An Air Force Association Special Report

How the world conflict transformed America’s air and space weapon The Air Force Association The Air Force Association (AFA) is an independent, nonprofit civilian organi- zation promoting public understanding of aerospace power and the pivotal role it plays in the security of the nation. AFA publishes Air Force Magazine, sponsors national symposia, and disseminates information through outreach programs of its affiliate, the Aerospace Education Foundation. Learn more about AFA by visiting us on the Web at www.afa.org.

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Published by Aerospace Education Foundation 1501 Lee Highway Arlington VA 22209-1198 Tel: (703) 247-5839 Produced by the staff of Air Force Magazine Fax: (703) 247-5853 Design by Heather Lewis, Assistant Art Director The War of 9/11 1 How the world conflict transformed America’s air and space weapon

By Dr. Rebecca Grant

Dr. Rebecca Grant is president of IRIS Independent Research, Inc., in Washing- ton, D.C., and a fellow of the Eaker Insti- tute for Aerospace Concepts, the public policy and research arm of the Air Force Association’s Aerospace Education Foun- dation. She is also a contributing editor to Air Force Magazine, the journal of the Air Force Association. Her professional re- search interests center on joint doctrine and airpower employment in joint campaigns.

An Air Force Association Special Report

February 2005 2 Table of Contents

Prologue: This New War 3

Operation Enduring Freedom 4 Prior Planning 4 Major Combat Begins 5 The Tide Turns 10 Anaconda 12

Operation Noble Eagle 15 Creating a Strategy 15 Box: The Foundation: the Air Force’s Strategic Air Mobility Forces 16-17 Permanent Commitment 18

Operation Iraqi Freedom 21 Southern Focus 21 War Councils 23 Major Combat Operations 26 The Sandstorm 30

The “Phase IV” Fight 34 Theater of Mobility 34 Afghan Mop-Up 35 The Iraqi Nettle 36 The Fallujah Model 40

Tying It Together 42 What Airpower Wrought 42 Beyond Jointness 43 Seeking a Course 44

Maps Southwest Asia 6 The Afghan Theater 8 The Gulf Region 22 Iraq in Detail 24

Tables Total Coalition Aircraft 25 Combat Aircraft 28 Support Aircraft 28 Air Mobility Sorties 29 Strike Sorties 31 Strikes by Category 33 Total Air Sorties 33 Snapshot of Phase IV Air Operations 41 Prologue 3 This New War

On Sept. 11, 2001, at 0846, al Qaeda hijack- the skies over the cities, fields, and mountains ers flew American Airlines Flight 11 into the north of America. tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. It is a war with American leadership, and yet The first response in the global war on terrorism it is also a coalition war. The flags of more than fell to two F-15 pilots sitting alert that bright, clear 60 nations can be found at US Central Com- morning. A new defense of America had be- mand (CENTCOM) headquarters at MacDill gun—and with it, a new era of challenge for air AFB, Fla. They are represented by their soldiers, and space power. special operations forces, warships, aircraft, When one thinks of the war on terrorism that and supplies abroad. It is a war to prevent more began after Sept. 11, individual actions come terrorist disasters of the kind seen in Bali and to mind: Operation Enduring Freedom, Opera- Madrid as well as in New York, Pennsylvania, tion Noble Eagle, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and and Washington, D.C. so-called “Phase IV” stability operations in both This new war—The War of 9/11—has had Afghanistan and Iraq. many successes, but also setbacks, and it has Yet the series of campaigns and battles that been a time of soul-searching. It is the war to were launched after Sept. 11 are military actions shape the character of the early 21st century. in support of a single purpose. It is a war fought Airmen are playing a leading role in this war on many fronts, at home and abroad. To those as they did in the wars of the 20th century. New in the armed forces and those millions more who tactics and operational concepts in air and support and care for them, it is a war of vivid, space power pioneered and perfected for this unexpected places. There are the snow-capped war have altered the fighting style of joint mili- mountains of Afghanistan, the dun-colored cit- tary forces. ies of Iraq, the dark blue waters of the North Ara- The war has had four distinct phases—thus bian Sea, the heavily guarded desert bases in far. With the war now in its fourth year, this es- the Gulf, the enclave of Djibouti in the Horn of say attempts to describe, explain, and analyze Africa. The war is waged from Cheyenne the role played by air and space power in each Mountain’s command post in Colorado and in of these phases.

Long after the attack, the ruins of the World Trade Center still smolder. The Sept. 11 attacks killed more than 3,000 from the US and other countries.

US Navy Photo by J01 Preston Keres 4 Operation Enduring Freedom

Within hours of the disasters at the World the idea of relying on airpower and a small con- Trade Center in New York and Pentagon in Wash- tingent of Special Operations Forces (SOF) to ington, war planning was underway in the United go after bin Laden and al Qaeda in Afghani- States. The first target of American arms was stan. “After we didn’t get Osama bin Laden in the terror-prone regime in Afghanistan, which TLAM strikes in Afghanistan, we started this had been providing safe haven and support for game of trying to follow Osama around Afghani- Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda terrorists. stan and trying to figure out how to get a shot Going after bin Laden’s main base was no easy at him,” recalled one top CENTCOM officer.4 The task. Nor was reliance on airpower the immedi- US began developing contingency plans “to get ate choice of Army Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the Osama, or go in there and bust up the Taliban.” CENTCOM chief. Submarines were on station in the North Ara- The commander’s first instinct was to plan for bian Sea to conduct a TLAM strike if bin Laden 5 1.Gen. Tommy Franks, USA a multi-pronged land attack relying on helicop- turned up. However, actionable intelligence (Ret.), American Soldier, p. ter airborne assault, with Pakistan as a staging never came through, and the whole idea re- 250-51. area. “I can’t see conducting operations inside minded some of Desert One, the disastrous 2. Rear Adm. James Robb, Afghanistan without basing, staging, and over- 1980 attempt to rescue 56 Americans held hos- interview, Aug. 30, 2004. flight support from Pakistan,” he told his staff on tage in the US embassy in Tehran. That failed 3. Franks, American Soldier, Sept. 12.1 There was, however, a problem. “We effort resulted in the deaths of five airmen and p. 250-251. had no air bases on that soil or even near that three marines. 4. Vice Adm. David Nichols, interview, Oct. 13, 2004. soil,” said Rear Adm. James Robb, inbound as The SOF and airpower option was more ap- 2 5. President Bill Clinton, My CENTCOM’s chief of strategic plans and policy. pealing in 2001—in part because air and space Life, p. 891. Franks asked Secretary of Defense Donald H. power had progressed, and in part because 6. Cesar G. Soriano, “Pilots Rumsfeld for 10 days to develop a course of Washington would not wait for a massive Continue Mission to Destroy action. “We had al Qaeda and Taliban target sets buildup and a ground campaign. A hard look Taliban Targets,” USA Today, Oct. 15, 2001. in Afghanistan and plans to strike those targets at the real tactical options showed that it was with TLAMs [the Navy’s Tomahawk land-attack the air component that was ready to go. B-2 cruise missiles] and manned bombers,” Franks bomber crews at Whiteman AFB, Mo., went into recalled, “but CENTCOM had not developed a crew rest soon after they got word of the Sept. plan for conventional ground operations in Af- 11 attacks. The Navy’s aircraft carrier USS En- ghanistan” or for access agreements with bor- terprise was close to the scene of action. “I was dering nations.3 watching CNN when I saw the second plane hit the tower,” said Navy Capt. Sandy Winnefeld, Prior Planning commanding officer.6 “Right then I thought, In 1998, CENTCOM planners had toyed with ‘We’re not going home.’” That was true. “It was

Four B-52H bombers taxi for take off on strike mission against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and Taliban military installations in Afghanistan on Oct. 7, 2001, the beginning

of Operation Enduring USAF photo by SrA. Rebecca M. Luquin Freedom. DOD photo 5

USAF battlefield airmen in Afghanistan, who made do with local food and transportation, were key elements in the success of the air component.

only a matter of hours before they turned us during Freedom, the code-name for the war in around.” Another carrier, USS Carl Vinson was Afghanistan. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs passing the tip of India en route to the Arabian of Staff, USAF Gen. Richard B. Myers, said, Gulf. For the first time in decades, the sea-based “About 15 land-based bombers, some 25 strike part of the air component became indispens- aircraft from carriers, and US and British ships able to shaping the campaign. and submarines launching approximately 50 With two big-deck carriers, long-range bomb- Tomahawk missiles have struck terrorist targets ers, refueling tankers, E-3 AWACS aircraft, and in Afghanistan.”8 7. Gen. Tommy Franks, Senate Armed Services other ISR assets, America soon had enough air- Afghanistan turned out to be a new kind of Committee testimony, Feb. 7, power in place to quickly start operations in Af- war, but it had a familiar starting point: the gain- 2002. ghanistan. The Combined Forces Air Component ing of air supremacy. The first order of business 8. USAF Gen. Richard Myers, Commander (CFACC)—the “air boss”—was Lt. was to “remove the threat from air defenses and DOD press conference, Oct. 7, 2001. Gen. (now Gen.) Charles F. Wald. Wald and his from Taliban aircraft,” Rumsfeld said.9 “We need 9. Defense Secretary Donald staff quickly deployed forward to Prince Sultan the freedom to operate on the ground and in Rumsfeld, DOD press AB, Saudi Arabia. “P-SAB,” as it was called, was the air, and the targets selected, if successfully conference, Oct. 7, 2001. home to the Air Force’s new Combined Air Op- destroyed, should permit an increasing degree 10. Rear Adm. John erations Center (CAOC). of freedom over time,” he added. Bombers and Stufflebeem, interview, Aug. Over the next few weeks, CENTCOM built a TLAMs hit suspected air defense sites and ma- 4, 2004. 11. Mark Bowden, “The plan to link up US forces with Afghan forces that jor air bases while carrier-based F-14 Tomcats, Kabul-ki Dance,” Atlantic had been fighting the Taliban for years. The in- F/A-18 Hornets, and EA-6B Prowlers ensured Monthly, November 2002. digenous groups would provide the manpower control of the air. on the ground and would be assisted by spe- On paper, the Taliban looked like anything but cial operations forces. The air component would a pushover. It had access, in theory, to about give them the firepower they needed to win 70 MiG-21s—more than enough to cause against a more mobile and heavily armed en- trouble for US bombers, tankers, AWACS, Joint emy. Franks briefed the military plan to Presi- STARS, E-2s, S-3s, and C-17s. Said Rear Adm. dent Bush on Sept. 21, 2001.7 Franks’ plan gave John D. Stufflebeem, an F-14 pilot serving on top priority to early air strikes and a sustained the Joint Staff, “Initially, there was a big fear campaign with SOF assisting the Afghan oppo- about the Afghanis flying to try to shoot us down, sition. With the right kind of firepower, he argued, and so everything would have to go with fighter the Northern Alliance and other opposition cover.”10 forces could drive out the Taliban and help hunt Afghanistan’s ground-based air defenses down bin Laden and al Qaeda. were not dense or sophisticated, but they could still be unnerving. One Air Force F-15E crew Major Combat Begins striking targets near Jalalabad, a den of al On Sunday, Oct. 7, the President went on tele- Qaeda targets, reported antiaircraft fire in vision to announce the start of Operation En- streaks of white, yellow, and red.11 Navy Lt. Chris Southwest Asia 6 Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Kyrgzstan Turkey Khanabad Kulyab Turkmenistan Tajikisistan Incirlik AB

Lebanon Syria Iran Kabul Israel Iraq Afghanistan Jordan Pakistan

Jacobabad Al Jaber AB Dalbandin Saudi Arabia Shaikh Isa AB Pasni Qatar India

UAE Prince Sultan AB Seeb

Masirah Oman

Thumrait Yemen

Gasko, an F-14 pilot flying early missions near Kabul, watched a “string of tracers from the ZSU-23s” and “hand-held SAMs coming up too, 12. Navy Lt. Chris Gasko, interview, July 22, 2004. like the bottle rockets come corkscrewing up at you.”12 He also saw “medium and heavy caliber 13. Gen. Tommy Franks, Senate Armed Services AAA over Kabul and around the Bagram [Air Committee testimony, Feb. 7, Base] area” and heard reports from fellow pilots 2002. of antiaircraft fire up north near Mazar-e Sharif. Even so, air superiority wasn’t long in com- ing. It enabled CENTCOM to start inserting SOF units via helicopter. The command also began humanitarian airdrops right away because seven million Afghanis were believed “to be at risk of loss of life” as a result of conditions inside Af- ghanistan, Franks estimated.13 Two C-17 trans- ports based in Germany flew 6,500-mile mis- sions on Night One of the Afghan war to airdrop supplies. “The fact that you’re flying into a com- Diego Garcia bat zone cannot be ignored,” said Col. Kip Self, 2,500 miles from director of mobility operations at Ramstein AB, Afghanistan Germany, “but, if you do the right training and fixed target sites. Strikes on pre-briefed, fixed planning ahead of time, you mitigate those targets continued throughout the fall. threats and rely on your professionalism to get The second challenge stemmed from targets 7 you through.”14 which were not fixed. These emerging targets—

With cargo and SOF aircraft operating all over targets whose coordinates were not known to 14. MSgt. Randy Mitchell, Afghanistan, this was definitely a different kind aircrews when they launched for a mission— “Afghan Food Drops of air war. soon began to dominate. “There are preplanned Underscore Bush’s Humanitarian Pledge,” To kick start the war on the ground, CENTCOM targets, and there is also the ability to handle American Forces Press called on the air component to mount a cycle of targets that might emerge,” Myers said Oct. 8.16 Service, Oct. 9, 2001. air operations so that controllers on the ground “By the end of the first week, the pilots didn’t 15. DOD background could call in airstrikes and clear the way for Af- know what targets they’d be striking when they briefing, Oct. 14, 2001. ghan opposition forces to take back Taliban-con- launched,” said Vice Adm. John Nathman, the 16. DOD press conference, Oct. 8, 2001. trolled cities. It was a plan faced with many chal- then-commander, Naval Air Forces.17 Pilots still 17. Vice Adm. John Nathman lenges. studied target folders, but they knew they were and Rear Adm. Mike Mullen, The first was the challenge of generating sor- likely to be retasked once in Afghan airspace. remarks, reported by Lisa ties. The CAOC organized tanker tracks that That meant each aircrew had to manage its own Troshinsky, “Navy Pilots Set Flying and Target Records in would allow fighters and bombers to enter air- communications with the CAOC—generally via Afghanistan,” Navy News and space over Afghanistan and stay there for pre- AWACS—and keep abreast of tanker refueling Undersea Technology, Jan. designated periods, which soon became known times. A Navy or Marine pilot had to keep an 22, 2002. as “vul” periods; aircrews were “vulnerable,” or eye on his carrier’s deck cycle time, which typi- 18. Navy Capt. Patrick Driscoll, interview, Aug. 4, on-call for retasking, during these times. During cally covered about 90 minutes. During this pe- 2004. a typical 10-hour mission, theater-based B-1Bs riod, a deck would be “closed” to launch air- and B-52s could put in four or five hours of time craft or be “opened” to trap aircraft returning on station. USAF F-15Es and F-16s based in Per- from missions. Landing out of cycle was out of sian Gulf nations would fly long sorties that the question. yielded a few hours on call over Afghanistan. The third challenge entailed working with the Carriers in the north Arabian Sea split duties as controllers on the ground. At first, many of them “night” or “day” carriers, the better to keep up a were from government agencies such as the steady supply of sorties over the target. Aircrew CIA. They were often in the right place at the endurance was stretched to the limit. Moreover, right time but could not compare with fully quali- the composition of the missions changed, too. At fied close air support (CAS) controllers. Their first, airmen attacked fixed military targets such lack of familiarity with military air support pro- as airfields and Taliban strong points. One of the cedures made for some dodgy moments both first areas targeted was the “front” on the open on the ground and in the air. “It was extremely plains north of Kabul. As many as 10,000 Taliban frustrating at first,” said Navy Capt. Patrick were gathering there in garrison. Some on the Driscoll, an F/A-18 pilot who flew missions from front lines were “arrayed with heavy weapons in USS Kitty Hawk.18 (This carrier had off-loaded revetments in covered and concealed positions,” most of its air wing to turn itself into a floating a CENTCOM briefer explained.15 Bombers and airfield for SOF units and their helicopters.) Ini- fighters alike delivered precision weapons on the tially, ground controllers Driscoll encountered

USAF’s heavy bombers were mainstays in the fight. At right, a weapons loader preps munitions for a B-1B USAF photo by SSgt. Shane Cuomo bomber for another Operation Enduring Freedom strike mission. sounded like they were “nonmilitary” or, at best, of the targets required positive identification and inexperienced. “I spent a couple of hops just approval from a specially trained lawyer on the 8 trying to find targets that were not being prop- CENTCOM staff. Tight rules of engagement erly marked or properly talked on,” he recalled. mandated by the White House to prevent col- The stakes were high, and so the learning curve lateral damage often ended up requiring even

19. Navy Lt. Scott Smith, had to be steep. “We learned very quickly what Franks to check with Bush or Rumsfeld and interview, July 22, 2004. sort of things that we wanted the FACs [forward caused inevitable time delays. It was up to the 20. Rear Adm. John Cryer, air controllers] to be telling us and what they CAOC to execute a strike. Rear Adm. John P. interview, Sept. 2, 2004. needed to hear from us,” said another F/A-18 Cryer, a naval aviator serving as a day shift pilot, Navy Lt. Scott Smith.19 For “the first couple CAOC director, described the flow of a typical of flights it was sort of painful, but then, after TST strike as it unfolded over a period of hours. that, we were able to work through it and got a “We were watching a safe house, vetting a tar- good idea of how we wanted to work things.” get through a variety of different sources,” he Challenge four was what the CAOC officers said, “until it was determined that yes, this was came to call “time-sensitive targets,” or TSTs. the site that we needed to hit. Then it would be These were not the same as “emerging targets.” our job in the CAOC to go ahead and tee up Part of CENTCOM’s plan was to hunt down and the strike.”20 The CAOC had to find an available strike at al Qaeda and Taliban leadership. Con- fighter or bomber with the right weapons and stant surveillance and multiple intelligence fusing to carry out the strike while Tampa sources generated leads on key leaders. Most worked final approvals. As clearance came The Afghan Theater

