What Is Immediate Perception? the Buddhist Answer

> Research What is immediate perception? The Buddhist answer

Is the immediacy of our knowledge an epistemological ideal or merely a psychological reassurance that our senses don’t misguide us? If we disregard immediacy in favour of other means to determine all of our knowledge including sensation, how can we discern sensation from knowledge? Conversely, if we regard immediacy as a physiological event (sense stimulation), how can we prove that it’s part of the cognitive process? Immediacy-related problems arise in any epistemological discourse – Western or Eastern, ancient or modern. What is immediacy according to Buddhist epistemological tradition (pramanavada) represented by Dignaga (480-540) and Dharmakirti (600-660)?

Victoria Lysenko

ccording to the Stanford Encyclo- Apedia of Philosophy (henceforth, the SEP), immediacy requires two criteria: ‘The first one appeals to the idea of inference: something is immediately experienced or is given if the cognitive consciousness of it is not arrived at via any sort of inferential process. The second one appeals to the idea of certainty: something is immediately experienced or given if the awareness of it is certain, incapable of being mistaken’ (BonJour: Fall 2001).

In their disputes with Brahmani- cal thinkers the Buddhists tried to exclude any kind of mental construction (kalpana) from the realm of the immediately given. But, deprived as it is of mental construction, immediate perception becomes automatically incapable of providing any cognitive information about its object. That is why Buddhist thinkers had to prove that immediate perception (pratyaksha), in spite of its non-conceptual character, is still a genuine instrument of knowledge (pramana). How did they manage to reconcile the ‘blindness’ of pure sensation with its being part of the cognitive activity?

Units of becoming The main goal of knowledge from the Buddhist point of view is to know things the way they are (yathabhutam) or to know reality as such (tathata). What then constitutes reality? For the Bud- dhist the essence of reality is imperma- nent (anitya); to exist means to change, because nothing has any endurable essence (anatman). Existence is being reduced to a stream of discrete momentary dharmas.

The term dharmas (in plural form) has no equivalent in Western thought; it has been interpreted in many ways: ‘phenomena’, ‘point-instances’, ‘units of becoming’, ‘properties’, ‘tropes’ etc.. To know reality as it is means to know it as a series of dharmas. For the Buddhist this kind of knowledge is obtained in meditation and has a totally immediate character. In this instruments of valid knowledge (pra- that Dignaga calls samanyalakshana only inasmuch as their epistemology mind-independent or mind-dependent. way immediacy is obviously related to mana) exist: pratyaksha, or perception, – a general characteristic applicable to requires them to be. They even seem As far as immediacy is a kind of inner the religious soteriological perspective and anumana, or inference, and each many objects or distributed over many to feel free to alternate between several experience of mental actuality, it will of the Buddhist tradition, but it is the of them has its own subject matter. instances. Samanyalakshanas, generally conflicting metaphysical standpoints. be natural to accept that svalakshana, immediacy of the common cognitive Pratyaksha deals with what Dignaga translated as ‘universal’, are endurable For example, in most of their works, at least in some of our authors’ texts, is experience that was a subject of epis- calls svalakshanas, literally, that which and not subject to change – for this rea- Dignaga and Dharmakirti adopt a so- regarded as a sort of sense data. temological discourse and controversy characterises itself, a particular charac- son they are regarded by Buddhists as called Sautrantika standpoint, presup- among philosophers of different Indi- teristic or pure particular – something only relatively real (samvrttisat). posing the existence of external objects. Is pratyaksha a cognitive an schools and traditions – Buddhist absolutely unique, singular and, most In other parts of their work, however, event? as well as Brahmanical. important, momentary (kshanika). As The term svalakshana does not easily they shift their ontological frameworks To Dignaga, a pratyaksha (etymologically, svalakshanas are ultimately real (para- lend itself to interpretation. Its under- and move to a Yogacara rejection of ‘before eyes’) is above all an immediate Particulars and universals marthasat) and inexpressible, to experi- standing is still a highly controversial external objects…Commonsensical lev- experience, and its immediacy proves its as subject-matters of ence them means to experience reality matter among scholars. The problem els are introduced for the sake of con- veracity and certainty. This immediacy pratyaksha and anumana as it is. The object of the other pramana, is that its ontological status is quite venience and withdrawn to be replaced is so important that he defines pratyak- According to Dignaga’s major epis- inference (anumana), is constituted ambiguous in our authors’ writings. by higher but more counterintuitive sha through the exclusion of mediacy in temological work Pramanasamuc- by conceptualisations, verbalisations, The reason for this ambiguity was schemes’ (Dreyfus 1997: 49). A choice the form of mental constructions. Thus caya (‘A Collection of Instruments of reflections and other products of men- formulated by George Dreyfus: ‘Dig- of ontological positions is equally appli- he calls it kalpana-apodham, ‘free from Knowledge’, henceforth, PS), only two tal construction (kalpana or vikalpa) naga and Dharmakirti…are ontologists cable to svalakshana: it may be either mental constructions’ (PS: 3c). In this

