Irregular Warfare: a Case Study in Cia and Us Army Special Forces Operations in Northern Iraq, 2002-03

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Irregular Warfare: a Case Study in Cia and Us Army Special Forces Operations in Northern Iraq, 2002-03 IRREGULAR WARFARE: A CASE STUDY IN CIA AND US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ, 2002-03 THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE ANDREW L., MICK MULROY, AND KEN TOVO AUGUST 2021 WWW.MEI.EDU ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE The Middle East Institute is a center of knowledge dedicated to narrowing divides between the peoples of the Middle East and the United States. With over 70 years’ experience, MEI has established itself as a credible, non-partisan source of insight and policy analysis on all matters concerning the Middle East. MEI is distinguished by its holistic approach to the region and its deep understanding of the Middle East’s political, economic and cultural contexts. Through the collaborative work of its three centers — Policy & Research, Arts & Culture, and Education — MEI provides current and future leaders with the resources necessary to build a future of mutual understanding. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Andrew L. “Uncle Andy” is a retired Senior Intelligence Service Paramilitary Operations Officer in the Special Activities Center with 25 years of service in the CIA. He is a former U.S. Marine infantry and reconnaissance officer. Michael “Mick” Patrick Mulroy Mick Mulroy is the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East. He is also a retired CIA Paramilitary Operations Officer in the Special Activities Center and a United States Marine. He is a Senior Fellow for the Middle East Institute, an ABC News National Security Analyst, and a co-founder of Lobo Institute. Kenneth “Ken” Tovo Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ken Tovo retired from the U.S. Army in 2018 with 35 years of service. A career Green Beret, he commanded at every level in the 10th Special Forces Group. He commanded SOCCENT, the Nato Training Mission in Afghanistan, was the deputy at U.S. Southern Command and commanded the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Ken was the 3rd Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group Commander, working with the PUK before and during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Cover photo: Soldiers of Joint Special Operations Task Force stay alert on the front line of the northern front of the war in Iraq on April 7, 2003 in Pir Daud, northern Iraq. Photo by Patrick Barth/Getty Images. CONTENTS 4 Introduction 5 Background 6 Reestablishing Contact with the Kurds 6 Working with the Kurds: First Steps 8 Arrival of 10th Special Forces Group 9 The Fight 10 Key Takeaways 12 The Strategic Landscape: US Policy 12 The Strategic Landscape: Our Competitors (or Adversaries) 14 Conclusion 16 Endnotes 3 Photo above: U.S. Special Forces team (ODA 013) in Kurdish Refugee Camp, Isikveren, Turkey, April 1991. Introduction In the early hours of March 19, 2003, cruise missiles fired from U.S. Navy ships and precision munitions dropped from U.S. Air Force F-117 stealth aircraft struck Dora Farms, a cluster of While conventional buildings in a rural area just outside of Baghdad. This was an warfare is an episodic attempted decapitation strike targeting Saddam Hussein and interruption of the his top leadership team. If successful, it could have averted the normal security need for the war that followed. Saddam escaped the attack, environment, some but the targeting information was accurate: Despite all of his security precautions, his precise location had been identified.1 level of IW is the norm. The information that enabled this near-miss strike was not the result of some marvel of technology. Rather, it was the product of a complex human intelligence network. These were the first Americans to enter Iraq prior to the start of the Iraq War in 2003.2 4 “The United States must learn from its successful IW experiences and apply those lessons to great power competition.” Pinpointing Saddam’s location in early 2003 was only one of and apply complementary capabilities to achieve successful several significant irregular warfare (IW) tasks accomplished IW outcomes. The CIA/Army Special Forces partnership in by this combined team. American intelligence officers and Northern Iraq during the invasion of Iraq demonstrates the special operators practice IW constantly around the world; value of this interagency team and provides lessons and a IW is both a set of missions and a mindset. These missions model for the conduct of IW in the future. include counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, stabilization operations, and unconventional warfare. Background Rapid, mission-focused adaptability and the ability to work closely with others — whether from another agency, an ally, or a Ethnic Kurds make up the majority in the three provinces in partner — constitute the IW mindset. Northern Iraq (known as Iraqi Kurdistan) and around 20% of Iraq’s population as a whole. They fought