Uzbekistan Kyrgzstan

Khanabad Kulyab Turkmenistan China Tajikistan

Mazar-e Sharif Taloqan Kunduz Kabul Herat Afghanistan Jalalabad Khowst Iran Kandahar

Pakistan

Dalbandin Jacobabad

India

Pasni

UAE 9 Nighttime, covert insertion and extraction of special operations units are the specialty of MH- 53J Pave Low USAF photo by SSgt. TSgt. Manuel Trejo helicopters, which crisscrossed Afghanistan during OEF. The image at left shows the standard lights-out, night- vision view of a gunner at his station in the doorway.

through “we’d go ahead and execute the strike making it possible to carry out many different drop and you’d watch the survivors come out of objectives at the same time. These included the the building.” If survivors tried to flee in their ve- airman’s tasks—holding air dominance, extend- hicles “we would follow them with Predator and ing intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance then we’d stay after them until we got every one (ISR) coverage, pursuing TSTs, and air-drop- of them,” Cryer said. The first efforts at pursuing ping humanitarian supplies—as well as joint TSTs in Afghanistan were sometimes bumpy, but tasks. In this case, the joint tasks concerned in those high-pressure cycles a new form of air the link between SOF and the indigenous Af- warfare was unfolding. As the War of 9/11 pro- ghan opposition forces. 21. William Arkin, “A Week gressed, so would the CAOC’s expertise and On the ground, a critical mass of well-trained of Air War, washingtonpost. level of control. controllers was starting to use the air compo- com, Oct. 14, 2001. Through October 2001, the air component nent to astonishing effect. From the start, Franks 22. Robert Pape, “The Wrong adjusted to the new demands. Critics bemoaned was eager to have American “boots on the Battle Plan,” Washington what they misperceived as a lack of progress. ground” for the engagements with the Taliban Post, Oct. 19, 2001. After just one week of combat, columnist Will- and al Qaeda. “The sooner we had the teams’ 23. Kendra Helmer, “Gen. Franks, in Uzbekistan, Says iam Arkin called the effort “sparse to the ex- combat air controllers designating Taliban and Fight Against Terrorism Has treme.”21 By the end of October, University of al Qaeda targets for the bombers, the quicker not Stalled,” Stars and Chicago professor Robert A. Pape concluded: Northern Alliance troops could climb out of their Stripes, Oct. 31, 2001. “The initial air strategy against Afghanistan is World War I-style trenches and advance on the 24. Gen. Richard Myers, DOD Press Conference, Oct. 22 25 not working.” The critics, however, were off the enemy,” he said. The new Air Force Chief of 22, 2001. mark. Flexible airpower in Afghanistan was be- Staff, Gen. John P. Jumper, said it was “abso- 25. Gen. Tommy Franks, USA coming proficient at new tasks, and, in the pro- lutely imperative here that you start with people (Ret.), American Soldier, p. cess, air and space power were changing the on the ground” who could assess the military 289. nature of military operations from that of sequen- situation, identify targets, and, most of all, work 26. Gen. John Jumper, interview, July 23, 2003. tial, phased campaigns to that of simultaneous with the Northern Alliance.26 27. Franks, Senate operations. The first SOF team was inserted into Afghani- testimony, Feb. 7, 2002. Senior leaders tried to find the words to ex- stan on Oct. 19.27 Three teams were in Afghani- 28. Bob Woodward, Bush at plain the changes. “It’s been said that those who stan by Oct. 26, with five more waiting in War, p. 261. 28 expect another Desert Storm will wonder every Uzbekistan. The highly trained controllers 29. Gen. Richard Myers, day what it is that this war is all about,” Franks knew how to work effectively with the heavy interview with Al Jazeera, said.23 “This is a different war. This war will be bombers and fighters the CAOC sent their way. DOD transcript, Oct. 31, 2001. fought on many fronts simultaneously.” Myers “They are specially trained individuals that know echoed the point. “In the Gulf War, three phases how to bring in airpower and bring it into the of an air campaign went on for 38 days as we conflict in the right way, and that’s what they’re tried to set conditions with the air war,” Myers doing. We think that will have a big impact on said in late October. “Then we had a ground the Northern Alliance’s ability to prosecute their component that went in and finished the job. You piece of this war against the Taliban,” said shouldn’t think of this in those terms.”24 Myers.29 In Afghanistan, air and space power were Full 24-hour coverage over the whole coun- 10 USAF mobility forces aided strike elements and provided humanitarian supplies

USAF photo by Mannie Garcia to the Afghans. At right, a C-17 loadmaster drops the one millionth meal delivered during OEF.

try was not possible but the CAOC worked with emboldened or ready to make moves, then that 30. Rear Adm. John Cryer, SOF teams to ensure both sides understood means that it [the bombing] has had the in- interview, Sept. 2, 2004. when air support would be available. Distances tended effect.”32 31. Rear Adm. John and intricacies of the missions deep into Af- Stufflebeem, DOD press conference, Nov. 2, 2001. ghan airspace were problems. The CAOC knew The Tide Turns 32. Stufflebeem, DOD press it and worked to funnel air support where and Now came the seismic shift in air warfare. The conference, Nov. 6, 2001. when it was needed most. “It was impossible number of preplanned targets struck gave way 33. Stufflebeem, DOD press to get 24-hour coverage,” said Cryer, “so we to so-called unfragged targets—targets se- conference, Nov. 2, 2001. contracted with the SOF” to provide strike air- lected by ground controllers and delivered by 34. Stufflebeem, interview, craft in set increments.30 Throughout the first XCAS (airborne alert close air support). By early Aug. 4, 2004. week of November, airstrikes concentrated on November, strike aircraft were reporting more Taliban and al Qaeda forces and military equip- weapons drops on unfragged targets than on ment near Mazar-e Sharif and farther south, preplanned targets.33 Back in Washington, near Kabul. On Nov. 1, 65 coalition aircraft Stufflebeem watched closely for results. Moni- struck nine preplanned targets, plus dozens toring the daily reports made him think: “Wow, more in engagement zones.31 Stufflebeem said, we’re taking a lot of risk in doing some of these “If the Northern [Alliance] is feeling operations, but obviously it’s paying off.”34 Re-

USAF photo by TSgt. Scott Reed Members of the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron, Indian Springs AFAF, Nev., perform pre-flight checks on a RQ-1 Predator before a Nov. 9, 2001, mission. The UAVs helped provide data and images for strikes on time-sensitive targets. USAF photo 11 Air National Guard EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft and crews deployed to the Southwest Asia theater to broadcast to the Afghans messages about the US war on terror and the Taliban.

sults came first at Mazar-e Sharif, where the was a major victory. “We in fact have the initia- Northern Alliance was positioned to roll up tive,” Franks declared on Nov. 15.39 Taliban forces and occupy territory. The nearby The use of persistent air coverage and pre- town of Shulgareh fell on Nov. 7. On Nov. 8, cisely controlled strikes had brought the United Northern Alliance warlords Abdurashid Dostum States its first major victories of the War of 9/11. and Mohammad Attah had come within 10 miles These nonlinear, simultaneous engagements by of Mazar-e Sharif, according to reports from the airpower made for a rapidly accelerating cam- 35 SOF teams operating with them. On Nov. 9, the paign. Jumper said it was “more effective than 35. Bob Woodward, Bush at Northern Alliance claimed Mazar-e Sharif itself. any kind of close air support we’d done in a War, p. 297. 40 The fall of Mazar-e Sharif kicked off four im- long time.” As the Army vice chief of staff, Gen. 36. DOD press conference, pressive weeks of military victories which ended John M. Keane, later said, “those population Nov. 13, 2001. Taliban control of Afghanistan. On Nov. 10, the centers toppled as the result of a combined 37. Gen. Richard Myers, air component attacked trench lines outside of arms team: US airpower and a combination of DOD press conference, Nov. 13, 2001. Taloqan. “It was important for these trenches, Special Forces and Afghan troops.”41 The Af- 38. Rear Adm. John and others like them, to be cleared to open the ghan air war proved the concept of pairing pre- Stufflebeem, DOD press way for the Northern Alliance to advance,” Myers cise, persistent airpower with light ground conference, Nov. 14, 2001. 36 said. Taloqan fell on Nov. 11. In the west, op- forces. It also demonstrated that with enough 39. Gen. Tommy Franks, position forces seized Herat on Nov. 12. ISR, CAOC officers could track and strike time- DOD press conference, Nov. 15, 2001. The morning of Nov. 12 also saw the begin- sensitive targets. Joint integration of the air com- 40. Gen. John Jumper, ning of the end for the Taliban’s control of ponent had never been so good. interview, July 23, 2003. Afghanistan’s capital city. B-52 strikes targeted Still, obstacles remained. Communications 41. Kim Burger, “Interview Taliban lines around Kabul in the morning. By across Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain could with General Keane,” Jane’s late afternoon, Northern Alliance armored forces be difficult. Many aircraft had voice or digital Defence Weekly, Jan. 30, were moving down the Old Road toward the city, data links, but it was far from a fully networked 2002. with infantry sweeping through former Taliban battlespace. Problems with targeting fleeing al 42. Adm. Mark Fitzgerald, interview, July 1, 2004. positions. “The Taliban appear to have aban- Qaeda and Taliban “pointed out real shortfalls doned Kabul and some Northern Alliance forces in the ability to push digital information,” con- are in the city,” Myers declared on Nov. 13.37 cluded Adm. Mark Fitzgerald, battle group com- “Last Friday the Northern Alliance controlled less mander aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt.42 than 15 percent of Afghanistan,” he said. “By Those Taliban and al Qaeda remnants were to Monday morning they had fundamentally cut Af- become an ongoing problem even after Hamid ghanistan into two areas of control, but we must Karzai became head of the interim Afghan gov- keep in mind that pockets of resistance do re- ernment on Dec. 20, 2001. main,” he added. Some Taliban fled south toward In addition, the focus of situation awareness the sparsely populated, mountainous areas con- was shifting from the cockpit to the CAOC—and trolled by Pashtun tribes. “Where we can posi- it took time for everyone to get used to it. The tively identify Taliban as such, we are pursuing CAOC had matured significantly and had be- them,” said Stufflebeem on Nov. 14.38 However, come the dominant node for battlespace aware- nothing changed the fact that taking the capital ness. No longer were the aircrews, by default, “the smartest people on Earth about what was Through the major victories of November, SOF going on in that battlespace,” commented teams had often been the de facto supported 12 Robb.43 That role was now played by CAOC of- force. Vast distances and virtually empty skies ficers. It was a major change from Vietnam, or kept aircraft disentangled. The system, how- even from Desert Storm. Hard as it was for pi- ever, was not perfect. It was often difficult for lots to concede, an in-theater CAOC or the the CAOC to pinpoint locations of SOF and CENTCOM command post at headquarters in other government agency teams. Late notifi- Tampa, Fla., might have more knowledge of the cations of SOF helicopter movements caused 43. Rear Adm. James Robb, interview, Aug. 30, 2004. operational situation. The “greatest situation dramatic moments—especially when the air- 44. Adm. Mark Fitzgerald, awareness is actually at higher levels,” Robb craft in use were old Soviet helicopters similar interview, July 1, 2004. said. “And the guys in the cockpit are becom- to those the Taliban might have. 45. Robb, interview, Aug. 30, ing farther and farther separated from the deci- In mid-November, the mission of OEF began 2004. sion process. That becomes frustrating, because to change, and that meant deploying more 46. Rear Adm. John you always want to support those that are in the ground forces. At the time, Stufflebeem ex- Stufflebeem, DOD press battlespace who are at risk.” At the same time, plained: “We still have the job of finding and conference, Nov. 14, 2001. he said, the overall goal is still “trying to shape getting al Qaeda. We still have the job now of 47. Gen. John Jumper, interview, July 23, 2003. decision-making in such a way that it moves the finding and getting at Taliban—leadership, spe- mission forward. So the decision to drop and not cifically.”46 Given the new focus, “I was very drop becomes ever more complicated.” happy to see in Afghanistan where Tommy Communications limits and tight rules of en- Franks created a combined force land compo- gagement (ROE) often made pilots believe that nent commander,” said Jumper of the mid-No- they were on a wild goose chase. The net effect vember CFLCC stand-up.47 But the Army forces on some missions, said Fitzgerald, was a “lot of trickling in from Uzbekistan and other locations frustration on the pilot’s part, because he would were not familiar with how the air component find something out there—a tank, or a helicop- operated. Some came to OEF with their own ter, or whatever—and it would take an inordinate ideas—ideas that did not always take into ac- amount of time to get clearance.”44 As much as count the Army’s dependence on the air com- six hours could go by, during which time the tar- ponent for everything from mobility to firepower. get had long since become the responsibility of Lack of strong component coordination almost another fighter package. Still, this mild frustra- cost the US dearly in the land component’s first tion in the cockpits was the price willingly paid big battle. for major operational flexibility for the CAOC and CENTCOM. “Really,” said Robb, “the mission’s Anaconda not necessarily to make the guy in the cockpit On March 2, 2002, the coalition kicked off the happy.”45 CENTCOM was able to wage a pre- biggest ground offensive of the war—code- cise and tightly controlled air war with minimal named “Anaconda.” As originally conceived, collateral damage. Anaconda was to be a raid on a concentration The final point of friction in these simulta- of al Qaeda and Taliban forces which had re- neous operations concerned the difficulties of treated and holed up in the Shah i Kot Valley in coordination between air and ground forces. eastern Afghanistan. On Feb. 7, 2002, several

At right, one can see MiG fighters and a cargo airplane lined up at Herat Airfield, Afghanistan. At far right, one sees the same field after a precision strike. No enemy fighters came up to challenge coalition warplanes. 13

At far left, an AC- 130H Spectre gunship. At left, a gunner on an AC-130

USAF photo (right) by Capt. Denise Boyd Spooky gunship loads a 40 mm cannon.

weeks before the start of combat, Franks had told ment statements. Gen. John D.W. Corley said, members of the National Security Council that “We gathered up every available flying resource coalition forces would “go in from several direc- that we could in that part of the world,” includ- tions on the ground while simultaneously insert- ing C-17s earmarked for Vice President Dick ing air assault forces into the objective” and take Cheney’s visit to the region.51 “We moved out this “al Qaeda redoubt in the mountains south 193,000 gallons of gas between the 23rd and of Kabul.”48 Ten days later, the land component 28th, of which zero was moved by ground,” said commander was briefed on Anaconda, which now the director of mobility forces, USAF Brig. Gen. 48. Gen. Tommy Franks, USA 52 called for coalition SOF and Afghan forces to ring Winfield Scott. As a result of this lack of prepa- (Ret.), American Soldier, p. the valley while 1,400 US troops, inserted by he- ration, Anaconda missed out on many of the big- 369. licopter, rounded up about 200 al Qaeda strag- gest benefits of air and space power—benefits 49. Adm. Mark Fitzgerald, glers hiding there. used to great effect just a few months earlier in interview, July 1, 2004. There was a huge problem, however. No one Afghanistan. For example, there was no time to 50. Gen. Michael Moseley, interview, June 25, 2003. had told the senior leaders of the air component run a full ISR “collection deck” and then use it about this major new operation. Land compo- 51. Gen. John Corley, to attack al Qaeda hiding places before the interview, Jan. 3, 2003. nent coordination with the air component was battle. Different controllers on the ground went 52. Brig. Gen. Winfield Scott, tardy and incomplete—and that was the just the in with different equipment and training. SOF interview, Feb. 11, 2003. start of the biggest glitch to date in the War of 9/ controllers, inserted a few days early, were not 11. “We didn’t have a clue what they were going fully briefed on the plans. Startled by close air to do,” said Fitzgerald,49 whose Roosevelt battle support strikes, they had to issue a “knock it group was wrapping up a record 159 days at off” call that truncated what little initial air sup- sea flying Afghanistan missions. The view was port there was. echoed by CENTCOM’s current air boss, USAF Worse, the final Anaconda planning somehow Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, who replaced Wald overlooked the long-standing CENTCOM con- in a regular rotation in November 2001. “The big- clusion that the Shah i Kot Valley and surround- ger issue,” Moseley said, “is there was never an ing areas actually harbored 1,000 or more al opportunity to orchestrate and figure out what Qaeda and Taliban fighters, not just a handful. was needed. Had we known this was going to As a result, the forces that landed in the valley go on, we would have stood up a full ASOC [air on March 2, 2002, unexpectedly found them- support operations center] and moved [the selves under fire right away. Only the quick re- people] to Bagram a week or two weeks ahead actions of on-call airpower from carriers and of this and then conducted a set of rehearsals nearby land bases prevented the day from turn- with the carriers, with the bombers, with the ing into a bloody disaster. As it was, botched whole thing. And I would have forward-deployed efforts to reinsert a SOF team on a key ridge the A-10s for indigenous quick reactions.”50 above the battle area on day three were to cost Late notification left the air component scram- the lives of a Navy SEAL and six Army Rangers bling at the end of February to meet the Army’s who were sent in to mount a rescue. needs. All fuel and passengers had to be lifted Fortunately the air component was able to to Bagram by air, but the land component failed perform as well as it had in the fall. The CAOC to generate and deliver thorough airlift require- supplied ground forces with persistent and le- 14

E-3 AWACS aircraft kept hundreds of aircraft under control in the airspace over USAF photos byMsgt. Keith Reed Afghanistan. At far right, a USAF airman (right) and her Canadian counterpart operate the E-3’s Joint Tactical Information Distribution System.