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way the first criteria of immediacy from form of its object. To exclude the pos- the SEP is strictly observed. sibility of interpreting sarupya in the sense that knowledge may have only If pratyaksha is construed by Buddhists the form of the object, but not its own as a direct experience (anubhava), does form (nirakaravada), we should add to it mean that its immediacy consists in our criteria the self-reflexive character the activity of the sense faculties (indri- (svasamvedama) as a confirmation of ya) or in the contact of the senses with the fact that cognitive event has its own their object (indriya-artha-sannikarsha)? form as well. Buddhists accept neither of these alter- natives. That a sense faculty cannot Thus, we can single out six criteria by itself possess cognitive activity was of immediacy from the works of our acknowledged by all Indian epistemolo- authors]: 1) non-inferential character gists (pramanavadins). And the major- (kalpana-apodham), corresponding to ity of Indian philosophers, except Bud- the first point of the SEP definition; dhists, saw in the sense-object contact 2) non-erring character (abhranta), the main condition of sense perception. corresponding to the second point of Why didn’t Buddhists? First, for them SEP definition; 3) instrumentality (pra- not all senses could enter in direct con- manatva) with regard to practical tasks; tact with their objects (they insist on 4) vividness (spashta); 5) congruence non-contactualness of certain senses (sarupya) with its object; and 6) self- – the visual and auditory). Second, pra- reflexive character (svasamvedana). In tyaksha is not necessarily a sense per- this way, an acquaintance with Buddhist ception. Among its manifestations Dig- epistemology may suggest new perspec- naga lists mental perception (manasa tives for our understanding and inter- pratyaksha), yogic perception (during pretation of perceptual immediacy. < meditation) and self-awareness, which have nothing to do with senses. Thus For further reading we could safely say that immediacy of - BonJour, Laurence. Fall 2001. ‘Epistemo- pratyaksha is not reduced to any sort of logical Problems of Perception’. Zalta, direct sense stimulation. Edward N., ed. The Stanford Encyclopedia as a variety of pratyaksha. Literally, exempt from mental construction, does something), for example, a jug, con- of Philosophy. See also: http://plato.stan- Then how is it produced? Dignaga is svasamvedana is a self-awareness, not he mean that the pramana of pratyaksha stitutes two different cognitive events ford.edu/archives/fall2001/entries/per- not clear about this question. Accord- the awareness of the Self as Atman, but is a true cognition? The confirmation that have different contents. One is ception-episprob/>). ing to Dharmakirti, a svalakshana, or the awareness of the cognitive event that pramana is not tightly associated perception without mental construc- particular, possessing its causal func- itself, or self-reflective awareness. Dig- with truth lies in the veridical status of tions, the other is perceptual judgment - Dreyfus, George. 1997. Recognizing Reality. tion (arthakriya), can produce its own naga distinguishes between mental per- anumana (inference). Being a mental somehow caused by this perception Dharmakirtis’s Philosophy and Its Tibetan image or aspect (akara) in our mind. ception of the object, such as colour and operation dealing with mentally con- and assisted by memory. For Dhar- Interpretations. New York: SUNY press. Does it mean that we really apprehend other sense qualities, and self-aware- structed objects, it could not grasp the makirti the perceptual judgment ‘this svalakshana at the moment of percep- ness of desire, anger, pleasure, pain, true nature of the object and for this rea- is a jug’, unlike inference (anumana), - Dunne, John. 2004. Foundations of Dhar- tion? Taking into account that all of our etc., which for him constitute mental son is regarded as bhranta – erring or is not a pramana because it deals with makirti philosophy. Boston: Wisdom Pub- own cognitive devices – images, concep- events not dependent on any sense subject to errors. Nevertheless, it is still something already apprehended by lications. tions, words, etc. – are products of men- organ. Svasamvedana is a sort of intui- a pramana. Why? Because, according to perception. But how does he explain tal construction, how could we say that tive experience (anubhava) that accom- Dharmakirti, it may reveal something our experiencing immediacy with - Gupta, Rita. 2006. The Buddhist Concepts immediate perception of particulars or panies all kinds of mental activity, being previously unknown and may lead to a regard to seeing something definite, of Pramana and Pratyaksha. New Delhi: of their aspects is a cognitive event? For itself free of any conceptualisation. It is successful action. It is pramana because like a jug? For him it is because of the Sundeep Prakashan. Dignaga and Dharmakirti the answer sometimes rendered by the term ‘apper- of its instrumentality with regard to kalpana (mental construction) that a to this question is not simple. Being ception’, introduced by Leibnitz in the practical tasks, including final eman- cognitive image appears for us as a - Williams, Paul. 1998. The Reflexive Buddhists, both of them reject the sense of the reflexive awareness of our cipation (nirvana). Thus we may safely totally external thing (Pramanavart- Nature of Awareness: a Tibetan Madhya- existence of Atman or Self in a role of personal cognitive experience as desir- add instrumentality to what we sup- tika III: 359-362). One more distin- maka defence. Curzon Press: Richmond, a permanent cogniser. For them there able or not. But that does not mean pose may be the Buddhist definition of guishing feature of kalpana owing to Surrey. UK. is no subject of knowledge apart from either that cognition is cognised by a immediacy. its mediate character is its lack of viv- the knowledge itself, which is a flow of separate cognitive act (otherwise, there idness (Svavrtti to Pramanaviniscaya Victoria Lysenko is a research professor at momentary point-instances (dharmas). would follow an infinite regression) or Sketching a new definition of 1. 31 ). Accordingly, pratyaksha is dis- the Institute of Philosophy, So what makes an instance of pratyak- that svasamvedana, being a sort of intro- perceptual immediacy tinguished by its vividness (spashta), Russian Academy of Sciences. sha a piece of knowledge if sense-object spection, has other mental states as its Dharmakirti argues that when we which may be construed as our fourth [email protected] contact is not cognitive and conceptuali- objects. think of an object, we have only a criterion of pratyaksha’s immediacy. sation is cognitive but not immediate? blurred cognition of it, whereas when To this set of criteria one may add Is pratyaksha a true or an we see it we have a vivid apprehen- another: sarupya, the congruency of They might propose an answer con- instrumental cognition? sion. But for him simple seeing and internal image with external object, or nected to their concept of svasamvedana When Dignaga defines pratyaksha as ‘seeing as’, (perceiving an object as the fact that the knowledge takes the

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