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International Court of Justice Case Concerning INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE CASE CONCERNING APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (UKRAINE V. RUSSIAN FEDERATION) MEMORIAL SUBMITTED BY UKRAINE 12 JUNE 2018 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Part I: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1 Russia’s Campaign for Hegemony in Ukraine ................................ 3 Structure of the Memorial .............................................................. 9 Part II: THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S VIOLATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM .. 14 Section A: Evidence Showing the Financing of Terrorism in Ukraine ..................... 17 Chapter 1. Systematic Terrorism by Russia’s Proxies in Ukraine ............................ 17 Since Their Inception, Russia’s Proxies Have Engaged in a Pattern of Terrorist Acts to Intimidate Civilians and Coerce the Ukrainian Government .........................................................18 The Shoot-Down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 ......................... 28 The Shelling Attacks on Civilians in Donbas .............................. 37 The Campaign of Bombing Attacks in Ukrainian Cities............. 67 Chapter 2. Russian Financing of Terrorism in Ukraine ........................................... 80 The Massive, Russian-Supplied Arsenal of Weapons to Illegal Armed Groups in Ukraine ................................................81 The Russian Buk Anti-Aircraft Missile Used to Destroy Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 ......................................................... 86 The Russian “Grad” and “Smerch” Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems Used to Shell Ukrainian Civilians ................................ 98 The Russian Explosives Used to Bomb Ukrainian Cities ......... 104 The Russian Training Camps For Members of the DPR, LPR, Kharkiv Partisans, and Other Armed Groups .......................... 109 Russian Fundraising for Illegal Armed Groups in Ukraine ......... 113 Chapter 3. The Russian Federation’s Failure to Assist Ukraine in Preventing and Punishing the Financing of Terrorism ......................... 120 Russia Has Failed to Take Measures to Prevent Weapons Transfers Across the Ukraine–Russia Border .......................... 120 i Russia Has Failed to Cooperate with Ukraine’s Requests to Freeze Bank Accounts Used for Terrorism Financing and Investigate Individuals Linked to Terrorism Financing ........... 122 Russia Has Failed to Assist with Ongoing Criminal Investigations Concerning Terrorism Financing or to Extradite Suspected Perpetrators.............................................. 126 Section B: The Russian Federation Has Breached Its Obligations Under the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism ............................................................................................... 131 Chapter 4. Russia’s Proxies Committed Numerous Acts of Terrorism in Ukraine Within the Meaning of ICSFT Article 2 ................................................. 131 The ICSFT Has a Broad and Comprehensive Definition of Terrorism ................................................................................... 131 Since the Spring of 2014, the DPR and LPR Have Openly Engaged in Attacks Against Ukrainian Civilians that Constitute Terrorist Acts Under ICSFT Article 2(1)(b) ............. 136 The DPR’s Downing of Flight MH17 Constitutes a Terrorist Act Under ICSFT Article 2(1)(a) ................................................ 139 The DPR’s Shelling Attacks of Civilian Areas Constitute Terrorist Acts Under ICSFT Article 2(1)(b) ............................... 142 The Bombing Attacks in Ukrainian Cities Constitute Terrorist Acts Under ICSFT Article 2(1)(a) .............................................. 162 Chapter 5. Russian Officials And Other Russian Nationals Knowingly Financed Terrorism in Ukraine ............................................................................. 165 Numerous Russian Officials and Private Actors Have Provided Funds to Groups Engaged in Terrorism in Ukraine .................. 166 The Financiers Knew That the Funds They Provided Were to Be Used, in Full or in Part, for Carrying Out Acts Covered by ICSFT Articles 2(1)(a) and (b) ................................................... 171 Chapter 6. The Russian Federation Bears State Responsibility For Violations of The ICSFT ....................................................................... 180 The Russian Federation Is in Breach of Article 18 .................... 180 The Russian Federation Is in Breach of Article 8 ..................... 189 The Russian Federation Is in Breach of Articles 9 and 10 ........ 190 The Russian Federation Is in Breach of Article 12 ..................... 193 ii Section C: Jurisdiction.............................................................................................196 Chapter 7. The Court Has Jurisdiction Over the Parties’ Dispute Concerning the ICSFT ............................................................................196 There Exists a Dispute Between Ukraine and the Russian Federation with Respect to the Interpretation or Application of the ICSFT ...............................................................................196 The Dispute Between Ukraine and the Russian Federation Could Not Be Settled Through Negotiation Within a Reasonable Time ...................................................................... 198 Ukraine and the Russian Federation Were Unable to Agree on the Organization of the Arbitration Within Six Months from the Date of Ukraine’s Request for Arbitration ................. 200 Part III: THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION .................................................................................................... 203 Section A: Evidence Showing Russia’s Policy and Practice of Racial Discrimination in Crimea ..................................................................... 206 Chapter 8. The Russian Federation’s Campaign of Cultural Erasure in Crimea .................................................................................................. 206 The Historical and Social Context for Russia’s Campaign of Cultural Erasure ....................................................................... 206 Origins of Russia’s Campaign of Cultural Erasure Against the Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian Peoples in Crimea ..................... 216 Chapter 9. The Russian Federation’s Policy of Discrimination in Political and Civil Affairs ...................................................................... 232 Disappearances, Murders, Abductions and Torture ................ 232 Political Suppression of Crimean Tatars .................................. 243 Arbitrary Searches and Detentions .......................................... 259 Forced Russian Citizenship and Subsequent Discrimination Against Non-Russians .............................................................. 265 Chapter 10. The Russian Federation’s Policy of Cultural Discrimination and Suppression ................................................................................... 276 Suppression of Culturally Significant Gatherings ..................... 276 Media Restrictions and Harassment ......................................... 293 iii Degradation of Cultural Heritage .............................................. 302 Suppression of Minority Education Rights ............................... 308 Section B: The Russian Federation Has Breached Its Obligations Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ...................................................................................... 322 Chapter 11. CERD’s Meaning and Applicability in the Present Case ...................... 322 The Principles of Non-Discrimination and Equality Before the Law Are Bedrock Principles Under the Convention and Should Be Given Their Broadest Meaning ............................... 323 The Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian Communities in Crimea Are Ethnic Groups Protected by the Convention ..................... 328 Chapter 12. The Russian Federation’s Violations of the CERD ............................... 335 Article 2 – Obligation to Eliminate Racial Discrimination ..... 335 Article 4 – Incitement to Racial Discrimination ..................... 340 Article 5 –Equality Before the Law ........................................... 341 Article 6 – Effective Protection and Remedies ........................ 353 Article 7 – Education to Combat Racial Discrimination ......... 354 Section C: Jurisdiction ........................................................................................... 357 Chapter 13. The Court Has Jurisidiction Over the Parties’ Dispute Concerning the CERD .......................................................................... 357 There Exists a Dispute Between Ukraine and the Russian Federation with Respect to the Interpretation or Application of the CERD. ............................................................................. 357 The Dispute Between Ukraine and the Russian Federation has not been Settled by Negotiation or by the Procedures Provided for in the CERD. ........................................................ 358 Part IV: SUBMISSIONS.........................................................................................................
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