the Magazine of the foreign legislation and comparative jurisprudence. 2013. No. 4. P. 35-44.

Eurasian Ideology as the Basis of the New National Landscape in Contemporary Russia 55 The Semi-Presidentialism: Russian Style Dr. Kharitonova Oxana

According to J.Brownlee, “the study of responsibility of the executive towards the parliament institutions enables us to make sense of how political (present in parliamentary systems and absent in presi- actors behave and how effective they are at achieving dential). their goals… By looking at institutions, we can understand the political constraints and inducements The main feature of the presidential system that shape behavior and outcomes” (Brownlee, p.10). is that a popularly elected president in the head of On the one hand, the institutions set up framework state and the only head of government, meaning that restricting actor’s choices and directing their actions. only the president can form and dismiss the govern- On the other hand institutional design and institutional ment. In presidential systems two branches of power changes can result from the choice of actors involved. are independent from each other and do not have The actors use institutions in order to process conflicts interrelated sources of legitimation. The two branches through institutional arrangements and not to take the cannot dismiss each other as well since presidential conflict to the streets. Adam Przeworski wrote that impeachment is not equal to the confidence vote and “Institutions matter: they influence norms, beliefs, and can only be implemented when the president com- actions; therefore, they shape outcomes; Institutions mits a treason or crime. If the main characteristic of are endogenous’: their form and their functioning presidential systems is the separation of powers and depend on the conditions under which they emerge their independent survival, since the government can and endure” (Przeworski, 2004, 527). well survive without the support of parliamentary ma- jority, then logically the president and parliament will Russia witnessed parliamentary elections in be in opposition if controlled by different parties. The 2016 and will have presidential elections soon after proponents of presidential systems argue that the ex- in 2018. Should we expect any change in Russia? istence of two independent legitimate actors with pre- What institutional factors prevent or foster the cisely defined powers defends the system from the implementation of electoral promises. In order to tyranny of the minority and of the majority. The ex- answer the above questions, the article will unfold as ecutive power in the presidential system is the realm follows: first the basic features of the presidential of the exclusive presidential powers, since the presi- and presidential-parliamentary systems will be dent as the head of government is personally respon- compared, then the perils of presidenitalism in both sible for the government. The US president can ap- systems and the legislative and non-legislative powers point the ministers with the approval of the Senate of the presidents will be analyzed. and can dismiss any appointee at his discretion.

Presidential and Semipresidential Systems Parliamentary systems are opposite to presi- dential since they are characterized by interdepen- Six systems of government are usually distinguished dence and interrelation of the executive and legisla- in comparative politics, with the two pure types (presi- tive branches of power. The government whether one- dential and parliamentary), two mirror types (elected party or coalition needs parliamentary support for its premier and assembly independent) and two mixed formation and survival. According to Juan Linz the semi-presidential systems. The two criteria in the M. parliamentary system has more chances for demo- Shugart’s matrix used for the typology are: the sources cratic survival than presidential systems for the fol- of the executive power (electorate in presidential lowing reasons: better representation, flexibility, ne- systems and parliament in parliamentary systems) and cessity for the government to have support from the parliament, better chances to survive with multiparty

56 World Focus January 2017 systems, checks on the government and prime-ministerial dependence of the confidence vote. professionalization of government (Linz, 1990). The differ in the sets of presidential powers; in presi- dential-parliamentary systems both the president and Semi-presidential systems were developed the parliament have defined roles in cabinet forma- an alternative system which could overcome the mi- tion and dismissal, in premier-presidential systems the nuses of the separation of powers. The term semi- cabinet dismissal function is the sole responsibility of presidential system was suggested by M. Duverger the parliament. in 1980 and included three characteristic features: popular presidential elections, significant powers of In these systems the parliament is respon- the president and dependence of the government on sible for the cabinet, thus the latter lacks independent the confidence of the parliamentary majority sources of support. The government is formed by (Duverger). Both the term and its characteristics were the president but if there is no consensus on the cabi- criticized for various reasons. First, according to M. net composition, the no confidence vote may follow. Shugart, the semi-presidential systems are not pure Depending on the constitutional provisions, the par- types but hybrid, mixed types. Second, the scope of liamentary dissolution and new elections may be the powers named significant is unclear since the result. Duverger list of semi-presidential countries included very weal though popularly elected presidents. That Russia is a clear example of the presiden- is why many political scientists (R.Elgie, J.Sartory, tial-parliamentary system with the popularly elected J.Blondel) suggested to exclude the significant pow- president serving as the head of state, having the right ers feature and to focus instead on the dual responsi- to appoint and dismiss the head of government, who bility of the government vis-à-vis the president and in turn is responsible to the parliament. the parliament. Perils of Presidential and Semi-Presidential Sys- The semi-presidential systems were designed tems for overcoming the problems of presidential and par- The critics distinguish the following threats arising liamentary systems. For example the deadlock situa- from the regimes with popularly elected presidents. tions in presidential systems were s solved by coups Originally these perils were found by Juan Linz (Linz, d’état, impeachments and emergency situations. 1990) in presidential systems, but due to popular presi- Semi-presidential systems give other alternatives dential elections they can be also found in semi-presi- since the president can dissolve the parliament with- dential systems. out turning to emergency powers and the govern- ment can be dismissed after the confidence has gone. First peril is the dual legitimacy, as there are two legitimate popularly elected institutions with pre- According to J. Blondel, the system of dual cisely defined sets of powers, i.e. the president and leadership allows the president to have independent the parliament. The dual legitimacy can even become means of influencing the parliament (Blondel, 172). triple legitimacy when the parliament has two cham- In the view of Charles de Gaulle, the president in bers popularly elected and both chambers have veto- such a system “must serve as arbiter above political powers over each other’s decisions. In presidential contingencies” and “must have the responsibility to systems, the set of powers of each actor is precisely reconcile, in the choice of men, the general interest defined since the president is the chief executive re- with the direction given by the parliament” (De Gaulle, sponsible for the government and budget implemen- 141). tation and the parliament is the main legislative body. M. Shugart and J. Carey distinguish two In presidential systems the president usually does not types of semi-presidentialism: premier-presidential have the power of legislative initiatives and cannot with exclusive responsibility of the government to the influence the legislative process but for the veto. In parliament and presidential-parliamentary – with dual semi-presidential systems the branches are more in- responsibility of the government. Both systems are tertwined, since the president is the head of state and characterized by the dual structure of executive, the not the head of government, with the latter being re-

The Semi-Presidentialism: Russian Style 57 sponsible to both the president and the legislature. In Second peril is the majoritarian decision - presidential systems the dual legitimacy will arise not making, the presidential power is majoritarian what only between the president and parliament but be- is usually the consequence of non-proportional tween two branches of power, i.e. legislative and electoral system. First- past-the- post (relative executive. In semi-presidentialism the dual legitimacy majority) and two-round or alternative vote (AV) will be between institutions, i.e. president as head of systems (absolute majority) are usually criticized for state and parliament. Thus dual legitimacy raises more disproportional representation of the voters and problems for the presidential systems since the ex- underrepresentation of minorities (unless their ecutive power is personified in the figure of the popu- settlement is geographically concentrated). The larly elected president, who bears the sole responsi- winner-take-all elections in presidential systems bility for all successes and failures of the govern- assure that the winner gets the executive branch, and ment and its policy, while parliament is considered to if the parliamentary elections are held not be the body separated from the governmental affairs. simultaneously, the winners for two branches can be In semi-presidential systems the dual legitimacy is different. In parliamentary systems with the single less acute since it is not about the branches of power elections, the winner will take both branches either (executive versus legislative) as in presidential sys- as a partisan veto player in one-party government or tems, but between the posts (head of state versus collective partisan veto player in coalition parliament). government.

Dual legitimacy creates problems for regime Winner-take-all systems create sharply survival when the individual player (i.e. president) in disproportional results and tend to create more either system feels his/her own agenda to be at stake problems for multi-party systems, since the smallest due to unsupportive parliament. This is usually the party will be either under- or unrepresented. Relative case when president’s party does not have the ma- majority systems are the worst among plurality and jority in the parliament and in presidential systems majoritarian systems since the winner’ share of seats about half of the world presidents survived without will be disproportionally larger than that of the losers such support. and UK parliament is a picturesque example of such post-electoral discrepancies. Two-round systems and Russia has consolidated majority govern- AV systems give the voters the second choice, thus ments enjoying support by the parliamentary major- in order to succeed the contenders need to be more ity and the president’s party. Thus this threat is no responsive not only to their but also to their opponents’ longer relevant for Russia. Figure 1 shows that the supporters. pro-presidents party United Russia (UR) had enjoyed significant majority in parliament after its creation. Originally two electoral systems were used That is why the dual legitimacy peril is not an issue at in Russia, the president elected by absolute majority all. and the Parliament elected by the parallel vote system. Figure 1 Distribution of seats on the Russian In each of the systems the electorate has two votes. lower chamber (State Duma) In the presidential elections the president elects needs to get the absolute majority of votes. If the party system is not fragmented, the two-round electoral system usually leads to moderate multi-partism with two big coalitions and the victory of moderate representatives, since they need to win the votes in the second round and the voters have more than one vote. In the parliamentary elections the semi- proportional parallel electoral system was used for Source: http://www.duma.gov.ru/structure/factions/, the election of the three Dumas (second, third and Wikipedia election results. fourth) when half of the lower house was elected by

58 World Focus January 2017 proportional party-list system with 5% barrier and branches of power can become insolvable and lead another half – by first past the post in single member to deadlock situations which can be solved by districts. Such electoral systems often lead to the unconstitutional means including coups d’état against results when parties receiving majority of votes do the presidents and presidential self-coups against the not have the parliamentary majorities. Such systems parliaments. led to the appearance of two types of parliamentarians (one from the party and one from the district) and The democratic way of deposing the popularly could not foster the consolidation of party systems elected president is the impeachment procedure but since they have contradictory effects. On the one it can only be justified in case the president is guilty hand the proportional system with high electoral of crime or treason. Still it is very difficult to impeach threshold can decrease the fragmentation of the party the president, for example in the US no president system, but on the other hand the district majoritarian was impeached, though one president (Richard Nixon elections led to the personification of elections and to in 1974) resigned before the impeachment vote took creation of parties around each leader, what hindered place and two presidents were barely impeached but the institutionalization of the party system. the number of votes was not sufficient (in 1868 against Andrew Johnson and in 1999 against Bill Ckinton). In the conditions of fragmented party system Impeachment is a difficult procedure in a two party in Satori’s terms with over 40 parties running for the system and in a fragmented party system. In Russia office, the electoral system did not assist in the impeachment procedure can start by 2/3 of the consolidating the party system since it favored lower chamber that is why in 1999 the impeachment individuals rather than parties and especially those of President Boris Yeltsin advocated by the communist individuals that had district support. The typical result and agrarian parties failed due the insufficient number of the combination of these two systems with atomic of votes (300 votes of the lower chamber needed party system is visible in the fragmented compositions and from 239 to 283 on different claims received). of the second and third parliaments (Figure 1). On the one hand such electoral system prevented the Fixed term limits can also be considered opposition party (Communist party of Russia in the guarantees of stable executive power but if the 90-s) from getting the majority of votes, on the other constitution does not foresee the extension of hand the absence of a clear majority made the presidential term limits, a popular and competent decision-making inefficient. president can lose his seat. That was the reason behind the increase of the term and reinterpretation of the In Russia the electoral system was changed two consecutive terms. twice. After the newly created ruling party had a strong victory in 2003 elections (Figure 1), the system Comparative empirical research reveals that was changed to proportional party list system with the restricted term limits lead to the change of leaders 7% barrier. The last change of the system was made and parties in government and increases the chances again before 2016 parliamentary elections which for the opposition candidates. Since when incumbent witnessed the reintroduction of the original parallel runs for reelection the opposition has no chance of formula. winning against him, while running against the successor gives the two of them practically equal Third peril is connected with presidential fixed chances [Maltz, 2007]. Usually in democratic regimes terms, since there is no vote of confidence to the the president’s term is restricted to one or two, though government in presidential systems and no possibility in the US the restriction was introduced only in 1951 to decrease the president’s term in semi-presidential by the XXII amendment after president F.D. systems. This problem is about the fixed term of the Roosevelt won four elections. Another notable president (though in presidential systems the exception for fifty years was France, in which the parliament has also fixed term and there is no way to two terms were introduced in 2008. In Russia dissolve it). If the president cannot be removed by according to Constitution (art. 81) the president can the constitutional means, the crises between the serve for two consecutive terms. Originally the term

The Semi-Presidentialism: Russian Style 59 was four years though as of 2008 the term was president and the parliament resulting in a deadlock. increased to six years. The Constitution is interpreted The populist, sometimes outsider, president with a as two consecutive terms meaning that the term in- popular mandate feels personal responsibility for the between can allow counting anew. Such government and under conditions of the unsupportive interpretation allowed the president Vladimir Putin to parliament tries to use and misuse presidential serve two consecutive terms from 2000 to 2008, be constitutional powers and eventually turns into an the prime-minister for 4 years in-between and start elected dictator. The presidential style in Russia again the first term as president in 2012. The aggravated by the institutional characteristics revealed conversion results from “the changed enactment of itself in the party building strategy and personalist existing rules” (Mahoney and Thelen.). The tendencies of the presidents. The transformation of interpretation of the two consecutive term clause in the party system seemed to be the easiest solution. Russia as two consecutive terms after one interim The United Russia ruling political party was created term can be described as conversion of the existing from above by the political elite in order to fix the rules without changing them. fragmented party system and secure support from the parliament. The figure 1 below shows the Fourth peril concerns the personalities of the correlation between the decrease of the effective elected presidents. , presidential systems usually number of parties and the increase in the share of encourage the election of popular and inexperienced the vote by the ruling party, outsiders and political newcomers. Russia did not follow this tendency as all the Russian presidents had Figure 2 The correlation between the Effective political although not electoral experience. The first number of parties and the share of the President’s president Boris Yeltsin used to be the CPSU high- support party ranking regional official, the second (and fourth) president Vladimir Putin was the prime-minister both times before becoming the president, and the third president Dmitry Medvedev was also recruited from the government before the presidential elections and has returned there as Prime minister immediately after the end of his presidential only term.

Fifth peril is connected with the presidential style of behavior creating a so-called delegative democracy. Originally used by G.O’Donnell the term is now used to denote the style of presidential politics when the president is the sole decision-maker, standing above parties and non-responsible to either the Source: Authors’ calculation electorate or the legislature since he thinks of himself as the legitimate delegate of all the people. This peril Russian political elite chose the is the direct consequence of the other perils above, hyperinstitutionalization party-building strategy since the dual legitimacy, majoritarian decision- creating their own political party (and even a popular making, fixed terms only encourage irresponsible movement) since a ruling party United Russia was behavior of the popularly elected president, and in also supported by a popular movement. The creation case the president is an outsider. This situation is of a party supporting the leader can be considered as especially aggregated in the conditions when the the counterweight to other political parties in the president is not supported by the parliamentary fragmented political system. The ruling party was majority. That was the case with the second and third needed in order channel the decision-making in the Russian parliaments (Figure 1). All these perils of parliament, to mobilize the support for the president, presidential and semi-presidential systems originate to provide opportunities for participation and also to from the absence of cooperation between the coopt the fractions.

60 World Focus January 2017 According to Andreas Schedler, hyper- legislation either formally (through addresses) or institutionalization turns politics into the world of informally. The party members of the president’s party political corporations. In the case of Russia the hyper- can also initiate legislation as per President’s electoral institutionalization in the form of the dominant party program. That is why it is difficult to assess the real turned politics into a single corporation. Several weight of the president’s initiative power. The Russian political parties could still articulate the alternative presidents have the power to initiate legislation, though views, potentially capable and ready to participate in only 4 percent of the legislature initiatives actually decision-making but in reality other parties could not came from the presidents. The figure 3 below shows compete with the ruling party. that the 2 main sources of the legislation were the individual members of parliament and the regional Presidential powers parliaments of various subjects of the Russian Mathew Shugart and John Carey analyzed the Federation. The upper chamber and the courts were legislative and non-legislative powers of the presidents passive and the government initiated almost a fifth of in presidential systems and identified the breakdown the legislative acts. of democracies with significant legislative powers of the president (Shugart, Carey, 1992). The logic behind Figure 3 The initiators of legislation in Russia this observation is that the powerful president can try (1995-2016) to use the constitutionally given powers and become the sole legislator who does not require the support from the parliament. Only the constitutionally weak president will be willing to cooperate with the parliament, though high fragmentation, the lack of party discipline and stimuli of inter-party cooperation can hinder such cooperation. The parties will have the stimuli to cooperate only in semi-presidential systems in which the parliament co-shares the responsibility over the government.

The institutional solutions in order to minimize Source: Authors’ calculation of data from Legislative fractionalization will be the set-up of the ruling party process statistics http://www.duma.gov.ru/legislative/ and the change of electoral rules. Many scholars statistics/ follow Shugart and study the powers of either the parliaments (Fish) or the presidents (Frye) and Another legislative power of the president conclude that strong presidents and weak parliaments which is considerably strong is veto power, but its can undermine democracy. According to S.Fish weak strength depends on the number of votes required parliaments hinder democracy and parliamentary or for its override, the fragmentation in the parliament premier-parliamentary systems are the best for and the party discipline. For example, the veto power democratic survival (Fish). of the US president, which is the only legislative power that the president has, is very strong since it is very The legislative powers of the president difficult to collect two thirds of the two-party include the legislative initiative, the veto power, the parliament for its override. That is why the presidential decree powers and the power to call a referendum. vetoes in the US are hardly ever overridden (the Russian presidents have the three of them, thus the Congress overrode 111 out of 2572 vetoes1). In Russia president is granted with huge powers which increase the president can either veto (reject) or sign the the role of the president. The president cannot initiate legislation and the presidential veto is overridden by the referendum though should call it after it is initiated. the two thirds of the deputies. As depicted in figure 4 The power to initiate legislation is considered a strong (below), only United Russia (UR) party at the moment power of the president, though presidents lacking such enjoys the absolute support and could if needed a power can still articulate their ideas about proposed override the presidential veto. Though in the conditions of the party-merge of the presidential power with The Semi-Presidentialism: Russian Style 61 the executive and legislative power, any sharp Another considerable power of the Russian president disagreements between them are highly unlikely. is the rule by decree. According to the Constitution, the decree fills the gaps in law and then the legislation Figure 4 The parties in the parliament should be initiated to fill it. Moreover, the decree cannot be in the area of budgets, taxes or constitutional law.

The high number of decrees shows on the one hand the increase of the president’s role in politics and on the other hand the decrease in the significance of the parliament turning it into a rubber-stamp. But it is very difficult to analyze the presidential decrees and orders. In Russia the number of presidential orders/decrees is rather high, and is comparable with Note; The numbers in the x-axys correspond to the the number of legislative acts at the same period of numbers of the parliaments time. But no database at the moment distinguishes within these orders/decrees the ones dealing with In Russia all the disagreements were legislation, revealed during the period of more polarized parliament. The figure 5 shows that during 2nd (1994- Figure 6 Presidential orders/decrees of the Russian 1999) and 3rd (1999-2003) Parliaments, the president presidents (1999-2016) vetoed a considerable number of legislative acts. The strength of the president as veto player can be revealed only in the situation of minority government or divided government. For example in Russia in the period of fragmented parliament (1996-1999), the president returned 18,59% laws to the parliament, while in the period of consolidated majority parliament (2004-2007), only 0, 56% of laws were returned. Later the president had the same power but he did not need to use it that much due to the set-up of the propresidents’ party. That is why institutions and their consequences can change the essence of each Source: Kremlin site. http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/ presidential power and the rules for its usage. And the set-up of the president’s party will again be the According to M.Shugart and J.Carey the counter-rule for the president to feel safer. presidential decree power and its usage is always a consequences of other institutional conditions such Figure 5. The rejections and signatures of the as the weakness of party system, the lack of party legislative acts discipline and conflict between president and parliament (Shugart, Carey, 1998). That means that this power is also a preventive power, which is needed while the ruling party has not formed.

The non- legislative powers of the president which increase his/her veto potential include the government formation, government dismissal, influence on the government agenda, dissolution of the parliament and appointments. In the realm of non- Source: Authors’ calculation from Legislative process statistics legislative power the Russian president is also http://www.duma.gov.ru/legislative/statistics/ 62 World Focus January 2017 powerful. The president determines the main direction veto player (in Tsebelis terms) in Russia at the of the inner policy, nominated and dismisses the moment. government, which is in its turn responsible before the parliament. In the Russian system the government Conclusions will be always the support structure of the president, Semi-presidential systems develop under the follow- since the president forms the government without ing conditions: if the party system is weak, if the con- taking account of the balance of forces in the stitution inherits elements of the previous non-demo- parliament. According to Shugart, “The logic of a cratic system; if strong executive power is required. semi-presidential system makes the dissolution power Weak party system and underdevelopment of politi- the means of reinforcing the president’s ability to serve cal parties encourage personification of party lead- as a check on the assembly and its parties… In other ers and the presidents, thus the president may place words, presidential power of dissolution provides a themselves above parties (like Boris Yeltsin did). counterweight to the assembly’s enhanced authority” Personalism becomes the reason for and the conse- (Shugart ,2005, P. 9). In semi-presidential systems quence of the weak party system, weak parliament the no confidence vote of the parliament is a string and weak democracy. G.O’Donnell named such per- power, thus the balance of forces in the parliament sonalist style of politics as delegative democracy, in may influence the presidential choice of prime minister which the president considers himself to be the del- and may result in the government dismissal when the egate of the whole people, responsible only to the president would like to keep it. If the president has people, thus he can position himself not only above the power to dissolve the parliament, as in Russia, parties but also above all political institutions. The new elections can bring about the same party solution chosen by the Russian elite was to create a configuration in the next parliament and the same ruling party and people’s movement. According to dilemmas may occur. B.Magaloni. the dominant party regimes are over- large ruling coalitions, as they need to create an im- In the conditions of such interconnectedness age of party unity (Magaloni). Besides the unity the between the federal structures the president can dominant party needs mass support for the regime choose to be above politics and parties and act as an during elections. Such support can be gained either arbiter between various structures or choose sides. by repression and encouraging loyal behavior or by The contemporary research reveals that presidents the rational choice of the voters, aiming to maximize positioning themselves above parties, place their electoral utility. According to Magaloni, “the themselves in strategically disadvantaged position “tragic brilliance” of these systems is that the popu- especially when they require mobilization of support lation plays an active role in sustaining them, often to his policy (Baylis). According to Schleiter, if the despite corruption, inefficient policies, and lack of president stands above parties, 50% of the cabinet economic growth. Citizens’ choices are free, yet they will be partisan, compared to 91% with the partisan are constrained by a series of strategic dilemmas that president (Schleiter, 679). compel them to remain loyal to the regime” (Magaloni, 2006, P. 19.). Thus one-party regimes survive due to To conclude, the president in Russia with the unity of the ruling (party) elite and the mass mo- huge legislative and non-legislative powers is a strong bilization in support to the regime. Russian political veto player in politics, though most of the powers are elite managed to build unity in politics, that is why preventive and meant to be used in case of a sudden decision-making becomes easy to implement and change in the balance of forces. The decree power nothing can stop the president from introducing any without the counter-signature of the government and changes and prevent him from implementing the elec- the presence of legislative initiative also increase the toral promises. veto potential, Though when the ruling party dominates and there is unity of all the branches of References power the president enjoys the majority support Baylis T. (1996) Presidents Versus Prime Ministers: everywhere and formally can be considered the only Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe. World Politics, Vol. 48, ¹ 3, pp. 297–323.

The Semi-Presidentialism: Russian Style 63 Blondel J. (1992). Dual Leadership in the Contempo- tems and Democracy: The Difficult Equation. Com- rary World in A.Lijphart (ed.). Parliamentary Versus parative Political Studies, Vol. 26, pp. 198-228. Presidential Government. Oxford, Oxford univ. press. O’Donnell G. (1994) Delegative democracy. Journal Brownlee J. (2007). Authoritarianism in the Age of of Democracy, Vol. 5, ¹ 1, pp. 55-69. Democratization. N.Y.: Cambridge univ. press. Przeworski A. (1991). Democracy and the Market. De Gaulle, Ñh. (1992). The Bayeux manifesto. (ad- Cambridge university press. dress delivered 16 June 1946) in Arend Lijphart (ed.) Samuels D., Eaton K (2002) Presidentialism And, Or, Parliamentary versus presidential government. Oxford. and Versus Parliamentarism. Duke university. 50 p. Oxford university press. Schedler, A. Under- and Overinstitutionalization: Some Duverger M.A (1980) New Political System Model: Ideal Typical Propositions Concerning New and Old SemiPresidential Government. European Journal of Po- Party Systems. Kellog Working paper ¹ 213. March litical Research, Vol.8, ¹ 2, pp. 165-87. 1995. Ferejohn J. (2015) Instituting Political Change. In De- Schleiter P., E. Morgan-Jones (2009). Party govern- mocracy in a Russian Mirror. Przeworski A. ed. Cam- ment in Europe? Parliamentary and semi-presidential bridge university press. democracies compared // European Journal of Political Fish S. (2006). Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democ- Research, Vol. 48, pp. 665–693. racies. Journal of Democracy, Vol. 17, ¹ 1, pp. 5-20. Shugart M., J.Carey (1998). Executive Decree author- Gandhi J., A. Przeworski. (2006) Cooperation, ity. N.Y.: Cambridge univ. press. Cooptation, and Rebellion under Dictatorship. Eco- Shugart M., J.Carey (1992). Presidents and Assem- nomics & Politics, Vol. 18, ¹ 1, pp.1 -26. blies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Linz J. J. (1990) The Perils of Presidentialism. Jour- Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. nal of Democracy, Vol. 1, ¹ 1, pp.51–69. Stepan A., C. Skach (1993). Constitutional Frame- Magaloni B. (2006). Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic works and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico. Cambridge: Versus Presidentialism. World Politics, Vol. 46, pp. 1- Cambridge Univ. Press. 22. Mahoney, James and Kathleen Thelen eds. (2010). Ex- plaining Institutional Change. Ambiguity, Agency, and Footnotes Power. Cambridge. 1 Presidential Vetoes. Electronic version..http:// Maltz G. (2007) The Case for Presidential Term Lim- history.house.gov/Institution/Presidential-Vetoes/ its. Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, ¹ 1, pp. 128-142. Presidential-Vetoes/ Mainwaring S. (1993) Presidentialism, Multiparty Sys-

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64 World Focus January 2017 De-Facto States and Effects of Partial Recognition: The Abkhazia and South Ossetia Case Dr. Irina Kudryashova and Elena Meleshkina

Abkhazia and South Ossetia are the political Hirschman of exit, voice and loyalty as different units which have emerged as de-facto states in the ways of behavior toward formal rules in unfavorable wake of armed ethnical conflicts and were conditions (Hirschman, 1970). In Hirschman’s logic recognized as sovereign states by Russia (2008) and statelessness was closely associated with an atrophy several other countries. Both polities belonged to a of voice, i.e. lack of institutional channels of voice periphery of the and then of the that have not been developed because of the existing USSR, and gained the Soviet experience of state- possibilities of exit. and nation-building. The application of Hirschman concept has For more than 8 years now the Republic of allowed Rokkan to explain the role of interaction Abkhazia (RA) and the Republic of South Ossetia between a center and its peripheries as well as (RSO) have existed as partially recognized states. between different centers in the process of nation The available data enables us to determine the level and state formation. He has elaborated some empirical of their stateness and decide to what extent partial models of this process and used them to develop the recognition influences it. Bearing in mind the situation conceptual map of Europe. It has shown that center in south-eastern Ukraine it seems relevant to also and communities consolidation have been produced determine the logic behind secessions on the post- by establishing boundaries as well as imposing empire territories and way in which territorial polities international order (Rokkan, 1987). without consolidated boundaries develop. The proportions of exit and voice correlate Center and boundary consolidation as factors with the success in state boundaries formation. The of state-building boundaries determine configuration of actors and To better understand common features of state and public resources (i.e. services necessary for nation-building in post-Soviet countries it is useful to consumption) “locked” within the territory. Since they apply a broad analytical model considering state and are locked there are no possibilities for exit. In this nation-building as a systemic process. We have used situation non-state actors tend to conceal their private the model of nation-building created by Norwegian resources or to invest them in voice. The control on political scientist Stein Rokkan and his colleagues. the boundaries and the decrease in possibilities for One of them Stefano Bartolini has suggested that exit generate the process of political production and the formation of every territorial polity could be promote the legitimization of a central hierarchy, analyzed with the focus on center and boundaries realization of special functions of political system and consolidation, criteria of membership definition and political structuring (Bartolini, 2005: 29). political structuring (Bartolini, 2005). Such logic allows us to describe nation and state formation in every The representatives of Rokkan’s research country as a process of territorial consolidation, tradition have noted that internal structuring of polity creation of institutional structure (including normative depends on the process of consolidation of boundaries essential principals) and socio-cultural mechanisms of different kind (political, economical, social, cultural of integration. etc.). Membership aspects presuppose that the attachment of the actors to political community and Rokkan and his colleagues have resorted to possibilities of external exit are determined by the the concept of well-known economist Alfred center’s control over both territorial and socio-cultural boundaries. That implies two type of the exit: territorial

De-Facto States and Effects of Partial Recognition: The Abkhazia and South Ossetia Case 65 (secession etc.) and functional or membership of the system of government. Their common imperial (emigration, refusal of taxes, of military service etc.) “institutional identity” aggravates the problems of (Finer, 1974: 82). formation of institutional bases of the state, consolidation of the boundaries and political The degree of center control over boundaries structuring. greatly increases its abilities to develop both nation- state and democratic institutions. Domination of voice The Soviet Union consisted of “segment- in political system presumes structuring of channels states”1. Many of them have been created in of representation and development of appropriate contemporary boundaries only during the socialist organizations. They reduce the costs of the voice for period. Some new independent republics had not individual actors providing them with institutional rules existed as independent states in contemporary and infrastructural support in the spheres of social, boundaries before they have been created in the cultural and political equality. Such spheres establish Soviet Union. At the same time there were attempts additional (non-territorial) boundaries within a polity to introduce some common boundaries of the Soviet and define the limits of legal deliberation (see: community on the basis of Russian language and Meleshkina, 2010: 149-151). communist ideology. The attempts to form common “civic” nation were undertaken under the slogan of Representatives of Rokkanian tradition also “New historical community of Soviet people”. have proved the existence of correlation between external recognition and internal development (see: However such a policy was carried out Bartolini, 2005). International recognition promotes inconsistently. The territorial organization of the USSR strengthening of state sovereignty, consolidation of and the Communist Party were based on the principle center and borders through common judicial and of division into the national republics and other political frames. These buy-turns contribute to internal administrative units. Respectively the promotion of political and judicial standardization as well as to representatives of original ethnic groups in the power internal political structuring. Unrecognized polities exist structure, scientific and cultural elites was the partially out of international relations and influence common political requirement. The policy of of common international demands. These are “corenizatsia” enhanced the formation of Soviet relatively unfavorable conditions for center and ethnic intelligensia and its engagement in the process borders consolidation and political structuring. Partial of government of the ethnic territorial units. The recognition has especially unclear impact on state- institute of “titul’nost” was the system of informal building and democratization. If only few countries ensuring of collective rights of some groups and their recognize new states there are no many incentives domination over the rights of other groups. Russian to apply international norms and mechanism into scholar S. Markedonov reported that “in fact the internal politics. Moreover governments of these semi- Soviet state has institutionalized the ethnic groups as recognized polities could use external center interested a major subject of politics and state law… In practice in their recognition to extract economic resources. it has meant the formation of ethnical property on the At the same time the external centers could be territory marked as “national republic” (Markedonov, interested to preserve the situation of weakness of 2006:18). state institutions and legal norms in semi-recognized states in order to get some economic and geopolitical Abkhazia and South Ossetia had status of benefits. autonomous republic and autonomous oblast respectively in the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. “Transit” territories in the context of imperial The competition for “titular” benefits was very keen legacy there. In the Stalin era there were practically no After the disintegration of the USSR the new states Ossetians and Abkhazians in Georgian republican have been confronted with difficulties of territorial, elite. After the death of Stalin the situation has not cultural, economic and political boundaries changed much. Ethnic Georgians have retained consolidation and of formalization and standardization majority of leading positions in Abkhazia especially in

66 World Focus January 2017 the Communist party. In a letter to Khruschev emigration to Ottoman Empire after the Great Abkhazian popular poet Dmitri Gulia complained to Caucasian war. It was continued under Menshevik domination of Georgians that do not speak Abkhazian government that tried to create protective belt of in the party and state bodies of autonomy (Gulia). In “Cossack settlements” in Abkhazia and Ossetia 1978 first secretary of the Central committee of the (Achugba, 2006: 19-21). In the USSR politics of Georgian Communist Party E. Shevarnadze convicted resettlement has been supported by federal “chauvinistic politic” toward Abkhazians and abolished government. In 1937 “Abkhazpereselenstroi” was practices of “absolute distrust in cadre politics” founded. It has been engaged in the construction of (Marykhuba, 2007: 65). kolkhozes and resettlement of collective farmers from Georgia. During the period of 1939-1959 Georgian In the USSR the thesis of “brotherly population has increased till 66,000 people friendship of people” and then in the Khrushchev era (Demographic…). - of “new historical community – Soviet people” was widespread. The limits for ethno-political protest were According to 1920 peace treaty the territory narrow and contradictions between center and of Ossetia has been divided between two states autonomies were expressed in language and cultural (RSFSR and Georgia). South Ossetia has remained forms. “Language factor” has involved the in the Soviet Georgia. In 1944 Soviet government introduction of Georgian graphics in Abkhazian decided to move tens of thousands of Ossetians form alphabet (1938-1954) and Georgian language as a South Ossetia in Prigorod district of North Ossetia. teaching language in Abkhazian schools and colleges. Data about the dynamics of ethnic composition testify It also assumed the renaming of places including the reduction of the portion of the titular ethnic groups capital and creation of new historical narrative. in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Abkhazian intelligentsia sent to Moscow several protest letters (in 1956, 1967, 1978) which has The vagueness and arbitrariness of the included request for joining the RSFSR. boundaries created during the Soviet era have led to the emergence of “transition” territories (with mixed Similar actions have been taken in South population, culture, religion, two or more “external” Ossetia. In 1939 Georgian alphabet was introduced centers of influence, high level of communications as the basis for written Ossetian. In 1944 Georgian with neighboring regions etc.). Most evident examples languages became teaching languages in secondary are Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, Transdniesria, schools and in 1949 – in elementary schools. Nagornyi Karabakh and Chechnya. Their relatively Introduction of Georgian as a language of official conflict-free existence in the USSR was possible due correspondence has resulted in change of to the common political, ideological and economic administrative cadres. Afterwards the politics of framework. After the disintegration of the USSR the “georgianization” of the Stalin era was officially problem of discrepancy of various boundaries have recognized as “distortion of Lenin’s national politics”. became actual. The ethnic and interregional contradictions have been aggravated. The potential Abkhazians and Ossetians began getting of “exit” has increased. “Transitional” zones have “cultural compensations” including Sukhumi been transformed into zones of territorial conflicts or University, radio, television, public houses etc. Ethnic even civil wars. The secessionist political projects composition of administrative cadres has been have appeared in these zones, and in five cases the changed much. These footsteps of Moscow have unrecognized states have been created. promoted the nationalistic discourse. Territorial Polities Development in the Non- As in other parts of the Russian empire and Consolidated Borders Environment the USSR there have been territorial and resettlement All of the issues mentioned above mainly affected experiments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In “transitional” zones and, primarily, the non-recognized Abkhazia the process of resettlement became in tsarist states. “Transitional” nature of these territories, the era as a result of liberation of acres because of mass majority of which was characterized by intensive

De-Facto States and Effects of Partial Recognition: The Abkhazia and South Ossetia Case 67 communication flows, dilution of the economic, between Russia and Abkhazia (2015) envisages a cultural and political boundaries, hindered joint “defense and security space” with a unified group consolidation of the state and the nation. of Russian-Abkhaz troops. It is evident that this measure has a dual effect on the consolidation of The polities in question are vivid examples territorial borders. On the one hand, it minimizes of “transitional” territories with heterogeneous ethnic Georgia’s possible territorial claims, on the other hand composition, active cultural interaction with the – it increases their dependence on the neighboring republics which they once belonged to or states Russia and the borders with Russia become even emerging upon the disintegration of the USSR. The more diluted. majority of population of the semi-recognized states (in full or in part) coincided with the title ethnic groups Russian military presence in RA and RSO of other territorial units (South Ossetia – North Ossetia guaranties border security (sea border in Abkhazia (Russia), Abkhazia – Russian autonomies with the as well). According to available data, Russian military Abazin – Adyge population). presence in Abkhazia, including specialists and service personnel, amounts to 4,000 – 5,000 people and to Economies of certain “transit” territories 2,900 – 4,000 people in South Ossetia. Russian military were also largely based on goods and services transit. bases on the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia South Ossetia had a regional market (Ergnet) where comprise a part of the Southern military district of trade traffic from Georgia and Russia converged. Russia. Abkhazia had a sea port and a railroad connecting Russia and Georgia. These territories are also characterized by ambiguity of the citizenship regime. Overwhelming Armed conflicts of the first half of the 1990s majority of the RA and RSO population hold Russian within these territories resulted in partial territorial passports. “National passportization” is undertaken consolidation only of their borders. Until 2008, all too, but naturally these passports are of limited use. attempts to establish the territorial border control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were not successful and Armed conflicts of the first half of the 1990s the control was rather notional. In particular, a part similar to the 2008 conflict between Russia and of the Kodori Valley located within the territory of Georgia over South Ossetia smoothed out the ethnic Abkhazia was controlled by Georgia that attempted composition heterogeneity of the partially recognized to establish an alternative Abkhazian government states. The latest conflict in South Ossetia resulted in there. A similar situation also evolved in South Ossetia, yet another outflow of the ethnic Georgians and higher within the part of its territory where the alternative ethnic homogeneity within its territory2. In 2009, government was established. However, partial according to the official data, the Ossetians accounted recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia did not for as much as 80% (Official website of the President resolve the issue of further consolidation of the of the Republic of South Ossetia). In 2003 polities’ borders. composition of the population of Abkhazia was as follows: Abkhazians – 43.8%, Armenians – 20.8%, The 2008 armed conflict in the Caucasus and Georgians – 19.6%, and in 2011 - 50.71%, 17.39% recognition by Russia of the South Ossetia and and 17.93% respectively (The population of Abkhazia Abkhazia in April 2009 resulted in the border control – where is…). services agreements between the two republics and Russia. According to these agreements Russia Abkhazia and South Ossetia failed to settle undertakes to secure their borders until their border- the ethnic minorities’ issues. In the first instance these security forces are formed. According to the Treaty are the Megrells with the principal community in the on Alliance and Integration between Russia and South Gali District (40-60 thousand people, according to Ossetia (2015), border formalities and customs various estimates). The majority of the Mingrelians barriers are vanishing and the two countries form “a holds passports of Georgia and is forced to cross the single space”. The new partnership agreement border to obtain financial support provided by the

68 World Focus January 2017 government of Georgia (pensions, benefits, including Economic situation in Abkhazia is better due those provided for the persons with the official refugee to the country’s tourism potential (up to 3 mln tourists status). In 2009, on the initiative of the late Abkhazian in 2015) but 80% of all products consumed are President Sergey Bagapsh the parliament amended imported from Russia. Private ownership of land is the law “On citizenship” and gave to the Gali District prohibited. There are no foreign (not even Russian) population the right to citizenship of Abkhazia and to banks in the republic (Abkhazia). participation in elections. The opposition deemed it as an attempt to increase Bagapsh’ electorate and High level of penetration and the incongruity organized mass protest. Thus, the amendments were of various borders promoted “privatization” of the ruled out on the pretext of the need for “a more state by the economic actors, the military holding the transparent legal definition of the status of the Gali key positions in the system of power after the armed District population” (Parliament of Abkhazia conflicts, as well as defense and law enforcement revoked). Authorities of the Republic of South Ossetia agencies. In the opinion of Natalia Mirimanova restrict the rights of the ethnic Georgians who do not “majority of the governments of the region (South wish to revoke their Georgian citizenship and to accept Caucasus – Authors’ remark) can be described as the citizenship of South Ossetia, prevent the return “clan-based bureaucracy” deeply affected by corrupt of the Georgian “internally displaced persons” and informal practices (Mirimanova, 2006). The fact (South). that the former president (2011-2014) and prime Partial recognition of RA and RSO also failed minister (2005-2010) of the RA Alexandr Ankwab to result in consolidation of the economic borders. survived six assassination attempts, none of which These are still an economically attractive “shadow” has been tracked down, depicts how high the crime transit and illegal goods traffic channel. For instance, level in the Abkhazian society really is. certain experts believe that the basis of economic interaction between Turkey and Abkhazia is illegal Also, the use of the funds provided by Russia traffic as the Turkish cargo vessels “illegally, paying to Abkhazia and South Ossetia is non- no taxes or duties export from Abkhazia to Turkey transparent. Thus, Inal Khashig, an Abkhazian scrap metal, timber, coal, and cement, building political analyst, notes: “Corruption in Abkhazia is vast. materials and consumer goods in the opposite Our law-enforcement system is yet to be formed; it direction” (Karaev, 2012). is extremely weak and inefficient. Currently, the scale of corruption is threatening the sovereignty of our Partially recognized states are extremely Republic. The uppermost objective of the President dependent on economic assistance from other states is to reform the government system and to separate and/or international structures. For instance, Russian business from power” (Abkhazia is tiny). In 2014- financial aid to Abkhazia exceeded 7 billion rubles 2015 both republics passed an anti-corruption law. and roughly amounted to 8 billion rubles in case of South Ossetia in 2016. RSO’s lawful currency is the Development of political representation Russian ruble. The national currency of RA is apsar, institutes which is however rarely used in circulation; most Meantime, there is a noticeable progress in transactions are made in Russian rubles. development and functioning of the power and political representation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Factors Economic development data evidence that promote this process include the high level of economic incapacity of South Ossetia. The republic popular support of the nationalistic elites largely is a traditional agricultural region. Upon departure of determined by ethnic blending and the long-standing Georgian farmers their fields and vineyards are in threat of armed interventions in 1990-2000s. Thus, neglect. Other agricultural lands are owned by the the election system functions relatively well. Existing state, which prevents their development. Local conflicts of interest (for instance, the conflicts within agricultural production satisfies only 20% of the local the course of the presidential elections in Abkhazia in demand (South). 2004, in South Ossetia in 2011-12 (see below), political unrest in Abkhazia in 2016 did not result from the

De-Facto States and Effects of Partial Recognition: The Abkhazia and South Ossetia Case 69 ideological and political differences but from those of participated in the last parliamentary election of 2012 the economic interests of the clans. (35 seats, majority voting system).

