THE STRUGGLE FOR IRAQ: UNDERSTANDING THE DEFENSE STRATEGY OF SADDAM HUSSEIN By Ibrahim al-Marashi*
This article analyzes how the Iraqi regime portrayed the war to its people and conducted it on both a military and political level. Using earlier captured Iraqi documents it analyzes the regime's strategies and techniques for both controlling and mobilizing the population. Saddam's choice of a defensive strategy to force a lengthy war of attrition was his best possible one, based on his hope that his enemies would lack the patience or courage to continue the war and also that domestic and international pressures would force his opponents to let his regime survive.
"Military training is the central path that implication was that Saddam was fighting has no substitute, to make the soldier for all the Arabs and that he would win a proficient in militarism and able to serve tremendous and total victory. the Iraqi nation, the people and Arab nation That earlier battle, which took place in from this location." 637 AD, led by the Arab general Sa'd ibn Waqqas lasted for three days, resulting in The President Leader, Saddam the death of both the Persian general Hussein (1) Rustum as well as the end of Persian Sassanian rule in Iraq.(2) The collapse of While there has been massive coverage the Zoroastrian Iranian forces at al- and analysis of the 2003 Anglo-American Qadisiyya allowed the Arabs to spread war with Iraq regarding the Western Islam eastward, thus giving the battle a perspective of the fighting, relatively little religious significance. As Ofra Bengio has attention has been paid to how the war was written, "The myths woven around al- waged from the Iraqi side, tactically or Qadisiyya are a most instructive example conceptually. For example, the Anglo- of the Ba'thi technique of using an event American operation's official name was with a core historical truth that is deeply "Iraqi Freedom," and most Arab circles etched into collective memory in order to called it "al-Harb al-Khalijiyya al-Thalitha" further the party's ideology of Arab (The Third Gulf War) but what did the nationalism and to appeal to the public by Saddam regime call it? means of a challenge of great emotional The Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 was power."(3) not referred to as such in the official Iraqi Thus, by invoking the name of al- discourse but rather as Qadisiyat Saddam, Qadisiyya, Saddam justified his war as a coupling the leader's name with the first continuation of the struggle between battle ever fought in history between the Persian and Arab. Saddam's label of the Persians and Arabs, in which the Arab Iran-Iraq war as al-Qadisiyya revealed his Muslims emerged victorious. The vision of how the war should end: a Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003) 1
Ibrahim al-Marashi decisive Arab victory over the Persian achieve a spectacular sequence of rapid masses, leading to the complete surrender military victories."(5) of the Iranian nation. Saddam, too, can be said to have The 1991 Gulf war was termed combined serious misperceptions of the "Operation Desert Storm" by the Coalition world, including a profound belief in forces, while Saddam used the term, "Umm conspiracies, with a shrewd sense of the Kul al-Ma'arik" or "the Mother of all political behavior and strategies required Battles". This euphemistic title for the by his position. Claims of conspiracies also 1991 war reveals Saddam's emphasis on justified many of the regime's policies and the scope and severity of the impending garnered loyalty to them by the security war with the United States. Nevertheless, apparatus and sometimes by the population the regime believed it would emerge at large. victorious. In a military memo circulated As one example of the regime's use of among military units it states, "We are this method, here are two statements guaranteed victory because we are standing justifying Iraq's possession and possible up to 30 nations, and that is a point of pride use of chemical weapons in an official for us."(4) This statement infers that if the training manual.(6) These weapons were regime survives the "mother of all battles" needed: that would mean a victory no matter what happened on the battlefield itself. And by …as a result of the American- this measure, the regime could well claim Zionist union against our country in to have won the 1991 war. order to steal the natural resources Saddam euphemistically referred to of the Arab world, under an Iraqi Operation Freedom as Ma'rakat Al- international umbrella and the Hawasim, "The Defining Battle," to decision of the Security Council mobilize the Iraqi masses against the and the distortion of facts by some impending American attack in 2003. of the traitorous Arab leaders like Perhaps the rhetorical use of this title the [king of Saudi Arabia] and indicated that this was the final, defining [President] Husni Mubarak [of battle of the regime. Like almost Egypt]. And as a