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Hirohito, Emperor of Japan a Forgotten War Criminal? by Lydia Chagoll Translated from French by Google Translate
Hirohito, Emperor of Japan A forgotten war criminal? by Lydia Chagoll Translated from French by Google Translate April 29, 1987. According to the radio, you Emperor Hiro-Hito, you the oldest reigning monarch, would have felt unwell during an official meal offered for your 86th birthday. But your state of health did not seem to be of great concern. It was only an indisposition. There is certainly more important than the fortunes and misfortunes of royal personages. Personally, I am not interested in it. But you, Emperor of Japan, are an exception to the rule. You, Emperor Hirohito, do not leave me indifferent. Do you not have millions of deaths on your conscience? Millions of people who, in your name, by the hands of your servile subjects, have been martyred to death, beaten to death, trampled to death, crucified, hanged, beheaded, drowned, buried alive, burned alive, finished by the bayonet. I have decided to send you an open letter. A letter begins courteously with Monsieur, dear Monsieur, Sire, dear Sire, Excellency. In your case by Majesty. Majesty, as for you, proves impossible. For more than three years I had, under duress, to show you respect. You were, at that time, Emperor of Dai-Nihon (Greater Japan). The ceremonies of bowing the head in front of you have been taught to us by means of beatings, kicks, punitive constraints, reductions made to our already so meagre ration. We have bowed to you, literally and figuratively, to the point of vomiting. Always the deepest inclination because it was addressed to the Emperor. -
Dossier Presse Joseph
Les Films de la Croisade en coproduction avec Iota Production et uFilm en association avec uFund avec la participation de France Télévisions Joseph l’insoumis Une fiction de 90’ inspirée de la vie du Père Joseph Wrésinski, fondateur d’ATD Quart Monde avec Jacques Weber, Anouk Grinberg Nicolas Louis, Patrick Descamps, Laurence Côte Salomé Stévenin, Anne Coesens, Isabelle de Hertogh Un film de Caroline Glorion Projet labellisé réalisé avec le soutien de : CNC, Région Aquitaine, Communauté Française de Belgique, Commission Européenne, Conseil Général de Gironde, Ville de Bordeaux, Ministère de la Santé et des Sports - Délégation à l’information et à la Communication, L’Acsé –Fonds Images de la Diversité, Observatoire National de la Pauvreté, Caisse des Dépôts, Fondation Bettencourt Schueller, Association Georges Hourdin, du Programme Media de l’Union Européenne, de Soficinéma 5 Développement et de TV5 Monde Joseph l’insoumis Le Rachaï Joseph l’insoumis Début des années 60, un bidonville aux portes de Paris. Une poignée de familles survivent sous des abris de fortune dans une misère effroyable et une violence quotidienne. Un homme, le Père Joseph Wrésinski, décide de s’installer au milieu de ceux qu’il appelle « son peuple ». Parmi ces familles, celle de Jacques. Sa vie va être transformée par sa rencontre avec le Père Joseph. La sienne mais la vie aussi de ceux qui vont rejoindre le combat de ce curé révolutionnaire. Un combat contre l’assistance et la charité qui dit-il « enfoncent les pauvres dans l’indignité Distribution artistique Joseph -
Bilan 2003 Du Centre Du Cinéma Et De L
2003 - Bilan en bref Bilan de la production, de la promotion et de la diffusion cinématographiques et audiovisuelles Centre du Cinéma et de l’Audiovisuel Service général de l’Audiovisuel et des Multimédias Ministère de la Communauté française de Belgique TABLE DES MATIÈRES Introduction Le Centre du Cinéma et de l’Audiovisuel : enveloppe budgétaire pour la production audiovisuelle ......................................... 4 1. Bilan de la Commission de Sélection des Films (courts et longs métrages, téléfilms et collections, programmes télévisuels) .................................. 6 1.1 Examen des projets ........................................................................................ 6 1.2 Promesses d’aide sélective attribuées en 2003 ............................................. 