jgumfc. 41172 5327

SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette OF TUESDAY ioth SEPTEMBER, 1957 bj> Sutfcotttp

Registered as a Newspaper

THURSDAY 12 SEPTEMBER, 1957

The Ministry of Defence, Uth September, 1957 DESPATCH BY GENERAL SIR CHARLES F. KEIGHTLEY, GCB., GBE., DSO., COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, ALLIED FORCES

OPERATIONS IN EGYPT—NOVEMBER TO DECEMBER, 1956

The following despatch describes the opera- being involved as a result of her commitments tions in the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN from through the Anglo-Jordanian Alliance. 30th October, 1956, when orders were issued It was now necessary to consider specifically by Her Majesty's Government to be pre- what action should toe taken against Egypt if pared in certain circumstances to initiate her seizure of the Canal should result in operations in EGYPT until 22nd December, hostilities. 1956, when evacuation was completed. I am forwarding certain detailed recommenda- The following forces were earmarked by the tions on specific organisational tactical and British and French Governments should opera- technical matters separately. tions prove to toe necessary: — BRITISH ONE Naval Background Aircraft Carrier Task Group On llth August, 1956, in the appointment of Support Forces Group, including Cruisers, Commander-in-chief of the British MIDDLE Darings, Destroyers and Frigates EAST Land Forces, I was informed that, in Minesweeping Group view of EGYPT'S action in nationalising the Amphibious Warfare Squadron SUEZ CANAL, Her Majesty's Government and Land the French Government had decided to con- centrate certain forces in the Eastern Mediter- 16 Independent Parachute Brigade Group ranean in case armed intervention should be 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines necessary in order to protect their interests and 10 Armoured Division that in this event I was to assume the appoint- 3 Infantry Division ment of Allied Commander-in-Chief of all Air British and French Forces engaged. (Medium and Light Bomber Force In my capacity as Commander-in-Chief Fighter/Ground Attack Force, shore- MIDDLE EAST Land Forces -I had already been based and carrier-borne engaged in planning for possible operations in Reconnaissance, Transport and Helicopter the area but mainly in the event of BRITAIN Forces 5328 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 SEPTEMBER, 1957

FRENCH 3. Limited resources of landing craft and Naval air transport. We had only a total of 18 Aircraft Carrier Task Group LST's and 11 LCT's. We had an air lift Support Forces Group, including 1 Battle- for two battalions but very limited ah* supply ship, Cruisers, Destroyers and Frigates. resources. Minesweeping Group TWO Land Early in October I was instructed to recast 10 Division Aeropprtee our current plans so that action could if neces- 7 Division Mecanique Rapide sary be taken any time during the winter Air months. Fighter/Ground Attack Force, shore- This had wide repercussions. based- and carrier-borne Men could not be kept for long stretches Reconnaissance and Transport Forces at a number of hours notice to move, and The following Commanders were nominated in view of the prolonged period that the call to draw up plans and to assume command in up had lasted it was especially desirable to the event of operations:— send reservists, who had been called up at very Vice-Admiral D'Escadre P. BARJOT— short notice, on leave. Deputy Commander-in-Chief Certain vehicle ships had to be unloaded as Vice-Admiral M. RICHMOND, CB., DSO., some of the vehicles had been loaded for as QBE.—Naval Task Force Commander much -as three months and batteries and equip- (Succeeded Iby Vice-Admiral D. F. ment were deteriorating so much that they DURNFORD-SLATER, CB., on 24th October, were unlikely to be able to start on landing. 1956). In addition there was a danger from petrol Contre-Amiral P. LANCELOT—Deputy fumes in the loaded ships. Naval Task Force Commander A stockpile of supplies was built up in Lieutenant^General Sir Hugh STOCKWELL, CYPRUS but even so owing to the limited port KGB., KBE., DSO.—Land Task Force resources the majority of ships for the follow- Commander up and supply for the assault troops must come General de Division A. BEAUFRE—Deputy from the UNITED KINGDOM. This demanded Land Task Force Commander ships which it was quite impossible economic- Air Marshal D. H. F. BARNETT, CB., ally to hold loaded for a long stretch being CBE., DFC.—Commander Air Task Force requisitioned and sailed to the EASTERN General de Brigade -R. BROHON—Deputy MEDITERRANEAN. Commander Air Task Force Neutral shipping in and approaching the I formed a small Allied 'Headquarters in SUEZ CANAL would have to be diverted before LONDON and similarly Task Force Com- any operations could take place. manders built up their Headquarters which were also located in LONDON. Up-to-date intelligence was required of Egyptian preparations and land and air dis- Owing to the Forces concerned being located positions. This would necessitate photographic as far apart as the UNITED KINGDOM, MALTA, reconnaissance over the area of assault and the CYPRUS, FRANCE and ALGIERS, and my Head- airfields.^ quarters being split between LONDON and CYPRUS a great deal of travelling was required Action would 'be necessary and was planned by all Commanders. to evacuate the British contractors working in the SUEZ BASE. Throughout August and September plans were made to take action in EGYPT if some Weather would be deteriorating and empha- crisis should occur to demand pur interven- sised the time required to sail .the assault land- tion. These plans were necessarily flexible as ing craft from the nearest harbour where they it could not be foreseen precisely in what could be held, at MALTA, to PORT SAID. circumstances it might be necessary to inter- The effect of these factors was to make a vene. requirement for a longer period between the Whatever action was required by us would executive order to start operations being however clearly require airborne and sea received and the date it was possible to land assault operations and the British and French on the mainland of EGYPT. Airborne Forces and Commandos were pre- The period of1 notice which had been pared and trained for such action. accepted for the start of operations was 10 The main limitations to our operations were days, although in the event we got little more caused by the following factors: — than 10 hours. 1. Lack of harbours or anchorages or landing craft "hards" in CYPRUS: thereby Exercises necessitating any seaborne assault being One of our greatest problems was to train launched from MALTA, which was over 900 and exercise the troops and Headquarters in- miles away. volved for the task which lay ahead, owing 2. Shortage of airfields in CYPRUS. At to the immense dispersion of the forces, •the outset of the planning only NICOSIA was involved. in operation and that was under reconstruc- The forces in the UNITED KINGDOM were tion and not working to full capacity. concentrated on SALISBURY PLAIN and at their AKROTIRI and TYMBOU were developed home stations and certain useful unit training, rapidly during September and October. was carried out. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 SEPTEMBER, 1957 5329

