Delivering Security in a Changing World Future Capabilities 1 Delivering Security in a Changing World Future Capabilities Presented to Parliament by The Secretary of State for Defence By Command of Her Majesty July 2004 £7.00 Cm 6269 Chapter 1 Introduction 2 Chapter 2 Force Structure Changes 5 Chapter 3 Organisation and Efficiency 11 Chapter 4 Conclusions 13 Annex Determining the Force Structure 14 © Crown Copyright 2004 The text in this document (excluding the Royal Arms and departmental logos) may be reproduced free of charge in any format or medium providing that it is reproduced accurately and not used in a misleading context. The material must be acknowledged as Crown copyright and the title of the document specified. Any enquiries relating to the copyright in this document should be addressed to The Licensing Division, HMSO, St Clements House, 2-16 Colegate, Norwich, NR3 1BQ. Fax: 01603 723000 or e-mail: licensing@cabinet-office.x.gsi.gov.uk Foreword by the Secretary of State for Defence the Right Honourable Geoff Hoon MP In the Defence White Paper of last December I set out the need to defend against the principal security challenges of the future: international terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and weak and failing states. Our need in the future is for flexible and adaptable armed forces properly supported to carry out the most likely expeditionary operations. To create a more sustainable and affordable force structure which better meets these operational requirements we have secured additional resources: the 2004 Spending Review allocated £3.7 billion to defence across the Spending Review period, which represents an average real terms increase of 1.4% a year. Additionally, we shall also generate resources to strengthen the front line through our comprehensive efficiency and rationalisation plans, the benefits of which will be ploughed back into the defence budget. As indicated in the White Paper, we are pursuing radical change in the future force structure, reducing force levels in some capabilities in order to invest more in higher priority capabilities better able to achieve the effects we will require. We will increase our capacity to undertake expeditionary operations alongside an equipment programme that is delivering, and will continue to deliver, an advanced range of capabilities. The result will ensure that the resources the Government commits to Defence are deployed to optimum effect. The Chiefs of Staff support the radical change we are pursuing and have been instrumental in its preparation. Delivering Security in a Changing World Future Capabilities Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 The Defence White Paper set • The need to optimise our force • The need to ensure that the out our analysis of the future security structure to support three concurrent organisation of our Armed Forces environment, the implications for small and medium scale1 operations reflects the reasonable aspirations defence, our strategic priorities and (rather than two in the SDR) including of our people in the 21st Century how we intend to adapt our planning the capability to lead or be framework in terms, for example, of greater and force structures to meet potential nation for coalition operations where geographic stability in their home threats. This policy was an evolution the US is not involved. lives. of the strategy contained in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR), • The retention of the flexibility to • Continued support to the Home Office and built on the conclusions of the reconfigure for less frequent large and other civil authorities charged 2002 SDR New Chapter and recent scale operations, while concurrently with the safety and security of the UK, operational experience. Crucially, it conducting a small scale operation. both through routine military tasks demonstrated the need to adapt to the The full spectrum of capabilities is not and our preparedness to support more pronounced threats presented required for large scale operations, them in a time of crisis. by international terrorism and the as the most demanding operations proliferation of weapons of mass could only conceivably be undertaken 1.3 Based on this analysis the White destruction (WMD) and the challenges alongside the US, either as a NATO Paper set out a revised set of 18 Military posed to the international community by operation or a US led coalition, Tasks, both standing and contingent, weak and failing states. where we have choices as to what to with the range of strategic effects contribute. our armed forces need to be capable 1.2 The White Paper set out a revised of delivering. Extensive work has set of assumptions which underpin • The importance of the continued been undertaken to identify the future future planning. These include: transformation of our forces to force structure and the development concentrate on the characteristics of of capability in the longer term. An • An expanded regional focus beyond speed, precision, agility, deployability, illustration of how we match capability the core regions set out in the reach and sustainability. Key