No. 198 Strategic Forum June 2003 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Building an Iraqi Defense Force by Joseph McMillan
The reconstruction and reform of the been not only the prominence of the armed Key Points Iraqi armed forces will inevitably take place in forces, but also the proliferation of security ith the demise of the Saddam the context of both Iraq’s present and past. services which have introduced a baneful 4 Hussein regime, a high priority Saddam Hussein and his predecessors, going logic to Iraq’s political life. W must be the rebuilding of the Iraqi back to the creation of the state, have left Iraq From the beginning, to be an officer was armed forces. The United States must super- a legacy of endemic domestic political vio- one of the main paths to political power and vise and assist in this task, but the template lence, dysfunctional civil-military relations, social advancement in Iraq. With the exception for the new force should not be the American and, in recent decades, an ideology of un- of the royal family, the makers of the Kingdom model—a joint, highly trained, all-volunteer remitting hostility to virtually every one of of Iraq were predominantly former officers of force that emphasizes quality over size. Iraq Iraq’s neighbors. the Ottoman Imperial Army, mainly Sunni does not need and cannot produce such a The use of Iraqi armed forces for internal Arabs from modest families who rose to the top U.S.-style force. repression is often associated with Saddam. through military service.5 Eight of the 22 prime What Iraq does need is a military that Most people are aware of the brutal 1987–1989 ministers under the monarchy and all 4 presi- provides for self-defense while complement- Anfal campaign, which resulted in the system- dents of the republic before Saddam were ing political reformation—or at least not atic slaughter of at least 50,000 Kurdish men, career military men. Their combined tenure in 1 undermining it. What the region and the world women, and children and ethnic cleansing office covered 43 of the 58 years from the need is the assurance that the new Iraqi operations in southern Iraq in the early 1990s installation of the first Iraqi cabinet in 1921 military will not threaten the peace anew. that caused the deaths or forced displacement until Saddam assumed full power in 1979. At 2 Shaping a new force’s capabilities in of over 200,000 Marsh Arabs. Though Saddam least 10 times in Iraq’s history, the army inter- the short term is therefore far less important certainly escalated the army’s role as an agent vened to change the government, either by than creating institutions by which a legiti- for repressing the Iraqi people, he did not actual coup, threatened coup, or political mate civilian government can control and originate it. On the contrary, this was one of pressure. Even when civilian politicians headed monitor the development, funding, and em- the main purposes for which the army was the government, the officer corps was the most 3 ployment of the military and ensuring the developed. From the 1930s onward, the army important base of political support. In several development within the new military of atti- carried out summary executions of combatants cases, civilian prime ministers served simply as tudes and patterns of behavior that reinforce and noncombatants alike, razing of villages, front men for cabals of officers. the new constitutional political order at and aerial bombardment to suppress any and With these officers in the vanguard, the home and peace and stability abroad. all challenges to the authority of the central ruling elite in Baghdad developed an intensely These goals can be met by a force that government, even by such numerically in- centralizing, nationalistic, authoritarian is based on conscription, which is the re- significant groups as the Assyrians and Yazidis. ideology that justified the use of force—and gional norm, provided that it is led by a new As the historian Charles Tripp observes: hence of the army—as an indispensable and more inclusive officer corps and shaped The use of violence to suppress dissent, much component of national development. This by a recast military education system. The of which took violent form itself, has been principle, along with the corollary that the resulting active force of about 350,000— reproduced and elaborated by central gov- military should be actively involved in politics, considerably smaller than the combined ernments in Baghdad since the foundation was propagated to new generations of officers regular and irregular forces before the war— of the state. Indeed, control of the means of through their training at the Iraqi Military would be sufficient for defense against exter- violence has been one of the lures for those Academy.6 It was in this overheated praetorian nal threats without posing a threat to Iraq’s who seized the state apparatus. The result has milieu that younger officers developed the neighbors. “free officers” movement that would oust the
No. 198, June 2003 Strategic Forum 1 monarchy in 1958, and in which still younger Social Attitudes Of course, American officials engaged in the ones would orchestrate the coup that brought rebuilding effort will need to be aware that Like any military force, the Iraqi armed the Ba’ath to power 10 years later. such attitudes will have an enormous impact forces reflected to some degree the society from on what is politically sustainable. which they sprang. Iraq enters its new era with Saddam’s Legacy a population that has been immersed in a cult Until the rise of Saddam in the early of militarism. In emulation of the European The Burden of History 1970s, Iraqi governments did not exercise fascist regimes of the day, compulsory military Even if Iraqis have a low opinion of their civilian control over the military; the military training was introduced in Iraqi schools in own military, they