Landing exercises were carried out with the LAND FORCES Commandos and 6th Royal Tank Regiment British at MALTA. 16 Independent Parachute Brigade in It was in the Command and control field CYPRUS. and especially with regard to Signal exercises 3 Commando Brigade and 6 Royal Tanks where we were most handicapped and it is a in MALTA. great credit to all the 'Headquarters and Signal 10 Armoured Division in LIBYA. staffs that in the event communications worked 3 Infantry Division in the UNITED KING- so well. DOM. Early in October Task Force Commanders French had pressed for a Command Signal Exercise 10 Division Aeroportee partly in CYPRUS. in particular to exercise the Headquarters ship. 7 Division Mecanique Rapide in ALGERIA. This exercise, called Exercise BOATHOOK, was agreed in October and planned to take place early in November; in the end it never took AIR FORCES place. British Israeli Mobilisation Bomber force in CYPRUS and MALTA. 3 Ground attack squadrons in CYPRUS. During the last week in October intelligence sources were reporting from TEL Aviv and French elsewhere increasingly strong indications of 2 Ground attack squadrons in CYPRUS. Israeli mobilisation. As a result of these reports certain precautions were taken as regards the preparedness of our forces. FOUR On October 29th ISRAEL attacked across the SINAI Peninsula. The Plan of Operations At 0430 hours 31st October I was informed THREE that the ISRAELI Government had agreed the requirement and that EGYPT had refused. Situation on 30.ffc October My object was defined as follows: — On 30th October I was informed that Her Majesty's Government were issuing a require- (i) To bring about a cessation of hostili- ment to ISRAEL and EGYPT : — ties between ISRAEL and EGYPTIAN forces. (a) to cease hostilities by land, sea and (ii) To interpose my forces between those air; of ISRAEL and EGYPT. (hi) To occupy PORT SAID, ISMAILIA and (b) to withdraw contestant troops ten SUEZ. miles from the SUEZ CANAL ; (c) to allow occupation by Anglo-French The agreement to our requirements by the Forces of PORT SAID, ISMAILIA and SUEZ. ISRAELIS and the refusal by the EGYPTIANS meant that we were now involved in opera- I was to be prepared to take action on 31st tions against the EGYPTIANS but with limited October in the event of this requirement not objectives. being met by either country. It was therefore clear that instead of 10 days My instructions were that air operations interval between the executive order and the against the EGYPTIANS would start on 31st start of operations I was liable to get about October. 10 hours, and our operations might well be My estimate of the Egyptian strength at this quite different to those for which we had time was as follows, not taking into account planned. such forces as were known to have been en- There-was much to be done. gaged in the SINAI Peninsula: — Of the many immediate steps to be taken Egyptian Air Force the most important were:— 80 MIG 15's (a) To complete the preparedness of the 45 IL 28 bombers Allied Air Force. 25 Meteors (b) To embark and sail the British 57 Vampires Assault Force from MALTA and the French 200 trainers, communication and transport Assault Force from the WESTERN MEDITER- Egyptian Army RANEAN. 75,000 Infantry (c) To embark and sail the immediate 300 tanks which included over 150 follow-up forces from MALTA, the WESTERN modern Russian tanks (JS 3's, T 34's and MEDITERRANEAN and the UNITED KINGDOM. T 85's). {d) To open up all Command Signal nets An unknown number of self-ipropelled between my Allied Force Headquarters, anti-tank guns, including the modern Task Force Headquarters and formations. Russian SU 100's. Allied Forces were then located as A considerable number of anti-aircraft follows: — guns and a modern radar organisation. NAVAL FORCES My main concern was naturally that of speed. British and French Naval Forces were then Certain parts of the previous plans coukl fit in the general area of the CENTRAL MEDITER- in with the operation which I was now required RANEAN. to carry out; certain of them could not. A2 5330 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 SEPTEMBER, 1957