The opposition mass media of Abkhazia and A noticeable mark in the politics of Abkhazia South Ossetia openly criticize the state and disclose was made by the 2004 presidential elections when a ugly facts; this, however, does not undermine significant event occurred. The elections resulted in legitimacy of the establishment as such. For instance, a change of power in the Republic and arrangements the society remained loyal to Vladislav Ardzinba, the between the key contenders (Raul Khadzimba – first President, despite high level of corruption within Sergey Bagapsh). This constituted the basis for the state government. However, when such negative further institutionalization of the primary universal trends become dangerous, there emerges a “re- rules of the game in the Republic, for enhancement democratization” trend joined by the tribal democracy of the political institutions that ensure power handover institutions (popular councils, councils of elders). by elections. Public officials in both republics are open and accessible for the population. Significance of the elections in South Ossetia is more controversial than in Abkhazia. Conflict of Political parties also champion particular the clan interests in South Ossetia and the interests. As an institution, these enjoy no significant controversial impact of Russia on the political process standing with the majority of the population. within the semi-recognized republic are evidenced Nevertheless, existence of the parties and political by revocation by the Supreme Court of the presidential popular movements assists in organization and, to a election (November 2011) won by Alla Dzhioeva certain degree, modernization of participation in the (56.7%), a candidate undesirable for the then political process. Following the example of Russia, President Eduard Kokoity. It was also stated that she the 2009 parliamentary election in South Ossetia was would not be allowed to participate in the re-election. the first to be organized on the one person – one vote However, the threat of breakup of the South Ossetia principle with the threshold of 7%. Nine parties took society was overcome: the standoff between the part in the last parliamentary elections in 2014, and opposition and the standing power resulted in a four of them passed the threshold to win seats in the compromise of re-election involving different new parliament. The opposition United Ossetia, led candidates. As a result, Dzhioeva became the Vice by former presidential contender Anatoliy Bibilov, Premier for Social Matters. won 20 seats, followed by the Unity of the People party with six seats. The People’s Party and Nykhas Recognition and Power Efficiency each captured four seats. The President of South Comparison of the internal political development of Ossetia elected by the nation is the head of state, as Abkhazia and South Ossetia supports the conclusion well as the holder of executive power. whereby the status of the non-recognized states (absence of the external guarantees of sovereignty Same functions are discharged by the and borders, an external regulatory framework as a President of Abkhazia. The 2011 extraordinary mandatory guideline) complicates formation of the presidential election in Abkhazia necessitated by the state and the nation by creating the unfavorable demise of President Sergey Bagapsh was won conditions for continuation of the “privatization of the through real competition by Vice President and state”. Struggle for recognition could be a certain former Premier Alexander Ankvab. In 2014 Ankvab reference point for the politicians and induce the was forced to resign over allegations of corruption political elites to demonstrate to the international and misrule, and opposition leader Raul Khadzhimba community compliance with the international was elected president. 129 public interest groups, as standards as an argument for recognition or, at least, well as four parties (United Abkhazia, the oppositional against reintegration in the republics, which they used Abkhazia Popular Unity Forum, Communist Party and to belong to. However, partial recognition of the states Party of Economic Development of Abkhazia) is no automatic guarantee of establishment of the beneficial conditions for the sovereign statehood and

70 World Focus January 2017 nation evolvement. Unresolved problems of ethnic a support instrument for the existing system of minorities prevent development of the democratic sovereignty (Ilyin, Kudryashova, 2011). mechanisms and provoke further territorial demarcation, while economic assistance is not always References efficient for the reasons of the general social and In Russian Abkhazia is Tiny, Corruption is Huge. URL: http:// www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/51228.html economic development level. Furthermore, Achugba Ò.À. Justification of the “Georgian Refugees’” Status. Sukhumi: participation of the external centers in the economic, Dom Pechaty, 2006. 96 p. Gulia D. To First Secretary of the Central Committee, Comrade N.S. social and political processes within the territories of Khruschev. URL: http://www.hrono.ru/libris/lib_a/abh509.php the partially recognized polities promotes conservation Demographic Situation as a Factor of Aggravation between Georgia and Abkhazia. URL: http://www.apsny.ru/history/history.php?page=content/ of their dependence and lack of self-sufficiency. nov_hist/pravov_asp.htm#4 Ilyin Ì.V., Kudryashova I.V., eds. Asymmetry of the World Sovereignty System: Zones of Troubled Stateness. Moscow: MGIMO-University, 2011. External political centers play a significant P. 20-47. role in political development of the “transitional” Karayev Z. The Turkish Coast of Abkhazia. URL: http://kavpolit.com/ territories but this role is ambivalent. On the one hand, tureckij-bereg-abxazii/ Markedonov S. De Facto States of the Post-USSR Zone // Proceedings of their competition and expansion result in dilution of the Institute of Eastern Europe. Edition 1. Non-Recognized States. Ì.: the borders of the partially recognized / non-recognized Territory of the Future, 2006. P. 13-27. Marykhuba I. Abkhazia: Its Past and Present (essays, documents, materials). republics thus promoting “privatization” of the state. Sukhumi: Alasharbaga, 2007. 360 p. On the other hand, the external centers to a degree Mirimanova N. Corruption and Conflicts in the Southern Caucasus. 2006. URL: http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/publications/ guarantee the existence of such territories by limiting Corrupt_Confl_Russian_small.pdf claims of the states that these formally belong to or Official website of the President of the Republic of South Ossetia. URL: http://presidentrso.ru/republicParliament of Abkhazia revoked amendments used to be a part of. Duality of the external centers’ to the Law on Citizenship. URL: http://abkhasia.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/ role becomes especially manifest during the period 157569 Population of Abkhazia. URL: http://www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru/ of partial recognition, which allows some of the players rnabkhazia.html that recognized a certain state to play an active role Population of South Ossetia. URL: http://www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru/ rnsossetia.html in the internal affairs of the polities recognized by South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition // http://www.crisisgroup.org/ such players. en/regions/europe/caucasus/georgia/205-south-ossetia-the-burden-of- recognition.aspx?alt_lang=ru The Population of Abkhazia – Where is the Truth?! URL: http:// Prospects of inclusion of the partially abkhazeti.info/news/1305685446.php recognized states in the international relations system Tsutsiev À. Territories of Troubled Sovereignty // Proceedings of the Institute of Eastern Europe. Edition 1. Non-Recognized States. Ì.: Territory of the as competent actors and, thus, establishment of the Future, 2006. P. 28-53. preferential conditions for state- and nation-building In English Bartolini S. Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building, are ambivalent, same as the consequences of partial and Political Structuring between the Nation State and the European Union. recognition as such. The situation is partially Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005. 639 p. Finer S. State-building, State Boundaries and Border Control: An Essay on determined by the lack of objective interest of the Certain Aspects of the First Phase of State-Building in Western Europe international community in any changes to the status Considered in the Light of the Rokkan-Hirschman Model // Social Science Information. 1974. Vol. 13. P. 79-126. quo as any resolution of the non-recognized states Hirschman A.O. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Response to Decline in Firms, issue potentially threatens further international tension Organizations, and States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970. and questions the universality of the international 162 p. Meleshkina E. Democratization in the Post-Soviet Countries of Eastern norms and regulations. As A. Tsutsiev rightly noted, Europe and “Nationalizing” Politics // Nationalism and Democracy: “looking back at the three epochs of evolution of the Dichotomies, Complementarities, Oppositions / Ed. by André Lecours and Luis Moreno. Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2010. P. 149-169. self-determination principle / right one can note that Roeder P.G. Where Nation-States Come From: Institutional Change in the the external self-determination “windows” opened Age of Nationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. 430 p. Rokkan S. The Center-Periphery Polarity// Center Periphery Structures in only with the need for legal formalization of the large- Europe: An ISSC Workbook in Comparative Analysis. Frankfurt a. M.: scale changes in the political map of the world, for Campus, 1987. P. 17-50. alignment of the political architecture of the entire Footnotes world” (Tsutsiev, 2006: 36). Given the imbalanced 1 The term proposed by Ph. Roeder (Roeder, 2007). 2 In the opinion of Ron Redmond, official representative of the Office of the and indefinite conditions of the contemporary United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the South Ossetia conflict international system, partial recognition may become resulted in 15 thousand South Ossetia refugees in Georgia, approximately 30 thousand of refugees from South Ossetia are in Russia (UN: the South Ossetia conflict resulted in more than 118 thousand refugees).

De-Facto States and Effects of Partial Recognition: The Abkhazia and South Ossetia Case 71 The Russian Model of Federalism and World Experience: General and Specific Dr. Marianna Abramova

Russia’s might lies on the free development of all her was quite a successful variant of resolving national peoples, in their diversity, harmony and cultures, in their and territorial questions and issues. But as the years languages, in their mutual respect, traditions, in the dia- went by, rigidity and the “guiding” role of the CPSU logue of followers of the Russian Orthodox Church and led to irreversible processes that brought about the Moslems, the followers of Judaism and Buddhism. collapse of the USSR. (President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin)1 The idea of Federalism came into being in The given paper examines the historical experi- Russia under the influence of the 1789 French Revo- ence of the Russian model of federalism: its evolu- lution. For instance, in 1818, Russian statesman, tion from its emergence in 1918 to the present day. Count Nikolai Novosiltsev proposed, for the first time, The author singles out peculiarities of the Soviet to separate the State into so-called Vice-regencies model of federalism, such as the absence of com- or “regions” that would possess a certain degree of petition among the various subjects and the blos- autonomy and a two-chamber parliament or Seime. soming off national cultures. The new model of However, this proposal of Novosiltsev’s failed to Russian federalism which emerged in 1991-1993 receive any further development. differed by its asymmetry, the complex structure of its subjects, budgetary federalism and other fea- And it was only after the Bourgeois Demo- tures. The author concludes that modernization of cratic Revolution in February 1917 that there again the existing model of federalism should proceed was talk about establishing Federalism. At the Con- along the lines of strengthening the horizontal ties gress of Peoples of Russia that was held in Kiev in and infrastructures, since this will promote the September 1917 – also known as the Federative evening out of the social-and-economic levels of Congress – participants spoke out in favor of estab- the 85 subjects of the Russian Federation. lishing a Federative Republic in Russia. Chairman of the Provisional Government, Alexander Kerensky, The Russian Federalism can be viewed as a in his message to the Congress, declared: “Convey complex and multifaceted phenomenon. The Russian to them (participants of the Congress) that only a Federation, which is acknowledged as the largest state decentralized Russia can be a free Russia.”2 How- in the world in terms of its territory, has gone through ever, the Provisional Government was unable to a transition from a unitary state to a Federation. From carry out its plan due to the October Revolution and the historical point of view, Russia grew and devel- the transfer of power to the Bolsheviks who pro- oped as a strong centralized state, but that “principle claimed Russia a democratic State, but did not pro- of development” cannot, in any way, be called uni- claim it a Federative Republic. tary. More likely, it could be called “imperialist” prin- ciple since it implied a multitude of religions, cultures, Thus, the idea of Federalism was not imple- ethnic groups and methods of governance. During the mented until January of 1918. It is noteworthy that process of state construction, the peoples and ethnic the Bolsheviks too did not immediately realize the groups who were living in the acquired lands, with the need to establish a Federation. They thought that a passage of time, began to feel they belonged to a single Federation presupposed autonomous, national politi- society. cal entities, but this ran counter to ideas and goals of the Socialist Revolution. Nonetheless, in January of Subsequently, a Soviet-styled Federalism based 1918, the Declaration of the Rights of the Workers on the same principle came into being. Initially, that and Exploited People proclaimed the establishment 72 World Focus January 2017 of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic its territorial structure. And then, in March of 1992, a (RSFSR). The Soviet Russian Republic was founded Federative Treaty consisting of three parts was signed on the basis of a free union of free nations as a Fed- with the regions, but with the exception of eration of Soviet National Republics. and Chechenya.

The next stage in the establishment of Fed- Subsequently, the main principles of that eralism was its consolidation in the Treaty on the Treaty were incorporated into Russia’s 1993 Consti- Formation of the USSR in 1922. There were four tution and consolidated the asymmetry of the politico- republics. In 1940, there were sixteen republics in legal status of the subjects making up the Russian the USSR. Later, in 1956, the Karelo-Finniish Re- Federation. Therefore, it is precisely the asymmetry public became an autonomous republic in the frame- in the status of the subjects of the Russian Federa- work of the RSFSR, thereby fifteen republics re- tion that can be viewed as the main reason for the mained in the USSR. And all republics possessed the currently emerging social-economic, cultural and na- status of sovereign states, since the Treaty contained tional problems on the agenda of upgrading Russian a normative statute which allowed them to leave the Federalism. USSR. Therefore, all republics were sovereign state entities, and herein lies the unique historical form of Let us examine the principle which the the states making up the USSR. However, in prac- present-day Russian Federation is base on. It is com- tice, the Union republics were unable to exercise the mon knowledge that practically all stable Federations right to secede, since in the Soviet period socialist in the world today (the USA, Australia, Brazil) are ideology united them. What is more, the bodies of based on the territorial principle which ensures their state power and governance formed a single, unified stability. The Russian Federative model can be called system, whose decisions were mandatory for all re- a “mixed” model built on a territorial-national prin- publics. ciple which right from the start introduces an ele- ment of confusion in its name. It is made up of dif- Since these republics were based on a uni- ferent types of territorial units (let’s call them sub- form system of state governance, on a unified sys- jects” of the Federation: 22 Republics, 9 krais (terri- tem of law and principles of national economic spe- tories), 46 oblasts (regions), 4 autonomous okrugs cialization, these regions supplemented each other and (districts), one autonomous oblast (region) and three therefore, did not compete with each other in eco- Federal cities – Moscow, Saint-Petersburg and nomic, political and other fields. Unity of these enti- Sevastopol. ties was also defined by the guiding role of the CPSU. All these subjects have their own legislative, executive and judiciary bodies. Therefore, since Rus- Taking into account the existence and the sia is the largest Federation in the world having six disintegration of the USSR – as a Federation that different names for its subjects, this allows one to was based on the national principle - we must admit speak about the inequality and uncertainty of the le- the deficiency of such a narrow-minded understand- gal status of these subjects. For example, the Repub- ing of its institutions that led to cramming national lics are equated with the State, and they have their formations of the population into State-like structures, own Constitutions, whereas the territories, regions, i.e., dividing up the people into national communes, Federal cities, the autonomous region and autono- and “providing” some of them with a status corre- mous districts adopt Charters. sponding to a legal-state form of an organization. What is more, the Republics have the right Nonetheless, the present-day model of the to establish their own state languages, and to utilize Russian State that was created without giving it seri- them along with the Russian language in the bodies ous thought still has many shortcomings. of State power, bodies of local self-government and After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Rus- executive institutions of the Republics. The other sub- sia faced the question of what was to be the form of jects of the RF do not have such a right. Therefore,

The Russian Model of Federalism and World Experience: General and Specific 73 one can say that the Constitution gives the National ciple, in particular such projects aimed at creating Republics a much higher status and broader powers so-called Ural, Vologda, Far Eastern and South Rus- than those of the regions and territories. Besides that, sian republics. I may also remind you of the so-called while examining the Constitution attentively, one can “Ultimatum-32” in which the “territories” and “re- spot another contradiction, namely Article 68 refers gions” demanded for themselves a status equal to to the Republics as “States.” This means that the that of national republics. The question of sovereignty “heads” of these “States” could be called “Presi- was even more acute in the national republics. They dents,” and indeed, this actually was the case until considered that they possessed sovereignty, and that 2010. Such a situation seemed to create a kind of this gave them the right to secede the Russian Fed- competition with the President of Russia: it turned eration any time they wished. This question triggered out that there were more than 20 presidents in the heated discussions both among politicians and legal State of the Russian Federation. In 2010, amendments experts. were introduced to the existing legislation, whereby the leaders of executive bodies of authority in the This dispute was finally resolved by Russia’s subjects could no longer be called “presidents.”3 To- Constitutional Court in 2000 when it handed down its day, they are called “Heads” of their respective Re- judgment on a request from the authorities of the Altai publics. Republic.5 The Court’s ruling was very definitive: the Constitution of the Russian Federation does not ac- Experts in law negatively assessed the can- knowledge any other entity carrying sovereignty or cellation of elections of the highest ranking officials source of authority other than the multinational peoples in the subjects of the RF in 2004: that is when Presi- of Russia, and consequently, does not presuppose dent Vladimir Putin tabled a proposal, whereby the there can be any state sovereignty other than the appointment of such officials to office was to be con- sovereignty of the Russian Federation. The sover- firmed by decisions of legislative bodies following a eignty of the Russian Federation excludes the exist- proposal by the President. Here, I might point out ence of two levels of sovereign authority within a that the last direct gubernatorial elections were held single system of state power – levels that would pos- in the Nenetsk Autonomous District in January 2005. sess superiority and independence, i.e., it does not In 2012, President Dmitri Medvedev reinstated di- allow sovereignty to either republics or to any other rect elections of the Heads of the subjects of the subjects of the Federation. Therefore, subjects of the Federation.4 But in 2013, President Putin once again Russian Federation do not possess sovereignty which returned to this issue and tabled amendments giving initially belonged to the Russian Federation as a whole. subjects of the Russian Federation the right whereby To recognize the republics as being sovereign at a heads of their subjects who came into office as a time when all the other subjects of the Russian Fed- result of general elections could be replaced by hold- eration did not possess sovereignty would be a viola- ing a vote on several candidates in their respective tion of the Constitutional equality of the subjects be- parliaments. As you may know, the “over-the-top” longing to the Russian Federation. objective of this novelty was to eliminate direct elec- tions in the Caucasus region. Therefore, it may be Therefore, even though Article 5 (Part 2) of said we are witnessing a consolidation of the vertical the Constitution employs the concept “republic (state)” of power as a tendency or trend in the political devel- this does not mean – unlike the March 31, 1992 Fed- opment of present-day Russia. erative Treaty – recognition of the state sovereignty of these subjects of the Russian Federation; it only One more problem concerning the asymme- reflects certain peculiarities of their Constitutional legal try of the Russian Federative model is evident in the status related to historical, national and other fac- question of sovereignty. In this connection, I would tors. like to remind you of the so-called “Parade of Sover- eignties” back in the 1990s that affected not only the The third problem related to the contempo- national Republics, but also strictly Russian subjects rary Russian Federative model concerns the compli- that were formed according to the territorial prin- cated composition of some of its subjects. Some ex-

74 World Focus January 2017 perts refer to such subjects as “matryoshka” (or Typical terms characterizing budgetary Fed- Russian “nest dolls”): the large one includes the small eralism are region-donor and region-recipient. In its ones. current state, the Federation can be viewed as a huge At the moment, two subjects of the Russian conglomerate of diverse administrative entities that Federation may be viewed as such “matryoshka” were created during different periods of time and for dolls: Tyumen Region which includes within itself the absolutely different purposes. Today, it is character- Yamalo-Nenets and the Hanty-Mansi Autonomous ized by a formidable and ever-intensifying differen- Okrugs (Districts) and Archangelsk Region which tiation as regards the social-economic development includes within itself the Nenets Autonomous Dis- of the regions with a predominant number of Federa- trict. The difficulty in their interaction that arises here tion Subjects displaying low indices of development. is because the legal status of the Districts has yet to The difference between them when it comes to the be defined. So far, there are no Federal laws con- majority of key parameters is really phenomenal, and cerning an autonomous “okrug” or district, although may exceed several-fold. For example, this is evi- attempts have been undertaken towards this end, but dent from the following fact: the city of Moscow with such a law existed during Soviet times. Throughout a population making up 6 % of the overall population the 1990s, these complicated compositions in such of the country controls the greater part of resources, regions gave rise to serious conflicts that were fi- and first of all, financial resources.Here, I would like nally settled only thanks to the efforts of the country’s to point out that such relationships between the Cen- leadership. One such solution of these conflicts was ter and its Subjects can also be seen in other Federa- achieved following a proposal to enlarge these sub- tions, for instance, in Belgium and Canada. jects.66 For example, referendums were held in the Perm Oblast (Region) and in the Komi-Permyak And now, let us try to define certain pros- Autonomous Okrug (District); as a result, these two pects for upgrading or modernizing the Russian Fed- subjects were united to form a single entity (subject) erative model. Historically, a specific feature of the that acquired a new name - (or Terri- administrative regions of Russia was that they formed tory). Subsequently, similar referendums were held around urban centers. The rest of the territory auto- in the Taymyr and Evenk Autonomous Okrugs (Dis- matically acquires the status of periphery. What is tricts), as well as in . Such refer- more, scientific literature notes that Russia is known endums resulted in the formation of Krasnoyarsk Krai not only for its relatively poorly developed transpor- (Territory) in 2007, (Territory) in tation routes, but also centripetal or radial nature. Not 2008, Pre-Baikal Krai (Territory) in 2008, and Za- only roads and highways, but railroads as well, origi- Baikal Krai (Territory) in 2008. However, these meth- nate in the capital (Moscow) and lead to the centers ods do not solve the problem. of oblasts (regions), and from there – on to the cen- ters of local municipalities. However, the following is The fourth peculiarity of Russian Federal- very important – the centers of neighboring regions ism stems from the budget relationship between the quite often have no direct connection routes, and Center (Federal Government) and the Subjects. Here, therefore, are compelled to communicate with one we are speaking precisely about a so-called budget- another via the capital of the country. According to ary economy within the framework of which the bud- the apt remark of Rostislav Turovsky:”…the natural get acts as the main source of financing social-eco- and nurtured polycentrism should be supplemented nomic development. Budgetary Federalism implies a with measures for overcoming the communicative specific type of relationship dealing with limiting bud- gap.”7 After all, this is the real meaning of the country’s get-related authority, expenditures, revenues, distri- unity which is to be achieved by developing horizon- bution and redistribution of the latter (i.e., revenues) tally rather than by consolidating vertically. There- between the Federal budget and the budgets of the fore, we believe that development of direct horizon- Subjects in the Federation, in order to ensure unity of tal routes of communication, as well as other types the general State interests and the interests of the of communication, and the entire infrastructure populations living in the territories of the Subjects in among the subjects (rather than via the capital city) the Federation and Federal municipal entities. is the main task of upgrading Russian Federalism to-

The Russian Model of Federalism and World Experience: General and Specific 75 day. This situation differs substantially from that in introduces a special clause into the Family Code that practically all industrially developed countries that have makes it possible to lower the marrying age in accor- many centers of economic potential and influence. dance with the national traditions of this or that Sub- And that is why one of the main problems that Rus- ject.8 sia faces today is to decisively overcome mono-cen- It is also worth mentioning another similar tricity and to expand possibilities for development of mechanism for executing administrative authority that its regions. It is precisely decentralization that will allows establishing minimal administrative fines in ac- make it possible to activate considerable regional cordance with the social-economic development level capabilities and forces which, in their turn, will help of the Subjects of the Russian Federation. This indi- in overcoming the periphery alienation syndrome. cates that one should not negatively assess the Rus- sian model of Federal governance; it has acquired The process of enlarging subjects (in terms quite unique experience in combining the interests of territory) can be viewed as one more way of re- and traditions of different nationalities, peoples and solving the problem of Federative structuring. De- ethnic groups, religions and cultures, which actually bates and discussions on this issue have been going represents the over-the-top task or objective of pre- on since the Federative Treaty was adopted in 1992 cisely the Federative model of governance. and the Constitution in 1993. Politicians and scholars have been arguing over the need to enlarge the Sub- Now, let us try to sum up. It would be cor- jects of the Federation by reducing their number. It is rect to say that a promising vector in the develop- our opinion that the arguments about the number of ment of the Russian Federative model would be stra- Subjects are nevertheless secondary although it ap- tegic modernization of precisely budgetary relations pears to be quite obvious that their present-day num- between the Federal Center and Subjects in order to ber – 85 – is indeed a very large number. But what lessen the asymmetry, to do away with distributive is even more important is this – to even out the levels relations, and to begin implementing their own indus- of social-economic development of these territories, trial and agricultural state policy – all this will enable to launch a comprehensive and mutually beneficial the Subjects to release themselves from “tethered” utilization of their resources, as well as to ensure the management by the Center, and to go over to equi- financial self-sufficiency of the Subjects. table relationships in a Federal structure.

In particular, this point is emphasized in the Footnotes 1 Putin V.V. The President’s Address to the Federal Assembly. December 3, 2015 Concept for long-term development up to 2020 in // (Electronic Source) http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50864 ( which “economic regionalization” is viewed as the Date of statement16.11.2016) 2 Kerensky A. Lost Russia. Moscow, 2007, p. 135. key element. What is more, here, we are not talking 3 (Electronic Source) http://governors.ru/ (Date of statement16.11. 2016) 4 Alla Boyarova, Igor Kiryanov,Oleg Podvintzev. INSTITUTE OF ACTUAL about changing or altering the administrative struc- APPOINTMENT OF HEADS OF SUBJECTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERA- tures, but rather about economic specialization of TION: RATIONAL AND HISTORY PRACTICE TEST //Power, 2012, ¹7, p. 40-44 http://cyberleninka.ru/ larger regions. Therefore, we may say: the Russian article/n/institut-fakticheskogo-naznacheniya-glav-subektov-rf-obosnovanie- istoriey-i-ispytanie-praktikoy#ixzz4QB3HdwnF(Date of statement16.11. 2016) Federation today is a Constitution-and-Treaty based, 5 Official website of Russia’s Constitutional Court -http://www.ksrf.ru/ru/ mixed, poly-Subject Federation that still has quite a info(Date of statement29.05.2016) 6 For example, referendums were held in the Perm Oblast (Region) and in the number of unresolved legal, socio-economic, political Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug (District); as a result, these two subjects were united to form a single entity (subject) that acquired a new name - Perm Krai and cultural problems. (or Territory). Subsequently, similar referendums were held in the Taymyr and Evenk Autonomous Okrugs (Districts), as well as in Krasnoyarsk Krai. Such referendums resulted in the formation of Krasnoyarsk Krai (Territory) in 2007, At the same time, I would like to note that Kamchatka Krai (Territory) in 2008, Pre-Baikal Krai (Territory) in 2008, and Za- Baikal Krai (Territory) in 2008. However, these methods do not solve the prob- the Russian model of Federative governance also has lem. 7 Turovsky R. EFFECTIVENESS AND DEMOCRACY SCORES OF RE- positive features. Although it is based on worldwide GIONAL POLITICAL REGIMES IN MODERN RUSSIA: THE CONTRO- practice of employing the mechanism of sharing au- VERSY OF MEASUREMENT’S THEORY AND PRACTICE// PolitBook, 2013, #1, p.8-32. http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/effektivnost-i-demokrati thority (power) between the Center and the Subjects, chnost-regionalnyh-politicheskih-rezhimov-v-sovremennoy-rossii- protivorechiya-teorii-i-praktiki-izmereniya#ixzz4QB6RjAQv(Date of statement the Russian model differs in that it tries to take into 16.11. 2016) 8Article 13, Family Code of the Russian Federation. //http://www.consultant.ru/ account the national peculiarities of its Subjects. For document/cons_doc_LAW_8982/d431b248afe31c49fd597b5beb10122 example, it has quite a unique mechanism whereby it ca74df291/(Date of statement 16.11. 2016)

76 World Focus January 2017 Russia’s Nuclear Strategy in the New Geo-Strategic Paradigm Dr. Roshan Khanijo

The disintegration of the Soviet Union led to kept the arms industry flourishing and the aspiration a drastic shift in the global architecture. The world to build and modernise offensive weaponry and de- went from a bipolar world to a seemingly unipolar velop and deploy new type of weapons is weakening one and the new Russian state had to contend with global security. Furthermore another cause for con- the distinctive problems and security challenges that cern is that the system of treaties and agreements in emerged due to the reconfiguration of its geographi- the arms control sphere, as well as the principles of cal boundaries. Since then the global power balance equal and indivisible security are not being observed has been in a constant state of flux and in the new in the Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, and Asia-Pacific re- world the classical Cold War has shifted into a Neo gions as militarization and arms-race processes are Cold War of sorts wherein Russia has been forced developing in regions adjacent to Russia3. to recalibrate its own policies in response to shifting power paradigms and its altering national interests. Russia’s problems on the Southern front have The new currency of global power is based on eco- actually deteriorated due to the long-term desta- nomic development which is now one of the primary bilisation that has occurred in the Middle and Near markers of global influence. The effectiveness of the East, but Russia is prepared for this contingency and World Trade Organisation (WTO) and other west- can play an active role in ensuring relative stability ern led monetary systems has declined and several and security in its neighbouring regions and the world rivalling bilateral and multilateral trade/economic in general4. This belief in its increased geostrategic agreements have emerged in Asia. Russia’s current role can be deduced from the recent demonstration policy is based around integrating itself within these of Russia’s military capabilities. While the current emergent monetary structures for the improvement geopolitical system requires economic strength in tan- of its economic growth and global influence. The dem with military strength to ensure sustenance as a Russian Foreign policy is therefore currently under- major global power, Russia does not necessarily see going a tremendous transformation on the geopoliti- its economic weakness as a geopolitical lacuna. While cal, politico-economic as well as geostrategic fronts. it still has a considerable amount of progress to make As Russian analyst Sergei Karaganov, states “The before calling itself an economic leader, it believes disintegration of the post-Soviet and historical Rus- its military supremacy especially its nuclear weap- sian imperial space, which could have triggered more ons guarantees its status as a superpower and Rus- conflicts and invited external forces to struggle for sia therefore retains the confidence that it possesses influence in this space, has been partially stopped and the requisite capabilities to thwart any opposition it may even, be reversed. The conflict in Ukraine is an might encounter. Russia was a superpower in the past aftermath of such disintegration. The creation of the and it believes that its current military strength is still Russia-Belarus Union State and the EAEU, and the superior to that of its adversaries. The military has strengthening of the CSTO are steps that lead to fur- been and will be the key weapon in its arsenal for ther consolidation1”. global dominance and is a guarantor that aids Russia in preserving its national interest. Therefore, Russia Nevertheless, the Russians believe that the has undertaken tremendous efforts to transform its process of shaping a new polycentric world order is military doctrines in order to ensure they are relevant being accompanied by an increase in global and re- and concurrent with shifting geostrategic require- gional instability and the role of force as a factor in ments. Two major facets of Russia’s military doc- international relations is not declining2. Fears regard- trine which have gained salience given the recent ing the defense of a country’s sovereign borders has shifts in the global power nexus are – its military Russia’s Nuclear Strategy in the New Geo-Strategic Paradigm 77 modernisation program, and the use of nuclear weap- infrastructure of NATO member countries near the ons in the resolution of conflict scenario. Both of these borders of the Russian Federation, including by fur- policy shifts are interlinked and need to be re-exam- ther expansion of the alliance; ined to theorise Russia’s evolving military attitude. . The deployment (build-up) of military contingents Before one discusses Russia’s nuclear policy it is of foreign states (groups of states) in the territories essential to review and understand the Russian mili- of the states contiguous with the Russian Federation tary doctrine as it is a key indicator of Russia’s mili- and its allies; tary strategy. Furthermore, policy doctrines are im- The establishment and deployment of strategic mis- portant signposts that provide an inlet into examining . sile defense systems undermining global stability and a nation’s military intentions, the expected develop- violating the established balance of forces related to ment of its force structures and its overall military nuclear missiles, implementation of the global strike preparedness. concept, intention to place weapons in outer space, as well as deployment of strategic non-nuclear sys- The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federa- tems of high-precision weapons; tion Russia’s latest “Military Doctrine” was made public . The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in a press release in 2014. The Doctrine contained missiles and missile technologies. three salient parts: - The first part highlighted “Gen- eral Provisions” and contained the main provisions Similarly, the doctrine also highlights various of the military policy and of military-economic sup- core internal military risks, main military threats, and port for defense of the State based on the analysis of several other characteristic features and specifics re- military risks and military threats facing the Russian garding current military conflicts. Furthermore, the Federation and the interests of its allies5. This sec- military doctrine also states that Nuclear weapons tion provides the definition of certain basic terms and will remain an important factor in preventing the out- contextualises them with respect to national re- break of nuclear military conflicts involving the use sponses. For example, a military threat is defined as of conventional arms (large-scale war or regional a situation in the inter-state or intra-state relations war). characterized by a real possibility of an outbreak of a military conflict between opposing sides and by a high The final caveat is of particular interest as it degree of readiness of a given state (group of states) highlights the potential use of nuclear weapons for or separatist (terrorist) organizations to resort to mili- retaliation in conventional warfare situations as well. tary force (armed violence)6. Based on the defini- Additionally, the fact that these weapons could be tions provided in the first section, the second section used in a regional context is an incredibly threatening of the doctrine deals with Military risks and military addition to the doctrine that could potentially increase threats, while the final section deals with the military insecurity within the region thereby lowering the cu- policy of the Russian Federation. This section high- mulative nuclear threshold and further destabilizing lights the Russian Federation’s activities, its attempts the geostrategic region. It is essential therefore to to Deter and Prevent Military Conflicts, the Employ- closely examine and understand the various nitigrities ment of its Armed Forces, the Development of its involved while keeping a holistic view of the Russian Military Organisation, the Mobilisation Preparation Nuclear policy and its impact on Geo-politics. and Mobilisation Readiness of the Russian Federa- tion and so forth. Nuclear Policy of Russia Unlike some other countries, Russia does not have According to the Russian military doctrine the main an explicitly defined/written nuclear doctrine and the external military risks are7: Russian nuclear posture therefore can be gauged The build-up of the power potential of the North through the nuclear policies mentioned in its military . doctrines and by the statements made by Russia’s Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and vesting political and military leadership. For the Russians, NATO with global functions carried out in violation nuclear weapons serve two primary functions namely of the rules of international law, bringing the military deterrence and de-escalation. The former refers to a 78 World Focus January 2017 standard global understanding involving the usage of nario12.” Furthermore, the then Colonel-General nuclear weapons as deterrents to contain the threat Vladimir Nikolayevich Yakovlev, Commander of the of a large-scale (global) nuclear war. This is essen- RVSN (Strategic Missile Troops), had stated that: tially, a default mission that has been around since “The need for Russia’s orientation toward expanded the dawn of the nuclear era. The second function nuclear deterrence, which means including not only which has been added rather recently however re- nuclear and wide-scale conventional wars, but also quires further examination. Formulated for the first regional and even local military conflicts in the sphere time in the 2000 Military Doctrine, the second func- of interests of the RVSN and Strategic Nuclear tion is based on Russia’s idea of de-escalation, which Forces as a whole, is because of a number of objec- refers to the potential of a limited nuclear response tive reasons13.” Aleksey Arbatov, the then Deputy to a large-scale conventional attack. Russia defines Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee and this attack as one that could seriously threaten Russia’s Duma Deputy Petr Romashkin had also gone on territorial integrity and/or vital interests, but not [wipe] record to state that “For Moscow’s part, ‘enhancing Russia from the global scene.8 This de-escalatory deterrence’ presumes the first-use of nuclear weap- mission allows for the infliction of “tailored” (as op- ons ‘in response to large-scale aggression involving posed to “unacceptable”) damage. Furthermore, tai- the use of conventional weapons in situations critical lored damage has been defined as “damage, [which to the national security interests of the Russian Fed- is] subjectively unacceptable to the enemy [and] ex- eration14.” All these statements taken together dem- ceeds the benefits the aggressor expects to gain as a onstrate a clear ideological shift from the ‘No First result of the use of military force9.” The essence of Use’ policy to a potential ‘First Use Scenario’. This this strategy has been conveyed in all its military doc- concept has not changed since then and several west- trines including the present one which states that “The ern powers believe that Russia has formally adopted Russian Federation shall reserve the right to use a nuclear escalation doctrine in which the introduc- nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear tion of nuclear weapons into a conventional conflict and other types of weapons of mass destruction is characterized as “de-escalation” of the conflict. against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of This can be substantiated with the then Colonel-Gen- aggression against the Russian Federation with the eral Yakovlev statements that “The general-purpose use of conventional weapons when the very exist- forces have been reduced, their global rearmament ence of the state is in jeopardy10.” Thus, one can is impossible in the foreseeable future, and Russia is state that Russia’s nuclear posture has been rather compelled to reduce the threshold for the use of consistent since 1999. This can be seen by the vari- nuclear weapons and extended nuclear deterrence ous statements made by the Russian political and to conflicts of lesser scales and to openly warn about military leadership, signaling a shift in their policy that15” as nuclear weapons are capable of nullifying outlook. For example, in November 1999 Nikolai the combat qualities of all modern conventional sys- Mikhailov, then the First Deputy Defense Minister of tems16.” He further stated that the strategy involves the Russian Federation, was remarkably candid about the modernization of the Russian nuclear forces, the the new nuclear escalation strategy and he states increase in the level of training of those forces, and that: “This strategy boils down to the threat of using the possible combination between conventional ac- nuclear weapons against any aggressor at a scale tions and the use of nuclear forces, including possibly ensuring unacceptable damage to such aggressor. The in the framework of a hybrid war17,” These state- amount of damage should be such as not to provoke ments and the subsequent changes in policy emerged the aggressor into escalating the use of nuclear weap- out of the shift that was occurring in the international ons without a justified reason. In other words, the power balance. The US had demonstrated its con- point at issue is a limited use of strategic nuclear ventional weapons superiority during the Gulf War in forces adequate to the threat11.” He also states that 1990 and the Kosovo conflict which occurred around “For the nuclear deterrence strategy as a means of the same time period were triggers that threatened ensuring Russia’s national security to be effective Russian sovereignty. The duress felt on the interna- each of the other nuclear states should be vulnerable tional front as well as within the homeland became to Russia’s nuclear forces under any conflict sce- reason enough for Russian policymakers to re-ex-

