Notes

Preface

1. Basil Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare (New York: Macmillan, 1933), Chapter 1, ‘The Historical Strategy of Britain’. Liddell Hart’s treatise was writ- ten in reaction to Britain’s costly participation on the Western Front during the Great War; for Michael Howard’s interpretation, see ‘The British Way in Warfare: A Reappraisal’, in The Causes of Wars, and Other Essays (Boston: Unwin Paperbacks, 1985), p. 200.

1 Introduction

1. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987); Philip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947 to 1968 (: OUP for RIIA, 1973); Nicholas Tarling, The Fall of Imperial Britain in South-East Asia (London: OUP, 1993); Correlli Barnett, The Lost Victory: British Dreams, British Realities 1945–1950 (London: Macmillan Press–now Palgrave, 1995). 2. Barnett condensed this argument for his 1995 presentation to the RUSI. See ‘The British Illusion of World Power, 1945–1950,’ The RUSI Journal, 140:5 (1995) 57–64. 3. Michael Blackwell has studied this phenomenon using a socio-psychological methodology. See Michael Blackwell, Clinging to Grandeur: British Attitudes and Foreign Policy in the Aftermath of the Second World War, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993). 4. Tarling, p. 170. 5. Darby, p. 327. 6. See John Garnett, ‘Defence Policy-Making,’ in John Baylis et al. (eds), Contemporary Strategy, Vol. II: The Nuclear Powers, 2nd edn (London: Croom Helm, 1987) pp. 1–27. 7. Richard Rosecrance, Defense of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), Appendix Table 1, Defense Expenditures, pp. 296–7. As a percentage of gross national product, the defense budget absorbed an average of 8 per cent per year during the same period, which includes the Korean War rearmament program, partly financed with American aid. See Michael Dockrill, British Defence Since 1945 (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), Appendix IV, Defence Expenditure, 1948–1979, p. 151. In comparison, the United States’ average expenditure on defense during the same period represented 48.91 per cent of the budget and 8.78 per cent of GNP. These figures calculated from United States Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition (Washington, DC: GPO, 1975), Series F 1–5 (p. 224) and Y 472–487 (p. 1116).

237 238 Notes

8. Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994). 9. Ibid., p. 15. 10. Ibid., p. 70. 11. Ibid., pp. 69–70. 12. Ibid. Extrapolated from pp. 68–70. 13. Ibid. See chapter 3. Kupchan’s model is intended to explain strategic behavior only when a power detects threats in both its core and periphery. 14. Note by the CIGS 20 Apr 50, DEFE 11/35, para. 7. 15. Thomas S. Kaplan, ‘In the Front Line of the Cold War: Britain, Malaya and S. E. Asian Security, 1948–55’ PhD dissertation, Oxford, 1990. 16. Rosecrance, op. cit. 17. Besides various modern biographical studies of Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries, there are a number of useful studies on British foreign policy, most of which deal only with the Attlee government. Among the more prominent are Ritchie Ovendale’s The English-Speaking Alliance: Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the Cold War 1945–1951 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985) and his earlier edited volume, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945–1951 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984). A valuable survey is provided by Michael Dockrill and John W. Young (eds), British Foreign Policy 1945–56 (London: Macmillan Press – now Palgrave, 1989). There are scores of both contempo- rary and modern books on the of 1948–60. The standard works remain: Anthony Short, The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948–1960 (London: 1975); Brig. Richard Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam (Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966); and Sir Thompson, Defeating Communist Insur- gency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam, Studies in International Security: 10 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1972). Two recent works which have benefited from releases of previously closed documents are John Coates, Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1954 (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1992) and Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: the Malayan Emergency 1948–1960 (New York: OUP, 1989). 18. David Lee, ‘Australia and Allied Strategy in the Far East, 1952–1957,’ The Journal of Strategic Studies, 16:4 (1993): 511–38; Karl Hack, ‘South East Asia and British strategy, 1944–1951,’ in British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945–1951, ed. Richard Aldrich (London: Routledge, 1992), 308–32; Malcolm H. Murfett, In Jeopardy: the and British Far Eastern Defence Policy 1945–1951 (Oxford: OUP, 1995). 19. Sir Denis Boyd, ‘The Services in the Far East,’ Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Feb. 1950, p. 43. 20. The senior political officials of the Defence Committee – the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, Colonial Secretary, and the Commissioner- – all thought retention of a supreme was a good idea. Under strident protests from the Chiefs, who argued that the trinity system ‘was better preparation for supreme command in wartime, and allowed bet- ter attention to peace-time training of officers than did joint command’, the politicos relented. See DO(46)24(4), 7 Aug. 46, CAB 131/1. Notes 239

21. See , Harding of Petherton, Field Marshal (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1978), p. 172. Although their Royal Navy and RAF counterparts were competent officers, with little extant naval or air threat, their counsel on defense matters was proportionately less important than that of the FARELF commander. Geoffrey Hodgson, who served as an aide-de-camp to the C-in-C from 1953 to 1954, once commented upon the fact that Admiral Sir Charles Lambe, the C-in-C, Far East Station, sometimes drove himself to meetings with his Army counterpart, an unheard of event in protocol- obsessed . General Loewen’s response to this observation was to say ‘He bloody well ought to, [he has] nothing else to do!’ Author’s interview with Geoffrey Hodgson, 19 May 1995. 22. Dominick Graham, ‘Stress Lines and Gray Areas: The Utility of the Historical Method to the Military Profession,’ in David A. Charters, Marc Milner and J. Brent Wilson (eds), Military History and the Military Profession (London: Praeger, 1992), pp. 148–52.