will nevertheless take a exercised control over them. Saddam finally 1935–1936 and continued right up to the fall of skeptical attitude toward U.S. attempts at de- succeeded in imposing civilian political control Saddam. Generations of Iraqis have been indoc- fense reform. Most will view American initia- through an enormously intrusive and destruc- trinated to believe that their nation is in danger tives in military reconstruction through the tive system of purges, executions, internal from a host of external enemies, especially Iran, lens of their previous experience with foreign security monitoring, political indoctrination, occupiers. As has already been widely observed, and competitive parallel military organiza- Iraq enters its new era statements that “the United States seeks to tions.7 Indeed, it was probably his success in with a population that liberate Iraq, not to occupy Iraq”9 sound to curbing the institutional power of the army as Iraqis like an echo of the proclamation issued much as his inflated military pretensions and has been immersed by Lieutenant General Sir Stanley Maude when the damage he did to the nation that motivated in a cult of militarism British troops took Baghdad in 1917: “Our the deep resentment that many Iraqi career armies do not come into your cities and lands soldiers harbored toward him by the time he Israel, and imperialism, as well as internal as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators.”10 fell from power. enemies, and they have been taught to glorify Iraqis also recall that British mandatory offi- The civilian control that Saddam estab- the armed forces and their achievements. cials in the 1920s rejected the need for con- lished over the military came at a heavy price. The extent to which ordinary Iraqis still scription, that the British military training Even before their defeat at the hands of the share that vision is open to speculation. Many mission in the 1930s functioned to restrict Iraqi coalition, the Iraqi armed forces were in seri- undoubtedly see the army, along with the other decisionmaking, that British occupation forces ous trouble. The dismal condition of their security services, as an instrument of decades of during World War II purged the Iraqi army of weaponry after 12 years of sanctions was the repression—as the enemy of the people, not radical nationalists, and that the withdrawal of least of their problems. Like the rest of Iraqi their protector. Moreover, the prestige of the British forces after World War II was condi- society, the armed forces were corrupt and military services cannot be high after their poor tioned on Iraqi agreement to allow contingency demoralized; members had been terrorized by performance against U.S. forces. It is probable access to key air bases and to accept British the brutal systems of control established by that the unrepresentative nature of the force oversight of Iraqi defense planning. All these Saddam to ensure their loyalty. The corporate has been a matter of public unhappiness; while incidents have parallels in the issues that will professional ethic that had built up within the Sunni Arabs make up somewhere between 15 confront U.S. officials in considering how to officer corps over the course of the 1980–1988 and 20 percent of the population, a small self- rebuild the Iraqi force today. Above all, Iraqis Iran-Iraq war was systematically crushed by the perpetuating elite drawn from that minority will suspect that the United States is pursuing a regime as an implicit challenge to the Leader’s constituted 80 percent of the officer corps. hidden agenda in abetting the revival of an omnipotence and omniscience. The thorough Conversely, conscription in the enlisted Iraqi military—an agenda they will assume to penetration of the armed forces by political and ranks—especially in the poorly supported be dominated by the interests of Israel and the security officers and their informers made regular army—fell with disproportionate American oil and armaments industries. impossible the kind of mutual trust and respect weight on the Shi’a population.8 At the same Finally, we must keep in mind in building on which effective command relationships time, other military forces have treated their a new Iraqi defense force that the Iraqi armed depend. The regular army (that is, units other conscripts and the populations from which they forces under Saddam did not constitute the than the Republican Guard) was particularly sprang with great brutality (the Soviet Army only significant military institution in the affected in personal terms by the impact of comes to mind) yet have continued to enjoy a country. Including the Republican Guard, the economic sanctions, with officers and men sizable reservoir of popular respect and even armed forces are estimated to have totaled alike forced to shirk their military duties in affection. Only when it is possible to conduct some 390,000 active duty personnel11 at the order to provide for their families. Desertion detailed public opinion polling and get frank start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. On top of and absence without leave were endemic. and open answers will there be any way of that were roughly 15,000 members of the knowing what Iraqis think about the military. Special Republican Guard, as many as 40,000 thugs of the paramilitary Fedayeen Saddam, and an indeterminate number of the Ba’ath Party’s People’s Militia, an organization that Joseph McMillan is the academic chairman of the Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at once numbered over one million. The coalition the National Defense University (NDU). He prepared this analysis as a distinguished research fellow in the must decide what to do not only with these Institute for National Strategic Studies at NDU. Comments or questions may be e-mailed to his attention forces but also those on the other side—the at: [email protected].