thal firepower. Combined with smart tactical de- Attack Munitions, GBU-12s, and even Mk 82s cisions on the ground, the close air support set to “airburst the al Qaeda into the next life,” swung the balance. In the end, Anaconda was as Moseley put it.53 Strafing, the quintessential 53. Gen. Michael Moseley, a success, but achieving it took two weeks in- World War II action, reappeared on the 21st cen- interview, June 25, 2003. stead of 72 hours, as had been advertised. For tury battlefield. Task Force Mountain organized 54. Gen. Richard Myers, two weeks, the CAOC funneled fighters and more intensive airstrikes for the final push of “Interview with Wolf Blitzer,” CNN, March 10, 2002. bombers into tight airspace above an area about March 9-10 to take Objective Ginger and seal 55. Gen. Tommy Franks, nine miles by nine miles. Immediate CAS sup- off the Shah i Kot Valley. The days of March 9 DOD press conference, May plied consistent support. Total numbers of weap- and 10 were also the single heaviest days for 24, 2002. ons dropped did not tail off at night. In fact, on airstrikes on terrorist positions. That was the cul- some days, nighttime totals were higher than day minating point. Anaconda drew to a close on drops. A total of 751 bombs were dropped into March 16 after fresh Afghan forces helped clear the tiny Anaconda battle area in the first three the Shah i Kot Valley. “Thank goodness for the days. The intensity and precision of the airstrikes bravery of those soldiers that we were able to topped anything seen before, even in Opera- take the fight to the enemy and be successful tion Desert Storm. Bombers were mainstays due here,” said Myers.54 “Anaconda sought to clear to their long “vul” periods and heavy payloads, the enemy in that valley area and in those hills,” and they too, experienced the push and pull of Franks said a month later, “and succeeded in air control. They released individual weapons as doing so where many operations in history had necessary and most made multiple target not been able to get that done.”55 passes. Some good came from Anaconda. It At night, gunships under SOF control illumi- spurred a drive to improve component coor- nated al Qaeda positions and drilled them with dination and fix procedures wherever pos- precise and heavy artillery. Veteran Navy pilots sible. This drive was led largely by the Air from Roosevelt, Stennis, and newly arrived John Force. Air Force and Army three and four-stars F. Kennedy provided more than half of the fighter twice discussed Anaconda in private ses- sorties each day. A-10s flew from Kuwait and sions. Jumper made it a personal priority to then moved forward to take up roles as premier review and standardize ground controller CAS assets. All fighters took a turn at airborne training. Moseley remained as air component forward air control. Predators tracked al Qaeda commander for Iraq and took the opportunity troops moving along roads and up through can- to forge much closer relations with the new yons, then vectored several two-ships of A-10s CFLCC, Army Lt. Gen. David D. McKiernan. and sections of F/A-18s onto the target. A coali- Moseley’s deputy, then-Rear Adm. David tion SOF controller surveying the scene after one Nichols, also vouched for the change in com- such strike noted that the reinforcing troops were ponent relationships between Anaconda and wiped out. Operation Iraqi Freedom. Air and land coordination improved during the Never again in the War of 9/11 would the battle. One result was a list of pre-planned tar- land component try to act alone. A new level gets generated by Task Force Mountain and the of air integration—and a new level of joint CAOC. Coalition aircraft delivered Joint Direct military power—was now at hand. Operation Noble Eagle 15

During the Fall of 2001, the war in Afghani- basis.57 “Fighters and tankers were up and down stan held the headlines, but it was not the only all day,” commented MSgt. David G. Rafferty, scene of military operations. Far from it. The who was on duty in Alaska.58 United States Air Force was actually flying more However, there were major problems. combat sorties in the skies over America than it NORAD’s systems had not been designed to was in the Middle East. The War of 9/11 put com- track hostile aircraft across the interior of the 56. Air National Guard Brig. Gen. Paul Kimmel, interview, bat air patrols and the distinctive roar of jet fight- country. Wide gaps existed in radar coverage Nov. 8, 2001. ers over American cities. and fighter communications across the coun- 57. Memo for the Record, The unusual air campaign that began as a try, particularly in the west. As a Western Air “Air National Guard Input to NORAD response on Sept. 11 grew quickly into Defense Sector controller phrased it, “we had Project Vulcan for Period 11- 14 Sept 01,” Sept. 18, 2001, a major force commitment. Navy and Marine fighters on alert in places where we had no ra- Charles J. Gross, ANG Corps aircraft had flown sorties during the first dar coverage and no radio coverage.59 AWACS historian. several days, but it fell to the Air Force to pick filled in the gaps. This strange new air cam- 58. MSgt. David Rafferty, up the major new mission named Operation paign also had no strategy. NORAD flew only “Personal Account of Events Occurring 11 Sept 01,” Noble Eagle. This new air campaign had les- 147 sorties under the air defense mission in the Alaskan Air Defense Sector sons all its own for the evolution of air and space entire year 2000.60 Units were mounting airborne Response. power. CAPs without a central air tasking order. “We 59. Maj. Sue Cheney, The first of them were rammed home within were in foreign territory,” said Col. Robert J. interview, October 2002. hours on Sept. 11. Despite starting with a Cold Marr, USAF, commander of the Northeast Air 60. Gen. Ed Eberhart, Senate War defensive posture, there was plenty of ca- Defense Sector (NEADS).61 “We were used to Armed Services Committee testimony, March 11, 2002. pacity to generate fighter and tanker sorties over protecting the shores, way out overseas. Our 61. Col. Robert Marr, the continental US, in Alaska, and from Hawaii. processes and procedures weren’t designed for interview, June 25, 2002. Some 300 fighters were on alert, in the air, or this.” generated within 18 hours of the attacks on New York and Washington. About 180 missions were Creating a Strategy flown on Sept. 11. Tankers surged to support. One question was paramount: How do you “If you’re going to fly CAP [combat air patrol] for turn Operation Noble Eagle into a sustainable 24 hours, they need a lot of tanking,” remarked mission—with a coherent strategy? Brig. Gen. Paul Kimmel, Air National Guard chief Early on, Rumsfeld issued guidance to main- operating officer and director of the Crisis Ac- tain the CAPs indefinitely over New York City tion Team.56 In addition to active duty tankers, and Washington. He said, “We have certain 18 ANG wings delivered 78 aerial refuelers— parts of the country, including Washington, generated, ready, and flying—all on a volunteer [where] we have aircraft in the air. In other parts

An F-15 Eagle from the Massachusetts Air National Guard’s 102nd Fighter Wing at Otis ANGB, Mass., flies a combat air patrol mission over New York City for USAF photo by Lt. Co.. William Ramsay Operation Noble Eagle. of the country we have them ready to take off. From whence might come the next attack? The set of decisions that would have to be made CIA daily intelligence summaries frequently 16 as to whether or not a plane was threatening a identified dozens of specific threats to US fa- high-value target in the United States are com- cilities, ranging from cities to shopping malls.63 plicated, but the short answer is, yes, we have The core of the strategy was to defend New 62. Defense Secretary people who are prepared to do what might be York and Washington, and to make the rest of Donald Rumsfeld interview necessary.”62 the country a hard target, as hard as possible. for ABC News “This Week,” Sept. 16, 2001, DOD Random CAPs for other cities and locations CAP placement was often driven by immediate transcript. were flown nearly every day. On many occa- contingencies: a Presidential trip, special 63. Bob Woodward, Bush at sions, extra 24/7 CAPs were added in response events, detections of increased threats to War, p. 111. to threat indicators or major scheduled public nuclear power plants, and so forth. After Octo- events. Scrambles continued in large numbers. ber, “flights of interest” such as Middle Eastern In late September, Rumsfeld delegated author- airlines flying into major US airports were added ity to declare a target hostile to NORAD’s re- as a possible source of the threat. The Air Op- gional commanders. They were the com- erations Center at Tyndall AFB, Fla., was at a mander of 1st Air Force, ANG Maj. Gen. Larry loss to give better information on threats to the K. Arnold, for CONR, the continental US forces executing Operation Noble Eagle. As NORAD region, and Lt. Gen. Norton Schwartz, Col. Steve Callicutt put it, “one night it’s crop for ANR, the Alaska Norad Region. dusters, next night it’s Citations. I mean, people

The Foundation: the Air Force’s

Over New York City on the morning of Sept. ity muscled into Afghanistan in late 2001. USAF 11, 2001, two F-15s needed a tanker. They were bombers and Navy fighters depended on USAF 1. MSgt. David Rafferty, on Combat Air Patrol, and they’d just witnessed tankers to cover the battlespace. When ground “Personal Account of Events on 11 Sep 01,” Alaska Air the collapse of the World Trade Center’s north forces began to arrive at captured airfields, Defense Sector Response, and south towers. Now they were tracking suspi- airlifters supplied their aviation gas, ammunition, Alaska NORAD Region. cious aircraft for North American Aerospace De- and other requirements. C-17s offloaded gas into 2. Air Mobility Command, fense Command. fuel bladders at Bagram AB, Afghanistan, then Fact Sheet, Jan. 14, 2005. A KC-135 from Bangor, Maine, dropped its took off, tanked, landed, and delivered more fuel 3. David Fulghum, “To Iraq in ‘Chunks’”, Aviation Week & scheduled training mission and hurried to estab- just to support initial Army requirements for Ana- Space Technology, July 7, lish an orbit at 20,000 feet over John F. Kennedy conda in March 2002. 2003. International Airport so that one F-15 could take The build-up for Iraq also showcased airlifters on fuel while the other stayed on station over the and tankers. In March 2003, the first month of city. Later, a KC-10 tanker from McGuire AFB, N.J., OIF, 94 percent of all C-5s and 91 percent of all came on the scene and replaced the KC-135. C-17s were committed to worldwide operations, All across America that morning, there were much of it in the area around Iraq. signs of how important Air Force strategic mobil- Air Force Gen. John W. Handy Jr., commander ity forces would be to the new War of 9/11. Far to of US Transportation Command and USAF’s Air the west, the Alaska NORAD Region scrambled Mobility Command, set teams to negotiating a alert fighters and tankers to track an inbound for- modular deployment strategy and leaner logis- eign airliner broadcasting the wrong squawk. With tics. “There were no mountains of supplies in Iraq two tankers on the UHF/HF radio relay, “we were that you saw in [1990-91 during] Desert Shield able to maintain communication with the fighters, and Desert Storm,” Handy said.3 “You didn’t see even after they were handed off” to Canadian air huge unopened containers” at the end of the defenders, said USAF MSgt. David Rafferty of the conflict. Alaska NORAD region.1 During major combat operations in Iraq, the From the first hours of the War of 9/11, USAF’s large digital maps at the Joint Mobility Opera- strategic mobility forces have been in demand tions Center at Scott AFB, Ill., blinked updates non-stop both at home and abroad. every four minutes, showing the locations of 450 For Operation Noble Eagle, the Homeland De- cargo aircraft en route to or from Southwest Asia. fense Tanker Cell provided 9,589 aerial refueling An extensive database tracked nearly six million missions flown between 9/11 and mid-January items flowing through the distribution pipelines 2005, plus more than 400 C-130 missions for every day. emergency response activity.2 By the numbers, mobility dominated the cam- To take the war to the enemy, strategic mobil- paign. “We hauled and we hauled good,” said were just grabbing at straws.”64 (Callicutt, on loan CAPs were in place, protecting nuclear reac- from the Air and Space Command, Control, In- tors, nuclear weapons storage and production telligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance facilities, and “high priority landmarks ranging 17 (ASC2ISR) Center, Langley AFB, Va., served as from the White House to Wall Street to tall build- 1st Air Force’s deputy for operations.) ings in other cities such as Chicago, to Disney In addition, Noble Eagle explicitly sought to amusement parks.”65 New York and Washing- 64. Col. Steve Callicutt, protect the President and the Vice President with ton, D.C., were constantly capped. For the pi- interview, Nov. 7, 2002. air cover when they traveled around the US. lots, it was a mission they were determined to 65. Bob Woodward, Bush at War, p. 288. Requests sometimes came directly from the do well. “I’ve seen those films of the World Trade 66. John Curran, “New White House to the operations floor. “One night, Center and the towers coming down, and I don’t York’s Getting Help from we got a call at 11 o’clock from the White House, want to see that happening again,” said Maj. Above,” Los Angeles Times, and we were ordered to be on station by six the Steve Ziomek, an F-16 pilot.66 Dec. 2, 2001. next morning,” recalled Callicutt. They got a CAP By the end of 2001, many were feeling the in place by 0600, which they did by tasking Can- stress on combat capabilities. Nearly 30 sites non AFB, N.M., to pull alert out of home station were now on alert status—a big change from (in addition, Cannon had assets deployed near the seven sites before Sept. 11. Maintaining Dallas at the time.) CAPs over cities without two or more bases On one particular day in early November nearby was a recurrent problem. For example, 2001, Rumsfeld briefed the President that nine as a major population center, Atlanta was on

Strategic Air Mobility Forces

Secretary of the Air Force James G. Roche.4 Tank- CAOC Air Mobility Division planners continu- ers and airlift accounted for 56 percent of the Air ously reviewed airfield data, the situation with 4. Secretary James Roche, Force’s 24,196 sorties flown from the start of the enemy forces, and aircraft self-protection sys- interview, July 1, 2003. war on March 20 (local Baghdad time) through tems to help contain risk. “By mission and by 5. USCENTAF, “Operation 5 April 18, 2003. destination we make preparations for what they Iraqi Freedom: By the “You just do your mission,” said C-130 pilot need” for self defense, said Brig. Gen. Mark Numbers,” April 30, 2003. 11 Maj.Dan Keneflick of the Minnesota Air National Zamzow. 6. MSgt Chuck Roberts, “C- Guard’s 133rd Airlift Wing.6 “You realize you’re a “Mobility operations have allowed coalition 130 crews keep the supplies coming,” Air Force News, very small piece in a very huge puzzle.” forces to project power halfway across the globe April 16, 2003. Handy announced that Air Mobility Command and sustain our military and support personnel,” 7. Harry Levins, on April 8, 2003, hit a peak by flying 575 strate- said Lt. Gen. Walter Buchanan III. “They are the “Transportation Command’s gic missions. “That’s not counting missions inside unsung heroes in the fight.”12 Mission Tops Total From ’91 7 War,” St. Louis Post- the theater of operations,” he said. As of Jan. 14, 2005, strategic air mobility Dispatch, April 10, 2003. US Air Force tankers flew 6,193 sorties during forces had flown a total of 37,154 missions in 8. MSgt. Chuck Roberts, the main phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom and support of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” off-loaded 376.4 million pounds of fuel. Although Military and Civilian Reserve Air Fleet trans- Airman, May 2003. 149 KC-135s and 33 KC-10s were deployed for ports moved 2,076,652 passengers. By Air 9. MSgt. Chuck Roberts, OIF, the pace of operations kept tanker crews Force calculation, this was the third largest air- “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Airman, May 2003. busy. KC-135 pilot Capt. Richard Peterson at the lift ever, after the Berlin Airlift of 1948-49 and 321st Air Expeditionary Wing described OIF as a that of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm 10. John Tirpak, “The Airlift Gap,” Air Force Magazine, 13 nonstop cycle of “fly, crew rest, and time to go in 1990-91. October 2004. 8 again.” The demand for mobility muscle never goes 11. Brig. Gen. Mark Zamzow, Nearly every combat aircraft depended on away, in peace or war. Air Mobility Command interview, Dec. 23, 2004. USAF tankers to reach a target—or return from put a Tanker and Airlift Control Element 12. Maj. David Honchul, one. “Not a single bomb gets dropped, not a (TALCE) in Thailand to help coordinate relief “Airpower Critical to OEF’s First 1,000 Days,” ACC News single air-to-air engagement happens, or missile flights after the Dec. 26, 2004, tsunami. Di- Service, July 23, 2004. is fired unless tankers make it happen,” said Col. rected by the TALCE crew, airlifters flew 83 13.Air Mobility Command Cathy Clothier, commander of the 401st Air Ex- strategic missions from Dec. 29 to Jan. 25, Fact Sheet, Jan. 14, 2005. 9 peditionary Operations Group. 2005, moving 1721 passengers and 2,886 14. AMC Fact Sheet, Jan. 25, Mobility units continued to fly essential mis- short tons of supplies.14 2005. sions in support of “Phase IV” stability opera- “We could not do what we do in the United 15. TSgt. Carrie Bernard, tions—despite new dangers. “We are routinely States military and as a nation without our great “CMSAF: Our Airlift is what makes us a global power,” shot at,” Handy said. In Iraq, a C-17 was hit in airlifters,” said CMSAF Gerald Murray. “Our air- 62nd Airlift Wing Public 10 15 December 2003, a C-5 in February 2004. lift is what makes us a global power.” Affairs, Jan. 19, 2005. every CAP list, but the nearest Air Force bases Permanent Commitment (such as Eglin AFB, Fla., or Shaw AFB, S.C.) There was no doubt that Noble Eagle was part 18 were far away. A forward deployment to Dob- of a permanent shift in national defense strat- bins ARB, Ga., eased the situation.67 egy. No more would the country’s critical loca- The War of 9/11 was taking a double toll on tions be left unguarded. The pilots flying the air assets—at home and abroad. Tanker pilots CAP missions were ready to do whatever it took were pulling duty both for Noble Eagle and for to prevent another Sept. 11. Col. Mike Cosby, Enduring Freedom. Some pilots in the 319th Air commander of the New Jersey ANG’s 177th Refueling Wing at Grand Forks AFB, N.D., Fighter Wing, Atlantic City Arpt., N.J., said: “I racked up 150 hours in just 25 days during that can assure you, every one of them would ex- busy fall. Normally, it would have taken them six ecute that decision without question. Would they months to accumulate the hours.68 have nightmares about it? Of course they NATO AWACS deployed to the US for the first would.”72 Costs in money, manpower, and air- time in October 2001, but, even still, the com- craft fatigue were beginning to add up. Accord- bination of Operation Noble Eagle and Opera- ing to one estimate, the nonstop CAPs cost as tion Enduring Freedom imposed a heavy bur- much as $200 million per month.73 Officials es- den. “We lost about 80 percent of our continu- timated that more than 13,000 men and women

A New Jersey Air National Guard weapons load crew prepares to load an AIM-120A missile on

an ANG F-16C that is USAF photo by MSgt. Don Taggart scheduled for a combat air patrol.