The limiting factor was clearly the Com- Weather was also a factor to toe reckoned mando and armour located at MALTA. As a with. At this time of year weather can result of previous preparedness and excellent deteriorate very suddenly and very seriously. work by all officers and men they were em- Apart from the start of air operations, the barked on the night 30/31st October and speed of operations was dictated solely by local directed to sail at full speed for PORT SAID, factors. It was estimated that we would land a distance of 936 miles by the shortest route. our assault forces from MALTA by November At the maximum speed of the landing craft 6th, have seized ISMAILIA by November 8th and this trip must take 6 days. SUEZ by November llth. That would have The aircraft carriers and HQ ships had been completed the whole operation in 12 days from assembling in the CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN the start of air operations. for Exercise BOATHOOK. This was in some ways an advantage and in some ways a disadvantage. Although it resulted in ships toeing reasonably FIVE concentrated they could not be briefed per- The Operation sonally or easily for the operations in hand. At 1615 hours GMT on 31st October, The Royal Air Force were the most easily 1956, Valiant and Canberra bombers under the prepared for action. It was clearly necessary command of Air Marshal BARNETT began their to eliminate the threat of Egyptian air effort attacks on Egyptian airfields at ALMAZA and from being able to engage our landing craft INCHAS near CAIRO and at ABU SUIER and as they sailed from MALTA along the Egyptian KABRIT in the CANAL ZONE. These attacks coast or our air transports from CYPRUS as .they were continued with the aid of flares during approached their dropping zones. Further, the early part of the night and encountered a any action by the IL.28 bombers against our certain amount of anti-aircraft fire but no night overcrowded airfields in CYPRUS would have fighters. done damage out of all proportion to the iWe had an anxious moment when I was effort involved. instructed, after -the aircraft had taken off on Although the effectiveness of the Egyptian Air their first mission which included CAIRO WEST Force was never overestimated, they had been AIRFIELD, not to attack that airfield, since in action against the ISRAELI forces and they information had been received that American had foreign technicians who were certainly Nationals were being evacuated to ALEXANDRIA capable of carrying out missions on the Korean and were using the road close to the airfield. Since CAIRO WEST was a main bomber base pattern. for the Russian made IL 28's its sudden So my first objective was the Egyptian Air reprieve was a matter of concern. However, in Force. the event, the Egyptians only used it to remove The plan for this was a combination of high their IL 28's to LUXOR. level bombing with contact and delay action I was also instructed to be prepared to bombs to damage runways and discourage attack CAIRO Radio later after issuing warnings aircraft from taking off. This to be followed so as to avoid civilian casualties. by daylight ground attacks. During the night HMS NEWFOUNDLAND It was estimated this would take 48 hours encountered the Egyptian Frigate DOMYAT in to complete. the RED SEA and sank her after she had failed to reply to a signal: 68 survivors were picked The next problem was when to use our up. airborne forces. From daylight onwards Allied shore-based We had a limited airborne effort but in par- and carrier aircraft carried out highly success- ticular our air supply lift and air supply ful attacks on aircraft on Egyptian airfields resources were very restricted. The offensive while French naval aircraft set fire to a power we had against the Egyptian anti-aircraft Russian-built destroyer off ALEXANDRIA. guns was from the Fleet Air Arm and fighters Two attempts were made to sink the old from CYPRUS, the time over target of the latter LST AKKA which -had been identified as a being limited to ten to fifteen minutes. prepared tolockship. Anchored in shallow My final objective at this stage it may be water in LAKE TIMSAH she was well placed remembered was SUEZ. My problem was there- for towing into the narrow channel at the fore to prevent the Egyptians moving any of southern end of the lake. Unfortunately the their armoured forces, which were concentrated attacks were only partially successfu3i and before in reserve, to the CANAL ZONE and especially the ship could be sunk she had been towed on to the Causeway, that narrow strip of sand in a sinking condition to her blocking position. at places only a few hundred yards wide, on In view of the subsequent orgy of sinking which the road runs from {PORT SAID to carried out by the Egyptians the relative ISMAILIA. Here even a few tanks might have importance of the AKKA assumed far less signi- caused a physical block which would have ficance than seemed likely at the time. taken a very considerable time to clear. We By the end of the day the Egyptian Air hoped to do this by keeping them uncertain Force had been severely treated: a large until the last moment whether our main attack number of aircraft had 'been destroyed or was to toe at PORT SAID or ALEXANDRIA. This, damaged on the ground and very few appear in fact, we succeeded in doing. to have been airborne. Only one of our aircraft It was therefore decided to employ the air- had been attacked in the ah* and suffered slight borne forces early enough to facilitate a quick damage, while others had incurred minor run through of the armour but to avoid using damage from anti-aircraft fire. them piecemeal whereby they might become During the night, bomber attacks from immobilised. CYPRUS and MALTA were kept up against SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 SEPTEMBER, 1957 5331

Egyptian airfields followed up by ground watched their activities from the perimeter of attacks by naval and shore based aircraft from the landing ground. The same undisturbed first light onwards on 2nd November. Later in public interest was later to be reported from the day these attacks were made on HUCKSTEP PORT SAID in the course of the assault. CAMP, which contained many armoured fight- On tile 3rd and 4th November air attacks ing vehicles and large quantities of military were directed at armoured concentrations and transport, and on ALMAZA BARRACKS, also a military movement on

