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Home , Bilohirsk (Crimea), Crimean Tatar diaspora, Crimean Tatar language, Republic of Crimea, Rustam Minnikhanov, Sergey Aksyonov

Centre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 141 | 30.06.2014 www.osw.waw.pl

Crimean after ’s of the Crimean Peninsula

Tadeusz A. Olszański

After Russia’s annexation of , face the necessity of working out a mo- dus vivendi to cope with the difficult situation which now confronts them. On the one hand, the desire to remain in their homeland, which they regained after exile in Soviet times, is an imperative encouraging them to accept the status quo, while on the other, the fear of Russia and the strong relations of Crimean Tatar elites with would favour opposing the present state of affairs. Another fact pointing in favour of an agreement with is that Kyiv has not attempted to defend Crimea and has not been active in demanding its return to , which has undermined Kyiv’s authority in the eyes of the Tatars. Therefore, the leaders of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars (the national self-government) act carefully, trying to avoid actions which could be seen as provocative and thus liable to incite retribution. It could be expected that this course of action will continue, although it faces ever greater difficul- ties in the context of the Russian authorities’ adoption of a strongly anti-Tatar policy, which is likely to evoke more radical attitudes among the Crimean Tatars.

Exile and return Shortly afterwards, some 200,000 Crimean Tatars returned to Crimea and the 2001 census Crimean Tatars (referred to in the local language revealed the total number of Crimean Tatars to as Qirimlar, Qirimtatarlar) are a separate ethnic be 243,000 (12% of the population of the Au- community using their own language, which tonomous ), however in five makes them distinct from Tatars, for ex- (Bakhchysaray, , , ample. By the 1860s, following the conquest of Kirovske and Lenine raions, i.e. the Pen- Crimea by the in the late 18th insula) the percentage of the Tatar population century, Crimean Tatars had become a minor- lay between 21% and 29%. Today, the num- ity group in Crimea. In 1897 they accounted ber of Tatars in Crimea is higher, which is due for 36% of the population, and in 1939 – 29%. to further repatriations and population growth. In Soviet authorities exiled the en- The probable number is around 300,000, al- tire non-Slavic population from Crimea. Nearly though credible data are missing1. According to 190,000 Crimean Tatars were deported to Cen- estimates, around 100,000 Tatars still live in Cen- tral Asia, mainly to . Around 40% of tral Asia, and the Crimean Tatar in Russia the exiled population died during the transport (Moscow in particular) is estimated to include be- and in the first years of exile. Unlike the other tween 50,000-100,000 individuals. A large group “deported nations” they were not covered by (at least one million individuals, although there the 1956 “rehabilitation”. They began to re- turn to Crimea only in the late 1980’s, and their 1 According to Mustafa Jemilev, Crimean Tatars currently account for 14% of the peninsula’s population (interview right to return was officially recognized in 1989. given to Rzeczpospolita daily, 23 March 2014).