2 ‘Future Defence Policy’: the Far East as Strategic Backwater, 1945–48

1. Ronald Hyam (ed.), The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945–1951. Part I: High Policy and Administration, vol. 2, (London: HMSO, 1992), ‘Introduction,’ p. xlii. 2. Barnett, Lost Victory. 3. Walter L. Arnstein, Britain Yesterday and Today: 1830 to the Present 4th edn (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and Company, 1983), p. 338. 4. Ibid., pp. 337–8. 5. Barnett, Lost Victory, pp. 41–4. 6. Ibid., pp. 77–8. The balance of payments deficit was costing US $500 million a month. 7. See, for example, CM(47)69(2), 5 Aug. 1947, CAB 128/10. 8. Alexander had not the force of personality needed to strong-arm the Chiefs or Service ministers. Moreover, the Service ministers retained direct legal responsibility to Parliament for their departments’ expenditures. See Franklyn A. Johnson, Defence by Ministry: the British Ministry of Defence 1944–1974 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980), pp. 20–6. 9. DO(47)68, 15 Sept. 1947, CAB 131/4, paras 2–7. 10. Barnett, Lost Victory, p. 6. 11. Cmd. 7327, Statement Relating to Defence, 1948 (London: HMSO, Feb. 1947). The Royal Navy especially suffered from the ensuing cuts. For example, by the end of 1948 there was only one , two , six frigates, and twenty submarines in the Home Fleet; a single frigate in the Persian Gulf; three , four destroyers, four frigates and three submarines in the Pacific Fleet; and the only operational was in the Mediterranean with four cruisers, eleven destroyers, nine frigates, and two submarines. See Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987), pp. 30–8. 12. W. K. Hancock (ed.), Statistical Digest of the War, History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series (London: HMSO, 1951), Table 173, p. 195. 240 Notes

13. Bread rationing was necessary because Britain had to forgo some of its wheat allocation in order to help alleviate famine in India and near-famine in Germany. See Hugh Thomas, John Strachey (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 232–3 (Strachey was Minister of Food at this time, and later became Secretary of State for War); Bernard Donoughue and G. W. Jones, Herbert Morrison: Portrait of a Politician (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973), pp. 382–3; Kenneth Harris, Attlee (New York: Norton, 1982), pp. 327–8. 14. Arnstein, p. 338. 15. Richard Mayne, Postwar: the Dawn of Today’s Europe. (London: Thames and Hudson, 1983), p. 85. 16. Arnstein, p. 339. 17. Harris, p. 294. 18. Christopher Warner, ‘The Soviet Campaign Against This Country and Our Response to It’, 2 April 1946, FO 371/56832 N6344/605/38G, para. 1. 19. Ibid., para. 28. 20. Harris, p. 300. 21. W. Scott Lucas and C. J. Morris, ‘A very British crusade: the Information Research Department and the beginning of the Cold War’, in Richard J. Aldrich (ed.), British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945–1951 (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 89–94. 22. Besides their subversive acts in occupied and other areas as well as their threatening military posture, the Russians had proved to be supremely dis- putatious at the Paris Peace Conference that concluded in September 1946. See Alan Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, vol. III, (London: Heinemann, 1983), p. 312. 23. See Attlee to Bevin, Personal and Private, 1 December 1946, and Attlee to Bevin, 5 January 1947, as reproduced in Ritchie Ovendale, British Defence Policy Since 1945, (New York: MUP, 1994), pp. 32–5. 24. Sir Orme Sargent, quoted in Hyam, Labour Government, vol. I, p. xlix. 25. John Kent and John W. Young, ‘The “Western Union” Concept and UK Defence Policy’, in Aldrich, British Intelligence, pp. 166–92. Although Bevin was keen to establish Western Europe as a third power led by the British, no guarantees were ever made and the concept was overtaken by the Atlantic Alliance in July of 1948. 26. Bullock, p. 461; Lucas and Morris, ‘A very British crusade’, p. 93. A slightly different interpretation is offered in another chapter in the same book. See Kent and Young, pp. 166–89. 27. Bevin to Attlee, 13 February 1946, fo. 44, Def/46/3, FO 800/451. 28. Bullock, pp. 315–16; Bernard Law Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field- Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, KG (London: Collins, 1958), pp. 440–3. See also General Sir William Jackson and Field Marshal the Lord Bramall, The Chiefs: the Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff (Washington: Brassey’s, 1992), p. 274. The resulting war plans are discussed in detail in Steven T. Ross’s American War Plans 1945–1950 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1988). 29. Ovendale, Foreign Policy, pp. 9–10. 30. Judith M. Brown, Modern India: the Origins of an Asian Democracy, The Short Oxford History of the Modern World, ed. J. M. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 350. Notes 241