result of the everything that happened in Iraq between concentration of the hostile around 1973 and 2003, that matter was forces…in preparations for highly dependent on the mindset of unleashing hostilities on our dear Saddam Hussein. country: Christopher Andrew of Cambridge [Intelligence] reports have University points out that analysis of indicated the possession of the Saddam Hussein has vacillated between American-Zionist union of characterizing him as a rational, logical chemical weapons, and their ill actor, and a fanatic, isolated from reality. intention to use them against our "The most dangerous fanatics, however, country to increase our losses in combine elements of both--they are shrewd persons, equipments, weapons and operators with deranged views. Though preparations.(7) Hitler was obsessed by the preposterous theory of a Jewish plot for world mastery, Yet it would be a mistake to overstate he was also remarkably astute--outwitting Saddam's irrational side--noting that even Western statesmen before the Second the purveying of conspiracy theories often World War and driving his generals to served as a practical political measure for the regime. Indeed, an examination of 2 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003)
The Struggle for Iraq: Understanding the Defense Strategy of Saddam Hussein
Saddam's strategy in the 2003 war shows Essentially, Saddam's end game was not how it parallels the strategy that he used in a victory for the Iraqi nation, but a victory 1991. It is vital to make a distinction for the regime itself. As one pre-war between the mistakes Saddam made in assessment put it, most Iraqi military blundering into a war under unfavorable leaders knew "that Iraq cannot resist a U.S. circumstances and his choice of the best assault, but could only hope to make the possible--though limited and difficult-- U.S. entry as costly as possible as soon in option once faced with fighting such a the war as possible, and then to draw out conflict. the fighting into Baghdad to the point In both wars, Saddam realized that he where the U.S. media would make could not achieve a military victory against continued U.S. engagement untenable."(9) vastly superior U.S. forces. His goal in Essentially, this comment echoes the goals both conflicts was to emerge with a laid out for the Iraqi military in the January political victory by ensuring the survival of 14, 1991 directive to the Iraqi army. his regime, just as Nasser had done in 1956 when a losing war guaranteed his place as SADDAM'S DEFENSE STRATEGY champion of the Arab world. The military defense of Iraq was most The manner in which Saddam organized likely coordinated by Saddam through the the defense of Iraq in both wars Ba'th Party Military Bureau, the body demonstrated that his goal was to ensure a which managed Iraqi defense and security protracted conflict, inflicting as many issues during the 1991 Gulf War, as well as Allied casualties as possible, in the hope selected high ranking military officers.(10) that his opponents' impatience, spiritual The Bureau was subordinated to the party weakness or internal conflicts forced them chairman, Saddam Hussein, who was also to give up. its general secretary. Saddam, not the A document dated January 14, 1991, minister of defense, was thus the highest two days before the commencement of military authority in Iraq. Given the nature Operation Desert Storm reveals Saddam's of the system he established, his active and strategy and bears a striking resemblance to direct control was absolutely necessary for the strategy employed during this conflict. the morale and functioning of the Iraqi Directives to commanders of the Iraqi army armed forces and to provide leadership. bluntly indicate that Iraq is at a Prior to the commencement of technological disadvantage: "The enemy Operation Iraqi Freedom, Saddam had has different equipment. There is a divided Iraq into four military command difference between Iraqi soldiers and zones. Yet it appeared that Saddam set the American soldiers in methodology, size, overall strategy along a three-tiered etc." The following directive orders, "Try approach. The first line of defense was the to cause many casualties and have a long regular Iraqi military. The Republican war. Wait underground for the end of the Guard would defend the capital from air attack. Utilize propaganda. Do not leave outside it. The Special Republican Guard Kuwait. Have self-confidence."(8) and the military units of Iraq's intelligence Essentially, the document suggests that the organizations would defend Baghdad from Iraqi army, in the face of overwhelming within. firepower, should engage "the enemy" in a protracted war but does not command it to The First Tier act in an offensive campaign. The regular Iraqi Army was organized into five corps which were stationed in the Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003) 3