Russia’s Nuclear Strategy in the New Geo-Strategic Paradigm 79 amine and renovate a static military doctrine. The warfare, weapons based on new physical principles need of the hour was the creation of a firm, innova- that are comparable to nuclear weapons in terms of tive, action based military doctrine that protected effectiveness, information and control systems, 6) Russia’s sovereign interests. Russia’s answer to this drones and autonomous marine vehicles, guided ro- global paradigmatic shift was the notion of de-esca- botic weapons and military equipment20”. The Rus- lation—a strategy [based on the understanding that] sians have taken into account the shifting dynamics the threat of a limited nuclear strike would force an of conventional military warfare in a technological opponent to accept a return to the status quo ante18. age and adapted their doctrine to these modern de- Such a stratagem therefore would use Nuclear weap- velopments. By accounting for potential force ma- ons not only as a deterrent against Nuclear attack nipulators and modernized technological upgrades that but against conventional attack as well. And in order could redefine warfare in the future as well, the Rus- to ensure this deterrence, it was essential for the re- sian policymakers attempted to create a pliable doc- taliatory nuclear reaction to be of a credible minimal trine that could adapt to a variety of situations and force thereby necessitating the creation and usage threats. The Russians are making an attempt to re- of non-strategic weapons. Thus Russia’s de-escala- establish their geopolitical and geostrategic dominance tion policy represented a re-emergence of the impor- through these military measures. However; they be- tance of nuclear weapons in defense strategy (after lieve that their implementation of an independent for- a period when these weapons’ salience had de- eign and domestic policy is being unduly opposed by creased) and became a game changer, re-establish- the United States and its allies, who seek to retain ing Russia as a strategic military pivot on the map. their dominance in world affairs, by the containment This is evinced by the fact that ever since then all and prevention of the proliferation of Russian influ- large-scale military exercises that Russia conducted ence. The Russians further believe that the US and beginning in 2000 have featured simulations of lim- NATO are willing to implement this containment ited nuclear strikes19. The purpose of these efforts through every means possible including but not lim- and this policy shift was to deter the United States ited to the application of political, economic, military, and its allies from getting involved in conflicts in and and informational pressures on it, which needs to be around Russia’s immediate geostrategic addressed21. Contemporary Russian strategy and neighbourhood. foreign policy is focused on restoring the power of the nation in its traditional area of influence/dominion The situation for Russia has not changed and defending Russia from external challenges. much since then. It is veritably an unstable political Therefore; the political and military leadership has impasse given that the ongoing situation in Ukraine placed particular emphasis on the modernization of and Russia’s incontrovertible standoff with America its nuclear forces. Russia aims to reconfigure its mili- and its European partners – the North Atlantic Treaty tary doctrine to make it adaptable enough to address Organization both have the potential to escalate given known threats - from United States and NATO – as the slightest provocation. These sanctions and politi- well as unknown threats emanating from Europe and cal manoeuvres have compelled Russia to amend their Asia. Russian officials have made several statements military doctrine to incorporate retaliatory responses regarding the potential use of limited strike nuclear to a plethora of instigator attacks. The doctrine has weapons against NATO missile defense facilities. been amended to deal with emergent technological Russian leadership has also gone on to state that they threats as well and now states that the “Characteris- may increase the readiness of its nuclear forces in tic features and specifics of current and future mili- reaction to limited regional scenarios that do not in- tary conflicts can be due to 1) integrated employ- volve WMD attacks or threats to its “very exist- ment of military force 2) political, economic, infor- ence22.” mational or other non-military measures implemented with a wide use of the protest potential of the popula- Modernisation of Weapons tion and of special operations forces; 3) the massive If one were to psychoanalyze the various threats that use of weapons and military equipment systems, 4) pressured Russia into adopting more aggressive mea- high-precision and hypersonic weapons, 5) electronic sures in its military doctrine, one would find the his-

80 World Focus January 2017 torical emergence of several triggers such as the ing its Tu-160 Blackjack bombers, by reopening the build-up of the military potential of the North Atlantic Blackjack production line26. Several of the Russian Treaty Organization (NATO), and its subsequent en- systems have become old and obsolete and the thrust dowment with a plethora of global functions pursued of the political and military leadership is aimed at de- in violation of the norms of international law. Another veloping, installing and creating newer versions of set of triggers could also be the galvanization of the weaponry and armament. As far as SSBNs are con- bloc countries’ military activity, and the further ex- cerned the Russian Navy operates a fleet of 12 pansion of the alliance, followed by the placement of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) its military infrastructure disconcertingly close to of three classes: Six Delta IVs (Project 667BRDM), Russian borders. All these triggers together can be three Delta IIIs (Project 667BRD), and three Boreis seen as responsible for the creation of a threat to (Project 955). Each submarine can carry 16 subma- national security23. In the last decade and a half, rine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) for a com- Russia has made sustained efforts in allocating re- bined total of nearly 800 warheads. It is believed that sources towards the modernization and strengthen- gradually the Delta class is being replaced by Borei- ing of the nation’s military. According to Hans M. class submarine and the Borei-class modernization Kristensen and Robert S. Norris as on early 2016, will increase the capability of the Russian SSBN fleet the country had a stockpile of approximately 4500 as they will be able to carry more warheads than the nuclear warheads assigned for use as long-range stra- current one27. tegic launchers and shorter range tactical nuclear forces. Additionally; the Russian inventory also con- Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons sists of as many as 2800 weapons that have been Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons consists of retired on paper, but still largely await dismantlement, cruise missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, aircrafts. thus forming a total inventory of about 7300 weap- Russia’s apparent focus in the past has been on the ons. The modernization program reflects the low-yield nuclear weapons the “nuclear scalpel”, as government’s conviction that strategic nuclear forces a means to terminate a conventional conflict on terms are indispensable for Russia’s security and status as favourable to the Kremlin28 . These weapons were a great power24. However, given Russia’s economic to be used as a strategy, whereby escalating the con- slump, it will be a challenge to achieve and sustain a flict with the threat of use of nuclear weapons in high level of military modernization due to budget order to achieve de-escalation. The Russian military crunches which are already responsible for forcing continues to attribute importance to nonstrategic trade-offs between nuclear and conventional pro- nuclear weapons for use by their naval, air and mis- grams. sile-defense forces, as well as on their short-range ballistic missiles and Russia has roughly 2000 non- Strategic Nuclear Weapons strategic nuclear warheads assigned for delivery by The Russians have invested substantially in their mod- air, naval, and various other defensive forces29. Fur- ernization program and have categorically invested thermore, these weapons provide the dual benefit of in all the three major classes of weapons essential offsetting the advantage that NATO’s conventional for their military strategy. These three classes include military possesses while simultaneously containing strategic nuclear weapons, nonstrategic nuclear China’s increasing conventional force in the far east weapons and conventional forces. As far as strate- (China has the largest number of cruise missiles in gic weapons are concerned Russia deploys an esti- Asia). mated 307 ICBMs that can carry approximately 1040 warheads, nearly 40% of the country’s total strate- Conventional Weapons & Niche Technologies gic warheads25. Furthermore, Russia is also procur- In terms of the conventional domain, technologically, ing eight Borei-class ballistic missile submarines the Russians military is inferior to the American one, (SSBNs), and is halfway through a ten-year program nevertheless the goal of the current leadership is to to build four hundred intercontinental ballistic mis- implement an efficient military modernization siles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic mis- programme and upgrade 70 percent of the army’s siles (SLBMs). Simultaneously, Russia is also updat- equipment modern by 2020. It must be stated here

Russia’s Nuclear Strategy in the New Geo-Strategic Paradigm 81 that the Russians are rapidly catching up to the Ameri- proliferation of arms, their commitment towards the cans as far as the development of conventional prompt maintenance, enforcement and execution of the trea- global vehicles are concerned, and the former also ties remains lukewarm to say the least. Both nations, claim to have conducted successful tests with re- (especially Russia) have developed distinct ap- spect to the development of hypersonic glide vehicles. proaches to tackle nuclear disarmament in their own The economic realities faced by Russia however individual capacity. might serve as a preventive or a deterrent towards the rapid culmination of its modernisation process. Nuclear Disarmament Despite Russia’s bravado the mainland is suffering During the period from 1979 to 1999, the commission from a harsh resource crunch due to international on Disarmament adopted, by consensus, guidelines sanctions and fluctuating oil prices. All of these ob- and recommendations on various disarmament is- stacles notwithstanding, however, there have been sues33. However, after the first sixteen interventions, reports that the Russians have developed a nuclear- the efforts towards disarmament hit a roadbloack of armed, submarine launched, self-propelled underwa- sorts. It has been now 20 years since the Confer- ter craft, that appears similar to a Russian nuclear ence on Disarmament last negotiated a multilateral drone30 The mission of the weapon is to “Damage treaty and it has been 17 years since the Disarma- the important components of the adversary’s economy ment Commission last adopted guidelines or recom- in a coastal area and inflict unacceptable damage to mendations34. This stasis or lapse in interest surround- a country’s territory by creating areas of wide radio- ing global disarmament can be attributed to the cur- active contamination that would be unsuitable for rent flux in global stability. The current age holds the military, economic, or other activity for long periods presentiments for a very challenging global environ- of time31". Russia has also made tremendous attempts ment that has witnessed growing tensions, and ter- to modernize Russia’s air and missile-defense forces rorism. Furthermore, the persistence of disagree- which are currently being upgraded to nuclear-ca- ments amongst several nation states has led to insta- pable systems. The S-300 air-defense system with bility and insecurity has become the motif of the hour nuclear-capable SA-10/20 interceptors is deployed and subsequently put a dent in multilateral disarma- across Russia and is slowly being upgraded to the S- ment initiatives. While US and Russia have signed a 400 system with SA-21 interceptors. There is also number of treaties, their adoption and implementa- an upgrade of the nuclear-tipped A-135 antiballistic tion of these measures remains tokenistic to say the missile defense system around Moscow that is said least. Furthermore, less powerful countries, threat- to be underway32. Thus, inspite of the various geo- ened by the geostrategic dominance of these super- political and economic challenges the Russian gov- powers follow suit placing their individual sovereign ernment is determined to forge ahead with its mod- interests above collaborative disarmament efforts. ernization programme that will form the cornerstone This can be seen clearly in the treatment of two ma- of Russia’s efforts at regaining global dominion. jor treaties namely the New Strategic Arms Reduc- tion Treaty (START) and the Treaty on Intermedi- It needs to be remembered that as of now, ate Range Nuclear Forces (INF). US and Russia retain the major share of global nuclear weapons. The two have also continued to develop New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty niche technologies aimed at targeting specific weak- The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) nesses and this technological and military rivalry has was signed in 2010 between the US and the Rus- caused geostrategic instabilities birthing an arms race sians and entered into force in 2011. According to in Asia. This volatile military environment has also this treaty by February 2018 each side is required to negatively impacted disarmament negotiations and reduce its strategic forces to no more than 1,550 de- adversely affected the bid towards arms containment ployed warheads on no more than 700 deployed stra- and control. While both countries recognize the com- tegic missiles and bombers. Despite the praisewor- plications that could emerge out of such an instable thy sentiments of the treaty the factual reality re- global military architecture, and have established bi- mains that there has been little [to no] progress to- lateral treaties in an attempt to control the wanton wards further nuclear arms reduction35. The Rus-

82 World Focus January 2017 sians have not committed towards a further reduc- range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilome- tion of their forces as no explicit agreement has been ters but not in excess of 1000 kilometers38. The in- reached to limit conventional weapons in Europe. This termediate-range missiles included for the United has created a tautological paradox of sorts wherein States of America were the Pershing II and the the Russians remain reluctant to reduce their forces BGM-109G and for the Russians it was the SS-20, due to the perceived threat posed by US and Europe, the SS-4 and the SS-5, the short range for the Ameri- while the latter refuse to stop the development of cans were Pershing IA and for the Russians it was their conventional forces due to Russia’s nuclear re- SS-12 and the SS-23. However, like most other trea- taliatory capabilities as well as internal geostrategic ties the inescapable suspicion on both sides has marred strife. Aside from conventional armament reduction, collaborative efforts as actions have been forgotten Russia’s two main objections have been - US de- in the rigmarole of exchanging allegations and counter ployment of interceptors in some of the NATO states allegations regarding violations on both sides. For (which serves as a major threat to Russian sover- example, the Russian officials claim that three cur- eignty) and in future these interceptors may be re- rent and planned U.S. military programs violate the placed by the modern faster versions, and finally the INF Treaty and those identified by them are (1) the American Conventional strike capabilities. Accord- use of intermediate-range missiles as targets during ing to the Russians, the American Prompt Global Strike tests of U.S. missile defense systems; (2) the use of possesses the capability to hit major Russian com- drones as weapons delivery vehicles; and (3) the mand and control systems including their silo based planned deployment of missile defense interceptors missiles. While the US has expressed interest in re- on land in the Navy’s MK-41 missile launchers39. newed negotiations that would involve all US and Russia claims that target missiles using Minuteman Russian nuclear weapons - strategic and non-strate- II motors violate the INF Treaty because they “have gic, deployed and non-deployed, Russian hesitance similar characteristics to intermediate-range missiles” regarding the same, given the lack of parity in terms and can fly to ranges covered by the INF Treaty40. of conventional armament is understandable. As a Similarly, on the flipside, the Americans have alleged result, these efforts have remained at a political im- that the cruise missile developed by the Russian Fed- passe and unless US and Russia reconcile their dif- eration meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground- ferences little can be achieved aside from deferrals launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 and extensions36. km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used to launch such a Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF The United States and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty41. In order to clear the impasse, it is essential Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) that both the parties resolve their security concerns on December 8, 1987. They exchanged the instru- together and the language and terminology used in ments of ratification, and the treaty entered into force the treaty. It is essential to clarify the differences on June 1, 1988. Article I of the treaty states that between permitted missile defence target missiles and each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and prohibited IRBMs and the differences between the shorter-range missiles, not have such systems there- UAVs and ground-launched cruise missiles42 if any after, and carry out the other obligations set forth in progress is to be made. this Treaty37. Article II describes major terminology, for example it states that “ballistic missile means a Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its Both countries need to respect each other’s nuclear flight path, the term “ground-launched ballistic mis- posture. The Americans need to understand the Rus- sile (GLBM)” means a ground-launched ballistic mis- sian policy of “escalate to deescalate” better without sile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle, “intermediate- jumping to apocalyptic conclusions. A better under- range missile means a GLBM or a GLCM having a standing of the other country’s military doctrine will range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not help iron out mistrust to an extent and can jumpstart in excess of 5500 kilometers” and the term “shorter- collaborative CBMs. While Russia needs to take into range missile means a GLBM or a GLCM having a account concerns regarding its nuclear posture, there

Russia’s Nuclear Strategy in the New Geo-Strategic Paradigm 83 is also a need for America and Europe to understand might disappear or become uncomfortably thin. There- Russian concerns regarding conventional forces in fore in order to safely engage in nuclear disarma- Europe for better confidence-building measures. Mili- ment and another round of arms reduction, Russia tary posturing especially in terms of the notification, would need to have a significantly higher level of observation and implementation of exercises, and in- predictability with regard to China’s modernization spections can be seen as a geostrategic threat and plans45 in order to protect its sovereign interests. As pose a great risk to national sovereignty. It is essen- President Vladimir Putin stated at the nuclear weap- tial to come together and allay each other’s fears ons laboratory in Sarov in February 2012 that “al- before building a base aimed at tackling a subject as ready the next steps [in nuclear arms reduction pro- tricky as global disarmament. The United States and cess] should … include all nuclear states; we cannot Russia, working with NATO members and other disarm non-stop while some other nuclear states are European states, could start by re-examining the increasing their [nuclear] arms46”. Furthermore, the Document on confidence and security build- Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabov had also ing measures, with the aim of lowering the threshold commented that “Any next steps in the area of for notifications and observations. Collaborative ef- nuclear arms reduction and limitation must be of mul- forts at negotiating boundaries would increase trans- tilateral nature. This would allow implementing them parency and reduce the risk of miscalculation and in a manner that would enhance international stabil- misinterpretation. Alternatively, NATO might try to ity and peace based on equal and undivided security engage Russia on a multilateral agreement based on as well as ensure verifiability and irreversibility of the 1972 Incidents at Sea and 1989 Prevention of measures that might be adopted47.” Dangerous Military Activities agreements43. Conclusion Multilateralization In conclusion, what needs to be remembered is that The Russian approach towards the reduction of the consolidation and reassertion of Russia’s geo- nuclear weapons has changed off late and, the political influence is taking place against a backdrop country’s political leadership is more interested in of new threats to national security that are of a mul- implementing multilateralization as opposed to bilat- tifarious and interconnected nature. Russia is pursu- eral negotiations. This posture has gained prominence ing an open, rational, and pragmatic foreign policy post the New START enforcement and can be par- with the view of retaining and maintaining its sover- tially attributed to the tremendous proliferation of eign interests. Russia’s long-term national strategic nuclear material. There has been a dramatic increase interests are aimed at strengthening the country’s in the number of nuclear weapons for the second- defense by implementing military policy through stra- tier nations. Furthermore; the secrecy with which tegic deterrence48. Russia has therefore adopted a several countries guard their nuclear problems is an- dual policy to deal with and combat the rising global other cause of concern as attempts at mitigating instability. Firstly, Russia is developing and nuclear attacks become much harder. Furthermore, modernising its military, which remains an integral the secrecy surrounding Nuclear capability causes part to Russia’s global power projections. This is es- further insecurity among other countries within the pecially evident in the political impasse between Rus- geostrategic region and thus becomes one of the key sia, NATO and the US wherein the former still relies reasons for nuclear proliferation. For example, one quite heavily on its militarily capabilities - both con- of the biggest contributors towards this global uncer- ventional and nuclear – in order to counter the ad- tainty is China. The high levels of secrecy that sur- versaries ‘Russia containment’ policy. Secondly, Rus- round its large-scale modernization program cause sia is also participating in multilateral engagement further insecurity within the geostrategic region as based disarmament procedures for global security. the size and the capability of its nuclear arsenal are While Russia isn’t opposed towards bilateral disar- difficult to predict with any degree of confidence44. mament efforts, it believes in an equitable reduction At the moment, the overwhelming superiority over of arms aimed at truly achieved a reduced global China provides Russia with a safety cushion, but if nuclear arsenal. It therefore wishes to create a mul- the attempts at nuclear reduction continue, that cushion tilateral system of treaties and agreements in the arms

84 World Focus January 2017 control sphere for better results that will not unfairly 24Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris,‘Russian Nuclear Force 2016’,Bulletin of the Atomic Scientiests, 15 April 2016, at http:/ hinder the sovereign interests of individual countries. /www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbul20 25ibid 26 Pifer Steven, “Pay Attention America, Russia is upgrading its Endnotes Military”,03 February 2016, The National Interest at http:// 1 Karaganov Sergei, “Global Challenges and Russia’s Foreign Policy”, nationalinterest.org/feature/pay-attention-america-russia-upgrad- Russia in Global Affairs, Council on Foreign and Defence policy,20 ing-its-military-15094?page=show November 2016, at http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Global-Chal- 27 Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris,‘Russian Nuclear Force lenges-and--Foreign-Policy-18468 accessed on 01 Decem- 2016’,Bulletin of the Atomic Scientiests, 15 April 2016, at http:/ ber 2016 /www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbul20 2Russian National Security Strategy, December 2015 – Full-text 28 Russian National Security Strategy, December 2015 – Full-text Translation, at http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/Otras Translation, at http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/Otras Publicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strat- Publicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strat- egy-31Dec2015.pdf egy-31Dec2015.pdf 3 ibid 29 See N-27 Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris, 4 See-1, Karaganov Sergei, “Global Challenges and Russia’s Foreign 30 Gertz, B. 2015. “Russia Nearing Deployment of New Intermedi- Policy” ate-Range Naval Missile.“ Washington FreeBeacon, August 21. 5The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, Press Release, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-nearing-deploy- 29 June 2015,, The Embassy of the Russian Federation to the ment-of-new-intermediaterange- naval-missile/ United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, at http:// 31 Podvig, P. 2015.“Is Russia Working on a Massive Dirty Bomb?“ rusemb.org.uk/press/2029 Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, November 10. http:// 6 ibid russianforces.org/blog/2015/11/is_russia_working_ 7 Ibid on_a_massive.shtml 8 Dr. Nikolai Sokov, Multilateralization of Nuclear Arms Reduc- 32 See N-27 Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris, tion process: Russian Attitude and Prospects for US-Russian Co- 33 Opening statement by the Chairman Ambassador Odo Tevi, operation, February 2013 Center for International strategy, Tech- Permanent Representative of Vanuatu, 4 April 2016, United Na- nology and PolicyProgram’on’strategic’stability’evaluation tions Disarmament Commission 2016 substantive session, at https:/ (POSSE), at http://posse.gatech.edu/sites/default/files/blogfiles/ /s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ Multilateral%20Nuclear%20Reductions%20Rev.pdf chair-opening-statement-undc-4-April-2016.pdf 9 ibid 34 ibid 10 See 5,The Military Doctrine of the Russian 35 Pifer Steven,‘The Future of US Russia Arms Control,’,26 Febru- 11 “Russia: Military Review Oct 99,” Moscow Voyeninform, 2 ary 2016, Brookings ,at https://www.brookings.edu/research/the- November 1999. In Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Doc. future-of-u-s-russian-arms-control/ ID: FTS19991108001431. 36 ibid 12 ibid 37 Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union 13 CINC Yakovlev Interviewed on 40th Anniversary of RVSN,” Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Inter- Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye No 17 Dec 1999. Trans- mediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), Bureau lated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Doc. ID: Of Arms Control and Compliance ,08 Deccember 1987, Treaty CEP19991229000022. As quoted by Mark Schneider in Nuclear Text at http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm#text force and doctrine of the Russian Federation, United States Nuclear 38 ibid Strategy Forum, 2006,at http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/ 39 Amy F. Woolf,‘Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range 2014/12/Russian-nuclear-doctrine-NSF-for-print.pdf Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty’, Congressional Research Service,20 14 Aleksey Arbatov, “View on the strategic debate over the relative October 2016 At https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43832.pdf utility of nuclear forces,” Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye 40 Moscow Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comments on the report Obozreniye, 22 December 2000. Translated in Foreign Broadcast of the U.S. Department of State on Adherence to and Compliance Information Service, Doc. ID: CEP20001228000113. with Arms Control, Non-proliferation, and Disarmament Agree- 15 “Yakovlev on 40th Anniversary of Rocket Forces,” Moscow ments and Commitments, Moscow, August 12, 2014, http:// Vek, 17 December 1999. Translated in Foreign Broadcast Infor- www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/D2D396AE143B098144257 mation Service, Doc. ID FTS1999122000029. D2A0054C7FD. 16 Col.-Gen Muravyev, Ground-Based Nuclear Forces,” Moscow 41 See-N-39 Amy F. Woolf, Armeyskiy Sbornik, 1 December 1999. Translated in Foreign 42 Pifer Steven,‘The Future of US Russia Arms Control,’,26 Febru- Broadcast Information Service, Doc. ID, CEP20000112000037 ary 2016, Brookings,at https://www.brookings.edu/research/the- 17 “Insight– Russia’s Nuclear Strategy Raises Concern in NATO.“ future-of-u-s-russian-arms-control/ 04 February, Reuters. 2015, at http://uk.reuters.com/ 43 ibid 18 See n-8,Nikolai N. Sokov.‘Why Russia calls a limited nuclear 44 Dr. Nikolai Sokov, ‘Multilateralization of Nuclear Arms Reduc- strike “de-escalation”, tion process: Russian Attitude and Prospects for US-Russian Co- 19 ibid operation, February 2013, Center for International strategy, Tech- 20The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, Press Release, nology and PolicyProgram’on’strategic’stability’evaluation 29 June 2015,, The Embassy of the Russian Federation to the (POSSE), at http://posse.gatech.edu/sites/default/files/blogfiles/ United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, at http:// Multilateral%20Nuclear%20Reductions%20Rev.pdf rusemb.org.uk/press/2029 45 ibid 21 Russian National Security Strategy, December 2015 – Full-text 46“Rossiya ne budet Razoruzhatsya v Odnostoronnem Poryadke, Translation, at http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/Otras Zayavil Putin,” RIA-Novosti, February 24, 2012; “Natsionalnaya Publicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strat- Bezopasnost Rossii. Putin. Sarov 2012” (http://www.nsnbr.ru/Rus- egy-31Dec2015.pdf sia/national_security/national_security_of_russia_ 22 Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris,‘Russian Nuclear Force putin_sarov.html). 2016’,Bulletin of the Atomic Scientiests,15April2016,athttp:// 47 See-39 Dr. Nikolai Sokov, ‘Multilateralization of Nuclear Arms www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbul20 Reduction process: Russian Attitude and Prospects for US-Russian 23 Russian National Security Strategy, December 2015– Full-text Cooperation” Translation, at http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/Otras 48 Russian National Security Strategy, December 2015 – Full-text Publicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strat- Translation, 28 June 2014, at http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/ egy-31Dec2015.pdf OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security- Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf

Russia’s Nuclear Strategy in the New Geo-Strategic Paradigm 85 Buryatia: Narratives of a Russian and Mongol matrix Dr. Suchandana Chatterjee

Among expectations about connectivity due to forced Russian settlements. There is also a across shared spaces in post-Soviet Eurasia, pertinent parallel discourse about internal displacement that questions have been raised about the complexity of examines how the Buryats were also the competitors relationships within the spatial units that the Eurasian of the Tungus whom they had displaced earlier in the nations collectively or individually represent. In the course of their settlements. The Baikal fabric was immediate aftermath of Soviet disintegration, ethnicity reconstituted as the Russians entrenched themselves within a Turkic, Mongol or Baikal space was given firmly in the Yenisei-Angara basins and forced the maximum attention and friction among ethnic groups Evenkis and the Tofalars to migrate from their of Eurasia was implied. Only in recent years the homeland. The original Buryat ethos, comprising of emphasis seems to have shifted from ethnic 16 tribal groups on both sides of Lake Baikal was polarization in Central Asia to fluid contours of space, reconstituted further with territorial adjustments that place and identity. Talking about varying degrees of brought it closer to the Mongol territory. 5 The attachment to different places of origin and places of mainstream Buryats of the Baikal region, depicted living, scholars have identified interactive behaviour as an ethno-linguistic group of a Mongol stock were in various landscapes and the ways in which the framed as a territorial unit (called the Buryat-Mongol people relate to that particular landscape.1 Others Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) with well- have argued that in post-Soviet Eurasia, social tension defined territorial identity markers like Aga brews at the ground level, arising out of intra-ethnic autonomous okrug (district), Ust-Ordinskii okrug [that differentiation and contested identities.2 In this paper, had high density of Buryat population] within the I shall discuss the case of the Buryats and their ideas Irkutskaya and Chita oblasts. of home and identity and inter-ethnic relationships vis-a-vis the Russians and the Mongols. The flexibility Till Soviet disintegration, the dominant of those relationships has generated complications in perception was Buryatia’s integration to Russian the post-Soviet context. At the same time, multi- culture. Most writings focussed on provinces and ethnicity is a manageable affair in Buryatia primarily regions with experiences of development and contact because integration is the dominant element in with metropolitan centres like St. Petersburg or Buryatia’s political culture.3 Some features of Moscow. In such descriptions, Buryatia was the integration that have been indicated are official status Soviet model of revolution and integration of to the four religions (Orthodox Christianity, Old Transbaikalia and the Far East. The unification Believers, Buddhism and shamanism) and consocialist (prisoedinenie) of Buryat-Mongol autonomous democracy despite the existence of heterogeneous republic within Soviet federation is an example of such settlements, divergent urbanization patterns and use a mechanism of centralized control. The Buryats, of language (as majority people living in the urban categorized as 16 ethno-territorial groups were areas speak Russian even though there is a integrated and assimilated into the Russian empire preferential and selective use of Buryat as a dialect through a Cossack fortification system that began of the Mongol language). 4 since the 17th century and extended upto the borders of China and Mongolia. There was an attempt by Buryatia and Russia: Historical Ties Russian imperial administrators to impart a system The Buryats settled as compact Mongol communities of governance to the region through ethnic around Lake Baikal, were subjected to Russian generalization. They were depicted as an ethno- incursions in the Angara region and were displaced linguistic group with shamanist affiliations and Mongol

86 World Focus January 2017 genealogies that made them constituent units of a migration as a survival technique and sought refuge Mongol ethnic stock. As they were integrated into with other Mongol kin groupings. The alliance with the Irkutsk governor generalate, the Buryats of the the Russians seems to have broken, but this did not Baikal region got an administrative status as well as completely exclude the Russians as relatives, an economic identity. Irkutsk and Kyakhta prospered especially as uncles. as economic hubs of the East Siberian governor generalate, and this imparted a new geopolitical profile The adaptability of Buryats in Mongolia as to Eastern Siberia. So, Buryat nationality proliferated members of the Khori clan also got affected over around language, territory and culture as well as a time. This was faced by the Aga Buryats who were single administrative structure. During the Soviet dispersed over three regions—-Russian Siberia, north- period, the Buryats who ideologically belonged to the eastern Mongolia and Inner Mongolia. The Aga Mongol commonwealth, were framed as a territorial Buryats were separated from other Mongol groups unit (the Buryat-Mongol Autonomous Soviet Socialist during Russian colonization and some of their Republic) with well-defined territorial identity markers intellectuals moved out to Outer Mongolia during the like Aga autonomous okrug (district) and Ust- Civil War in Russia after the October Revolution. Ordinskii okrug. These groups of Aga Buryats are scattered in Outer and Inner Mongolia which they now imagine as their Alternative scenarios homeland. It is because of their dispersal across The fact of the matter is that Buryatia is the original national borders that the Aga Buryats are said to have home of the 16 tribal groups that are spread all over two sets of homeland—their original homeland and the Buryat Republic and the adjoining four the one who are ‘borderlanders’. Not only do they autonomous regions and , China have strong attachment to their ‘lost homeland’ but and Mongolia. The historical reminder of this original also to their ‘plural homelands’. 7 The shamans’ homeland concept has produced debate about the presence in Aga Buryat region of Russia and the extent of group contact among the Khoris, Ekhirit performance of shamanic rites also point to the Bulagats and the Soiots and the character of Diaspora existence of ancestral lands of the shamans, bringing relationships across Russian boundaries. back memories of East Siberian as well as Mongol identities among the Aga Buryats. Newer assessments about family ties, i.e. ‘avuncular’ relationships’ in social anthropology Sometimes, the parameter of inter-ethnic terminology, in the Buryat homeland as well as in the bonding is not so crucial. Rural-urban relationships host society Mongolia where the Buryats settled or within Buryatia seem to be determined by personal resettled over time indicate the changing dynamics and individual contacts rather than group interests.8 of Eurasia’s shared spaces. The local experiences Some scholars even question whether the Buryat case are so varied and diverse that relationships based on at all represents an ideal model of ethnos-based genealogical connection tend to have lesser relevance. integration. The argument that is given here is about 6 Responsibilities and obligations of the nephew (zee) an urbanized culture centred in Ulan Ude which to the maternal uncle (nagasa) were fixed by Buryat impacts on daily living and the social fabric. The customary law of the 18th and 19th centuries and there ethnicity issue is least significant here.9So, the Buryats has been no reason to question that. But in the course have an ambiguous status—as federal members of of their live-in relationship with the Russians for the Russian Federation, they are tied to the Russian centuries, the Buryats have developed a parallel set fabric; as a transnational Mongol-speaking of avuncular relations with their Russian kin. But this community they share familial ties and historical links relationship was broken after the mass arrival of with Mongolia. Russian settlers which led to a loss of prestige on the part of Buryat clan leaders. Land acquisition by the Buddhism as a template of integration new Russian settlers became a bone of contention Today, the template of Buddhist integration is gaining which completely altered the pattern of goodwill recognition in Buryatia. Buddhism was encouraged relations with the Russians. The Khori Buryats used by the Russian Empire and was introduced in

Buryatia: Narratives of a Russian and Mongol matrix 87 Transbaikalia by the Tsarist government. It received diplomatic pursuits are sensational topics. But for state patronage in 1740 after the promulgation of the Buryats today, this was a moment of revelation. Edict on religion by Tsarina Catherine the Great. The Dorjiev and his fellow travellers like Badmaev long history of association between Buddhist lamas generated a space for activity for Buryat Buddhists of Russia, Mongolia and Tibet and the history of and this has been appreciated to a great extent. It Buryat Buddhist pilgrimages to the seminaries and unfolds the ‘Buddhist destiny’ of the Buryats— datsans of Mongolia and Tibet are fairly prominent. reflected in their overall sympathy towards Buddhism Buddhist pilgrimage tradition as an integral part of as a social institution, the ethnographic content of their Buryat heritage has been asserted time and again surveys in Tibet and elsewhere, their appreciation of and discussions on this tradition play a prominent role Buddhism as an art form and their revelation of the in contemporary Buryatia’s cultural policies, especially continuity of the Buddhist monastic tradition beyond in the regions east of Lake Baikal. So, Buddhism the Himalayas. Scholars are diverse in their views appeared as a cultural influence in Buryatia, centred about the role of Buddhism in Buryatia. For some, it around Gusino Ozero and had far-reaching influence became an important cultural instrument for the in the realm of literacy and education in the 18th Russian government. In the early Soviet years, the century. How this perception of Buddhism as a cultural number of monasteries grew— from 36 in 1917 to movement changed in the 19th and 20th centuries 46 in 1945. During the Stalinist purges, all excepting needs to be told. those at Aga and Ivolginsky were closed or destroyed and the number of lamas dropped from 16000 in 1917 As the Russians secured their control over to 900 in 1936. There was a resurgence of Buddhist Transbaikal territory in the early 19th century, it rituals in the 1960’s and the 1970’s (the open air oboo became imperative to control the seat of religious rituals) but a national spiritual renaissance occurred power of the Buddhists, i.e. that of Bandido Khambo only in the 1990’s as intellectuals encouraged the Lama in Gusino Ozero. So, theoretically speaking, publication of Buddhist works in Buryatia. In July there was an enforcement of Russian control on the 1991, the 250th anniversary of the official recognition Buddhist citadel of Gusino Ozero. So, it was due to of Buddhism in Buryatia was celebrated in the internal Russian control that Buddhism in Transbaikalia presence of the Dalai Lama and the bi-monthly journal, got attention. At the turn of the 19th century and the Buddizm, funded by a Moscow-based organization beginning of the 20th century, the surroundings of was founded in 1992. Reconstruction of 10 Buddhist Baikal became the nestling ground for autonomists monasteries took place. who were entrusted with the task of transporting alternative ideas of St. Petersburg’s educators For some scholars, the revival of Buddhism Scherbatskoi and Oldenburg to the Far Eastern sector. has a specific (i.e. Buryat) purpose. If it does have Some of these Buryats who studied in the oriental universal appeal, it is because of the fact that it unites academies in St. Petersburg entered imperial service a bigger pan-Mongolian community. The revival or and they were sent on research trips to Tibet to help renewal of Buddhism only takes place at a superficial the imperialists gather knowledge about the land of level—only at the popular level whereby Buddhist the inorodetsy. Their access to the Buryat lama Agvan publications in India or Buryatia are encouraged, Dorjiev who was an emissary of the Dalai Lama in festivals like Dalai Lama’s visit is solemnized, the Tibet helped develop close ties between Tibet and Dalai Lama’s Tsarist emissary Agvan Dorjiev is Russia. There seems to be unusual interest in the rehabilitated, ecological movements are popularized namtars (biographies). Dorjiev’s memoir An Account and lamaism is historically reassessed. In the of my Life in Tibet (1899) is a reflection of his worldly Khrushchev period, the ideology of Lamaism as a pursuits, in contrast to his spiritual pursuits. The cultural reform movement had enormous appeal. account reveals his diplomatic activities as a Russian Soviet writings at that time have referred to the intermediary in Tibet and Dalai Lama’s intermediary necessity of studying Lamaism within the overall body in St. Petersburg, his clandestine links with Kalmyk of European philosophy and not necessarily connect and Buryat fellow-travellers, his contacts with his it to the Buddhist ideological framework. So, there mentors in St. Petersburg and so on. 10 Dorjiev’s was new appreciation of the cultural content of