2 Strategic Forum No. 198, June 2003 sizable Kurdish and Shi’ite militias that sprang the new Iraqi government. Any remnants of resented Saddam, but this does not mean that up in opposition to Saddam’s rule. By most Saddam’s system of control must be eradi- they—even those who went into exile—held estimates, each of the main Kurdish parties, the cated. That system is hostile to both military views conducive to a healthy civil-military Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic effectiveness and a healthy civil-military rela- relationship under a constitutional system of Union of Kurdistan, could put 10,000 to 15,000 tionship. Those who operated it were the most government. Indeed, the chauvinistic, authori- fighters into the field, while the Badr Brigades irredeemable of the old regime’s supporters tarian mindset of the old Iraqi officer corps operating under the auspices of the Supreme and in many cases indictable war criminals. must be cleared away if the new Iraqi military Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq Assuming that Iraq adopts a European-style is not to revert to old habits. At a minimum, all (SCIRI) had up to another 15,000. Other parliamentary political structure, a system of general officers should be retired and barred antiregime groups probably accounted for parliamentary accountability should be estab- from future involvement with the armed forces. 2,000 to 3,000 more men under arms. The lished to ensure civilian control of the military. It goes without saying that all former political future of these forces must also be taken into Ideally, a civilian member of parliament12 and security officers and anyone who was ever account, notwithstanding whatever role their should be appointed as minister of defense, in the Special Republican Guard should also be members may have played in the liberation. banned for life, if not imprisoned. It may very creating institutional well be that anyone who served as an officer in Priority Tasks mechanisms for civilian the Republican Guard, regardless of rank, will also have to be excluded, although service in What are the most crucial areas that the control of the military the Republican Guard was not always volun- United States should focus on in helping de- and the security services tary—a number of officers and men were velop a new Iraqi defense force? Essentially, will be one of the great- ordered into the Guard because of their profes- they are those tightly interrelated issues that lie sional qualifications, not for political reasons.13 at the political-military nexus between any est tests facing the new In any case, it will be necessary to apply a constitutional government and the armed Iraqi government careful review process—similar to that used in forces that serve it: post-war Germany and again when the Bun- ■ how national security policy is determined given the support of a trained civilian staff, deswehr took over the former East German through the political process and placed squarely in the chain of command Volksarmee after unification—to determine ■ how the legitimate government exercises for both operational and administrative pur- which officers, whether regular or Republican control over armed forces poses. The model is a familiar one in the West, Guard, are fit for service under the new dispen- ■ how national resources—both human and financial—are allocated to military purposes but not in the Arab world or even the broader sation. The process will inevitably and inten- Islamic world. The United States and United tionally result in the decimation of the Iraqi ■ how the military force reflects and interacts with the society at large. Kingdom can play a key role in the develop- officer corps as it existed under the old regime. ment of these institutions, especially in the For all practical purposes, a new officer corps The processes by which the new Iraqi training of staffs, but even more valuable will have to be built from scratch. This will government will formulate security policy lie might be the advice of countries, such as undoubtedly delay the recovery of the Iraqi beyond the scope of this paper, but several key Spain and Poland, that underwent the process military as a qualitatively effective force vis-à- points should be made. First, unless the new of transformation from dictatorship to democ- vis such threats as Iran, but this is a price that government embraces the principles set forth in racy in the fairly recent past. must be paid. the United Nations (UN) Security Council Particular attention should be given to resolutions that terminated the 1990–1991 Gulf parliamentary control over military budgets, Dealing with Militias War, there will be no way to rebuild the Iraqi including not only the amounts budgeted but military that does not eventually endanger also the uses for which funds are programmed The sorts of militias maintained by the regional security all over again. These princi- and the follow-up accounting to ensure that Kurdish parties and the SCIRI, while justifiable ples include not only the permanent renuncia- they