LIBYA. This formation was therefore removed the Russian self-propelled anti-tank guns (SU from the Order of Battle. I was offered instead 100's) which had been dug in along the fore- 3 Infantry Brigade which had come out from shore left their emplacements and turned to ENGLAND to replace 10 Armoured Division meet the threat from GAMIL. in LIBYA and was then in MALTA. General These guns were most skilfully handled and STOCKWELL considered he did not require any caused us considerable trouble, the fighting more infantry but might later need additional here was hard and the Egyptians made good armoured units. Two such regiments were use of their dug positions which were often then earmarked 1b come from fche UNITED difficult to locate. I warned General KINGDOM. STOCKWELL that unless the parachute opera- At 2015 hours GMT on 4th November I tion achieved complete success these armoured was asked to state, in the event of a post- self-propelled guns might have to be neu- ponement of the airborne assault for 24 hours tralised by destroyer fire before the seaborne being ordered for political reasons, what was landing was made next day. the latest time by which a decision must be Egyptian, resistance was very stubborn made. In reply I gave the hour as 2300 hours throughout .the morning. It centred mainly GMT and added that any such postponement round the SU 100's which were being used would have most serious consequences and as mobile centres of resistance. By degrees must be avoided at all costs. Admiral BARJOT the 3 Parachute Battalion overcame these posi- fully supported my views. It was accordingly tions and under continuous fire made further agreed there should be no postponement and progress towards the town. the stage was now set for the assault. One of the features of this operation was the excellent support provided by the aircraft from the Carrier Force. Continuous missions were SIX flown throughout the day and there was always The Airborne Assault—5th November a "cab rank" of British and French aircraft overhead waiting to be called down on 'targets The morning of 5th November broke clear, by the troops on the ground. Such targets as with a light wind, and for some hours before- presented themselves were for the most part hand Allied paratroopers had been loading on the outskirts of the town. Shore based and emplaning in their aircraft on NICOSIA and fighters and ground attack aircraft meanwhile TYMBOU airfields. made certain that no revival was possible from At 0820 hours GMT 3 Parachute Battalion the Egyptian Ah- Force and that no reinforce- Group and 16 Parachute Brigade Tactical ments reached PORT SAID. HQ, some 600 strong, began their jump on to At 1345 hours GMT a second drop of 100 GAMIL Airfield to the West of the town. A men of 3 Parachute Battalion Group with few minutes later 500 men from the 2 Regi- vehicles, heavy equipment and re-supply was ment Parachutistes Coloniaux (2RPC) dropped made at GAMIL. Some 460 French para- near the water works to the South of PORT chutists of 2 Regiment Parachutistes Coloniaux SAID. dropped on the Southern outskirts of PORT FUAD: here for a time resistance was stub- Anti-aircraft fire was encountered and was born and some 60 of the enemy were killed, dealt with by anti-flak patrols of shore based thereafter opposition at PORT FUAD collapsed. aircraft. Although nine transport aircraft were Egyptian military vehicles made for the ferry hit there were no casualties and all returned across the harbour and were attacked with safely to their base. great effect from the air. Both landings were successful although .they At 1500 hours GMT the local Egyptian were met with considerable fire from machine Commander in PORT FUAD contacted the Com- guns, mortars and anti-aircraft guns used in manding Officer of 2 Regiment Parachutistes a ground role and from self-propelled guns, Coloniaux to discuss surrender terms on be- the Russian self-propelled SU IOC's. The half of the Governor and Military Commander French quickly secured intact their two impor- of PORT SAID. The latter was referred to tant objectives, -the water works and the main Brigadier M. A. H. BUTLER, DSO., MC, Com- road and rail bridge over the INTERIOR BASIN. mander of 16 Parachute Brigade, who was in The Egyptians succeeded in destroying the control of the whole airborne assault and who less important pontoon bridge. The Water had dropped at GAMIL. Half an hour later at works were of particular value for, although 1530 hours GMT a Cease Fire was ordered we had made provision to supply the town by by the Commander in PORT SAID while nego- water tanker, in that event strict water ration- tiations were in progress. Surrender terms ing would have been necessary. were agreed and the Egyptian forces began to lay down their arms while their police were By 0900 hours the airfield was securely in assisting under orders. Subsequently, how- our hands and shortly afterwards a helicopter ever, the proposed terms were rejected by the was able to land to take off casualties. 3 Egyptians, and operations were resumed at Parachute Battalion then advanced eastwards 2030 hours GMT. It was later confirmed towards PORT SAID town. that the matter had been referred to CAIRO A particular centre of resistance which for whence orders had been issued for the fight a tune held up the Eastward advance of the to be continued. Although we had cut all pos- British parachute force was the COASTGUARD sible telephone communications, there were BARRACKS, which were demolished by an wireless sets and an underwater cable which extremely accurate air strike by Wyverns and we had not the resources to destroy in time. Sea Hawks of the Fleet Air Arm without On the resumption of operations, the Garrison -damage to surrounding buildings. Meanwhile and populace were encouraged to resist by SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 SEPTEMBER, 1957 5333 loudspeaker vans which toured the town comparatively light and was only