88 World Focus January 2017 Buddhism, and there was strong opposition to the to them by the imperial state and the Orthodox decrepit nature of orthodox forms of dissemination Church. Nikolai Tsyrempilov, based on his analysis of lamaist knowledge.11 This trend continues today of the Buddhist historical sources and Tibeto-Mongol- and contemporary writers have examined the Buryat lamist texts, assesses the background to the educative role of lama scholars Dorjiev, Zhamtsarano Buryat Buddhists’ relations with imperial Russia. and Baradin.12 According to him, and many others, it was a mutual feeling of trust and toleration that can be traced to There are different opinions but the enigma the 17th century when the Russian Emperor began of the Dalai Lama continues across generations. For negotiations with the Mongol chief Altyn Khan. casual travellers in Buryatia, Buddhism is like a Evidently, at that stage, the Russians did not want to practice, a living experience among the younger antagonize the spiritual leadership among the Buryat generations who are attracted to it because of the and Kalmyk lamas. After that, a steady integration personality of the Dalai Lama. Perhaps they are not of the Transbaikal Buddhist communities into the even aware of the integrationist philosophy of their Russian empire took place. 14 Such an analysis forefathers. Colin Thubron recounts his suggests that there is not one single model for communication with young Buddhist lamas in the describing the Buryat-Russian interaction that took premises of Ivolginsky datsan, who had taken a place since prisoedinenie occurred in the early 18th conscious decision of becoming Buddhists during the century. Since Soviet disintegration, Buryats have heyday of Communism. The practice of Buddhist faith been renewing their long standing Buddhist faith, was never lost, according to some of them. generating considerable interest in the renewal of ‘Our lama sits beneath the Dalai Lama now. Tibet is transitional, post-Soviet ties across North and South important to us and Mongolia. Most of us have studied Asia. Many Buryats view themselves as in Mongolia. cosmopolitans, considering the long history of Buryat ‘But your parents were Buddhists?’ Buddhist pilgrimages to Mongolia and Tibet to be one ‘Only in their ancestry, in some part of them. I was of the most important markers of south Siberia’s brought up without God. It was my decision to become transnational histories and identities. Anya Bernstein a monk.’ makes a strong point in her argument about the ‘I asked tentatively: ‘How was that?’ engagement of Buryat Buddhist intellectuals as ‘I don’t know. At school and in the Young Pioneers it ‘fieldworkers’ in an imperial exercise in which their was drummed into us and over that God did not exist. own mentors in St. Petersburg school of Russian He does not exist! He does not exist!’ He laughed Buddhology were involved. gently. ‘Now it is the Young Pioneers who do not exist’….. Shamanism as a marker of tradition Life was tranquil here, he said. The monks learnt In the case of Buryatia, references have been made Tibetan language, philosophy and medicine and to Buddhism and shamanism as religious ‘tradition’ sometimes held theological debates. They advised among the Buryats, though there is some debate about people on their weddings by horoscope, and prayed the ‘religious roles’ that shamans play in at oboos, the shamanist cairns piled along the communities.15 Though shamanism has always mountains to ancestral gods. ‘We say simple prayers belonged to the domain of religion,16 there seems to there. It is like remembering the dead.’ be different portrayals of shamans as artists and the ‘And funerals?’ activities they perform to reach out to their audience. ‘We sometimes attend them.’ A flicker of unease. in the new age research on Eurasian shamanism, ‘Although it’s difficult.’ shamanism is perceived as cultural heritage and the I asked in surprise: ‘Why?’ preservation of traditions as eco-animism, cosmic ‘Only for me. It’s a personal thing, hard to explain. symbolism, folk belief and a new form of shamanic It’s because of …pity’. 13 narrative.17 This may have called for a revival of shamanism in Siberia in general and Buryatia in Some of the Buddhists were desirous of particular. The contemporary shamanic discourse spreading their influence beyond the activity assigned speaks of ancestral shamanic genealogies that were

Buryatia: Narratives of a Russian and Mongol matrix 89 created despite the official Soviet construction of shamans, through their associations, have tried to socialist ideology. The Buryats in Mongolia today seem carve out a cultural-ecological niche for themselves to accumulate the dispersed stories of the past and in the post-Soviet period.19 develop a sense of their ancestral lands and encounter the purge victims of the Stalinist era or the War years. Conclusion Through shamanism, the Buryats link their current The new narratives in Buryatia indicate both continuities misfortunes with historical oppression. So, it is a and discontinuities—on the one hand there is an unique way of representing Buryat spiritual and social affirmation of Siberia’s Russian legacy and an history. It has been indicated that remaking of histories understanding of multiple narratives of encounter and have taken diverse cultural forms (narratives, resilience. On the other hand, there is recognition of autobiographies, secret memories—lost or the mechanisms of integration in the Buryat space: be repressed)—and through shamanism, Buryats have it a pan-Mongol domain, a shamanist tradition, or a tried to rearticulate their local histories, revolving Buddhist spirituality. What we see today are the around the Olkhon island in Lake Baikal or the Aga attributes of a region that was not just the backyard of steppe and in Ulhan on the Russian side of the Mongol Tsarist Russian empire but as an Asiatic domain with a border, for instance. The Treaty of Nerchinsk (1729) living history that has restored Buryatia from her past. divided the Buryats in Russia from their brothers in The web of transnational identities is a complicated Mongolia and China. Therefore, the Buryat shamans reality that cannot be ignored either. So, in Buryatia, have been isolated due to their sense of loss and there is a merger of narratives, past and present. These resistance to Russian colonialism, Christian narratives speak about a negotiated space 20—i.e. a missionaries and Buddhism may have occurred over space that has its own tradition of syncretism, reflected time. In the Soviet period, the illusion of success in its engagements with the Russians. Similarly, it is a pervaded everywhere and in Mongolia the losses of space that has its own sacred tradition symbolized by agriculture were fixed with Soviet subsidies. In the shamanism (that has reappeared in the Olkhon region), post-Soviet period, a ‘recovery’ of resources was Buddhism and epic (Geser) tradition. attempted but with limited results. The neglected past of the shamans and the disruption of shamanic Footnotes 1That landscape is mostly associated with tribalism and descent. But this association has also been recreated over lineages are identified as tragic history and the time by the people who have carried out ‘acts of remembrance’ and have perpetually engaged with that particular environment. Judith Beyer, ‘Settling descent: place making and genealogy in Talas, Kyrgyzstan’, Central Asian Survey, Nos 3-4, September-December 2011. ‘unmaking’ of that past that is happening today in 2 Meltem Sancak,‘Contested identity: Encounters with Kazak diaspora returning to Kazakstan’, Anthropology of East Europe Review, Vol 25, No 1, 2007. 3 Discussed in Olaf Leisse and Utta Kristin Leisse, ‘A Siberian Challenge: Dealing with multi-ethnicity in the republic various forms in Mongolia and Buryatia. In the local of Buryatia’, Nationalities Papers, Vol 35, No 4, September 2007. 4 Scholars have referred to the language and ethnicity links in Buryatia. Buryat as minority language is preserved landscape of Buryatia, there is immense popularity in combination with Russian making many Buryats bilingual persons with dual identities, a feature which is very typical of a multi-ethnic state like Russia. The Buryat language has more symbolic, unifying value and even if it is not strictly used in the official sense, that does not affect ethnic identity. The Buryat case demonstrates that survival of shamanism as ethno tourism, whereby shamans is possible by preserving one’s own ethnic identity, i.e. the Buryat-Mongol identity. Erjen Khilkhanova and Dorji Khilkhanov, ‘The changing dynamics of language and ethnic identity link by Russian minorities: The Buryat case Study’, Journal of Eurasian Research,Vol 2, No 1, Winter 2003. play the role of disseminators of local knowledge, 5 The Historical Museum of Ulan Ude refers to 16 ‘ethno-territorial groups of Buryats’-Nizhneudinskie Buryats, Balaganskie Buryats, Alarskie Buryats, Idinskie Buryats, Kudisnkie Buryats, Verkhoudinskie Buryats, Olonskie mediators between the spirits and the human worlds Buryats, Kudarinskie Buryats, Barguzinskie Buryats, Okinskie Buryats, Tunkinskie Buryats, Zakamenskie Buryats, Selenginskie Buryats, Khorinskie Buryats, Aginskie Buryats, Ononskie Khamnigany. 6 Sayana Namsareva, ‘Avuncular terminology in Buriad Diaspora relationships with both homeland and host society’, and sometimes of the larger worlds by taking the role Working Paper No. 126, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Papers, 2010. Revised paper ‘The metaphorical use of avuncular terminology in Buriad diaspora relationships with homeland and host society’, Inner Asia, Vol 12, issue 2, 2011. of cultural guides, explaining the shamanic tradition 7 Ippei Shimamura,‘More than One Homeland-Diasporic Imaginations of the Aga Buryats’, Minpaku Anthropology Newsletter No 19, December 2004. to the global community of tourists and visitors. It 8 Pavel Vernavsky, ‘Etnichnost’ I individual’nye strategii osvoeniya obrazovatel’novo prostranstvo (na primere respubliki Buryatii), www.innerasia.ru 9 This is a study by Balzhan Zhimbiev, depicting the urban transformation of Ulan Ude as a provinci explains the very process of intercultural exchange al city. The small pre-Revolutionary town of Verkho Udinsk that came into existence in 1669 at the confluence of the Uda and Selenga rivers flourished on the basis of relations with surrounding rural areas. It was transformed in the Soviet period as the architectural layout was based on ‘genplans’ whose features were development of heavy industry that take place at the shamanic sites, which therefore and workers’ residential areas. So, a trading town was transformed into a departmental town. As a result, the connections with neighbouring rural areas decreased, though territorially, the city expanded to the rural regions. are transformed as sacred sites for self representation Social and economic relationships also altered and the individuality of rural and urban areas disintegrated. As rural dwellers came to the city in search of livelihood a rift with the urban dwellers was created. This also increased social pressure and land use relations were particularly affected. Dwelling patterns also differed—that of the static house of the shamans. Some scholars (like Anya Bernstein) and the tent—two features of the sedentary agriculturists and the nomad tribes. The commonassumption is that Russian influence resulted in permanent wooden dwellings which were considered to be ‘progressive’ compared to the tents have welcomed this trend as a mode of connecting which fell into disuse during collectivisation in the 1930’s. The narrative then explores the changes that gave the city its hybridity. Today it is a mixture of the urban and the rural, the sedentary and the pastoral. Balzhan Zhimbiev, 18 History of urbanization of a Siberian city: Ulan Ude, Cambridge: White Horse Press, [publication of Mongolia and with the world outside and a form of social action. Inner Asia Studies Unit, University of Cambridge], 2000. 10 Alexandre Andreyev, ‘An Unknown Russian Memoir by Aagvan Dorjiev’, Inner Asia,3, 2001. 11 K.M. Gerasimova,Obnovlencheskoe dvizhenie Buryatskovo Lamaistskovo Dukhoventsva, 1917-1930, Ulan Ude: Buryatskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel’stvo, 1964. 12 Tatyana Skrynnikova,‘Traditsionnaya kultura I Buddizm v samoidentifikatsii Buryat’, http: //www.dartmouth.edu/ So, in pan-Buryat imagination, neo- ~crn/groups/religion_group_papers/Finalpapers/religion_group_final_papers.htm. 13 Colin Thubron,In Siberia,London: Harper Collins, 1999, p. 179. 14 Nikolai Tsyrempilov,‘Za svatiyu Dzharmu I Belovo Tsariya-Rossiskaya imperiya glazami Buryatskikh Buddistov shamanism is extremely popular. The popularisation XVIII-nachala XX vekov’,Ab Imperio, No.2, 2009. 15 Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer ed, Shamanic worlds-rituals and lore of Siberia and Central Asia,Armonk: New York, 1997. of mythological legends (e.g. rock legend in the Olkhon 16 Mihaly Hoppal ed Shamans and traditions,[Bibliotheca Shamanistica], Budapest: Akademiai Klado, 2007 17 Series of writings in Mihaly Hoppal ed Shamans and traditions,op.cit. region) and various educational and scientific 18 Anya Bernstein, ‘Remapping sacred landscapes-shamanic tourism and cultural production on the Olkhon island’, Sibirica, Vol 7, No 2, Autumn 2008. 19 N.L. Zhukovskaya, ‘Neo Shamanism in the context of the contemporaryethno-cultural situation in the republic of collaboration programmes have taken place. The Buryatia’, Inner Asia, 2, 2000, pp. 34-35. 20 Luis Ortiz Echevarria, Narratives of social change in rural Buryatia,Russia,AnthropologyTheses, 2010, Paper36, http:digitalarchive.gsu.edu/anthro_theses/36. 90 World Focus January 2017 Russia’s Stand on South China Sea: Is it Appeasement, Accommodation or Support to China? Dr. Alok Kumar Gupta

South China Sea (SCS) conflict since July 2016 has been in international media spotlight quite The Dispute of South China Sea (SCS): frequently. Many experts of international politics are Philippines brought a case against China in the of the opinion that this dispute is fast turning into a Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague hotbed of international politics. Some have been in January 2013. Philippines accused China of addressing it as a dispute with potentials to become violating the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. flashpoint of another world war. China’s assertions China’s territorial claims to the Spratly Islands in the and expansionist approach towards the SCS has South China Sea, which are believed to be rich in oil invited protest by many of the small and big countries and gas reserves, run counter to those of the of the world. It has led to a war of words between Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam. China on the one hand and the other claimants of the SCS on the other. Different countries have different PCA delivered its ruling on July 12, 2016. set of interests and problems vis-à-vis China in South The ruling struck down China’s territorial claims to China Sea. Growing number of stakeholders in SCS historic rights in the South China Sea. This seems to has made it complex with multifaceted issue. The have wiped clean the slate for the Philippines and dispute was taken to the Permanent Court of other contenders in these extremely complicated 1 2 Arbitration (PCA) by one of the neighbours of China disputes. China claims almost 90 percent of the i.e. Philippines. Subsequent to which PCA delivered waters under its ambiguous nine-dash line. The its judgement which was refuted by China that verdict rejected China’s claims to sovereignty over amounted to violations of international law. Russia virtually the entire SCS as illegal. The PCA found one of its neighbours stood in support of China’s stand China had unlawfully restricted fishing access around which led to speculation and analysis in international the Scarborough Shoal, a small but strategic reef and media regarding Russia’s interest in doing so and its fertile fishing ground 130 miles (200 kilometers) west 3 ramifications. Russia’s support sounded abominable from the Philippines island of Luzon. for some players in the international politics and some took it in its stride. The so called islands or those features in the South China Sea have long taken the meaning of being This has raised pertinent questions as to symbols of sovereignty, for all the claimants whether Russia is siding with China on South China concerned. Those symbols remind Chinese of their Sea or is it mere diplomacy driven by needs of Russia disastrous encounters with the Western imperial in the contemporary world and regional geopolitics. powers during the co-called century of humiliation. Fact remains that both Russia and China are opposed These disputes are laced with competing historical to internationalization of the SCS dispute but both may memories, emotions, and national pride. Accordingly, have different reasons for doing so. Therefore, author no amount of arbitration, however decisive the results wishes to explore the Sino-Russian convergence on may seem, would be able to put the matter to rest. the SCS dispute; the level of convergence between The result was a huge win for the Philippines and a the two; contingencies or circumstances that made it devastating blow to China, even though China refused imperative to converge; the interests of both the to honour the rulings of the PCA. parties that are involved and have brought them together on the one hand; and reality of Russia’s Issues Involved in the Dispute: articulation of its support to China on SCS on the The dispute has never been either purely legal or other. purely technical. The SCS has a great significance in Russia’s Stand on South China Sea: Is it Appeasement, Accommodation or Support to China? 91 view of the fact that trade worth more than USD 5 being contested by other claimants, both from within trillion passes through the strategic South China Sea and outside the region. annually. The US and Japan have said that the PCA tribunal’s verdict is legally binding. However, China’s Fourth issue is that of militarization. Owing claims got a fillip when Russian President Vladimir to the dispute China is militarizing the SCS. The Putin expressed his backing to China’s stand at G20 construction of Chinese military infrastructure will summit in September 2016 at Hangzhou.4 There are provide Russia with protection in the area against a number of issues involved so far as dispute in SCS US Navy ships and the Aegis system and SM-3 and is concerned. Tomahawk missiles.8 US demonstrated its military power through Valliant Shield exercise, 2000 miles First issue is that of internationalization which (3,300 kilometers) to the east, where US forces from is also the most important. Russia has aired its strong around the Pacific gathered for the two-week drill resentment against any internationalization of the with 18,000 personnel, 180 aircraft and the aircraft dispute. China has been touting what it sees as Russian carrier USS Ronald Reagan, among other warships. support for its SCS stance. Chinese media Xinhua The US Command of the Pacific commented that applauded Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov the participating forces will exercise a wide range of for criticizing efforts by some regional governments capabilities and demonstrate the inherent flexibility to internationalize their maritime disputes with China. of joint forces. The range of capabilities include China has opposed such efforts because it prefers to maritime security operations, anti-submarine and air negotiate with its weaker rivals one-by-one.5 Fact of defence exercises, amphibious operations, and other Russia’s stand against internationalization of the elements of complex war-fighting.9 Sino-Russian dispute has other reasons and Russia’s own interests, military exercise near the region ‘Joint Sea 2016’ in which has been dealt-with in detail below. September 2016 also amounted to muscle flexing.

Second is that of sovereignty. China has been Fifth is the issue of reclamation of land. engaged in decades-long disputes with five smaller Tensions have ratcheted up during the last two years neighbours who challenge its claim of sovereignty as China has reclaimed land in massive dredging over most of the South China Sea; Brunei, Malaysia, operations in the Spratly Islands, turning sandbars into the Philippines, Taiwan, and the Vietnam.6 China islands equipped with airfields, ports and lighthouses. asserts its sovereignty over the SCS, whereas its’ China claims almost all of the sea, including islands neighbours and other powers of the world are more than 800 miles (1,200 kilometers) from the advocating for ‘freedom of navigation’ and are not Chinese mainland, despite objections from neighbours ready to accept China’s claims and sovereignty. China including the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and has reacted angrily to US freedom of navigation Vietnam.10 Philippines military released images of operations in the region, scrambling fighter jets and Chinese ships and said were capable of dredging sand boats and denouncing the nation’s navies as around the Scarborough Shoal, a small but strategic threatening Chinese sovereignty. reef and fertile fishing ground 130 miles (200 kilometers) west from the Philippine island of Luzon. Third is factual control. China has turned However, China has denied it is reclaiming land, saying several Spratly islets that it has long occupied into that while Chinese coast guard vessels patrol the artificial islands in the past years, using land waters around the shoal, which it calls Huangyandao, reclamation to build military-capable runways and they were there for ‘law enforcement’.11 ports. Those reclamations have drawn criticism from Scarborough Shoal is only one point of tension in the the Spratly Islands’ rival claimants and from the United SCS. There are many other islands and islets which States, although US has said it is neutral on the are in the heat of dispute. competing maritime claims and wants them to be resolved peacefully.7 The factual control over disputed Sixth is that of freedom of navigation. It islets and islands in SCS is that of China, which is relates to US claims for ‘freedom of navigation’ which is irksome to China. US insist on the principle of

92 World Focus January 2017 freedom of navigation, which is at odds with the consequence of past stand-offs and consequently interests of China in the region. China lays claims on Chinese permanent marks in the SCS have been ever the Spratly Archipelago and the Malacca Strait and growing. The inconvenient truth is that China is here thus both these get disputed. The placement of military to stay and it has a greater geographical advantage infrastructure by China on the Spratly Archipelago and more resources to gradually alter the status quo would eliminate the ability of US warships to navigate on the ground in its favour if it feels pressured to do these waters. Experts are of the opinion that Russia so. Therefore, China has strongly refuted the rulings stands to benefit if the disputed islands were under of PCA and has increasingly been growing assertive. the China’s influence and beyond the US and its allies Accordingly it is making all efforts to maintain its in the region. Therefore, free navigation is against hold and sovereignty on SCS to the exclusion of all the strategic interests of China; whereas in the interests other powers littoral as well as external to the region. of US and other allied powers. Therefore, they support the operation of freedom of navigation in SCS. Russia’s Stand on SCS: Winston Churchill Once noted that Russia is Seventh is that of resource management. particularly enigmatic.13 This is heightened by the fact According to different estimates it has been informed that Western Europe and the United States have not that the region under dispute is a rich source of oil produced a cohort of Russia-focussed strategists since and gas alongside other minerals and marine food. the mid-1990s. Therefore, this may be the western Therefore, at the heart of the dispute there is also the perception of Russia in the contemporary world based scramble for resources apart from the strategic on historical trends of Russia’s behaviour. However, location and strategic interests of the disputed water- Russia’s stand on the South China Sea could be bodies. Resource management will come into play analysed on the basis of its aims, objectives, interests only when resources are unearthed in the SCS, which and statements. Russia’s stand needs to be understood at this stage is speculation. However, even when from the following perspectives. resources are discovered some international law shall Firstly, Russia is not directly involved in the South have to be developed in view of it being in international China Sea dispute. The SCS does not affect its waters. strategic interests. However, presence of a third-party in the proximity of Russia may create a pressure on China’s Stand on PCA Rulings: The Assertive its strategic interests. Therefore, Russia has been Bully against internationalization of the dispute and China claimed the rulings of PCA as a piece of waste interference by any third party into it. paper. Accordingly, the episode is bound to be debated and discussed in the history of international law as a Secondly, Russia’s traditional stance on the classic case of China flouting international law, issue has been to see that the dispute is resolved thereby damaging its international image. China has directly between the countries involved in a peaceful also been projected in a manner of assertive power political and diplomatic manner, without any in SCS. Its’ widely-publicised assertive action in the interference from third parties. Russia’s exclusion of region, such as land reclamation, construction of the third party was in view of the fact that it may artificial islands and airstrip construction, need to be lead to attempts to internationalize these disputes. understood in the broader context of intensified Internationalization of the issue thus seems to be international pressure, particularly from the US pivot against the Russian interests in the region. Russian to Asia.12 China wants to be the strongest party in Foreign Minister criticized in the media the dispute right from the beginning, preferably one- the attempts to internationalize the issue in on-one with any other claimant. The meaning of international forums like the ASEAN Regional Forum internationalization for China includes legal arbitration (ARF), the East Asia Summits, and the Asia-Europe and an increase in the all-out China-bashing that the Meetings and called upon non-claimants to refrain smaller states have purportedly been engaging in with from taking sides or using these on-going disputes to the help of the extra-regional states. China has been get any geopolitical unilateral advantage in the region involved in construction of artificial island as a or to isolate one country or another.14 Russia is

Russia’s Stand on South China Sea: Is it Appeasement, Accommodation or Support to China? 93 opposed to internationalization owing to its overall Vladimir Putin publicly stated support for China’s philosophy of foreign policy, which has been a standing defiance of the arbitration ruling. Since then, Russia criticism of US, NATO and the EU for interference has spared no effort to reiterate that this addition does in other states’ affairs, be it the Eastern Europe, the not change Russia’s neutral stance and does not Balkans, and elsewhere. They consider concern sovereignty or politics.18 Russian President internationalization as the first step towards Putin also pointed out the legality of the award by interference.15 PCA and stressed, “We stand in solidarity and support of China’s position on this issue—not to recognize Thirdly, in the aftermath of the July 2016 the decision of this court. This is not a political position, rulings of PCA some experts were of the opinion but purely legal. It lies in the fact that any arbitration that Russia offered a neutral statement on the proceedings should be initiated by the disputing parties. tribunal’s award, voicing neither support nor outright As you know, China did not address the Hague opposition. Simply stating that it is against any arbitration and no one listened to its position there. internationalization of the dispute does not suffice that How can you recognize these decisions as fair? We Russia is in favour of China. Russia’s statement was support China’s position on this issue.” thus a calculated articulation of its stand and to maintain ambiguity. Russia was quite calculative in Sixthly, Russia has been historically against its move taking care that it must not alienate China any interventions by extra-regional states into its own while maintaining close relationship with Vietnam as neighbourhoods be extension. However, this well as other competing claimants with China. China opposition of Russia sounds in consonance with and Vietnam, both are strategic partners of Russia, China’s stand against internationalization of South and Russia cannot afford to lose either of them. This China Sea disputes. Russian President Vladimir Putin became more obvious when Russian MFA on September 5, 2016 said that Russia supports spokeswomen claimed that Russia does not take sides China’s stance on the South China Sea dispute and in the conflict, though she did make a case against opposes any third-party interference. He further said, extra-regional involvement to serve their own “We of course have our own opinion in this matter. It geopolitical considerations. She also expressed her is that, first of all, we do not interfere and we believe commitment to UNCLOS so that the rule of law in that any intervention of a non-regional power goes the oceans is upheld and stressed the universal nature only to the detriment of settling these issues. The of the document.16 intervention of third-party non-regional powers, in my opinion, is harmful and counterproductive.19 This non- Fourthly, Russia expressed support for a involvement in SCA means two things to China: one diplomatic solution to the dispute by the parties relates to opposition to US involvement; and second involved, and called for compliance with international opposition to any international arbitration. Both these law, including UNCLOS and the 2002 Declaration of interests of China are in line with Russia’s interests Conduct, and an early conclusion of a binding Code as well. of Conduct in the immediate aftermath of the deliverance of the PCA.17 This reveals that Russia is Russia’s opposition is, thus focussed on just asking for both: commitment to the international legal the first issue i.e. internationalization or non- regimes; as well as China’s right to assert its involvement of a third-party, among the issues sovereignty. Russia is also asking to resolve the issues identified above that relates to SCS. On rest all other through diplomacy and negotiations among the parties issues Russia is silent. This is suggestive enough of at disputes. the facts: first, that Russia does not want to entangle itself in the conflict which seems to have potential to Fifthly, Russia has been saying different things escalate rapidly in the future; secondly, Russia wants at different times, which changes from neutrality, to remain neutral so that it does not end up losing opposition to internationalization, to support China’s either of its strategic partners i.e. China or Vietnam; stand on Rulings of PCA. However, for the first time, thirdly, that it does not want it to become a hotbed of in G20 summit in September 2016 Russian President politics as it is in near proximity and shall have a great

94 World Focus January 2017 bearing on its security climate. Russia thus has been by NATO, particularly when it comes to practicing both low-key in SCS as well as quite calculative as it complex integrated military operations.23 simply doesn’t have much at stake directly; but indirectly it may become a cause of concern if it Therefore, the major rationale behind the joint develops in the wrong direction. Stake is calculated drills could be political and is meant to emphasize the mostly in terms of those whose volume of trade travels burgeoning security partnership between the two through SCS; and fact is that little of Russia’s energy countries. Moreover, China and Russia, while not resource travel through the waters of the South China formal allies, have steadily increased their military- Sea. Russia does not yet have the reach or need to to-military contacts and cooperation. In addition to participate in regional squabbles, and does not have naval exercise, the two countries cooperate on any major economic interests to protect there. Even counterterrorism, holding the Peace Mission exercises awareness among the people of Russia about the SCS annually. Russian President Vladimir Putin once said is very low, and rarely a matter of presidential in June 2016 during a visit to China, “Russia and politics.20 However, Russia does not want to be China stick to points of view which are very close to isolated completely as it is also geared-up to play its each other or are almost the same in the international own role in matters of international concerns. Russia arena.”24 Therefore, Russia has its own way of has also been found involved in ‘muscle flexing’ on engaging China and keeping China on its tow at the different occasions of conflicts in world, to keep it same time. alive that ‘it is a power to be recon with’; hence must not be ignored. Accordingly, Russia participated in a Common Enemy Factor: Zero-Sum-Game for joint naval exercise with China for number of reasons Russia and China in the immediate aftermath of the PCA rulings which United States seems to be common enemy of both is being discussed below. Russia and China. Russia has its own set of disputes and problems with US owing to its involvement in Sino-Russian Joint Naval Exercise: Its Ukraine and cessation of Crimea. China has different Implications set of rivalries with US. Therefore, US become a Subsequent to the pronouncement of the PCA Russia common enemy of both Russia and China. planned and executed “Joint Sea 2016” an annual Accordingly, Russia has been actively strengthening Sino-Russian naval exercise from September 12 to its ties with China since a cooling of relations with 19, 2016. Russia dispatched its Pacific Fleet consisting the West after its invasion of Crimea and barely of a number of warships for the exercise. Most of concealed active support of separatist forces in the Chinese participants came from the Nanhai (South neighbouring Ukraine. China’s own relations with the China Sea) Fleet under the People’s Liberation Army west have soured significantly since it was discovered Navy (PLAN). The major objective of the to be building artificial islands as naval air bases in participants was to practice ‘joint air defence, anti- several regions also claimed by the likes of the submarine operations, landing, island-seizing, search Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam.25 and rescue, and weapon use.21 China and Russia have held six joint naval drills since 2005, with China first A hypothetical alliance between Russia and assuming the role of host for the Joint Sea exercise China is based on the assumption that it should serve in 2012. In 2015, both countries held naval and as a counterweight to the US hegemony. That thinking, amphibious exercises in the Sea of Japan, a smaller however, overlooks the possibility that China and naval drill in the Mediterranean, among a number of Russia might build closer relations for dealing with other bilateral military exchanges. Both countries have the important challenges they both face. If Russia also participated in trilateral and multilateral exercises, and China both would have been careful in stating under the umbrella of Shanghai Cooperation their position on SCA and Ukraine Crisis, the joint Organization (SCO).22 China and Russia do not have military exercises would certainly have not presented a formal military alliance; the interaction between the a posture of Sino-Russian support for each other to two navies cannot be compared to similar exercises the rest of the world. The naval drill was projected as the sign of increasingly tight links between world’s

Russia’s Stand on South China Sea: Is it Appeasement, Accommodation or Support to China? 95 second and third largest militaries as they seek to possible its unequivocal support for China in the counter US influence in the region.26 dispute.

Facing a common threat from US; China and China’s Efforts to Check Internationalization Russia have enhanced their strategic partnership since and Emphasise Russia’s Support: 2009, through military cooperation. China has China has utilized bilateral channels to push Russia perceived United States ‘pivot’ and later ‘rebalance’ toward more support. The ‘Joint Drill 2016’ was to Asia as a containment strategy against China’s advertised and highlighted amply in the Chinese media rise. The US involvement in the SCS through freedom by both China and Russia. China also succeeded in of navigation operation has further deteriorated the blocking a reference of The Hague Decision to be bilateral relations between China and US. Russia too included in ASEAN’s summit’s final communique. has faced similar kind of pressure from US-led States like Cambodia and Laos which are friendly to NATO’s continued expansion in the Baltic States as China blocked the inclusion of the said reference.29 a threat to its traditional sphere of influence in the According to some experts, Philippines government region. Therefore, it makes it quite obvious that threat which took the matter to PCA committed a blunder against a common enemy has contributed towards by doing so as it achieved nothing and damaged a lot. strengthening of ties between the two countries. First, it further enraged China against Philippines. However, interestingly Russia clarified that the naval Secondly, it was a known fact that if the decision exercise is not targeted against any third parties; comes against China, it will be out-rightly rejected by whereas China pointed that China and Russia need China. Nevertheless, the decision of PCA has further to strengthen their military capabilities to jointly handle internationalized the issue and brought China’s ‘security threats from the sea’.27 Fact remains that violations of international law on the fore and in the the naval exercise has benefitted both the parties as limelight. China did strive hard to solicit support from the drills are part of Putin’s policy of a ‘pivot toward different corners as well as neutralize the stand of Asia’. China has been significant, both economically others. Russia was the most important ally for which and politically for Russia’s resurgence on the world even China was seriously concerned to solicit support stage. Chinese navy could explore new waters and and it said to have clicked many for number of gain experience through the joint exercise.28 The joint reasons. On the one hand China wants to deal with drills facilitated Russian rebuilding of its naval forces, the opponents on one-to-one basis to settle their which used to dominate the Black Sea. By supporting demands or claims; on the other hand by winning the China’s position in the SCS and Asia, Russia also support of Russia, China wants to keep US at a expected similar support from China on the issues of distance. Russia’s stand in favour of China has Syria and Ukraine. However, China has its own certainly blunted the power projections of US in the separatist problems in Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan. region under dispute. China has also been able to Therefore, China will continue to face a dilemma over bring greater legitimacy to its stand in the eyes of the issue of support on Ukraine and its self-interest international community and minimize damage to its will come in conflict with principle. image.

Overall, the ‘Joint Drill 2016’ presents a win- Other Stakeholders Vis-à-Vis China: win option for both the parties as China projected as There are immediate stakeholders in the impending if it has been able to garner the support of Russia and dispute and then there are extra-regional powers who send the message across the world or the powers for their effective presence in different parts of the that matters. On the other hand, Russia projected world become stakeholder from that perspective, as that it participated in the exercise is a fact, but it was they want to strengthen their strategic interests in in undisputed international waters, or waters where the SCS. Immediate stakeholders are Philippines, China has maritime control. However, the fact Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei, and Vietnam. Among the remains that by agreeing to participate in the exercise most vociferous extra-regional stakeholder is United Russia demonstrated in the most emphatic way States. Among the regional stakeholders Vietnam and Philippines are most affected parties.

96 World Focus January 2017 Vietnam is one of the major stakeholders in security cooperation, which included joint drills in the the South China Sea. According to some experts the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and Sea of Japan in booming Russia-China partnership may take a toll on recent past. Russia also nurses a common desire with Russia’s strong ties with Vietnam. Vietnam fears that China to prevent the United States from having Russia’s pivot to Asia is becoming too focussed on unopposed global leadership. Other view could be China and the China may use the growing that the convergence between Russia and China interdependence between the two countries to cajole cannot be of a permanent nature and is thus issue- Russia into supporting Chinese policies in the South based as both are rivals in Asia as well as in the China Sea.30 Recent stand of Russia has certainly world. Russia’s energy trade with China can benefit irked Vietnam. Russia is a key arms trade partner of the Russian economy, yet Russia will never want to Vietnam, providing the very weapon systems that are be reduced to a mere supplier of natural resources to raising the costs for a hypothetical Chinese attack. China. Moreover, Russia cannot sit idle and watch Vietnam has been and is a strategic partner of Russia. China’s increasing influence in Central Asia through However, in the recent past Vietnam has revealed its its ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative as also interests to broaden its arms profile and has started in other parts of the world. Russia has a closer link negotiating with US as well, which may be detrimental with Vietnam and India in terms of arms trade. This to Russia-Vietnam relations, as well as a huge is a constant source of irritation to China. business loss to Russia. It is not the Sino-Russia bonhomie that Conclusion: culminated into Russian support to China; rather the Regional Chess Board of Eurasia and the Asia Pacific US-China competition in the SCS is the driving force presents a complex and highly contested deployment of the convergence between the two immediate of resources and moves by major players of the neighbours. Otherwise, Russia’s annexation of region to keep the balance of power in their own Crimea in 2014, when Crimeans voted in a Russia- favour. Therefore, the cooperative gestures between backed referendum to secede from Ukraine; was Russia and China requires to be deciphered in the viewed by China that allowing a groups of people to larger milieu of geopolitical competition and widely choose to leave a country sets a very dangerous prevalent strategic distrust among the players in the precedent. However, it was never of any vital region. China and Vietnam are both strategic partners interests to Chinese so they were not thrilled at it; of Russia. Accordingly, the chess board has also led and realised that they stand to gain more by at least to a fast changing geopolitical and geo-economics giving Russia the appearance of support. On the other reality of the region. Russia therefore, would never hand, Russia does not have any vital interests in SCS wish to irritate either of its strategic partners. Russia’s in terms of its security but it wishes only to keep US big diplomatic success will consist in standing ground at a distance. The most disturbing trend is that SCS and withholding pressure from both sides—even if is fast becoming the battlefield among the great its neutrality is taken as a lack of support as some powers of the world, with massive militarization. This experts are of the opinion that Russia’s stand is may also lead to a cold war in very near future even nothing more than a diplomatic solution of the issues if a real battle on the ground is delayed or kept in involved. This stand is there in view of the fact that abeyance for a while. The great powers of the world Russia is selling weapons to Vietnam since the Cold need to be increasingly responsible to avoid War days; therefore, if Russia is seen as siding too competition in different regions of the world for mere much with China that will upset Vietnam. Vietnam primacy and supremacy. Designing a geopolitical now has been turning to the United States for security chess board even for natural resources or hydrocarbon support and this will have potentials to jeopardize must not be served or promoted at the cost of peace Russia’s relationship with a longstanding security in the region or militarization for power projection or partner. deterrence as it creates pressures on developmental projects. They need to come closer for greater Russia is also under pressure to maintain cooperation to address the more pressing issues like good terms with China as the two sides deepen their

Russia’s Stand on South China Sea: Is it Appeasement, Accommodation or Support to China? 97 Syrian crisis, international terrorism at the behest of Sea”, The Diplomat, April 21, 2016, ISIS, and growing nuclearization of North Korea. www.thediplomat.com 15 Ibid., n.14.. Russia may have adopted this stance in 16 Anton Tsvetov, “Did Russia Just Ask China to ‘Buzz exchange for economic cooperation by selling off’on the South China Sea?”, The Diplomat, July 16, diplomatic and security capabilities. The SCS will 2016, www.thediplomat.com 17 continue to factor in Russia’s grand strategy in Asia. Ibid., n.16. 18 Anton Tsvetov, “Overlapping claims in the South Russia is aspiring for inclusive multilateral security China Sea”, November 01, 2016,Asia Maritime architecture. Neutral stance for Russia will not serve Transparency Initiative,www.amti.csis.orgVisited on its purpose and will have to take an active role in December 04, 2016. It must be noted that the statement SCS. Russia’s Asia Policy is still in the process of of Putin was likely made in view of the similar evolution. Russia will soon find a shift in its Asia UNCLOS-based suit that could be soon filed by Ukraine policy and not a mere change in its bilateral relations against Russia over the waters surrounding Crimea, with China, as it will sooner or later get involved itself and partly in continuation of Russia’s non-participation deeper into SCS imbroglio. Russia is also aspiring for in and non-adherence to an international tribunal on a deeper engagement with ASEAN and northeast the Arctic Sunrise case brought in 2013. Still, the effort Asian partners. Therefore, SCS has already given to demonstrate continued neutrality indicates that rise to a geopolitical conundrum and Russia cannot Russia seeks to maintain autonomy from Chinese keep itself away from it for long influence, or at least to look like it is doing so. 19"Russia Supports China’s Stance on South China Sea” Footnotes ©Sputnik/http://sputniknews.com/world/ 201609051044988523-russia-china-putin/ Visited on 1 Chengxin Pan, “The South China Sea Ruling: Who December 5, 2016. Really Won?”, The Diplomat, July 16, 2016, 20 Anton Tsvetov, “Overlapping Claims in South China www.thediplomat.com Sea”, November 01, 20016, Asia Maritime 2 According to some sources China claims 95% of Transparency Initiative,www.amti.csis.org Visited on SCS waters and yet other sources say whole of SCS December 4, 2016. waters. 21 Alex Lockie, “China and Russia are practicing ‘island- 3 Brad Lendon & Katie Hunt, “China, Russia begin joint seizing’ in the South China Sea”, September 13, 2016, exercises in South China Sea”, CNN, September 13, www.businessinsider.in Visited on December 4, 2016 2016,www.eidtion.cnn.com 22 Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia to Send Anti-Submarine 4 “Russia-China to hold joint naval exercise in South Warfare Destroyers to South China Sea”, The China Sea”, PTI, September 11, 2016, Diplomat, August 31, 2016,www.thediplomat.com www.ibtimes.com 23 Ibid., n.22. 5 Michael Lipin, “Location matters for Russia China 24 Ankit Panda, “Chinese, Russian Navies to Hold 8 South China Sea drill”, August 04, 2016, Days of Naval Exercises in the South China Sea”, The www.voanews.com visited on December 5, 2016 Diplomat, September 12, 2016, www.thediplomat.com 6 Ibid., n.5. 25 Jamie Seidel, “Moscow joins Beijing in South China 7 Ibid., n.5. Sea military manoeuvres”, News Corp Australia 8 Russia Beyond the Headlines, www.rbth.com/ Network, August 23, 2016. international/ Visited on December 5, 2016. 26 Huiyun Feng, “The Great Russia-China South China 9 Ibid., n.3. Sea Naval Hook (and Why it matters?)”. October 7, 10 Ibid., n.3. 2016,www.nationalinterest.org 11 Ibid., n.3. 27 Ibid., n.26. 12 Ibid., n.1. 28 Ibid., n.26. 13 As quoted in Donald Thieme, “Analysis: Russian 29 Alexander Mercouris, “Tensions rising: Russia joins Military Activities from South China Sea to Sevastopol”, South China Sea dispute as Chinese ally, plan joint naval September 14, 2016, www.news,usni.org Visited on exercise”, August 3, 2016. www.theduran.com Visited December 4, 2016. on December 4, 2016 14 Anton Tsvetov, “Analyzing Russia Foreign Minister 30 Ibid., n.14. Sergey Lavrov’s recent remarks on the South China