are properly disbursed. Given the culture as instruments of resistance against Saddam’s tion of weapons of mass destruction, which has tyranny, are nonetheless rightly prohibited of corruption that has long characterized Iraq, 14 received the greatest attention over the years, it will be difficult to stop the diversion of gov- under the old Iraqi constitution, as they are but also the renunciation of territorial claims ernment funds to private pockets. While meet- by the constitutions or laws of most countries. against Iraq’s neighbors and of the use of force ing this challenge is important, it is more The failure of previous governments to enforce to change the regional status quo. Secondly, the critical for the representative government to this provision against the militias raised by the new government must develop more legitimate, ensure that funds are not siphoned off to the Ba’ath Party was a key element in Saddam’s consensual means of dealing with the country’s development of capabilities within the military rise to power, and it is hard to see how such ethnic, religious, and tribal cleavages. that undercut a government policy of peace militias could be allowed to continue outside abroad and civil liberties at home. some sort of governmental control without An Accountable Military Making parliamentary control work will undermining the legitimacy and credibility of a Creating institutional mechanisms for require sweeping changes in the leadership of civilian control of the military and the security the new Iraqi defense force. Many Iraqi officers services will be one of the greatest tests facing
No. 198, June 2003 Strategic Forum 3 constitutional government. The specific solu- Not only education and training but also 20th, as an important means of forging a na- tion to this problem will depend in large meas- the process of inducting candidates into the tional identity from among disparate religious ure on the shape of the constitutional system officer corps should be reformed. Assuming and ethnic communities.16 that is adopted; clearly, a pure federal structure that Iraq will continue to use a system of con- Despite the American disposition in favor will require different arrangements than a scription to fill the enlisted ranks of the mili- of an all-volunteer force, Iraqi reliance on basically unitary state with limited devolution tary (see below), it should take the step of conscription will not necessarily be a bad of powers to the various governorates. In either making a term of conscripted service in the thing, especially if it can be administered in a case, Iraq might consider establishing an ranks a prerequisite for attendance at the way that helps reshape military culture. Under organization similar to the Pakistani Frontier military academy and the receipt of an officer’s the monarchy, the early republic, and the Corps, in which the enlisted ranks are filled by commission. It should also diversify the train- Ba’athist dictatorship, the draft was of course a voluntary recruitment from local tribal com- ing of officers by instituting something compa- source of popular resentment, partly because munities—including the current rable to the American officer candidate schools, conscription is never popular, partly because its peshmerga—while the officer cadre is pro- burden fell disproportionately on already disad- vided by the regular national army. despite the American vantaged elements of society, and partly be- disposition in favor of an cause it was overtly used as a tool of control. Reforming the Ranks Despite this history, however, a new Iraq has the all-volunteer force, Iraqi opportunity of using a fairly administered Attention should also be given to integrat- reliance on conscription system of conscription to ensure that the mili- ing the leaders of opposition militias into the tary is more representative of the population. officer corps of the new defense force. The new will not necessarily be Without the leverage of conscription, there is Iraqi government should look closely at the a bad thing little chance that the Kurds, and perhaps even similar experience of South Africa as it inte- many of the Shia, will enter the army, leaving grated African National Congress and other through which those who have already com- it even more Sunni Arab-dominated than in forces into the South African Defense Force pleted their military obligation in the enlisted the past and thus making it even more difficult after the end of apartheid. This process will ranks will have the opportunity to return to a to persuade Kurdish, Shia, and other militia- accelerate the attainment of broader represen- career as an officer following completion of a men to lay down their arms. tation for the Shi’ite and minority communi- civilian university education. This will weaken Young Iraqi men and their families may ties in the new military leadership, something the residual grip of the culture heretofore find themselves more willing to endure con- that is essential if a replay of the Iraqi army’s cultivated at the military academy and, as in scription