Lost in Annexation? The Causes of Russia’s Foreign Policy Choices in Crimea Anno 2014 Árni Þór Sigurðsson Lokaverkefni til MA-gráðu í alþjóðasamskiptum Félagsvísindasvið 2015 Lost in Annexation? The Causes of Russia’s Foreign Policy Choices in Crimea Anno 2014 Árni Þór Sigurðsson Lokaverkefni til MA-gráðu í alþjóðasamskiptum Leiðbeinandi: Alyson J.K. Bailes Stjórnmálafræðideild Félagsvísindasvið Háskóla Íslands Júní 2015 Ritgerð þessi er lokaverkefni til MA-gráðu í alþjóðasamskiptum og er óheimilt að afrita ritgerðina á nokkurn hátt nema með leyfi rétthafa. © Árni Þór Sigurðsson 2015 3007604579 Reykjavík, Ísland 2015 To my children, Arnbjörg Soffía, Ragnar Auðun, and Sigurður Kári ABSTRACT Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 marked a dramatic turning point in East-West relations. Likewise, it signalled a watershed in Russia’s policy in the near abroad, most importantly with Ukraine, with whom Russia has shared fate and fortune through centuries. What may have caused Russia’s resort to such an assertive move against its brother nation, violating international law in many people’s opinion, and jeopardising its renommé in world politics? The two nations’ common history and culture, and extensively shared identity, were in full play in this ‘Borderland’ crisis, and so were concrete concerns of geopolitics as the Black Sea region is of utmost significance for Russia. This study examines continuity and change in Russian foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, and inter alia considers the role of President Putin. While traditional realist balance-of-power analysis might appear to fit the Crimea case, Russia’s foreign policy choices cannot be fully explained or understood unless due weight is accorded to the historical and ideational context, in keeping with constructivist tenets. The study’s main finding is that the causes of Russia’s action in Crimea must be sought in its perceived lack of recognition as a great power by the West; Russia’s strong belief that Crimea is essentially a Russian land; and a defensive calculation whereby Russia – yearning for a strong post-Soviet space – could not face losing the fraternal country of Ukraine to its adversaries. Key words: Russia, Crimea, Ukraine, annexation, Putin, foreign policy, International Relations (IR), Constructivism, Self/Other, Soviet Union, Gorbachev, Yeltsin. i | P a g e ÚTDRÁTTUR (ABSTRACT IN ICELANDIC) Innlimun Krímar í Rússland í mars 2014 olli áhrifamiklum umskiptum í sambúð austurs og vesturs. Ennfremur var hún til marks um straumhvörf í stefnu Rússlands í málefnum nærsvæða, einkum Úkraínu, en þessi tvö ríki hafa deilt súru og sætu um aldir. Hvað olli því að Rússland greip til svo einbeittra aðgerða gagnvart bræðraþjóð, fór í bága við alþjóðalög að mati fjölmargra, og laskaði orðstír sinn á alþjóðavettvangi? Sameiginleg saga og menning þessara tveggja þjóða, og sjálfsmynd sem þær deila að verulegu leyti, gegna ríku hlutverki í þessum átökum – sem kennd hafa verið við „Jaðarland“ – og hið sama má segja um geopólitískar áhyggjur Rússa vegna sérstaks mikilvægis Svartahafssvæðisins. Í þessari ritgerð er fengist við samfellu og breytingar í utanríkisstefnu Rússlands frá endalokum kalda stríðsins, og meðal annars er hlutverki Pútíns Rússlandsforseta gefinn gaumur. Enda þótt hefðbundnar raunhyggjukenningar um valdajafnvægi gætu virst eiga við um innlimun Krímar, verður utanríkisstefna Rússlands samt ekki að fullu skýrð og skilin án þess að sögulegu og hugmyndalegu samhengi sé gefið tilhlýðilegt vægi, í anda kenninga mótunarhyggjunnar. Helstu niðurstöður ritgerðarinnar eru að leita verði orsaka aðgerða Rússlands í Krím í meintum skorti á viðurkenningu af hálfu Vesturlandanna á Rússlandi sem stórveldi, í bjargfastri sannfæringu Rússlands um að Krím sé þegar allt kemur til alls rússneskt land, og í varnarviðbrögðum þar eð Rússland – í eins konar þrá eftir sterku bandalagi á svæði gömlu Sovétríkjanna – gat ekki hugsað sér að tapa hinni úkraínsku bræðraþjóð í hendur andstæðingunum. Lykilorð: Rússland, Krím, Úkraína, innlimun, Pútín, utanríkisstefna, alþjóðasamskipti, mótunarhyggja, Sjálf/aðrir, Sovétríkin, Gorbatsjov, Jeltsín. ii | P a g e АННОТАЦИЯ (ABSTRACT IN RUSSIAN) Аннексия Крыма Россией в марте 2014 г. явилась кардинальной поворотной точкой в отношениях Востока и Запада. Помимо этого, она ознаменовала перелом в российской политике в ближнем зарубежье, в особенности в отношении Украины, с которой Россия веками делила пополам радость и горе. Что могло заставить Россию прибегнуть к столь решительному ходу против братского народа, нарушив – по мнению многих – международное право и рискуя своим реноме в мировой политике? Общая история и культура народов России и Украины, а также значительная общность их национальной идентичности были в полной мере