67. Task Force Enduring Look interview with Brig. Gen. Larry Arnold. 68. David Castellon, “Homeland Defense, War Stress KC-135 Wings,” Air Force Times, March 25, 2002. ation training,” said retired Brig. Gen. Ben participated in ONE activities on a day-to-day 69. Bruce Rolfsen, “Ready or 74 Not,” Air Force Times, March Robinson, who commanded the AWACS 552nd basis. In the War of 9/11, there was no end in 4, 2002 Wing.69 Fighter forces in the active, Guard, and sight to the need to increase air defense capa- 70. Adam Hebert, “DOD Reserve components also felt the strain. “It’s bilities. However, it was time to find a sustain- Weighs Air Defense Options taking a toll on the aircraft in that it’s really build- able strategy for the long haul. as Patrols Become Unsupportable,” Inside the ing up the flying hours on them—much more The sorties for Noble Eagle declined after Air Force, Jan. 25, 2002. so than we would have done under normal con- policy decisions in April 2002 returned the re- 71.Rolfsen, “Ready or Not,” ditions,” Lt. Gen. Michael Zettler, deputy chief sponse posture to a steady-state level. Linked Air Force Times, March 4, of staff for installations and logistics, said in interior radar coverage and communications, 2002. January 2002.70 “The troops are flying CAP af- graduated response levels, and a better listing 72. Linda Kozaryn, “Air Guard Fighters Protect U.S. ter CAP because right now the national leader- of critical assets made it possible for Noble Skies,” American Forces ship is asking us to do that,” Gen. Hal M. Eagle to decelerate. Press Service, Feb. 21, 2002. Hornburg, the commander of Air Combat Com- Under the new plan, the ONE focus became 73. Hebert, “Noble Eagle mand, said in mid-February 2002.71 “But our critical national sites such as nuclear power Without End,” Air Force Magazine, February 2005. readiness is suffering because what these folks plants and major cities. Instead of flying ran- are being asked to do doesn’t prepare them 74. Gen. Ed Eberhart, Senate dom CAPs as was the case in the fall of 2001, Armed Services Committee for what we may ask them to do tomorrow or the Air Force dealt with these sites as a whole. testimony, March 11, 2002. the day after tomorrow.” Five different alert levels allowed the force to 19

A North Dakota Air National Guard F-16 and an active duty F-15

USAF photo by SSgt. Greg L. Davis from Langley AFB, Va., fly CAP over the Washington, D.C., area.

adjust to varied threats. For example, aircraft on training cycle,” Col. David Rhodes at Air Com- 75. Bruce Rolfsen, “Fighter ground alert could be positioned to reach criti- bat Command’s new Homeland Security Divi- Wings Returning to Pre- cal asset sites in 20 minutes. Under the new sion said in July 2002.75 Sept. 11 Readiness,” Air Force Times, July 29, 2002. Noble Eagle strategy, there was more flexibility Still, there was a heavy impact on tasked 76. Elizabeth Rees, “GAO: to put more CAPs in place and reposition fighter, units. A GAO report released in August 2003 Domestic Air Patrol Mission tanker, and airborne control assets. This was the found that Air Force fighter units performing do- Erodes USAF Training and new, steady-state phase of air sovereignty. mestic combat air patrols were “inhibited from Readiness,” Inside the Air Force, Aug. 15, 2003. In May 2002, the number of fighter sorties executing the full range of difficult tactical ma- averaged fewer than 100 per month for each of neuvers with the frequency that the Air Force three sectors. Tanker sorties dropped, too. A requires.”76 GAO said that some fell short of spike in the July-August 2002 period briefly meeting training standards in the previous year. brought the busy Northeast Air Defense Sector’s Since then, NORAD has refined its procedures total fighter sorties to just under 200 per month. for air defense, and Noble Eagle has become a However, this was still far below the levels of 550- permanent commitment for airmen. NORAD be- 750 per month for NEADS in the fall of 2001. gan working with the new US Northern Command “The fighter wings have returned to a normal that stood up on Oct. 1, 2002, with USAF Gen.

An Air Force Reserve Command KC-135E from Beale AFB, Calif., gets ready to refuel two California Air USAF photo by MSgt. Lance Cheung National Guard F-16s from Fresno during an Operation Noble Eagle mission over the San Francisco area. 20

Massachusetts Air National Guard F-15s return to their home station at Otis ANGB, Mass., after a Noble

Eagle sortie. USAF photo by Lt. Col. William Ramsay

Ralph E. Eberhart as its first commander. The air Air sovereignty has also been recognized as 77. NORAD statement on sovereignty mission of NORAD fell under North- a mission dominated by the Air National Guard. release of 9/11 Commission ern Command’s wider mission of homeland de- The posture provides for 18 full-time air defense Report, July 22, 2004. fense, which includes protection of waterways sites—17 ANG and one active duty—up from 78. NORAD statement. and military assistance for civil response in the seven sites before Sept. 11, 2001, noted a re- 79. MSgt. John Tomasi, event of disaster. Formalizing the relationships programming document that shifted funds in NORAD public affairs, Jan. 6, 2005. strengthened homeland security. 2004. These sites are to be staffed with dedi- Flexible response levels were working. “We cated aircraft and personnel, allowing ANG to 80. Cynthia di Pasquale, “Air Sovereignty Alert becomes have options such as increasing our fighter assume the air sovereignty mission and pro- permanent Guard Mission,” presence, both alert and airborne around the vide a steady state alert posture with fully Inside the Air Force, July 16, 80 2004. nation; layering our air defenses with both equipped squadrons. 81. Adm. Timothy Keating, ground and air assets; and deploying other America will never be vulnerable to attack in NORAD change of command people and assets as directed by the President the same way it was on Sept. 11, 2001. Improv- remarks, Nov. 3, 2004. or Secretary of Defense to support lead federal ing air sovereignty is a clear step forward. Adm. agencies,” said a NORAD statement.77 Timothy Keating, who became commander of By March 2003, the airmen of Noble Eagle had NORAD and NORTHCOM in November 2004, logged more than 27,000 sorties. By July 22, told NORAD and NORTHCOM personnel: 2004, that total number had climbed to 35,000 “You’ve built a solid base for integrated home- sorties.78 At the end of 2004 it reached 38,800, land defense, and our nations are well-posi- with a total of 1,800 scrambles since 9/11, ac- tioned to face challenging and evolving cording to MSgt. John Tomasi of NORAD.79 threats.”81 Operation Iraqi Freedom 21

With the Afghan campaign winding down and level of operational risk in order to assure stra- order returning to domestic air defense opera- tegic gains depended directly on the ability of tions, the Bush Administration shifted its focus air and space power to make good on OIF no to another menace: Dictator Saddam Hussein matter when and how it started. of Iraq. In March 2002, during the last days of Operation Iraqi Freedom took the use of mod- Anaconda, Vice President Dick Cheney said: ern air and space power to a new level of pre- 82. Michael Gordon, “Cheney Says Next Goal in US War on “Our next objective is to prevent terrorists, and cision, intensity, and effectiveness. This was the Terror is to Block Access to regimes that sponsor terror, from threatening biggest single application of air and space Arms,” New York Times, America or our friends and allies with weapons power yet in the War of 9/11, and it came in March 16, 2002. of mass destruction.”82 No one doubted that he three waves: the prewar destruction of Iraq’s 83. Gordon, “UN Inspectors Prepare for Iraq,” New York was referring to Saddam, a ruthless tyrant with integrated air defense system; the major joint- Times, April 8, 2002. nuclear ambitions. force combat operation, which unfolded from 84. Bob Drogin and Mark It had been almost three years since Saddam March through early May 2003; and postwar Mazzetti, “Only Hussein Had had thrown out the last United Nations inspec- stability operations, which have been going on Full Picture,” Los Angeles Times, Oct. 7, 2004. tors sent to Iraq after Desert Storm with the mis- ever since. sion to find and eliminate Iraqi WMD programs. The post-9/11 world wondered what sort of ar- Southern Focus senal Saddam had left and whether any of his In March 2003, just before the start of major formerly large research programs were still ac- combat operations in Iraq, the world press was tive. The truth may never be known. What was awash with speculation and learned commen- most relevant by the spring of 2002 was that un- tary about whether the war would feature a huge certainty about Iraq was mounting, and that, to opening air campaign, à la Desert Storm in Bush, Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain, and 1991. However, the real strategic issue was others, the uncertainty was intolerable. “I made largely misunderstood, and the point of all of up my mind that Saddam Hussein needs to go,” the speculation was by that time almost moot. Bush told a television interviewer.83 It is true that, among CENTCOM planners, Saddam appeared genuinely unaware of his there was a spirited debate about the size, peril. He “had not realized the nature of the shape, and duration of any air operations that ground shift in the international community,” said could be used in advance of a ground thrust Charles Duelfer, head of the CIA’s Iraq Survey into Iraq. What was more noteworthy, however, Group.84 However, the new American determina- was this: Coalition airmen had been in action tion to unseat Saddam and change the regime against Iraqi targets since mid-2002. The ob- in Iraq did not add up to clear military plans. It jective was to carve up Iraqi air defenses, un- would take 11 more months, with many last- der strict rules of engagement, and ensure the minute adjustments, before Operation Iraqi Free- kind of air dominance needed to begin a major dom began. Having the freedom to accept that joint campaign on short notice.

Southern Focus helped lay the foundation for coalition air dominance during Operation Iraqi Freedom. At left, two USAF photo by MSgt. Ronny Przysucha F-15E Strike Eagles fly over the Iraqi desert, ready to strike Iraqi air defense elements. The Gulf Region 22

Ankara Turkey

Incirlik AB Bashur Airfield Syria Mosul Mediterranean Sea Kirkuk Damascus Tikrit Tehran Lebanon Afghanistan Israel Baghdad Amman Iraq Tigris River Iran

Jordan Euphrates River Kuwait

Pakistan Bahrain Shaikh Isa AB Saudi Arabia Persian Gulf al Udeid AB Riyadh Qatar Gulf of Oman Prince Sultan AB UAE Seeb Airport

Oman Masirah AB Red Sea Thumrait AB

Yemen Arabian Sea

Job one—air superiority—was well in hand. things,” including reconnaissance and surveil- For more than a decade, coalition airmen had lance.87 “In other words,” he said, “we updated all enforced Operation Northern Watch and Opera- the targets. Aircrews knew southern Iraq very well 85. Gen. John Jumper, tion Southern Watch “no-fly zones”—air exclu- as a result of Operation Southern Focus.” Franks interview, July 23, 2003. sion zones—in Iraq’s north and south. In early declared to members of the National Security 86. Jumper, July 23, 2003. 2002, Moseley saw the need to press harder Council in August 2002: “We want to continue to 87. Rear Adm. James Robb, against Iraq’s air defenses. So, too, did Jumper, use response options to degrade the Iraqi inte- interview, Aug. 30, 2004. who said, “I had been bugging them in the Tank grated air defense system. If it ever comes to war, 88. Ret. Gen. Tommy [the name for the secure Pentagon meeting room 88 Franks, American Soldier, p. we’ll want their IADS as weak as possible.” 388. used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff] ‘Now is the time The Iraqis employed tricks like keeping track- 89. “Leaflets Warn Iraq Not to start breaking these guys down. We ought to ing radars out of attack range but moving mis- to Target Allied Jets,” be taking some bold steps.’”85 sile batteries up to firing positions. “They’ve been Washington Post, Oct. 4, In June 2002, Franks approved the initiative 2002. doing this for quite a long time, and they’ve got- and launched the actual operation, code-named ten pretty smart at it,” said Maj. Gen. Walter E. 90. John Tirpak, “Legacy of 89 the Air Blockades,” Air Force Southern Focus. “That really opened the door,” Buchanan III, the Southern Watch commander. Magazine, February 2003. Jumper recalled. With the new guidance, the no- Southern Focus proved to be a success. 91. Robb, interview, Aug. fly zone fighters “were able to aggressively go CENTCOM calculated that Iraq fired at the coa- 30, 2004. after command and control and the surface-to- lition aircraft nearly 500 times in 2002 and drew air-missile sites that had been there for a long roughly 90 retaliatory attacks.90 “The air threat time” and “just take those out of the fight.”86 had been essentially neutered throughout, up CENTCOM’s Robb said that the CAOC staff to the 33rd [parallel], probably higher than that,” “took Southern Watch and tuned it to do several Robb claimed.91 That gave CENTCOM “a pretty 23

Army Gen. Tommy Franks, head of US Central Command, meets Brig. Gen. Rick USAF photo by SSgt. Derrick C. Goode Rosborg, commander of the 379th Air Expeditionary Wing, at a base in Southwest Asia.

good start on the air part of it [the overall inva- of the jump off of our ground forces from Ku- sion]” well before March 2003. wait,” he said some weeks after US forces en- According to the Air Force, coalition aircrews tered Baghdad.94 “Because of this aerial prepa- dropped 606 bombs on 391 targets during ration, Iraq’s air defenses stayed mostly silent, Southern Focus. At the peak of Iraqi attacks, and our aircraft were able to begin reducing Saddam’s forces were firing more than a dozen opposing ground forces immediately.” missiles and rockets per day at coalition forces. On one day, Iraq fired 15 SAMs. The pace of War Councils coalition responses picked up in the final three The stepped-up air activity during 2002 and weeks before the start of major combat opera- early 2003 put the CAOC on a wartime footing tions. During that time, coalition pilots in the no- for the enormous joint and combined military fly zones flew 4,000 strike and support sorties. effort that was about to be hurled at Iraq. 92. Col. Gary Crowder, DOD The flights not only cut down Iraqi radars, air The new war with Iraq—often called “Gulf briefing, March 20, 2003. defense guns, and fiber-optic links, but also War II”—pitted a different coalition against a 93. Gen. John Jumper remarks to National Space enabled the coalition to map out the fiber-optic changed enemy. Republican Guard divisions Symposium, April 10, 2003. networks and wiring that provided the Iraqis cen- defending Baghdad, though not as well- 94. Ret. Gen. Merrill McPeak, tralized command and control. Surveillance air- equipped or trained as they had been in the “Leave the Flying to Us,” craft, for example, carefully noted evidence of 1991 war, were still the strong point of the con- Washington Post, June 5, 2003. construction or repair of the air defense network. ventional force. More importantly, Saddam had Just hours before the declared start of the war assembled irregular fighters in Iraq’s major cit- on March 20, 2003, Col. Gary L. Crowder, chief ies to quell popular uprisings and enforce his of Air Combat Command’s strategy, concepts, personal control. These irregulars offered and doctrine division, estimated that Saddam deadly surprises both in major combat opera- had, by that date, effectively ceded “about two- tions and afterward. thirds” of his airspace to coalition forces.92 Air and space power’s first contribution to the Jumper said: “We actually flew about 4,000 sor- fight lay in underwriting the flexibility of the plan ties against the integrated air defense system for how—and when—to actually start the in Iraq and against surface-to-air missiles and ground invasion. their command and control.”93 As Jumper dryly Moseley, the combined forces air component added, “By the time we got to March, we think commander (CFACC), aggressively pursued in- that they were pretty much out of business.” ternal process changes to better position the Southern Focus was a critical factor in the air component for the coming battle. He wanted subsequent success of the coalition ground ef- a CAOC with better joint service representation, fort. Retired Gen. Merrill A. McPeak, who was smooth channels for SOF coordination, and a USAF Chief of Staff during Desert Storm, was detailed plan for the worst-case scenario: per- one who saw the significance of “the war before petual urban close air support operations in the war,” as many called it. “It’s incorrect to say Baghdad. At the same time, he began prepa- that, unlike Desert Storm 12 years before, there rations for a second CAOC in another state in was no independent air campaign in advance the region. Quiet increases in manning levels throughout time-sensitive targets was an issue in OIF.” Po- the region soon brought the CAOC’s key ele- litically sensitive TSTs such as leadership tar- 24 ments to combat status. The majority of all se- gets, terrorist sites, and suspected WMD sites nior positions were double-manned due to the got their own category. As a CENTCOM spokes- requirements of 24-hour operations. Some were man explained, “the President, Secretary [of De- 95. Vice Adm. David Nichols, triple-manned. Joint service staffing increased. fense], and General Franks have a very good interview, Oct. 13, 2004. In the most important staffing decision, Moseley agreement [that] only those key targets have to 96. DOD background briefing brought back his OEF Navy deputy, Capt. David be elevated” and for other targets.96 “We allow on targeting, March 5, 2003. C. Nichols, for a return engagement. The final the battlefield commanders to make those de- result was thorough integration. One example: cisions” with pre-established rules, he said. Each of the three CAOC directors—two USAF Having on hand a flexible, fine-tuned supply of brigadier generals and one RAF air commo- airpower was essential to the war effort, not least dore—had two Navy captains as deputies. because the shape of OIF was hard to determine Another major, post-Afghanistan change at at that stage. The preparation of the coalition ac- the CAOC was a reform of the time-sensitive tar- tion was nothing like the response to Iraq’s 1990 get process. “We had a TST process where de- invasion of Kuwait; for one thing, there had not cisions were made in the joint fires coordination yet been a firm political decision to go to war. Plan- center, which was really the CAOC,” said ners had to be prepared for many options. Nichols.95 He added, “None of the ROE stuff, Five main factors shaped and channeled the none of the decision-making on time-critical or joint planning effort. Iraq in Detail

Turkey

Mosul Bashur Airfield

Kirkuk Iran

Syria

Tikrit

Euphrates River

Baghdad H 2 Jordan H 3 al Kut Karbala

Iraq Tigris River

Najaf Euphrates River Nasiriyah

Tallil Airfield Basra al Faw

Umm Qasr al Salem AB Saudi Arabia Kuwait Kuwait City al Jaber AB Total Coalition Aircraft 25 900 863

800 The air armada in the 700 Gulf comprised 1,801 USAF Navy USMC Army* Allies combat and support aircraft. 600

500 (Charts in this study are 408 based on US Central Air 400 372 Force’s “Operation Iraqi Freedom—By the Numbers,” published April 30, 2003.) Number of Aircraft 300

200 138

100 20 0

Fighter Bomber SOF ISR C2 Airlift Tanker Other Total USAF 293 51 131 60 22 111 182 13 863 Navy 232 0 0 29 20 5 52 70 408 USMC 130 0 0 0 0 0 22 220 372 Army* 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 2 20 Allies 80 0 14 11 4 10 12 7 138

*Does not include helicopters.