31. Hyam, Labour Government, vol. I, p. xxv. 32. Aldrich, British Intelligence, pp. 311–12. 33. The Brooke family ruled Sarawak as ‘White Rajahs’, while the British North Borneo Company controlled Sabah. See CP(45)133, 29 August 1945, CAB 129/1, and Sarawak: CO internal note on cession to the British Crown, 27 May 1946, CO 537/1632. 34. See COS(46)239(O), 5 Oct 46, as reproduced in Appendix 6 of Julian Lewis, Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-war Strategic Defence, 1942–1947 (London: Sherwood Press, 1988), pp. 363–9. 35. Ibid., pp. 279–83. 36. Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1945–1952, Vol. I, Policy Making (London: Macmillan press – now Palgrave, 1974), p. 182; on the development of the ‘V’ bombers, see Simon J. Ball, The Bomber in British Strategy: Doctrine, Strategy, and Britain’s World Role, 1945–1960 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995) and Andrew Brookes, V Force: the History of Britain’s Airborne Deterrent (London: Jane’s, 1982). 37. Gradon Carter, ‘Biological Warfare and Biological Defence in the United Kingdom 1940–1979’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 137 (1992), p. 71. See Aldrich, British Intelligence, pp. 7–9. Much of the relevant material on the chemical and biological weapons program remains closed, although portions of the record have recently been opened at the PRO. 38. Lewis, p. 363. Lewis’s work is the single, most comprehensive study that exists of British planning during this period, being an almost week-by-week account of the iterative planning process from 1942 to 1947. 39. The Chiefs passed it virtually unaltered to the Defence Committee on 1 April 1946. DO(46)47, 2 April 1946, CAB 131/2; Lewis, p. 255. 40. DO(46)47, para. 16. No ‘Continental Commitment’ in the form of combat- ready divisions was envisaged at this time. Despite the threat that would arise from Russian domination of Western Europe, the Chiefs felt able to offer only that ‘we should be prepared to give the countries in Western Europe the support necessary to ensure that in peace they do not fall under Russian influence’ (para. 18). 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid., para. 15(b). 43. Ibid., paras 5–6. This assertion would change only a short time later to refer to India as a main support area, rather than as a potential one. See Lewis, p. 266. 44. Anthony Gorst. ‘“We must cut our coat according to our cloth”: the making of British defence policy, 1945–8’, in Aldrich, British Intelligence, p. 154; Lewis, p. 292; Montgomery, Memoirs, pp. 435–6. See also Barnett, Lost Victory, pp. 46–69. 45. This was a direct swipe at Attlee’s desire to rationalize Britain’s overseas commitments. When Bevin weighed in with his complete support of the Chiefs of Staff’s position, Attlee finally acquiesced in maintaining a British presence in the Middle East. See DO(46)10(2), 5 Apr 1946, CAB 131/1; see also Lewis, p. 259. 46. At war’s end, ‘[m]anpower was one of the crucial economic issues. At a time of enormous industrial shortages the diversion of productive manpower to the forces was directly at the expense of industrial production, the export drive, and the balance of payments’. See Leonard V. Scott, Conscription and 242 Notes

the Attlee Governments: the Politics and Policy of National Service 1945–1951 (Oxford: OUP, 1993), p. 10. 47. DO(46)47, paras 9–12, 20–1, 23 and 26 48. Arthur Bryant, Triumph in the West (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1959), p. 406. The initiating report was contained in DO(46)46 and discussed in DO(46)10(2), DO(46)10(3), and DO(46)10(4), 5 April 1946, CAB 131/1. 49. DO(46)10(4); Bryant, p. 406. 50. DO(46)10(4). This was an idea which would be revisited in the years to come and is dealt with later in this study. SEAC operations in Burma, the East Indies, and southern French Indochina absorbed the equivalent of five infantry divisions. 51. However, as shown in this study, the Korean War prompted most of the Dominions to assume a greater burden. 52. Aldrich, British Intelligence, p. 149; Johnson, p. 313. See also Lewis, pp. 267–8; and Barnett, Lost Victory, pp. 58–9. 53. Quoted in Bryant, p. 406. 54. See COS(47)35(1), 5 March 1947, DEFE 4/2, on the difficulty of meeting strategic needs. Montgomery replaced Alanbrooke as CIGS in June 1946. 55. This was DO(47)44, 22 May 1947, extracts of which are reproduced in Dockrill, British Defence, Appendix I, pp. 132–8. Dockrill gives the PRO citation as DEFE 5/4. The full text is also reproduced from a retained Cabinet Office version in Lewis, Appendix 7, pp. 370–87; I cite from this version. 56. DO(47)44, para. 1. 57. Ibid., paras 4–6. 58. Barnett, Lost Victory, p. 56. 59. DO(47)44, para. 36. The Chiefs added the cooperation of India as a fourth – desirable though not essential – pillar, primarily for its use as an air offensive base and to ensure the Russians were denied the subcontinent. 60. Ibid., para. 33(d)(v). 61. Surprisingly, although the use of atomic bombs ‘were becoming firmly embedded’ in military plans, they ‘still had been related to strategy only in the vaguest terms and no attempt had been made to calculate how many atomic bombs were needed for the deterrent purposes for which they were supposed to serve’. See Gowing, pp. 188–9. 62. Stanley Simm Baldwin, Forward Everywhere: Her Majesty’s Territorials (New York: Brassey’s, 1994), p. 161. 63. DO(47)68, op. cit., paras 19(c) and 19(d). , Cyprus, Sudan, and the West Indies would all have garrisons of one each, while would have two and Cyrenaica, three. 64. As Tarling notes, ‘No one document encapsulates British policy for South-East Asia in the post-war period’ (Fall, p. 187); Darby is scathing about the lack of analytical thought put into the strategic appraisal of the entire British position east of Suez (for example, see pp. 20–1). Since he did not have access to any of the planning or other relevant docu- ments, however, his criticisms, based as they were largely on empirical observation and supposition, have not weathered well the release of the official record. 65. Lewis, p. 80. Notes 243