98 World Focus January 2017 Russia and Mongolia: Strengthening Strategic Partnership Dr. Vaishali Krishna

“Mongolia is an old and trusted partner of Russia. changed the whole dimension of Mongolia-Russia Our partnership as good neighbours, mutual trust and relations, particularly in the period between 1991 and respect, and strong bonds of friendship connect our 2000, when the stagnant bilateral relations also saw two nations”, that is what the Russian Foreign Minister a revival after Russian President Vladimir Putin Sergey Viktorovich Lavrov has said last month in his undertook a visit to Mongolia. congratulatory message to his Mongolian counterpart Ts. Munkh-Orgil on the occasion of the 95th The relations between Mongolia and Russia anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two in the pre-1991 period remained influenced by countries.1 The diplomatic relations between the two Mongolia’s geographical location that had compulsion countries were established on November 5, 1921. of being a territorial buffer for centuries. When the Earlier while visiting Mongolia in April 2016, Lavrov Manchus subjugated China and established the Qing signed a mid-term programme agreement with his Empire in 1644, they also brought Mongolia under Mongolian counterpart for the development of a their dominion.4 But when the Qing Empire collapsed strategic partnership between the two countries.2 in 1911, Moscow sucked Mongolia into its own Since the bilateral relations have been developing expanding sphere of influence.5 From 1911 to 1915, energetically for quite sometimes now, the two sides Russia, Mongolia, and China engaged in difficult appear to be firm in further strengthening their negotiations, including frequent secret bilateral talks, strategic partnership. However, there is a need to and military posturing that eventually led to a tripartite examine the past setting in which the idea of this agreement known as Kiakhta agreement concluded strategic partnership was evolved and the way it has in June 1915.6 The agreement came up with the been developing given that the two sides have broadest possible “autonomy” for Mongolia, then witnessed ups and downs in their bilateral relationship. called Outer Mongolia.7 However, following the 1917 Russian Revolution, China renewed its efforts to Background assert control over Mongolia which did not last long The geo-strategic importance of Mongolia due to its as Soviet Russia ultimately lent its support for landlocked geographical location between Russia and Mongolian independence in 1921. Finally, Soviet China is the key reason for both Russia and Mongolia support to Mongolia paved the way for the to have cordial relations with each other.3 By establishment of the Mongolian People’s Republic pursuing its third neighbour foreign policy with a (MPR) in 1924. balancing approach towards its two geographic neighbours- Russia and China, Mongolia has searched Since then the whole span of 20th century for a place in the post-cold war world and has saw Mongolia being closely allied to that of the Soviet overcome isolation and created a stable and Union. The two sides remained very close so much favourable external environment. Today, as in the so that Mongolia found itself totally dependent on past, only Russia appears to have the potential Soviet Union in all fronts – diplomatic, political, military capability and interests necessary to protect Mongolia and economic.8 During the period of Sino-Soviet from the Chinese and only China is in a position to antagonism from the mid-1960s to 1989, the Soviet afford Mongolia similar protection against Russia. troops and military equipment remained stationed in Thus, this article begins with exploring the relations Mongolia to enhance its strategic advantage over between Russia and Mongolia in a historical China.9 All these years China continued to demand perspective right up to the Soviet collapse which the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia as a pre-condition for the normalization of its relations with Russia and Mongolia: Strengthening Strategic Partnership 99 the USSR. However, in 1986, the period of tense characterizing bilateral ties between Russia and Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian relations seemed to Mongolia, the post-1991 period witnessed quite a be over as Soviet Union decided to withdraw its troops different pattern that was based on “equality” in the from Mongolia as part of Vladivostok initiative of the overall relationship. Initially, the political-diplomatic Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.10 In the late relations began to take shape primarily through 1980s, when it was evident that the Soviets and East exchange of high level visits between the two sides. Europeans had reached the brink of economic But these visits did not yield the much desired results collapse, Mongolian government decided to embark as one can witness a clear state of stagnation in their on a programme of reforms aimed at breaking the relations until the year 2000 when Russian President country out of its own economic deadlock. Modeled Vladimir Putin paid a visit to Mongolia. The political- on the Soviet perestroika policy political reforms in diplomatic relations experienced an improvement in Mongolia began primarily as a drive to rebuild the 1999 largely due to the China factor as Chinese economy but gradually they evolved into a full-fledged domination in Mongolian economy was clearly visible. democratization movement.11. What really came out Russia began to realize the geostrategic importance of the 1990 democratic revolution was that it “became of Mongolia in the light of Chinese presence which a catalyst of new thinking in all spheres”.12 As a result, also raised Russian concerns for the security of its Mongolia’s foreign relations posture shed its deep- eastern borders. By then situation in Mongolia too seated dependence on the former Soviet Union and became conducive for strengthening the ties with shifted toward a policy of nonalignment shaped by Russia. A long-awaited meeting between Russian balanced relations with Russia and China as well as President Boris Yeltsin and Mongolian President N. with the US and other Western powers.13 The whole Bagabandi took place in Kremlin in December 1999 policies on foreign relations were shifted in to discuss several important issues of mutual concerns conjunction with the structural transition. Japan and in almost all areas- political, economic, cultural and the US welcomed this shift in foreign policy, especially military. In 2000, Putin’s visit to Ulaanbaatar was in view of Mongolia’s geopolitical significance as a aimed at improving the bilateral relations which had vast territorial buffer between Russia and China. been facing stagnation for almost a decade. The credit Needless to say, Mongolia required export markets for improvement in relations was also given to the as well as sources for imports of essential goods in overwhelming victory of the Mongolian People’s order to make progress in developing its economy. Republican Party (MPRP) by defeating the That is why close economic ties with Russia and Democrats in the June 2000 parliamentary elections. China have always been so vital. Mongolia’s transition As such Putin’s visit, combined with the MPRP to a democratic state structure has not been an easy victory, rekindled the hope for Russia and Mongolia task, since it remained isolated from the outside world to resume and promote their traditional ties. This, in except the Soviet Union for almost seven decades.14 the following years, eventually gave a strong push to During these intervening period, the extent and pattern their so called “halted” relations and marked the return of Mongolia’s domestic and external politics was not of Russia’s comprehensive cooperation with only oriented towards Soviet Union but was even Mongolia. It may be pointed out that Mongolia’s shaped under latter’s influence. But collapse of the greatest importance to Russia lies in its geopolitical Soviet Union in 1991 altered the whole scenario in location,16 and hence it was in the interest of Moscow the relations between the two sides, partly due to to renew its relations with Mongolia. changes in the geopolitics of the region, which “has always played a decisive role in the history of Mongolia has become even more prominent Mongolia”.15 The post-Soviet transition in Mongolia in their self-interested calculations in the 21st century also gave way to the beginning of a new era in their that has been witnessing the world having new bilateral relations. economic and political realities since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of China.17 On the other Post-Soviet Developments in Relationship side, Russian leaders were hopeful that President Unlike Soviet period when dependence and Putin’s Ulaanbaatar visit in 2000 would help re- domination were the two fundamental features establish Moscow’s preeminent position as a most favoured neighbour.18 The leaders of the two States 100 World Focus January 2017 held a thorough exchange of views on a broad range such high-level visits between the two countries of issues relating to their bilateral relations and on deepened their mutual trust, and hence Mongolia- international issues of mutual concerns, which Russia bilateral ties entered into a new period of culminated in the signing of the Ulaanbaatar growth.23 The year 2009 was full of remarkable Declaration that was dubbed as “a legal groundwork events for both Mongolia and Russia as they for the restoration of bilateral ties between the two celebrated the 70th anniversary of the Victory at the countries”.19 Since the signing of the Ulaanbaatar Battle of Khalkhyn Gol,24 and the 60th anniversary Declaration the two sides witnessed several high level of the Ulaanbaatar Railway that had a great bilateral visits including the 2002 visit of Russian Prime significance in recalling the tradition and historical Minister Mikhail Kasyanov who became the first head features of the relations between the two countries. of cabinet to come to Mongolia since 1971. Such frequent visits went a long way in contributing to the Looking at the state of bilateral relations development of bilateral relations between Mongolia between Russia and Mongolia in the post-2000 period, and Russia. it is found that treaties and agreements signed in various areas of cooperation on interstate and Nevertheless, the significance of Ulaanbaatar intergovernmental levels have become the basis for Declaration lies into the fact that it was a document, development of Mongolia-Russia bilateral relations. which determined the principles of directions for Initially, the relationship between the two sides was extending and developing Mongolia-Russia relations guided by the Treaty on Friendly Relations and in the 21st century.20 Earlier in 2003, the two countries Cooperation between the Russian Federation and established their good neighbourly and traditional Mongolia of January 20, 1993, and the Ulaanbaatar partnership during the visit of the then Mongolian Declaration of November 14, 2000. Putin’s visit to Prime Minister Nambaryn Enkhbayar to Russia. As Mongolia in 2000 was viewed as meaningful for a result, in December 2003, the Russian government peaceful relations and constructive cooperation decided to write off almost the entire Soviet-era between the two sides in the succeeding years. The Mongolia’s debt to Russia, once valued at US $ 11 two sides recognised the importance of signing billion.21 This gave a boost to bilateral economic bilateral agreements in a Joint Russian-Mongolian relations which were overshadowed since the Soviet Statement issued on January 14, 2004, when the collapse in 1991, though it did not stimulate Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation investment until political relations set a new landmark paid an official visit to Mongolia at the in 2006. In that year, bilateral political relations invitation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of entered in to a phase for an all-round resumption when Mongolia Luvsangiin Erdenechuluun.25The joint “Moscow Declaration” was signed during a fresh statement reflected the historically established deep visit to Russia by Nambaryn Enkhbayar after he took mutual trust, good-neighbourliness and friendship over as the new Mongolian President. In this between the peoples of Russia and Mongolia. Bilateral document both sides fixed their mutual aspiration to trade and economic cooperation revived gradually increase the efficiency of bilateral interaction in the following a period of decline since1990s but it was spirit of strategic partnership.22 only in 2006 that the two countries agreed to move from “traditionally good-neighbourly partnership” to In April 2008, Mongolian Prime Minister “strategic partnership”.26 Sanjaagiin Bayar paid an official visit to Moscow, which opened up what has been described as “a new Entry into Strategic Partnership and its era for comprehensive cooperation between the two Advancement nations.” The following month, i.e., in May 2008, It was on August 25, 2009 that the visit of Russian President Enkhbayar met in Moscow with President President Dmitry Medvedev to Mongolia marked the Medvedev and discussed a range of political and signing of a Declaration on the Development of strategic issues. By then Moscow already considered Strategic Partnership between the two sides, thus Mongolia as a special subject in its foreign affairs raising the relationship from good neighbours to development. Politically, the frequent exchange of strategic partners.27 Not only did they sign what is

Russia and Mongolia: Strengthening Strategic Partnership 101 known as the “manifesto to boost the strategic Both sides hailed the multilateral efforts …to move partnership” but also a series of other agreements by towards improving the efficiency of this treaty based which the two countries pledged to consolidate on the unity of its three key components: non- cooperation in railway system updating, uranium proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of exploitation, and a huge investment in the coal mining. nuclear energy…. Several critics and political analysts noted that “the 4. The two sides stressed that one of the important signing of the declaration on strategic partnership tools to strengthen the non-proliferation regime is to development signifies the progress of vital importance create zones in the world free of nuclear weapons. scored by Russia’s diplomacy towards Mongolia.”28 Russia pointed out that an internationally recognized This was, in fact, an extension of the existing level of nuclear-free status of Mongolia is a significant Russia-Mongolia relations which had been contribution to this process, and hence the entry into successfully developing on the basis of the 1993 Treaty force on March 21, 2009 of the Treaty on a Nuclear on friendly relations and cooperation, Ulaanbaatar Weapons Free in Central Asia was considered as a Declaration of 2000 and Moscow Declaration of significant factor in ensuring security in the region. 2006. All such agreements are the evidence that 5. They expressed their concerns over DPRK’s May Russia and Mongolia are committed to strengthen 25, 2009 nuclear test and urged Pyongyang to comply their political and diplomatic relations. strictly with UN Security Council Resolution No. 1695, 1718 and 1874 to abandon nuclear weapons Further in 2012, the two sides proceeded to programmes. They also stressed on the need to work reinforce their bilateral political and economic ties. towards the resumption of negotiations in order to Evidently, on October 19, 2012, Sergei M. Mironov, resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula Chairman of the Council of Inter-Parliamentary besides maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Assembly of States in the upper house (Federation Asia. Council of Russia) and Head of the Russia-Mongolia 6. The two countries expressed their commitment to inter-parliamentary group, held a meeting with work together to combat terrorism and other new Mongolian Ambassador to Russia Doloonjin Idevkhten threats and challenges. They called for the consistent to review efforts for expanding relations between the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism State Duma and Mongolia’s parliament.29 Mongolia Strategy, implementation of norms of universal anti- obviously figured prominently in the general thrust of terrorism conventions and speedy finalization of a Russia’s Asian policy. The fact that the Russian and Comprehensive Convention on International Mongolian views converge on regional and global Terrorism. issues can be seen through agreements incorporated 7. Expressing their concerns over ongoing ideological into the Declaration on the development of their expansion of terrorism, Russia and Mongolia Strategic Partnership, which are, in part, as follows: confirmed the need for strict compliance with 1. Both Mongolia and Russia stressed on the desire Resolution 1624 of the UN Security Council calling to work together in the interests of all members of for a criminal offense of inciting terrorism, among the international community to equal opportunities for civilizations, intercultural and interfaith dialogue as development, including through the establishment of an effective tool to suppress terrorist ideology, a new global financial architecture and adapt existing bringing to this task the capacity of civil society, financial system to the current realities. including business and media. 2. They made commitments to lend their support for 8. They also expressed their strong intention to comprehensive reform of the United Nations, including continue close cooperation in curbing the new the expansion of the Security Council, with a view to challenges and threats to regional sites. Mongolia in make it more representative and effective through a this regard expressed support for the efforts of the broad consensus of UN member states. Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai 3. Since the spread of nuclear weapons remained a Cooperation Organization (SCO) according to … the threat to international peace and security, Russia and atmosphere of peace, security and cooperation. Mongolia reaffirmed their support for the Treaty on 9. Both sides called for the formation of a transparent the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). and equal security system in the Asia-Pacific Region

102 World Focus January 2017 (APR) that would be based on a collective basis, circumstances because under the existing regulations, international law and the interests of all countries in the planning of bilateral relations was being carried the region. They noted the need for an ATP partner out only on a yearly basis based on the protocol of network of multilateral organizations, close the Russian-Mongolian Intergovernmental cooperation within the existing integration forums, Commission, which was not enough to realize the full especially the SCO and ASEAN Regional Forum potential of the strategic partnership. Both sides also (ARF) on security. held talks on strengthening economic and political 10. Russia welcomed Mongolia’s desire to become a cooperation at the bilateral level, joint projects with member of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation the participation of China, and further intensification (APEC), and stated that it will support an application of Russian-Mongolian interaction. They renewed the to the case of the adoption of APEC consensus existing intergovernmental agreement on the decision on enlargement of the forum. promotion of regional and cross-border cooperation 11. Keeping in mind the importance of cooperation in as well. Another noteworthy component of Russia- the SCO framework, the two countries agreed to Mongolia strategic partnership framework has been continue exchanging information and conducting Russia’s positive posture for Mongolia’s efforts of bilateral and multilateral consultations on strengthening making its presence felt in the world, particularly in mechanisms for collaboration of member countries the Community of Democracies. During 2011-2013 and observer states to implement a number of Mongolia chaired the Community of Democracies, programmes within the organization in priority areas which has been both an honor and a heavy such as energy and transportation. responsibility for Mongolia as its goal was to focus on promotion of democracy education, strengthening Following the 2009 Declaration on the regional cooperation, providing greater support to civil development of their Strategic Partnership the two society and promoting sharing of experience.32 sides had been planning to establish a strategic partnership since September 2014, when the Russian Russia essentially is not opposed to such and Mongolian Presidents met in the Mongolian capital, activities of Mongolia for the simple reason of Ulaanbaatar. At that time, among notable eco-nomic developing democratic culture in the Asia-Pacific deals Putin and Elbegdorj agreed to include a protocol region. The success of democratic transition has that provided for visa-free travel of both Russian and indeed taken Mongolia to the new stage of Mongolian pass-port holders between the two development not only at home but also at foreign front countries for up to 30 days. This agreement, which in strengthening its bilateral and multilateral came into effect on December 14, 2014, marked the relations.33 return of dip-lomatic relations to the level the two sides enjoyed dur-ing the Cold War years and is, as Russian Support to Mongolia in Regional Efforts such, a remarkable and symbolic development so far In accordance with the Declaration on the as strengthening strategic partnership is concerned.30 development of Strategic Partnership Russia has also been showing positive attitude towards Mongolia’s However, in order to give a boost to the plan efforts of going with the regional integration and of establishing a strategic partnership recently on joining different groupings. Mongolia, in fact, is back April 14, 2016, Russia and Mongolia signed a medium- on the international scene after centuries of relative term program for the development of strategic isolation in the post-2000 period as it engages itself partnership between them during Russian Foreign actively in international for a as well as reinforcing Minister Sergey Lavrov’s official visit to Ulaanbaatar. its integration into regional and global structures. Since According to the Mongolian Foreign Minister Lundeg Russia-Mongolia relations have been developing in a Purevsuren, “this is not only a medium-term plan for spirit of strategic partnership and on the basis of the development of bilateral relations, but also a kind mutual benefit and mutual trust, it has been observed of a compass, a benchmark for the two countries’ that Russia remains supportive in Mongolia’s future actions over the next five years.”31 This engagement with regional organisations. Although a document was most needed in the ongoing member of the United Nations, Mongolia has had

Russia and Mongolia: Strengthening Strategic Partnership 103 trouble gaining full participation in broader processes with different intensity, developing strategic international security dialogues. It attended the partnership with Russia has become a natural choice ASEAN-centered “ASEAN Regional Forum” (ARF) for Mongolia in pursuing its national interests. By in Singapore and remained an OSCE Partner member supporting Mongolia for its involvement in the since 2004 until becoming a full member in 2012.34 Northeast Asian regional integration process, Russia has an opportunity to find its own “niche” as well in Evidently, in the 21st century, Mongolia has the region.37 Russia’s engagement with Mongolia in become a geographic and political locus of surpassing the framework of developing strategic partnership is strategic importance to the United States, Russia and also important because both the countries have China. By reviewing the dynamic of interests these distinct geopolitical needs:38 For Russia, Mongolia three nations have in Mongolia, one can understand traditionally provides a strategic buffer from China, its importance to the broader global community of while Mongolia increases Russia’s stake in Sino- democracies i.e., OSCE and also to NATO.35 The Russian relations and offers leverage for Moscow North Atlantic Council formally approved an Individual when dealing with Beijing. In recent years, Russia Partnership and Cooperation Programme with has resumed its military assistance to Mongolia quite Mongolia on 19 March 2012. This has not only actively through training, equipment and exercise. For formalized but also developed relations between Mongolia, Russia has been the only source of political, NATO and Mongolia.36 Earlier, July 2005 conference economic, and military support in the face of an of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) welcomed assertive China. Mongolia’s accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and then in the following year Nevertheless, other than the benefits the 2006 ASEM 6 Summit invited Mongolia to become Mongolia enjoys across its political, economic and a member. The result was that Mongolia officially security segments, developing its rela-tions with Russia joined ASEM at the 2008 ASEM 7 Summit. Mongolia also has significant strategic value in three important has also joined the Conference on Interaction and ways as described by Jeff Reeves:39 Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), while (a) strengthening strategic partnership with Russia at the same time seeking membership of APEC. ensures Mongolia to continue with its ‘balanced These are all clear signs that Mongolia has been relationship’ approach with the two neighbours in the actively participating in regional groupings to make face of China’s growing influence, especially on its worthy contribution internationally. Mongolia’s trade and economy. For Mongolia, the more developed its relations with Rus-sia become, However, Russian support to Mongolia’s the more Mongolia can manage these rela-tions to engagement with regional organisations is more visible balance China’s dominance; (b) strengthening in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) strategic partnership with Russia increases stability where it has an observer status since 2004. Recently, for Mongolia within the Shanghai Cooperation there have been indications that Mongolia would now Organisation (SCO) and the Conference on seek full membership in the SCO. Even both Russia Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia and China are insisting that the observer status of (CICA). Russia’s position in the two organisations Mongolia in SCO should be changed to the status of provides a balance to China so as to give legitimacy a full member (Kamalov2010:241). In terms of to the claims of equality among member states of regionalisation efforts in Asia, Northeast Asia has SCO and CICA; and (c) strengthening strategic been one region where both Russia and Mongolia partnership with Russia also ensures Mongolia’s have enduring interests, particularly since the importance in China’s “One Belt, One Road” project beginning of the twenty-first century (Soni 2013:297). under which the three sides agreed to create a The two countries’ interests in the Northeast Asian economic corridor. For Mongolia, a trilateral region have contributed much to strengthen their agreement with Russia and China provides a far more bilateral and multilateral relations of which the regional bal-anced approach to regional security, economic factor has its own significance. Since Northeast Asian exchange, and political affairs.It is to be noted that nations are getting involved in the regional integration on June 23, 2016, a trilateral economic partnership

104 World Focus January 2017 agreement in Tashkent has already been signed during a heavyweight in Eurasia is also of great value to the 11th SCO meeting by the Presidents of the three Mongolia as it seeks to be connected to Europe in countries- Russia, China and Mongolia.40 The this era of globalization. agreement contains 32 proposed projects, and sketches out the creation of a joint investment center Endnotes 1B. Amarsaikhan (2016),“Sergey Lavrov sends congratulatory message on 95th jubilee of Mongolia- to assess the financial requirements and feasibility of Russia diplomatic ties”, 4 November, [Online: web] Accessed 25 November 2016, URL: http:// en.montsame.mn/politics/sergey-lavrov-sends-congratulatory-message-95th-jubilee-mongolia-russia- each by the end of 2016. One of the main parts of diplomatic-ties 2. Oyundari Erdenebat (2016), “Mongolia and Russia sign mid-term program agreement to develop the agreement involves cooperation on improving strategic partnership”, UB Post, 15 April,[Online: web] Accessed 25 November 2016,URL:http:// theubpost.mn/2016/04/15/mongolia-and-russia-sign-mid-term-program-agreement-to-develop-strategic- partnership/ roads and other forms of transportation in the region. 3. Sharad K Soni (2002), Mongolia-Russia Relations: Kiakhta to Vladivostok, Delhi: Shipra Publications, p.8. The agreement also proposes regular consultations 4. Vaishali Krishna (2015), Mongolia and Russia: Towards a Constructive Re-engagement, Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, pp.15-16. with third-party transport agencies, including railway 5. Allan M.Wachman (2009), Mongolia’s Geopolitical Gambit: Preserving a Precarious Independence While Resisting “Soft Colonialism”,EAI Fellows Program Working Paper Series 18, Seoul: The East companies. It, thus, appears that Russia’s efforts Asia Institute, p.2. 6. For details of 1915 Kiakhta Agreement on Mongolia’s Status, see Sharad K. Soni (2006), Mongolia- toward this end serve Mongolia’s strategic interests China Relations: Modern and Contemporary Times, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 60-64 7. Ibid. 8. Soni, Mongolia-Russia Relations, p.7. exceptionally well. 9. For details of 1966 Soviet-Mongolian Treaty and its aftermath, seeSharad K Soni, “Shadow of Sino- Soviet Rivalry over Mongolia in the 1960s”, in Borjigin H and Junko I, eds, (2012), The History and Culture of Mongols in the 20th Century: Collection of Treatises in the 2011 International Symposium in Ulaanbaatar, Tokyo: Fukyosha Publishing Inc., pp. 395-401. Conclusion 10. Sharad K Soni (2006),Mongolia-China Relations: Modern and Contemporary Times, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 192-6. The emergence of new geostrategic realities in the 11. Japan International Cooperation Agency (1997), Country Study for Japan’s Official Development Assistance to Mongolia, Tokyo, p.1. post-Soviet period has left tremendous influence on 12. Ts. Batbayar and Sharad K. Soni (2007), Modern Mongolia: A Concise History, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, p.137. broadening Mongolia’s diplomatic outlook and the 13. D. Bayarkuu (2001), “Mongolia and its Third Neighbours”,Himalayan and Central Asian Studies, 5(1): 84. scope of its international activities. However, almost 14. Sharad K Soni (2005), “Mongolia’s Security Concerns in the Post-Cold War Period”, in Mahavir Singh, ed.,Building a New Asia, Delhi: Shipra, p.283. the whole period of 1990s saw stagnation in 15. G. Tumurchuluun (2001), “Mongolia, Russia and China: The Geopolitical Perspective”, Himalayan and Central Asian Studies, 5(1):33. Mongolia’s relations with Russia though some 16. R. Bold (1994), “The Changing International Order and Mongolia’s Security,” TheMongolian Journal of International Affairs (Ulaanbaatar), (1):10. scholars argue in favour of Russian interest in having 17. Alicia J. Campi (2013),The New Great Game in Northeast Asia: Potential Impact of Energy Mineral Development In Mongolia on China, Russia, Japan, and Korea, Asia-Pacific Policy Papers Series, no. 15, Washington, DC : Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, Johns Hopkins not only “a friendly Mongolia but also a Mongolia University-SAIS, p.1. 41 18. Nomin Lhagvasuren (2000), “Russia Seeks to Restore Position in Mongolia as Most Favoured strategically allied with Russia”. Their contention Neighbour”, Eurasia Insight, 17 November, [Online: web] Accessed 25 November 2016, URL: http:/ /www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav111700.shtml was that “if Mongolia were to be dominated by China 19. Sharad K Soni (2011), “Russia and Mongolia: Recent Upsurge in Ties”, Defence & Security Alert , p. 48. or any other nation, it would represent a dramatic 20. Sharad K Soni (2006), “Mongolia’s Security Thinking and Outside World: A Reappraisal”, BimonthlyJournal of Mongolian and Tibetan Current Situation (Taipei), 15 (6):33. shift in the balance-of-power in the entire region of 21. Sergei Blagov (2009), “Russia boosts Mongolia ties”, Asia Times, 5 June, [Online: web] Accessed 21 October 2016, URL: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/KF05Ag01.html 22. Elena Boykova (2010), “Russia and Mongolia: Prospects of Relations in the 21st century”, in K. the Asia and Pacific”. Such thinking helped build up Warikoo and Sharad K. Soni, eds., Mongolia in the 21st Century: Society, Culture and International Relations, New Delhi and London: Pentagon, pp.234-5. confidence on both sides to develop their relations, 23.Huo Wen and Zhang Guangzheng (2009), “Mongolia, Russia to bolster bilateral ties”, People’s Daily Online, 27 August, [Online: web] Accessed 21 October 2016, URL: http://english.people.com.cn/ and the turning point came in 2000 when Putin paid a 90001/90780/91343/6741484_txt.html 24. Uradyn E. Bulag (2009), “The Nomonhan Incident and the Politics of Friendship on the Russia- visit to Mongolia, resulting in the signing of the Mongolia-China Border”, The Asia-Pacific Journal, no. 48, 30 November, [Online: web] Accessed 21 October 2016, URL: http://archive.constantcontact.com/fs053/1011273691009/archive/ Ulaanbaatar Declaration. Since then there is no 1102854389249.html 26. Hudson Institute (2009), Remarks by Batbold Sukhbaatar, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Mongolia on “Mongolia’s Relations with Russia and China and Its third neighbor policy: Relations looking back and the determining aspect of relations with U.S, Japan”, Washington DC, 8 June, p.3. 27. Wen and Guangzheng, “Mongolia, Russia to bolster bilateral ties”. between Russia and Mongolia, especially since 2009 28. Ibid. 29. Alicia J. Campi (2012), “Mongolia and Russia Re-Invigorate Mutual Ties”, 12 November, Eurasia has been the mutual interest which forms the basis Daily Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 9 (207), [Online: web] Accessed 10 October 2016, URL: http://www.refworld.org/docid/50a4d3fa2.html of developing a strategic partnership. Yet, in order to 30. Jeff Reeves (2015), “Russo–Mongolian Relations: Closer than Ever”, Russian Analytical Digest No. 161, 30 January, [Online: web] Accessed 18 November 2016, URL:http://www.css.ethz.ch/ strengthen their strategic partnership both Russia and content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/RAD-161-2-5.pdf 31. “Russia and Mongolia to sign medium-term strategic partnership program”, 13 April 2016, [Online: web] Accessed 18 November 2016, URL: http://tass.com/politics/869238 Mongolia have to recognize each other’s importance 33. Sharad K Soni (2012), “Post-Soviet Transition in Mongolia: Gauging the Success of Democratization”, Mongolica, vol. I (45):156. in bilateral and multilateral affairs. Keeping in mind 34. OSCE (2012), “A look at the OSCE’s newest member, Mongolia”, 21 November, [Online: web] Accessed 15 November 2016, URL: http://www.osce.org/cio/97404 the priorities of Russian foreign policy it is in Russia’s 35. John J. Jr. Tkacik (2008), “Mongolia’s Current Political Situation: Implications for the OSCE,” no. 1098, 15 September, Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, p.2. interests that Mongolia, as its immediate neighbour, 36. NATO (2012), “NATO and Mongolia agree programme of cooperation,” 19 March, [Online: web] Accessed 15 November 2016, URL: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_85430.htm remains a politically stable and economically 37. Sharad K Soni (2013), “Russia-Mongolia Relations: The Northeast Asia Factor”, in Tulsi Ram and Ajay Patnaik, eds., Eurasian Politics: Ideas, Institutions and External Relations, New Delhi: KW Publishers, p.306. prosperous state so as to establish a good-neighbour 38. JargalsaikhanMendee (2012), “Why is Russia favoured by Mongolia and North Korea?,” [Online: web] Accessed 10 October 2016, URL: http://isnblog.ethz.ch/international-relations/why-is-russia- zone around the perimeter of the Russian borders. favored-by-mongolia-and-north-korea-2 39. Reeves, “Russo–Mongolian Relations”. Similarly, despite Chinese economic dominance Russia 40.Peter Bittner (2016), “China, Russia, Mongolia Sign Long-Awaited Economic Partnership Agreement”, The Diplomat, 28 June, [Online: web] Accessed 20 November 2016, URL: http://thediplomat.com/ as a significant strategic partner remains to be a 2016/06/china-russia-mongolia-sign-long-awaited-economic-partnership-agreement/ 41. G. Tumurchuluun (1999), “Mongolia’s Foreign Policy Revisited: Relations with Russia and PRC credible necessity in matters of Mongolia’s bilateral into the 1990s”, in Stephen Kotkin and Bruce A. Elleman, eds., Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan, Armonk, New York: M.E.Sharpe, p.282. 42 42. Vaishali Krishna (2016), “Mongolia’s Relations with Russia: Security Dimension”, in Sharad K and multilateral security concerns. Russia’s role as Soni, ed., Mongolia Today: Internal Changes and External Linkages, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, p.172. Russia and Mongolia: Strengthening Strategic Partnership 105 Fight against Islamic State: Russian Policy towards Syria Dr. Manabhanjan Meher

Introduction 2003 invasion. Many recruits come from Libya whose Terrorism has become the most dangerous threat to statehood was destroyed as a result of a gross viola- the national security of nations and to the interna- tion of UN Security Council Resolution 1973.”1Since tional community as a whole in the 21st century. Is- 1900s in consonance with the Islamists forces the lamic State (ISIL/ISIS/IS/DAESH) that as a terror- US has been involved in disintegrating the Middle East, ist organization, was not taken seriously till 2014, sud- pursuing twin goals. On the one hand, it seeks to denly emerged as the most powerful organisation in weaken or even decimate states (including secular 2015, seizing large tracts of land in both Iraq and regimes) that might harm Israel. On the other, Wash- Syria. It was also responsible for organizing terrorist ington aspires to resist region’s oil policy.2 Thus, attacks not only in the Middle East but even in Eu- America’s Middle East policy revolves around oil and rope, like the mass shootings in Paris and downing of Israel. The invasion of Iraq has partially satisfied a Russian passenger aircraft in Sinai. America’s thirst for oil, but ongoing air strikes in Syria Towards the end of September 2015, the Russian and economic sanctions on Iran have everything to military started to bomb ISIS positions in Syria. Rus- do with Israel. The U.S. has fought two major wars sia began coordinating with the Syrian military, thus in Iraq. The first was the Gulf war in 1991. Then, assisting Syrian troops in regaining ground against following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. invaded Iraq again terrorism. Russia’s “active measure” in Syria puts it in 2003. Much like the Gulf War, the “War in Iraq” in an advantageous position. The Syrian Arab Army was based on lies and fabrications. It was claimed has successfully broken through remaining terrorist this time that Saddam had “weapons of mass destruc- strongholds, following the liberation of Aleppo Inter- tion.” This proved to be an utter fallacy propagated national Airport in the 1st week of December 2016. by the US government and supported by its tradi- It can act independently from the Western countries tional allies like United Kingdom and others. in its efforts to combat ISIS. Russia has tried to put an end to the interference of the US and its NATO In order to understand why the Islamic State allies into domestic affairs of the Middle East states has grown and flourished so quickly, one has to delve motivated by a regime change goal. at the organization’s American-backed roots. The 2003 American invasion and occupation of Iraq cre- Rise of ISIS and Western Policy in Middle East ated the pre-conditions for radical Sunni groups, like The current situation in the Middle East, particularly ISIS, to take root. Iraq being a multi-ethnic society, in Syria and Iraq, is the direct consequence of the inhabited by the Shiite Arabs in the south and centre, US dominated Western policy that has been con- Sunni Arabs in the centre and north, and mostly Sunni ducted in the region for past two decades. Address- Kurds in north, along with smaller groups such as ing the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly, Turkmens. After the fall of secular Baath adminis- New York on Sept. 28, 2015, Russian President tration in 2003 at Anglo-American hands and the rise Vladimir Putin stated that “Power vacuum in some of new regime dominated by Shiites and Kurds. A countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa Sunni Arabs waged an insurgency against the new obviously resulted in the emergence of areas of an- order, with bombing campaigns still common as late archy, which were quickly filled with extremists and as 2011. Violence was also common but not on the terrorists. The so-called Islamic State has tens of same scale, between Kurds and Arabs in north.3 thousands of militants fighting for it, including former During this time and till date the US policy had been Iraqi soldiers who were left on the street after the essentially aimed at planting a kind of replica of American democracy in a country whose traditions 106 World Focus January 2017 and conditions are generally against it.4 The roots of President Putin argued that “I provided examples all these developments can be traced back to US’s based on our data on the financing of different Is- initial approach to post-Saddam governance and the lamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL) units by private democratization process in Iraq. individuals. This money, as we have established, comes from 40 countries and, there are some of the The origin of ISIS can be traced back to Al- G20 members among them. I’ve shown our colleagues Qaida in Iraq, founded by the Jordanian extremist photos taken from space and from aircraft which Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. ISIS was formed in 2006 clearly demonstrate the scale of the illegal trade in from the merger of eleven factions of Iraqi Al-Qaeda oil and petroleum product. The motorcade of refuel- and little was known about it before 2013. The orga- ing vehicles stretched for dozens of kilometers, so nization comprised only a few thousand people dur- that from a height of 4,000 to 5,000 meters they stretch ing the first years of its operation, mainly former sol- beyond the horizon.”9 diers and officers from Saddam Hussein’s old elite from the political space.5 In 2006, when Zarqawi was Since the beginning of the war, the United killed by the US and Iraqi intelligence agencies, Abu States and some of its allies have been supporting Ayyoub al-Masri, an Egyptian, emerged as the new the so-called moderate Syrian opposition. The United leader, espousing the cause for an Islamic State of States has recognized the National Coalition of Revo- Iraq (ISI). ISI took the name of Islamic State of Iraq lution and Opposition Forces (SC) as the legitimate and Sham or Levant (ISIS/ISIL) after an amalgam- representative of the Syrian people and has provided ation of the original AQI, the Mujahedeen Shura nonlethal assistance, such as medical supplies, food, Council in Iraq and the Jund al-Sahhaba (Soldiers of communications equipment, and training to the Coa- Prophet’s Companions). In 2010, the emir Abu-Baker lition and an affiliated Supreme Military Council al-Baghdadi, also known as Abu Dua, established its (SMC). 10 The CIA had trained thousands of ‘rebels’, headquarters Baquba in Iraq. Abu-Baker al-Baghdadi, not to fight ISIS, but admittedly to fight the Assad who was of Iraqi origin, was announced as the new government – showing once again that the real ob- leader by the outfit after the killing of the former com- jective behind the US’ involvement is regime change. mander, Masri, by the US and Iraqi forces. Al- The presence of ISIS and other terrorists groups Baghdadi rebranded the outfit as the Islamic State of serves these interests. The US has a long history of Iraq and Levant in April 2013.6 Ultimately, in 2014 using terrorism to topple governments friendly to Rus- the ISIS in a well coordinated and swift attacked sia.11 captured the key town of Mosul about 400 kilome- ters north of the capital Baghdad. In Syria it man- Russia-Syria relations aged to capture Raqqa, a town with strategic signifi- The Middle East has always had a special meaning cance about 445 kilometers of north-east of the capi- for Russia. In practical terms, the Russian Federa- tal Damascus. It was a this time that the IS militants tion would prefer the preservation of the secular re- declared Caliphate in Iraq and Syria.7 gime in Syria. The fight against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS/IS/DAESH) and other ISIS has also received handsome amounts terrorist groups is due to Russia’s own domestic com- from the government and private sources in the rich pulsions. Thousands of Russian citizens from the monarchies of Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Sunni North Caucasus, Tatarstan and have [private] donor networks have been operating in the already gone to fight on the side of ISIS. Alexander region long before ISIS’ ascent to power in Iraq. Al- Bortnikov, head of the FSB and head of the National though Saudi Arabia, under the pressure of the US Anti-Terrorist Committee, reported that “about 2,900 and the international community, has passed a legis- Russian citizens were found to be suspicious of hav- lation criminalizing financial support of militant orga- ing links with jihadi organizations in Syria and Iraq, nizations such as Al-Nusra and ISIS, a majority of including those involved in military operations. As per the donors still remain unchecked in Kuwait and report 198 of them were killed in actions abroad, while Qatar.8 Moreover, revealing the truth and the finan- 214 returned to Russia and are under control by the cial link of ISIS to West and Middle East countries,

