UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los Angeles ‘George Washington Must Go’: The Causes and Effects of Great Power Electoral Interventions A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the Requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Dov Haim Levin 2014 © Copyright by Dov Haim Levin 2014 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION ‘George Washington Must Go’: The Causes and Effects of Great Power Electoral Interventions by Dov Haim Levin Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Los Angeles, 2014 Professor Arthur A. Stein, Chair This study assesses the causes and effects of partisan great power interventions in the elections of other countries. Such interventions have been a quite common phenomenon extending back to the beginnings of competitive elections and even including the 1796 U.S. Presidential elections (the source of this study’s title). Since World War II, such interventions have become quite common: a dataset I constructed of U.S. and Soviet/Russian electoral interventions between 1946 and 2000 finds that there were such interventions in approximately one of every nine competitive national level executive elections during this period. In today’s world, in which competitive national level elections are a significant feature of domestic politics in more than half of the states in the international system, partisan electoral interventions will likely become an even more prominent tool in the great powers’ arsenal. Nevertheless, there has been scant scholarly research on this topic. As for the causes of electoral interventions this study argues that electoral interventions usually occur when two concurrent conditions exist. The first is the consent and cooperation of a significant domestic actor within the target with a proposed intervention by the great power. The ii second is that the intervener sees its interests as being endangered by the very different and inflexible preferences held by another significant candidate/party within the target. As for the electoral consequences of electoral intervention, this study argues that they usually significantly increase the electoral chances of the aided candidate and that overt interventions are more effective than covert interventions. Likewise, electoral interventions will be less helpful to the aided party/candidate in founding elections than in later elections. These hypotheses are tested using multiple methods. The first argument concerning the causes of electoral interventions is tested largely through the in-depth analysis of four case studies (utilizing archival documents) in which such interventions were done or seriously considered by a great power chosen out of the abovenoted dataset of electoral interventions. The second set of hypotheses, about the electoral consequences of such interventions, is tested in two different ways. The first is a large N statistical study utilizing a new dataset of all U.S. and USSR/Russian partisan electoral interventions between 1946 and 2000 constructed by the author. The second is a single election level examination of the electoral consequences of such interventions (utilizing exit polls etc.) in four select intervention cases. Utilizing these methods, this study finds strong evidence in support of the arguments presented here as to both questions. iii The dissertation of Dov Haim Levin is approved Barbara Geddes Robert F. Trager Mark A. R. Kleiman Arthur A. Stein, Committee Chair University of California, Los Angeles 2014 iv Table of Contents Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………..1 Chapter I: Theoretical Arguments and Methodology……………………………………………34 Chapter II: Overview of the Electoral Intervention dataset……………………………………...66 Chapter III: The Causes of Electoral Interventions (prt.1)- the cases of Greece 1967 and Germany 1953…………………………………………………………………………………....83 Chapter IV: The Causes of Electoral Interventions (prt.2)- the cases of Venezuela 1958 and Philippines 1965………………………………………………………………………………..140 Chapter V: The Effects of Electoral Interventions on Election Results – the Large N Statistical Analysis…………………………………………………………………………………………173 Chapter VI: Single election level analysis of the effects of electoral interventions (prt.1)…….215 Chapter VII: Single election level analysis of the effects of electoral interventions (prt.2)……252 Conclusions……………………………………………………………………………………..289 Appendix 1.1: Research on the Effectiveness of Electoral Interventions- An addition………..313 Appendix 1.2: Defining a partisan electoral intervention- further description…………………314 Appendix 1.3: Definition, Operationalization and description of Dataset Construction………321 Appendix 5.1: Description and operationalization of the control variables for chp.5………….334 v Appendix 5.2: Tables