66. Ibid., pp. 80–2, 147. 67. Ibid., p. 158. 68. Ibid., pp. 82–3. Lewis quotes from PHP(44)6(O) (2nd Prel. Draft). 69. Ibid., p. 169. 70. Ibid., p. 173; Aldrich, British Intelligence, p. 323. 71. Lewis, p. 168. This was no mean consideration, for until Indian and Burmese independence, the COS believed that substantial numbers of British troops might be needed if the loyalty of the began to waver. See Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, eds, The Transfer of Power 1942–47, vol. VII (London: HMSO, 1977), Document 509, DO(46)68, R/30/1/7: ff. 96–106, 12 June 1946. The Chiefs estimated that they would need five British divisions for India, six British brigades for Burma and Malaya, and two for Hong Kong. 72. Lewis, p. 287. 73. Ibid. Conclusions drawn from The Foreign Office Strategy Paper of 5 October 1946, circulated in COS(46)239(O)(Retained – Cabinet Office), pp. 287–8; reproduced on pp. 363–9. 74. Ibid., p. 288. 75. Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma: a Study of the First Years of Independence, 4th edn (New York: OUP, 1967), p. 323; John H. McEnery, Epilogue in Burma 1945–1948: the Military Dimension Of British Withdrawal (Tunbridge Wells: Spellmount , 1990), p. 116; JP(48)3(O)(Preliminary Draft), 15 Jan 48, Annex II, Burma, IOLR L/WS/1/1075. 76. Ibid. 77. Ibid., Annex II, Siam. 78. Ibid. 79. Ibid., Annex II, French Indo-China. 80. Ibid. 81. Ibid. 82. JP(47)93(2nd Revised Final), 16 Oct 47, DEFE 6/3, para. 5. 83. Ibid., para. 6. 84. JP(48)101(Final Revise), 17 March 1949, DEFE 6/6, para. 13. 85. JP(47)72(Final), 9 June 1947, DEFE 6/2. 86. JP(48)3(O)(Preliminary Draft), Annex II, Hong Kong. 87. COS(48)200, 6 Feb 48, DEFE 5/9. No time period is expressly mentioned in the report, it being of a general nature. However, it seems safe to assume that the report was predicated on the Chiefs’ of Staff assumption that war with Russia would occur sometime from 1956 on. 88. Ibid., para. 4(a)–4(e). 89. Ibid., para. 5. 90. Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, p. 18. 91. COS(48)200, para. 13(d) (emphasis added). 92. Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia (London: OUP for RIIA, 1965), pp. xiii–xiv. 93. COS(48)200, para. 20(e). 94. Ibid., para. 17(b). At the time the report was written, the MCP’s campaign of labor unrest in Singapore had already been underway for some time. See Richard Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945–1963 (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), pp. 45–57. 244 Notes

95. COS(48)200, para. 21. This strategic aim was quite a bit narrower than the one stated by the Joint Planning Staff just three weeks earlier in JP(48)3(O)(Preliminary Draft). 96. COS(48)200, para. 23. 97. Ibid., para. 21 98. Ibid., para. 22. 99. Ibid., para. 22. 100. Ibid., paras. 30(a)–(c) 101. Ibid., para. 33. These would be proportionately greater than the forces required by the enemy to disrupt them. 102. Ibid., para. 34(c). 103. Ibid., para. 35(c). 104. Ibid., paras. 35, 36, 38, 39. 105. Ibid., para. 41(g). 106. Ibid., paras. 41(h), 41(k). At this time there was no airfield in either Singapore or Malaya capable of handling such aircraft. 107. Ibid., para. 41(l). 108. See JP(48)69 (Revised Final), 15 September 48, DEFE 6/6, and JP(48) 109(Final), 3 December 48, DEFE 6/7.

3 National Service, the Gurkhas, and the Reorganization of the , 1946–48

1. Scott, p. 10. 2. W. K. Hancock (ed.), Statistical Digest of the War, History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Civil Series (London: HMSO, 1951), Table 10, p. 9. Discrepancies in figures are caused by rounding and specification errors about data sets. At the time there were 437 200 women in uniform too. See also F.W. Perry, The Commonwealth Armies: Manpower and Organisation in Two World Wars (New York: MUP, 1988), p. 75, and David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them: The British Army in the Second World War (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1983), p. 93. 3. Michael Carver, Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy Since 1945 (London: Hutchinson, 1992), p. 6. 4. Cmd. 7042, Statement Relating to Defence, February 1947, p. 6; Cmd. 7327, Statement Relating to Defence 1948, p. 3. This is roughly the size of today’s US Army, which is neither as extensively deployed, or globally committed, as was the British Army of the late 1940s and early 1950s. 5. The Infantry man [pseud.], ‘A New Organisation for the Infantry’, The Army Quarterly, 53:2 (Jan. 47), p. 203. 6. Ibid.; Hancock, Statistical Digest of the War, p. 9; and Scott, Appendix 1, p. 276. 7. Gregory Blaxland, The Regiments Depart: A History of the British Army, 1945–1970 (London: William Kimber, 1971), pp. 8–9. This, in essence, evis- cerated the Cardwell system of paired battalions which had served the Army since 1882. 8. Infantryman, pp. 203–4. 9. Ibid., p. 203. Notes 245

10. Ten of the 77 battalions were Household (Foot Guards) troops, technically not part of the infantry ‘line’. (Blaxland, pp. 9–10); Scott, Appendix 5, p. 284; Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 118–19. 11. Scott, p. 284; Blaxland, p. 6. 12. Blaxland, p. 10. 13. Nigel Hamilton, Monty: The Field Marshal 1944–1976 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986), p. 660. 14. Cmd. 7042, pp. 6–7; Stanley Baldwin, Forward Everywhere: Her Majesty’s Territorials (New York: Brassey’s (UK), 1994), p. 161. 15. Blaxland, p. 13. Of the 16 other battalions stationed in the United Kingdom in 1948, most had ‘been heavily mulcted of men in order to bring overseas units up to strength’. 16. CM(47)35(1), 3 Apr. 47, CAB 128/9. 17. Cmd. 7042, p. 7. 18. , The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G. (London: Collins, 1958), p. 482. 19. Ibid., p. 483. 20. Scott, pp. 46–61. 21. DO(46)1(3), 21 Jan. 46, CAB 131/1. 22. DO(46)29, 1 Mar. 46, CAB 131/2. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. DO(46)7(4), 8 Mar. 46, CAB 131/1. 27. Byron Farwell, The Gurkhas (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984), pp. 14–15. 28. MoD [attrib.], The Brigade of Gurkhas, n.p., 1978, p. 4. 29. Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon (eds), The Transfer of Power 1942–7: Constitutional Relations between Britain and India. Volume V (London: HMSO, 1974), document 346, para. 14. 30. Alanbrooke to Mosley Mayne, IO Ref CIGS/BM/23/9513, 11 May 45, IOLR L/WS/1/1023. 31. Auchinleck to Wavell, Ref DO No. 80/V-i/II/53, 20 Nov 45, IOLR L/WS/1/1023. 32. Ibid.; Mansergh and Moon, op. cit., Volume VI (London: HMSO, 1976), doc- ument 4, para. 17. 33. Mansergh and Moon, Volume VI, document 325, paras. 5–6. 34. Ibid., para. 6. 35. Ibid., para. 9. 36. Ibid., para. 10. 37. Lawson to Arthur Henderson, 31 May 46, IOLR L/WS/1/1023. 38. Mansergh and Moon, op. cit., Volume VII, (London: HMSO, 1977), docu- ment 467. 39. DO(47)22, 7 Mar. 47, PREM 8/537, para. 6(a). Although it had always been the custom that only British officers would command Gurkhas (with the help of subordinate Gurkha subalterns called Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers, or VCOs), it was not an element of any written agreement between Nepal and Britain. In fact, the entire basis of Gurkha recruitment into the British Indian Army was little more than an understanding between the Raj and Nepal (para. 2). 246 Notes