7 1.3 Liste des films soutenus ................................................................................. 8 2. Subventions à la diffusion et primes à la qualité ................................................... 16 3. Coproductions entre les producteurs indépendants et les télévisions (RTBF / RTL-TVi / Canal + / AB3) ............................................... 17 4. Ateliers d’accueil, de production et ateliers d’école.............................................. 18 5. Promotion et diffusion ............................................................................................ 18 5.1 Aides à la promotion ..................................................................................... 18 5.2 Aides à la diffusion ....................................................................................... -
The US Asiatic Fleet's Gray-Zone Deterrence Campaign Against Japan, 1937–40
Naval War College Review Volume 72 Article 9 Number 3 Summer 2019 2019 “They Were Playing Chicken”—The .SU . Asiatic Fleet’s Gray-Zone Deterrence Campaign against Japan, 1937–40 Hunter Stires Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Stires, Hunter (2019) "“They eW re Playing Chicken”—The .SU . Asiatic Fleet’s Gray-Zone Deterrence Campaign against Japan, 1937–40," Naval War College Review: Vol. 72 : No. 3 , Article 9. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss3/9 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Stires: “They Were Playing Chicken”—The U.S. Asiatic Fleet’s Gray-Zone De “THEY WERE PLAYING CHICKEN” The U.S. Asiatic Fleet’s Gray-Zone Deterrence Campaign against Japan, 1937–40 Hunter Stires he United States is facing a significant strategic challenge to its interests, al- lies, and leadership of the liberal world order from an increasingly wealthy, Twell-armed, and assertively nationalistic China� Whether through the seizure of maritime features and the construction of artificial island fortifications in the South China Sea, the aggressive use of maritime law enforcement to articulate and impose its nationalistic territorial claims on its neighbors, or attempts to re- strict military and civilian freedom of navigation in international waters, Chinese forces are working to undermine and revise the political and geopolitical status quo in East Asia�1 These subtly assertive steps, which stop short of open warfare, constitute a category of activity known to contemporary military thinkers as gray-zone aggression�2 Current U�S� policy makers and the forces at their com- mand struggle to find effective countermeasures Hunter Stires is a fellow at the John B. -
The Dutch Strategic and Operational Approach in the Indonesian War of Independence, 1945– 1949
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 46, Nr 2, 2018. doi: 10.5787/46-2-1237 THE DUTCH STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL APPROACH IN THE INDONESIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1945– 1949 Leopold Scholtz1 North-West University Abstract The Indonesian War of Independence (1945–1949) and the Dutch attempt to combat the insurgency campaign by the Indonesian nationalists provides an excellent case study of how not to conduct a counter-insurgency war. In this article, it is reasoned that the Dutch security strategic objective – a smokescreen of autonomy while keeping hold of political power – was unrealistic. Their military strategic approach was very deficient. They approached the war with a conventional war mind- set, thinking that if they could merely reoccupy the whole archipelago and take the nationalist leaders prisoner, that it would guarantee victory. They also mistreated the indigenous population badly, including several mass murders and other war crimes, and ensured that the population turned against them. There was little coordination between the civilian and military authorities. Two conventional mobile operations, while conducted professionally, actually enlarged the territory to be pacified and weakened the Dutch hold on the country. By early 