if they are decently paid, housed, and historic role as an enemy of Iraqi society is to the case of the other proposed reforms, make fed. They should also be provided a modicum be avoided. the new Iraqi defense force a better mirror of of technical training, not only to increase their The coalition should insist that the new Iraqi society. military effectiveness but also to help position Iraqi government completely revamp the selec- them for a more productive life after leaving tion procedures and curriculum of the military the service. Perhaps most importantly, an academy (historically the overwhelming source Reliance on Conscription entirely different approach to discipline and of new officers) and staff college to ensure that As suggested above, the enlisted ranks of military justice will be required. Presumably an these institutions do not continue propagating the new Iraqi defense force will undoubtedly be Iraqi military justice system will draw heavily the aggressively nationalistic mindset that has filled through conscription. Conscription in on Islamic legal principles. In any case, the traditionally characterized past graduates. Iraq has always been seen as a symbol of na- new Iraqi government should give careful Heavy emphasis should be laid on developing a tional independence, since it was instituted in consideration to structuring such a system so professional ethos—an organizational culture part as a way of asserting Baghdad’s right to as to protect the interests of conscripts as well that values apolitical competence and demands make security policy notwithstanding British as the interests of the state—a balance that service to the duly constituted civil government objections. In fact, it is even written into the has rarely been taken into account in Iraqi regardless of personal agreement or disagree- constitution and has been since the beginning military affairs. A German-style defense om- ment with its policies. At the same time, given of the republic.15 Conscription is also the re- budsman, responsible to parliament and the very troubling human rights record of the gional norm, the means by which most of charged with protecting the rights of service- Iraqi armed forces, an Arab version of the Iraq’s neighbors, including those countries members against abuses, could be a further German Bundeswehr’s concept of Innere perceived by Iraq as its most serious threats, fill safeguard. Ultimately, if democratization of Führung, or “inner guidance,” is essential. In their enlisted ranks. Moreover, it is a relatively Iraq succeeds, the connections between con- other words, officers—indeed, all members of inexpensive way to man a force in which high scripts and their families and elected represen- the force—must be indoctrinated in the under- levels of individual proficiency are not tatives will serve as a check on unconstitutional standing that no order, even from a democrati- required. Finally, and perhaps most impor- uses of the armed forces. If it does not, a non- cally elected government, can justify violations tantly, conscription has been viewed in Iraq, as democratic government will find it more diffi- of basic human rights. it was Italy in the 19th century and Israel in the cult to use an army that is manned, officered, and trained as described here as an instrument of repression.
4 Strategic Forum No. 198, June 2003 Pitfalls to Avoid neighbors that could be presented by a highly still less should it have the kind of domestic trained professional force of the same size. role that it has played since Iraq was formed With approximately 275,000 young Iraqi Strategically, Iraq does not need an offen- following World War I. Iraqi governments have males coming of military age each year, it is sively oriented military posture in the post- traditionally treated the armed forces, security reasonable to expect that some 180,000 would Saddam Gulf. While many Iraqis and other and intelligence services, and police as more or be taken into service after taking into account Arabs would undoubtedly like to see Iraq re- less interchangeable instruments for achieving deferments and those unfit for service. An sume its supposed 1980s role as the counter- the same ends.17 As we have seen, this attitude 18-month service obligation would yield a force weight to a hegemonic Iran, it would be a was manifested in the routine use of the army of about 270,000 conscripts. Adding a reason- mistake for the United States to share that and air force to carry out internal security able proportion of officers and long-service vision. For one thing, pitting Iraq and Iran functions. Even without the heavy dose of noncommissioned officers, the total active force against each other in the belief that a bipolar totalitarian ideology that permeated Iraqi would fall somewhere in the range of 350,000, regional balance could be stabilizing turned military education over the decades, this im- considerably smaller than the combined armed out to be disastrously wrong. For another, the mersion of the armed forces in what amount to forces, paramilitary security