40. Lt.-Gen. Sir Francis Tuker, Gorkha: The Story of the Gurkhas of Nepal (London: Constable, 1957), pp. 252–3. 41. DO(47)22, para. 6(b). 42. Hollis to Attlee, 5 Mar. 47, PREM 8/537. Emphasis added to draw attention to the intention to transfer, rather than recruit, this number of Gurkhas. During the war over 200 000 Gurkhas were enlisted into the Indian Army, serving in 44 battalions (including 24 war-raised battalions), six training battalions, and one garrison battalion. See DO(47)22, para. 4 and Farwell, p. 85. 43. Hollis to Attlee, op. cit. 44. DO(47)8(2), 17 Mar. 47, CAB 131/5. 45. Ibid. 46. DO(47)30, 28 Mar. 47, PREM 8/537. 47. Ibid. 48. Brief … as to the Employment of Gurkha Troops Ref 0164/6649(SD2), nd, but 1947?, IOLR L/WS/1/1024. 49. Ibid. 50. DO(47)10(1), 3 Apr 47, CAB 131/5. 51. Tuker, Gorkha, pp. 252–3; Mary Des Chene, ‘Soldiers, Sovereignty and Silences: Gorkhas as Diplomatic Currency’, South Asia Bulletin XII, nos 1–2 (1993): 67–80, p. 73. 52. Mansergh, Moon, Blake, and Carter, eds., The Transfer of Power 1942–7, Volume XI, (London: HMSO, 1982), Document 173, Mountbatten to Attlee, Telegram R/3/1/147: f 75. New Delhi, 12 June 47, rec’d 13 Jun. Tele no. 1422-S; Mountbatten says CIGS (Monty) should take opportunity of his visit to India to settle once and for all the question of the Gurkhas, which had been languishing for some time. This was agreed as noted in a telegram from Attlee of 18 June 47, L/WS/1/1024: f 63. 53. Shone to Attlee, No. 63, 24 June 47, 28 June 47, PREM 8/537 (emphasis added). 54. Ibid. 55. Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 457. 56. UK HC in India to Cabinet Office, IRKU 569, 6 Aug. 47, IOLR L/WS/1/1025. The choice was based upon two factors: those regiments that had a battal- ion serving in Burma at the time, and a desire to be able to recruit from both Western and Eastern Nepal. 57. Lt.-Col. H. R. K. Gibbs, Historical Records of the 6th Gurkha Rifles, Vol. II, 1919–48 (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1955), p. 258; Lt.-Col. G R Stevens, History of the 2nd King Edward VII’s Own Goorkha Rifles (The Sirmoor Rifles), Vol. III, 1921–48 (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1952), p. 310; Cross, In Gurkha Company, p. 18. There are also several reports of Gurkha units being asked in July to conduct unofficial referendums in order to discover the wishes of the men. Maj.-Gen. R W L McAlister, Bugle & Kukri: The Story of the 10th Princess Mary’s Own Gurkha Rifles, vol. II (Winchester: Regimental Trust of the 10th Gurkha Rifles, 1984), p. 14. 58. Lt.-Gen. Sir Francis Tuker, While Memory Serves (London: Cassell, 1950), p. 636; McAlister, p. 14; Cross, In Gurkha Company, p. 18; Gibbs, p. 258; Stevens, p. 310. 59. Lt.-Col. J. N. Mackay, History of 7th Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Gurkha Rifles (London: William Blackwood, 1962), p. 290; Cross, In Gurkha Company, pp. 16–17. Notes 247