1949, it was clear that the Dutch had lost the war, mainly because the Dutch made a series of crucial mistakes, such as not attempting to win the hearts and minds of the local population. In addition, the implacable opposition by the United States made their war effort futile. Keywords: Indonesian War of Independence, Netherlands, insurgency, counter- insurgency, police actions, strategy, operations, tactics, Dutch army Introduction Analyses of counter-insurgency operations mostly concentrate on the well- known conflicts – the French and Americans in Vietnam, the British in Malaya and Kenya, the French in Algeria, the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, the Ian Smith government in Rhodesia, the South Africans in Namibia, et cetera. -
Music Chapel FESTIVAL Les Flagey Deutsch- Academy Lands
trimestriel / driemaandelijks 01.12.19 –– 29.02.20 music chapel FESTIVAL les flagey Deutsch- academy lands — -l. 02 641.10.20 TICKETS (ONLINE : WWW.FLAGEY.BE) Billetterie : Place Sainte-Croix, 1050 Bruxelles Ticketshop : Heilig Kruisplein, 1050 Brussel mardi > vendredi : 12 > 17h dinsdag > vrijdag : 12 > 17u music 10 En dehors de ces horaires, Flagey est également Buiten deze uren is Flagey dagelijks ook één meet 55 ouvert une heure avant le début de chaque activité. uur voor de start van elk evenement geopend. 2 junior 58 + Call center : mar > ven : 12 > 17h — t. 02 641 10 20 Callcenter : din > vrij : 12 > 17u — t. 02 641 10 20 3 cinema 64 Ticket shop : Place Sainte-Croix, 1050 Brussels Ticketshop : Place Sainte-Croix, 1050 Brüssel info 108 Tuesday > Friday : 12 pm > 5 pm Dienstag > Freitag : 12:00 > 17:00 calendar 112 INFO Outside these hours, Flagey is also open Außerhalb dieser Zeiten ist Flagey auch eine Stunde one hour before each activity. vor dem Anfang jeder Veranstaltung offen. Call center : Tue > Fri : 12 > 5 pm — t. 02 641 10 20 Callcenter : Di > Fr : 12:00 > 17:00 — t. 02 641 10 20 FLAGEY D’ IXELLE AN S ELSENSESTW NICE PRICE BY BNP PARIBAS FORTIS BUS CH . MALIBR B O PLACE ON FLAGEY D AE PLEIN L BUS Tout au long de l’année, une série d’événements sont B TRAM O OND A ALSES Lars Vogt © NEDA NAVAEE, P. 50 T marqués d’un label “Nice Price by BNP Paribas GA N T W AA LEUR L V E Fortis”. Ces événements sont offerts au public à un prix AT GAUL RA 1 EST DE ÉDÈR LV . -
Part I - Updated Estimate Of
Part I - Updated Estimate of Fair Market Value of the S.S. Keewatin in September 2018 05 October 2018 Part I INDEX PART I S.S. KEEWATIN – ESTIMATE OF FAIR MARKET VALUE SEPTEMBER 2018 SCHEDULE A – UPDATED MUSEUM SHIPS SCHEDULE B – UPDATED COMPASS MARITIME SERVICES DESKTOP VALUATION CERTIFICATE SCHEDULE C – UPDATED VALUATION REPORT ON MACHINERY, EQUIPMENT AND RELATED ASSETS SCHEDULE D – LETTER FROM BELLEHOLME MANAGEMENT INC. PART II S.S. KEEWATIN – ESTIMATE OF FAIR MARKET VALUE NOVEMBER 2017 SCHEDULE 1 – SHIPS LAUNCHED IN 1907 SCHEDULE 2 – MUSEUM SHIPS APPENDIX 1 – JUSTIFICATION FOR OUTSTANDING SIGNIFICANCE & NATIONAL IMPORTANCE OF S.S. KEEWATIN 1907 APPENDIX 2 – THE NORTH AMERICAN MARINE, INC. REPORT OF INSPECTION APPENDIX 3 – COMPASS MARITIME SERVICES INDEPENDENT VALUATION REPORT APPENDIX 4 – CULTURAL PERSONAL PROPERTY VALUATION REPORT APPENDIX 5 – BELLEHOME MANAGEMENT INC. 5 October 2018 The RJ and Diane Peterson Keewatin Foundation 311 Talbot Street PO Box 189 Port McNicoll, ON L0K 1R0 Ladies & Gentlemen We are pleased to enclose an Updated Valuation Report, setting out, at September 2018, our Estimate of Fair Market Value of the Museum Ship S.S. Keewatin, which its owner, Skyline (Port McNicoll) Development Inc., intends to donate to the RJ and Diane Peterson Keewatin Foundation (the “Foundation”). It is prepared to accompany an application by the Foundation for the Canadian Cultural Property Export Review Board. This Updated Valuation Report, for the reasons set out in it, estimates the Fair Market Value of a proposed donation of the S.S. Keewatin to the Foundation at FORTY-EIGHT MILLION FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($48,475,000) and the effective date is the date of this Report. -