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 141 1 are no detailed calculations) of Crimean Tatars spontaneous nature and the so called “glades and people of Crimean Tatar origin live in Tur- of protest” began to be used as a form of pres- key, where numerous organizations supporting sure put on local authorities to force them to the Tatar presence in Crimea have been active. transfer attractive plots of land to private own- Compared with the rest of the population in- ers, with some of the plots becoming the prop- habiting Crimea, Crimean Tatars are character- erty of non-Tatar investors shortly afterwards. ised by younger age and a higher birth rate. The allocation of a sufficient number of plots It can be expected therefore that the propor- of land to Crimean Tatars and legal recognition tion of this group in Crimea’s society will grow of illegally occupied plots have been among the in the coming decades, even without further most significant points of dispute between the immigration. Crimean Tatar population and Crimean author- ities since the 1990’s. An assessment of the actual scale of the needs The system of the bodies of the Crime- of Crimean Tatar families is even more difficult, an Tatar national self-government is in considering the fact that fact and in its assumptions the nucleus institutions have not established any adviso- of nothing less than an autonomous Tatar ry bodies composed of the representatives of territory in Crimea. ethnic minority groups, as required by the . Also, there exists no single regis- ter of repatriates which could help determine Before the exiles, Tatars lived mainly in the who has already received benefits as part southern part of Crimea, forming a majority of state-funded assistance programmes etc. group in some raions. After 1989, local au- Similarly, there are no registers which would thorities tried to prevent Tatar families from make it possible to determine what portion of returning to their former places of abode, es- property allocated to the repatriates remains pecially by banning them from settling along in their hands and what part has been sold. the south coast. Tatars were forced to accept The large majority of Crimean Tatar repatriates these restrictions and settled mainly in the strip are Russian-speaking. They only have a basic of land stretching from Bakhchysaray through command of their native language or do not to Kerch. This is why the 2001 cen- know it at all. Despite a very strong “symbol- sus showed that the Tatar population account- ic” identification of the community with their ed for 21% of the inhabitants in the Simferopol language (in 2001 92% of Crimean Tatars con- (including the former Bakhchysaray raion) sidered the Crimean their moth- and only 1.5% of the population of Greater Yal- er tongue), the process of returning to using ta (before the exile the share was 29%). Sevas- this language has been difficult mainly due to topol was practically closed to Tatars: in 1939 the weak education system. In 2009 in Crimea Tatars accounted for 4% of the city’s population ( excluded) there were around 650 and 55% of the inhabitants of the areas incor- general schools. In just 15 of them, attended by porated into Sevastopol after the war, whereas only around 8% of children from Crimean Tatar in 2001 – only 0.5%. families, were classes taught in the Crimean Ta- It was only around 2005 that the Tatars began tar language2. The unavailability of education to settle in larger numbers in the coastal areas, delivered in the Tatar language, which in most cases illegally occupying plots of land excluded from building development (as well as 2 Volodymyr Prytula, Krymski Tatary. I cherez 65 ro- nature reserves). This movement quickly lost its kiv deportaciya tryvaie?, http://maidanua.org/static/ mai/1242582815.html, access: 9.06.2014.

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 141 2 accelerates the progress of of the tion”. From among its members it elects the Tatars, is one of the most important problems, Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar Nation consisting if not the most important problem, faced by of 33 representatives and serving as the “only this community. highest plenipotentiary representative body of The religious element of Crimean Tatars are the Crimean Tatar Nation” in the period in be- followers of Sunni . They form religious tween the sessions of the Kurultai. communities led by the Spiritual Board of Crimean (the Muftiat of Crimea), con- nected with the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars. How- On 29 March the extraordinary session ever, from among around 380 registered Mus- of the Kurultai rejected the annexation lim communities in Crimea, several dozen do of Crimea by Russia and announced the not recognize the supremacy of the Muftiat; launch of actions aimed at “enforcing it is also not recognized by the non-registered the right to self-determination on one’s communities whose number is difficult to esti- own historical territory”, not indicating mate. These independent communities belong in which state. to various currents of the Muslim revival, and include Salafi communities and groups associ- ated with the international Islamic organization The Mejlis is commonly referred to as the “par- Hizb ut-Tahrir. The latter, supported by exter- liament” (although only a state, not an ethnic nal funding, are gaining control over more and community, can have a parliament), howev- more mosques, and consequently, over the er, its powers are mostly executive. The most preaching. The Muftiat has accused the Crimean important of them is the creation of Crimean authorities, and even the Russian Federation, of Tatars’ national self-government bodies and supporting these communities and movements managing their operation. It is not clear wheth- in order to create a schism, although the main er these bodies function only in the territory of inspirations and sources of funding seem to be Ukraine or also cover Tatars living in Uzbekistan located in the states of the involved and Russia. The system of the bodies of the in the propagation of Islam. The radicalization of Crimean Tatar national self-government is in Crimean Islam is facilitated by the fact that some fact and in its assumptions the nucleus of noth- Crimean Tatar imams complete their education ing less than an autonomous Tatar territory in Arab states (most of them, however, study in Crimea. in ), and by the participation of Crimean In recent years the influence of the Mejlis on Tatar volunteers in the civil wars in . the social life and political attitudes of Crime- an Tatars has weakened, due mainly due to its Kurultai and Mejlis nature, akin to a sui generis “national corpo- ration”, hindering the natural political plural- In 1991 Crimean Tatars established their nation- ism of the Crimean Tatar community. When al self-government composed of the Kurultai, an increasingly larger part of the community the Mejlis and local bodies subject to it, also began to achieve financial and social stability, called mejlises. The Kurultai of the Crimean people’s interest in protest actions weakened, Tatar Nation is an assembly of 250 delegates all the more so, because they have not engen- elected by local Tatar communities in Ukraine dered any significant improvement in the situ- for a 5 year term. It is referred to as “the na- ation of individual families. On the other hand, tional assembly – the highest plenipotentiary the torpid nature of the Mejlis and the fact that representative body of the Crimean Tatar Na- its members have been accused of profiteering