60. Tuker, While Memory Serves, pp. 638–9. 61. In The Second Step (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1962), pp. 194–7, Adrian Hayter of 2 GR recounts how he and his men felt about the possibil- ity of serving under an Indian . 62. The most detailed account is in Brig. Gordon Richardson, Incident at Santa Cruz on 3 Nov. 1947, 13 May 66, GM 2GR/834, but Auchinleck to COS, 270033/DSC(ARMY), 7 Nov. 47, IOLR L/WS/1/1025 also provides a good synopsis. 63. Auchinleck to COS. This seems to have been the conventional wisdom among British officers. See Cross, In Gurkha Company, p. 17. On another incident, see Maj.-Gen. S. Shahid Hamid, Disastrous Twilight: A Personal Record of the Partition in India (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1993), p. 281. 64. FARELF, 1948 Progress Report on the Gurkha Project CR/FARELF/5950/SD2, 25 Jan. 49, WO 32/12822, Darby, pp. 40–1. 65. Selby Report, 1 Apr. 50, FO 371/84281 FN 1201/23, Part I, para. 3(b). It is worth noting that in an agreement signed two days earlier, Britain agreed to an Indian demand that its recruitment of Gurkhas ‘shall not in any way interfere with recruitment to the Gurkha units in the Indian Army’. See Annex I, para. 4. 66. Ibid. This may have been a reference both to friction with the new state of Pakistan as well as the Nizam of Hyderabad, who refused to join the new Dominion of India. The Indians actually ended up forming an additional Gurkha regiment consisting of those men from 2, 6, 7, and 10 GR who opted to remain in the Indian Army. See Leo Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival (Los Angeles: UCLA Press, 1971), p. 181. 67. FO Delegation Report, 18 Nov 47, DEFE 7/629. There would have been about seven war-raised battalions still in existence at this time. India retained these battalions much longer than was anticipated because of its need for troops in settling the boundary troubles and for hostilities with Pakistan over Kashmir. See also Selby Report, Annex I, note 3. 68. Ibid. 69. Redman to DSD, Ref 10413/CS, 25 Nov 47, IOLR L/WS/1/1026. 70. Tuker, While Memory Serves, p. 637. 71. John H. McEnery, Epilogue in Burma 1945–1948: The Military Dimension of British Withdrawal (Tunbridge Wells: Spellmount, 1990), Annex I, p. 130. 72. Mackay, p. 290. 73. The 7 GR, for example, had only 53 men from its second battalion opt for British service. The first battalion, which had been in Burma, had 382 opt (Mackay, p. 291); for 1/10 GR in Burma, 400 out of 750 opted, with 2/10, serving in the Punjab Boundary Force in the Lahore area providing a surprising 300 men for transfer, probably because they were on the Pakistan side of the border (McAlister, pp. 16, 267–9); 1/6 GR in Rangoon retained 330 GORs, but the 2/6 left New Delhi for Malaya with only 3 KGOs and 113 GORs (Messenger, p. 6). I could find no published figures for 2 GR. 74. HQ British Gurkhas India to WO, info FARELF, Ref P/32384(A), 20 Jan 48, IOLR L/WS/1/1026. Several hundred more would make their way into British service within a few months (see Chapter 3). 75. JP(48)131, 18 Nov 48, DEFE 6/7. 76. DO(47)37, ODC(47)10, 11 Apr 47, CAB 131/4. 248 Notes

77. See Nadzan Haron, ‘The Malay Regiment 1933–55: A Political and Social History of a Colonial Military Establishment in Malaya’ (doctoral disserta- tion, University of , 1988), pp. 223–4. James Lunt, Imperial Sunset: Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century, (London: Macdonald Futura, 1981), pp. 381–2; anon. ‘The Federation Army of Malaya’, British Army Review: 4, (Mar. 1957) 38–43. 78. CIC(FE(48)2(P), 22 Apr. 48 WO 268/7. 79. Ibid. 80. HQ British Gurkhas India to WO, op. cit. As of January, 1948, a total of 124 VCOs and 3,432 GORs had opted for service under HMG.; 12822 cites a figure of 5,103 volunteers (optees and others), 463 ‘received from units allocated to India’ (i.e. presumably Gurkhas who deserted the Indian Army to join the British Gurkhas) (para. 7). 81. n.a., ‘A British Gurkha Division’, The Times, 12 Feb. 48, p. 6. 82. Ritchie, Progress Report on the Gurkha Project, para. 20. 83. WO to FARELF, no. 02268 SD2b, 3 Dec. 47, WO 32/12822. 84. LEP served in combat service support units such as the Royal Army Service Corps, Royal Army Ordnance Corps, and the Royal Pioneer Corps. 85. WO to FARELF, 3 Dec. 47, op. cit. 86. Redman to DSD, op. cit. 87. Ibid. 88. Ibid. 89. Maj.-Gen. , A Life on the Line (Tunbridge Wells: D. J. Costello, 1988), pp. 144–5. 90. Gen. Sir Neil M. Ritchie, Report on Operations in Malaya, June 1948 to July 1949, 6 Sep. 49, WO 106/5884 (hereafter referred to as Ritchie Report), para. 45; Brigadier D. J. Sutton (ed.), The Story of the Royal Army Service Corps and Royal Corps of Transport, 1945–1982 (London: Leo Cooper/Secker & Warburg, 1983), pp. 134–5. 91. Ritchie, Report, para. 45. In his autobiography (p. 145), Wade, then the GOC Malaya District, recounts one awkward attempt to fill the manpower short- age by enlisting Ceylonese laborers into the Royal Pioneer Corps. 92. Ritchie to USSW, CR/FARELF/1707/SD1, 23 Feb 48, WO 32/12822, para. 1. 93. Ibid., para. 6. 94. Ibid., para. 7. 95. WO to FARELF, no. 06395 SD2b, 29 Jan. 48, WO 32/12822. 96. Ibid. 97. McEnery, Epilogue in Burma, pp. 116–17, and Annex I; Cross, In Gurkha Company, p. 20. Detailed accounts of each battalion’s locations and move- ments can be found in the various regimental histories. 98. McAlister, p. 16. 99. ‘The Move to Malaya’, The Kukri, no. 1 (1949): 3–6; McAlister, p. 269. 100. ‘The Move to Malaya’. 101. McAlister, p. 269. 102. Cross, In Gurkha Company, p. 18. 103. Messenger cites figures from March 1948 giving 4288 optees, 2088 raw recruits, and 108 already in recruit companies (pp. 5–6). 104. Brigadier A. E. C. Bredin, The Happy Warriors (Dorset: Blackmore Press, 1961), p. 88. Notes 249