The Report of the Inquiry Into Unresolved Recognition for Past Acts of Naval and Military Gallantry and Valour
Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal THE REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO UNRESOLVED RECOGNITION FOR PAST ACTS OF NAVAL AND MILITARY GALLANTRY AND VALOUR THE REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO UNRESOLVED RECOGNITION FOR PAST ACTS OF NAVAL AND MILITARY GALLANTRY AND VALOUR This publication has been published by the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal. Copies of this publication are available on the Tribunal’s website: www.defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au © Commonwealth of Australia 2013 This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission from the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal. Editing and design by Biotext, Canberra. LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL INQUIRY INTO UNRESOLVED RECOGNITION FOR PAST ACTS OF NAVAL AND MILITARY GALLANTRY AND VALOUR Senator The Hon. David Feeney Parliamentary Secretary for Defence Parliament House Canberra ACT 2600 Dear Parliamentary Secretary, I am pleased to present the report of the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal’s Inquiry into Unresolved Recognition for Past Acts of Naval and Military Gallantry and Valour. The Inquiry was conducted in accordance with the Terms of Reference. The Tribunal that conducted the Inquiry arrived unanimously at the findings and recommendations set out in this report. In accordance with the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal Procedural Rules 2011, this report will be published on the Tribunal’s website — www.defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au — 20 working days after -
Admiral Thomas C. Hart and the Demise of the Asiatic Fleet 1941 – 1942
East Tennessee State University Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Student Works 5-2014 Admiral Thomas C. Hart And The eD mise Of The Asiatic Fleet 1941 – 1942 David DuBois East Tennessee State University Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.etsu.edu/etd Part of the Asian History Commons, Military History Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation DuBois, David, "Admiral Thomas C. Hart And The eD mise Of The Asiatic Fleet 1941 – 1942" (2014). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 2331. https://dc.etsu.edu/etd/2331 This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works at Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Admiral Thomas C. Hart And The Demise Of The Asiatic Fleet 1941 – 1942 A thesis presented to the faculty of the Department of History East Tennessee State University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in History by David DuBois May 2014 Dr. Emmett M. Essin III, Chair Dr. Stephen G. Fritz Dr. John M. Rankin Keywords: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U.S. Navy WWII, Asiatic Fleet, ABDA, USS Houston, Battle of the Java Sea ABSTRACT Admiral Thomas C. Hart And The Demise Of The Asiatic Fleet 1941 – 1942 by David DuBois Admiral Thomas C. Hart And The Demise Of The Asiatic Fleet 1941 – 1942 is a chronicle of the opening days of World War II in the Pacific and the demise of the U.S. -
The Nafziger
THE NAFZIGER ORDERS OF BATTLE COLLECTION FINDING A ID DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE IN PDF FORMAT AT: http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/nafziger.htm This collection contains a compilation of orders of battle from 1600 to 1945. Sources range from published works to primary archival documents. Most orders of battle break down to the regimental level and many contain information regarding the availability of strength figures and artillery equipment. FILE NAME: DOCUMENT TITLE: 625XAA Distribution, Imperial Forces of Holy Roman Empire, 1625 625XHRA Army of the Holy Roman Empire, 1625 626XAA Distribution, Imperial Forces of Holy Roman Empire, 1626 626XHRA Army of the Holy Roman Empire, 1626 627XHRA Army of the Holy Roman Empire, 1627 628XAA Distribution, Imperial Forces