with additional results and robustness checks for chp.5………………..345 Appendix 5.3: Defining an interveneable/competitive election- further description…………..382 Appendix 6.1: Analysis of the 1992 Israeli election survey: regression models, description of variables, and robustness checks………………………………………………………………..384 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………396 vi List of Figures Figure 1.1: The case studies (possible targets) by selection criteria……………………………..56 Figure 2.1: Competitive vs. intervened elections by region- all interveners 1946-2000………...69 Figure 2.2: USSR/Russia electoral interventions by region- 1946-2000………………………..69 Figure 2.3: US electoral interventions by region- 1946-2000…………………………………..70 Figure 2.4: U.S. and USSR/Russia electoral interventions by decade 1946-2000………………75 Figure 3.1: The case studies (possible targets) by selection criteria……………………………..83 Figure 4.1: The case studies (possible targets) by selection criteria……………………………141 Figure 5.1: Electoral intervention dataset 1946-2000 summary description………………….181 Figure 5.2: Predicted mean effects of electoral interventions………………………………….190 Figure 6.1: 1992 Israeli elections Bloc Choice vote……………………………………………225 vii List of Tables Table 1.1: Examples of Activities Coded or Excluded as Partisan Electoral Interventions……..62 Table 2.1: Top five targets of electoral interventions- the U.S. and the USSR/Russia………….70 Table 5.1: Estimated effects of the electoral intervention on election results- selected real intervention cases……………………………………………………………………………….193 Table 5.2: Hypothesis 1: Electoral Interventions Effects in HS Model………………………...205 Table 5.3: Hypothesis 1: Electoral Interventions Effects- Various Controls (HS)……………..206 Table 5.4: Hypothesis 1: Electoral Interventions Effects (in KP)……………………………...207 Table 5.5: Hypothesis 2: Effects of Covert and Overt Electoral Interventions & Various Controls (HS)…………………………………………………………………………………………….208 Table 5.6: Hypothesis 2: Effects of Covert and Overt Electoral Interventions - Further Robustness Checks (HS & KP)………………………………………………………………...209 Table 5.7: Hypothesis 3: Effects of Electoral Interventions in Founding vs. Non-Founding Elections & Various Controls (HS)…………………………………………………………….210 Table 5.8: Hypothesis 3: Effects of Electoral Interventions in Founding vs. Non-Founding Elections & Further Robustness Checks (HS & KP)…………………………………………...211 Table 5.9: Hypotheses 4 & 5: Electoral Interventions for Challengers vs. Electoral Interventions for Incumbents- select models………………………………………………………………….213 viii Table 5.10: Effects of different subtypes of Electoral Interventions: Interventions Which Aid the Campaign vs. Those which Affect Overall Conditions- select models………………………...214 Table 8.1: Causes argument summary (H1-H3): theoretical predictions, case studies and results…………………………………………………………………………………………...293 ix Acknowledgements When I look back at the intellectual debts, as well as the debts of gratitude, accumulated during the long process of writing this Ph.D dissertation I become very thankful that such debts aren’t monetary in nature. Had that been the case, I would need at least a few additional lifetimes to pay them all back. My largest intellectual debt is to my Ph.D advisor Arthur Stein. Without Stein’s highly discerning and perceptive feedback and suggestions on the drafts of this argument and various draft chapters, the quality of the arguments made here in general, and of the dissertation in particular, would have been far poorer. Every time I left a meeting with Stein over one or another part of my dissertation I came out feeling that I better understood what I needed to correct, which ways I should go about correcting it and what I needed to do next- even when his comments called, as they sometimes did, to the heavy revision or even abandonment of much of the empirical research or theoretical argument that we had just discussed. I was quite fortunate to have an advisor who, besides being one of the smartest people I have ever known, was also open to letting his students to go into barely charted lands while giving them the tools they needed to survive the experience. My other committee members were also very helpful. Barbara Geddes’ feedback on the earliest versions of my arguments in her Research Design course saved me months of aimless wandering in blind methodological alleys. Her subsequent methodological and other feedback also helped make this work into a solid empirical house rather than a flimsy sandcastle. Likewise, Robert Trager’s trenchant comments and very helpful suggestions throughout the dissertation process were invaluable in improving its quality in all of its aspects. I am also x indebted to Etel Solingen for providing valuable comments during the orals. A special thanks