used against announcing that Russian help was on the way, known positions or SP guns which actively that LONDON and PARIS had been bombed and fired, it achieved the result of enabling our that the Third World War bad started. At forces to land without suffering the casualties the same time arms were distributed to civi- usually expected in an assault against a lians, some from lorries and some from piles defended and mined coast. dumped in the streets. These arms appear It was not found necessary to engage the to have been handed out to all civilians, many coast defence guns on the breakwater which of whom used them indiscriminately, causing were silent and had evidently been neutralised casualties to both sides. after previously being attacked from the air. Up to this stage there had been very little Fortunately also the French Parachute force fighting in built up areas and hence few casual- had completed the occupation of PORT FUAD ties had been caused to civilians or damage during the night so that the Frendh seaborne to private property. landing on this flank required no supporting In PORT FUAD 2 Regiment Parachutistes fire. Coloniaux met little further resistance and Further support for the assault on PORT completed the capture of the area during the SAID was provided by an air strike on the hours of darkness. 3 Parachute Battalion were beaches lasting for 10 minutes immediately however up against much stiffer resistance. before the start of the naval gunfire: the On the narrow strip of land between the sea beaches were again engaged in a low level and LAKE MANSALA they came under fire attack along their whole length after the naval from mortars, including the Russian multi- fire had stopped and just before the leading barrel type, from ARAB TOWN. troops reached the shore. It was now clear that PORT SAID could not 'Preceded by minesweepers the assault force be captured and cleared by the Parachute reached its destination exactly on time after Force alone and that the seaborne force would the sea passage from MALTA of over 900 miles have to make an opposed landing the next having taken 6 days. At 0450 hours GMT morning. the leading waves of 40 and 42 Royal Marine The decision to launch a comparatively Commandos came ashore and across the small airborne force without preliminary air beaches in LVT's (Landing Vehicle Tracked) bombing or naval bombardment against a large 'before disembarking. This obviated what town, whose defence was numerically nearly otherwise would have been an excessively long three times as strong and was supported by wade on the gradually shelving beach, and an armour, had proved a justifiable risk. PORT exposed run across the broad beaches before FUAD, the water works and the most important reaching cover. One squadron of the 6th Royal bridge to the South had been captured intact Tank Regiment was waterproofed and waded and a small but serviceable airfield was in our ashore from LCT's (Landing Craft Tanks) hands. All this had been achieved with few which touched down in 4£ feet of water. casualties to our own troops and negligible At the same time the French Assault Force casualties to civilians or damage to property. consisting of l,st Regiment Etranger Para- The subsequent tribulations which were suf- chutistes and three Naval Commandos, sup- fered by PORT SAID were entirely due to the ported by a squadron of light tanks, was local Commander being overruled and making an unopposed landing on the beaches instructed to continue the battle. of PORT FUAD. As the Royal Marine Commandos passed SEVEN through the beach huts, which were by then on fire and amongst which quantities of aban- The Seaborne Assault—6th November doned ammunition were exploding, they came The heavy air and naval pre-assault fire plan under small arms fire from buildings along the had been drastically reduced and I had issued sea front and one SU 100 on their right flank precise instructions that supporting fire was opened fire on one of the supporting destroyers. to be confined strictly to known enemy de- The destroyer returned the fire and as a result fences and to .those which engaged our assault. conflagration started in the shanty town in Air bombing was prohibited and heavy naval the immediate neighbourhood of the SU 100; guns were banned. fanned by a stiff breeze a large area of this We thus maintained our policy of accepting collection of shacks was burnt out. risks to our own forces in order to minimise Luckily an area free of the Russian mines Egyptian civilian casualties and damage .to placed along the beaches was found at the their property. The results bear witness to point of assault. the effectiveness of these measures and their The objectives of 42 Commando supported strict observance by the forces engaged, despite by the tank squadron less one troop, was to the distorted and exaggerated reports broad- get through PORT SAID as quickly as possible cast from CAIRO and circulated throughout the to the area of GOLF COURSE CAMP and world. thereby seal off the Southern exits of the For 45 minutes before .the landing some town, while 40 Commando with one troop of 3000 yards of the beach were subjected to tanks was to clear the vicinity of the harbour covering fire from destroyers. The object of in order to enable craft to enter without coming this fire, which was extremely accurate, was under fire. to neutralise known enemy positions which 42 Commando met considerable resistance in had been dug amongst the bathing huts on the area of the Governorate where 100 to 150 the foreshore. That it achieved its purpose Egyptian Infantry debouched from buildings was evident from the quantity of ammunition South and West of the Square. They were en- and equipment which was later found aban- gaged by supporting tanks, but as they con- doned on the.beaches. Although this fire was .tinued to hold out in a. block of buildings 5334 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 SEPTEMBER, 1957

