Republican Guard divisions looked pretty bold—until they got sliced and diced by coalition airpower. Saddam’s Elite In the Meat Grinder By Rebecca Grant USAF photo by MSgt. Terry L. Blevins ’LL TELL you up front that our ‘ sensors show that the pre- ponderance of the Republican Guard divisions that were out- Iside of Baghdad are now dead.” That announcement, made on April 5 by Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, the head of air operations for Op- eration Iraqi Freedom, was a sig- nificant moment. It was barely two weeks into Gulf War II and airpower already had ef- fectively neutralized Saddam Hus- sein’s Republican Guard forces— the cream of the crop of Iraq’s Army and the main military obstacle to the capture of Baghdad. Guard forces outnumbered coa- lition forces at the start of the war. These elite, experienced, profes- sional soldiers were willing and able to put up an organized fight. They had helped to keep Saddam in power for two decades. Destroying them signaled that Saddam’s con- trol over Iraq was about to collapse for good. Early in their existence, Republi- Boss Hogs. USAF A-10s, such as he put battle-experienced command- in 1988, the Iraqis took the offen- when a brigade of the Republican ners drew up plans to free Kuwait can Guard units accepted only men these lined up at Tallil Air Base in ers. sive,” said Westenhoff, “and Kho- Guard’s Hammurabi division marched and reduce Iraq’s offensive military from Saddam’s hometown area of Iraq, were key to the coalition air “The people at the top were mili- meini threw in the towel.” south. power, the effectiveness of Saddam’s Tikrit and did not demand special strikes that shredded Saddam’s tary professionals, albeit with loy- The success of the revitalized Re- When Iraq invaded Kuwait on Aug. key force was a prime concern. military experience. That changed alty to Saddam,” said Col. Charles publican Guard gave it considerable 2, 1990, Republican Guard forces Operation Desert Storm in 1991 Republican Guard units. with the 1980-88 Iran–Iraq War, M. Westenhoff, chief of the Air stature in Iraq. Its soldiers were vol- spearheaded the main offensive. The called for intense air strikes on the which was also the event that estab- Staff’s Checkmate operational as- unteers who got better military train- Hammurabi and Nebuchadnezzar di- Republican Guard. The Tawakalna lished Iraq as a menacing regional sessment office. Soon, the most ca- ing and pay than the rest of the Iraqi visions attacked from the north. The division was hit hardest, and it military power. The enemy was led pable of Iraq’s military forces were Army. The elite force also got So- Medina and Tawakalna divisions struck quickly fell to the advancing US by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, installed in the Republican Guards. viet military assistance, including from the west. Once Kuwait fell, regu- Army VII Corps. Iran’s supreme Islamic authority. This “accelerated Darwinian process,” thousands of tanks, armored person- lar Iraqi Army divisions stocked with However, elements of the Medina In 1986, Iraqi forces captured the as Westenhoff called it, quickly de- nel carriers, and artillery pieces. conscript troops moved forward to the and Hammurabi divisions used short, Iranian town of Mehran only to lose livered results in battle. Newly All that made the Republican Saudi border, while the Republican sharp engagements with coalition it again in a humiliating defeat. That formed Republican Guard units sent Guard, in 1990, the leading force Guard divisions pulled back to con- ground forces to screen the retreat of prompted Saddam to replace the po- to meet Iranian attacks in 1987 and in Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. solidate a strategic line of defense the main body. Losses of high-qual- litical hacks from Tikrit that infested early 1988 turned the tide. And the first tip-off of the impend- farther north. ity T-72 tanks and other equipment his Republican Guard. In their place, “In a series of four major battles ing invasion came in mid-July 1990 As the US and its coalition part- were great, but significant elements Republican Guard divisions looked pretty bold—until they got sliced and diced by coalition airpower. Saddam’s Elite In the Meat Grinder By Rebecca Grant USAF photo by MSgt. Terry L. Blevins ’LL TELL you up front that our ‘ sensors show that the pre- ponderance of the Republican Guard divisions that were out- Iside of Baghdad are now dead.” That announcement, made on April 5 by Lt. