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The Great Allied Offensive Begins.Arras EDITORIAL . FINANCIAL TUTORIAL . FINANCIAL AUTOMOBILES' AUTOMOBILES 3faw gurk ffrifame APRIL 1ÍH7 PART III EIGHT PAGES ^T ni ETGT1T PAGES Sl'NOAY. '2'2, THE GREAT ALLIED OFFENSIVE BEGINS.ARRAS Campaign Since Water¬ The Battle of Arra* German Offensive Is Vlost Significant Perhaps Dislocated loo Is ^n.New British Armies Win Success in Western Trench .End of Trench Greatest Warfare Be Warfare.Will Germans Halt or May Retire Out of France? at Hand Co jyright 1317.The Tribune Associatioa By FRANK H. SIMONDS Author of "The Great War," "They ShaJl Not Pass" French are now attacking, in the bloody battle of the Aisne, which marked the be¬ have .«con the begin- culminating fury on Easter, British ar .TW« _a5t tert days ginning of the trench war. Eastward of be the most momentous Canadian troops left their trenches ear tt m^neX must the Craonne Plateau is the one weak spot conflict and the on morning on a twelve-mile froi BtM*nmiF* ft t-ie Prcsent Monday in the German position, the point whew in Kuropean history since from the old battlefield at the north end ^ (jjjnificant the Aisne River comes through a wide Waterloo. After a the the Deule River, ^-jlion started for Vimy Ridge, along level plain between the Craonne Plateau the British ar- Hcnin, on the Cojeul, twelve miles sout! yjWinter of preparation, on the north and the hills cast of Rheima, first blow on Monday, east of Arras. ajaj struck their Through this gap a French division pene¬ a week later 1-2 9, before Arras, and The chief obstacle immediately befo: trated during the pursuit after the Battis between Soissons «and ?ka Flinch began the British waa the famous Vimy Ridg of the Marne. It actually succeeded in battle now trama*, to -¦*. ontcome of the a little less than five hundred feet hig separating the armies of Kluck and Buelow, iafml depends the question of peace by rising gently on the west side facing tl and, had it held it« ground, the German lttafjaÜon or by victory. British and falling abruptly into the grei retreat must have been to the frontier. article I intend to discuss Plain of Northern France on the east, V In til* present Unhappily, the troop« were green, the of¬ is now tit« British offensive, which passing this hill the troops of Foch had struggle ficer« inexperienced, and, finding them¬ for another week on! .At» s new phase, leaving in the great battle of Artois in 1915, selves momentarily out of touch with their of the French ut fjetailed di*$cussion op- to be driven back. A hundred thousan supporting troop«, they withdrew. Could is as I write, the unsuccesi m*afist\which just beginning French casualties paid for the French now push up through this gap, 17. in Jun« «Toeidsy, April ful effort in this region May and they would be in the rear of th« fort« of 1915. But this time the attack was ii the TV* Succei»ful Cerman Retreat Rheims, held by the Germans, fort of stantly successful, and in a few hours th Brimont, from which the Germans ha*ra The new campai-gn may be said to have Canadians had reached the crest of th bombarded Rheims during the last two when the Germans 6ave N« ifjfBB on February 6, Vimy Ridge at every point Hill years, and a general German retreat be¬ Ancre. ère ont of Grandcourt along the 140, at the extreme northern end. Mear tween the Vesle and the Argonne would there was Doriu-f the month of February time the British centre.the Canadian be necessary. retirement before the Somme were the left.moved out both banl« i rradual along The Precedent of 1915 «Mitions of the British, and on the IRth of the Scarpe River from the suburb« c «f March this retirement suddenly broad- Arras, rapidly penetrated four systems o We have, then, the problem of the new «yd into the great retreat out of the coun¬ German intrenchments and made an ac offensive. Two great forces of Allies ara try between Soissons and Arras. By this vanee of upward of six miles in the nex striking at either end of the Hindenburg rarest the Germans accomplished three four hours, forcing their way through a line, to which the German« have retreated, flap. They escaped from positions which the old German lines and making a greate A break at either end would compel th« *mà become difficult to hold, owing to the total advance than had yet been made i Germans to retire to the French fron¬ accewful advance of the French anr* the Western trench warfare» Between th tier. A simultaneous break at both point»* kituh during the Battle of the