forces, and irregu- nature of the Iranian threat is such that Iraqi domestic political issues would have tended to lar militias that constituted the armed popula- armed forces could play little direct role in politicize the force and impair its professional- tion of the country before the war. A force of defending anyone other than Iraq, unless, of ism. The limits within which the new Iraqi this size is not disproportionate to those of course, they acquired the kind of countervail- defense force will operate therefore need to be Iraq’s neighbors (for example, Iran, 545,000; ing weapons of mass destruction capabilities precisely defined and the boundaries between Syria, 354,000; Turkey, 515,000). Properly that the international community has sought their functions and those of civilian law en- trained and equipped (which does not neces- for 13 years to keep out of their hands. forcement and security organizations strictly sarily mean up to American or British stan- If the Iraqi military is not to have the enforced. It is true that some other countries do dards), such a force, backed up by reserves, international role that it sought in the past, not maintain such rigid compartmentalization should suffice for defense against external between military and internal security func- threats without posing the threat to Iraq’s tions and are still able to keep their armed
No. 198, June 2003 Strategic Forum 5 forces out of politics, but they do not have general guidance, emphasizing the comman- to have to fight the kind of opponent with Iraq’s political-military history. der’s intent and leaving it up to the discre- which the Iraqi armed forces—and Arab forces tionary judgment of the junior how best to in general—have problems. Other major Roles and Missions carry out that intent. It is a system that depends military forces in the region, with the exception on flexible, self-reliant officers, noncommis- of the Israelis, fight in much the same style as Rather than serving as either an instru- sioned officers, and soldiers capable of making the Iraqis do, while any potential conflict with ment for projecting Iraqi power in the region independent decisions in the heat of battle all Israel would likely be conducted on entirely or a tool of domestic control, the reconstituted the way down to the squad level. different terms. Iraqi force must be given the clear mission of This approach could only work for the This understanding of the kind of force defending Iraq itself—not the entire Arab Iraqi military if it were populated by young Iraq needs and can reasonably produce should world—against external aggression. Over men—18- to 25-year-olds—who had been carry over to issues of equipment. Just as the time, the United States might look toward culturally conditioned to make individual United States should not seek to export its helping shape constructive, cooperative mili- doctrine and organizational methods, it should tary ties among Iraq, the Gulf Cooperation also resist pressure (either Iraqi or American) to Council states, Jordan, and Turkey, but funda- the reconstituted Iraqi force must be given the provide large quantities of advanced American mental changes in the attitudes and outlook weaponry, and particularly to pursue the kind of of Iraq’s new government and military must clear mission of defend- sweeping replacement of Soviet-origin with first take root before Iraq is assigned anything U.S.-origin arms that has been attempted in like a leading role beyond providing for its ing Iraq itself—not the entire Arab world Egypt. In the first place, there will be countless own defense. competing claims on Iraqi financial resources In forging new military-to-military ties, that should rightly have a far higher priority there will be a temptation in the United States decisions, to take personal responsibility, and to than reequipping the Iraqi military. Moreover, to assume that Iraq would be best served by a communicate with their superiors frankly and even if Iraq had unlimited resources, the United force structure that looks and operates like confidently. It should go without saying that States needs to be sensitive to the claim—taken ours. We should avoid this trap. That Iraq st Saddam’s regime did not produce many young as an article of faith in much of the Arab could not produce a U.S.-style 21 -century men with these behavioral traits. The fact is world—that it sells expensive but unusable military, even if it needed one, reflects a real- that these are not the kind of behavioral pat- hardware only as an indirect means of getting ity with which the United States—after terns that Arab societies anywhere tend to its hands on Arab oil money. From a military decades of training and equipping other Arab produce. As a result, Arab officers and soldiers point of view, the normal rationale for prefer- military forces and after twice fighting the have different standards, expectations, habits of ring that friends and allies buy American—that Iraqis themselves—should be well thought, and styles of command than their doing so promotes interoperability—really