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, the head of air operations for Op- eration Iraqi Freedom, was a sig- nificant moment. It was barely two weeks into Gulf War II and airpower already had ef- fectively neutralized Saddam Hus- sein’s Republican Guard forces— the cream of the crop of Iraq’s Army and the main military obstacle to the capture of Baghdad. Guard forces outnumbered coa- lition forces at the start of the war. These elite, experienced, profes- sional soldiers were willing and able to put up an organized fight. They had helped to keep Saddam in power for two decades. Destroying them signaled that Saddam’s con- trol over Iraq was about to collapse for good. Early in their existence, Republi- Boss Hogs. USAF A-10s, such as he put battle-experienced command- in 1988, the Iraqis took the offen- when a brigade of the Republican ners drew up plans to free Kuwait can Guard units accepted only men these lined up at Tallil Air Base in ers. sive,” said Westenhoff, “and Kho- Guard’s Hammurabi division marched and reduce Iraq’s offensive military from Saddam’s hometown area of Iraq, were key to the coalition air “The people at the top were mili- meini threw in the towel.” south. power, the effectiveness of Saddam’s Tikrit and did not demand special strikes that shredded Saddam’s tary professionals, albeit with loy- The success of the revitalized Re- When Iraq invaded Kuwait on Aug. key force was a prime concern. military experience. That changed alty to Saddam,” said Col. Charles publican Guard gave it considerable 2, 1990, Republican Guard forces Operation Desert Storm in 1991 Republican Guard units. with the 1980-88 Iran–Iraq War, M. Westenhoff, chief of the Air stature in Iraq. Its soldiers were vol- spearheaded the main offensive. The called for intense air strikes on the which was also the event that estab- Staff’s Checkmate operational as- unteers who got better military train- Hammurabi and Nebuchadnezzar di- Republican Guard. The Tawakalna lished Iraq as a menacing regional sessment office. Soon, the most ca- ing and pay than the rest of the Iraqi visions attacked from the north. The division was hit hardest, and it military power. The enemy was led pable of Iraq’s military forces were Army. The elite force also got So- Medina and Tawakalna divisions struck quickly fell to the advancing US by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, installed in the Republican Guards. viet military assistance, including from the west. Once Kuwait fell, regu- Army VII Corps. Iran’s supreme Islamic authority. This “accelerated Darwinian process,” thousands of tanks, armored person- lar Iraqi Army divisions stocked with However, elements of the Medina In 1986, Iraqi forces captured the as Westenhoff called it, quickly de- nel carriers, and artillery pieces. conscript troops moved forward to the and Hammurabi divisions used short, Iranian town of Mehran only to lose livered results in battle. Newly All that made the Republican Saudi border, while the Republican sharp engagements with coalition it again in a humiliating defeat. That formed Republican Guard units sent Guard, in 1990, the leading force Guard divisions pulled back to con- ground forces to screen the retreat of prompted Saddam to replace the po- to meet Iranian attacks in 1987 and in Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. solidate a strategic line of defense the main body. Losses of high-qual- litical hacks from Tikrit that infested early 1988 turned the tide. And the first tip-off of the impend- farther north. ity T-72 tanks and other equipment his Republican Guard. In their place, “In a series of four major battles ing invasion came in mid-July 1990 As the US and its coalition part- were great, but significant elements of the Republican Guard made it safely back to Iraq. After the Storm Military analyst Anthony H. Cordes- man, in a 1998 Center for Strategic and International Studies report, said the Republican Guard after Gulf War I had as many as 600 T-72s and 300 USAF photo by SSgt. Cherie A. Thurlby T-62s, for a total of about 900 top- of-the line tanks. Soviet T-55s also remained in the arsenal. There was no doubt the Republican Guard re- mained a cohesive and comparatively well-equipped fighting force. In fact, Westenhoff said before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom that the Guard had more than twice as many tanks as coalition forces and probably about twice as many artillery pieces in the theater. On Target. Joint Direct Attack Munitions, such as this one being prepped for Military planners knew that Sad- a B-1B bomber, provided the precision needed for B-1s and B-52s to fly close dam’s ability to preserve his regime air support missions in Gulf War II. rested with the Republican Guard. They alone had the means to orga- roughly 30 miles outside the city of greatly simplifying the Republican nize and conduct counterattacks Baghdad. “They were put in block- Guard’s job. And, while speed and against coalition forces.