Somme, Scarpe and the Cojeul the British righ might mean the envelopment and capture _ty itraightened *heir line and short- j wing made corresponding advance» am of large German forées between Soissons ted it, saving a certain number of thou- by Tuesday had cleared the west bank o and Lens, for the troops penetrating tmes of troops. And they also tempora¬ the Cojeul River. through these breaks would be moving in a frustrated all the plans of the British direction in the rear of thd lly General Retreat Compelled converging sod of the French to attack between Sois- German armies on that front. a belt of reaisnd Arrss by putting twenty This was the first phase of the Battle o This situation entirely recalls that which sik» of devastated country between the Arras. In it the British took 6ome on existed in September, 1915, when the Brit¬ c_ poiitions of the Allies and the new hundred and fifty guns, many of then ish made their great attack at Loos, co¬ German line. heavy pieces, a vast amount of materia incident with the French offensive in This new German front, which has been and at least ten thousand prisoners. Th Champagne; but at this time the Allies christened the Hir.donhurg line, extended single failure up to this moment had beei lacked heavy artillery, the British army be¬ tlaoet in a straight line from Arras in the effort to get control of the northen was still untrained, and the operation was of fóte Csmbrai and Le Catelet and east end of the Vimy Ridge; but to balance thi: made primarily to relieve the pressure thence ft. Quentin to the Oise River,'and the British had reached the village o; upon the defeated Russians and only with te La Fera through the Forest of St. Monchy, six mile« east of Arras and domi the remote hope of a general victory in _**in to the suburbs of Soissons. On this the whole toward Douai. France. It ia worth recalling also that at nating plain the Battle of the Somme last a* it seemed, and still seems, that the After hours the Germans be year th« forty-eight Allies were to make their German« had chosen to meet the attack compelled at¬ gan to react. The next two days saw t tack in advance of the completion of their .Í the Allies. Their retreat along this desperate effort to regain the Vimy Ridg« preparations because the situation at Ver¬ tat was one of the most successful op- on the north and to break the right flanl* dun had become critical and the city «ition» in military history and will re- of the British lines southward betweer seemed likely to fall if German attention was not at once directed elsewhere. «¦«¦ s model of military efficiency. The Cojeul and the Sensée. Bear in mind thai of and material the We may say that in the new offensiv« *-*è**ttt* prisoners by at this point the British had crossed th« the Allies have had the of choos¬ «¦»were and the Germans privilege infinitesimal, Uind«_nburg line at its point of junctior ing their own time and their own places of .*__». the positions they had intended to with the old trench line and had, in fact attack, save only as the German retreat --_- or not have dislocated co in exactly the manner they had use the of the door, cut the may have may their to figure hinges between ¦PKtsd. By Easter the retreat was prac- door. plans on the front Soissons and of the northernmost Arras. But it is well to bear in mind that *-*-**7 completed, and the Germans could By Thursday the Germans recognized the Germans have also the men and the -*~*a with to the success of their pride that their defeat was absolute, that Vimy material to make an offensive in the Weat *\m-*mm*. Ridge could not be retaken.they had al- if they choose, and that we must watch for a German counter demonstration ence both Pieot« Now Attacked leady lost Hill No. 140.and a general re¬ dash line «_¦.._¦ show« the Hindenburg line at the point of solid line _________¦__¦ shows the front before the German retreat. The dot and Allied armies are committed to their great treat was ordered. Meantime, while the The in the Fattle of Arras to February 18. ¦fctttime Allied strategy had conformed with the old line. The broken line aa m am aa «how« the British gain» offensive. army of General Allenby had been winning junction » «W aew situation. All along Haig and Fire Million« of Men the Battle of Arras, the army of General Fighting **¦¦» had to strike at the ap- is too, that the British planned from the to its for again. It clear, On the other it is Home, to the north, extending told us.
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