First, as with the defeat of the Taliban in OEF, any conditions. Moseley used 2002 to rehearse any operation in Iraq would have to accomplish aspects of the war, from the urban CAS plans regime change. Saddam had to go. to the Scud suppression missions slated for the Second, WMD was regarded as a major con- western deserts. Moseley quoted the wisdom cern. Senior CENTCOM officials fully expected of the legendary Col. “Moody” Suter, a founder Saddam to use what he had when his back was of Red Flag: “You’re only surprised by [what] to the wall. you don’t think about.”98 Third, Franks wanted to encircle Iraq with a Backing up the combat force was the Air Force multi-front war, moving ground forces rapidly mobility machine. A logistics sustainability assess- from the north, west, and south. ment summit convened in August 2002 at Wright- Fourth, the start date would be uncertain. With Patterson AFB, Ohio, worked through the issues 97. Adm. Timothy Keating, interview, Oct. 14, 2004. the UN engaged in a debate over the need for the of how to sustain a war with Iraq, with fewer bases 98. Gen. Michael Moseley, war, the Bush Administration was not ready to fully available than in 1991. “We met there for a week,” interview, July 24, 2003. commit itself. That hesitancy compelled said Col. Duane Jones, head of CENTAF logistics 99. Col. Duane Jones, Task 99 CENTCOM to develop a sheaf of plans covering (A-4). “CENTAF told the rest of the Air Force lo- Force Enduring Look both a rapid start to the war, potentially kicked off gistics community what we thought the plan was interview, June 2003. by Iraq itself, and a generated start, which would and how we thought we could execute it.” 100. Jones, TFEL interview, permit more of a phased flow of coalition forces. The chain began back in the United States, June 2003. Fifth, it would be a joint operation. In the wake where the mobility forces were called upon to of Anaconda, said Keating, who led OIF mari- provide global reach. Active, Guard, and Re- time forces, Franks was “quite serious about our serve forces at dozens of bases did their parts integration.” 97 He added, “He would have to form the air bridges to transport people, ma- weeded us out individually had we not been will- teriel ,and aircraft to the theater. Westover ARB, ing disciples.” Mass., was one such base. “Westover acts as Taken together, uncertainties about timing, an air bridge,” said Lt. Col. John Metz, chief of regional bases and force levels meant a joint the war and mobilizations plans branch at Air campaign in Iraq was going to depend heavily Force Reserve Command headquarters.100 “Af- on air and space power to ensure victory under ter aircraft leave the base, the air bridge con- tinues basically as a group of tankers or ‘flying and SOF units were to attack for 96 hours, with gas stations’ in the Atlantic.” There were new full ground operations to begin after that. 26 allies in Europe, too, reflecting NATO’s expan- “The decision was made,” said Nichols, sion. The 40th Expeditionary Group set up an Moseley’s deputy.102 Franks told his commanders air refueling operation for KC-10s at Camp that, “on D-day and D+1, we’re going to expand 101. Col. Duane Jones, Task Force Enduring Look Sarafovo, Bulgaria. the no-fly zone essentially into northwestern Iraq,” interview, June 2003. Harder to handle was the base availability situ- said Nichols.103 That would start the counter-Scud 102. Vice Adm. David ation near Iraq, which continued to shift up to fight out west with SOF supporting the air com- Nichols, interview, Oct. 13, the last minute. Three weeks before the start of ponent. D+2 was to be “A-day,” with a huge batch 2004. the campaign, there were still several locations of strategic targets to be struck by aircraft and 103. Nichols, Oct. 13, 2004. “that we knew we needed and that we weren’t TLAMs. Twelve hours later the ground war would 104. President Bush, at,” said Jones of CENTAF.101 Relying on experi- start. The compression of the plan was actually a Address to the Nation, White House transcript, March 17, ence from Afghanistan, CENTAF logistics opera- vote of confidence in what the air component had 2003. tions laid plans to move some supplies from already done to reduce Iraq’s air defenses—and 105.Nichols, briefing, Oct. seaports by ground transportation. what it could do to Iraq’s ground army. 15, 2004. An outline for major combat operations was 106. Nichols, interview, Oct. in place by January 2003. During that month, Major Combat Operations 13, 2004. service Chiefs reviewed the plans in Washing- On March 17, 2003, Bush issued an ultima- 107. DOD press conference, March 21, 2003. ton. Commanders at wing and squadron level tum. “Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave met to “chair fly” the air campaign. Carriers in- Iraq within 48 hours,” he said.104 “Their refusal chopping to CENTCOM flew key staff ashore for to do so will result in military conflict, com- briefings from 5th Fleet. Liaison officers set up menced at a time of our choosing.” shop. For example, USAF Maj. Gen. Daniel P. The air component was already at a combat Leaf landed at the Combined Forces Land Com- tempo. After March 7, the air component aver- ponent Commander headquarters as Moseley’s aged more than 1,300 sorties per day through the personal envoy. beginning of the war on March 20 [local Baghdad The January plan took advantage of the work time.]105 It was a “Herculean effort to plan and man- done by airmen in Southern Focus. It called for age execution of this many sorties as we were the air campaign phase to last for 16 days, to headed into the war,” said Nichols.106 The cover- be followed by 135 days of major combat op- age made it possible to insert SOF teams in the erations to seize Baghdad. Privately, Franks north, west, and south and carry out other shap- hoped for something even more dramatic. ing actions. “Early battlefield preparations” on February saw collapse of the final attempts March 19 included airstrikes on radars in west- to work out a compromise with Iraq through the ern Iraq and near Basra in southern Iraq. Attacks United Nations. By early March, war was immi- also neutralized artillery in the Al Faw peninsula nent. On March 14, Franks held a commanders’ northeast of Kuwait,” said Myers.107 huddle at his forward headquarters to make last Then CENTCOM began to receive reports of minute changes in the war plan. He now opted destruction of Iraqi oil wells. It was imagery of for a short, sharp opening air war, lasting not for burning wells that convinced Franks to kick off weeks or even many days. The air component the war early. “We saw an opportunity to achieve

USAF’s KC-135 tankers were the backbone of the air operation. Shown at right are seven coalition fighters taking turns for aerial refueling from an Air Mobility Command KC-135R. At top (from USAF photo by MSgt. Ronny Przysucha left) are an F-15E, South Carolina ANG F-16CJ, and RAF GR4 Tornado. Tanking is a second F-15E. At bottom, just below the F-15E is an F-117. Next in line is an F-16CJ and finally an RAAF F/A-18 Hornet. 27

The air boss, USAF Lt. Gen. (now Gen.) T. Michael Moseley, arranged “rehearsals” of missions such as

USAF photo by SSgt. Jerry E. Clemens, Jr. urban close air support and Scud hunts. Heeding the lessons of Afghanistan, he worked closely with ground forces throughout major combat operations in Iraq.

one of our operational objectives, which was to no time to risk even minimal activity by the Iraqi prevent the destruction of a big chunk of the Iraqi air force. Counter-air strikes accounted for 40 people’s future wealth,” he said.108 A handful of percent of air targets over the first two days but Iraqi missile launches reaffirmed the need to act. tapered to 28 percent in the period March 21- It was the kind of decision that could only be 24 and down to 15 percent by March 25, an made with full confidence in the air component’s average that held for the rest of OIF.110 ability to counter anything the Iraqis might throw The west fight—in which SOF forces sup- at the coalition. As Moseley said, the “land com- ported the air component’s killbox-by-killbox ponent was concerned about having itself in control of prime Scud launch territory. As Deputy those cantonment areas [in Kuwait] just parking CFACC Nichols put it, this was a “Presidential 108. USCENTCOM press and just receiving fire. I agreed. I told Dave [Lt. tasking.”111 conference, March 30, 2003. Gen. David McKiernan, the land force com- The strategic attack—in which coalition air 109. Gen. Michael Moseley, interview, July 24, 2003. mander], ‘Let’s get you out of there.’”109 The Army forces took on preassigned targets selected to 110. Task Force Enduring V Corps, First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF), degrade Iraqi military command and control and Look, Operation Iraqi and British forces bound for Basra moved steadily otherwise weaken the regime. Opening attacks Freedom: Volume Two, across the line of departure in Kuwait and into struck at 59 separate national headquarters, Decisive Combat Operations, Chapter Two, “Air Warfare,” Iraq just before midnight local time on March 20, command and control centers, and VIP resi- 2003. 2003. The air component shuffled targets to ac- dences. Regime security and support included 111. Vice Adm. David count for the early advance of ground forces and 104 targets such as intelligence services, se- Nichols, interview, Oct. 13, re-roled some scheduled sorties, changing them curity facilities, Special Republican Guards fa- 2004. to close air support missions. cilities, Ba’ath Party Headquarters, and known Soon, the air component was engaged in five Fedayeen facilities. The aim was to jolt com- air wars, the prosecution of which demonstrated mand and control but also to weaken the orga- two facts about air and space power. The first nizations most responsible for imposing terror was its ability to harmonize five distinct opera- on the Iraqi people. The air component attacked tions to achieve unified effects. Second was the 112 communications targets consisting of cable effectiveness of air attack against ground tar- and fiber optic relays, repeater stations, ex- gets, whether in deep shaping operations or in changes, microwave sites, some television and close air support missions. radio transmitters, antennae, and more. Infra- Three of the five air wars had the air compo- structure such as electric power and oil indus- nent in the lead. These were not independent try targets were not on the target list. operations; they were all orchestrated to carry The other two air wars supported counterland out Franks’ objectives. However, they were ex- operations by forces of the US Army and the ecuted primarily by the air component (often in- US Marine Corps. cluding TLAM strikes launched from ships and The first of these is frequently called the north submarines at sea.) Airpower took the lead in: fight. Of the five air wars, the north fight had The air dominance fight—a continuation of the perhaps the most twists and turns at the start. prewar activity, with emphasis on airfield inter- Plans had called for the introduction of the US diction. With forces moving all over Iraq, this was Army’s 4th Infantry Division into the northern part of Iraq, through Turkey. Then Turkey began tion Just Cause in Panama in 1989, and it was to waffle on whether it would permit passage to intended “to provide additional combat power 28 the US forces. “In any case, there will be a north- to the special operations forces that had already ern option, with or without Turkey,” Myers insisted inserted themselves into Kurdish-held territory,” on March 5.112 said Air Force Maj. Gen. Victor E. Renuart Jr.115 112. Thomas Ricks, “Myers Ultimately Turkey did not permit ground troops Heavy equipment dropped first. Then came Depicts War on Two Fronts,” to open up a northern front, but Franks still the troops. “It was quite a feeling to see all that Washington Post, March 5, 2003. wanted action in the north to distract Iraq’s regu- stuff exit the aircraft then close the doors and 113. Vice Adm. David lar Army and Republican Guards stationed there. escape out of there,” recalled MSgt. Chris Nichols, interview, Oct. 13, “That left us with about a thousand SOF troops Dockery, a C-17 loadmaster.116 2004. in the north, supported by two carrier air wings, “Once you get into the area, people really get 114. Rear Adm. John to fix 11 Iraqi divisions,” said Nichols.113 focused,” said C-17 pilot Col. Bob Allardice, Stufflebeem, interview, Aug. 117 4, 2004. Like Afghanistan, the task was to keep strik- who led the first night’s drops. “When the 115. USCENTCOM press ing power on call at the right times and get it to doors open, you can hear the roar of the troops. conference, April 2, 2003. the right places. There are 100 airborne troops, standing up, 116. MSgt. Scott Elliott, “C-17 In the end “we only did about five days’ worth stomping and yelling, getting psyched up. Then Crews Describe Paratroop of servicing the master attack plan and just hit- they run out of the back of the jet.” Drop,” Air Force News, March 28, 2003. ting targets and just very quickly shifted to sup- Parachuting in with the 173rd Airborne Bri- porting these teams on the ground,” said gade were airmen of the 86th Contingency Re- 117. Elliott, “C-17 Crews Describe Paratroop Drop.” Stufflebeem, who was now in command of the sponse Group from Ramstein AB, Germany. 114 118. Louis A. Arana- USS Truman battle group. From there on, the Their mission: get the airfield up and running Barradas, “Bashur or Bust,” task involved delivery of “directed fires more as soon as possible. “There was no other way Airman Magazine, July 2003. than traditional close air support,” he said. to get Air Force boots and eyes on the ground On March 26, the north fight expanded. Fif- to assess the situation and prepare to receive teen Air Force C-17s departing from Aviano AB, aircraft, said Maj. Erik Rundquist, security forces Italy, dropped Army paratroopers and their commander for the group.118 equipment on a soggy, 7,000-foot runway at The next day, more C-17s started ferrying in Bashur in Kurdish-held northern Iraq. The for- additional members of the 2,000-man brigade mation of airlifters spread out over 100 miles to along with Bradley Fighting Vehicles, ammuni- space out each aircraft’s time over the drop tion, and other equipment and supplies. With zone. The airdrop was the largest since Opera- the 173rd on the ground, the way was clear for

Combat Aircraft

USMC (14.0%) Fighter Bomber SOF Total In OIF, the Air Force USAF 293 51 131 475 provided 51 percent Allies (10.1%) of the combat USAF Navy 232 0 0 232 aircraft. Most of the (51.0%) tanker, airlift, and ISR USMC 130 0 0 130 aircraft came from Army* 0 0 0 0 USAF units. Navy (24.9%) Allies 80 0 14 94

*Does not include helicopters.

Support Aircraft

Allies (5.1%) Army (2.3%) ISR C2 Airlift Tanker Other Total USAF 60 22 111 182 13 388 USMC (27.8%) USAF Navy 29 20 5 52 70 176 (44.6%) USMC 0 0 0 22 220 242 Army 18 0 0 0 2 20 Navy Allies 11 4 10 12 7 44 (20.2%) Strike Sorties 29

Allies (10%) Fighter Bomber Total Percent The Air Force provided nearly half USAF 8,828 505 9,333 45.0% the fighter sorties and all the bomber sorties Navy (27%) Navy 5,568 0 5,568 26.9% in OIF. USAF (45%) USMC 3,794 0 3,794 18.3%

Army 00 0 0

Allies 2,038 0 2,038 9.8%

USMC (18%) Total 20,228 505 20,733

a series of attacks beyond the Kurdish-controlled tics replenishment, both columns resumed at- green line and toward Irbil, Kirkuk, and the Sunni tacks to defeat the remaining Republican Guard strongholds of Mosul and Tikrit. forces blocking the approaches to Baghdad. Pilots worked a wide variety of targets under Then, beginning with the “thunder run” on April control of the 173rd and SOF and coalition FACs. 5, Army and Marine forces entered the city from Assisting ground controllers was the No. 1 priority opposite sides to link up and complete their and the biggest challenge. One F/A-18 pilot, Navy swift conquest of the capital. Coalition forces Lt. Melanie Lynch, an Afghanistan veteran aboard were in full possession of the city by April 9. the carrier Roosevelt, said that “coordinating with The strategy emphasized speed over every- the ground FACs presented a challenge in that thing else. “The mission here is get to Baghdad you wanted to do it right, you didn’t want to screw to demonstrate to the world and the neighbor- it up, you didn’t want to hurt any friendlies.”119 hood that he [Saddam] is incapable of defend- Those controllers tasked coalition airmen in the ing himself, and we will be in that capital city,” 122 north fight to a variety of targets. “Anything from Moseley said of Franks’ intent. It took a mighty 119. Navy Lt. Melanie Lynch, troops in the open to vehicles to even some build- effort from the air component to make the rapid interview, July 22, 2004. ing,” said Navy Lt. Geoffrey Bowman, an F/A-18 fall of Baghdad possible. 120. Navy Lt. Geoffrey pilot aboard Harry S. Truman.120 Both precision The CAOC dedicated the lion’s share of strike Bowman, interview, July 22, 2004. weapons and strafing were popular with the sorties in OIF to counterland operations across 121. Center for Army ground controllers. “Probably 70 percent or so of Iraq. Many sorties went deep to strike Republi- Lessons Learned, “On Point: my flights I came back without bullets,” Bowman can Guards forces. Others responded to imme- The US Army in Operation said. diate tasking of ground controllers engaged in Iraqi Freedom,” May 26, 2004. By the first week of April, coalition forces on firefights. The effect was twofold. Airpower reg- 122. Gen. Michael Moseley, the northern front were picking away at a net- istered devastating blows on Iraq’s best forces interview, July 24, 2003. work of bunkers and Iraqi forces near Irbil. Then as they attempted to hold or reposition around on April 6 came a pitched battle at Debecka Baghdad. At the same time, the marines on the Ridge. A platoon of Iraqi T-55 tanks backed with right, for example, used coalition airpower to two platoons of mechanized infantry and more pin down Iraqi divisions on their eastern flank troops in trucks attacked straight up the road in without delaying their “march up” to Baghdad. daylight toward a concentration of SOF and The air component also had to provide on-call Peshmerga, the Kurdish forces. SOF members airpower to counter irregular forces as well as aimed Javelin antitank missiles at the T-55s. They continue the deep shaping operations. On their “destroyed the Iraqi supporting weapons either 300-mile dash to Baghdad, US forces were not with the own mortars or by calling in CAS,” ac- stopping to defeat Iraqi regular—or irregular— cording to an official report.121 forces in detail. Meanwhile, hundreds of miles away, the air The irregulars—the so-called “Saddam component was engaged in the biggest of all Fedayeen”—proved more vigorous than ex- the air wars—the so-called south fight. pected. To be sure, there were hints about the The V Corps and I MEF moved up from Ku- role irregular forces might play. For example, wait in phases. First came the rapid drive Saddam reacted to the December 1998 US through southern Iraq. After nearly a week’s airstrikes by strengthening internal control mea- pause due to a sandstorm and planned logis- sures and conducting “minor movements” of ir- 30