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 141 3 in building plots encourages the more rad- repeatedly appealed to Moscow for support ical elements of the Tatar community to seek and sustains political relations with , a place for themselves outside the structures of launched most probably thanks to the Ka- the “national self-government”. It seems that zan Tatar Crimean diaspora (according to the the annexation of Crimea and the anti-Tatar 2001 census – 12,000 strong). It has also rec- policy of the new authorities have led to re-con- ognized the autonomous status of this republic solidation of Crimean Tatars around the Mejlis. as a model for the future status of Crimea. Since its establishment the Mejlis was headed The National Party organized support actions by Mustafa Jemilev, the unquestioned political for the mock-referenda in the and Lu- and spiritual leader of Crimean Tatars. On 28 gansk oblasts, and in May it openly supported October 2013 he was succeeded by his long- the annexation of Crimea. term collaborator , which gave the more radically oriented “political” faction Kyiv and Crimean Tatars an advantage in the Mejlis over the “econom- ic” faction (led by Remzi Ilyasov), which is more Independent Ukraine has not followed any con- prone to seeking compromise with the local au- sistent policy towards Crimean Tatars. Although thorities. Jemilev however remains the highest Kyiv originally declared support for them, this authority for the nation. was mainly due to the fact that in Crimea this anti-Russian community was the main force es- The pro-Russian Milli Firka party pousing Ukraine’s independence and territori- al integrity. When the separatist ambitions of Milli Firka (the National Party), active since 2006, Simferopol evident in the early 1990’s gradually has been the only significant Crimean Tatar po- extinguished, Crimean Tatars’ interests disap- litical formation after the Mejlis. Opposing the peared from Kyiv’s political agenda. Ukraine Mejlis, it has been a valuable tool in undermin- treated the problems faced by this community ing the position of the Mejlis (both during the just like it treated other ethnic minorities: as is- presidency of and presently). sues of tertiary importance. In particular, Kyiv did not want to open talks on regulating the legal status of the Mejlis. It never It seems that Simferopol and Moscow presented any proposal that would be compet- have moved on to persecute Crimean itive towards the Crimean Tatars’ demands for Tatars in order to intimidate them and recognition of their self-government as a form eliminate opposition-oriented sentiment. of non-territorial national autonomy. The au- thorities of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and of Ukraine, however, de facto recognized The party’s leader is Vasvi Abduraimov and the existence of the Mejlis and carried out talks the number of party members is estimated at with it, which was relatively easy considering several hundred. Milli Firka has been criticising the fact that its top leaders were also members the policy of the Mejlis and Jemilev himself for of the parliament of Ukraine (elected from the a long time, accusing them of inefficiency, au- lists of the People’s Movement of Ukraine, Our thoritarian tendencies and corruption. At the Ukraine and Batkivshchina). same time, it has formulated national demands During president Kuchma’s term in office, and of the Tatar community adopting a similarly later during Yanukovych’s presidency, it was abrasive attitude, if not more so, than the one difficult to reach an agreement because of the adopted by the Mejlis. The party leadership has consistent support offered by the Mejlis to the

