Republican Guard divisions looked pretty bold—until they got sliced and diced by coalition airpower. Saddam’s Elite In the Meat Grinder

By Rebecca Grant

USAF photo by MSgt. Terry L. Blevins

’LL TELL you up front that our ‘ sensors show that the pre- ponderance of the Republican Guard divisions that were out- Iside of Baghdad are now dead.” That announcement, made on April 5 by Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, the head of air operations for Op- eration Iraqi Freedom, was a sig- nificant moment. It was barely two weeks into Gulf War II and airpower already had ef- fectively neutralized Saddam Hus- sein’s Republican Guard forces— the cream of the crop of Iraq’s Army and the main military obstacle to the capture of Baghdad. Guard forces outnumbered coa- lition forces at the start of the war. These elite, experienced, profes- sional soldiers were willing and able to put up an organized fight. They had helped to keep Saddam in power for two decades. Destroying them signaled that Saddam’s con- trol over Iraq was about to collapse for good. Early in their existence, Republi- Boss Hogs. USAF A-10s, such as he put battle-experienced command- in 1988, the Iraqis took the offen- when a brigade of the Republican ners drew up plans to free Kuwait can Guard units accepted only men these lined up at Tallil Air Base in ers. sive,” said Westenhoff, “and Kho- Guard’s Hammurabi division marched and reduce Iraq’s offensive military from Saddam’s hometown area of Iraq, were key to the coalition air “The people at the top were mili- meini threw in the towel.” south. power, the effectiveness of Saddam’s Tikrit and did not demand special strikes that shredded Saddam’s tary professionals, albeit with loy- The success of the revitalized Re- When Iraq invaded Kuwait on Aug. key force was a prime concern. military experience. That changed alty to Saddam,” said Col. Charles publican Guard gave it considerable 2, 1990, Republican Guard forces Operation Desert Storm in 1991 Republican Guard units. with the 1980-88 IranÐIraq War, M. Westenhoff, chief of the Air stature in Iraq. Its soldiers were vol- spearheaded the main offensive. The called for intense air strikes on the which was also the event that estab- Staff’s Checkmate operational as- unteers who got better military train- Hammurabi and Nebuchadnezzar di- Republican Guard. The Tawakalna lished Iraq as a menacing regional sessment office. Soon, the most ca- ing and pay than the rest of the Iraqi visions attacked from the north. The division was hit hardest, and it military power. The enemy was led pable of Iraq’s military forces were Army. The elite force also got So- Medina and Tawakalna divisions struck quickly fell to the advancing US by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, installed in the Republican Guards. viet military assistance, including from the west. Once Kuwait fell, regu- Army VII Corps. Iran’s supreme Islamic authority. This “accelerated Darwinian process,” thousands of tanks, armored person- lar Iraqi Army divisions stocked with However, elements of the Medina In 1986, Iraqi forces captured the as Westenhoff called it, quickly de- nel carriers, and artillery pieces. conscript troops moved forward to the and Hammurabi divisions used short, Iranian town of Mehran only to lose livered results in battle. Newly All that made the Republican Saudi border, while the Republican sharp engagements with coalition it again in a humiliating defeat. That formed Republican Guard units sent Guard, in 1990, the leading force Guard divisions pulled back to con- ground forces to screen the retreat of prompted Saddam to replace the po- to meet Iranian attacks in 1987 and in Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. solidate a strategic line of defense the main body. Losses of high-qual- litical hacks from Tikrit that infested early 1988 turned the tide. And the first tip-off of the impend- farther north. ity T-72 tanks and other equipment his Republican Guard. In their place, “In a series of four major battles ing invasion came in mid-July 1990 As the US and its coalition part- were great, but significant elements Republican Guard divisions looked pretty bold—until they got sliced and diced by coalition airpower. Saddam’s Elite In the Meat Grinder