Fight against Islamic State: Russian Policy towards Syria 107 security forces, 80 were included in criminal records, renovations since the fall of the Soviet Union in a and 41 arrested.”12 way to support an expanded and modern Russian fleet. Third, as also pointed out earlier, Russia is also These groups also operate in the North suffering from terrorism back home. There is a pos- Caucasus within the Russian Federation itself. The sibility that Islamic State militants may try to approach Islamic State terrorist organization has already de- Chechen separatists in Russia to consolidate their clared war on Russia in the year 2014. It has also position in the North Caucasus region of Russia.14 admitted to being responsible for the Russian jet that crashed in Egypt due to an explosion by an impro- On the other hand Nikolay Kozhanov a Rus- vised bomb which was packed by up to 1.5 kg of sian expert on Iran and the Middle East, argued that TNT. The attack, according to the Islamic State, was the interests of Russian businesses may also play a an act of revenge against the Russian military inter- key role: having allegedly invested up to $20 billion in vention in Syria. During an interview to American the Syrian economy, Moscow’s companies are scared journalist Charlie Rose in the run-up to his address at to lose their investments in Syria in the event of the UN General Assembly’s 70th session on Sep- Assad’s fall. Specifically, Russian-Syrian military tember 29, 2015, President Putin stressed to build a cooperation should not be forgotten. Experts note that common front in order to fight against terrorism. As arms sales have a special importance for the Rus- he pointed out “I believe, I am pretty certain that sian government and make Moscow’s position on virtually everyone speaking from the United Nations Syria tougher. 151 Moreover, Russian energy and in- platform is going to talk about the fight, about the frastructure companies have a significant presence need to fight terrorism, and I cannot avoid this issue, in Syria, especially in natural gas facility and pipeline either. This is quite understandable because it is a construction. serious common threat to all of us; it is a common challenge to all of us. Today, terrorism threatens a During the visit of Syrian President to Mos- great number of states, a great number of people – cow on October 21, 2015 for negotiations, President hundreds of thousands, millions of people suffer from Putin asserted that Syria is a country friendly to Rus- its criminal activity. And we all face the task of join- sia, and Moscow is ready not only to assist with fighting ing our efforts in the fight against this common evil.”13 terrorism, but also in reaching a peaceful political settlement to the Syrian conflict in cooperation with Russia had played an insignificant role in the other global and regional powers. A bilateral treaty Arab uprisings that began in 2011, but in the case of that stipulates mutual support has allowed the Syrian Syria, Moscow has provided the Assad regime with leadership to send a formal request to the Russian important diplomatic and military support ever since government asking it to intervene in the ongoing civil the initiation of the unrest against it. Russia has many war. These operations were authorized by the Rus- motives for its involvement in Syria. The main mo- sian President, who in turn received approval by the tive, of course, is the threat of the unchecked spread Federation Council in response to a demand for Rus- of terrorism that is virtually knocking at its southern sian military assistance from the Syrian President. borders and amongst its large Muslim population. Speaking in the final plenary session of the 12th an- Russia is not a part of the US led coalition against nual meeting of the Valdai International Discussion ISIS but a major player in resolving the Syrian con- Club, on October 22, 2015 President Putin said “Af- flict. Kayani, Ahmed & Shoai highlighted three main ter Syria’s official authorities reached out to us for reasons for Russia’s involvement in Syrian conflict: support, we made the decision to launch a Russian First, it wants to protect its ally Bashar al-Assad re- military operation in that nation. I will stress again: it gime. Second, Russia has got a naval base in Syria is fully legitimate and its only goal is to help restore which is strategically important for the its military to peace.”16 Russian President made it clear what the remain relevant in the region. The Syrian port city of international law behind the UN Charter means and Tartus has been hosting a Russian naval base since that Russia is carefully abiding by the Charter in ac- the Soviet-era, which is the only naval base of Rus- tions in Syria against ISIS. sia outside of its borders. The base has undergone

108 World Focus January 2017 In this context, Russia has preferred to have Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Jordan, and other US- a regional alliance against ISIS. Russian would not aligned regimes throughout the region have openly like to get involved in the ground operations against facilitated and championed the terrorists of Syria. ISIS, in order to avoid the ‘Afghan syndrome’ which Turkey, a NATO member functioned as a ‘free tran- might spark negative responses in Russia. However, sit zone’ for every type of Syrian extremist terrorist Russia and Iran continued to strengthen their coop- group passing into Syria. Turkey had turned a blind eration in Syria and beyond, with their avowed goal eye to ISIS militants operating along its border with being to preserve the government of President Bashar Syria since 2011. However, Turkey eventually de- Assad. A Russia-Iraq-Iran-Syria coordination center clared war against Daesh on its frontier after an ISIL was established in Baghdad for planning operations suicide bomber killed thirty-two people in Suruc, a against ISIS. According to Nikolay Soukhov, re- Turkish town located near the border. 19 searcher at the RAS Institute of Oriental Studies, “Russia seems to have two opportunities under such Syria has become a complicating factor in a coalition. One involves a combination of missile and this relationship between Russia and some of the GCC air strikes against ISIS positions plus engagement of (Gulf Cooperation Council) States. The GCC states, its ground forces, and two, support for the Syrian mainly Saudi Arabia and Qatar have made their op- army, Hezbollah contingents tand Iranian volunteers position to Bashar being a part of any resolution well with air strikes, logistics and intelligence.”17 Hence, known. As one of the Russian scholar described, “For Russia’s military operation in Syria and the creation Turkey, the main threat is the Kurdish issue, which of a new coalition (comprising of Syria, Iran, they perceive as far more dangerous than ISIS; so Hezbollah, Kurds) to fight the common enemy on the far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, its main fear is that ground has drawn greatest attention to the policy being of Iranian Shia expansion rather than of the threats pursued by Russia in the Middle East. posed by ISIS militants; Iran is engaged in a complex regional game, with ISIS being just one element; Syrian Cold War in Middle East President Bashar al-Assad is not just facing the radi- Since the beginning of Arab Spring in the Middle East cal Islamists but a very wide range of opponents.” 20 the main confrontation between Russia and Iran on Hence, Middle East has now turned into a field for the one side and the West. Washington has made great power rivalry where each of the regional pow- Assad’s resignation or removal a precondition for ers have their own stakes. engaging with the Syrian authorities, who have been fighting IS on the ground all this time.On November Common Front against Terror 17, 2015 responding to a question on Rossiya-1 tele- Russia has had problems in the past with terrorism vision Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said within their own borders and in particular, Chechnya. “The trouble with the United States and its coalition It was not until the events of September 11, 2001, is that even though they announced that the coalition that the rest of the world finally began to acknowl- had been created exclusively to fight the Islamic State edge that Russia was dealing with more than just a and other terrorists and would not conduct any mili- secessionist republic. Russian President Vladimir tary operations against the Syrian army (they have Putin was the first world leader to call and offer assis- remained true to their word in this particular aspect), tance to the then President George Bush Junior after their strikes against terrorists and the analysis of these 9/11 attacks on the United States. Moscow was also strikes for over one year lead to the conclusion that instrumental in securing the agreement of Central their strikes were selective, I would even say, spar- Asian leaders allowing U.S. to the use of military ing; and in most cases those ISIS units which could bases in Central Asia. represent a serious threat to the Syrian army were not targeted. This is a rather dangerous and certainly At the G-20 summit in Turkey soon after the ambiguous game, which leaves US intentions un- terrorist attacks in Paris, on November 13, 2015 US clear.”18 The reason that the anti-government forces President Obama and Russian President Putin agreed in Syria are able to continue their campaign of vio- to support a cease-fire in Syria and intensify diplo- lence is because of foreign funding. The Kingdom of matic efforts to end the conflict in Syria. In the sum-

Fight against Islamic State: Russian Policy towards Syria 109 mit Putin had made an attempt to engage Washing- — is not the main goal for Russia, however much ton more closely with Russia and abandon policies Moscow supports Damascus.”23 Moreover it has aimed at isolating it.21 been reported that United States is refusing to hold coordination with Russia on military issues in Syria. President Putin has, on several occasions including during the Collective Security Treaty Orga- Conclusion nization summit, voiced Russia’s readiness to act Terrorism does not recognize borders and takes more against the ISIS as part of a broad coalition incorpo- and more inhuman forms spreading over new areas. rating countries of the West and the Middle East. Fight against international terrorism is one of the im- Addressing the meeting of the Collective Security portant national and foreign policy issue for Russia. Treaty Organisation (CSTO) in Dushanbe, on Sep- The Russian Federation has been in the very center tember 15, 2015 Vladimir Putin said, “I am certain of the fight against this evil for the last two decades. that we must resume concrete discussions on creat- On various occasion the policy makers in Russia ing Euro-Atlantic systems for equitable and indivis- stressed a ‘compressive approach’ associated with ible security; we need to carry out a full inventory of improvement of socio-economic conditions of the existing problems and disagreements. This analysis people to deal the terrorism. Russian military opera- can be used to achieve a discussion of the principles tion against ISIS and other terrorist groups in Syria of sustainable political development. The OSCE and has acquired additional logic and legitimacy. The other international organizations can be used to agree events in Syria in case of the regime collapse could on legally binding guarantees concerning the indivis- have had a devastating consequences for the entire ibility of security for all nations, achieve observance region. of important fundamental principles of international law (respecting the sovereignty of states, not med- References 1 See President Vladimir Putin at 70th session of the UN General Assembly, September 28, 2015, dling in their domestic affairs), and strengthen regu- available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50385. 2 General Didier Tauzin (2015), “On Russia’s Syria and Iraq Intervention“, available at http:// lations on the inadmissibility of appeasing anti-state, rethinkingrussia.ru/en/2015/11/on-russias-syria-and-iraq-intervention/(Accessed on 31st December 2015). anti-constitutional coups and the promotion of radical 3 Juan Cole(2013), “’Democratisation’, Religious Extremism, Fragile States, and Insurgencies: Bush ’s Legacies to Obama and the the challenges Ahead” 22 , in Shahram Akbarzadeh, Benjamin MacQueen, James Piscatori and Amin Saikal(eds.)American De- and extremist forces.” mocracy Promotion in the Changing Middle East, London & New York: Routledge, pp.16. 4 Amin Saikal, (2013), “Iraq: Elite Fragmentation, Islam and democracy”,in Shahram Akbarzadeh, Benjamin MacQueen, James Piscatori and Amin Saikal(eds.)American Democracy Promotion in the Changing Middle East, London & New York: Routledge, pp.106-107. On December 17, 2015 the UN Security 5 Vassily Kuznetsov(2015), “The Islamic State: Alternative Statehood?”,December 13th, 2015, available athttp://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Islamic-State-Alternative-Statehood-17876 (Accessed on 30th December 2015). Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2253, drafted 6 Zana Khasraw Gulmohamad(2014), “The Rise and Fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (Levant) ISIS”,Global Security Studies, 5( 2):1-2. jointly by Russia and the United States, on combating 7 Mansood Ur Rehman Khattak, Manzoor Khan Afridi, and Husnul Amin (2015), “The Emergence of Islamic State: Implications for Pakistan and Afghanistan”, Regional studies (Islamabad), Vol. xxxiii, No.4, pp. 76- ISIS and other terrorist organizations and expanding 77. 8Saima A. Kayani, Raja Qaiser Ahmed &Muhammad Shoai (2015), “Regionalization of Political Vio- lence: Arab Levant and Rise of Islamic State”,The Dialogue,Volume X, Number 1, pp.13. measures to suppress the financing of terrorism. The 9 See “Putin: ISIS financed from 40 countries, including G20 members”, November 16, 2015, available at https://www.rt.com/news/322305-isis-financed-40-countries/ Russian-US draft was co-sponsored by 68 UN mem- 10 Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard (2013), “Armed Conflict in Syria: Background and U.S. Response”,September 6, 2013, Congressiona ber-states. The resolution gives a U.N. blessing to a l Research Service, available atfpc.state.gov/documents/organization/214423.pdf 11Maram Susli, (2015), “Why Russia is Serious about Fighting Terrorism and the US Isn’t.: America Protects Al Qaeda and ISIS”,Global Research, October 21, 2015, available at http:// plan negotiated previously in Vienna that called for a www.globalresearch.ca/why-russia-is-serious-about-fighting-terrorism-and-the-us-isnt-america-protects- al-qaeda-and-isis/5483347 ceasefire, initiation of talks between the Syrian gov- 12 Six Hundred Citizens of Fight Against Al-Assad, available at http://plenglish.com/ index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4462591&Itemid=1 (Accessed on 30th December ernment and opposition, and a roughly two-year 2015) 13 See Vladimir Putin’s Interview to American TV channel CBS and PBS on September 29, 2015 at Novo-Ogaryovo, Moscow Region, available at timeline to create a unity government and hold elec- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50380. 14 Saima A. Kayani, Raja Qaiser Ahmed &Muhammad Shoai (2015), “Regionalization of Political tions. Violence: Arab Levant and Rise of Islamic State”, The Dialogue, Volume X, Number 1, pp.78. 16 See Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club: Vladimir Putin speech in the final plenary session of the 12th annual meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, available at http:// en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50548. 17 Nikolay Soukhov (2015), “International Coalition against ISIS – Can Common Evil Unite Us?”, But most of the Russian experts doubts the available at http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=6632#top-content. 18See Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov takes a question from the creators of The Arithmetic of Terror sincerity of Pro-West forces in Syria. One among documentary (Rossiya-1 TV channel), Moscow, November 17, 2015, available at http://www.mid.ru/ en/press_service/minister_speeches/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/1942693 them argues that “Of course, the pro-Western oppo- 19See “Erdogan Sets Sights on Syria, But is He Fighting Daesh or Democratic Kurds?” January 20, 2016, available at http://sputniknews.com/middleeast/20160120/1033421384/turkey-syria-daesh- operation.html#ixzz3yRMynYIk. sition is unlikely to convey information about its forces 20 Fyodor Lukyanov,(2015), “Turbulence over Syria’s skies”, December 10, 2015, available at http:/ /rbth.com/opinion/2015/12/10/united-front-turbulence-ahead-for-air-war_548815. to a major ally of Damascus — not even through the 21 Angela Stent (2016),”Putin’s Power Play in Syria: How to Respond to Russia’s Intervention” , Foreign Affairs, January/February 2016,pp.112 Western coalition’s information center in Baghdad. 22 See “Speech President of Russia Vladimir Putin at CSTO Collective Security Council session” September 15, 2015 , available at http://en.kremlin.ru/ events/ Meanwhile, it is clear that the National Coalition — president/news/50291 23 Artem Kureev(2015), “What are the risks of Russian military involvement in Syria?”, October 1, unable to seize power during three years of civil war 2015, available at http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/what-are-risks-russian-military-involvement- syria. 110 World Focus January 2017 Russian Media in Contemporary World Dr. Bishal Das

The media landscape in Russia has been The description above reveals the peculiarities changing rapidly in recent years as a result of the of the Russian media’s reality today. It is a mixture influence caused by the rise of digital media across of market forces, state ownership, power struggles the globe. In contemporary Russia, television remains between actors in different sectors, obstacles to central and subject to several forms of state and media freedom and challenges within the media political interference and the newspaper industry, convergence. After the Soviet Union’s collapse in which offers a range of perspectives covering many 1991, the media started to compete in market fields is suffering due to steep hike in prices. The conditions. However, at the same time, the media system which has emerged in the post-Soviet centralisation of power and media ownership had left Russia is for the country a new one, but nothing an indelible mark on the Russian media. In terms of particular in the international context. The key state intervention levels, Russia continues to be elements of the contemporary Russian media system regarded as a relatively closed regime that pursues are the central role of television, combination of an open internet policy (Oates, 2007; Toepfl, 2012, private and state television channels, weak position 2014). The Russian media has also been called a two- of newspapers, involving a strong position of regional tier, dichotomous media system ‘where some outlets, newspapers in comparison with national ones, plurality notably national TV, are very tightly controlled, while of newspapers both at national and regional levels, others, including the Internet, are allowed a substantial strong status of weekly newspapers compared to the degree of freedom’ (Dunn, 2014). This country’s dailies and low level of advertisement revenues. media has also been labelled as a system with conflicting messages within and between fields of The Russian media landscape is complex and communication (Beumers, Hutchings & Rulyova, varied. At least six out of 10 Russians use the 2009). The role of the Internet is seen to be manifold: Internet, while, in cities, more than three out of four while the government ‘promotes the use of the do so (Internet Live Stats, 2014). The largest daily, Internet for social and economic development, it also Komsomolskaia Pravda, attracts almost three million attempts to use the Internet as an additional political readers a day, and the largest TV channel, Pervyi, tool for control and co-optation’ (Oates, 2013) has a 50 million strong audience each month (Beard et al., 2014; Federalnoe Agentstvo po Pechati i In the beginning of the 2000s, Russia Massovym Kommunikatsiiam [FAPMK], 2014). experienced economic growth that also helped the Printed newspapers have lost a large part of their so-called development of media marketisation. Both previously sizable readership, and only 20% of domestic and foreign investors were attracted by the Russians read the national dailies (Vartanova, 2013). Russian media market, among which were the Advertising on the Internet, however, is growing Norwegian Schibsted and the German Westdeutsche rapidly, but, in 2014 and 2015, this growth slowed Allgemeine Zeitung, which, according to Pankin et down. According to Reporters Without Borders al. (2011), were ‘principally interested in local print (2015), Russia was 152 of 180 countries indexed media with politically safe content that were less likely according to their level of media freedom. Regulation to lead to confrontations with the authorities’. At this of communication and advertising has tightened over time, legislation did not restrict foreign ownership in the last years, although the largest magazine the print media – only in broadcasting (on the publishers, among some other media, still have foreign development of the Russian media in the 2000s, see, investors. for example, Nordenstreng & Pietiläinen, 2010 and Zassoursky, 2009). The financial crisis that started in

Russian Media In Contemporary World 111 2008 shaped the future direction of media and news use of their media properties, advancing varied consumption in Russia, that is, while advertising and interests and working to counter rivals, in contrast to circulations of the print media declined, online non instrumentalised media operated for simpler communication increased (see, for example, Pankin editorial and/or commercial motives. et al., 2011, p. 6). This trend has continued since then. The Russian media model relies heavily on Today, the Russian media system is a mixture the central role of TV, as it has done since the collapse of different media models, existing simultaneously and of the Soviet Union. TV is the main medium for most sometimes intertwining. The main dichotomy is Russians. Ninety nine per cent watch TV at least between more tightly controlled media loyal to the monthly, while computers are used by 72% and mobile authorities and freer media outlets and online devices, such as tablet computers, by 45%.4 The main communication platforms (e.g. Dunn, 2014; Toepfl, TV channels are state controlled directly or through 2014). The Russian media model has been described companies closely connected to the state. These also, for example, as semi-authoritarian or channels include, for example, Pervyi Kanal (First authoritarian (e.g. Toepfl, 2014, p. 69) and neo-Soviet Channel), Rossiia 1 (Russia 1), NTV and TNT (Oates, 2007). In addition to media that fall within (Vartanova, 2015). They still get the majority of their the state or local government’s sphere of control, part funding from advertising and sponsorship. Among the of the media behaves according to commercial top-10 channels are also privately owned channels, models, selling products directly to consumers and including STS and Ren-TV. serving as the contact between consumers and advertisers. Typical formats following commercial When it comes to news supply, newspapers media models include glossy magazines, business also still have an important albeit diminishing role. newspapers and commercial radio stations. In Even though social media have gained more addition, part of the media business is owned by so- significance in people’s lives in Russia (Fossato & called oligarchs or business tycoons, who may have Lloyd, 2008; Lonkila, 2012; Toepfl, 2014; Zassoursky, other business and political interests besides the media. 2009), news is still mainly produced by TV and These oligarchs include one of the richest men in newspaper companies (Kleis Nielsen, 2012). Russia, Alisher Usmanov, who owns, among others, the Kommersant publishing house, part of Mail.ru (i.e. Evolution of Russian Media the largest Internet company in Russia), half of the During the Soviet period, the state retained a virtually UTV holding (i.e. radio stations and music and Disney unlimited control over journalistic institutions and the TV channels) and part of mobile operator MegaFon content they produced. After the 1917 October (Forbes, 2015b). However, the core of his business revolution, the Bolsheviks faced a critical problem: is the metal and mining industry. Usmanov is seen as they had seized power but were struggling to loyal to Putin’s regime. Yuri Kovalchuk is another appropriate meaning. The faction strived to achieve billionaire with stakes in several TV channels; his dominance over the public discourse - an effort which background is in banking and insurance business required the introduction of a new system of symbols, (Forbes, 2015a). Another business tycoon, Mikhail rituals and imagery. This discursive transformation Prokhorov, has oppositional political views and minor entailed a redefinition of social values (Bonnell,1997). media assets. Prokhorov represented the Civic The media – particularly print and radio – became a Platform party in the 2012 presidential elections, particularly helpful means to that end. The press and receiving almost 8% of votes. He sponsors Snob, a broadcast outlets were used for the purposes of social media platform and magazine that serves propaganda. There was a strict control over content, networking more than purely business purposes establishing practices meant to limit the information (Roesen, 2011). Snob’s business model includes, in available to the masses. Newspapers, radio, and later addition to selling the magazine, membership fees for television served as tools for the “propagation of an the social networking site.3 These media owners, with ideologized reality” (Zasoursky, 2004) to which they resources derived from other activities in business gave a formal shape. Media were supposed to serve and politics, are in a position to make instrumental the nomenklatura system and reinforce an ideology

112 World Focus January 2017 which governed not only the public space, but also reports, newspapers saw a striking drop in their interpersonal relations and everyday routines. In circulation and importance. They stopped receiving Soviet Russia, information was seen as an exclusive a state subsidy, their prices went up, and their right of the chosen few. The privileged elite had access distribution system collapsed. Television, which was to forbidden periodicals, books and movies - the already very influential, became the most powerful masses did not. The audience was considered to be media in the country. too fragile and in constant need of protection from anything seen as remotely disturbing or alarming. A Putin’s Russia (1999-today) ban on publishing negative reports and covering In the first years of Vladimir Putin’s presidency, the domestic catastrophes was imposed on all Soviet government’s political control over national TV newspapers. Not even road accidents, train collisions networks was fully restored. With his coming to power, or street crimes could find their way into the news. Putin adopted a number of policies aimed at restricting The information access segregation was severe. The the autonomy of independent news outlets (Becker, TASS news agency actually produced separate 2004). Claiming that he was liberating the media from bulletins (printed on paper of a different color) for the oligarchs, he launched a campaign to take every the ruling class. Party officials had access to more television and newspaper that mattered under state detailed and international news, while the common control. As a result, all large national TV networks in people read inspiring local stories. Mundane materials Russia are currently governed by the Kremlin, as are like street maps, catalogues and telephone books were a number of the larger newspapers. The vast state not available to the masses – they were considered a media empire includes the news agencies ITAR- military secret. Banned book had “special editions” TASS and RIANovosti; the national radio stations available “for administrative use” only (Gorny, 2012). Radio Mayak and Radio Rossiya; the leading TV The closed, centralized Soviet model that relied on networks Channel One, Rossiya and NTV (Freedom complete control over information may in fact have House, 2009b). Controlling the television programming played a major role in the collapse of the Union. is particularly important as TV remains the dominant According to some scholars (Castells & Kiselyova, source of news for the vast majority of Russians 1995), that restrictive system was the reason why (Broadcasting Board of Governors, 2014). A research the communist regime was unable to adapt to the brief published by the US government agency BBG new information economy. reports that over 95% of the Russian population turns to television broadcasts for news at least once a week. From Soviet to Contemporary Russia (1991 - Media Control and Internet Censorship in Russia 7 1999) While constitutional limitations forced Putin to Shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the relinquish the presidency from 2008 to 2012, during Russian media got a relative freedom. News outlets that period he remained the prime minister and de used their new-found independence to lead the facto national leader of Russia (Kimmage, 2009). opposition against the communist party. Yeltsin Today, Vladimir Putin is still the most powerful political became the first democratically elected Russian figure in Russia. He has continued to keep close ties president and with his coming to power the freedom with the owners of mainstream media. With his return of the press came to an end. Ivan Zassoursky (1999) to the presidency in 2012, Putin tightened his control describes the period that followed as “the formation over both traditional and online news. The state of a new media-political system”. Rather than being interference with the press was particularly heavy- governed by the communist party, the media became handed during and after the recent Crimea crisis. dependent on corporate players and oligarch capital. Around that time, strong political pressure from the Instead of catering to a mostly united elite with a Kremlin resulted in a number of reorganizations and single ideology, they started serving a number of leadership changes in large Russian media outlets. different (and often contradictory) commercial Those included, among others, the liquidation of the interests. Censorship was once again prevalent but it state news agency RIA Novosti, and the dismissal of became increasingly multidirectional and therefore radio Ekho Moskvy’s director Yuri Fedutinov. less predictable. During that period, Zassoursky

Russian Media In Contemporary World 113 Authorities in Russia are neutralizing the democracy around the world the following key independent media through restrictive legislation, developments are associated with Russian media administrative fines, tax inspections, and editorial At least three internet users received significant interference. Over the past decade, vaguely worded . legislative initiatives apparently designed to target prison sentences for posting “extremist” content re- extremism, public disorder, offensive content, or lated to Ukraine on social media. defamation—have been aggressively used to . TV-2, an independent television station based in intimidate journalists and encourage self-censorship, Tomsk, was forced off the air due to opaque con- with the ultimate goal of silencing independent media tract and licensing decisions by state entities. The in Russia. outlet survived only on the internet. European media companies sold their stakes in three In 2007, the State Duma passed an . important news publications, and in two cases, the amendment to anti-terrorist legislation that introduced new Russian owners subsequently reduced the scope liability for “public justification of terrorism,” or frequency of their reporting. effectively banning media organizations from disseminating alternatives to official information about Although the Russian constitution provides terrorist attacks and thereby shielding the government for freedom of speech and of the press, government from criticism for its handling of terrorist violence or officials frequently use the country’s politicized and the rights of victims. corrupt court system to harass the few journalists In 2012, following a series of massive protests and bloggers who expose abuses by authorities. Rus- linked to flawed parliamentary and presidential sian law has a broad definition of extremism that of- elections, the authorities used trumped-up criminal ficials invoke to silence government critics. Enforce- charges and regulatory violations to intimidate or ment of this and other restrictive legal provisions has dismantle independent media outlets that had provided encouraged self-censorship. particularly critical reports on electoral fraud. A law passed that July reintroduced defamation as a criminal In May 2015, President Putin signed a de- offense, with large administrative fines for media cree that expanded an existing ban on publication of outlets. The nationalistic tone of the dominant Russian information about military casualties in wartime to media continued to drown out independent and critical include casualties from “special operations” during journalism in 2015, stressing patriotic themes peacetime, further limiting meaningful coverage of associated with Russia’s 2014 military incursions into Russian military involvement in Ukraine and Syria. Ukraine and the launch of air strikes in Syria in In July, the president signed a “right to be forgotten” September 2015. Russian leaders and pro-government law that allows individuals to ask search engines to media outlets also sought to mobilize public support remove links about them under certain circumstances. and suppress any dissent in the face of an economic Freedom of information advocates criticized the downturn linked to falling oil prices and Ukraine- measure for failing to include safeguards pertaining related sanctions. Deterrents to independent reporting to public figures, the public interest, and the effects and commentary included draconian laws and of the law beyond Russia’s borders. A new law that extralegal intimidation. Although no journalists were took effect in September requires companies to store killed in connection with their work in 2015, the data about Russian citizens on Russian territory. It persistent threat of deadly repercussions for was still unclear at the end of 2015 how the legisla- expressions of dissent was reinforced in February, tion would be enforced, though it could affect news when opposition leader Boris Nemtsov was and information by facilitating surveillance or enabling assassinated in central Moscow. authorities to penalize noncompliant foreign-based internet platforms. According to a report published by Freedom House, an independent watchdog organization A law signed in 2013 allows the state dedicated to the expansion of freedom and telecommunications regulator, Roskomnadzor, to block websites that disseminate calls for riots, “extremist”

114 World Focus January 2017 activities, or participation in illegal assemblies. The scrutiny for offering materials that touched on the law continued to be invoked against independent and sensitive topic of Ukraine. In June, a Moscow-based opposition websites in 2015, as were laws that allow consumer protection group, Public Control, became blocking on various other grounds. More than 20,000 the target of a criminal investigation after it published websites were being blocked at year’s end, according an online memo for Russian tourists that called Crimea to the independent watchdog Roskomsvoboda. A an “occupied territory” and raised legal and safety 2014 law requires any website, blog, or public social- concerns about traveling or buying property there. media account with more than 3,000 daily viewers to Roskomnadzor blocked the group’s website on orders register with Roskomnadzor as a media outlet and from the prosecutor general’s office. In October, the comply with the regulations accompanying that status, Investigative Committee, Russia’s main federal including bans on anonymous authorship and legal investigative body, launched a criminal case against responsibility for comments posted by users. Natalya Sharina, director of the state-funded Library Prosecutors in 2015 continued their practice of of Ukrainian Literature in Moscow, on the grounds charging individuals—including journalists, bloggers, that the library contained anti-Russian propaganda and in one case a librarian—with defamation, and incited “national hatred and enmity.” Sharina extremism, and other criminal offenses designed to remained under house arrest at year’s end. limit free speech. In January, jailed journalist and blogger Sergey Reznik, who had written articles on While the constitution and a 2009 law provide alleged corruption and abuses by officials in Rostov- for freedom of information, accessing information on-Don, received a three-year prison sentence on related to government bodies or via government new charges of insulting and misleading authorities; websites is extremely difficult in practice. Under a his earlier 18-month prison term on similar charges 2012 law, civil society organizations, including those would have expired in May. advocating for journalists and media freedom, are registered as “foreign agents” if they are found to In December, three internet users received receive foreign funding and engage in broadly defined substantial prison sentences for their online activities. “political activity.” A new law signed in May 2015 Vadim Tyumentsev, a blogger in the city of Tomsk, allows the prosecutor general’s office to designate was sentenced to five years in prison for posting foreign organizations as “undesirable,” after which videos on YouTube and the social-networking platform anyone working with the blacklisted group can face VKontakte that included criticism of the conflict in up to seven years in prison. Dozens of Russian eastern Ukraine, which prosecutors said amounted nongovernmental organizations have been labeled as to incitement to hatred and extremist activity. A court “foreign agents,” leading some to close. Four foreign in Krasnodar found activist Darya Polyudova guilty organizations were deemed “undesirable” during 2015, of “public calls to separatism and extremism” and including the U.S.-based National Endowment for sentenced her to two years in a penal colony after Democracy. she posted a handful of items denouncing Putin’s leadership and Russian actions in Ukraine on The main national news agenda is firmly VKontakte. Neither she nor Tyumentsev had a controlled by the Kremlin. The government sets significant following on social media. Oleg editorial policy at state-owned television stations, Novozhenin, an internet user in Surgut, was sentenced which dominate the media landscape and generate to a year in a penal colony for distributing “extremist propagandistic content. The country’s more than 400 material” on social networks. He had posted audio daily newspapers offer content on a wide range of and video files promoting Ukrainian nationalist topics but rarely challenge the official line on important organizations. A number of other social-media users issues such as corruption or foreign policy. Meaningful and journalists faced investigations, fines, and short political debate is mostly limited to weekly magazines, detentions during the year. news websites, some radio programs, and a handful of newspapers. These outlets operate with the In addition to individuals, seemingly understanding that the government has the means to innocuous organizations were subjected to official close them at any time.

Russian Media In Contemporary World 115 There is significant evidence that the reports of attacks on journalists and bloggers over government organizes propaganda campaigns online, the course of the year. including by hiring people or creating automated social- media accounts to produce positive content about the In January, Sergey Vilkov of the online news regime and attack its detractors. Aside from fulfilling portal Obshchestvennoye Mneniye was badly specific disinformation and propaganda goals, the beaten by two unidentified assailants in Saratov. practice undermines the Russian internet as a source Vilkov, who had written critical articles on local of reliable news and information. officials and businessmen, said the assault was likely connected to his work. In April, four masked men The country’s few independent media outlets abducted, beat, and eventually released Vyacheslav struggled to remain operational in the face of political Starodubets, owner of the news website My Derbent, pressure in 2015. TV-2, a regional broadcaster based which had exposed official corruption in the Dagestani in Tomsk, was forced to cease terrestrial broadcasting city. The attackers reportedly threatened to target at the beginning of the year after a state-owned his family if he did not leave Dagestan. In November, transmission monopoly canceled its contract. The Aleksandr Kholodov of the news portal Fontanka.ru, station was then forced off cable services when who reports on abuses by St. Petersburg’s road police, Roskomnadzor terminated its license, and was only was beaten by unidentified assailants in his apartment able to continue operating online. The reasoning behind building. Such crimes against journalists are rarely the decisions was not fully explained, but TV-2 solved and successfully prosecuted. representatives suggested that the channel was being punished for its independent reporting. The online In at least one case during the year, a news television outlet Dozhd (Rain), known for critical outlet was used to transmit a threat against a member coverage of the Russian government, remained a of the press. A May editorial in Grozny Inform, which target of official harassment after being dropped by is associated with the leadership of Chechnya, warned cable and satellite services in 2014, apparently under that investigative journalist Yelena Milashina of the pressure from the authorities. In December 2015, the independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta could meet station was inspected by the Moscow prosecutor’s the same fate as Nemtsov and Anna Politkovskaya, office for possible violations of laws on extremism, a Novaya Gazeta reporter who was murdered in labor rules, and licensing regulations. One prominent 2006. Russian news site, Meduza, operates from a base in Latvia to avoid interference by Russian authorities. Conclusion The Russian state controls, either directly or through Both Russian and foreign journalists often proxies, all five of the major national television encounter physical intimidation or official obstruction networks, as well as national radio networks, while reporting in the field. In July, journalist Anna important national newspapers, and national news Gritsevich of the online news outlet Kavkazskiy Uzel agencies. The state also controls more than 60 percent was ordered to serve three days in jail for allegedly of the country’s estimated 45,000 regional and local disobeying a police order as authorities dispersed a newspapers and other periodicals. State-run television local protest in Sochi in 2014. She was reportedly is the main news source for most Russians and serves injured by police, who detained her as she filmed the as the key propaganda tool of the government. The protest from a distance. government owns an array of media assets directed at foreign audiences, including RT, an international, The Committee to Protect Journalists multilingual satellite news network that promotes the recorded no murders of journalists in connection with Kremlin’s take on global events. Internet access their work in 2015, but the organization has continues to grow and is widely affordable. About 73 documented 56 such murders in Russia since 1992, percent of Russians used the internet in 2015, and finding that the perpetrators nearly always enjoyed more than half of internet users are able to reach the impunity. Nonfatal assaults remain relatively common. medium via smartphones. The Glasnost Defence Foundation collected 70

116 World Focus January 2017 A law signed in 2014 will restrict foreign some freedom of speech on the one side while on the ownership stakes in Russian media assets to 20 other side the television channels and newspapers percent by early 2017. In 2015, Germany’s Axel watched and read by a vast majority, following the Springer group sold the Russian edition of Forbes, authorities line of censorship on the other. The media and Finland’s Sanoma sold its stakes in the business system in Russia today cannot be compared to the newspaper Vedomosti and the English-language Soviet media system seen after Stalin, although Moscow Times. Russian media executives were the similarities can be found. Journalists are experiencing buyers in both transactions. The Moscow Times a society that hardly protects them from violence and subsequently switched from daily to weekly arbitrary exercising of laws. The media outlets are publication, and its chief editor resigned due to trying to maneuver themselves in unsafe conditions, conflicts with the new owner. The new publisher of pleasing both owners and advertisers, together with Forbes said that the magazine would carry fewer federal and regional authorities and legislation. The stories on politics and focus on business and average Russian citizen has few abilities to run checks economics. on the authorities, whether they are federal or regional. The television channels are keeping up Government advertising allocations are an appearances with building an image of a well- important means of influencing content, and most functioning state with a government working in the media businesses remain dependent on state subsidies interests of the people. The independent media outlets and government printing, distribution, and transmission may present investigative and critical journalism as a facilities. In addition, businesses are reported to be service for the intelligentsia and the western countries, reluctant to place advertisements with outlets that as long as they are kept small and with marginal are not favorable to the government. In the current influence not in hindrance for the United Russia and economic crisis, publications face both shrinking the government to stay in power. The media system subsidies and dwindling advertising revenues, putting in Russia today is working more to the advantage of greater pressure on newsrooms. the authoritarian government, rather than encouraging democratic tendencies and accountability. In February 2015, Putin signed amendments to 2014 legislation that had banned advertising on References 1 Beard, N., Crews, S., Omidi, M., Pakhomova, E., Rann, J. & Zinatulin, I. (2014). Media Compass: Russia’s changing media landscape. television channels and charged subscription fees for Retrieved from http://calvertjournal.com/features/show/2234. 2 Becker, J. (2004). Lessons from Russia: A neo-authoritarian media system. European Journal of Communication, 19(2), 139. 3 Beumers, B., Hutchings, S. & Rulyova, N. (2009). The post-Soviet Russian media: Conflicting Signals. London: Routledge. cable and satellite viewers and did not hold terrestrial 4 Bonnell, V. E. (1997). Iconography of power: Soviet political posters under Lenin and Stalin. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. broadcasting licenses. The initial ban threatened the 5 Castells, M., & Kiselyova, E. (1995). The Collapse of Soviet Communism: A View from the Information Society. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 6 Internet Live Stats. (2014). Internet users by country. Retrieved from Dunn, J. A. (2014). Lottizzazione Russian style: Russia’s two-tier commercial viability of many outlets, though notably media system. Europe-Asia Studies, 66(9), 1425–1451. Retrieved from http://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2014.956441http:// www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users-by-country/ not the traditional pro-government broadcasters. 7 Das, Bishal (2014), Russian Media Under Putin Presidency, Thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi for award of PhD Degree 8 Federalnoe Agentstvo po Pechati i Massovym Kommunikatsiiam. (2014). Rossiiskaia periodicheskaia pechat. Sostoianie, tendentsii i Under the 2015 amendments, pay channels can air perspektivy razvitiia. Otraslevoi doklad. [Russian periodical press. Situation, tendencies and perspectives for development.] Moscow: Federalnoe Agentstvo po Pechati i Massovym Kommunikatsiiam. Retrieved from http://fapmc.ru/mobile/activities/reports/2014/polygraph-inrussia2/main/ advertisements if their share of foreign programming custom/0/01/file.pdf 9 Fossato, F. & Lloyd, J. (2008). The web that failed – How opposition politics and independent initiatives are failing on the Internet in Russia. Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Retrieved from http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/ does not exceed 25 percent. Observers remained The%20Web%20that %20Failed%20- %20How%20opposition%20politics %20and%20independent%20initiatives%2 0are%20 failing%20on%20the%20internet%20in%20Russia.pdf concerned that foreign commercial stations could be 10 Forbes. (2015b, September 7). Alisher Usmanov. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/profile/alisher-usmanov/ 11 Forbes. (2015a). Yuri Kovalchuk. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/profile/yurikovalchuk/ 12 Kimmage, D. (2009). Russia - Selective capitalism and kleptocracy. Undermining Democracy: 21st Century Authoritarians. Washington, excluded from the market, and that many regional DC: Freedom House 13 Gorny, E. (2012). A creative history of the Russian Internet: Studies in Internet creativity. Saarbrucken, Germany: VDM Verlag stations could be driven out of business if they lose 14 Lonkila, M. (2012). Russian protest on- and offline: The role of social media in the Moscow opposition demonstrations in December 2011 (FIIA Briefing Paper No. 98). Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved from http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/ 244/ their terrestrial broadcast licenses in a national shift 15 Nordenstreng, K. & Pietiläinen, J. (2010). Media as a mirror of change. In T. Huttunen & M. Ylikangas (Eds.), Witnessing Change in Contemporary Russia (pp. 136–158). Helsinki: Aleksanteri Institute. Retrieved from http://tampub.uta.fi/handle/10024/66231 to digital terrestrial transmission, now scheduled for 16 Oates, S. (2007). The neo-Soviet model of the media. Europe-Asia Studies, 59(8), 1279– 1297. 17 Oates, S. (2013). Revolution stalled: The political limits of the Internet in the post-Soviet sphere. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. the end of 2018. 18 Pankin, A., Fedotov, A., Richter, A., Alekseeva, A. & Osipova, D. (2011). Mapping digital media: Russia. London: Open Society Foundations. 19 Reporters Without Borders. (2015). 2015 World Press Freedom Index. Retrieved from http://index.rsf.org 20 Roesen, T. (2011). A social network site for the elite. Digital Icons: Studies in Russian, Eurasian and Central European New Media, 6, 81–92. The legacy from the Soviet era, features of 21 Toepfl, F. (2012). Blogging for the sake of the president: The online diaries of Russian governors. Europe-Asia Studies, 64(8), 1435– 1459. Russian journalism, the authorities, ownership 22 Toepfl, F. (2014). Four facets of critical news literacy in a non-democratic regime: How young Russians navigate their news. European Journal of Communication, 29(1), 68–82. Retrieved from http://doi.org/10.1177/0267323113511183. 23 Vartanova, E. (2015). Russia: post-Soviet, post-modern and post-empire media. In K. Nordenstreng & D. K. Thussu (Eds.), Mapping structures, legislation and journalistic professionalism BRICS media (pp. 125–144). London & New York: Routledge. 24 Vartanova, E. L. (2013). Postsovetskie transformatsii rossiiskikh SMI i zhurnalistiki. [PostSoviet transformations of Russian mass media are parts of the Russian media system of today. In a and journalism.] Moskva: MediaMir 25 Zassoursky, I. (1999). Mass-media of the second republic. Moscow, Russia: Izdatelstvo MGUPanorama. 26 Zassoursky, I. (2004). Media and power in post-Soviet Russia. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe Inc. way a dual media system exists in Russia where a 27 Zassoursky, I. (2009). Free to get rich and fool around. In B. Beumers, S. Hutchings & N. Rulyova (Eds.), The post-Soviet Russian media: Conflicting Signals (pp. 29–41). London: Routledge. I have completed my MA, M.Phil, PhD (Research Topic: Russian Media Under few enjoy access independent media outlets enjoying Putin Presidency) from JNU, New Delhi, PG Diploma in English Journalism, IIMC. I started my career as a journalist at PTI, New Delhi. Later on, I was selected for Indian Information Service and got posted at PIB, New Delhi. Currently, I am posted at DAVP, M/o Information and Broadcasting, Govt.of India, New Delhi.