which lay across the main axis of advance of for " gallabiyahs ", and were indistinguishable 42 Commando, an air strike was called down from civilians, many of whom were armed. at 0700 hours GMT. Immediately after this Streets had to be cleared house by house the advance was resumed with the Commandos and sometimes room by room. This took time travelling in their unarmoured open LVTs and required a considerable expenditure of escorted by tanks. They moved rapidly down small arms ammunition and grenades. Failure the RUE MAHOMET ALI coming under fire to observe 'the normal street fighting drill and from side streets with grenades being thrown the wish of all ranks to get through PORT SAID down from balconies overhead. as quickly as possible led in some cases to The Commandos replied with their personal avoidable casualties to our own .troops. It is weapons while the tanks knocked out anti- a tribute to their -patience and forbearance that tank guns halfway down the street and overran so little damage was done to PORT SAID. a further three guns as -they emerged into the At 0900 hours GMT Lieutenant-General open South of the heavily built up area. STOCKWELL reported that, with the other Task The Commandos suffered some casualties at Force Commanders and General BEAUFRE, he this stage in their vehicles and while subse- was going ashore to try to secure the un- quently clearing the houses on either side of conditional surrender df PORT SAID. Negotia- the street. tions were in progress through the Italian Meanwhile 40 Commando was carrying out Consul and a rendezvous had been arranged a deliberate clearance of the houses along the at the Consulate. Lieutenant-General QUAI SULTAN HUSSEIN bordering the harbour. STOCKWELL and his party sailed into the A considerable number of Egyptian infantry harbour in a motor launch as far as the Canal were seen and engaged to the West of this Company building where they were fired on axis and strong opposition developed amongst from the direction of NAVY HOUSE. Going about they landed near the CASINO PALACE the warehouses behind NAVY HOUSE. HOTEL and proceeded to the Consulate. The At 0540 hours .GMT the Commanding Egyptian Commander however failed to come Officer of 45 Commando took off from HMS to the rendezvous and as a result fighting con- OCEAN in a helicopter to reconnoitre the land- tinued throughout the day. ing zone for his unit. In the smoke and haze the pilot lost his way and landed temporarily By 1015 hours GMT a tough battle was in an Egyptian held football stadium where taking place in PORT SAID but the situation was the party came under fire. Quickly realising gradually being brought under control. British his mistake he re-embarked his -passengers and and French forces had linked up at the Water made good his escape in spite of a considerable Works and the advance Southward was being number of bullet holes in his machine. organised. 45 Commando were landed using 22 heli- I was particularly anxious to secure as much copters from HM'S OCEAN and THESEUS and of the Causeway running South from PORT 90 minutes later 400 men and 23 tons of SAID as quickly as possible, mainly in order to stores were ashore near the CASINO PIER with- prevent our "break-out from the Causeway from out further incident. This was the first occasion being blocked by the Egyptians but also to on which such an operation had been carried enable PORT SAID to be -used for unloading out. men and material without interference or the requirement of a lot .of troops to secure it. The remainder of 6 Royal Tank Regiment disembarked at the FISHING HARBOUR later In PORT SAID the last area of resistance in the morning. One squadron was placed in centred round NAVY HOUSE where tanks support of 45 Commando who had the task supporting 40 Commando used their guns to of clearing -the town between the axes of the blow in the doors of warehouses from which two leading Commandos: the other squadron Egyptian fire was still coming. by-passed the opposition with which 40 Com- Finally, just before dusk an air attack was mando was dealing and finally joined up with called down on NAVY HOUSE itself which still the French parachutists well South of the town held out. This building was engaged and our near the bridges over the INTERIOR BASIN. troops occupied the area. All organised By 0730 hours GMT 42 Commando and its resistance now ceased, 3 Parachute Battalion supporting tanks had taken up positions in had also closed up to the edge of ARAB TOWN the area of .the GAS WORKS and GOLF COURSE and the Commandos had linked up with the CAMP South of the town from which they en- French South of the town. Sporadic sniping gaged Egyptian infantry near the PRISON. These however continued throughout ,the night. appeared to be forming up for a counter- At 1700 hours GMT orders were received attack and an air strike was called down on from LONDON .that a United Nations Force them at 0900 hours whereupon they rapidly would take over from us and that a Cease Fire dispersed. was to take effect 2359 hours GMT, and that From then onwards until 1200 hours GMT no further move of forces would take place 42 Commando engaged Egyptian infantry try- after that hour. Orders were therefore issued ing to cross their axis from East to West to the leading troops to halt at midnight by evidently seeking sanctuary in the rabbit which time the leading Allied Forces had warren of ARAB TOWN. This Westward move reached EL CAP, some 23 miles South of PORT was also due to pressure from 45 Commando SAID. who were slowly clearing the middle of PORT SAID. EIGHT Like all street fighting the clearing of PORT The Occupation of Port Said SAID was a slow process made more difficult Early the next morning I flew into GAMIL by the fact that most of the regular Egyptian airfield and joined General STOCKWELL there. troops had by then discarded their uniforms We then toured the town together in a Land SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 SEPTEMBER, 1957 5335