By Rebecca Grant

USAF photo by MSgt. Terry L. Blevins

’LL TELL you up front that our ‘ sensors show that the pre- ponderance of the Republican Guard divisions that were out- Iside of Baghdad are now dead.” That announcement, made on April 5 by Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, the head of air operations for Op- eration Iraqi Freedom, was a sig- nificant moment. It was barely two weeks into Gulf War II and airpower already had ef- fectively neutralized Saddam Hus- sein’s Republican Guard forces— the cream of the crop of Iraq’s Army and the main military obstacle to the capture of Baghdad. Guard forces outnumbered coa- lition forces at the start of the war. These elite, experienced, profes- sional soldiers were willing and able to put up an organized fight. They had helped to keep Saddam in power for two decades. Destroying them signaled that Saddam’s con- trol over Iraq was about to collapse for good. Early in their existence, Republi- Boss Hogs. USAF A-10s, such as he put battle-experienced command- in 1988, the Iraqis took the offen- when a brigade of the Republican ners drew up plans to free Kuwait can Guard units accepted only men these lined up at Tallil Air Base in ers. sive,” said Westenhoff, “and Kho- Guard’s Hammurabi division marched and reduce Iraq’s offensive military from Saddam’s hometown area of Iraq, were key to the coalition air “The people at the top were mili- meini threw in the towel.” south. power, the effectiveness of Saddam’s Tikrit and did not demand special strikes that shredded Saddam’s tary professionals, albeit with loy- The success of the revitalized Re- When Iraq invaded Kuwait on Aug. key force was a prime concern. military experience. That changed alty to Saddam,” said Col. Charles publican Guard gave it considerable 2, 1990, Republican Guard forces Operation Desert Storm in 1991 Republican Guard units. with the 1980-88 IranÐIraq War, M. Westenhoff, chief of the Air stature in Iraq. Its soldiers were vol- spearheaded the main offensive. The called for intense air strikes on the which was also the event that estab- Staff’s Checkmate operational as- unteers who got better military train- Hammurabi and Nebuchadnezzar di- Republican Guard. The Tawakalna lished Iraq as a menacing regional sessment office. Soon, the most ca- ing and pay than the rest of the Iraqi visions attacked from the north. The division was hit hardest, and it military power. The enemy was led pable of Iraq’s military forces were Army. The elite force also got So- Medina and Tawakalna divisions struck quickly fell to the advancing US by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, installed in the Republican Guards. viet military assistance, including from the west. Once Kuwait fell, regu- Army VII Corps. Iran’s supreme Islamic authority. This “accelerated Darwinian process,” thousands of tanks, armored person- lar Iraqi Army divisions stocked with However, elements of the Medina In 1986, Iraqi forces captured the as Westenhoff called it, quickly de- nel carriers, and artillery pieces. conscript troops moved forward to the and Hammurabi divisions used short, Iranian town of Mehran only to lose livered results in battle. Newly All that made the Republican Saudi border, while the Republican sharp engagements with coalition it again in a humiliating defeat. That formed Republican Guard units sent Guard, in 1990, the leading force Guard divisions pulled back to con- ground forces to screen the retreat of prompted Saddam to replace the po- to meet Iranian attacks in 1987 and in Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. solidate a strategic line of defense the main body. Losses of high-qual- litical hacks from Tikrit that infested early 1988 turned the tide. And the first tip-off of the impend- farther north. ity T-72 tanks and other equipment his Republican Guard. In their place, “In a series of four major battles ing invasion came in mid-July 1990 As the US and its coalition part- were great, but significant elements of the Republican Guard made it safely back to Iraq.

After the Storm Military analyst Anthony H. Cordes- man, in a 1998 Center for Strategic and International Studies report, said the Republican Guard after Gulf War

I had as many as 600 T-72s and 300 USAF photo by SSgt. Cherie A. Thurlby T-62s, for a total of about 900 top- of-the line tanks. Soviet T-55s also remained in the arsenal. There was no doubt the Republican Guard re- mained a cohesive and comparatively well-equipped fighting force. In fact, Westenhoff said before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom that the Guard had more than twice as many tanks as coalition forces and probably about twice as many artillery pieces in the theater. On Target. Joint Direct Attack Munitions, such as this one being prepped for Military planners knew that Sad- a B-1B bomber, provided the precision needed for B-1s and B-52s to fly close dam’s ability to preserve his regime air support missions in Gulf War II. rested with the Republican Guard. They alone had the means to orga- roughly 30 miles outside the city of greatly simplifying the Republican nize and conduct counterattacks Baghdad. “They were put in block- Guard’s job. And, while speed and against coalition forces. ing positions around Baghdad, es- lethality were bred-in-the-bone ad- Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Leaf—the Air sentially to the north, south, and vantages for US and allied forces, Force point man who worked di- west,” said Westenhoff. All the Re- the strategy of moving ahead fast rectly with Army Lt. Gen. David D. publican Guard units were combat with relatively few forces carried McKiernan, the coalition forces land ready. The strength of these divi- some risk—namely that the ground component commander—said that sions was at least 80 percent in all forces would move beyond their sup- did not mean the coalition could dis- cases and as high as 90 percent in ply lines and expose their flanks. miss the other Iraqi forces. How- some units. The Republican Guard might easily ever, Leaf explained, “It was clear The coalition battle plan called exploit such a vulnerability. that the main effort was going to be for swift ground force advances to- The Republican Guard “had the the defeat of the Republican Guard.” ward Baghdad, from the north and capability to counterattack, which I Before the coalition launched OIF, south. Turkey’s last-minute decision would not have credited to the other Republican Guard forces left their to prohibit ground operations from Iraqi forces,” said Westenhoff. “One garrisons and took up positions its soil left only a southern thrust, of the things I observed was that our forces, as they went into Iraq, were equipped for offense. They weren’t as well-equipped for defense.” The US and its allies had a ground force smaller than that assembled for Desert Storm. In Gulf War II, US Army’s V Corps and 1st Marine Ex- peditionary Force, along with British forces, were to lead ground opera- tions. In Gulf War I, there were two