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 141 4 opposition forces, and the fact that Ukrainian Two weeks after the referendum, on 29 March, nationalists supported the demand to consider the Kurultai held an extraordinary session. Crimean Tatars an “indigenous nation” (the na- In the session hall there were no flags of tionalists claim that there are only two indige- Ukraine or Russia, just the flags of Crimean nous nations in Ukraine: and Tatars, Tatars. The session was attended by represent- and treat as “invaders”, “conquerors” atives of the Russian Federation: the President etc.). Yushchenko too did little to improve the of Tatarstan and the head status of Crimean Tatars or regulate the legal of the Russian Muftis Council Ravil Haynutdin. status of their self-government. It was only After heated disputes, the Kurultai considered in the resolution “on guarantees of rights of the referendum illegal, rejected the annexation the Crimean Tatar nation within the Ukraini- and announced the launch of actions aimed an State” adopted on 20 March 2014 (i.e. af- at “enforcing the right to self-determination ter the annexation of Crimea by Russia), that on their own historical territory” (the resolu- the Kurultai and Mejlis were recognized (the tion can also be interpreted as a declaration Kurultai as “the highest representative body of actions leading towards independence). of the Crimean Tatar nation”). This resolution, At the same time, the offer involving the pres- however, failed to regulate their legal status or entation of Crimean Tatar candidates to posts in their place in the state’s legal order in any way. the new Crimean administration was accepted. In the current situation the resolution is com- A few days later, Lenur Islamov (one of the lead- pletely extraneous, similar to the act of 17 April ers of the “economic” faction) was appointed 2014 on the “legal rehabilitation of individuals deputy prime minister, and Zaur Smirnov became deported due to their nationality”, clearly limit- head of the committee for ethnic minorities. ed to Crimean Tatars. At this time, Russia attempted to win the sup- of Crimean Tatars and its success seemed Crimean Tatars’ attitude towards increasingly feasible in the context of the fu- the annexation of Crimea tile attempts made by the Tatars in recent years to receive support from Kyiv and of the chaos The new leadership of the Mejlis supported the which engulfed Ukraine after the fall of Ya- protests in Kyiv in 2013 and 2014, and both nukovych, together with Ukraine’s surrender Jemilev and Chubarov spoke to the protesters of Crimea without even token resistance. The from the stage in the Maidan. When in late Feb- popular feeling was that “nobody defended us ruary 2014 the separatist actions were launched and nobody ever will” and the Crimean Tatar in Crimea, Crimean Tatars tried to stop it, e.g. by community must survive also in the conditions organizing demonstrations in Simferopol on 26 of occupation. February and then announcing the organization On 21 April the scope of the Russian act of 1991 of their own referendum (concerning the estab- concerning the rehabilitation of “repressed na- lishment of a Crimean Tatar national autonomy tions” was extended by a decree of the Presi- in Crimea). When it became clear that the new dent of Russia to include Crimean Tatars. Mos- prime minister of the Autonomous Republic of cow suggested that President Putin could see Crimea, , was directly support- Jemilev (in the end only a telephone conver- ed by Russia, and Russian soldiers began to ar- sation was held, even though Jemilev came to rive in Simferopol and other locations, the Mejlis Moscow). On 18 May President Putin met with gave up its objections. The illegal referendum a group of representatives of the Crimean Ta- on incorporating Crimea into the Russian Feder- tars. At the meeting the Mejlis was represented ation was boycotted by Crimean Tatars. by the leader of the “moderate” wing, Remzi