Ibrahim al-Marashi south of Iraq, as well as the area to the institutions, they fought effectively north of Baghdad, bordering the Kurdish together in defensive operations. safe-haven. The Iraqi Third and Fourth Despite Saddam's high-profile use of the Corps were based in the south of Iraq, Republican Guard, they were strategically while the First and Fifth Corps were based deployed outside Baghdad so as not to in the north of Iraq to guard against an facilitate or allow any one of the Guard attack from the Kurdish zone. The Second units to act against the regime. The Special Corps had been deployed to the east of Republican Guard was the largest armed Baghdad, along the Iranian border.(11) unit allowed inside of Baghdad. Iraq's regular Army suffered neglect after the 1991 Gulf war and was the least The Third Tier effective element of Saddam's defense. Saddam allowed his son, Qusay, to Generally, it was deployed in the furthest organize the defense of the capital using reaches to the north and south of Iraq on elite forces that numbered up to 40,000 the front lines. Thus, they served as a men who would fight inside the city using buffer between invading forces and the terror and guerrilla tactics. One of the Republican Guard stationed in the second organizations tasked with defending the tier. Ostensibly, it seemed that such capital was Jihaz al-Amn al-Khas (the deployments were designed to stall the Special Security Organization),(13) with its invading American and British forces, thus brigade which served as a rapid response giving the Republican Guard time to unit for the organization, independent of prepare to defend their positions on the the military establishment and of the outskirts of Baghdad. Special Republican Guard. In addition, various armed security The Second Tier forces were deployed inside the capital, The Republican Guard was stationed to such as Al-Amn al-'Amm (General defend the areas in the vicinity of the Security), a political police force, with its capital. It had the best-equipped and trained paramilitary wing, known as Quwat al- units among Saddam's forces and received Tawari' (The Emergency Forces). Another better pay and privileges than the regular unit in Saddam's security apparatus, known Iraqi army. The Republican Guard's six as Jihaz al-Himaya al-Khasa (The Special divisions included an armored division, Protection Apparatus) was the only unit to three mechanized divisions and two have armed men in the direct proximity of infantry divisions, as well as three Special the President and served as his bodyguards. Forces brigades. These were the al-Nida Finally, al-Haris al-Jamhuri al-Khas Division, Baghdad, the Madina al- (The Special Republican Guard), which Munawarah, Nebuchadnezzar, Adnan, and had up to 26,000 men, was divided into Hammurabi divisions. Each had four brigades, with three brigades guarding approximately 8,000 to 10,000 men, with the northern, southern and western routes total manpower estimated at about 60,000- into Baghdad.(14) 80,000 men.(12) In addition to this three-tiered defense, The Republican Guard was not under it was predicted that Saddam would destroy the control of the Iraqi Ministry of the oil wells in the south and north of Iraq, Defense, rather it was supervised by Qusay destroy bridges at critical junctions such as Hussein, head of the Special Security Nasiriyya, flood the approaches to Organization. However, even though the Baghdad and bring the Americans into a Guard and regular Army were separate bloody urban battle for the capital where chemical weapons would be unleashed. 4 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003)
The Struggle for Iraq: Understanding the Defense Strategy of Saddam Hussein
However, the course of the war wrong as the Fidayin were dispatched to demonstrated that only a few elements of the south, where they provided stiff Saddam's defense strategy were ever resistance, particularly in defending the implemented to halt the Coalition advance. southern cities of Basra, Um Qasr, Najaf, and Nasiriyya, and targeting Coalition THE WAR FOR SADDAM'S IRAQ supply lines. The Fidayin employed The Battle For The South Of Iraq guerrilla tactics against these forces in units Operation Iraqi Freedom began on of 10 to 15 fighters. It seemed, though, March 20, 2003 with an attempted that they fought without coordination, decapitation air strike against the regime, instead fighting a war of attrition, subsequent to which American and British attempting to inflict as many casualties as ground forces entered Iraq. As U.S. and possible. UK forces were dispatched to the south of They proved to be the crucial element in Iraq to seize the port of Um Qasr as well as Iraq's guerrilla war tactics, capturing the oil fields in the south, Iraq launched a several Americans as well. It is most likely variety of missiles toward the invading that part of Iraq's strategy in this regard forces bases in Kuwait, perhaps the only was to offer financial incentives to every offensive aspect of Saddam's