задействованы в этом «пограничном» кризисе – как и конкретные геополитические соображения, связанные с чрезвычайной важностью района Чёрного моря для России. В настоящей работе рассматривается преемственность и изменения во внешней политике России со времён окончания холодной войны – и в частности, роль президента Владимира Путина. Может показаться, что традиционные реалистические концепции баланса сил применимы к крымскому вопросу, однако внешнеполитические решения, принятые Россией, могут быть в полной мере поняты и объяснены только в том случае, если историческому и идейному контексту будет придаваться должное значение в соответствии с принципами конструктивизма. Основные выводы данного исследования заключаются в том, что причины действий России в Крыму следует искать в предполагаемом непризнании России Западом как великой державы, в твёрдой убеждённости России в том, что Крым в сущности является Российской территорией, а также в защитной реакции, поскольку для России – тоскующей по сильному пост-советскому пространству – было немыслимо, чтобы братский украинский народ попал в руки её противников. Ключевые слова: Россия, Крым, Украина, аннексия, В.В. Путин, внешняя политика, международные отношения (МО), конструктивизм, Я/Другой, Советский Союз, М.С. Горбачёв, Б.Н. Ельцин. iii | P a g e «Umom Rossiju ne ponjat’… Rossiju možno tol’ko verit’»1 Fyodor Tyutchev 1866 PREFACE Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 is a relatively recent event, there has not been much written on it, nor research carried out, so far. The author has a background in Russian Studies and has previously worked as a correspondent for the Icelandic State Broadcasting Service in Moscow, and has also taught Russian Foreign Policy at the Faculty of Foreign Languages, Literature and Linguistics at the University of Iceland. When seeking a subject for a dissertation in International Relations2, the unfolding events in Ukraine and Russia’s foreign policy choices were an almost self-evident choice. This research was conducted under the supervision of Adjunct Professor Alyson J.K. Bailes at the Faculty of Political Science, School of Social Sciences at the University of Iceland. It counts for 30 ECTS credits and is in partial fulfilment of a Master of Arts degree in International Relations at the University of Iceland. During the preparation for this assignment I have drawn on and am thankful for comments from fellow-students in the mandatory course ‘Masters Theses: Research Plans and Design’ as well as the course’s lecturer Erla Hlín Hjálmarsdóttir, particularly with regard to the scope of the dissertation. It became clear that there was a risk of the topic expanding too far unless a clearly delimited framework was chosen for the analysis: thus – for example – this study will chiefly focus on two International Relations (IR) theories, and only very briefly address other relevant concepts and theories (see chapter 2). This dissertation is written at and submitted to the Faculty of Political Science at the School of Social Sciences, University of Iceland. The research and the writing fully abide by the Code of Ethics applicable at the University. I would like to express my sincere thanks to my supervisor, Adjunct Professor Alyson J.K. Bailes. She has been of tremendous help through the whole process of this work, and it fact through whole my studies in International Relations. Her supportive and encouraging attitude, 1 This citation is from one of Russia’s greatest romantic poets, Fyodor I. Tyutchev (1803-1873). Its meaning is: ‘The Russian spirit is not to be comprehended … in Russia one can only believe’. 2 The term ‘International Relations’ is written with capital letters when referring to the science as such, otherwise normal spelling rules are applied. iv | P a g e and the many enjoyable discussions we have had on various international affairs, have made a great difference and without her engagement, this dissertation would not have been promptly concluded. She also encouraged me take master-courses on international affairs and global politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science, which was both enjoyable and hugely useful for the completion of my Master degree. I am also grateful to the peer reviewers, Dr. Valur Ingimundarson (Professor in International History and International Relations), Dr. Guðni Th. Jóhannesson (Associate Professor in Political History), and Dr. Jón Ólafsson (Professor in Russian and Cultural Studies), all based at the University of Iceland, with whom I have exchanged views on the topic of this study, thereby underpinning its scientific quality. Pétur Dam Leifsson Associate Professor in Public International Law at the University of Iceland, has been kind enough to read the sub-chapter on legal aspects.