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UNDERSTANDING the DEFENSE STRATEGY of SADDAM HUSSEIN by Ibrahim Al-Marashi*

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UNDERSTANDING the DEFENSE STRATEGY of SADDAM HUSSEIN by Ibrahim Al-Marashi* THE STRUGGLE FOR IRAQ: UNDERSTANDING THE DEFENSE STRATEGY OF SADDAM HUSSEIN By Ibrahim al-Marashi* This article analyzes how the Iraqi regime portrayed the war to its people and conducted it on both a military and political level. Using earlier captured Iraqi documents it analyzes the regime's strategies and techniques for both controlling and mobilizing the population. Saddam's choice of a defensive strategy to force a lengthy war of attrition was his best possible one, based on his hope that his enemies would lack the patience or courage to continue the war and also that domestic and international pressures would force his opponents to let his regime survive. "Military training is the central path that implication was that Saddam was fighting has no substitute, to make the soldier for all the Arabs and that he would win a proficient in militarism and able to serve tremendous and total victory. the Iraqi nation, the people and Arab nation That earlier battle, which took place in from this location." 637 AD, led by the Arab general Sa'd ibn Waqqas lasted for three days, resulting in The President Leader, Saddam the death of both the Persian general Hussein (1) Rustum as well as the end of Persian Sassanian rule in Iraq.(2) The collapse of While there has been massive coverage the Zoroastrian Iranian forces at al- and analysis of the 2003 Anglo-American Qadisiyya allowed the Arabs to spread war with Iraq regarding the Western Islam eastward, thus giving the battle a perspective of the fighting, relatively little religious significance. As Ofra Bengio has attention has been paid to how the war was written, "The myths woven around al- waged from the Iraqi side, tactically or Qadisiyya are a most instructive example conceptually. For example, the Anglo- of the Ba'thi technique of using an event American operation's official name was with a core historical truth that is deeply "Iraqi Freedom," and most Arab circles etched into collective memory in order to called it "al-Harb al-Khalijiyya al-Thalitha" further the party's ideology of Arab (The Third Gulf War) but what did the nationalism and to appeal to the public by Saddam regime call it? means of a challenge of great emotional The Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 was power."(3) not referred to as such in the official Iraqi Thus, by invoking the name of al- discourse but rather as Qadisiyat Saddam, Qadisiyya, Saddam justified his war as a coupling the leader's name with the first continuation of the struggle between battle ever fought in history between the Persian and Arab. Saddam's label of the Persians and Arabs, in which the Arab Iran-Iraq war as al-Qadisiyya revealed his Muslims emerged victorious. The vision of how the war should end: a Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003) 1 Ibrahim al-Marashi decisive Arab victory over the Persian achieve a spectacular sequence of rapid masses, leading to the complete surrender military victories."(5) of the Iranian nation. Saddam, too, can be said to have The 1991 Gulf war was termed combined serious misperceptions of the "Operation Desert Storm" by the Coalition world, including a profound belief in forces, while Saddam used the term, "Umm conspiracies, with a shrewd sense of the Kul al-Ma'arik" or "the Mother of all political behavior and strategies required Battles". This euphemistic title for the by his position. Claims of conspiracies also 1991 war reveals Saddam's emphasis on justified many of the regime's policies and the scope and severity of the impending garnered loyalty to them by the security war with the United States. Nevertheless, apparatus and sometimes by the population the regime believed it would emerge at large. victorious. In a military memo circulated As one example of the regime's use of among military units it states, "We are this method, here are two statements guaranteed victory because we are standing justifying Iraq's possession and possible up to 30 nations, and that is a point of pride use of chemical weapons in an official for us."(4) This statement infers that if the training manual.