Russian Media In Contemporary World 117 Resurgence and Redefinition of Russia’s Soft Power – Issues and Contestations Tahira Batt

Introduction power being an intangible concept is impossible to It was Joseph Nye who coined the term “Soft Power” quantify and that its application is rather limited in contrast to “Hard Power” strategies which is based (Liaropoulos 2013). Nevertheless there is a change mostly on military capabilities. According to Nye, soft in the functioning of relationship between various power is the ability to make others want what one countries, especially with regard to power relations wants through the power of attraction and not through highlighting the role of soft power. For a coercion. This new concept of power therefore relies country like Russia, which has not embraced proper on sources like culture, values and foreign policy. democratic practices such as freedom of speech, What is therefore interesting is the kind of soft power expression, transparency of governance and others; that Russia will be employing or has employed in the it is important to turn to culture and foreign policy as past, as soft power of Joseph Nye is regarded as a the main sources of its soft power formation. It should “western construct” and cannot explain everything. however bear in mind that political values also form Nye believes that soft power does not belong to the one of the main sources of attraction and should not government or the state in the same degree that hard be neglected. power does, despite the fact that government policies at home and abroad are important source of soft During the Soviet period, Russia had power (Nye 2004: 29-33). immense soft power capabilities. However with its disintegration came the decline of its soft power, as Scholars like Yelena Osipova raise an its ‘ideology’ crumbled to the core. It is true that interesting point about different nations sharing “socialist ideology’’ of the Soviet Union was its different world view, yet wanting to share the benefits greatest source of soft power but it collapsed. The that “soft power” offers in the present world, Russia collapse of this ideology along with the Soviet Union being one of these countries. The author believes that led to disastrous implications for Russia. Russia faced Russia too follows a different perspective; hence its the most troubled times, as it was a new born child way of dealing with soft power also may not be the without a mother to guide it. Therefore, Vladimir Putin same as any other Western country for that matter. in his second term brought with him a substantial On the other hand, Giulio M. Gallaroti tries to change in the way Russia had been functioning and understand the complexities of soft power and also has equally focussed his attention on a need to re- tries to situate it in international relations. The prime build its soft power capabilities. Soft Power has been argument of his article according to our understanding included officially in its concept of foreign policy and is that soft power is basically a product of it states, “soft power”, as a comprehensive toolkit “globalisation” which has lead to a flow of information for achieving foreign policy objectives building on civil with each nation trying to imitate the other but through society potential, information, cultural and other cooperation. There is economic cooperation of free methods and technologies alternative to traditional trade and capitalist markets, thus, projecting it more diplomacy (Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian as a “cosmopolitan power”. Federation 2013).

Soft power is often claimed to be just a Putin has undertaken the task of opening up reflection of hard power and that the former works many new institutions, agencies and foundations only if the latter is strong. Critics also mention about which are responsible for spreading Russia’s culture the difficulty in measuring soft power as they discuss and language. For instance, Rossotrudnichestvo is that power itself is very difficult to measure and soft an agency set up by presidential decree under the 118 World Focus January 2017 former President Dmitry Medvedev, on 6 December for ‘training specialists for foreign countries in 2008. Earlier it was largely responsible for international Russia’. Resolution number 891 drafted by the cultural cooperation, promoting Russian language and government has furthered the cause of cultural maintaining a network of Russian Houses of Science cooperation and also to implement the State Migration and Culture. However in 2013, Rossotrudnichestvo Policy Concept until 2025 (Ministry of Education and was transformed into Russia’s national agency for Science, Russian Government 2013). Russian international development. With its expanded powers, language has been used by Putin to foster strong it is expected to shift Russia’s approach to influence over other countries, especially the former international development from a more passive Soviet regions. approach to an active one (Sherr 2013:62-63). India-Russia Friendship Russian literature, artists, music, theatre, The relationship shared by Russia and India is a time philosophy, ballet, painting, folklore and architecture tested one. The nurturing of the friendship they share are globally renowned from the Soviet days and even is blissful from the Soviet period till present. One of in present day Russia they form an important source the first visitors to India was Afanasiy Nikitin, a of soft power. Russia is also willing to make religion merchant from Russia. His journey has been a major factor abroad (Sherr 2013). The Ruskiyy documented in the book, ‘A Journey Beyond the Three Mir (Russian World) Foundation, headed by Seas’. The book is an example of the historical Vyacheslav Nikonov, was set up through a Presidential connections shared by India and Russia. Sanskrit also decree of Putin in 2007. This organisation is mostly stands as an example of the linkage between the two used for the promotion of Russian language and countries. Similarities between Sanskrit and Russian culture. Along with it there are numerous institutions only prove that there could be a possibility of influence that carry out similar kind of roles and they help each on Russian language as a result of ancient Indians other in their work. One such institution is the Institute taking their languages and culture to Russia (Simha for Democracy and Cooperation, which also works 2015). as an NGO and was also established in the year 2007 ((Liik 2013). The Soviet Union had a great influence on India which can be seen in the writings of D.Selveraj, Another important factor in Russia’s foreign of Tamil Nadu. His novel ‘Thol’ (Hide) speaks about policy has been Education, which has been the travails and struggles of the Dalit Tannery workers strengthened by Putin. According to the Minister of of Dindigul in Tamil Nadu. Almost all his works Education and Science, the number of international highlight the plight of the toiling masses and their students at Russian Universities in 2012-2013 nearly constant struggle to change the social order. He exceeded 250,000 and almost 40,000 have been derives his inspiration from the Russian author Maxim receiving funding from the state budget. Most of the Gorky. (Frontline 2013). Another example of the soft international students who enrol in Russian universities power of Soviet Union through its socialist realist are from the former Soviet regions and China. Among writings in India is witnessed in the work of the very the developed countries, it is the United States that renowned writer Gopalakrishnan. He spent twenty has maximum representation in Russian universities. five years in Moscow, where he translated Russian However the number has not exceeded to more than writings, communist classics and propaganda. (Lal approximately 2000. This is followed by Germany, 2011). France and Japan with 1300, 850 and 700 students approximately (Dolinsky 2013: 12-15). Any discussion on socialist realist literature would be incomplete without the mentioning of the Apart from the CIS regions, students from great works of Maxim Gorky. This is true even in India, Mongolia, Vietnam, Malaysia and Myanmar the case of India where his writings have been also come to Russia in good numbers. The increase explicitly appreciated and adored. Almost all his works in the number of reservations for the students from have instilled a sense of fervour in the minds of the the foreign nationals has been due to the rise in need readers. Maxim Gorky’s ‘Mother’ (1906) is a world

Resurgence and Redefinition of Russia’s Soft Power – Issues and Contestations 119 famous work, which in India, is seen to have received scientific and business fields dubbed as the “New an additional magnitude and has been translated into Generation” from April to October 2017 (Chaudhury various Indian languages like Hindi, Punjabi, Marathi, 2016). Gujarati, Oriya, Bengali, Assamese, Tamil, Urdu and the like. Apart from ‘Mother’ other books of Gorky By far Russia’s cultural ties with India have that were translated into Indian languages were, been very strong and deep. Despite the ups and downs ‘Foma Gordeyev’, ‘Three of Them’, ‘Artamonovs’, on their relationship the two countries continue to ‘Lower Depths’, ‘Miserable or Luckless Pavel’, remain on much cordial terms. However Russia’s ‘Childhood’, ‘Apprenticeship’, ‘Enemies’ and ‘V.I scope of soft power in India is limited to that of its Lenin’, to name a few (Sahitya Akademi 1968: 68- cultural relationship. Its soft power is not very 73). discernible as compared to the influence of other Western countries in India. The hegemony of the The Indo-Russia ties started with the West or even China for that matter through dependence of India on Russia for weapons, consumer/commercial and entertainment market is technology and industrial investment and especially very substantial. Russia is unable to reach to that during India’s war with Pakistan. Although gradually level although its contribution in the defence sector is India’s economy started to improve and eventually high. Although the two countries have great surpassed that of Russia, cooperation between them dependence in defence and other sectors, the power has continued smoothly. The relationship between of attraction is sometimes seen to lose its way. Russia them has matured and they have stood for each other needs to highlight more on the consumer industry as whenever the situation has demanded. For instance well on public diplomacy and therefore more emphasis Prime Minister Narendra Modi in December 2014, should be made to reach the masses rather than during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India focussing on just mere governmental relationship. A stated: “Even a child in India, if asked to say who little effort from both the sides can enhance the soft India’s best friend is, will reply it is Russia because power of both the countries. Russia has been with India in times of crisis” (Simha 2015). Russia’s Soft Power In The Former Soviet Space Even after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the bonds Russia and India continue to further their of the past is still visible as far as Russia’s relations diplomatic ties in various fields. Russia’s with these regions is concerned. The relationship that Rossotrudnichestvo Representative Office was they share with Russia is not just cultural but also established in 1965 and has five Russian Centres of economic and political as Russia still has immense Science and Culture in Indian states of New Delhi, hold in these regions. This hold of Russia can be seen Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Trivandrum. The year from different angles, with the West seeing the act 2017 will mark the 70th anniversary of Russia India of Russia as a big brother who sometimes acts as a diplomatic relations. To bring about the significance bully and hence has to be criticised. This can also be of this anniversary of their relationship the two understood by the fact that the West is much countries will be engaged in different events in the interested in these regions due to the vast expanse of sphere of culture, science, economy, sports and natural resources available in there as well as to terrorism, covering a total of thirty five different sets counter Russia’s moves and interest in these regions. of events. During the eight BRICS summit held in Goa, India from 15 to 16 October 2016, President Whenever Russia’s control has exceeded in Putin and Prime Minister Modi emphasised on suitable this region, it has only had a negative impact on its ways to celebrate this anniversary. The events will soft power. This is so because the CIS is no longer range from the launching of radio programme ‘Russia under Russia even though they share common past, Today’ on Gold FM All India Radio to photo culture, religion and language in some cases. competitions to promote Russia and India as tourist Therefore their relationship should not be of control destinations, to short term visits of young from just one side as soft power is not limited to the representatives belonging to the political, social, capacity to influence or to manipulate public opinion;

120 World Focus January 2017 it also includes a proper idea of partnership with the CIS, Russian remains the main lingua franca, mutual benefits in the near and long term. Russia’s functioning in a similar fashion to English in large parts need to enhance its soft power capabilities in these of the world (Lytvynenko 2013). However in the case regions rose due to the immediate concern with regard of Latvia and Estonia, since the 1990s, a decline in to the Colour Revolutions in Georgia (2003) and Russian language among the non-Russian population Ukraine (2004). Russia realized that the West is seen (Grigas 2012: 13). The Russian social countered the Russian influence in the post Soviet networking site ‘Odnoklassniki’ is considered to area with the help of their well developed soft power more popular than ‘Facebook’(Liik 2013:55). The channels such as international NGOs and media House of Moscow in Latvia, a cultural centre funded outlets. Hence, to increase their influence in these by the Moscow city government has been a key player regions, Russia started undertaking various means in promoting Russia’s culture from its opening in 2004 taken by the West to counteract the activities of the (Grigas 2012: 15). West. For instance, Russia’s state controlled Television news programs were broadcasted across To improve political and social relations with most of the CIS territory to increase their influence neighbouring countries, the Kremlin tries to use the on public opinion especially after the Colour positive image of the Orthodox Church in the post- Revolutions (Cwiek-Karpowicz 2012: 6). Soviet areas to its advantage. The Russian Church also played the important role of an arbiter and also Television continues to be a strong factor of offered in practical terms, financial support for the Russian cultural influence in these regions. It is Abkhazian and Ossetian parishes (Cweik-Karpowicz considered to be one of the most popular media outlets 2012: 7). In Armenia, 98 percent of the population in . Prime TV which is the rebroadcast of are considered to be members of the Armenian ‘Russian Channel One’ remains the most popular Apostolic Church but in Moldova it is estimated that source of information in Moldova along with heavy 75 percent of its population belong to the Moldovan popularity of Russian films and serials. Hollywood is Orthodox Church which comes directly under the also very much popular but they are broadcasted with Russian Orthodox Church (Liik 2013: 60). Russian subtitles. This also shows the influence that the language policy of Russia has on these regions. Although Russia was deeply hit by the global Even in the case of Ukraine, Russia’s popular culture financial crisis of 2008-2009, it affected the post- industry appears to be an important source of soft Soviet countries in a more severe manner. This power. Television channels like RTV, NTV, and First resulted in Moscow implementing a series of anti- Channel act as important source of promoting crisis measures that stabilized the labour market as Russia’s soft power (Lytvynenko 2013). Russian radio well as the finances of many state-run companies enjoys more popularity than Russian Television in (Cweik-Karpowicz 2012: 8). With the help of business Estonia, with over four Russian music radio channels and political elites, Russia has tried to enhance its and two very popular Russian language channels: soft power. In the Baltic business world, many of the Radio 4 and Russkoye Radio (Conley et al 2011: elites are former members of the Soviet nomenclature 16). The Soviet era movies are considered to be who loyalty is to the Kremlin out of economic interest. extremely popular in Russia and it is believed that the The businessmen are of Russian origin as well as same is in the case in the post-Soviet countries. The from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Grigas 2012: 7). inter-state program for innovation cooperation in the Vladimir Putin is regarded as the most trusted CIS countries is regarded by Russia as its top priority politician by the people of Moldova and in Armenia The influence of Russian popular culture is stronger too he enjoys a positive image due to the fact that he in the case of Armenia (Liik 2013: 59-62). managed these regions well during the hard times (Liik 2013: 79). In Armenia, the language presence and knowledge is perceived much more positively despite The only way for Russia to become a real the fact that sometimes it is made mandatory in schools soft power in the post-Soviet area is to introduce (Liik 2013: 59). For the older generations throughout serious internal reforms which will focus on the

Resurgence and Redefinition of Russia’s Soft Power – Issues and Contestations 121 liberalization of its economy and the democratization can explain at least to some extent why Putin’s foreign of its political system. The most influential products policy became popular with the majority of Russians. of Russian soft power tend to use the rhetoric of Unlike during Yeltsin’s time, Russia under Putin has fraternity in reference to the common victory in World been projected as a strong country, as an independent War II and nostalgia for the lost Soviet empire (Cweik- centre of power in a multi-polar world (Feklyunina Karpowicz 2012: 6). 2008: 619). Russia’s soft power projections in the former Soviet regions have been criticized by the West Russia and The West as a propaganda tool against the Western countries’ The Cold War period was one of major distrust and efforts to promote democracy and human rights and detestation between Russia (Soviet Union) and United not termed as a reliable offer of cooperation with States of America, when they strongly competed. With target countries (Cwiek-Karpowicz 2012: 5). regard to the image of Russia in the West and especially in the Unites States, it can be said that it is The Western media especially that of the quite negative. The Russians from an early period United States acts as a hindrance in Russia’s road to have complained about the hostility and indifference soft power. This can be traced right from the period of the West to Russia and its culture. They claim that after the disintegration of USSR whereby the the West lacks an understanding of their culture and Western media projected the period to be a legitimate have often viewed Russia from afar. They have not period where all acts of Boris Yeltsin were justified tried to comprehend Russian culture in depth like they in the name of transition from ‘Communism to do with their own. Instead they have often Democracy’. However on the other hand they stereotyped and judged Russian artists, writers and portray the present period under Putin as being composers expecting the Russians to be ‘Russians’, illegitimate politics, either at home or abroad. The that is to say their art are easily notable ‘by the use media has thus acted as a barrier in Russia’s of folk theme, by onion domes, the sound of bells and improvement of soft power image abroad because full of Russian sole’ (Figes 2002: xxxi). Russia’s the United States hegemony is successful in projecting culture however is more diverse and rich and is not a negative image of Russia, which is taken at face limited to the stereotypical image of Russia value by some countries. Even during the Sochi Winter constructed by the West. Olympics the Western media has been highly pessimistic about its results or anything related to it. Imperialism, Expansion and revanchism are commonly used terms by the West to construct a President Putin in his 2012 article, ‘Russia negative image of Russia (Taras 2013: 1). Valentina and the Changing world’, published in the Moscow Feklyunina also talks about ‘Russophobia’ to explain Times mentions about how, ‘nobody should possess Russia’s identity in international relations and how complete control over the sphere of human rights...no this topic has become significantly more pressing in country has a perfect record on human rights and the second term of Vladimir Putin’s presidency. The basic freedom’. Furthermore, he also mentions about murder in Moscow of a prominent critic of the how Western states especially the United States has Kremlin, journalist Anna Politskaya added to the politicized and dominated the human rights agenda negative image of Russia in the West and led to more using it as a means to exert pressure (Putin 2012). criticism by the West on Russia (Feklyunina 2013: Therefore one can deduce the Russian leadership as 615). Russia regards NATO as a Cold War construct trying to create an alternative discourse on human and its 2010 military doctrine defines NATO’s policies rights; thus forming an alternative image of Russia. as the main ‘external military danger’ facing the Russian Federation (Sherr 2013: 63). Despite the tussle between Russia and the West and the effect that it has had on the image of According to some, the image of Russia in Russia and its soft power, it should be noted that for the West is also determined by Russia’s own self- many in the West, Russian culture appears to be highly perception, which is a vision of Russia as a great attractive. This attraction to these people is seen power. This aspiration to see Russia as a great power through organisations such as Pushkin House in

122 World Focus January 2017 London, created in the year 1954 by a group of Millionaire Fair in Moscow in 2007; and an instance Russians. It was opened for facilitating and where President Putin called Trump a ‘talented’ understanding of Russian culture by various person which Trump thought to be ‘a great honour’, nationalities and hence is open to all who have any the article highlights Trump’s interest in Russia (Stott kind of interest in its culture. Since then it has been and Belton 2016). working to promote Russian culture and indulge in activities that include art, poetry, literature, theatre, Russia has also been accused of hacking philosophy and politics. It also involves lectures, talks, political sites and email accounts during the US shows and thus facilitates in the exchange of idea. It election campaign. Whether it is work of the Western has now been functioning as a politically independent media that portrays Trump’s connections with Russia and registered charity that is owned and run by or it is truly a fact will only be understood in the future. Pushkin House Trust. Through various sharing of However Vladimir Putin recently declared his views ideas it becomes a channel of cultural exchange and on its ties with the US stating it would cooperate with a link between Russia and United Kingdom the US in the fight against international terrorism but (Pushkinhouse.org). it would not tolerate US intervention in Russia’s interest (Aljazeera 2016). What remains interesting The celebration of the Russian festival is to understand Russia’s image in the Western world ‘Maslenitsa’, a celebration of the end of winter and after Trump got elected. If Russia’s ties with the the beginning of spring, in United Kingdom also helps United States improve, will it contribute to Russia’s in spreading Russian culture and make people more soft power in United States? Or will the ‘not so good’ aware of the Russian way of life. Apart from acting image of Donald Trump and the criticisms from the as a family event and entertaining people through good opponents prove detrimental to Russia’s soft power music, food, crafts and celebrations image. Nevertheless it will definitely be an interesting (maslenitsa.co.uk), it can further enhance Russia’s phase in the U.S Russia relations. soft power by making culture more attractive to people. While the relation between Russia and the Limitations In Russia’s Projection Of Soft Power West is filled with conflicts, competition and After the Soviet Union collapsed, a number of former misunderstandings, Russian culture would help in Soviet States, mostly the Baltic regions articulated easing the tensions between them. This can be a their interest towards the West and also showed positive step towards debunking the stereotypes that interest in cooperating with some of the Western Russia has been associated with in the West as well organisations like NATO and European Union. The in the world. Russian Federation perceived this shift towards the West as a threat to its geopolitical power (Roslycky Russia’s relationship with the West reached 2011:302). Russia’s effort has been to attract these its lowest ebb with the Ukrainian crisis and the war regions. It is obvious that Russia’s high-handedness in Syria. However with Donald Trump being elected is seen in most of the cases when dealing with these as the President of United States, changes might come regions which sometimes costs Russia dearly. in the relationship between Russia and the US. Although the differences will remain with regard to The Crimean crisis involving the control over many issues, the business mindset of Trump might the Crimean peninsula after February 2014 has gone not be in a mood to offend Russia. Donald Trump’s in favour of the Russians. However the West and soft corner towards Russia has been a topic of the United Nations has not recognized the inclusion discussion among the opponents of Trump. The of Crimea into Russia. The West has used it against Financial Times even came up with an article Russia’s soft power by portraying it as an aggressor. highlighting Trump’s connections with Russia As Russia’s interest in the area of Soft power is in its spanning a period of almost thirty years. From the initial phases, it has to be very careful with the image discussion of ‘Trump Tower’ in 1986 by the then that it is trying to build abroad. While the West might Soviet Ambassador and Trump to the promotion of be adamant to use the word “annexation” with regard ‘24k Super Premium Vodka’ by Trump at the to Russia’s inclusion of Crimea into the Russian

Resurgence and Redefinition of Russia’s Soft Power – Issues and Contestations 123 Federation, the Russians only believe it to be the will Russia’s augmented part in international affairs. Sochi of the majority who voted to be with Russia in the 2014 represents the changing relations between Russia referendum. The initial protestors in Ukraine were and the world over the last decade. Nonetheless, the mostly from the Western part of the country but the Olympics is concurrently a cue that Moscow will need Eastern and Southern parts are closer to Russia and fresh approaches, new resources, and technologies, have strong bonds with it because of their deep roots to grow as a global power (Makhmutov and Timofeev in Russia that dates back not just to the Soviet period 2014). The Sochi Olympics thus acted as a “Litmus but to the time of Peter the Great. test” to prove its importance and to fight against all odds through attraction and not coercion. With In Chechnya, the Kremlin’s policies remain Russia’s negative image due to the hostility of the heavily tilted towards building political and military West, its firm position on the Syrian issue, the Ukraine control over the area, rather than developing its soft crisis, restrictions on LGBT rights within Russia, the power capital (Tsygankov 2006: 1080). The Russo- Russo-Georgian war and the Pussy riots controversy, Georgian War tightened Russian policies toward its it indeed was an opportunity for Russia to boost its closest neighbours. The Kremlin decided to widen its soft power (ibid). influence in the CIS area by mobilizing loyal constituencies living there despite the negative It would not be correct to say that liberal consequences that would result from such a policy democracy of the West is the only solution for Russia (Cwiek-Karpowicz 2012: 7). to achieve the much needed change. It could however achieve success through other alternatives such as Russia has not spent much on the funding of cooperation with other BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, various organisations that help in promoting its image China and South Africa) members, it could come up abroad, which shows that the government has not with a ‘new world order’ that would respect viewed it as one of the top priorities of Russia’s foreign democratic rights and market economy but also bring policy. Surveys conducted on the non-governmental about sustainable development which is the need of sectors of Russia in the year 2007 show that almost the hour (Kreutz 2013). one fifth of the NGOs in Russia is international and the same survey also reveals that the funding provided Conclusion to these NGOs has amounted only to six percent to Russia has often been seen as a country that relies thirteen percent of their budgets. However, the mostly on its hard power tactics. It has also been suggestion made by Putin in the year 2012 to increase seen as a country where democratic values are very the funding of NGOs from the state budget to an low with lack of proper freedom of speech or amount of three billion roubles, can be seen as a expression. Russia has also been stereotyped as being positive effort undertaken by him towards achieving involved mostly in espionage and nefarious activities Russia’s soft power (Conley et al 2011). as often portrayed through Hollywood movies and the Western press. This also proves the fact that while Another major problem is Russia’s fear of the negative image attached to Russia might be the West, when they tend to view everything that because of its own hard power pursuits but a lot is involves the West as Western attempt to undermine dependent on the way the West has portrayed it. The Russian interests. It is true that the West have been Western supremacy has always kept Russia at a an intruder in the matters of Russia but such fears disadvantage with regard to its global ambitions. While only prevents Russia from exploring the opportunities it may be true that the West have acted as a hindrance available. The stereotypes that have tagged in the in the making of a positive image, Russia can do a lot Russian image across the globe also acts as a on itself to fight against such negative portrayals or hindrance in Russia attempt to project itself as an stereotypes by projecting to the world its reliance on attractive country (Koshkin and Smertina 2014). soft power.

However the Sochi Olympics was an What Russia needs is to win the support and important event in Russia. The Olympics denotes trust of its own people. It can have a positive image

124 World Focus January 2017 in the world by placing equal importance to all the Kreutz, Andrej. (2013), “Russia’s Soft Power: Does Moscow have diverse ethnic groups in Russia. For this to achieve, any Chance to Achieve it?” [Online:web] Accessed 5 December 2013, URL: http://gpf-europe.com/forum/ Russia apart from being a strong country needs to ?blog=external_relations&id=141 follow a proper political value system that would give Koshkin and Smertina. (2014), “Russia’s Soft Power Should Not rights and freedom to the people and to safeguard Add up to Propaganda”, [Online: web] Accessed 15 June 2014, URL: http://www.russia-direct.org/content/russias-soft-power- their interest and simultaneously uphold the values of shouldnt-add-propaganda a Russian state. Lal, Amrith. (2011), “The Soft Power of the Soviet Union”, [Online: web] Accessed 6 December. 2013 URL: http:// articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-03-10/news/ There is also a need for increasing the 28675614_1_translations-malayalam-russians parameters of soft power. By viewing a country’s Liik, Kristina (2013), Russia’s Soft Power: The Case of Moldova soft power through the lens of just Western principles and Armenia, MA Thesis, Estonia: University of Tartu. will not be fair on part of the other countries that Lytvynenko, Oleksandr. “Russia, the West and the Rest: Foreign Soft Power in Ukraine”, [Online: web] Accessed 17 December. might have rich sources of soft power which does 2013, URL: http://www.google.co.in/ not fall under the current definition of soft power. search?rlz=1C1_____enIN568IN568&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF- The present world needs the use of both soft and 8&q=Russia,+the+West+and+the+Rest:+Foreign+Soft+Power+in+Ukraine Liaropoulos Andrew. 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Resurgence and Redefinition of Russia’s Soft Power – Issues and Contestations 125 Russia-US Relations post Trump victory: A turning point? Sukanya Kakoty

These few months have seen some current crisis, resolve issues on the international exceptional forms of tables-turning in the political agenda, [and] look for effective responses to global forecast of the very popular and widely followed US security challenges”. Further there were highlights presidential elections. For a campaign that had lasted on how to form “a constructive dialogue based on for nearly 597 days1, the results of Donald Trump as the principles of equality, mutual respect, and genuine the next US president came out as a complete surprise consideration for each other’s positions.”3 for it defied almost all the political opinions and surfaced a complete new-comer to politics with zero There has been several attempts earlier experience in the political field who assumed the most towards ‘resetting’ of ties between the US and powerful office in the world. That is simply why the Russia. It was for the first time launched in 2009 outcome of the American elections will certainly bring when Obama came to power. There was a symbolic ramifications not only to the American people for the representation of the reset as well in the form of a next four years but it will have implications globally big ‘red button’. The reset had come as a means to as well. In this context, there is a famous ‘backyard’ mend the US-Russia relationship after the bruise of that’s extensively read about and observed in global Russia’s Georgia invasion of 2008. It was a means to politics; which is the region considered by Russia as discover newer and different shades or areas where it’s ‘near abroad’- the post-Soviet space or to say the US and Russia had not touched upon earlier and Russia’s backyard! The US presence in Russia’s could still cooperate or at least work on despite having neighborhood and Afghanistan with the intent of ‘war some longstanding unresolved issues in other areas. on terror’ post 9/11 or even before have consistently However, popular opinion in the US about the ‘reset’ entangled the US-Russia relations; much as in the attempts was rendered as a failure and definitely not same way as following an apparent trend of a post- a priority. In fact in the year 2012, Republican cold war hangover. Things between both the countries Presidential nominee of the US verbally expressed had in fact accelerated into greater bitterness year how strong the dislike for Moscow was and after year and the last two and a half years have emphasized that Russia “is without question our seen an abysmal low- especially the critical and number one geopolitical foe.”4 And indeed, in the differing positions taken by both the US and Russia years that followed thereafter, the US and Russian on issues like Ukraine crisis and Syria to mention ties had reached its all time low. precisely. But it is important to understand- what makes The Russian President and the President- Trump’s tones of ‘resetting ties’ unique? My article elect of the US were in much news for being mutually will try and find out the gaps that the previous overboard with compliments for each other administration left out in the resets. The difference throughout the year. While Trump praised Putin calling probably between Obama’s reset attempts and him a “better leader” than even the American Trump’s method lies in the difference of approaching President Barrack Obama2; Putin exhibited his wish Russia with all the problems that American has with for Trump to win the American Presidential Elections it. And, also why it is urgent for the US to mend and was one of the first global leaders to congratulate relations with Russia? While Obama had assured of Trump at his victory and the congratulatory note had a kind of ‘reset’ that would have tried to cooperate put enough emphasis on the need to work together on selective sectors keeping the bigger and older over the current international challenges. To put it in concerns for Moscow in the back burner, Donald his words, “lift Russian-U.S. relations out of the Trump has actually dared to be vocal about and touch 126 World Focus January 2017 the sensitive and chronic issues for Moscow like approach between Trump and Obama’s vision in deal- NATO’s expansion and the like. This also indicates ing with the issue of ISIS. the willingness of the President-elect of a complete commitment in reviving the relations in a Syria is one area where Russia’s coopera- comprehensive manner, which most likely might be tion has been now understood as inevitable for the the gap that needed to be filled up all these years. US. Moscow certainly has an upper hand in dealing the Syrian crisis and the US certainly cannot put a There are several areas where the US-Russia blind eye on this. In fact since the second half of the interests coincide. Sections of analysts’ world over Obama administration, the significance of Russia’s have predicted how the new Trump administration is role became pretty much clear. According to a news likely to change all the equation that America and report of the Washington Post, Josh Rogin revealed Russia previously shared. The Middle Eastern region about a document that stated close cooperation be- has been in a big political and security debris making tween the US and Russian military forces operating ground for civil wars, conflicts, coups, militancy which in the Syrian airspace. The report further states that in fact laid further grounds for international rivalries. the Joint implementation Group consisting of Russian International powers like the US and Russia found and American military officials and other intelligence the Middle Eastern region as a lucrative arena for officers would be based in Amman, Jordan and work voicing their own preferences. The US and Russia towards extracting and exchanging information on have often come face to face in different events during Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS targets in Syria. However the Arab Spring- for instance when relations between until now the response of the US to collaborate with the US and Egypt and Saudi Arabia got sour, Russia the Russians have been more of delay and reluc- was there to provide diplomatic and arms assistance. tance to fully commit to this joint mission. The US Of course the Syrian crisis was the most pronounced has to understand at this point that Russia still has one in the recent times in bringing Russia and the US got a better leverage to work in Syria having close to lock horns. affinity with the Assad regime. In fact, Putin has been asking Obama for some serious and elaborate dis- Russia-US in the Middle Eastern arena: cussions on the Syrian issue but with limited response So the biggest change that is being expected with in return. Therefore in spite of having good grounds Donald Trump steering America’s foreign policy is to cooperate, it was obvious that under Obama ad- the operation pattern in the Middle East; most impor- ministration the US will try to cooperate with the tantly because unlike Obama, Trump seems to have Russians, but it did not.6 So, it has been highly ex- a different kind of outlook as far as it comes to un- pected that Trump’s approach would be unlike the derstanding the Middle Eastern region and Ameri- traditional American approach to Russia and the fu- ca’s policies in it, it sees it as an intervention to its ture might see more of cooperation or at least ap- domestic policies and in relation to Moscow’s per- peasement among the two powers especially in the sonalized interest in supporting the Syrian President Middle Eastern region. Bashar Al Assad. According to a report in the Reuters, Trump made a warning statement like, “You’re not The only concern of the new US administra- fighting Syria anymore, you are fighting Syria, Rus- tion’s role in the Middle East is the way Trump navi- sia and Iran, all right? Russia is a nuclear country”; gates the US-Iran nuclear deal. During the presiden- which suggests that American role in Syria might even- tial campaign Trump and many of his advisers like tually spark a third world war according to Trump. Rudolph W. Giuliani and John Bolton made some anti- Of course Trump as articulated in his various politi- Iranian remarks including a threat to sabotage the cal campaigns did give ample importance to fight the deal and reinforce sanctions. Trump had referred to Islamic State and defeat it and any country in this the deal as a ‘disaster’ and wants to ‘dismantle’ it mission would be a friend of America. Like he said, which he also believes that will dismantle the Iranian “Any nation who shares in this goal will be our friend regime. Mike Pompeo, who was selected by Presi- in this mission.”5 This brings a striking difference in dent-elect Trump to be his nominee for Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recently

Russia-US Relations post Trump victory: A turning point ? 127 tweeted, “Iran has dismantled and limited key as- The Ukraine crisis: pects of its nuclear program in exchange for an eas- The Ukraine crisis that sparked by the end of 2013 ing of sanctions. Not only has it advanced the West’s when the then- Viktor non-proliferation agenda, it has also prevented the Yanukovich halted the implementation of an agree- United States from resorting to military responses.”7 ment with the European Union, resulting in mass pro- However, what Trump and his circle of friends might tests by pro-Western proponents known as have overlooked is that firstly, the nuclear deal was ‘’ that ultimately led to the toppling of the the outcome of a collective action taken not solely by President on 22 February, 2014. What followed after the US but others like the permanent members of the this was the real unrest that began in Ukraine. Huge UN Security Council and Germany. In fact, on 17 tensions sparked especially from the Eastern part July 2015 in a meeting of the Russian Security Coun- (Russophone) and Southern regions of Ukraine; the cil, Putin had appreciated his American counterpart areas mostly with pro-Russian sentiments and from stating as, “The agreement on Iran became possible where Yanukovich also drew most of his support. thanks to the leading and constructive position of the Russia got involved in the crisis through a military US”8. This was probably a note of appreciation com- intervention in the Ukrainian autonomous region of ing from US’ most strategic geopolitical rival after Crimean and finally annexed it on 18 March 2014. years. Consequently, these actions led to a political crisis and unrest and struggle in and Secondly, keeping the deal intact would earn Oblasts of Ukraine between the pro-Russian rebels the support of the US allies along with Russia and (backed by Russian military forces) and the forces China as well. In fact tearing down the agreement is of post-revolutionary Ukrainian government of Petro actually completely incompatible with Trump’s will- Poroshenko11. Russia’s active interference in the ingness and strategy to play a greater role in fighting Ukraine crisis and military intervention invited sev- the Islamic state along with Moscow, as certainly eral rounds of heavy sanctions from the US, the EU, Russia would not want to go a step away from Iran. some other countries and international organizations. Not to forget, Iran was supplying ground troops and training pro-Assad Syrian forces, depicting a shared Sanctions have always been a very funda- interest with Russia. Thirdly, it would come naturally mental component of US-Russia ties and there has for the Europeans to push against any attempt to been a history of various sanctions at different times. change the deal. And, fourthly, sabotaging the deal However the recent American sanctions over Rus- would in no way help the US to cement relations sia for the Ukraine crisis have affected the Russian with Iran in anyway. As a matter of fact, the damage economy tremendously as it led to a sharp decline in of the deal would damage the prolonged attempts of the world oil prices that plunged the Russian economy the US and the rest in checking Iran’s nuclear weapon into recession (by 2015), being primarily dependent ambitions to a considerable level. With the deal gone, on energy exports. Although the sanctions were not it is highly likely of Iran to restart its nuclear program eminently responsible for the economic recession, but which would be dangerous for even the US-Iran ten- it did affect the Russian economy and Moscow’s abil- sions9, not to mention dangerous for the world. ity to overall attract foreign investments in the hydro- carbons sector affecting the long-term projects as- However, it is also hoped that the US intelli- sociated with the energy sector of Russia; and sec- gence briefings to the President-elect would indeed ondly, it has to a great extent limited the access of show how the deal is important to be all in one piece Russian companies in the Western markets.12 The giving the new US administration on one hand, the sanctions have also in a way affected the business of international credibility and capacity to work in the American oil and investment companies as well. As Middle Eastern region with its shared goals of eradi- Mikhail Leontyev of Rosneft pointed out, “We be- cating the ISIS activities along with Russia and on lieve that the sanctions against us are not only unjust the other hand letting the US companies access the but they also damage the interests of our American Iranian markets on the business front in the near fu- partners.”13 ture.10