When a major sandstorm hit, key airborne and space- based sensors kept working, and fighters

USAF photo by MSgt. Terry L. Blevins and bombers mounted shattering air attacks on a surprised Republican Guard.

regular forces for counterinsurgency operations. planners ensured the overall intensity did not There were “units dedicated to this,” said Ma- diminish. The level of effort for the air compo- rine Corps Gen. Anthony Zinni, CENTCOM com- nent was still on the upswing. 123. Gen. Anthony Zinni, 123 DOD press conference, Dec. mander at the time. One appreciative unit was the 3rd Regiment 21, 1998. In 2003, CENTCOM put the total numbers of ir- of the 7th Cavalry, which began its mission to 124. Gen. Tommy Franks, regular forces at about 40,000. Little was known sweep around the town of Najaf from the south USA (Ret.), American about their command and control structure. Franks on the morning of March 25 and fought con- Soldier, p. 486. said that, prior to OIF, “at no point had I thought tinuously for 60 hours in the sandstorm’s “nega- 125. Michael Gordon, “US 128 Army Starts Push on these forces would be moved into the south to fight tive illumination,” as one soldier called it. The Republican Guard,” New as guerrillas.”124 Yet that was just what happened. regiment had artillery backing, but later re- York Times, March 24, 2003. “Thousands of fedayeen fighters, who wear black corded that “CAS had provided the lion’s share 126. Franks, American uniforms or civilian clothes, are now in the south- of support, with 182 sorties” during their Soldier, p. 499. ern zone, according to American estimates, and battle.129 “The bombardment that lasted from the 127. CAOC interviews, have produced the largest American casualties night of March 25 through the morning of March December 2004. so far,” noted a New York Times reporter.125 27 was one of the fiercest, and most effective, 128. Center for Army 130 Lessons Learned, “On Point, in the history of warfare,” Franks said. the United States Army in The Sandstorm The land component was completing its op- Operation Iraqi Freedom,” The air component was shaping the fight erational pause and logistics replenishment as May 26, 2004. ahead and helping to hold off irregular attacks the sandstorm cleared. Air strikes after the 129. “On Point, ... ,” May 26, 2004. in the rear when a massive sandstorm in the sandstorm “ramped up to about 1,000 sorties a 130. Franks, American period March 25-26 put the entire force to a day against those formations. They got no Soldier, p. 503. major test. “I could taste the dust on the rim of pause,” said Moseley in the July 2003 interview. 131. USCENTCOM press my coffee cup,” said Franks of the afternoon of Said a CENTCOM briefer on March 28, “What conference, March 28, 2003. March 25, 2003.126 we see in many formations of the Republican 132. Lt. Gen. James Conway, The air component had the lead for deep Guards is some effort to try to reposition inter- I MEF commander, DOD shaping operations. Land forces had not closed nally within their defenses.”131 briefing from Iraq, May 30, 2003. with the Republican Guards. They did not have Marine Corps Lt. Gen. James T. Conway, the I 133. Marine Corps Maj. Rich enough artillery with them to do the shaping, and MEF commander, said, “While we were station- Hilberer, interview, March 12, attacks with Apache helicopters had failed mis- ary, we were, in fact, attacking with our air, taking 2004. erably. Continuing the pressure ahead—and maximum advantage of intelligence, surveillance, protection over the lines of communication—was and reconnaissance capabilities to determine vital. Fortunately, the CAOC had plenty of ad- what the enemy was that we faced.”132 Air sup- vance notice of the storm’s effects from the so- port was so steady that US marines used it to phisticated work of combat weather teams. In control bypassed Iraqi units on their right flank. fact, airmen turned the sandstorm period into a They did not pose a threat because the MEF had “JDAM-fest,” as one planner called it.127 Use of kill boxes open all along its frontage and down on laser guided bombs dipped while expenditure one side. “We didn’t want to have to go over there of Joint Direct Attack Munitions soared. Some and fight those guys, so we blew ‘em up with air- sorties were cancelled due to weather but, by planes,” said Maj. Rich Hilberer.133 resorting to synthetic aperture radar for JDAM, Airpower provided an efficient tool for stifling enemy maneuver and keeping marines on the Corps forces advancing out of Karbala did in- march. Iraq’s 10th Armored Division and the deed find that airstrikes had “destroyed or se- 31 Baghdad Division of the Republican Guard got verely degraded” most of the Republican Guard 134. Brig. Gen. John F. Kelly, 138 nonstop attention from the Marine Corps air wing forces. “Tikrit, South to Babylon” and other coalition assets. The Iraqis, as it turned The Medina Division of the Republican Guard Marine Corps Gazette, February 2004. out, “were either dead, happy to remain station- provided a dramatic case in point. Later analy- ary and a long way from their vehicles, or they sis showed that 1,817 air attack sorties in the V 135. Rowan Scarborough, “General Tells How Cell would desert,” said Brig. Gen. John Kelly, as- Corps area against the Medina Division had de- Phone Foiled US Attack in sistant commander of the 1st Marine Division.134 stroyed the following:139 Iraq,” Washington Times, Coordination was not perfect. Early problems 191 of its 215 tanks May 8, 2003. 136. Maj. Gen. Daniel P. Leaf, caused the Air Support Operations Center at V 203 of its 401 artillery pieces interview, June 27, 2003. Corps to be overwhelmed by the number of sor- 40 of its 41 air defense systems 137. Third Infantry Division tie requests sent its way. In fact, more than 625 Airpower had the same effect on the other (Mechanized) After Action sorties designated for V Corps were diverted Republican Guard divisions. Marine Corps Gen. Report, Operation Iraqi Freedom, p. 108. Found at elsewhere, mainly to the Marine Corps sector. Peter Pace, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs globalsecurity.org. Another slip came when V Corps placed its fire of Staff, said on April 6, “Of the six Republican 138. Center for Army support coordination line (FSCL) very far forward Guard divisions, which are their main fighting Lessons Learned, “On Point, to accommodate a shaping attack by Apache force, two are assessed to be totally destroyed. the United States Army in helicopters on a Republican Guard unit. It was The remaining four are assessed that about one Operation Iraqi Freedom,” May 26, 2004. a stark demonstration of failure—and a waste of half of their tanks, artillery, armored personnel 139. Charles Kirkpatrick, 140 joint airpower, with fixed-wing sorties blocked carriers have been destroyed.” JCS Chairman “Joint Fires as They Were out. The “attack of the 11th Aviation on the Myers said the next day: “Republican Guard di- Meant to Be: V Corps and the 4th Air Support Operations Medina Division did not meet the objectives that visions have only been able to conduct sporadic Group During Operation Iraqi I had set for that attack,” said Army Lt. Gen. Wil- attacks on our forces. Of the 800-plus tanks they Freedom,” (Arlington, VA: liam S. Wallace, the V Corps commander.135 began with, all but a couple of dozen have been The Institute of Land 141 Warfare, AUSA, October USAF’s Leaf, with the land forces commander, destroyed or abandoned.” 2004), p. 10. said that the decision “cost us basically a full A postwar assessment only added to the evi- 140. Marine Corps Gen. 136 night of fixed target strikes inside the FSCL.” dence of a massive airpower victory. In the V Peter Pace, NBC Meet the The Apache fiasco compelled the writers of Corps area, airpower had destroyed:142 Press, April 6, 2003. the after-action report from V Corps’s lead unit, 46 of 153 surface to surface missiles 141. DOD press conference, the 3rd Infantry Division, to recommend that the 424 of 843 artillery pieces April 7, 2003. FSCL be placed closer in because the officers 421 of 660 tanks 142. Kirkpatrick, p. 12. at V Corps “demonstrated their inability to man- 107 of 859 other armored vehicles 143. Allied Force data is from SACEUR press conference, age said battlespace” and “CFACC [the air boss] 76 of 159 air defense artillery systems Sept. 16, 1999. Operation is better prepared to engage targets to effec- 1,144 of 2,000+ military vehicles Desert Storm data is from tively shape the battlefield versus V Corps use The destruction of a full 64 percent of tanks DOD, “Conduct of the Persian Gulf War,” 137 of Corps CAS.” in Iraq’s prewar inventory was a record. It out- (Washington, DC: 1992), p. Still, when land forces resumed their advance, stripped airpower’s destruction of 26 percent 140. it was evident that the air component had done of Serbian tanks in 1999 or the 41 percent of its job well. Despite concerns at CENTCOM Iraqi tanks before the start of the ground war in about how to track the effect of airstrikes, V Desert Storm.143

Strikes by Category

The air component (4.2%) (1.2%) devoted an KI/CAS 15,592 overwhelming amount (7.2%) of its effort—some 78 Regime 1,799 percent—to support (9.0%) of ground forces. Counterair 1,441 These were called “kill box interdiction/close WMD 832 air support,” or KI/ CAS missions. Fixed targets 234

(78.4%) Total 19,898

KI/CAS Regime Counterair WMD Fixed Targets 32

At the top, an A-10 Warthog pilot heads in with cannon firing. Crew chiefs—one Air Guard and one active—join forces to prepare an A-10 in the Gulf Region for its next mission.

USAF photos by SSgt. Jeffrey A. Wolfe and MSgt. Stefan Alford

Counts of equipment destruction, alone, did Baghdad, soldiers and marines had a highly not provide an adequate measure of airpower’s coordinated supply of airpower on call for ur- battle effects, however. The air attacks broke the ban close air support. Republican Guard divisions as fighting forma- They also saw the power of component coor- tions. The official Army report on this phase of dination—”jointness.” What had been a serious OIF concluded, “Evidence suggests that the flaw in Anaconda the year before had been high rate of desertion among Iraqi units can be eliminated and turned into a focus of achieve- directly attributed to strikes by fixed- and rotary- ment in Iraq. Coordination among the compo- winged aircraft.”144 There was no better testimony nents and the services enabled CENTCOM to 144. Center for Army to the success of airpower in support of ground bring all the advantages of air and space power Lessons Learned, “On Point, the United States Army in forces in the south fight. to bear on the joint fight. Operation Iraqi Freedom,” For airmen, there was much to be gleaned By any measure, this third campaign of the May 26, 2004. from the new techniques of air and space power War of 9/11 marked a high point in air control 145. “On Point, ... .” on display in Operation Iraqi Freedom. and interdiction of enemy maneuver forces. So 146. Charles Kirkpatrick, They saw that the power of the air component strong was the performance of the air compo- “Joint Fires as They Were shaped the joint campaign. Airpower had done nent that the Army offered up effusive praise. Meant to Be: V Corps and the 4th Air Support Operations it before—at Normandy, in the Southwest Pacific, “Time and again during OIF, airmen intervened Group During Operation Iraqi in Desert Storm, and in Afghanistan. This time, at critical points on the battlefield,” said an offi- Freedom,” (Arlington, VA: 145 The Institute of Land though, the slate of tasks was wider and the cial Army report. Staff officers at V Corps said Warfare, AUSA, October period available for action was compressed. The that, during the campaign, they received “the 2004), p. 1. ability of the air component to control enemy ma- best, most efficient, most effective, and most neuver, degrade Iraqi command and control, responsive air support the Air Force has ever and pursue time-sensitive targets, as well as provided any US Army unit.”146 control western Iraq and provide firepower for a The so-called “killbox and keypad” system second-front diversion in the north, was a leap of battlespace management across Iraq al- ahead in simultaneous operations. lowed airmen and controllers to use sophisti- The end result was flexibility that allowed cated techniques that sped up strike response commanders to accept more operational risk times. Among them were SCAR—strike coor- to ground forces when it served higher strate- dination and reconnaissance—a marine- gic objectives, such as pre-empting the wan- coined term with a tip of the hat to the killer ton destruction of Iraq’s oil fields or getting to scouts of Desert Storm. The system placed Baghdad fast. Operational risk was hedged by strike aircraft in a designated area to identify the known ability of the air component to spot targets and then direct other incoming strike and control Iraqi maneuver against the coali- aircraft to the target. tion spearheads. Airpower likewise backed up At the CAOC, the automated deep opera- the plan to bypass southern cities and Iraqi tions coordination system (ADOCS) set up a troop concentrations such as those to the right software network of key players to sort and of the marines. It ensured that the feint-and- manage target selection and deconfliction. attack strategy at various critical points would “Now think about a digital battlefield with succeed on the desired timetable. Once in ADOCS or any other systems that you can use Air Mobility Sorties 33 90 81% The Air Force was 80 Tanker Airlift Total Percent overwhelmingly the dominant factor in air 70 USAF 6,193 7,413 13,606 81.3% mobility in the Iraq War. 60 Navy 2,058 0 2,058 12.3% 50 USMC 454 0 454 2.7% 40 Army 00 0 0 Allies 359 263 622 3.7% 30 Total 9,064 7,676 16,740 20

Percent of Air Mobility Sorties 12% 10 3.7% 2.7% 0

USAF Navy USMC Allies

to turn a killbox on and off at the speed of light,” Predator UAVs to Joint STARS to the high-alti- 147 Moseley said. “You can go black. You can tude U-2s proved their flexibility in adapting to 147. Gen. Michael Moseley, bring it back. You can bring parts of it back.” demands for persistent ISR. interview, July 24, 2003. Fine-grained control of the battlespace created That in turn led to improved operational re- 148. Rear Adm. James Robb, superior coordination. sults such as the drastic reduction in collateral interview, Aug. 30, 2004. Increased coordination between the CAOC’s damage. “Drive around Iraq and you’ll find intelligence-reconnaissance-surveillance divi- building after building after building with a sion and combat operations directors on the single hole in the roof,” said Robb.148 This cam- CAOC floor led to better real-time targeting up- paign was done “with absolute minimal collat- dates—as when a Global Hawk unmanned eral damage,” he said. aerial vehicle (UAV) fed to airborne bombers For Iraq, and for airmen, the end of major synthetic aperture radar pictures of revetted combat operations certainly didn’t bring the Republican Guards. Much of the increase in tar- War of 9/11 to a close. To paraphrase Win- geting accuracies could be attributed to per- ston Churchill, it was not the end, or the be- sistent—and innovative—employment of ISR ginning of the end, but it was the end of the assets. Systems from the medium-altitude beginning.

Total Air Sorties

Fighter Bomber Tanker Airlift Total USAF 8,828 505 6,193 7,413 22,939 Air Force aircraft Navy 5,568 0 2,058 0 7,626 Allies (7.4%) turned in nearly 60 USMC 3,794 0 454 0 4,248 Army (0.6%) percent of the Army 0 0 0 0 0 coalition’s 41,404 sorties. USAF notably Allies 2,038 0 359 263 2,660 USMC Total 20,228 505 9,064 7,676 37,473 dominated the strike (12.0%) and mobility categories of sorties. C2 ISR Rescue Other Total Navy Data do not include Special Operations USAF 432 452 191 182 1,257 (21.6%) USAF Navy 442 357 0 520 1,319 (58.4%) Forces, Army USMC 75 305 0 320 700 helicopter, and Army 0 269 0 0 269 coalition sovereignty flights. Allies 112 273 0 1 386 Total 1,061 1,656 191 1,023 3,931 Total Sorties 41,404 34 The “Phase IV” Fight

When Bush declared an end to major combat stan and Iraq. Intensive consumption of ISR, re- operations on May 1, 2003, he told US forces: finement of precision weapons employment, the “The tyrant has fallen, and Iraq is free.”149 He was use of airpower for shows of force, and tight, also, however, implicitly announcing one of the networked integration with joint forces were just more difficult and uncertain steps in warfare: the some of the developments that marked a new switch from combat to a murky post-combat phase of airpower evolution. period of activity, “Phase IV” stability operations.