to this against military tasks is attached at Strategic Defence Review of Europe, is our ability to exploit the benefits of Annex. As new capabilities come into the Near East, North Africa and the Network Enabled Capability, precision service such calculations will change, Gulf, to reflect the requirement to munitions and the development of particularly with our increasing focus operate further afield across sub- effects-based planning and operations. on effects achieved by combinations of Saharan Africa and South Asia, flexible and adaptable forces. and to meet the wider threat from • The importance of those capabilities international terrorism on a global which can rapidly come together to basis. achieve specific military effect and then rapidly adapt with other capabilities to • The need to strike the right balance achieve what is required by the next of capabilities for expeditionary operation. By doing so decisive military operations to meet the demands of effect may be achieved through a our eight strategic effects - Prevent, smaller number of more capable, linked Stabilise, Contain, Deter, Coerce, assets acting quickly and precisely to Disrupt, Defeat and Destroy. achieve a desired outcome. 1 An example of a small scale operation was the UK’s deployment to Macedonia in 2001; Afghanistan (2001) was at medium scale; and Operation TELIC large scale. 2 continue to have the full spectrum of military capabilities to achieve the desired effects at medium scale. For some of our assets such operations Force Structure Changes - Key have now become the principal driver Judgements in determining the size of the force needed. - precision attack of strategic targets; 1.4 In determining where we have the most scope for change within the • The assumption, based on the - joint land and air offensive force structure to allow necessary experience of the last 10 years, that operations; and rebalancing and continued investment on enduring operations, once the joint in transformational capabilities we have force has been deployed and stability - post-conflict stabilisation. focused on key policy judgements from established, lower force levels and the White Paper, in particular: generally lighter forces are required. • Our aim at large scale is therefore to This has particular implications for the contribute: • The need to rebalance and optimise levels of maritime sea control, air and our Armed Forces to meet the heavier offensive land forces required - Special Forces; demands of the more likely multiple on an enduring basis. concurrent and enduring small and - a range of C4ISR assets, forming medium scale operations. This • The assumption that the most our own network and integrated requires the capability to form a third complex large scale operations will with the US network; line of communication including only be conducted as part of a US- deployable Headquarters, and led coalition. Our primary goal is - amphibious and carrier strike task Command, Control, Communications, to maximise our ability to influence groups; Computers, Intelligence and at all levels the planning, execution Surveillance and Reconnaissance and management of the operation - an air expeditionary task force (C4ISR) assets and logistics. It also and its aftermath, in support of our capable of both long range strike demands that all deployable units wider security policy objectives. Our and support to land operations; and should be fully manned, minimising force structure at large scale should the requirement for individual therefore focus on those capabilities - a land manoeuvre division capable reinforcements and backfilling. which add real weight to the of conducting offensive operations. campaign and hence the UK’s ability • The requirement to enhance our to influence its outcome. The most ability to lead or be the framework important capabilities are those which nation for European (and other contribute to: coalition) operations where the US is not engaged. To do so we must - initial theatre entry and shaping operations; - intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; 3 Delivering Security in a Changing World Future Capabilities Improved Effect through Improved Improved Accuracy 1980 - 200ft 1970 - 400ft 2004 - 20ft 1970 1980 1990 2000 Improved Effect Through Improved Accuracy over the During the Vietnam War over last 30 years. 800 sorties were flown against the Thanh Hoa bridge before it was destroyed by aircraft using precision weapons. Today we would aim to destroy a similar In the 1991 Gulf War, fewer than 20% of air dropped target with a single formation of munitions were precision guided. In Operation 6 Tornado aircraft with Enhanced TELIC, greater than 80% were precision guided, Precision guided bombs. greatly improving accuracy. A Tornado GR4 dropping a precision guided munition, such Improved accuracy on target translates into as Enhanced Paveway II, will be a direct improvement on the desired kinetic around 10 times more accurate than effect and therefore we can more accurately it would be with a “dumb” bomb. and more efficiently achieve our military aim with minimum risk of collateral damage.