Bomber Command's Electronic Warfare Policy and Suppression of Enemy Air Defence Posture During the Second World
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BOMBER COMMAND’S ELECTRONIC WARFARE POLICY AND SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENCE POSTURE DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR By THOMAS JEAVONS WITHINGTON A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History, History office, Arts Building, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, September 2017. II University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT This thesis will examine the Electronic Warfare [EW] policies and subsequent Suppression of Enemy Air Defence [SEAD] postures of the Royal Air Force’s Bomber Command during the Second World War. It examines how EW was applied to the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) Integrated Air Defence System [IADS] so as to reduce Bomber Command aircraft losses, and determines whether EW policies were drafted in a proactive and/or reactive fashion vis-à-vis the Luftwaffe IADS. The thesis applies air power theory regarding the levels and methods of application by which SEAD was brought to bear against the IADS as a result of these EW policies. Ultimately, the thesis will argue that Bomber Command enacted both proactive and reactive EW policies at the Campaign and Localised SEAD levels using a combination of Manoeuvrist, Mass and Stealth/Surprise approaches. III DEDICATION For Brian Withington and Stephen Benn who knew only too well the strength of the Luftwaffe. IV ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am indebted to the generous support of the Royal Air Force’s Henry Probert Bursary for Academic Study which helped to fund my research. Similarly Dr. Peter Gray, senior research fellow in air power studies at the University of Birmingham’s Centre for War Studies, has been an extremely helpful and patient supervisor providing tireless support and invaluable insight. Meanwhile Professor Gary Sheffield, professor of war studies at the University of Wolverhampton, was instrumental in encouraging me to commence doctoral research; quite simply, without the support of both these inspiring individuals, this thesis would never have been written. The staff at the National Archive in Kew went ‘above and beyond’ the call of duty on many occasions when documents and materials proved fiendishly difficult to locate. Moreover, I am very grateful to Dr. Chris Smith and Dr. Ahron Bregman; both of whom encouraged me to embark upon doctoral study many years ago. This thesis is the culmination of that journey, and I hope that it meets their high standards. Mr. Andrew Brookes and Mr. Ben Moores are both dear friends and trusted colleagues whom have been valued confidants and sounding boards during the preparation of this thesis. Susan Carvell in the University of Birmingham registry and Karolina at Blissets were both immeasurably helpful and patient when the courier company experienced challenges in correctly delivering the final thesis, while Dr. James Pugh helped to relax the my mind immediately prior to my viva. I must also express my gratitude to my parents and family whom were tireless sources of support and motivation. Last, but by no means least, Dr. Nathalie Rivère de Carles has been an inexhaustible source of strength, motivation, encouragement, honesty, patience, empathy and laughter during the preparation of this thesis. Without her, it would quite simply never have seen the light of day. There maybe other individuals to whom I have accidentally omitted to V give thanks; please accept my humble apologies and gratitude. Finally, any and all errors remain the author’s responsibility. VI CONTENTS FIGURES ............................................................................................................................... XI GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................................ XIII INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1 Summary ................................................................................................................................. 1 EW and SEAD ........................................................................................................................ 1 The Necessity of Examination ................................................................................................ 6 The Existing Literature ......................................................................................................... 10 Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 31 CHAPTER ONE - THE THEORETICAL DIMENSIONS OF AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC WARFARE POLICY AND THE SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENCE MISSION ............................................................................................................. 33 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 33 The Relevance of Contemporary Theory ............................................................................. 34 IADS Defined ....................................................................................................................... 39 SEAD Defined ...................................................................................................................... 41 Electronic Warfare Policy .................................................................................................... 43 SEAD Approaches ................................................................................................................ 46 Campaign SEAD .................................................................................................................. 47 Localised SEAD ................................................................................................................... 50 VII Opportune SEAD .................................................................................................................. 53 Applying SEAD .................................................................................................................... 54 Stealth/Surprise ..................................................................................................................... 56 Mass ...................................................................................................................................... 57 Balance ................................................................................................................................. 59 The Necessity of Analysis .................................................................................................... 64 CHAPTER TWO - BOMBER COMMAND ELECTRONIC WARFARE POLICY AND SUBSEQUENT SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENCE POSTURE: SEPTEMBER 1939 TO DECEMBER 1941 ......................................................................... 65 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 65 September 1939 - March 1940: Acquiring the Knowledge .................................................. 66 April - September 1940: The Expansion of the Strategic Air Campaign ............................. 73 September - December 1940: Towards Area Bombing ....................................................... 81 December 1940 – December 1941: Mounting Losses.......................................................... 87 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................ 100 CHAPTER THREE - BOMBER COMMAND ELECTRONIC WARFARE POLICY AND SUBSEQUENT SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENCE POSTURE: JANUARY 1942 TO JULY 1943 ......................................................................................... 103 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 103 January-September 1942: Necessity Breeds Invention ...................................................... 104 October - December 1942: Gathering Momentum ............................................................. 118 January - July 1943: Waging the Electronic Offensive ...................................................... 126 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................ 134 VIII CHAPTER FOUR - MAKING THE COMMITMENT: THE RAISON D'ÊTRE FOR 100 GROUP’S ACTIVATION ............................................................................................ 137 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 137 July - September 1943: The Summer of Discontent .......................................................... 138 September - November 1943: The Growing Need ............................................................. 145 November 1943: The Activation