Preface 1 Introduction
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Notes Preface 1. Basil Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare (New York: Macmillan, 1933), Chapter 1, ‘The Historical Strategy of Britain’. Liddell Hart’s treatise was writ- ten in reaction to Britain’s costly participation on the Western Front during the Great War; for Michael Howard’s interpretation, see ‘The British Way in Warfare: A Reappraisal’, in The Causes of Wars, and Other Essays (Boston: Unwin Paperbacks, 1985), p. 200. 1 Introduction 1. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987); Philip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947 to 1968 (London: OUP for RIIA, 1973); Nicholas Tarling, The Fall of Imperial Britain in South-East Asia (London: OUP, 1993); Correlli Barnett, The Lost Victory: British Dreams, British Realities 1945–1950 (London: Macmillan Press–now Palgrave, 1995). 2. Barnett condensed this argument for his 1995 presentation to the RUSI. See ‘The British Illusion of World Power, 1945–1950,’ The RUSI Journal, 140:5 (1995) 57–64. 3. Michael Blackwell has studied this phenomenon using a socio-psychological methodology. See Michael Blackwell, Clinging to Grandeur: British Attitudes and Foreign Policy in the Aftermath of the Second World War, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993). 4. Tarling, p. 170. 5. Darby, p. 327. 6. See John Garnett, ‘Defence Policy-Making,’ in John Baylis et al. (eds), Contemporary Strategy, Vol. II: The Nuclear Powers, 2nd edn (London: Croom Helm, 1987) pp. 1–27. 7. Richard Rosecrance, Defense of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), Appendix Table 1, Defense Expenditures, pp. 296–7. As a percentage of gross national product, the defense budget absorbed an average of 8 per cent per year during the same period, which includes the Korean War rearmament program, partly financed with American aid. See Michael Dockrill, British Defence Since 1945 (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), Appendix IV, United Kingdom Defence Expenditure, 1948–1979, p. 151. In comparison, the United States’ average expenditure on defense during the same period represented 48.91 per cent of the budget and 8.78 per cent of GNP. These figures calculated from United States Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition (Washington, DC: GPO, 1975), Series F 1–5 (p. 224) and Y 472–487 (p. 1116). 237 238 Notes 8. Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994). 9. Ibid., p. 15. 10. Ibid., p. 70. 11. Ibid., pp. 69–70. 12. Ibid. Extrapolated from pp. 68–70. 13. Ibid. See chapter 3. Kupchan’s model is intended to explain strategic behavior only when a power detects threats in both its core and periphery. 14. Note by the CIGS 20 Apr 50, DEFE 11/35, para. 7. 15. Thomas S. Kaplan, ‘In the Front Line of the Cold War: Britain, Malaya and S. E. Asian Security, 1948–55’ PhD dissertation, Oxford, 1990. 16. Rosecrance, op. cit. 17. Besides various modern biographical studies of Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries, there are a number of useful studies on British foreign policy, most of which deal only with the Attlee government. Among the more prominent are Ritchie Ovendale’s The English-Speaking Alliance: Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the Cold War 1945–1951 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985) and his earlier edited volume, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945–1951 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984). A valuable survey is provided by Michael Dockrill and John W. Young (eds), British Foreign Policy 1945–56 (London: Macmillan Press – now Palgrave, 1989). There are scores of both contempo- rary and modern books on the Malayan Emergency of 1948–60. The standard works remain: Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948–1960 (London: 1975); Brig. Richard Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam (Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966); and Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insur- gency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam, Studies in International Security: 10 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1972). Two recent works which have benefited from releases of previously closed documents are John Coates, Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1954 (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1992) and Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: the Malayan Emergency 1948–1960 (New York: OUP, 1989). 18. David Lee, ‘Australia and Allied Strategy in the Far East, 1952–1957,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies, 16:4 (1993): 511–38; Karl Hack, ‘South East Asia and British strategy, 1944–1951,’ in British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945–1951, ed. Richard Aldrich (London: Routledge, 1992), 308–32; Malcolm H. Murfett, In Jeopardy: the Royal Navy and British Far Eastern Defence Policy 1945–1951 (Oxford: OUP, 1995). 