strategy. Iraqi combatant who captured a POW. A As Coalition forces advanced through document dated February 8, 1991 details the south, most assessments failed to financial rewards for the apprehension of account for the prominent role of Saddam's American and British prisoners of war. It Fidayin. Saddam's Fidayin (also spelled states, "Carrying out the orders of the Fedayeen) can be roughly translated as President Leader (May God bless him) that "those who sacrifice themselves for were issued in a meeting of the leadership Saddam." A paramilitary militia with the of the armed forces on the 8th of December strength of about 30,000 to 40,000 men, it 1990, regarding rewarding the fighters who was established in 1995 by Saddam's oldest are able to bring in an English or American son Uday to maintain internal security in POW with 10,000 dinars on average for Iraq. By no means a professional fighting every POW."(17) force, nor were its member recruited for Again, though, these resistance efforts suicide missions, members were induced to were uncoordinated. The reported death of join with higher salaries than regular Iraqi Ali Hassan al-Majid, Saddam's paternal soldiers.(15) It has been erroneously cousin, in Basra on April 6, 2003 in an referred to as an "elite" fighting force, airstrike against his residence seems to when in reality it is known for its brute have damaged Iraq's effort in the south. As force, rather than its fighting prowess.(16) commander of the southern military zone, Many of the fighters were youths in their al-Majid would have put up a more teens from Saddam's hometown of Tikrit or effective effort at mounting an attrition from his al-Bu Nasir tribe, with no prior defense. His loss also undermined Iraqi combat experience. morale there. Assessments of Iraq's strategy prior to the conflict indicated that this unit would The Battle For the Center be engaged in a battle for Baghdad, and While the Iraqi defense strategy that these forces, along with the Special involved using the Fidayin to defend the Republican Guard, would most likely southernmost areas in Iraq, the Republican defend the city in earnest. Iraq's defense Guard was deployed in the vicinity of strategy would prove these assessments Baghdad to provide a second tier of Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003) 5
Ibrahim al-Marashi resistance to the Allied forces. When the directing these forces and this fact led to a military conflict commenced, U.S. air demoralizing confusion, paralysis, and a strikes concentrated on the three belief that defeat was inevitable. Republican Guard divisions--the Madina, As U.S. forces approached the outskirts al-Nida, and Baghdad--defending the of Baghdad, the Pentagon asserted that outskirts of Baghdad. Republican Guard Units had been given the An unanswered question still remains as authority to deploy chemical weapons to the fate of Iraq's Republican Guard. All when the Americans approached Baghdad. Republican Guard troops were volunteers Such assessments indicate that some of the rather than conscripted and the majority Coalition war planners did not have a full were Sunni Arab Muslims.(18) When Shia understanding of the command and control and Kurds revolted against the regime after structure of Iraq's chemical weapons the 1991 Gulf War, the weakened arsenal. In fact, the only Iraqi unit that had Republican Guard rallied behind Saddam the authority to deploy chemical munitions Hussein and brutally suppressed the was the Chemical Corps of the elite Special insurrection. This uprising took on an Security Organization, managed by ethnic and sectarian nature, and it appeared Saddam's son, Qusay.(19) One reason as if the predominantly Arab Sunni Saddam entrusted a security/intelligence Republican Guards were defending their agency to deploy these weapons was out of privileged status in the Iraqi state. fear that the military would disobey his Understandably, they expected that orders to use them.(20) Saddam's fall would be a tremendous As the Republican Guard forces personal loss of status and power in Iraq. defending the outskirts Baghdad collapsed, In later years, though, the Guard's American forces conducted forays into the loyalty appears to have been shaken. capital. Besides Saddam's Fidayin, there Important Guard elements attempted to were a myriad of groups charged with overthrow Saddam on various occasions. defending the capital. It was at this Executions and purges of suspect officers juncture that many analysts predicted that was a common phenomenon. The Fidayin bloody street battles would begin. But and the Iraqi security apparatuses were chemical weapons were never deployed deployed against the Guard during times of and, contrary to Saddam's intentions, dissension. neither the Special Republican Guard nor After Operation Desert Fox in 1998, the Emergency Forces provided serious Saddam promoted a large number of resistance within Baghdad. officers from his hometown of Tikrit