Rover which enabled me to get a first hand chose to restrict the flow of water to PORT impression of the situation in PORT SAID and SAID. Arrangements were also made to accept the fighting. The Egyptian Garrison had con- a hospital train from CAIRO whose despatch sisted of three regular battalions supported by was organised through United Nations Russian self-propelled anti-tank guns channels. (SU 100's) and a considerable number of anti- High priority was given to salvage opera- aircraft guns which had been used in a tions and teams immediately started to inspect ground role after the parachute drop. The the wrecks sunk by -the Egyptians. There Garrison had been swollen by a last minute were 21 of these in the harbour, far more than influx from SINAI and there were some 4,500 air photographs had disclosed since many of Egyptian regular troops in the area. Arms and them were completely submerged. Blocking ammunition, mainly of Soviet manufacture, of the harbour had been catered for in the had -been supplied on a lavish scale and there planning and two salvage ships, an ocean tug had been a widespread distribution to civilians and four harbour itugs together with the neces- of all ages. The scale of this can be judged sary Clearance Diving Teams and HMS from the fact that on 8th November 45 DALRYMPLE (wreck dispersal and survey Commando recovered fifty-seven 3-ton truck vessel) had been included in the assault loads of arms and ammunition from the area convoy. The two salvage vessels entered round ARAB TOWN. This material was mainly harbour on 7th November and by the 9th surrendered by Egyptians in civilian clothes. November a channel had .been marked through British casualties had amounted to 16 killed the iblockships. Further salvage vessels con- and 96 wounded, while the French had had tinued to arrive over the next week, but it was 10 killed and 33 wounded. The value of heli- not until 12th November that the first LST was copters for evacuating the wounded to the air- able to pass through the blockships and berth craft carriers was amply demonstrated. The in the inner harbour. Search for obstructions French had converted a large liner as a was extended down to EL CAP while consider- hospital ship. able progress was made in actual salvage work The Egyptian casualties were much more and a base was established on shore by 'the difficult to assess at the time since the civilian time the main salvage force arrived. administration had broken down and no On 9th November I was instructed that the records of dead or wounded were available. policy of Her Majesty's Government and the Neither was it possible to distinguish between French Government was to retain our hold in military casualties who had abandoned their PORT SAID until the United Nations Force was uniforms, and civilians, who were killed or established there and that we should do so in wounded with arms in their hands. sufficient strength to insure against a breach The damage to property was mainly confined of the Cease Fire. to buildings along the sea front, the burnt out The Allied Forces were to be redeployed as portion of shanty town, the block near the follows:— Governorate and NAVY HOUSE, both of which had been attacked from the air with rockets. Naval Forces Damage to the main town was remarkably Two British and one French Carrier to slight. remain on station in the Eastern Mediter- The subject of Egyptian casualties and ranean. damage to property has since been thoroughly Ships for picket duties were to take investigated, first by Sir Walter MONCKTON and station off CYPRUS. then by Sir Edwin HERBERT, whose findings CYPRUS have been published in a Government White Paper. A minesweeping force, salvage and clear- The situation in PORT SAID on November ance ships would remain until the CANAL and its approaches were clear, a RED SEA 8th was then as follows: — element being based on ADEN. Tactical Headquarters of the Joint Task Force was in HMS TYNE moored alongside the Land Forces Western breakwater. 3 Commando Brigade