USAF photo by MSgt. Dave Ahlschwede Army corps, an MEF, and another corps of multinational Arab forces under Saudi and Egyptian leadership. At the start of Gulf War II ground operations, V Corps was at less than full strength. The full V Corps would have had four artillery brigades; in- stead, said Westenhoff, “We had one and a bit of those artillery brigades.” If V Corps had possessed its four artillery brigades, he said, they, along with available attack helicopters, No Time to Hide. USAF F-16s, such as these deployed from Spangdahlem AB, Germany, flew hundreds of strike sorties that helped destroy the unit would have been able to fight off a cohesion of Republican Guard divisions. Guard assault.

42 AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2003 To counter that shortfall, coali- “cost us, basically, a full night of ment locations, and in the vicinity, tion air attacks on Republican Guard fixed-target strikes inside the FSCL,” and therefore presumed to be dis- units began on the first night of the said Leaf. “We—the entire coalition persal or tactical sites, for the Medina war. On March 19 (Baghdad time), team—had not hit our stride in division.” two USAF F-117 stealth fighters achieving the command and control However, Pentagon officials noted struck a Baghdad site where Saddam required to operate in volume effec- that Republican Guard divisions were Hussein was thought to be hiding; at tively inside the fire support coordi- not sitting ducks. In an ABC TV the same time, 40 carrier-launched nation line.” interview on March 30, Secretary of Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles It became clear that fixed-wing at- Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld warned struck a Republican Guard facility tack aircraft—USAF bombers and Air that, as coalition ground forces and an intelligence headquarters in Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and al- moved forward to deal with the Re- another part of Baghdad. The next lied fighters—were the weapon of publican Guard, “that very likely will night, 10 TLAMs hit several Repub- choice for destroying the Republican be the most difficult fighting days lican Guard targets in Kirkuk. Guard. Leaf noted, too, that “FSCL that the coalition will face.” Soon, hundreds of sorties were placement became somewhat less of As in Gulf War I, the Republican being flown daily against Republi- an issue,” because the air-ground team Guard always had a plan. Guard di- can Guard positions throughout Iraq. got better at coordinating actions visions were adept at small-unit de- “The first area of concern was the within the various kill boxes. fensive fights and demonstrated their Medina division because of their The weight of the airpower effort prowess near Najaf, where they en- deployment south of Baghdad on a was such that it became hard to tell gaged US Army troops. Leaf noted major avenue of approach” for V which Republican Guard units were that one American unit, C Troop of Corps, said Leaf. The Hammurabi taking the brunt of the coalition’s at- the 7th Cavalry’s 3rd Squadron, sud- division was tucked in behind Me- tacks. Joint Chiefs of Staff spokesman denly found itself “surrounded and dina, he noted. Army Maj. Gen. Stanley A. Mc- taking fire from three sides.” So close Some Republican Guard forces Chrystal said on March 31 that coali- was the fighting that Iraqi soldiers also were moving south—cautiously, tion air had flown 1,000 sorties over were being killed by ricochets of and in small formations—ostensibly Iraq that day—a typical day. their own rocket-propelled grenades. to meet the coalition advance. Leaf Fixed-wing air strikes simply Some US soldiers ran out of ammu- said that “some significant pieces” shredded Republican Guard unit co- nition and left their vehicles to pick- of the southern-deployed Republi- hesion. And that became a problem up AK-47s from dead Iraqi soldiers can Guard units were part of the in itself, according to Leaf. “so they had something to shoot initial element that met coalition “I think that one of the real chal- back,” said Leaf. forces around An Nasiriyah and Basra lenges in doing our targeting of At the time, he continued, “I think early in the war. At the land compo- [Guard] units was their loss of unit it would have been reasonable for nent headquarters, Leaf said, he also identity,” said Leaf. “We had a hodge- some Iraqi tactical leaders to think saw signs that some of the Republi- podge.” He went on, “We couldn’t they were seizing an opportunity” to can Guard forces were moving into really tell you we were attacking the turn around the war. new positions to reinforce the de- Medina division; we could say we fense of Baghdad. were attacking forces which were in Bombers Fly CAS Although air strikes had taken a traditional Medina division deploy- The action around Najaf contin- toll, said Leaf, it was clear that the Republican Guard was still function- ing.