(6) These weapons were regime survives the "mother of all battles" needed: that would mean a victory no matter what happened on the battlefield itself. And by …as a result of the American- this measure, the regime could well claim Zionist union against our country in to have won the 1991 war. order to steal the natural resources Saddam euphemistically referred to of the Arab world, under an Iraqi Operation Freedom as Ma'rakat Al- international umbrella and the Hawasim, "The Defining Battle," to decision of the Security Council mobilize the Iraqi masses against the and the distortion of facts by some impending American attack in 2003. of the traitorous Arab leaders like Perhaps the rhetorical use of this title the [king of Saudi Arabia] and indicated that this was the final, defining [President] Husni Mubarak [of battle of the regime. Like almost Egypt]. And as a result of the everything that happened in Iraq between concentration of the hostile around 1973 and 2003, that matter was forces…in preparations for highly dependent on the mindset of unleashing hostilities on our dear Saddam Hussein. country: Christopher Andrew of Cambridge [Intelligence] reports have University points out that analysis of indicated the possession of the Saddam Hussein has vacillated between American-Zionist union of characterizing him as a rational, logical chemical weapons, and their ill actor, and a fanatic, isolated from reality. intention to use them against our "The most dangerous fanatics, however, country to increase our losses in combine elements of both--they are shrewd persons, equipments, weapons and operators with deranged views. Though preparations.(7) Hitler was obsessed by the preposterous theory of a Jewish plot for world mastery, Yet it would be a mistake to overstate he was also remarkably astute--outwitting Saddam's irrational side--noting that even Western statesmen before the Second the purveying of conspiracy theories often World War and driving his generals to served as a practical political measure for the regime. Indeed, an examination of 2 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003) The Struggle for Iraq: Understanding the Defense Strategy of Saddam Hussein Saddam's strategy in the 2003 war shows Essentially, Saddam's end game was not how it parallels the strategy that he used in a victory for the Iraqi nation, but a victory 1991. It is vital to make a distinction for the regime itself. As one pre-war between the mistakes Saddam made in assessment put it, most Iraqi military blundering into a war under unfavorable leaders knew "that Iraq cannot resist a U.S. circumstances and his choice of the best assault, but could only hope to make the possible--though limited and difficult-- U.S. entry as costly as possible as soon in option once faced with fighting such a the war as possible, and then to draw out conflict. the fighting into Baghdad to the point In both wars, Saddam realized that he where the U.S. media would make could not achieve a military victory against continued U.S. engagement untenable."(9) vastly superior U.S. forces. His goal in Essentially, this comment echoes the goals both conflicts was to emerge with a laid out for the Iraqi military in the January political victory by ensuring the survival of 14, 1991 directive to the Iraqi army. his regime, just as Nasser had done in 1956 when a losing war guaranteed his place as SADDAM'S DEFENSE STRATEGY champion of the Arab world. The military defense of Iraq was most The manner in which Saddam organized likely coordinated by Saddam through the the defense of Iraq in both wars Ba'th Party Military Bureau, the body demonstrated that his goal was to ensure a which managed Iraqi defense and security protracted conflict, inflicting as many issues during the 1991 Gulf War, as well as Allied casualties as possible, in the hope selected high ranking military officers.(10) that his opponents' impatience, spiritual The Bureau was subordinated to the party weakness or internal conflicts forced them chairman, Saddam Hussein, who was also to give up. its general secretary. Saddam, not the A document dated January 14, 1991, minister of defense, was thus the highest two days before the commencement of military authority in Iraq. Given the nature Operation Desert Storm reveals Saddam's of the system he established, his active and strategy and bears a striking resemblance to direct control was absolutely necessary for the strategy employed during this conflict. the morale and functioning of the Iraqi Directives to commanders of the Iraqi army armed forces and to provide leadership. bluntly indicate that Iraq is at a Prior to the commencement of technological disadvantage: "The enemy Operation Iraqi Freedom, Saddam had has different equipment. There is a divided Iraq into four military command difference between Iraqi soldiers and zones. Yet it appeared that Saddam set the American soldiers in methodology, size, overall strategy along a three-tiered etc." The following directive orders, "Try approach. The first line of defense was the to cause many casualties and have a long regular Iraqi military. The Republican war. Wait underground for the end of the Guard would defend the capital from air attack. Utilize propaganda. Do not leave outside it. The Special Republican Guard Kuwait. Have self-confidence."(8) and the military units of Iraq's intelligence Essentially, the document suggests that the organizations would defend Baghdad from Iraqi army, in the face of overwhelming within.
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