Lessons of Iraq

House of Commons Defence Committee Lessons of Iraq Third Report of Session 2003–04 Volume I: Report HC 57-I [incorporating HC 695-i to-xii, Session 2002-03 and HC 57-i to-viii, Session 2003-04] House of Commons Defence Committee Lessons of Iraq Third Report of Session 2003–04 Volume I Report, together with formal minutes Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 3 March 2004 HC 57-I [incorporating HC 695-i to-xii, Session 2002-03 and HC 57-i to-viii, Session 2003-04] Published on 16 March 2004 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £0.00 The Defence Committee The Defence Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Ministry of Defence and its associated public bodies. Current membership Mr Bruce George MP (Labour, Walsall South) (Chairman) Mr Crispin Blunt MP (Conservative, Reigate) Mr James Cran MP (Conservative, Beverley and Holderness) Mr David Crausby MP (Labour, Bolton North East) Mike Gapes MP (Labour, Ilford South) Mr Mike Hancock CBE MP (Liberal Democrat, Portsmouth South) Dai Havard MP (Labour, Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney) Mr Kevan Jones MP (Labour, North Durham) Mr Frank Roy MP (Labour, Motherwell and Wishaw) Rachel Squire MP (Labour, Dunfermline West) Mr Peter Viggers MP (Conservative, Gosport) The following Members were also a members of the Committee during the inquiry. Mr Gerald Howarth MP (Conservative, Aldershot) Jim Knight MP (Labour, South Dorset) Patrick Mercer OBE MP (Conservative, Newark) Syd Rapson BEM MP (Labour, Portsmouth North) Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk. Publication The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/defence_committee.cfm A list of Reports of the Committee in the present Parliament is at the back of this volume. Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Mark Hutton (Clerk), Steven Mark (Second Clerk), Ian Rogers (Audit Adviser), Dr John Gearson (Committee Specialist), Lis McCracken (Committee Assistant), Sheryl Dinsdale (Secretary) and James McQuade (Senior Office Clerk). Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerks of the Defence Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 5745; the Committee’s email address is [email protected]. Media enquiries should be addressed to Adele Brown on 020 7219 0724. Cover photographs reproduced with the permission of the Ministry of Defence (www.mod.uk) Lessons of Iraq 1 Contents Report Page Conclusions and recommendations 5 1 Introduction 25 Our inquiry 25 Other inquiries 26 Relations with MoD 28 Special Forces 29 2 Planning and Strategy 31 Military Preparations and Coercive Effect 31 The UK and the planning process 31 Early preparations 32 Did the Plan Match the Threat? 35 The debate within the Pentagon 37 3 The UK Force 39 Effect of Operation Fresco 41 Planning Assumptions 43 The Northern Option to the Southern Option 44 The force balance 48 4 Command and Control 51 Higher Command Levels 51 PJHQ 51 Deployed Command 52 Command relations with the Americans 53 The Land Component 54 The Maritime Component 55 3 Commando and the Al Faw Penninsula operation 55 The Air Component 57 Logistics 57 Targeting 58 Close Air Support 60 Battle Damage Assessment 63 5 Use of Reserves 65 Call-out and mobilisation 66 Length of the call-out 70 Finance and compensation issues 70 Employment issues 71 Impact on the reserves 73 6 Defence Medical Services 75 Manning 75 2 Lessons of Iraq Impact on the NHS 78 Medical equipment and supplies 78 7 Deployment 80 Key dates and scale of deployment 80 Sea Lift and Air Lift 80 Urgent Operational Requirements 84 Purpose of UORs 84 Timing of UORs 85 Success of UORs 88 Retention of UOR equipment 89 8 The start of operations 91 From planning to operations—what was found 95 The Approach to Basra 97 9 Major defence equipment 100 Overall performance 100 Availability of equipment 102 Communication and Information Systems 103 Combat identification 105 UAVs 108 Apache 110 Sea King 110 The Defence White Paper 111 10 Personal equipment and protection 113 Desert boots and clothing 114 Enhanced body armour 116 SA80 A2 118 Ammunition 119 Night vision capability 120 NBC equipment 120 Logistics and asset tracking 123 Operational logistic support 123 Asset tracking 124 11 Personnel issues 127 Accommodation and food 127 Operational Welfare Package and Families 128 Bereavement 131 Casualty reporting 131 Support to bereaved families 132 Training 133 Post operational health 134 Medical records 134 Gulf War illnesses 134 12 Costs and recovery 137 Lessons of Iraq 3 Net Additional Costs 137 Resource Accounting and Budgeting 138 Cost of the operation 138 Funding of the Operation 141 Equipment recovery 141 13 Transition and