against every regime According to most histories, the Iraq War was executed in in Baghdad from 1960 until Saddam was removed. In 1970 two distinct phases: a conventional war and then an irregular the government of Iraq announced a peace plan that included counterinsurgency war. In fact, IW began prior to the onset Kurdish autonomy, but instead started an Arabization program of conventional combat, continued through the ground war in Kurdish areas and launched a new military offensive against against the Iraqi Army, and continues today against the them. Iraq eventually signed a deal with Iran, known as the Islamic State. This paradigm — a mostly irregular, regular Algiers Agreement, in 1975 in which Iran cut all trade to Iraqi war — has always been dominant and is increasingly Kurdistan. Between this agreement and the start of the Iran- important to understand given the renewed U.S. focus on Iraq War in 1980, over 200,000 Kurds were forcibly relocated great power competition. from their homes in key Iraqi cities, such as Kirkuk. Conventional wars in the 21st century are typically high In 1988, the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein launched intensity and quick, or lower intensity and protracted. In the a direct attack using chemical weapons on Kurdish civilians in first case, irregular operations almost always precede and an “operation” called Anfal, or “spoils of war.” An estimated support the conventional war. In the latter case of protracted 100,000 Kurds were killed in this genocide, around 2,000 conventional struggle (e.g. Ukraine and Kashmir), irregular villages were completely destroyed, and landmines were actions like proxy attacks, intelligence operations, security emplaced to prevent anyone from returning. Per the Frontline force assistance, and unconventional operations are typically documentary on the subject, the international community was far more common than high-order combat. muted on these atrocities.5 6 We propose nothing new by stating that IW is, in fact, far In March 1991, in the aftermath of the coalition expulsion of more frequent than conventional warfare. In fact, while Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the Kurds, together with the Shi’a conventional warfare is an episodic interruption of the in the south of Iraq, rebelled against Saddam. Despite early normal security environment, some level of IW is the success in gaining control of the key cities in Northern Iraq, by norm; consequently, the United States must learn from its April 1991 forces loyal to Saddam had crushed the rebellion; successful IW experiences and apply those lessons to great 1.5 million Kurdish refugees fled to Iran and Turkey.7 8 power competition. This is exactly what the IW Annex3 of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) of 20184 requires. For In April, the U.S. and coalition partners deployed military forces the past two decades the CIA and Army Special Forces have to Turkey to assist in humanitarian relief operations.9 The U.S. demonstrated how to leverage interagency relationships 5 Army’s 10th Special Forces Group deployed elements to nearly The intent was to link up with both parties and work with every major refugee camp that had sprung up on both sides them to prepare the north for a potential war with Saddam in of the Iraq-Turkey border. For two months, they lived side by coordination with the Turkish government. side with the refugees, facilitating life-saving support until the coalition established a no-fly zone over Northern Iraq and The first NILE team deployed to Salah ah Din and Qalah Chulan cleared Iraqi forces from the area.10 in February 2002, to reestablish contact with the leaders of the KDP and PUK. Kurdish leaders were pleased to receive the These actions set the conditions for the return of refugees team, but skeptical of the U.S. government’s intentions. They to their homes in Iraq. For the Special Forces soldiers, this were reluctant to believe the U.S. was back to stay. With much would be the beginning of a long association with the Iraqi effort, the team was ultimately successful in re-establishing Kurds. They provided combat search and rescue support trust with the Kurds. It was a very difficult sell, especially to the coalition taskforce that patrolled the no-fly zone in with the KDP. The team departed Northern Iraq after 10 days, Northern Iraq until 1996, a mission that included a ground assuring the Kurds that they would return in the near future. presence in the Kurdish Autonomous Zone. The relationships and goodwill developed over these years of association Working with the Kurds: First Steps would prove invaluable when the Special Forces soldiers returned to Northern Iraq in 2002 to begin preparation for The team set up small operations bases in KDP-controlled Operation Iraqi Freedom. Salah ah Din and PUK-controlled Qalah Chulan in July-August 2002. These bases were established to prepare for a potential The CIA also had a lengthy association with the Kurds in upcoming U.S. military direct action operation against an Ansar Northern Iraq.
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