19. Admiral Sir Denis Boyd, ‘The Services in the Far East,’ Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Feb. 1950, p. 43. 20. The senior political officials of the Defence Committee – the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, Colonial Secretary, and the Commissioner- General – all thought retention of a supreme commander was a good idea. Under strident protests from the Chiefs, who argued that the trinity system ‘was better preparation for supreme command in wartime, and allowed bet- ter attention to peace-time training of officers than did joint command’, the politicos relented. See DO(46)24(4), 7 Aug. 46, CAB 131/1. Notes 239 21. See Michael Carver, Harding of Petherton, Field Marshal (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1978), p. 172. Although their Royal Navy and RAF counterparts were competent officers, with little extant naval or air threat, their counsel on defense matters was proportionately less important than that of the FARELF commander. Geoffrey Hodgson, who served as an aide-de-camp to the C-in-C from 1953 to 1954, once commented upon the fact that Admiral Sir Charles Lambe, the C-in-C, Far East Station, sometimes drove himself to meetings with his Army counterpart, an unheard of event in protocol- obsessed Singapore. General Loewen’s response to this observation was to say ‘He bloody well ought to, [he has] nothing else to do!’ Author’s interview with Major Geoffrey Hodgson, 19 May 1995. 22. Dominick Graham, ‘Stress Lines and Gray Areas: The Utility of the Historical Method to the Military Profession,’ in David A. Charters, Marc Milner and J. Brent Wilson (eds), Military History and the Military Profession (London: Praeger, 1992), pp. 148–52. 2 ‘Future Defence Policy’: the Far East as Strategic Backwater, 1945–48 1. Ronald Hyam (ed.), The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945–1951. Part I: High Policy and Administration, vol. 2, (London: HMSO, 1992), ‘Introduction,’ p. xlii. 2. Barnett, Lost Victory. 3. Walter L. Arnstein, Britain Yesterday and Today: 1830 to the Present 4th edn (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1983), p. 338. 4. Ibid., pp. 337–8. 5. Barnett, Lost Victory, pp. 41–4. 6. Ibid., pp. 77–8. The balance of payments deficit was costing US $500 million a month. 7. See, for example, CM(47)69(2), 5 Aug. 1947, CAB 128/10. 8. Alexander had not the force of personality needed to strong-arm the Chiefs or Service ministers. Moreover, the Service ministers retained direct legal responsibility to Parliament for their departments’ expenditures. See Franklyn A. Johnson, Defence by Ministry: the British Ministry of Defence 1944–1974 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980), pp. 20–6. 9. DO(47)68, 15 Sept. 1947, CAB 131/4, paras 2–7. 10. Barnett, Lost Victory, p. 6. 11. Cmd. 7327, Statement Relating to Defence, 1948 (London: HMSO, Feb. 1947). The Royal Navy especially suffered from the ensuing cuts. For example, by the end of 1948 there was only one cruiser, two destroyers, six frigates, and twenty submarines in the Home Fleet; a single frigate in the Persian Gulf; three cruisers, four destroyers, four frigates and three submarines in the Pacific Fleet; and the only operational aircraft carrier was in the Mediterranean with four cruisers, eleven destroyers, nine frigates, and two submarines. See Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987), pp. 30–8. 12. W. K. Hancock (ed.), Statistical Digest of the War, History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series (London: HMSO, 1951), Table 173, p. 195. 240 Notes 13. Bread rationing was necessary because Britain had to forgo some of its wheat allocation in order to help alleviate famine in India and near-famine in Germany. See Hugh Thomas, John Strachey (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 232–3 (Strachey was Minister of Food at this time, and later became Secretary of State for War); Bernard Donoughue and G. W. Jones, Herbert Morrison: Portrait of a Politician (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973), pp. 382–3; Kenneth Harris, Attlee (New York: Norton, 1982), pp. 327–8. 14. Arnstein, p. 338. 15. Richard Mayne, Postwar: the Dawn of Today’s Europe. (London: Thames and Hudson, 1983), p. 85. 16. Arnstein, p. 339. 17. Harris, p. 294. 18. Christopher Warner, ‘The Soviet Campaign Against This Country and Our Response to It’, 2 April 1946, FO 371/56832 N6344/605/38G, para. 1. 19. Ibid., para. 28. 20. Harris, p. 300. 21. W. Scott Lucas and C. J. Morris, ‘A very British crusade: the Information Research Department and the beginning of the Cold War’, in Richard J. Aldrich (ed.), British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945–1951 (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 89–94. 22. Besides their subversive acts in occupied and other areas as well as their threatening military posture, the Russians had proved to be supremely dis- putatious at the Paris Peace Conference that concluded in September 1946.