of Holy Roman Empire, 1628 628XHRA Army of the Holy Roman Empire, 1628 629XHRA Army of the Holy Roman Empire, 1629 630XHRA Army of the Holy Roman Empire, 1630 631BAA Distribution of the Imperial Army in Northern Germany, February 1631 631CAA Swedish Army, 7 March 1631 631IAA Swedish and Saxon Forces, Battle of Breitenfeld, 17 September 1631 631IAB Imperial Forces, Battle of Breitenfeld, 17 September 1631 631JAA Swedish and Associated Protestant Armies, October-November 1631 631XAA Swedish Reinforcements Sent to Germany 1631 631XHRA Army of the Holy Roman Empire, 1631 632CAA Protestant Army, Donauworth, March 1632 632CAB Tilly's (Catholic) Army on the Danube, March 1632 632HAA Swedish Main Army, Battle of Alte Veste, (by Nurnberg) 29 August 1632 632KAA Catholic Army in Germany, November 1632 632KAB -
Bilan 2004 Du Centre Du Cinéma Et De L
2004 Bilan de la production, de la promotion et de la diffusion cinématographiques et audiovisuelles Centre du Cinéma et de l’Audiovisuel Service général de l’Audiovisuel et des Multimédias Ministère de la Communauté française de Belgique SOMMAIRE INTRODUCTION Le Centre du Cinéma et de l’Audiovisuel CHAPITRE I Bilan de la Commission de Sélection des Films (courts et longs métrages, téléfilms et collections, programmes télévisuels) CHAPITRE II Subventions à la diffusion et primes à la qualité CHAPITRE III Coproductions entre les producteurs indépendants et les télévisions (RTBF / RTL-TVI / BE TV / AB3/MCM) CHAPITRE IV Ateliers d’accueil, de production et ateliers d’écoles CHAPITRE V Promotion et diffusion CHAPITRE VI Aides européennes et relations internationales CHAPITRE VII Comité de Concertation du Centre du Cinéma et de l’Audiovisuel ANNEXES - Production - Promotion - Diffusion - Exploitation p. 3 TABLE DES MATIÈRES Introduction 11 1. Le Centre du Cinéma et de l’Audiovisuel 11 2. Enveloppe budgétaire pour la production audiovisuelle 2004 12 Chapitre I Bilan de la Commission de Sélection des Films 15 Généralités 17 1. Rôle et fonctionnement de la Commission 18 2. Composition de la Commission de Sélection des Films 19 Bilan 22 1. Aides aux courts métrages 23 1.1 Généralités 23 1.2 Aides à la production et à la finition 23 1er collège 24 2ème collège 27 2. Aides aux longs métrages 30 2.1 Aides à l’écriture 30 1er collège 31 2ème collège 32 2.2 Aides à la production et à la finition 33 Majoritaires belges 1er collège 34 Majoritaires belges 2ème collège 35 Majoritaires belges 3ème collège 36 Minoritaires belges 1er collège 37 Minoritaires belges 2ème collège 37 3. -
1 You Engage and Then You See Willem G. J. Remmelink Leiden, 24
1 You Engage and Then You See Willem G. J. Remmelink Leiden, 24 September 2018 Much has been said and written about the Battle of the Java Sea. For foreign readers, however, a comprehensive account from the Japanese side has been lacking until now. As we all know, the battle was a major victory for the Imperial Japanese Navy. Nevertheless, the official communiqué from Imperial General Headquarters was remarkably terse. The lack of any detail, except for the explicit mention of the length of the battle, shows that the high command of the Navy was non-plussed, if not dismayed, by the length of this almost eight- hour long battle. Decisive battles were not supposed to last that long. It is something that also struck Samuel Morison, the first western historian of the battle.1 “That [the battle] lasted so long was,” in his eyes, “due to Admiral Doorman’s stubborn determination and the admirable manner in which men of the three Allied Navies under his command fought and fought until they could fight no more.” Without taking anything away from the valor and determination of Doorman and his men, we now know that there were other factors that crucially determined the length of this battle. Like all navies in the interbellum years, the Japanese Navy was obsessed with the idea of a decisive battle that would be decided in a matter of minutes because of the great progress made in gun and torpedo fire. This led to a basic naval doctrine that was wedded to big guns and capital ships.