105. Ritchie to USSW, CR/FARELF/5950/SD2, 23 Feb 49, WO 32 12822, para. 9. 106. Smith, Malaya and Borneo, p. 8. 107. Cross, In Gurkha Company, p. 20; Messenger, p. 8. 108. Notes from Conference at HQ British Gurkhas, held at New Delhi on 6 and 7 Jan. 48, Jan. 48, GM 10GR/APPX. 1/5. 109. Ritchie to USSW, 23 Feb. 49, para. 16; E. D. Smith, Johnny Gurkha: ‘Friends in the Hills’ (London: Leo Cooper, 1985), p. 31. 110. Ritchie to USSW, 23 Feb. 49, para. II.2. 111. Harold James and Denis Sheil-Small, A Pride of Gurkhas: 2nd King Edward VII’s Own Goorkhas (The Sirmoor Rifles) 1948–1971 (London: Leo Cooper, 1975), p. xiv; Mackay, p. 294; McAlister, p. 17; Cross, In Gurkha Company, p. 21. 112. The Gurkha Brigade was not a tactical formation, but an administrative one. 113. Ritchie to USSW, 23 Feb. 49. With the start of the campaign against the Malayan Communist guerrillas, the full brunt of these simultaneous responsibilities became near intolerable and a change was made in the command structure. 114. MGBG Charter; McAlister, Bugle & Kukri, p. 18. 115. McAlister, p. 18;, ‘Editorial’, The Kukri, July 1951, pp. 3–4. 116. MGBG Charter, paras. 7(a)–(e), 8–10, 11. 117. Ibid., para. 1. Emphasis in original. 118. Ibid., para. 2. 119. Ibid., para. 3. Emphasis in original. 120. Scott, pp. 186–91. 121. DO(47)68, 15 Sept. 47, CAB 131/4, para. 19(f). 122. Scott, p. 80. 123. Cited in Cross, In Gurkha Company, p. 22; reproduced in ‘The Move to Malaya’, The Kukri, no. 1 (1949).

4 FARELF and the Malayan Emergency, 1948–50

1. Short, pp. 447–8. 2. See John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 46; Lesek Buszynski, Soviet Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), pp. 11–12; Short, pp. 44–8. Chin Peng took control of the party in 1947, after the previous wartime leader and British agent, Lai Tek, was discredited. See Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, pp. 56–9 and Nigel West, The Friends: Britain’s Post-War Secret Intelligence Operations (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988), p. 42. 3. Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, p. 60. 4. This information was obtained from captured diaries. See Riley Sunderland, Antiguerrilla Intelligence in Malaya, 1948–1960, Memorandum RM-4172-ISA (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1964), p. 5. 5. Short, pp. 56–8. 6. Donald Mackay, The Domino that Stood: The Malayan Emergency 1948–1960 (Washington: Brassey’s, 1997), p. 35; Brig. E. D. Smith, Counter-Insurgency Operations: 1, Malaya and Borneo (London: Ian Allan, 1985), pp. 7, 10; Sunderland in Antiguerrilla Intelligence states a figure of 12 000. Although 250 Notes

based on contemporaneous intelligence sources, this may have been a cumulative figure rather than an initial one (p. 5). 7. SEACOS 853, 26 June 48, DEFE 11/32, para. 2. 8. The MPABA was simply a rendering of the wartime Malayan Peoples’ Anti- Japanese Army (MPAJA), which ostensibly disbanded at war’s end, but which cached numerous weapons and retained organizational coherence through an Ex-Comrades’ Association. 9. West, The Friends, pp. 41–2; Wade, p. 149; Ritchie, Report, para. 4; Gurney to Creech Jones, 11 April 1949, DEFE 11/33, Appendix ‘D’. An Australian com- munist by the name of Lawrence Sharkey is believed to have been the emis- sary of the new strategy, having stopped in Singapore to brief MCP leaders on the Calcutta Conference. See Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, p. 60, and Interview of Sir Robert Thompson, IWM SR 10192/6, Transcript of Interview, 1988, pp. 4–5. 10. A. J. Stockwell, ‘“A widespread and long-concocted plot to overthrow the government in Malaya”? The origins of the Malayan Emergency’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 21:3 (1993) 73–80; Short, pp. 69–75. The briefing given by the Colonial Office to the Cabinet on 1 July 1948 makes clear British uncertainty about the scope, nature, and direction of the disturbances. See CP(48)171, 1 Jul 48, CAB 129/28. 11. David Miller, The Communist Menace in Malaya. (New York: Praeger, 1954), pp. 82–4. 12. Ritchie, Report, para. 8. Wade writes of sending Gurkhas to support police operations against a ‘band of armed communists’ in North Perak, but makes no mention of the KMT (p. 148). The only mention I can find of Gurkhas operating at this time and location is of 2/2 GR, which simply states ‘opera- tions against bandits’ with no indication of political affiliation (James and Sheil-Small, A Pride of Gurkhas, p. 7). Since banditry was rife in Malaya and North Perak was the KMT base in the country (Stubbs, p. 69), the culprits may well not have been Communists. 13. Ritchie, Report, para. 8. It seems hard to believe that Ritchie would not have been told that the military had been called out in aid of the civil power on 18 June. 14. Ibid. The C-in-C ACFE, Air Marshal Sir Hugh Lloyd, apparently gave the same report of Malayan stability to the Chief of the Air Staff. 15. Ibid. 16. West, The Friends, pp. 41–3; Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, pp. 67–8; Short, pp. 77–90; Stockwell, pp. 72–9. 17. West, The Friends, p. 17. The SIS is perhaps better known by its cover name of MI6. 18. Anthony Clayton, Forearmed: A History of the Intelligence Corps. (London: Brassey’s, 1993), p. 207. 19. Sunderland, Antiguerrilla Intelligence, p. 8; GHQ FARELF [attrib.], ‘Commun- ism in South-East Asia’, The Army Quarterly, 57, no. 1 October 1948 (1948), p. 14. 20. Sunderland, Antiguerrilla Intelligence, p. 6. 21. Stockwell, p. 78. 22. Ritchie, Report, para. 9. Notes 251