Reconstruction 143 The Government’s objectives 143 Plans and preparations 145 Constraints 146 Domestic 146 International 147 Planning assumptions for the transitional phase 149 Insecurity and disorder in the transitional phase 152 What more could have been done? 154 Prisoners of War 160 Lessons for future campaigns 161 Continuing commitment 161 Understanding 162 Security 163 Reconstruction 164 Quick Impact Projects 165 Clearing up the mess (Unexploded ordnance) 166 Institutions 168 14 Information Operations 172 Information Campaign Objectives in Operation Telic 173 UK psychological operations capabilities 175 Effectiveness 176 15 Role of the Media 181 MoD’s media strategy 181 Taste and Impartiality 183 Attitudes to the embed system 184 Setting the context 187 The Forward Transmission Unit 188 The tempo of operations 189 Perception Management 190 16 Cause and effect 193 Annex: List of Abbreviations 198 Formal minutes 202 Witnesses 204 List of written evidence 207 4 Lessons of Iraq the Defence Committee since 2001 209 Lessons of Iraq 5 Conclusions and recommendations Introduction 1. The men and women of the Armed Forces deserve the highest praise for their conduct and performance in Iraq. The commitment required of them not only during the combat operations but also in the subsequent peacekeeping and peace support roles is of a very high order. (Paragraph 1) 2. We extend our deepest sympathies to the families of those who lost their lives. (Paragraph 1) 3. We welcome the openness of MoD and the Armed Forces in publishing its ‘lessons learned’ reports on operations in Iraq and we commend them for the efforts they made to do so promptly after the major combat phase had concluded. (Paragraph 6) 4. We regret that MoD has failed to provide us with certain documents which we have requested and has demonstrated on occasion less co-operation and openness than we have the right to expect as a select committee of the House of Commons. (Paragraph 21) Special Forces 5. The ‘increasing role’ of Special Forces was demonstrated in operations in Afghanistan, and has now been emphatically reinforced by the crucial role which they played in Iraq. Their skills and professionalism provide a unique capability to the total British military effort. (Paragraph 23) Planning and Strategy The debate within the Pentagon 6. The British, who had had embedded staff officers at Centcom from September 2001, were the first foreigners to be brought into the American planning process and appear to have been influential in the overall shape of the plan. In this the British-American relationship also drew on more than 10 years of close collaboration between the RAF and USAF in enforcing the northern and southern no-fly zones over Iraq. We are not, however, able to define the areas in which the British made specific contribution to what was essentially an American campaign plan, other than in the consideration of the northern option and in niche capabilities such as special forces operations. (Paragraph 43) Effect of Operation Fresco 7. Although the Armed Forces commitment to Operation Fresco did not prevent them from putting together an effective force package for the operation in Iraq, it did limit the total numbers. It also adversely affected some elements of the force (by for example requiring high readiness units to move at short notice from fire- 6 Lessons of Iraq fighting to deploying to Iraq). In the longer term it could have undermined the Armed Forces’ ability to sustain combat operations. (Paragraph 56) 8. Overall, the demands that Operation Telic placed on UK Armed Forces in the context of other operational requirements were very close to the maximum that they could sustain. (Paragraph 57) Planning Assumptions 9. We believe that MoD should consider whether for major equipment and capabilities the planning assumptions process is sufficiently flexible to match the very wide range of types and scales of operations which our Armed Forces may be required to undertake in the future. (Paragraph 59) The Northern Option to the Southern Option 10. From the evidence we have seen it appears that the late decision to move from the north to the south led to a requirement for the UK to deploy a significantly larger force—at least one brigade, something over 5,000 troops. This may well have been a contributory factor in complicating the various logistical problems that were later faced. (Paragraph 69) The force balance 11. MoD needs to urgently re-examine the mechanisms, including the use of reserves, by which units are brought to war establishment with minimal disruption in all important preparatory phases of the operations.

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