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 141 5 Ilyasov, and Zaur Smirnov. On the other hand, ophobia-motivated incidents grew, especially Crimean authorities announced that they would in neighbour-to-neighbour relations, and lo- deprive Crimean Tatars of property whose legal cal anti-Tatar terror groups have been formed, status has not been regulated. most probably acting with the silent consent of The careful policy of the Mejlis has met with the authorities. The number of Tatars leaving criticism from one portion of the Crimean Ta- Crimea also grew (according to the Mejlis ac- tar community. At the same time, the differ- tivists there were some 7,000 such refugees by ence between the more radical activists, who mid-May; this number, however, does not seem at that time were in Kyiv, and the ones focused credible in the light of other reports which on compromise for the sake of survival of the estimate the total number of refugees from nation, who stayed in Crimea, began to grow. Crimea, most of whom are families of Ukrainian The Mejlis criticised the draft of the new consti- soldiers, to be 5,000–6,000).3 tution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Simferopol and Moscow feared that a major as it did not guarantee Crimean Tatars the demonstration planned for 18 May, the 70th rights granted to indigenous nations and failed anniversary of the launch of the deportations to recognize the Kurultai and Mejlis. of Crimean Tatars, might take a violent course. Rumours of the possible “provocation” were spread, and it is not unlikely that some prov- Crimean Tatars, most of whom have a re- ocation was being prepared. The Crimean au- luctant or even hostile attitude towards thorities issued a ban on public gatherings on the annexation of Crimea by Russia, are the days of the anniversary, although later they not and by a large majority will not be agreed to a rally on the suburbs of Simferopol. eager to contest their current situation The rally on 18 May gathered over 10,000 thou- in an active way. sand people; in general the rallies and gather- ings organized on that day were attended by ca. 60,000 Crimean Tatars (around a fourth of the On 19 April Mustafa Jemilev returned to Crimea whole population). No incidents were reported. and was greeted by thousands of Crimean Tatars who waved flags at him, including the Ukrain- Summary ian flag. However, during his way back to Kyiv, Jemilev was informed that he was banned from Crimean Tatars, most of whom have a reluctant entering the territory of the Russian Federation or even hostile attitude towards the annexa- (including Crimea) until 2019. Since early May tion of Crimea by Russia, are not and by a large Crimean Tatar activists have been summoned majority will not be eager to contest their cur- for interrogations and suspected of engaging rent situation in an active way. Individuals most in extremist activities (pursuant to the Russian likely to leave Crimea are members of groups act on this issue); also Chubarov was official- of later repatriates (Ukrainians are expected to ly threatened with detention for “extremism”. leave Crimea in much greater numbers), and Finally, on 28 May Islamov was dismissed and an intensification of temporary, economically- replaced by Ruslan Balbek, the leader of a mi- -motivated migrations from Crimea, including nor organization, “Generation Crimea”, which to Russia, is anticipated. is openly hostile towards the Mejlis. The inter-ethnic relations in Crimea began to 3 Viktor Diachenko, Bezhentsy XXI veka, www.from- deteriorate quickly. The number of local xen- ua.com/adds/print.php?voice/412c1ae39c2d5, access: 28.05.2014.

OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 141 6 It seems that after a failed experiment focused This might lead to radicalization of attitudes on the policy of compromise, Simferopol and among Tatars and the emergence of groups re- Moscow have moved on to persecute Crimean maining beyond the control of the Mejlis and Tatars (e.g. by attempting to split the Mejlis) in the Muftiat. In the future, these groups might order to intimidate them and eliminate oppo- get involved in militant actions (especially sition-oriented sentiment. It cannot be exclud- after the end of the civil war in Syria, where ed that attempts will be made to remove them a group of Crimean Tatar jihadists are taking part from the plots they have occupied illegally. in the combat).

EDITORS: Adam Eberhardt, Wojciech Konończuk Centre for Eastern Studies Katarzyna Kazimierska, Anna Łabuszewska Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 TRANSLATION: Magdalena Klimowicz phone: +48 | 22 | 525 80 00 CO-OPERATION: Timothy Harrell e-mail: [email protected] DTP: Wojciech Mańkowski The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not Visit our website: www.osw.waw.pl necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities

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