acquainted. This reality is that a society’s American counterparts, with a much heavier does not apply. Realistically, there is little overall culture determines its military culture. reliance on top-down guidance and detailed chance that Iraqi forces will be called upon to Within the U.S. military, recruiters and train- instructions. fight side by side with American forces against a ers are well aware that a force must be built common enemy.19 using the raw materials that its society pro- Doctrine and Equipment It is not certain at this stage how much duces. As Michael Eisenstadt and Kenneth Iraqi military equipment survived the recent Pollack have pointed out, “a military doctrine To be at all effective in fulfilling its mis- war. By the time a new Iraqi military force is created by one nation will inevitably reflect sion of defending the Iraqi homeland, a new up and running, the picture will be clearer. It the dominant cultural traits of its society, and Iraqi military must develop doctrines and 18 seems likely that, despite the effectiveness of thus may not ‘fit’ another military.” Twenty- methods that build on this reality rather than coalition operations, a substantial quantity of first century American doctrine is an even fighting against it. Iraqi ground forces have hardware probably did survive, if only because worse fit with the cultural dispositions of the demonstrated the ability to conduct effective it was unserviceable and therefore never de- men who will make up the Iraqi military than static defenses against opponents who are not ployed for combat. In any case, when the time the British, Soviet, and French models that capable of fast-moving modern maneuver comes, first priority should be given to sal- failed to take root in the past. warfare. Conversely, when Iraqi staffs and vaging what was not destroyed and putting it Perhaps this can be seen most clearly if troops have had time to plan and rehearse set- back into working order. The United States we think about how American methods of piece offensives—as in the cases of the 1988 should at that point be willing to support command and control would work in an Iraqi offensive that drove Iran off the Al-Faw Penin- lifting of the UN Security Council ban on sales context. Although the U.S. services use different sula, the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the of military equipment to Iraq for the limited terms to describe their approaches, all rely attack on al-Khafji, Saudi Arabia, during purpose of allowing sales of spare parts and heavily on what the Germans call Auftragstak- Operation Desert Storm—their forces have repair and maintenance services, even though tik, usually translated into English as “directive generally been able to execute plans effectively. most of the business of providing those spares control.” Commanders give their subordinates Again, where they have problems is with an will inevitably flow to Russian, French, and opponent who does not act as predicted by a other companies. Notwithstanding the political plan. However, the new Iraq military is unlikely
6 Strategic Forum No. 198, June 2003 unpalatability of allowing those who opposed Iraqis, and not just unreconstructed Ba’athists, 5 Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, CO: the liberation of Iraq to participate in the will find these restrictions burdensome and Westview, 1985), 47–48. 6 Ibid., 80 revival of its armed forces, doing so will be unfair. Insisting on U.S. practices and policies 7 Hashim, 18–25. more cost effective than reequipping the Iraqi more extensively than necessary, whether in 8 Ibid., 58. forces with American hardware. Over time, the doctrine and training or in how threats are 9 Paul Wolfowitz, remarks at town hall meeting with prohibitions on arms sales can be lifted more defined, will magnify that sense of unfairness Iraqi-American community in Dearborn, Michigan, February 23, completely. At that point, American firms will and could well trigger a reaction that will 2003, accessed at
No. 198, June 2003 Strategic Forum 7 Other titles in the Strategic Forum series
The ROK-U.S. Alliance: Where Is It U.S.-Russian Relations: Toward a Headed? New Strategic Framework Kim Dong Shin Eugene B. Rumer and (No. 197, April 2003) Richard D. Sokolsky (No. 192, May 2002) Dissuasion as a Strategic Concept Richard L. Kugler Terrorism’s Financial Lifeline: Can (No. 196, December 2002) It be Severed? Kimberley L. Thachuk Flashman’s Revenge: Central Asia (No. 191, May 2002) after September 11 Eugene B. Rumer Anticipating Strategic Surprise on the (No. 195, December 2002) Korean Peninsula James J. Przystup Colombia’s War: Toward a New (No. 190, March 2002) Strategy John A. Cope Homeland Security: The New Role (No. 194, October 2002) for Defense Steven J. Tomisek China’s Trade Opening: Implications for (No. 189, February 2002) Regional Stability Howard M. Krawitz U.S.-Iran Relations: Normalization (No. 193, August 2002) in the Future? Judith S. Yaphe (No. 188, January 2002)
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8 Strategic Forum No. 198, June 2003