During the next few days 'the above plan TEN was modified to the extent of retaining the personnel of 1 Guards Brigade and most of The Evacuation the artillery of 3 Infantry Division in the The plan for the evacuation had to take the UNITED KINGDOM ready to fly out if required, following factors into consideration: — while their vehicles and equipment were held (i) The minimum period for the opera- already loaded at MALTA. Other units of the tion was 14 days although the final date of build up, mostly administration, were held in embarkation had not been settled and the the UNITED KINGDOM ready to be despatched period might be prolonged by as much as by air or sea should hostilities recommence. 4 days. This was obviously only a temporary expedient until the situation became clearer. (ii) Egyptian troops were to be prevented from entering PORT SAID until the Allied Plans were also formulated to deal either evacuation was complete. with a renewal of hostilities by EGYPT or an (iii) Internal security would remain a com- Allied evacuation. In the former case I in- mitment to the end. tended to break out down the causeway and (iv) A balanced force had to be main- capture ISMAILIA and the airfield at ABU tained to meet any emergency. SUEIR as a first step. (v) French and British withdrawal plans •had to be synchronised, particularly as re- NINE gards shipping arrangements. The United Nations Emergency Force (vi) The safety of our own troops had to be secured during the final stages of em- On 13th November a team of United barkation. Nations Observers who had sailed from HAIFA were disembarked at PORT SAID and moved Some indication of the task can be judged South .through our forward positions at EL from the number of men, vehicles and quan- CAP. United Nations Liaison Officers were also tity of stores which were ashore on 1 attached to Allied Force Headquarters and to December: — 2 Corps Headquarters. British French Three days later the leading elements of Men 13,500 8,500 the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) Vehicles 2,200 2,200 arrived by air at ABU SUEIR and shortly after- (including wards I was informed that it had been agreed trailers to station one infantry company of this force and motor in PORT SAID. This company of Norwegians cycles) arrived by train on 21 November and was Stores (in tons) ... 6,000 4,000 received with noisy demonstrations by the inhabitants. Early the next morning I was In addition to which a large number of informed- that as a result of the arrival of the British personnel and Allied refugees had to United Nations Force, one British battalion be evacuated. and one third of the French occupation force The plan was phased so that on the final would be withdrawn. On 25 November General day of embarkation the remaining British ele- BURNS met Lieutenant General STOCKWELL ment would consist of 19 Infantry Brigade and myself in PORT SAID and we agreed to made up of 1 Royal Scots, 1 West Yorks and accept ifurther United Nations troops in PORT one squadron 6 Royal Tank Regiment. The SAID and that a company should be established French element would consist of 1,500 men, between the Allies and the Egyptians at EL and 200 vehicles including one squadron of CAP. light tanks. With the arrival of the United Nations Emer- By 30 November a Danish Company had gency Force it now seemed that hostilities by relieved 1 West Yorks at EL CAP and was in- either side were out of the question and I there- stalled between Allied and Egyptian positions, fore informed the Chiefs of Staff that I could facing outwards, an unusual military posture make certain reductions in the Allied sea, land from which they were relieved a few days and ak forces and still retain a balanced force later by a company of Indian infantry. In capable of dealing with any likely eventuality. PORT SAID a Jugoslav battalion had disem- From the morale aspect there was now every barked and passed through our lines on their reason for sending as many troops as possible, way Southward and soon afterwards further. particularly reservists, home for Christmas. Danish, Swedish and Colombian contingents arrived to swell the size of the United Nations The next day I was officially informed that Emergency Force Garrison. These units co- Her Majesty's Government had agreed to the operated with British troops and Egyptian withdrawal of Allied units from PORT SAID police in maintaining law and order. as the United Nations Emergency Force be- During the whole period of occupation the came effective; I was therefore to plan on this Egyptians did their best to provoke incidents basis although the question of dates had not in PORT SAID. A campaign of intimidation yet been settled ; my plans need no longer pro- was carried out to prevent Egyptians and vide for a break out towards ISMAILIA, but only foreign nationals from co-operating with the at preventing the Egyptians from moving Allied authorities, shopkeepers were forced by troops into PORT SATO until the latest practical threats to keep their shops closed and subver- time before our final embarkation. sive posters and leaflets appeared in the streets. From then onwards our thoughts were en- Arms and ammunition were smuggled by boat tirely concentrated on evacuation which in across LAKE MANSALA, bombs were thrown' itself raised many problems, the biggest being at military vehicles and efforts made to ambush the fate of the Allied Salvage Fleet. patrols at .night. As a result curfews were SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 SEPTEMBER, 1957 5337 imposed, searches for arms were carried out than had the British forces, perhaps mainly with productive results and a number of administratively. Egyptians detained. Some further Allied But from my Deputy, Admiral BARJOT and casualties were also suffered including the kid- his three Land, Naval and Air Commanders, napping of a British Officer. General BEAUFRE, Admiral LANCELOT and On 15 December provocation reached its General BROHON down to their experienced peak whti 17 separate incidents in which three parachutists, commandos, airmen and sailors, British and a number of Egyptians were they displayed skill, comradeship and gallantry wounded. A special cordon and search of of the highest order. part of ARAB TOWN was carried out during Seldom before can such intricate operations which a quantity of arms was discovered and have taken iplace with more friendship and some 300 Egyptians detained. During the understanding at all levels. following night and the next day the Egyptians intensified their efforts and in one ambush an 2. British Commanders and Staffs officer of the Royal Scots was killed. This operation demanded 'the hurried forma- The next stage in the withdrawal consisted tion of new headquarters, new command of all British troops, who now numbered some channels and many unusal problems in which 7,000 with 600 vehicles, being concentrated in all services and many civilians were concerned. an inner perimeter preparatory to the final It is not possible to name the many hundreds stage of embarkation. This was carried out of officers, and others in the Service Ministries, smoothly and resulted in a cessation of further in all operational Headquarters and in the incidents. Headquarters of the MIDDLE EAST, who did On 13 December the final day of embarka- outstanding work; ibut in particular I would tion was fixed for 22 December but there was pay a tribute to Lieutenant-General still no decision on the future of the Allied STOCKWELL. Land Task Force Commander, Salvage Fleet. This continued to cause Vice- Vice Admiral DURNFORD-SLATER, who com- Admiral DuRNFORDnSLATER and myself the manded the Naval force, and Air Marshal liveliest concern up to the very last minute. BARNETT who commanded the Air Forces. Of Not only was this .fleet carrying out its task of my own staff Major General HOBBS and Air clearing PORT SAID Harbour and the entrance Vice Marshal HUDLESTON did outstanding to the CANAL with greatest efficiency but it was work on the operational side, Major General extremely doubtful whether the United Nations BUCKLE and Brigadier LUCAS on the adminis- would be able to collect a comparable fleet trative side and Vice Admiral RICHMOND as even after -prolonged delay. my personal link in LONDON with the Chiefs It was very disappointing that in the end the of Staff. best agreement that could be reached was that a limited number of ships should remain under PRESS United Nations Flag after our final withdrawal. In modern days world public opinion is a The fact .that the Egyptians had placed over most important weapon of war. This was fully 40 obstructions in an International Waterway appreciated at the outset by myself and my staff seemed, when viewed from PORT SAID, to carry but regrettably the short notice which we had little weight with the United Nations. before the operation started resulted in short- One encouraging piece of news received on comings in Press communications and arrange- 18 December was that the Egyptians had ments which we never managed to rectify in agreed to hand over the British employees of time. the Suez Contractors who had been interned I am therefore most grateful to those since the start of operations. At that time it members of the Press, and especially those was believed that Lieutenant MOORHOUSE, the among the accredited correspondents, because kidnapped British officer, was still alive and they had the most exasperating time, who that he would also 'be handed over: unfortu- reported accurately and objectively and who nately this proved to be untrue. The con- were cheerful and uncomplaining throughout tractors duly arrived in PORT SAID on 21 some difficult and often dangerous days. December and the next day they disembarked in CYPRUS en route for ENGLAND. At the same THE BRITISH SAILOR, SOLDIER AND AIRMAN time all Egyptian prisoners of war and Finally, in case (the events which followed the detainees were handed over. SUEZ operations should have obscured the On 22 December, the final day of embarka- straight military success achieved I should like tion, all went smoothly and the last troops to record my admiration and gratitude to the were on board by 1710 hours GMT leaving sailors, (soldiers and airmen who achieved all PORT SAID in charge of the United Nations the military objectives given to them. Emergency Force. By 1930 hours GMT the The skill and gallantry required, particularly last ship was clear of the harbour thus bringing of parachutists, commandos and pilots was the operation to a close. equal to that demanded in any operation of war and it is they more than anyone else who ELEVEN deserve praise. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 1. Allied Command (Signed) CHARLES KEIGHTLEY, General, I would like, firstly, to pay a tribute to all Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces. the French forces engaged on this operation. In many ways they had a more difficult task 10th June, 1957.

LONDON Printed and published by HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE: 1957 Price Is. 3d. net PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN S.O. Code No. 65-411-72