The Discourse Trap and the US Military from the War on Terror to the Surge
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Copyrighted material – 9780230372047 The Discourse Trap and the US Military From the War on Terror to the Surge By Jeffrey H. Michaels Copyrighted material – 9780230372047 pal-michaels-all.indd iii 2/13/13 7:20 AM Copyrighted material – 9780230372047 the discourse trap and the us military Copyright © Jeffrey H. Michaels, 2013. All rights reserved. First published in 2013 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States— a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN- 13: 978-0230-37204-7 Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data Michaels, Jeffrey H. The discourse trap and the US military: from the War on Terror to the surge / by Jeffrey H. Michaels. p. cm. ISBN 978– 0– 230– 37204– 7 (alk. paper) 1. United States. Dept. of Defense— History— 21st century. 2. United States— Armed Forces— Public relations— History— 21st century. 3. Military planning— United States— History— 21st century. 4. United States— Military policy— Decision making. 5. Military doctrine—United States— History— 21st century. 6. Afghan War, 2001— United States. 7. Iraq War, 2003– 2011— United States. 8. War on Terrorism, 2001– 2009. 9. Discourse analysis, Narrative. I. Title. UA23.6.M555 2013 355.601'4— dc23 2012039050 A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Scribe Inc. First edition: March 2013 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Copyrighted material – 9780230372047 pal-michaels-all.indd iv 2/13/13 7:20 AM Copyrighted material – 9780230372047 Contents Acknowledgments vii 1 Introduction 1 2 Global War on Terrorism 17 3 Shock and Awe 81 4 Characterizing the Irregular Adversary in Iraq 107 5 The Surge: From Iraq to Afghanistan 147 6 Conclusion 167 Notes 175 Bibliography 221 Index 257 Copyrighted material – 9780230372047 pal-michaels-all.indd v 2/13/13 7:20 AM Copyrighted material – 9780230372047 CHAPTER 1 Introduction n Makers of Modern Strategy, John Shy and Thomas W. Collier make a brief mention of the importance of language in “revolutionary war,” Iclaiming that words are weapons. They state, “Language is used to iso- late and confuse enemies, rally and motivate friends, and enlist the support of wavering bystanders.” Rather than being merely a tool of war, they also argue that language can shape a war: “But the same language directs— or misdirects—military effort; the rhetoric of political conflict becomes the real- ity of strategic theory.”1 This observation is one of the primary ideas inform- ing this study. It is my contention that the importance political and military systems attach to the creation, dissemination, and control of language in war extends beyond “revolutionary war” and instead is a key feature of conflict more generally. Once introduced into the political- military discourse, words can shape a battlefield and be battled over themselves. This terminological phenomenon has so far received scant academic attention and represents a gap in the existing war studies literature. This book aims to bridge this gap by examining how the discourses devised for political or military reasons can have a much greater, and in many ways, different impact than was intended when the discourse was first introduced. It will argue that discourse plays an integral role in conflict, direct as well as indirect. Discourse can take on a life of its own, forcing political and military leaders and their associated institutions to fall victim to a “discourse trap.” This phenomenon is defined as the action that is motivated or constrained primar- ily by the discursive constructs ostensibly created to serve the needs of policy makers. In some instances, political and military leaders may feel compelled to adopt policies and practices in order to justify or abide by their discourse. In other instances, the discourse, perhaps out of sheer repetition, creates a “self- fulfilling prophecy”— defined as “a false definition of the situation which makes the originally false conception come true”—and can seriously impair strategic Copyrighted material – 9780230372047 pal-michaels-all.indd 1 2/13/13 7:20 AM Copyrighted material – 9780230372047 2 ● The Discourse Trap and the US Military and operational performance.2 Nevertheless, it should be noted that, similar to Robert K. Merton’s observation that “unforeseen consequences should not be identified with consequences which are necessarily undesirable,” the effects of the “discourse trap” might be undesired but not always undesirable.3 This study will attempt to establish the existence of the discourse trap by providing a framework for identifying the phenomenon and its associated effects and demonstrating the ways in which it impacts the conduct and study of warfare and strategy. Specifically, the discourse trap will be examined through the prism of contemporary US military operations. The cases to be studied are “Global War on Terrorism,” “Shock and Awe,” “Characterizing the Irregular Adversary in Iraq,” and the “Surge.” This introduction chapter will begin by establishing a framework to clarify how the discourse trap functions, which will then allow subsequent investigation into how it impacted the US military. The relevance of discourse to war must also be firmly established, particularly as the literature on this subject is limited as a result of scholars’ reliance on a tradition- ally narrow approach to the function of language. Discourse and War Why is the study of discourse relevant to the study of war? After all, in the rich war studies literature, very little attention has been devoted to this subject. In comparison to the study of the nature and character of war, military history, military capabilities, military sociology, and so forth, the study of discourse remains marginalized. At best, the study of discourse in war has been subor- dinated to other areas of enquiry, such as those aforementioned, rather than existing independently. One of the main reasons for this is that scholars tend to view the function of language in war in very limited terms. For most schol- ars, language is relevant mainly for the study of propaganda and public affairs. Thus, in order to mobilize and sustain support for a war, or to undermine an adversary, political and military systems employ certain types of language. However, as will be highlighted, such a conception of the function of lan- guage in war is too limited. Instead, by expanding this conception, numerous avenues of enquiry can emerge. The term discourse is one that has acquired many different meanings and is often used by a single author in multiple ways.4 To avoid confusion, for the purpose of this book, discourse simply refers to the language actors use to discuss certain issues and assign meanings to them. For instance, when referring to “counterterrorism discourse” in the context of the US Department of Defense (DoD), I am merely referring to the way defense officials talk and think about “counterterrorism” and what they mean by it. However, the very fact that defense officials are talking and thinking about an issue in terms of counterterrorism, as Copyrighted material – 9780230372047 pal-michaels-all.indd 2 2/13/13 7:20 AM Copyrighted material – 9780230372047 Introduction ● 3 compared to “counterinsurgency,” also necessitates viewing discourse from the perspective of the terminology employed by the actors being studied. This then raises the problem of the relationship between discourse and terminology. My argument is that the two are mutually constitutive. Discourse gives terminology its meaning, or to put it slightly differently, terminology only acquires mean- ing within discourse. Simultaneously, terminology provides the essential building block for discourse, since it is impossible to discuss an issue without employing a term to describe it. By way of illustration, to take the example of counterterror- ism again, the term itself can have many different definitions assigned to it and also be used and understood in both positive and negative ways depending on who uses it and when. In this specific case, and as will be shown in Chapter 2, the way defense officials employed the term counterterrorism in the 1980s was very different from the way it was used after 9/11. Yet the way in which a term is employed in discourse is one thing; that the term is used in the first place is quite another. The simple fact that officials are employing the term counterterrorism, as opposed to counterinsurgency or some other term, can have the effect of guiding the discourse in a particular direc- tion. It is here that the possibility of a “trap” emerges, in which a discourse is perceived to be misguided yet is difficult to escape from. In the context of defense policy, officials may perceive that the term counterterrorism is inappro- priate to employ, preferring instead counterinsurgency, which they feel more accurately reflects reality and the use of which would lead to a different set of actions potentially resulting in more favorable outcomes. However, for either intended (e.g., political objections) or unintended (e.g., the effect of socializa- tion or indoctrination) reasons, officials may find themselves constrained by the discourse of counterterrorism and find it difficult if not impossible for a dis- course of counterinsurgency to emerge. Attempting to change a discourse is made particularly difficult when it is competing against a “dominant” discourse, or a discourse that can be considered “mainstream” or “acceptable,” especially if it has become institutionalized.