149. President Bush remarks The term “stability operations” was new. It was Theater of Mobility from USS Abraham Lincoln, imported into joint warfighting as a result of an The movement and resupply of forces for sta- May 1, 2003, White House Army doctrine change in the mid-1990s. The bility operations across CENTCOM’s vast the- transcript. change reflected lessons from combat in ater relied on air mobility. 150. DOD briefing, April 30, 2004. Panama and Bosnia, where continuing conflict Airlifters, tankers, and several dozen aerial 151. Brig. Gen. Mark after regime changes had been a major prob- ports formed a triad to “provide the means to Zamzow, interview, Dec. 23, lem. In joint military parlance, “Phase I” com- get cargo and people in the air,” said Brig. Gen. 2004. prises preparation for combat, “Phase II” cov- Mark R. Zamzow, the CAOC’s air mobility direc- ers initial operations, “Phase III” is decisive com- tor.151 C-130s formed the backbone of a highly bat, and Phase IV is a time of re-stabilization. orchestrated intratheater airlift. On a typical In Afghanistan as well as Iraq, American forces day, the CAOC reported that USAF C-130s had faced sporadic challenges from diehard irregu- flown 126 airlift sorties in Afghanistan, Iraq, and lars and fanatic terrorists trying to prevent estab- the Horn of Africa, moving 2,000 passengers lishment of successor regimes and stability. It was and 465 short tons of cargo. Coalition partners a challenge the military was determined to meet. such as Britain, Korea, Japan, Australia, and “Our strategy is fairly simple,” said Army Gen. Canada contributed their own airlift sorties. John Abizaid, who replaced Franks as CENTCOM The C-130 was a stellar performer, said commander in mid-2003.150 “We will stabilize Af- Zamzow. Its primary function was moving pas- ghanistan. We will stabilize Iraq.” By mid-2003, sengers. “We can haul 50 to 60 passengers” 66 nations and a quarter of a million forces in the at a time in the C-130, said Zamzow, and then region were engaged in the task. use the C-17s to focus on “massive amounts As the struggle to stabilize Afghanistan and of cargo.” Iraq intensified, air and space power proved in- US Transportation Command supplied two to valuable in dealing with a volatile situation on four C-17s at all times under CAOC manage- the ground. The Air Force’s airmen refined tech- ment for the theater to meet CENTCOM’s high niques for close air support, urban operations, mobility requirements. The C-17s routinely con- and counterinsurgency. The air component’s job tributed up to 30 percent of the intratheater lift. was to provide air mobility, extend coverage for The CAOC’s air mobility directorate also fre- ISR, and keep up a blanket of on-call CAS tai- quently tapped C-17s stopping over from stra- lored to the needs of ground forces in Afghani- tegic missions to augment cargo capacity. They

US Army forces seized Saddam International Airport and renamed it Baghdad International Airport. USAF airlifters, such as these C-130s, began USAF photo by SSgt. Cherie A. Thurlby bringing in vast amounts of supplies. 35

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USAF Gen. Richard Myers (left), and Defense Secretary

DOD Photo by MSgt. James M. Bowman Donald Rumsfeld give reporters at the Pentagon an update on the global war on terror.

would stay “for several extra days … to focus with a tanker surge capability available for on theater airlift and cargo along with the C-130s events such as the October 2004 elections in that are already here,” said Zamzow, who noted Afghanistan. USAF in 2004 flew more than that it was “more economical to use the C-130 12,000 refueling sorties, transferring some 720 for passengers than for the cargo.”152 million pounds of fuel to 45,000 receivers, ac- Passengers for intratheater airlift came from all- cording to the CAOC. service troop deployments—from AEF rotations Close cooperation with the Army and Marine to the Army’s rest and recuperation program. All Corps was key to setting and meeting require- told, “that’s about 35 percent of what we do,” ments. 152. Brig. Gen. Mark Zamzow said of the passenger airlift mission. Zamzow, interview, Dec. 23, CENTCOM also depended on the CAOC to Afghan Mop-Up 2004. supply aeromedical evacuation. An average of In Afghanistan, the job of the air component three to four aircraft per day moved patients ei- was to maintain stability alongside multinational ther within the theater or to hubs for transport to forces. The hunt continued for al Qaeda and destinations such as Germany. In 2004, the Taliban remnants along the eastern border and CAOC moved more than 13,000 patients at other locations. There were occasional ter- throughout the theater. rorist raids targeting coalition forces, often re- Within the CAOC’s air mobility section, repre- quiring rapid air strikes or action by teams on sentatives of CENTCOM’s Joint Patient Move- the ground. The air component continued to fly ment Requirements Center sat nearly back-to- sorties in support of ground stabilization opera- back with the aeromedical control team and re- tions in 2002, 2003—even during Iraqi Free- quirements cell, coordinating immediate dis- dom—and 2004. patch of aeromedical evacuation when needed. The Combined Forces Command, Afghani- At all times, the CAOC had on alert an aircraft stan (CFC-A) positioned teams of regular Army, specifically designed for aeromedical evacua- Marine Corps, SOF, and foreign coalition forces tion, said another officer. around the country. Troop presence there often The air component had a fixed number of the- topped 20,000. Patrols sought out al Qaeda and ater airlifters and tankers deployed, so flexibil- Taliban diehards near Gardez, Kandahar, ity rested on careful planning. For combat op- Oruzgan, and other hotspots. erations, the US could shift the focus where ap- Yet, the troop levels were relatively low for propriate, said Zamzow. policing a population of 28 million in an area Tankers kept strike aircraft on station. Typi- just slightly smaller than Texas. The reason, in cally for stability operations, the Air Force put part, was the air and space power that backed more than two million pounds of fuel a day in up these relatively light ground forces. The the air with its tankers. “We have specific tracks CAOC put in place an air support structure di- that we send them to, depending on where the rectly responsive to the needs of ground forces. warfighter wants us to put fuel in the air,” said Bases in theater made a big difference, too. Be- Zamzow. Other factors, particularly weather in ginning in late March 2002, after Anaconda, A- the region, required special attention, but the 10s that deployed to Bagram became the pri- CAOC kept the supply of airborne fuel steady, mary CAS asset in Afghanistan. From Bagram, an A-10 could log three hours of on-station time main intent was to demonstrate airpower was in one of the areas assigned by the CAOC. B- available and to reassure friendly ground forces 36 1B bombers operating from other bases in the and civilians.156 The presence mission was an region also provided on-call support. antidote to intimidation. Being “seen and heard” However, full, 24-hour coverage was not fea- was often the right move. On other occasions, sible, a fact which made close component co- however, it was important for the air component ordination vital. The CAOC handled the relative to be seen, heard, and felt. “There are times scarcity of strike, ISR, and mobility assets by when we want to get down low,” explained careful scheduling. “In Afghanistan, you are Marceau. Rattling windows and filling eardrums more actively scheduling the times for those with jet noise could have a powerful effect. That 153. Lt. Col. Ken Tatum, particular assets because they are more limited was the show of force mission—one step short interview, Dec. 23, 2004. than they are in Iraq,” explained Lt. Col. Ken of employing ordnance. When insurgents knew 154. Army Lt. Gen. David 153 Barno, statement, Dec. 28, Tatum, a CAOC combat operations director. aircraft could have lethal impact, the effect was 2004. The regular supply of airpower made it pos- strong. 155. Col. Ben Bitler, sible to give the mission of stability operations to This new form of presence had an impact interview, Dec. 23, 2004. relatively light forces in relatively few parts of the during Afghanistan’s elections. Airmen flew a 156. Lt. Col. Timothy large country. “While it takes ‘boots on the ground’ dozen show of force missions on election day Marceau, interview, Dec. 23, 2004. to win a counterinsurgency fight,” said Army Lt. over Afghanistan, said Maj. Gen. Norm Seip, Gen. David Barno, Coalition Forces Commander, the deputy CFACC.157 157. Maj. Gen. Norm Seip, interview, Dec. 24, 2004. Afghanistan, “it takes airpower to move, supply, He said, “Airpower played a complementary 158. Barno, statement, Dec. and protect those boots on the ground in a coun- role to what was being done on the ground” to 28, 2004. try like Afghanistan.”154 Through the last three provide security at Afghanistan’s 4,000 polling months of 2004, for example, airmen flew a per- places. week average of 66 ISR sorties and 137 strike In sum, modern airpower supplemented missions. On Oct. 8, 2004, a typically busy day, ground forces in a way that enabled the coali- a B-1B expended three JDAM weapons and A- tion to keep down the size of deployments to 10s strafing in support of troops in contact near Afghanistan and still carry out the mission. “Air- Oruzgan, Tarin Kowt, and Deh Rawod. power from all the services—intelligence-sur- However, dropping bombs was by no means veillance-reconnaissance assets, mobility air- the only task for airmen. Show-of-force missions craft, close air support and space systems— became a major task in Afghanistan during have given ground forces in Afghanistan the Phase IV. “We do those on a regular basis,” said ability to operate in smaller units and respond Col. Ben Bitler, a CAOC officer.155 In fact, the quicker with more accurate weaponry than at CAOC began to track and record these kinds of any other point in history,” Barno said.158 flights as it recorded sorties flown and ordnance expended. The low-level flights by fighters and The Iraqi Nettle bombers served one of two basic purposes: to Contending with the aftermath of regime show interest through presence, or to instill fear. change in Iraq was a far different proposition. Lt. Col. Timothy L. Marceau drew a distinc- CENTCOM was not truly prepared for it. The com- tion between a presence mission and show-of- mand had produced meticulous plans for virtu- force mission. With aerial presence, he said, the ally every aspect of Gulf War II—up to the planned

USAF’s Combined Air Operations Center in Southwest Asia uses its sophisticated systems to coordinate air strikes.

USAF photo by MSgt. Michael E. Best 37

ISR assets such as this RC-135 Rivet Joint, under the watchful eye of a USAF photo by AC1 Kevin A. Camara USAF security forces guard, contributed to persistent battlefield awareness.

taking of Baghdad. It focused on decisive com- in the Sunni heartland north and west of bat, not the end game. Without a clear decision Baghdad. Ba’athists who dominated the gov- to go to war, it was hard to make firm plans for the ernment bureaucracies and army wanted to re- occupation, according to US officers. At best, claim their privileged and lucrative position in CENTCOM kept Phase IV requirements in mind the nation. A variety of Muslim terrorists sought while planning and conducting Phase III. to inflict a bloody defeat on the US forces sta- “Our number one Phase IV objective,” noted tioned there. CENTCOM’s Robb, “was to not have a humani- The War of 9/11 had morphed again—this tarian crisis.”159 He said US planners “tried not to time, into a strange new type of conflict. For create a lot of refugees, tried not to put a lot of airmen, it pitted new techniques of persistence, pain and suffering on the people, tried not to cre- precision, and awareness against age-old chal- ate a medical catastrophe. Don’t let the water be lenges of local resistance. The insurgents were contaminated. Don’t let the rivers get flooded by highly unpredictable. During OIF’s major com- 159. Rear Adm. James Robb, blowing the dams. Keep the power plants up. So bat phase, Wallace, the Army’s V Corps com- interview, Aug. 30, 2004. the best work we did in Phase IV was probably mander, noted his surprise at the Iraqi tactics 160. Gen. John Jumper, the preparation, within Phase III, to not rubble- at Nasiriyah. “He [the enemy] was willing to at- interview, July 23, 2003. ize the stuff we needed in Phase IV.” tack out of those towns toward our formations, 161. Lt. Gen. William That worked, but it was not enough of a strat- when my expectation was that they would be Wallace, DOD live briefing, egy. Iraq was a nation in political and physical defending those towns and not be as aggres- May 7, 2003. decay. Soon the coalition ran into huge post- sive,” Wallace said.161 Those were, by and large, combat problems. Water, sanitation, and elec- the same forces the coalition now faced in sta- trical utilities were dilapidated and on the verge bility operations. of collapse. “I see us certainly dealing with Iraq Almost by definition, the struggle for control for quite a period of time and really hoping that of Iraq was an urban battle. Cities were politi- that continues on a path toward stabilization,” cal centers of gravity—the real objective—and Jumper said in July 2003.160 Iraq’s 16 biggest cities contained 70 percent of Iraqi irregulars—and probably some of the the population. The new challenge for the air Republican Guards who were thought to have component was to bring its power to bear on “melted away” from the battlefield—had not been the spreading counterinsurgency and do it in a defeated in detail. The blindingly fast campaign demanding urban environment. The key was to opted out of an attrition phase before the ground extend persistent ISR across all of the country’s war and left no time for proper mopping up. hotspots and build up a level of situation aware- Weapons and trained soldiers were everywhere. ness that gave some form to the shadowy in- Through fall 2003, Ba’ath remnants and Islamic surgent networks. By tracking key leadership irregulars carried out a disorganized but danger- targets, the CAOC put the time-sensitive-target- ous series of retaliation attacks on individual US ing process into the service of a highly sophis- military personnel trying to keep the peace. ticated manhunt. By the beginning of 2004, it was apparent that The air component turned its attention to an OIF had decapitated Saddam’s regime but left unprecedented task: learning all it could about some body parts strong and intact—especially the insurgents’ leadership and command and control network to give the coalition some ad- the ratio of strike sorties to ISR sorties flown vantages for war in the urban jungle. For this, was more than 12:1. In the second half of 2004, 38 the air component had powerful weapons—per- however, it averaged just over 2:1.165 “The pay- sistent ISR, network-centric collaborative tools off is the ability to watch a target,” Johanson for joint planning, and a sophisticated array of said.166 162. Lt. Gen. Walter lower-yield weapons ready to be delivered by As intelligence streamed in, the CAOC relied Buchanan III quoted in Bruce fighters, bombers, and UAVs. on special software to build the raw target data Rolfsen, “Troop Strength to Hold Steady for 2005,” Air Early battles in areas of Baghdad, Najaf, and into multiple steps in a coordinated campaign. Force Times, May 31, 2004. Fallujah marked 2004 as a year with new tests This software tool let multiple players participate 163. Col. Ben Bitler, for air and space power. “The situation is vola- in the target nomination and vetting process, said interview, Dec. 23, 2004. tile,” acknowledged Buchanan, who had taken Tatum, and it was fast and reliable.167 Next, the 164. Lt. Col. John Johanson, over Moseley’s job as CFACC in the summer of system took inputs such as weather, GPS accu- interview, Dec. 23, 2004. 2003.162 racies, and airspace control measures, layering 165. CENTAF, “OIF: By The Numbers,” April 30, 2003. Under Buchanan, the CAOC began a con- the structure needed for coordinated strikes. “It certed effort to diagram entire cities and to piece does coordination on the one hand and it also 166. Johanson, Dec. 23, 2004. together the key elements of the insurgent net- does deconfliction on the other hand,” Tatum 167. Lt. Col. Ken Tatum, work. Techniques used earlier for TSTs were re- explained. Early and quick collaboration de- interview, Dec. 23, 2004. fined and combined into a different type of air creased the potential for fratricide, too. campaign. ISR was the major ingredient. “Re- Now, CAOC officers were able to view insur- ally, SIGINT [signals intelligence] was our big- gent leaders and command and control points gest cue as far as identifying what particular diagrammed as a series of pre-planned, ap- home a bad guy was occupying at the time,” proved targets, down to mensurated coordinates. said Bitler.163 “Predator became important dur- Still, this wasn’t static air tasking. The CAOC kept ing the execution phase because those were a firm grip on the latest ISR inputs up to and dur- eyes on target in the CAOC where we’re trying ing strike execution. Sensors often gave near- to orchestrate the strike,” he said. immediate damage assessment feedback. It was Surveillance had to be full-time. Persistent ISR a continuously changing type of campaign was important, particularly with “a determined against the insurgent targets, requiring steady adversary” projecting “a low signature,” said Lt. control and continuous orchestration. Col. John Johanson, director of the CAOC’s ISR As always, the desire to avoid collateral dam- Division.164 Nor could the CAOC afford gaps that age was a major factor in planning. Collateral might let key data slip through the collection net- damage estimates in Fallujah, for example, re- work. Constant ISR was required, he said, lest quired particularly careful attention because “collection gaps create a collection bias” that many individual houses had common walls. Ul- could skew the overall assessment and charac- timately, if troops were engaged, the decisions terization of the enemy network. It took long- or on what to strike belonged to the on-scene ultra-long-dwell ISR to pull it off. ground commander. Ground commanders work- Counterinsurgency operators turned out to be ing with the air component sought to use the voracious consumers of ISR. Data on the mix of least amount of force possible. ISR and strike sorties reflected this phenom- By summer 2004, the CAOC was ready to enon. In the major combat operations of 2003, carry out the air component’s battlespace shap-

An Air Force Reserve Command HC-130 refuels a Reserve HH- 60G Pave Hawk over Iraq. USAF rescue units are a key part of USAF photo by SSgt.Shane a. Cuomo SOF teams in Southwest Asia. USAF photo 39

USAF’s high flying Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle helped the coalition achieve a persistent “picture” of the battle space.