to senior positions in the Guard, upsetting The Absence of Any "Oil Weapon" many senior officers. Based on these past While a few oil fields in the south of precedents, some analysts had predicted Iraq were set ablaze, Iraq's oil fields in the that the Republican Guard deployed on the north of Iraq remained undamaged. Given outskirts of the capital would not serve as Iraq's past motives for destroying Kuwait's an enthusiastic fighting force, nor put up oil fields, it seemed likely that Saddam much resistance to an American attack. would have given the order to destroy the The Guard's poor performance in the oil fields around Kirkuk and Mosul in the 2003 war could be attributed to this event of an American attack. The fact that reduced loyalty and the disabling of the oil fields were not set ablaze is Saddam as military commander. Whether surprising given that Saddam used the or not he was killed, wounded, or merely destruction of the oil wells in 1991 as part forced into hiding, Saddam was not visibly of his defensive strategy. 6 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003)
The Struggle for Iraq: Understanding the Defense Strategy of Saddam Hussein
While Saddam destroyed the Kuwaiti Some have argued that Saddam had no oil fields in the last days of February 1991 concept of reality and was insulated from to thwart the American abilities to conduct those around him about the nature of the air raids, the ensuing smoke clouds limited American threats in 1991 and 2003. visibility, documents illustrate that Saddam Nevertheless, in 1990, Iraqi intelligence had ordered the oil wells to be prepared for services often delivered candid reports on destruction as early as August 1990, well Iraq's inability to defend itself. It would before the Gulf War had started. For seem likely that Saddam's plan in 2003 was example, a document known as a "signed also a result of reasonable--if mistaken-- release for the detonation of the oil wells," assessments of Coalition capabilities and states, "I guarantee that all 16 wells in the strategy. group location 21 are ready to be For example, a report issued from destroyed."(21) An Iraqi officer signed the Mudiriyyat al-Istikhbarat al-Askariyya, document on August 26, 1990. Based on (The Directorate of Military Intelligence) this pattern, Saddam most likely rigged the on August 20, 1990, reported on the oil wells near Basra and Kirkuk with movements of the American aircraft explosives as well. carrier, the USS Kennedy, as well as the Another document suggests that the American fighters deployed in Saudi Iraqis also ordered the destruction of the Arabia, along with Egyptian and Pakistani wells simply so the Americans would not ground forces.(24) The report defines gain access to them. One captured "Possible Scenarios of an American attack" document reads, "Because the oil fields are involving the following steps: "The air important to the enemy we need to protect forces will be used to strike in the rear the explosives that are positioned at the oil areas of Kuwait to cut off transportation to fields."(22) Since the United States [Iraq], as well as strikes from the Gulf. coveted Kuwaiti oil, the Iraqis had to make Then the land forces will attack our army sure the wells were destroyed, in a in Kuwait, after the military air strikes have vengeful act of spite. Finally, the regime succeeded in paralyzing our military and believed that the destruction of the wells produced heavy losses for the Iraqis."(25) had an important psychological effect on In addition, "The enemy will use electronic its forces. "The importance of the warfare to affect our wire communications execution of the destruction of the oil wells and paralyze our defense."(26) This plays a significant role in lifting morale. document is in stark contrast to Saddam's The terminology, delayed destruction will rhetoric then about a quick and easy victory be used for destruction at the last moment over the Coalition. in front of the enemy."(23) Other reports from the Iraq military Given the importance of the destruction offered candid assessments of low troop of the oil wells in the eyes of the regime, it morale. On December 30, 1990 a report was surprising that most of Iraq's oil states, "Soldiers are afraid that if they infrastructure remained intact in 2003. retreat they will be killed by their own Perhaps Iraqi engineers were less willing to forces. Soldiers have had little to no destroy their own national resources, as training. Most were pulled off the street opposed to those in Kuwait. This issue will and shipped to the front lines without require additional research. training. This has had a great effect on morale. In order to increase morale the AN ASSESSMENT OF SADDAM'S officers are trying to arrange training for DEFENSE STRATEGY the soldiers. There are complaints about not Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003) 7