128 World Focus January 2017 A resolution to the crisis and political solu- Trump’s understanding of NATO as an impractical tion was believed to be brought about within the ca- and pointless liability has been appreciated by some pacity of the Minsk Agreements; which had various sections in the international circle and the media as protocols such as an immediate bilateral ceasefire, his argaument might be justified because most of the immediate release of hostages and illegally detained NATO members do not necessarily meet the finan- persons, improvement of the humanitarian situation cial obligations and have been banking upon the US’ in Donbass, withdraw illegal armed forces and mili- troops and its larger funding to take care of their se- tary equipments from Ukraine14 to mention a few. curity as these countries aren’t capable of doing that The wasn’t fully successful hence a in their own capacity. At the same time, critics have new set of revived protocol in the form of Minsk II pointed out how NATO as Trump imagines it is not was agreed on February 2015 by the leaders of such a narrow concept. It is important to understand Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany to pacify the the circumstances under which this alliance was his- ongoing war in Ukraine’s Donbass region. The set- torically formed and that NATO and the US pres- tlements have been implied as a way of trading off ence in Europe has kept the region much more calmer Moscow’s promise of ceasefire and withdrawal of in the aftermath of the World War II. And that it’s troops and military equipments in exchange of Rus- not just what the Europeans want but that it is a se- sia’s influence over “constitutional reformatting of the curity umbrella for even the US.18 Ukrainian state.”15 With the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements, the anti-Russian sanctions But even American experts have realized might be lifted. how if not NATO as an alliance but its expansionist policies specifically and the US military ambitions have Post-Minsk settlements, it seems that all that gone way beyond the line. Peter Kuznick gives a US wants to pursue with Russia under Trump now is very logical explanation and more of a side that has the cooling down of tensions especially on the Ukraine been completely overlooked in American academic front. As indicated in his campaign, Trump is positive literature and political understanding in the recent to reassess America’s commitment to Ukraine and times; that is how the US has constantly denied to most likely would like to see the Europeans to rather recognize that Russia has any legitimate security in- take more responsibility in the Kiev issue. Trump terests. Kuznick throws light on how it is crucial to views the Ukraine issue tied-up with NATO obliga- acknowledge the difference between the Yeltsin era tions which he does not at all approve of.16 with pro-Western outlook and Putin as a completely different person. Putin has a different personality and NATO’s Eastern Expansion and US deployment it shows in Russia’s own foreign policy directions and of troops: therefore putting thousands of military force right in The US military presence in Eastern Europe and Russia’s neighborhood is naturally bound to worry NATO’s expansionist policies has since the dissolu- Russia, and thus respond accordingly, not to mention tion of the Soviet Union displeased the Russians. Peter that military is one of the biggest spending of Rus- Kuznick, a Professor in the American University re- sia.19 So as Trump’s strategy seems to move away cently in a talk show admitted how dangerous the from NATO expansion, it will surely bring these ten- NATO Eastwards Expansion policy is. As Kuznick sions down between the two countries. pointed out, “In the agreement in 1990, when Gorbachev agreed to allow the unification of Ger- Trump in America: Putin’s winning equation? many, he was promised that NATO would not ex- The best part for Kremlin administration is that pand one thumb to the East and now NATO has ex- Trump’s victory has brought an era of uncertainty panded twelve countries to the East.”17 So, what for most people of the US and outside. His foreign Moscow wants now is that the US rolls back its policy strategies remain sometimes clear and at times NATO expansionist policies to the levels prior to Sep- ambiguous as at the moment these has been mostly tember 1, 2000 and lower down the US’ military tone drawn from Trump’s election campaign which also in Russia’s immediate neighborhood. had sentiments ranging from being Islamophobic, misogynist and xenophobic mixed with high voltage

Russia-US Relations post Trump victory: A turning point ? 129 drama- as if watching an American reality TV show! and international but even from his own party. Two Which also translates a perception for the world in of the specific hurdles would be- general and Russia in this case, the incapability of a Presidential candidate to exude signs of responsibil- The Magnitsky Act: ity and maturity and hence perhaps divulges a possi- This act was signed by Obama after it was passed in bility to easily get manipulate by a political magnate both the houses of Congress that introduced visa bans like Putin. But at the same time it is important to and financial sanctions on some Russian officials re- acknowledge that as far as Trump’s Russia policies sponsible for the death of Sergei Magnitsky, a Rus- are concerned, he has been fairly clear throughout. sian lawyer and auditor in 2009. Magnitsky was be- hind the investigation of a fraud involving Russian Going by what interests Moscow so much in tax officials. Putin has been demanding the annul- the American elections, it is apparent that for an in- ment of this Act. It has been understood that even experienced leader for a President of the US, Mos- though the Republicans will control both the houses cow hopes American attention to be more restricted of the Congress, yet it might be a formidable task for to its own concerns alone like immigration, and mak- the President-elect to repel the Act smoothly.22 ing American great again in the way that Trump un- Russia-US Plutonium disposal deal derstands it etc. Putin is content enough that with the Russia signed its plutonium disposal deal in 2000 with way Trump visualizes rebooting America, it is cer- the US that would have facilitated both the countries tainly going to leave Russia happy with its activities to take a key step ahead towards disarmament by in its ‘near-abroad’ and no more keep worrying about allowing both the nuclear powers to dispose of weap- NATO’s policy of Eastward expansion, for Trump ons-grade plutonium from their defence programs. calls this inter-governmental military alliance as an However, this year Putin has called for rolling back old and futile attempt in today’s world. As explained of the deal blaming the unfriendly circumstances cre- by Sergei Parkhomenko, a Russian publisher and ated by the US in the bilateral relationship and Wash- political commentator, “Putin wants the United States ington’s ‘inability’ to carry out the terms of the agree- to be taken up with its own problems, and forget about ment. This is a clear indication of a step back from things like Ukraine and Crimea.”20 the commitment of nuclear non-proliferation coop- eration.23 Titov however sees one of the downsides of Trump as the President. His election campaign was Another gesture of the treaty however did filled with possibilities of opening up oil reserves of indicate a possible step towards reviving US-Russia America and become self-sufficient in energy. This relations during the Obama era as a part of his at- as a result will have negative impacts on the energy tempt to ‘reset’ the US-Russia ties. And as Moscow’s exports driven Russian economy with the further fall roll back was essentially on the ground of US’ inter- in world oil prices.21 However, it is easier said than ference in Russia’s Crimean affair and the like, the done, as it is not an easy task to be an energy-suffi- new President-elect in his campaign speeches re- cient country overnight considering the whole mecha- veals a lot about how Obama’s handling of affairs in nism that goes behind building including resources the Russian foreign policy domain was a misstep and (which are limited), large infrastructures, massive in- as such Trump’s policies in the foreign affairs direc- vestments or development procedures for that mat- tion is likely to curtail much of the damages done. ter. The most accessible way out would definitely be Now, it is still uncertain how the new President-elect importing oil as has been done for years. finally handles affairs with the Russian Federation, but it certainly provides a fresh framework for both The Challenges Ahead: the leaders to work in unison especially considering Donald Trump has to undoubtedly face tremendous how the approach of both the leaders have been till challenges after he attains office not only because now. A Russian spokesman stated on November 10, he lacks political experience and especially in his poli- 2016 in New York that Trump and Putin holds, “the cies towards Russia because he already faces enor- same foreign policy principles”.24 mous resistance not only from the media- national

130 World Focus January 2017 Conclusion: 5 Bodner M. (2016), “What Trump’s unexpected victory means for US-Russia relations?” in The Moscow Times dated 10 Nov 2016, online accessed on 20 It is still an enigma as to whether Trump understands Nov 2016, Url: https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/the-shape-of-things-to- what America stands for, what are its ambitions in come-56073 6 DePetris D. (2016), “America has no choice but to cooperate with Russia in the world or for that matter how theories of interna- Syria” in The National Interest dated 18 July 2016, online accessed 8 Oct 2016, tional politics work; but it seems through his behavior Url:http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/america-has-no-choice- cooperate-russia-syria-17027 and firmness that he showed in the campaigns, that 7 Geranmayeh E. (2016), “Will Donald Trump destroy the Iran deal?” in The he fairly has an idea of what the US’ interests should New York Times dated 25 Nov 2016, online accessed 15 Nov 2016, Url: http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2016/11/25/opinion/will-donald-trump-destroy-the-iran- be, even if it is in a narrow sense. And probably, that deal.html?_r=0 is the reason why he doesn’t want the US’ to get into 8 Shevtsova L. (2016), “What Minsk Means” in The American Interest dated 11 April 2016, online accessed 19 August 2016, Url:http://www.the-american- unnecessary commitments and rather concentrate on interest.com/2016/04/11/what-minsk-means/ specific areas like terrorism to top the list. And that 9 Goldenberg I. (2016), “Kill the Iran deal or accommodate Russia? Trump will have to choose” in War on the Rocks dated 29 Nov 2016, Online accessed 5 Dec is why Trump’s statements about pulling back NATO, 2016, Url: http://warontherocks.com/2016/11/kill-the-iran-deal-or- downsize the US commitments to Ukraine or coop- accommodate-russia-trump-will-have-to-choose/ 10 Geranmayeh E. (2016), “Will Donald Trump destroy the Iran deal?” in The erate with Russia in Syria might make sense to some. New York Times dated 25 Nov 2016, online accessed 15 Nov 2016, Url: http:/ Additionally, a virtue of Trump that has come around /www.nytimes.com/2016/11/25/opinion/will-donald-trump-destroy-the-iran- deal.html?_r=0 for analysts as indicated from the campaign phase is 11 RFE/RL (2014), “Ukraine opposition vows to continue struggle after his willingness and commitment to strike deals as an Yanukovich offer” in RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty dated 25 January 2014, Online accessed 25 March 2016, Url: http://www.rferl.org/a/protesters-police- eminent ‘deal-maker’. He is banking on his business tense-standoff-ukraine/25241945.html sense and seems affirmative in driving a foreign policy 12 Weiss A. and Nephew R. (2016), “The role of sanctions in US-Russia relations” in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace dated 11 July 2016, Online especially with Moscow that might set a precedent accessed 25 Nov 2016, Url: http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/07/11/role- for future as well. of-sanctions-in-u.s.-russian-relations-pub-64056 13 Topalov A., Falyakhov R., et.al (2016), “In 2017, Will Trump remove sanctions against Russia?” in Russia & India Report dated 12 Nov 2016, Online accessed The global dynamics of the world has shifted 25 Nov 2016, Url: http://in.rbth.com/world/2016/11/12/in-2017-will-trump- remove-sanctions-against-russia_646943 considerably and the new era is Asia’s era and as 14 Minsk Protocol as online accessed on 30 Nov 2016, Url:https:// soon as the US understands it, the better. And trump en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsk_Protocol#Minsk_process_and_drafting 15 Shevtsova L. (2016), “What Minsk Means” in The American Interest dated 11 somehow seems to get that! But along with that the April 2016, online accessed 19 August 2016, Url:http://www.the-american- key problem with mainstream American establish- interest.com/2016/04/11/what-minsk-means/ 16 Bodner M. (2016), “What Trump’s unexpected victory means for US-Russia ments has been that it is very anti-Russian. The at- relations?” in The Moscow Times dated 10 Nov 2016, online accessed on 20 mosphere has been so anti-Russian that any kind of Nov 2016, Url: https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/the-shape-of-things-to- come-56073 rational position or opinion disappears in the thin air. 17 Interview on “Crosstalk on Russia-US relations: Russian Reset?”, dated 23 And practically speaking, if the US has to fight Jihadist Nov 2016, Online accessed on 30 Nov 2016, Url: http://thesaker.is/crosstalk- on-russia-us-relations-russian-reset/ terrorism or competing with a rising Asian rival such 18 The Editors (2016), “Trump’s reckless foreign Policy” in National Review as China at various levels; the anti-Russian sentiments dated 21 July 2016, online accessed on 24 Nov 2016, Url: http:// www.nationalreview.com/article/438204/donald-trump-foreign-policy- are definitely not going to be logically the best an- dangerous swer to it, rather more harmful. Provoking Putin at 19 Interview on “Crosstalk on Russia-US relations: Russian Reset?”, dated 23 Nov 2016, Online accessed on 30 Nov 2016, Url: http://thesaker.is/crosstalk- any level is very likely to back-fire the US under on-russia-us-relations-russian-reset/ today’s circumstances. Hence, befriending Russia is 20 Remnick D. (2016), “Trump and Putin: A love story, The attraction is mutual but history shows who’s really using whom” in The New Yorker dated 3 August going to be the most rational choice today, more seem- 2016, Online accessed 8 Oct 2016, Url: http://www.newyorker.com/news/news- ingly as the ball is in Moscow’s court now! desk/trump-and-putin-a-love-story 21 Topalov A., Falyakhov R., et.al (2016), “In 2017, Will Trump remove sanctions against Russia?” in Russia & India Report dated 12 Nov 2016, Online accessed Endnotes 25 Nov 2016, Url: http://in.rbth.com/world/2016/11/12/in-2017-will-trump- 1 Friedman U. (2016), “American elections: how long is too long? The upside remove-sanctions-against-russia_646943 22 of the endless Presidential race” in The Atlantic dated 5 Oct 2016, Online Schreck C. (2016), “Explainer: How Trump could roll back Obama’s Russia accessed 2 Nov 2016, Url: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/ policies” in RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty dated 13 Nov 2016, Online 2016/10/us-election-longest-world/501680/ Accessed 5 Dec 2016, Url: http://www.rferl.org/a/russia-us-explainer-trump- 2 Remnick D. (2016), “Trump and Putin: A love story, The attraction is mutual roll-back-obama-policies/28113333.html 23 but history shows who’s really using whom” in The New Yorker dated 3 August Report on “Putin scraps Plutonium disposal deal with US” in The Hindu, 2016, Online accessed 8 Oct 2016, Url: http://www.newyorker.com/news/news- dated 3 Oct 2016, Online accessed 24 Oct 2016, Url: http://www.thehindu.com/ desk/trump-and-putin-a-love-story news/international/Putin-scraps-plutonium-disposal-deal-with-U.S./ 3 Putz C. (2016), “Will Donald Trump reset US-Russia relations?” in The article15424005.ece 24 Diplomat dated 10 Nov 2016, online accessed on 17 Nov 2016, Url: http:// Schreck C. (2016), “Explainer: How Trump could roll back Obama’s Russia thediplomat.com/2016/11/will-donald-trump-reset-us-russia-relations/ policies” in RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty dated 13 Nov 2016, Online 4 Ibid. Accessed 5 Dec 2016, Url: http://www.rferl.org/a/russia-us-explainer-trump- roll-back-obama-policies/28113333.html

Russia-US Relations post Trump victory: A turning point ? 131 Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union: Potentials and Pitfalls Nivedita Kapoor

Introduction (CES). As Libman and Vinokurov (2012) point out, The idea of Eurasianism has been an old one in Russia, in order to coordinate between CU and CES, Eurasian the history of which can be traced back to the early Economic Commission (EEC) was also formed the years of the 20th century. As Mankoff (2009) same year. Despite concerns that Russia exercises explains, at a basic level, the concept means that disproportionate power in decision making, the EEC ‘Russia’s fundamental identity, and hence foreign saw all member states possess equal voting power policy priorities, are linked to its geographical position and operate within WTO rules and international law at the crossroads between Europe and Asia.’ It (Glazyev and Tkachuk 2015). Also, this was an asserts belief in the idea that Russia’s location puts it improvement over EurAsEC in which there was an in a unique position to ascend as a great power while unequal distribution of votes among the five member also laying claim to a unique civilization and ethos states (Yesdauletova and Yesdauletov 2014). that is distinct from the Western civilization. Already in 2011, the three members of CU Since 2008, as Mileski (2015) argues, neo- declared their intention to set up a Eurasian Economic Eurasianism has become ‘embedded in the political Union (EEU) by 2015. In January 2015, EEU came consensus in Moscow.’ As per this ideology, Russia into being with three founding member states of places a deep importance on establishing close Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan followed by Armenia relationships with members of CIS, before expanding and Kyryzstan in subsequent months. The focus was to Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and eventually on ensuring closer economic integration among India (Yigit 2013). President Putin has himself alluded members while working towards free movement of to this in his speech at the St Petersburg International goods, services, capital and labour based on obligations Economic Forum (SPIEF) in 2016, where he signed in the founding document (Kansikas 2015). envisioned partnership not just with CIS states but In all these groupings, Russia remains the biggest and also ‘countries with which we already have close strongest player – whether economically, politically partnership – China, India, Pakistan and Iran’ (Putin or militarily – underscoring its importance to the 2016). The idea also aligns closely with a repudiation success of EEU. It alone contributes 80 per cent of of Western values and an ‘Atlanticist interpretation the budget of EEU. of globalisation,’ with Russia calling for steadily increasing integration within the bounds of the EEU. The importance of this organisation to Russia can be gauged from its Foreign Policy Concept (2013), in It was Kazakh President Nursultan which EEU figures as an important regional priority. Nazarbayev who first proposed the idea of a ‘Eurasian It states that: Union of States’ in 1994, which in its institutional form ‘Russia sees as a priority the task of establishing the first came to fruition in 2000 when Eurasian Economic Eurasian Economic Union aiming not only to make Community (EurAsEC) was set up consisting of the best use of mutually beneficial economic ties in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and the CIS space but also to become a model of Tajikistan. The main aim was to ‘establish a single association open to other states, a model that would market with strong economic, social and cultural ties’ determine the future of the Commonwealth states. (Glazyev and Tkachuk 2015). In 2010, a Customs The new union that is being formed on the basis of Union (CU) agreement was signed between Russia, universal integration principles is designed to serve Belarus and Kazakhstan and was followed in 2012 as an effective link between Europe and the Asia- by the setting up of a Common Economic Space Pacific region.’

132 World Focus January 2017 Kansikas (2015) explains that EEU has been one of same trends can be seen continuing with the EEU at the ‘major foreign policy goals’ of Russian President present. As is expected with economic integration, Vladimir Putin, heralding a ‘latest phase in the the creation of EEU is expected to accrue benefits continuum of Russian-led cooperation projects.’ to members by creating a large market for goods and services, increasing cooperation among members, Glazyev and Tkachuk (2015) point out that removal of customs barriers to incentivize trade and the EEU is significant as the constituent states have simplifying business procedures among others. The shown willingness to ‘delegate authority’ relatively geography offers several opportunities to the EEU soon after breaking away from the Soviet Union. They as it covers a huge landmass with possibility for also explain that its creation will lead to establishment ‘micro-linkages across borders’ (Hartwell 2016). In of a ‘single market with 170 million consumers, unified order to do this, as the author explains, the countries legislation, free movement of goods, services, capital will have to adopt openness and not protectionism. and labour.’ It would also lead to changes in macroeconomic policies, competition rules, tariffs, The EEU also plans to establish a common subsidies and regulation systems. It now needs to be oil and gas market over the period of a decade, the examined as to what are the potentials and pitfalls members together possessing ‘14.6 percent of the that would go alongside the creation of EEU and the world’s oil production and 17.3 percent of natural gas fulfilment of above mentioned goals. production’(Pastukhova and Westphal 2016). As the authors point out, this common energy market will be Strengths and Future Potential able to exert a significant influence based on its natural In the years before Customs Union was established, resource potential both in its immediate neighbourhood a need was felt to increase economic cooperation to as well as the European Union to which it is a major push economic growth that was slowly gaining speed supplier. This would help consolidate the energy by late 1990s and needed increased investment to resources and reduce costs involved in bringing them sustain itself. The global financial crisis of 2008 further to the market (Hartwell 2016). Also, this would played an important role in alerting states of the directly help Russia strengthen its position as a major former Soviet Union towards the importance of power in Eurasia while preserving its influence in enhanced regional cooperation in times of global Central Asia. However, the issues of pricing of oil financial instability (Libman and Vinokurov 2012). The and gas in this common market is a contentious topic authors also point to the fact that common history of that is yet to be resolved, with the interests of member the Soviet period meant member states of CU and states conflicting with each other as Russia and now EEU already had existing linkages that would Kazakhstan remain producers while Belarus focuses be easier to regenerate for economic gains. The CU on processing. led to a decrease in cost of jointly manufactured goods, improved competitiveness and opened new markets The proposal for a common electricity market (Glazyev and Tkachuk 2015). Since there was an has been pegged as a positive development, with incentive now for companies to move across national negotiations at an advanced stage (Pastukhova and boundaries, it was also simultaneously an incentive Westphal 2016). The streamlining of customs and for procedures to be streamlined and business climate trade rules, along with movement of capital and labour be improved. The CU saw trade among the three are also expected to have long-term gains for the member states increase by 33 per cent in 2011, a economies involved (International Crisis Group 2016). year after its establishment. However, most analysts The freer movement of labour has the potential to agree that the promise of initial years faded away improve workforce quality and attract skilled and the union could not deliver on contribution to professionals to contribute their ideas within the higher economic growth as envisioned during its grouping. creation. For instance, according to figures provided by Glazyev and Tkachuk, the CU trade was 94.1 per Russia and China have already indicated their cent of 2012 level in 2013 and trade with third desire to enhance cooperation between Silk Road countries declined 0.7 per cent year-on-year. The Economic Belt and EEU. An agreement to the effect

Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union: Potentials and Pitfalls 133 was signed by the two countries in May 2015 during losses’ being unbalanced. As Libman and Vinokurov the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Moscow, (2012) point out, while Kazakhstan and Belarus were which was a major diplomatic victory for Russia and unhappy over need to raise import duties leading to a vital source of investment, coming close on the heels rise in domestic prices, Russia was worried about of the Ukrainian crisis and the subsequent Western rivalry for capital. The authors list other challenges economic sanctions (Spivak 2016). Here, as the author including delays in defining technical regulations, explains, Russia has a chance to make EEU a counter questions over entry of Kyrgyzstan (over changes to to excessive Chinese influence in Central Asia, a tariff rates that could adversely affect trade with prospect that has been worrying regional leaders to China) and Ukraine and ‘extreme resource strengthen its position. It will be a delicate balancing dependency’ of the two largest constituents – Russia game for Moscow, attracting Chinese investment and and Kazakhstan – that is not considered conducive at the same time preventing further decline of its own for long term growth. These challenges that confronted influence, while enhancing EEU’s profile even as it the CU and were yet to be resolved during the period tries to keep Central Asian states satisfied. But as it was in existence continue to confront EEU as well, Gabuev (2015) believes, the two states have through as will be seen in the following paragraphs. their agreement decided on a ‘division of labour’ of sorts where China provides the economic impetus As Yesdauletova and Yesdauletov (2014) plus investment while Russia remains the main argue, some of the critical areas of concern include security guarantor and enhances cooperation among excess regulatory framework, slow speed of members, avoiding a possible clash. integration, failure of trade to orient to the common market, too much dependence on natural resources EEU is also expanding its economic ties with and introduction of higher tariffs by Kazakhstan and other states and a free trade agreement was signed Belarus to correspond to Russian levels. They identify with Vietnam in 2015. While Iran signed a ‘temporary three types of challenges associated with the EEU – trade deal,’ negotiations are also ongoing with Egypt, economic, political and geo-political – which will be Israel and India for future cooperation (International explored in the coming paragraphs. Crisis group 2016). Kazakh President Nazarbayev has proposed that EEU should increase its cooperation The biggest economies of the grouping, Russia with other international associations, which include and Kazakhstan, focus on sale of natural resources SCO and ASEAN among others which would also and hence their markets are geared up for trade with help Russia to balance out Chinese influence by the outside world instead of with each other attracting outside players (Amrebayev 2016). (Yesdauletova and Yesdauletov 2014). For instance, in the case of Kazakhstan, only 14.4 per cent of its Despite current worsening of Russian ties exports were to CIS countries. Similarly, as the with the West, there is argument that in the future authors point out, Russian pronouncements of focusing EEU can serve as a ‘mechanism of dialogue’ with on increasing trade with CIS have not seen any various players in the region, including EU and other movement on the ground. Also, Kazakhstan and regional organisations (International Crisis Group Belarus have been forced to raise their tariffs to meet 2016). However, the other side argues that Eurasian Russian levels, leading to benefit for Russia as trade integration project puts EEU and EU as competitors, has been diverted towards it (Kansikas 2015) but seen in case of Armenia (which decided to abandon causing loss for other member states, resulting in Association Agreement with EU to join EEU) and animosity. Also, there has not been any major Ukraine (which decided in favour of EU over EEU). improvement in Belarus and Kazakhstan being able to access the Russian market since the establishment Challenges of the CU. Overall, the economic benefits accruing The challenges that plague EEU are not unique to it first from CU and now from EEU have not been and the echoes of these could also be found in CU. impressive by any standards till now. In 2015 alone, The latter suffered from several constraints, one of trade within EEU declined by 26 per cent. The the most important about a perception of ‘gains and infrastructure remains weak and transport costs are

134 World Focus January 2017 high and there exists minimal macroeconomic organisation came to the forefront (International coordination among EEU members, a condition which Crisis Group 2016). is indispensable for deepening integration. Also, the business environment remains to be streamlined and Experts believe that EEU is as much a bureaucratic procedures remain cumbersome political project for Russia as it is an economic one, (Hartwell 2016). through which Moscow seeks to preserve its influence in Central Asia. It wants to exploit the upper hand it There has also been no unanimity on a enjoys in the energy market while also keeping an common currency, as states hold on to national eye on the security situation on its borders, especially currencies and prefer to trade in dollars, looking upon in the light of ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan the issue as one preserving their sovereignty more (Yesdauletova and Yesdauletov 2014). It is also than an economic one (Yesdauletova and Yesdauletov intimately related to the idea of Russia as a great 2014). In October 2016, the member states failed to power that has the capacity to offer countries of the adopt the customs code due to the negative Former Soviet Union space an ‘alternative integration implications of relaxation of customs regulations. model’ (Kansikas 2015). Yet, as the author explains, Kyrgyzstan has seen higher tariff rates increasing it has not been all a smooth sailing for its intentions. the prices of imported goods. Kazakhstan too has While Armenia joining the EEU was a positive step, suffered due to diversion of Chinese traffic to Ukraine’s decision to snub the EEU and instead Kyrgyzstan as the latter enables movement of high gravitate to EU was a major blow. It set off a chain levels of contraband due to corruption among local of reactions that not only worsened bilateral relations officials (Zuenko 2016). This has prompted between Russia and Ukraine but also led to a crisis protectionist measures from domestic governments, with the West of the kind not seen since the end of going against the spirit of EEU and making progress the Cold War. The resulting sanctions on Russia have more difficult for Russia which has put development had an adverse impact on economic growth prospects of the Union as a major foreign policy goal. of EEU as well.

In case of any controversy among members It is also interesting to note that while on any issue, it is clear that Russia with its dominant imposing counter sanctions on Ukraine, Moldova, position has a greater ‘sway over decisions.’ Also, Georgia as well as food imports ban on EU and US, there is the issue of a minimal use of court set up Russia did not consult with members of the EEU. under the CU to resolve disputes and instead the focus This is a violation of the rules of the Union, which has been on use of ‘political leverage and peer were a ‘blow to Russia’s credibility’ (Kansikas 2015). pressure’ with the heads of states exercising huge In turn, Belarus and Kazakhstan have also not sided power (International Crisis Group 2016). with Russia in the sanctions regime and Minsk has even benefited out of repackaging banned EU Belarus and Kazakhstan have steadfastly products before sending them onwards to be sold in refused to give in to Russian attempts to transform Russian markets, angering its fellow EEU member. the EEU into a political platform and have insisted The bilateral differences have also cropped up in the that it is a purely economic body. Putin has himself case of Kazakhstan and Armenia where a summit to sought to allay concerns by reiterating that EEU is be held in the latter’s capital had to be shifted out not an attempt to resurrect the Soviet Union, even as over tensions in Nagorno-Karabakh, highlighting the concerns about Russian dominance of the ‘lack of political solidarity’ (International Crisis Group organisation remain. In fact, Belarus and Kazakhstan 2016). In the short term, the sanctions imposed on have ‘repeatedly complained of Russia exploiting its Russia also pose a threat to the ‘competitiveness of dominant position’ (Pastukhova and Westphal 2016). EEU countries’ due to restrictions on availability of The fact that it came into ‘direct’ conflict with the finance. Thus the solution to present troubles of EEU EU over its Association Agreement with Armenia, lies in a political solution of the Ukrainian crisis Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, the ‘geopolitical (Hartwell 2016), which needs Russia to take active significance and aspiration’ of the Eurasian steps to diffuse the situation.

Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union: Potentials and Pitfalls 135 Both Russia and EU want to attract new Conclusion common members and this has ‘polarised’ the decision As we can see from the above discussion, there are making for the states who do not want to get caught obvious benefits to the EEU but the potential is being up in the rivalry, especially since it is recognized that hampered due to the challenges that face the project. for Russia this integration was not simply about The member states need to implement policy economics but instead about ‘Eurasia as a geopolitical measures that will improve business environment, project’ (Kansikas 2015). He also points out that the harmonize rules, improve coordination and establish political ambitions of Russia via EEU can be mitigated joint projects to promote economic growth and deepen by member states in the supreme Eurasian Economic integration among members (Glazyev and Tkachuk Council where heads of states meet and all members 2015). The economic reason for establishing the union have an equal vote. This is also used by member remains compelling but the weak trade, excessive states to avoid EEU policy being hijacked by the more dependence on natural resources and weak domestic powerful Russian state, posing a challenge to Russia growth levels are a cause of huge concern. If Russia about how to use the organisation to fulfil its geo- wants to make EEU an effective body politically, it political aims. needs to make it economically relevant.

In the case of China, the potential for Also, it is clear that this is a geo-political cooperation comes with its own riders, as Russia project for Russia, where it seeks to make other seeks to attract investment from the rapidly growing member states dependent on it. The hope is that this economy while at the same time being loath to will once again make it the pre-eminent power in the squander its influence over Central Asia, which it former Soviet Union region and help Russia achieve considers its own sphere of influence. While the two its stated goal of becoming a great power (Malashenko have decided to link the Silk Road and EEU, China 2014). Russia is the central power in the EEU and believes that the Eurasian organisation is not united the other member states bring minimum influence to and continues to prefer bilateral ties with member the table. Also, Russia’s goals differ from those of states (Spivak 2016). other members when it comes to the EEU (Kassimova 2015), all of it together making the union fragile. The While Russia does see the EEU as a means dominance of Russia, which is ‘built into the very to enhance its influence in Central Asia, it has faced fabric of the EEU’ (Kolesnikov and Gabuev 2015), resistance from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan when has also made other players sceptical. It has created it comes to joining the organisation. While the former further troubles for Moscow as it seeks to ‘become is wary of a possibility of increased political the centre of its own integrative project’ (Sakwa integration among members in the future, the latter is 2015). And since all players also continue to pursue focused on maintaining ‘neutrality,’ not aligning itself their own different interests, it is a challenge for Russia closely with any regional organisation (Yigit 2013). to integrate them into a project that is not just This complicates Russia’s idea of retaining its hold economic but also ‘profoundly ideological that by its on the former Soviet Union states, especially those in very essence is antagonistic to the West’ (Sakwa Central Asia, through EEU. The inclusion of Ukraine 2015). has proved to be the most contentious, as discussed earlier, leading to Kiev not joining the EEU as well as There remains hope that EEU will result in an increase in economic impact to the project due to long term gains for its members but as of now, it has sanctions imposed on its biggest member, Russia. The failed to achieve the ‘breakthroughs it promised’ inclusion of Ukraine is considered important for (International Crisis Group 2016). However, as many success of EEU by some experts (Yigit 2013) as analysts caution us, there is a need for patience when without it the union cannot ‘resolve any of the it comes to analysing the role of EEU (Yigit 2013) as fundamental problems concerning economic and it is early days for the organisation and has a huge political integration in the post-Soviet region’ (Sakwa mandate to fulfil, a work that will inevitably take time. 2015)

136 World Focus January 2017 References Amrebayev, A. (2016), “Eurasia’s Economic Union and Internet Sources: ASEAN: Why Interaction Is Important”, RSIS, 233: 1-3. Foreign Policy Concept (2013), “Concept of the Foreign Glazyev, S. and S. Tkachuk, (2015), “Eurasian Economic Policy of the Russian Federation”, [online: web], Accessed Union: Achievements and Prospects” in Piotr Dutkiewicz 8 December 2016, URL: http://www.mid.ru/en/ and Richard Sakwa (eds.) Eurasian Integration- The View foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/ From Within, Routedge: New York. CptICkB6BZ29/cont ent/id/122186 Hartwell, C. (2016), “Improving competitiveness in the Gabuev, A. (2015), “Eurasian Silk Road Union: Towards a member states of the Eurasian Economic Union: a blueprint Russia-China Consensus?”, [online: web], Accessed 8 for the next decade”, Post-Communist Economies, 28(1): December 2016, URL: http://carnegie.ru/2015/06/05/ 49-71. eurasian-silk-road-union-towards-russia-china- International Crisis Group (2016), “The Eurasian Economic consensus-pub-60331 Union: Power, Politics and Trade”, 1-34. Kassimova, E. (2015), “How Central Asian Republics Kansikas, S. (2015), “The Eurasian Economic Union, Perceive the Emerging Eurasian Union”, [online: web], Russia’s Integration Policy and the EU Challenge,” Journal Accessed 9 December 2016, URL: http:// on Baltic Security, 1(1): 108–116. carnegieendowment.org/2015/01/24/how-central-asian- Libman, A. and E. Vinokurov (2012), “Eurasian Economic republics-perceive-emerging-eurasian-union-pub-58943 Union: Why Now? Will It Work? Is It Enough”, Journal of Kolesnikov, A. and A. Gabuev (2015), “Prospects for the Diplomacy & International Relations. 13(2): 29-44. Eurasian Economic Union”, [online: web], Accessed 9 Mankoff, J. (2009), Russian Foreign Policy - The Return December 2016, URL: http://carnegie.ru/commentary/ of Great Power Politics, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, ?fa=57699 Inc: Maryland. Malashenko, A. (2014), “The Problems for the Eurasian Mileski, T. (2015), “Identifying the new Eurasian Economic Union Are Just Starting”, Accessed 9 December orientation in Modern Russian Geopolitical Thought”, 2016, URL: http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=55805 Eastern Journal of European Studies, 6(2): 177-187. Putin, V. (2016), “Plenary session of St Petersburg Pastukhova, M. and K. Westphal (2016), “A Common International Economic Forum”, Accessed 9 December Energy Market in the Eurasian Economic Union”, SWP 2016, URL: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/ Comments, 1-8. 52178 Sakwa, R. (2015), “Challenges of Eurasian Integration” in Spivak, V. (2016), “A New Great Game in Russia’s Piotr Dutkiewicz and Richard Sakwa (eds.) Eurasian Backyard”, [online: web], Accessed 9 December 2016, URL: Integration- The View From Within, Routedge: New York. http://carnegie.ru/2016/09/10/new-great-game-in-russia-s- Yesdauletova, A. and Yesdauletov, A. (2014), “The backyard-pub-64542 Eurasian Union: Dynamics and Difficulties of the Post- Zuenko, I. (2016), “The Eurasian Gap: Winners and Losers Soviet Integration”, Trames, 18(1): 3–17. of the Economic Union”, Accessed 9 December 2016, URL: Yigit, S. (2013), “Eurasian Union = Energy Union”, Middle http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=65114 Eastern Analysis, 5(51): 55-68.

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Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union: Potentials and Pitfalls 137 Contributor’s Profile

Prof. Arun Mohanty GUEST EDITOR, Center for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi Prof. Tatiana Senyushkina The Crimean Federal V.I. Vernadsky University, Simferopol, Republic of Crimea Prof. R.G. Gidadhubli Professor and Former Director, Center for Central Eurasian Studies, University of Mumbai Prof. P. L. Dash Formerly ICCR Chair Professor in International Relations at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, Tashkent and Director, Centre for Central Eurasian Studies, University of Mumbai Prof. Evgeny Pashentsev Professor, Diplomatic Academy at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Dr. Lessya Karatayeva Chief Research Fellow, Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan Kanat Sakhariyanov Deputy Chairman of the Governing Board JSC “Khabar” Agency”, Republic of Kazakhstan Dr. Anna Popova Associate Professor at Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation Dr. Kharitonova Oxana Associate Professor of Comparative Politics, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University) Dr. Irina Kudryashova Associate Professor at the Department of Comparative Politics, Moscow State Institute of International Relaions (MGIMO University) of the MFA of Russia and Senior Research Fellow at the Department of Political Science, Institute of Scientific Information on Social Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (INION) Dr. Elena Meleshkina Head of the Department of Political Science, Institute of Scientific Information on Social Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (INION) and Professor at the Department of Political Science, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow Dr. Marianna Abramova Lecturer, Deputy Head of State Policies Chair, Lomonosov Moscow State University Dr. Roshan Khanijo Senior Research Fellow and the Research Coordinator at the United Service Institution of India (USI), New Delhi Dr. Suchandana Chatterjee Senior Academic Fellow, Indian Council of Historical Research (ICHR), New Delhi Dr. Alok Kumar Gupta Associate Professor, Centre for Political Studies, Central University of South Bihar, Gaya, Bihar Dr. Vaishali Krishna Teaches at SOL, Ramanujan College, Delhi University, New Delhi Dr. Manabhanjan Meher Research Assistant, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, (IDSA) New Delhi Dr. Bishal Das Former journalist at PTI, New Delhi. who after joining the Govt. worked at PIB. Now posted at DAVP, M/o Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India, New Delhi. Tahira Batt Research Scholar at Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi Sukanya Kakoty Senior Research Fellow at Center for Russian and Central Asian Studies, JNU, New Delhi Nivedita Kapoor PhD Scholar at the Center for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi 138 World Focus January 2017 World Focus: 2009-2016

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