ing as a series of highly selective strikes against of our troops,” said a USAF Predator sensor insurgent targets around Fallujah (and other re- operator, Capt. Catherine Platt of the 17th Re- bellious cities.) Johanson reported, “We began connaissance Squadron, Indian Springs AFAF, on the first of July with our first strike against the Nev.170 terrorist network in Fallujah and continued to ex- Such was the case during another memorable pand it outward as we had persistent ISR over strike in September. The CAOC pulled final veri- Fallujah 24 hours a day literally for several fication from multiple signals intelligence months.”168 sources that they had picked up “some signifi- One of the air component’s major efforts cul- cant bad guys.” Sensors tracked vehicles com- 168. Lt. Col. John Johanson, interview, Dec. 23, 2004. minated on Oct. 14, 2004, Johanson said, “when ing in and out of the target area—a compound 169. Lt. Col. Ken Tatum, we hit five major facilities associated with the with two small buildings, surrounded by a wall. interview, Dec. 23, 2004. terrorist network.” These strikes were not about It had been watched for some time, long enough 170. “Predator TV: Eye in the tonnage or numbers of sorties flown. Their ef- to verify its importance, to run the required col- Sky Protects Soldiers in Iraq fect was proportional to the high quality of the lateral damage estimates, and mensurate co- and Afghanistan,” CBS-11 ordinates. With the signals data in hand, CAOC News KTVT Dallas/Fort targeting data compiled over the summer, and Worth, Nov. 5, 2004. the flexible real-time execution. officers waited for the insurgents to show up. 171. Col. Ben Bitler, Accounts of the strikes themselves showed One strike aircraft was inbound to attack the tar- interview, Dec. 23, 2004. how airmen were making tactical decisions to get when video showed the key individual of shape the attacks in real time. In late August the insurgent group getting in a vehicle and and early September, planners shifted to tak- driving off. “We aborted right before the attack,” ing out buildings identified as insurgent strong said Bitler.171 points. One particular house on a walled lot at- But this chess game was not over. Predator tracted attention and made the target list of in- followed the insurgent target all around Fallujah surgent network sites. Then, as Predator was as the CAOC watched, until eventually the ve- keeping watch to cue a strike, air officers no- hicle returned to the compound again. “By the ticed that “all the bad people” were sitting out- time they closed the gates, weapons were in side “in a ring around a small campfire,” said the air,” Bitler said. Was the strike a success? Tatum.169 It was as though they knew the house “Absolutely,” he said. was a target—but thought they might be safe The net result was extreme precision and a outside. Targeteers were able to dial up new new tool in the air component’s arsenal. Bitler mensurated coordinates for the backyard “in said, “We were typically killing these guys in very short, single-digit minutes,” said Tatum, their sleep and unknowingly. ... It was all based and execute the retargeted strike. “The house on some pretty solid intelligence. In time, air- itself was hardly damaged,” he added. craft could destroy a standard building, about Insurgents were usually unaware of how 40 feet square, and remove that one concrete closely they were being watched by airborne structure without really doing major damage or sensors. “We’ve seen people setting up mortars, injury to the neighbors’ homes and families.” and actually located improvised explosive de- Tatum reported, “We were able to go in and, vices, and were able to prevent somebody with piece by piece, start breaking up that whole weapons from being able to shoot or injure any insurgent network, their command and control structure as well as their personnel, so that they Close air support got generally high marks. were in somewhat disarray as the troops were “I was on the ground in Fallujah in April ‘04, 40 getting ready to march in.”172 and there were quite a few lessons learned, all This was a new capability for air and space really kind of positive on what the CAOC can power. The air component proved it could do a do for you,” said Lt. Col. Greg Harbin.173 “I got great deal to target individual thugs. The rea- in trouble a couple of times. It never took more 172. Lt. Col. Ken Tatum, son was advances in technology and opera- than five minutes to get an airplane overhead interview, Dec. 23, 2004. tional-level command and control. The combi- to help us out.” 173. Lt. Col. Greg Harbin, nation of persistent ISR, on-call strike aircraft, Still, there were areas for improvement. “We interview, Dec. 23, 2004. and the combat ingenuity of those at the CAOC took a lot of lessons learned out of that to apply 174. Maj. Eric Grace, produced results that can only be described as to the November offensive in Fallujah,” said Maj. interview, Dec. 23, 2004. stunning. Eric Grace, an officer in the CAOC.174 One was 175. Tatum, Dec. 23, 2004. The capability would soon be put to a supreme to shape the battlespace. Another was to seek new test in a second assault on insurgent sites advance coordination with the ground forces. A in Fallujah. third was to increase the level of tactical air sup- port. “One of the huge successes of Fallujah II The Fallujah Model was the ability to pre-plan it and get one playbook What put Fallujah in the coalition crosshairs? to all,” said Grace. The playbook consisted in The town of some 500,000 Iraqis, situated 35 part of exact coordinates for about 800 Fallujah miles west of Baghdad in the “Sunni Triangle,” buildings. It was distributed to ground command- was a hotbed of anti-US activity right from the ers, air controllers, and air crew members. start of Phase IV. Tribal loyalties, intense nation- Air component representatives also put their alism, xenophobic dislike of foreigners, and a heads together with Marine planners a few history of smuggling created friction when coa- weeks before the new operation. The pre-plan- lition forces occupied the city in late April 2003. ning enabled airmen, said Grace, “to study A strong mix of Ba’athist fugitives and foreign Fallujah, get the graphics, get the imagery, and terrorists mingled and made common cause ELINT [electronic intelligence] to coordinate it, against the coalition. pre-planned, with the Marines.” In April 2004, US forces actually had staged The decisive battle for Fallujah began on the an attack against the Fallujah insurgents. It fea- night of Nov. 7, 2004. Lead elements of a tured 1,300 forces from the Marine Corps’ I MEF, 10,000-member-strong coalition and Iraqi force with some Iraqi participation. Marines sur- seized a hospital that doubled as a known in- rounded the city and teams made forays into it surgent base of operations. Aircraft hit in an attempt to locate “bad guys” and draw out preplanned targets—such as barricaded insur- insurgents. AC-130 gunships targeted specific gent sites—then shifted to on-call response. sites and marines called in precision strikes Once in Fallujah, marines and soldiers ben- against buildings harboring terrorists. After a few efited from the carefully planned air support. days, however, CENTCOM backed off as a re- The playbook made possible quick-response sult of political pressures and fears of high ci- strikes, generally in “single-digit minutes,” vilian casualties. noted Tatum.175 It also let soldiers and marines

A Navy crewman directs a Marine Corps AV-8 Harrier

armed with laser- US Navy photo by PH3 John Taucher guided bombs for a mission over Iraq. Marine airpower was integrated into the joint air campaign for urban CAS operations. Snapshot of Phase IV Air Operations 41

2000 1800 1600 Daily coalition air 1400 OIF Strike sorties in fall 2004 OIF ISR hovered between 1200 1,600 and 2,000, with 1000 OEF Strike emphasis on airlift 800 OEF ISR Airlift

Number of Sorties 600 Tanking 400 200 0 9/26 10/3 10/10 10/17 10/24 10/31 11/07 11/14 11/21 11/28 12/05 12/12 Sorties By Week (Sept. 26-Dec. 12, 2004)

stand off slightly from main targets. The domi- In the view of Marine Corps Col. Mike Regner, nant CAS in use was Type 2, when a controller the I MEF chief of operations, the precision—from can see neither the aircraft or target and directs air and land—was unprecedented. “I am respon- the aircraft based on intelligence. Most build- sible to the commander on precision targeting,” ings in Fallujah were only a few stories tall so “it Regner said.180 “Is this like Vietnam? Absolutely was tough to get a bird’s-eye view” especially not. Vietnam had Hue City, and that was leveled with buildings two or three blocks away, Harbin and there wasn’t precision targeting, and they observed.176 At night, especially, the close air didn’t secure it in the amount of time that we’ve 176. Lt. Col. Greg Harbin, support tended to be Type 2 CAS. secured” Fallujah, he said. interview, Dec. 23, 2004. An important advantage was the wide avail- After it was over, Capt. Paul Wood from the 177. Michael Sirak, “Interview: US Air Force Lt ability of the GBU-38. When this 500-pound CAOC master air attack plan cell was one of a Gen Walter Buchanan,” JDAM arrived in theater in quantity in the fall of team to survey bomb effects on the ground in Jane’s Defence Weekly, Sept. 2004, it quickly became one of the air Fallujah. “At one of the sites there was a mina- 29, 2004. component’s top weapons for use in the urban ret located approximately six or seven feet or 178. Capt. Mae-Li Allison, “Airmen use GBU-38 in 181 environment. CFACC Buchanan commented that so away from a mosque,” Wood recalled. “The combat,” Air Force News, it would “give us the reduced collateral damage aircrew was able to strike the minaret and es- Oct. 4, 2004. of a smaller weapon, while at the same time the sentially just damage the paint on the mosque,” 179. Harbin, Dec. 23, 2004. precision that you get with at GPS-guided Wood said. “It actually looked like precision 180. Marine Col. Mike weapon.”177 demolition to me.” Regner, DOD operational update on Fallujah, Nov. 15, Use of the GBU-38 provided a weapon with In eight days, Fallujah was “secure”—mean- 2004. lower targeting collateral damage potential and ing 100 percent of it was passable for coalition 181. Capt. Paul Wood, CAOC eliminated the occasional uncertainties that and Iraqi forces, although sporadic fighting forum, Dec. 23, 2004. cropped up in laser-guided bombs. “This was the continued. By month’s end, it was clear of most 182. Lt. Gen. Lance Smith right weapon for the job,” said the F-16 lead pilot insurgent resistance. Many of the estimated quoted in “Zarqawi’s City of who flew the first GBU-38 mission on Oct. 4.178 “If 2,000 insurgents in Fallujah were killed, and the Death,” Washington Times, Nov. 29, 2004. we used any bigger [type of] bomb, we would safe haven vanished. Moreover, the terrorists have caused unnecessary damage,” he said. lost control of an important logistical site. “Be- For ground troops in contact, the lower-yield sides being a safe haven for leadership com- precision weapons meant “we don’t have to mand and control, Fallujah was a center for break contact with the enemy,” explained making the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) Harbin.179 “With that kind of precision and that that were being produced and used in other kind of yield you can keep the enemy in sight, parts of the country to attack the coalition,” said keep them fixed, while Air Force destroys their Air Force Lt. Gen. Lance Smith, deputy com- position. That’s what GBU-38, and laser-guided mander of CENTCOM.182 Mavericks, Hellfires, etc. allow you to do.” Evolution in airpower—both technologies and That in itself was a revolution because it gave tactics—changed the calculus for insurgency the coalition marines and soldiers greater con- operations in the urban environment. The new trol over the engagement. “Type 2 allows you to model of urban operations added to the margin kill enemy before a force on force fight,” said of superiority for forces on the ground and took Harbin. That, he believed, would ultimately the pursuit of major targets to new levels through “save lives on the ground.” persistent ISR and on-call strike. 42 Tying It Together

In the War of 9/11 the performance of air and or protected opposition forces from counterat- space power has been nothing short of remark- tacks en route to Kandahar. That was a job for able. Precision and persistence are taken for the air component. 183. Gen. Tommy Franks, DOD press conference, Nov. granted. So is flexible mobility, from strategic Operation Noble Eagle started at the same 15, 2001. airlift to theater surges. Air and space-based ISR time and has now become a vital new mission provided by everything from small UAVs to so- for national security. The ability to adjust alert phisticated satellites has fed heavy consump- postures and prepare to counter new threats tion of intelligence in many forms. At the center such as cruise missile attack are hallmarks of a of it all, the CAOC has come into its own as a major, permanent mission. weapons system. The fine-tuned level of control In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the air compo- over battlespace shaping and air support in ur- nent started an early air campaign to increase ban areas in 2004 demonstrated that fact. air superiority over the southern approaches to From the beginning, success has depended Baghdad. It gave the joint force the flexibility to on a series of joint operating concepts built on juggle the start of full-scale ground and SOF the framework of air and space power. The war operations to take advantage of final political has proven several concepts debated in the decisions and pop-up tactical opportunities. 1990s—and before—and taken them to new lev- The air component was there to mitigate opera- els of proficiency in execution. tional risk to the spearheads driving north. It took on the Republican Guards in deep shap- What Airpower Wrought ing and provided the insurance policy of close Operation Enduring Freedom led the way. air support to rear lines of communication when “The first thing we did was set conditions to be- insurgent attacks began. Air and SOF controlled gin to take down the tactical air defense and all the western desert. With the 173rd Brigade and of that,” said Franks.183 “The next thing we did Kurdish forces, they established a northern was set conditions with these Special Forces front. All the while, the air component handled teams and the positioning of our aviation assets the tasks of maintaining air dominance and strik- to be able to take the Taliban apart or fracture ing at selected strategic targets, particularly it.” On Sept. 11, 2001, the Northern Alliance in those associated with Iraqi military command Afghanistan was neither cohesive nor effective. and control. As they neared Baghdad, coalition Nor did it have the power to take on Taliban forces fell under the umbrella of multilayered forces that overmatched them by a two to one close air support, provided with a level of pre- margin. The success of Operation Enduring cision and responsiveness not seen before in Freedom was a long shot until persistent air- modern warfare. power came into play. All the money in the world In the Phase IV fights, air and space power could not have broken the trench lines at Kabul in all its forms proved to be equally important.

An airman marshals an E-8C into position. The performance of Joint STARS battlefield

management aircraft USAF photo by SSgt. Matthew Hannen during the sandstorm helped produce a turning point in the war. 43

An airman at Schriever AFB, Colo., runs through a

USAF photo by AC1 Mike Meares checklist of Global Positioning System satellite operations. Space power is a critical force multiplier. Air Force Space Command had about 1,000 space operators in Southwest Asia during the height of OIF.

USAF’s strategic and tactical air mobility units said Barno, the Combined Forces Command in were essential for coalition operations. Aerial Afghanistan.184 “We can talk with A-10s or B-1s medical evacuation surged and responded as with a wide array of communications capabili- needed. Tankers kept the on-call strike aircraft ties from space-based systems, reducing the ready to fight over Afghanistan and Iraq. By need for ground-based relays,” he added. 184. Lt. Gen. David Barno statement, Dec. 28, 2004. 2004, there was even more progress in the blend “Never has a ground-based force been so en- of ISR and precision, and it turned the air com- abled and so interconnected to air capabilities ponent into an even more effective tool for the in an interdependent way—it’s a given for any tough challenges of stability operations. Urban operation we run in the country, from platoon to warfare in Fallujah and other cities saw the air battalion.” component display its abilities both as a None of this would be possible without reli- battlespace shaping tool and as a support force. able global mobility. Across the CENTCOM the- Phase IV Stability Operations, proved to be just ater, USAF air mobility (with some coalition as- as dependent on the products of air and space sistance) moves thousands of passengers a power as were decisive combat operations. week and delivers urgently needed supplies. Every commander will want to be able to call Theater schedulers borrow strategic C-17 on the capabilities that have been demonstrated airlifters to augment requirements. Tankers sup- in the War of 9/11. port all operations and give fighters and bomb- For example, hunting terrorists and other time- ers the persistence required, even with more sensitive targets is now a major feature of war- airfields now in use in Afghanistan and Iraq. fare, and it is a task made possible, to a great extent, by flexible air and space power. The air Beyond Jointness component (and higher headquarters) made Except for the harsh experience of Anaconda, substantial progress in the three years from the the War of 9/11 has been mostly a model of early TSTs such as the attacks on Mullah Omar’s jointness. Appreciative comments—and hard compound in Afghanistan to the orchestration statistics—from the Army reflect an understand- of battlespace shaping in Fallujah with Hellfire ing and acceptance of the air component’s missiles aimed over a wall and under a carport battlefield role that is probably greater than at roof to strike a target. any point in recent years and perhaps greater Close air support that exploits sensor links is than at any time since the end of World War II. another indispensable combat tool. From Ana- Lessons now taken for granted on the battle- conda to Fallujah II, the changes in air support fields of the War of 9/11 are poised to be solidi- to ground forces have been significant. Ongo- fied in joint services concepts, although some ing operations in Afghanistan proved the point. are still not completely or accurately reflected “Our multiple systems allow us to see our en- in the views of the Pentagon and Washington’s emy, array forces to respond, and guide them defense establishment. to a precision point for accurate engagement,” There are major implications for national mili- tary strategy. First, while it is the joint force that airpower—from doctrine to equipment—should wins the fight, there are many unique and indis- consider the needs of the joint force and resist 44 pensable capabilities provided by air and space breaking air into “penny packets” as new op- power. Air and space power formed the essen- erational concepts come into play. tial architecture to make possible the strategic For the air component as a whole, the War of outline of the multifaceted war. That architecture 9/11 opened new realms of collaboration with is composed of sensors, mobility units, and strik- SOF units. It has led to wholesale re-evaluation ing forces, and it was these capabilities that pro- of close air support. As much progress as the vided the wherewithal for the swift thrust into Af- air component made, the greater lesson was a ghanistan, the immediate surge in air defense timeless one: the necessary interaction of the of North America, the complex and ever-chang- components. Moseley, the air boss in two wars, ing war in Iraq, and the back-alley knife fights put it in these words: “The most powerful les- encountered in Phase IV operations, in both Af- son in all of this is you don’t win wars by land 185. Marine Corps Maj. Rich Hilberer, interview, March 12, ghanistan and Iraq. power. You don’t win wars by sea power. You 2004. At the operational level, the War of 9/11 has don’t win wars by airpower. You win wars by the 186. Gen. Michael Moseley, proven that air is the prime tool for shaping deep orchestration of the effects brought to bear by interview, July 24, 2003. operations and supporting counterland opera- those components.”186 187. Gen. John Jumper, tions. This is not a new lesson. It was learned Defense Writers Group, Dec. 14, 2004. over New Guinea and Normandy and again at Seeking a Course An Loc and later still at Khafji. To be sure, it de- Airmen have fought the War of 9/11 with new pends on advance coordination and procedures, equipment and old, with tried-and-true tactics, but the role of airpower in controlling the ground and with innovative procedures. However, the battle reached a new level of importance. stress on the force is undeniable. “The nation The character of the air component itself has depends on its tankers for global reach. Not just changed. The identity of an aircrew or airplane the Air Force,” Jumper pointed out.187 Since has begun to matter less and less to planners. Sept. 11, “we’ve seen a 33 percent increase in Beginning with Afghanistan, what mattered most the number of hours that we’re putting on our to controllers on the ground and CAOC opera- tanker force in order to sustain operations tors was the range and type of weapons aboard around the globe,” he said. an aircraft, the strength and sophistication of the Recapitalization of this war-winning force is data links, and the remaining “vul times” of air- not optional, it is essential. Networks, sensors, craft in the battlespace. Operation Iraqi Free- and weapons are important but so are plat- dom saw even more blending of the air compo- forms. Without recapitalization, the nation runs nent elements. A case in point was air support the risk of degradation in its ability to fight the for I MEF, which came from many sources be- next battles of the War of 9/11 or to meet other, yond the Marine Air Ground Task Force’s own possibly larger, challenges as they arise in this organic aircraft. The flow of coalition strike sor- decade and beyond. ties, preplanned and not, far exceeded anything Coupled with recapitalization is transforma- the Marine Corps air planners thought the CAOC tion. New systems such as the F/A-22 fighter would give them. “Not very long into it, we represent an investment in future air and space started to get a whole lot of stuff coming in from power—and the future of the nation. For all the CFACC in real time or near real time and shifted tactical and operational innovation, the air com- over to support our efforts,” said Hilberer.185 “The ponent depends on major force investment and amount we ended up getting from CFACC was new technologies to sustain the level of perfor- way more than we ever expected.” mance now demanded from it. To the controllers and forces engaged in The War of 9/11 came upon America by sur- ground combat, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, prise. Its first engagements, like many of its sub- and coalition strike aircraft were all part of the sequent victories, depended on investment flow. Controllers could pick and choose among made by previous generations every bit as them by the munitions and pods they carried. much as on the innovation and skills of today’s Many aircraft, from USAF F-16CJs to Navy S-3s, airmen. One major lesson of the War of 9/11 is performed dedicated, doctrinally distinct roles. that this past investment was sound and paid However, the firepower of the air component has off in the clutch. The watchword for the future is blended together during the War of 9/11. Sepa- to continue to back that reliance on air and rate aviation fiefdoms and doctrines meant little space power with smart planning, training, and or nothing compared to the power of centrally equipping. Upcoming generations deserve no directed air support. One major operational les- less—whatever the future may hold. son of the War of 9/11 is that future planning for

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