Ibrahim al-Marashi having night binoculars. They cannot see long as they believed the regime might what is happening around them and cannot survive. In most cases, their families were tell if they are about to be attacked at under threat of retaliation in the event of night."(27) treason or desertion. The military One could argue that such assessments intelligence unit of the 29th Division never reached Saddam himself. However, reported that two men had escaped to Saudi Saddam's control of the military and the Arabia in 1990. It requested from the way he organized the defense of Iraq in Corps command, "their home 1991 and 2003 indicated that in fact he was addresses…within 24 hours."(30) aware of the woeful state of his forces and A list of directives circulated to military that his survival depended on a political units on February 17, 1991, demonstrates victory through a protracted conflict. In how fear was instilled into the Iraqi 1991, the aim of regime survival was military in ways that still applied in 2003. fulfilled. In 2003, however, his enemies did The document warns that if there is a single not give up due to their own demoralization deserter in any unit "the entire unit will be or to domestic or international political punished. Those who escape are to be pressures. executed by the Popular Army. Those who Of course, when Saddam heard that his escape to Saudi Arabia will bring shame on soldiers were largely motivated by fear of them and their families."(31) Every soldier him this was not a disappointment but an understood the direct threat to his loved essential part of his strategy. In 1992, ones. The document concludes, Saddam established al-Amn al-'Askari "Executions should be held in public and (Military Security), which grew out of the without any mercy on every deserter. At Special Bureau of Military Intelligence, the battle, any soldier that is out of line is after Saddam believed the latter had failed to be executed. Those who escape and to detect disturbances in the military. It return should be sent to the front line. Iraq was designed to put agents into every is more dear than everyone."(32) branch of the military, serving as the But once the security organizations and regime's eyes and ears to ensure loyalty to the fear that the regime would survive to Saddam.(28) exact retribution collapsed toward the end Distrust of the fighting capability of the of Operation Iraqi Freedom, so did the military manifested itself in reports instruments of fear within the military. And emerging from the 1991 conflict. Officers with that, the overwhelming majority of were forced to sign statements along the Iraqi soldiers refused to fight to save following lines, "The Mission: Defending Saddam. Great Iraq within the brigade and division and prevent the Americans and their CONCLUSION coalition from taking any part from the It is possible to obtain a good sense of homeland and never give up my place how Saddam viewed his adversaries. He whatever happens. I am staying in my was highly influenced by his perception position until the last moment."(29) In the that America had been defeated in Vietnam context of Iraqi life, such statements by a lack of courage and will power, a limit indicated the signers were acknowledging on its patience, and an inability to sustain the fact that they would be executed if casualties. This view was reinforced by his these promises were not fulfilled. reading of American behavior after Most combatants in the Iraqi military Vietnam, leaving Lebanon in 1983 and had other reasons to fight to the very end Somalia in 1993, among other events. Even for the defense of the regime; at least as in Afghanistan in 2001, where the United 8 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 2003)
The Struggle for Iraq: Understanding the Defense Strategy of Saddam Hussein
States won a quick victory, Saddam noted 5. Christopher Andrew, “We Must Know that the United States preferred to use local What Makes Them Tick,” London Times, forces rather than risking its own troops. December 5, 2002. Since U.S. forces would have to do the 6. These files form the Iraq Research and fighting in Iraq, his best--and perhaps only- Documentation Project’s Kuwait Data Set -hope was a protracted ground war in and can be accessed at which America would tire of losing
Ibrahim al-Marashi
Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapon (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2000). p. 48. 21. KDS Folder Iraq Docs File 559-034 pp. 10,11,12,15. 22. KDS Folder Iraq Docs File 532-029 pp. 4, 5, 7, 8. 23. KDS Folder CD003 File 024-3-001 pp. 16-19. 24. KDS Folder 90809 File 124-6-009 p. 84. 25. KDS Folder 90809 File 124-6-009 p. 86. 26. KDS Folder 90809 File 124-6-009 p. 86. 27. KDS Folder CD004 File 048-5-002 p. 2. 28. Hiro, p. 57. 29. KDS Folder CD004 File 021-1-031 p. 2. 30. KDS Folder 90809 File 600-2-019 p.106. 31. KDS Folder 90809 file 681-1-3 pp. 4-7. 32. KDS Folder 90809 file 681-1-3 pp. 4-7.
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