Costly Mistake It was at this point that the Army blundered. It decided to use some 30 of its AH-64 Apache helicopters to attack the Republican Guard. It didn’t work. Instead, the Apaches “came USMC photo by MSgt. Buzz Farrell under intense enemy fire,” said Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace, V Corps commander, and had to retreat. Many of the aircraft were severely dam- aged. The helicopter attack also had a limiting effect on other airpower operations. Sorties by fixed-wing aircraft were reduced to make way for the Apache action, and the fire support coordination line in the sec- tor was moved dozens of miles far- The Remains. A field near Najaf—the site of a three-day battle—is littered ther out in front of coalition forces. with the carcasses of Iraqi T-55 tanks. Coalition fixed-wing aircraft decimated The decision to move the FSCL Iraqi forces.

AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2003 43 April 5, the 3rd Infantry Division made its show-of-force “thunder run” into Baghdad.

“We’re Killing Them” Moseley, the air component com- mander, said of the airpower contri- bution: “I find it interesting when USAF photo by 1st Lt. Daniel Triplett folks say we’re softening them up. We’re not softening them up. We’re killing them.” Moseley went on, “I would not tell you the Republican Guard is 100 percent gone. I believe they are gone in organized division strength, corps strength, brigade strength, but I be- lieve there are still some survivors out there that are still willing to fight.” He added that the dispersed survi- vors would “continue to cause a prob- BUFF on Call. One B-52, working with information supplied by an E-8 Joint lem for us.” STARS, “summarily destroyed” Iraqi forces attempting to flank a US Army unit His comments, however, left no during the action around Najaf. doubt that the Republican Guard had come to the end of the road as an ued for three days, during which two responsive airpower had been against organized fighting force. No longer USAF bombers played a key role in priority targets for the ground forces. would Saddam’s regime enjoy their turning the battle into a coalition “The Republican Guard has been protection. Small units might still victory. Leaf argued that one B-1B taking a pounding for some days now,” resist, but the road to Baghdad was and one B-52 ensured “the Iraqi at- Rumsfeld said in an April 1 press open, and coalition forces took con- tacks were defeated in detail.” briefing, “and some of the Republi- trol of the city on April 9. The air controller with C Troop can Guard units from up north have Air commanders, in particular, called for assistance and relayed been brought down south to try and were quick to credit all forces for the coordinates to the bombers, which reinforce Republican Guard units in smashing coalition victory. Unlike were already airborne and on call to the south that have been badly weak- in the 1991 war, Republican Guard provide close air support. The B-1B ened. That process goes on. They’re forces did not escape destruction crew targeted the Republican Guard being attacked from the air. They’re because of poor coordination between forces with precision guided muni- being pressured from the ground. And, air and land forces. No such problem tions, which were devastating in their in good time, they won’t be there.” occurred this time. effect. Then, a Joint STARS battle On April 2, McChrystal announced, Leaf pointed out that the effect of management aircraft picked up a sec- “I would say that the Medina and closely integrated airpower and land ond element of Iraqi forces moving Baghdad divisions are no longer cred- power was, at times, “absolutely down the highway from Al Hillah. ible forces.” devastating.” He emphasized, though, They were engaged by the B-52 and Leaf’s reviews of aircrew mission that it was airpower that removed “summarily destroyed,” said Leaf. reports confirmed those statements. from the Republican Guard the abil- The weight of the continuous air “They [coalition crews] were find- ity to choose the “time and place” of strikes was having a clear effect. ing so much to kill” that “there was engagement. “So the engagement At the land component headquar- a sense of both opportunity and ef- came on our terms.” ters, Leaf and his staff officers were fect coming across the wires.” Leaf Airpower, because it was precise able to review and update Republi- believed that most of the Republican and persistent, wreaked maximum can Guard targets using data col- Guards forces “were being ... deci- destruction on the Republican Guard lected by Joint STARS and Global mated, to the point that the land ad- units, breaking their military cohe- Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle sen- vance could accelerate to Baghdad.” sion, and, ultimately, dissolving the sors. Leaf’s staff displayed, on a He added, “And then it did.” divisions into knots of abandoned three-dimensional map of the battle- Coalition ground forces picked up equipment. “In essence, in the last field, the coordinates of each air their pace and, by the evening of week of March and first week of weapon dropped. April 2, were within about 30 miles April, the Republican Guard was “It wasn’t full-blown [battle dam- of Baghdad. Three days later, on neutralized,” said Westenhoff. ■ age assessment],” Leaf said, but, within 24 hours, he could display for Rebecca Grant is a contributing editor of Air Force Magazine. She is president McKiernan’s staff an “operational- of IRIS Independent Research in Washington, D.C., and has worked for RAND, level portrayal of the effects” of the the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Grant is a air strikes. The rough BDA helped fellow of the Eaker Institute for Aerospace Concepts, the public policy and show the cumulative impact of the research arm of the Air Force Association’s Aerospace Education Foundation. air strikes and demonstrated how Her most recent article, “Hand in Glove,” appeared in the July issue.

44 AIR FORCE Magazine / September 2003