23. Gurney to Creech Jones, Appendix D; Clutterbuck, Riot and Revolution, p. 53; Stockwell Papers, Vade Mecum. The Army in the Cold War (Malaya), 1952–53, LHA Stockwell 7/3, Tab 1, para. 4. 24. Acting High Commissioner, Federation of Malaya to SSC, 10 Aug 48, DEFE 11/32. 25. Ritchie, Report, para. 40. 26. See JP(48)3(O)(Preliminary Draft), op. cit., section (H); CP(49)72, CAB 129/34, ‘Siam’. 27. Gurney to Creech Jones, Appendix E. 28. Ritchie, Report, para. 12. 29. Ibid., para. 13. 30. Security Forces, or SF, was the term commonly used to denote all civilian and military forces engaged in counter-guerrilla operations. 31. SEACOS 853. See also Gen. Sir Neil M Ritchie, Directive to the General Officer Commanding Malaya District, CR/FARELF/1861/G(O), 26 Jun 48, WO 268/7. 32. Ritchie, Report, para. 14. 33. CP(48)171, 1 Jul 48, CAB 129/28, paras. 15(v) and 15(vi). 34. Ritchie, Report, para. 14. 35. SEACOS 853. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid., emphasis added. 38. Ibid. 39. Blaxland, p. 13. 40. Ibid., p. 14; Cmd. 7361, Statement on Defence 1949 (London: HMSO, 1949), para. 4. 41. Short, p. 114, n. 1. 42. Riley Sunderland, Army Operations in Malaya, 1947–1960, Memorandum RM- 4171-ISA. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1964), p. 31; Michael Dewar, Brush Fire Wars: Minor Campaigns of the British Army since 1945. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), Appendix B; Ritchie, Report, Appendix ‘A’ Order of Battle. Units went onto ‘war establishment’ at the beginning of 1951, the authorized strength of which was 840 officers and men. See Sunderland, Army Operations, p. 31. 43. Ritchie, Report, Appendix ‘A.’ 44. Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War, p. 43. 45. Short, p. 116. 46. At the end of 1947, the situation vis-à-vis British military strength had been even weaker than in June 1948. At that point all remaining Indian Army troops had left and the Gurkhas would not arrive for several months more. It is fortunate for the British that the MCP decided in favor of armed strug- gle in March 1948, rather than six months earlier. 47. Sunderland, Army Operations, pp. 132–3. 48. Thomas R. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 1919–1960 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), pp. 162–3. For more detail on the Palestine campaign, see David Charters, The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945–47 (London: Macmillan Press – now Palgrave, 1989), pp. 132–68. 49. COSSEA 653, 14 Jul 48, DEFE 11/32; Creech Jones to Alexander, 8 Jul 48, DEFE 11/32. 252 Notes

50. Ritchie, Report, para. 31. 51. Ibid., para. 31; Blaxland, p. 81. 52. Miller, p. 93; Short, pp. 99–100. 53. Blaxland, p. 80. 54. Following a row with MacDonald, and having lost the confidence of ‘all soldiers’ according to Ritchie and Lloyd, Gent had been recalled to London by Creech-Jones ostensibly for ‘consultations’ but in reality he had been sacked. He died when his plane crashed as it was approaching London. It would be several months before his eventual successor, Sir Henry Gurney, would be sent out to replace him. See Short, pp. 114–19, and CP(48)171. 55. MacDonald to Ritchie, 15 July 48, MJM 25/9/2–3. ‘Reinforcements’ is a ref- erence to 1 Inniskilling and 4 Hussars. 56. There were two battalions in Hong Kong, but these could not be spared. 57. The BDCC(FE) agreed in early August to expand the two existing battalions of the Malay Regiment from three to four companies, and to raise a third battalion for possible service on the frontier with Siam. See Ritchie, Report, p. 19. 58. GHQ FARELF G(TRG), Lessons from Operations, ref CR/FARELF/8023/G(O), 8 Nov. 48, WO 268/9, p. 5. Sir Robert Thompson, writing some 40 years after the fact, claims it was Boucher who approached John Davis and Richard Broome (of Force 136) ‘and myself among others’ to form Ferret Force. See Sir Robert Thompson, Make for the Hills: Memories of Far Eastern Wars (London: Leo Cooper, 1989), p. 88. 59. Like Slim, Ritchie disliked ‘private armies’ such as Ferret Force, as they tended to bleed regular units of their best men, required separate adminis- trative channels, and could easily get out of control. For Ritchie, Ferret’s role in raising the ‘jungle-worthiness’ of his regular troops was his primary goal. For his feelings about private armies, see his Report, p. 10, para. 15. For details on its organization, see Ritchie to USSW, ‘Jungle Guerilla Force’, ref. No. CR/FARELF/5567/G(O), 18 Aug. 48, WO 268/8; FARELF, 19 Aug. 48, WO 268/8. 60. Malcolm Postgate, Operation Firedog: Air Support in the Malayan Emergency 1948–1960 (London: HMSO, 1992), p. 60; Short, pp. 102–3. 61. MacDonald to Ritchie (ltr), 19 July 48, MJM 22/3/5–6. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid. 64. CP(48)190, op. cit. 65. Ritchie, Report, pp. 18–19. 66. BDCC(FE), SEACOS 863, 9 Aug. 48, DEFE 11/32. 67. CIC(FE), OP(X)1/2, 21 Sept. 48, WO 268/8; FARELF, Quarterly Historical Report – G(OPS) for Period Ending 31 Dec. 48, 16 June 49, WO 268/9, ‘Evacuation of British Nationals from China,’ p. 7. 68. SEACOS 863. 69. Ibid. 70. COS(48)112(2), 11 Aug. 48, DEFE 11/32. 71. DO(48)16(3), 13 Aug. 48, CAB 131/5. 72. Ibid. 73. Julian Paget, The Story of the Guards. (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1977), p. 244. These were 3 Grenadiers, who only four months previously had Notes 253

returned from two and a half years in Palestine; 2 Coldstreams; and 2 Scots Guards. 74. Blaxland, p. 84. 75. Ibid., p. 84; Paget, The Story of the Guards, p. 244. 76. Ritchie, Report, p. 17, para. 29. 77. See, for example, 2GR, ‘2nd King Edward VII’s Own Gurkha Rifles’, The Kukri, no. No. 1, July 1949 (1949). 78. Sunderland, Army Operations, p. 36. 79. Ritchie, Report, p. 12, para. 20. 80. Ibid., p. 12, para. 20. The regimental history admits as much. See Oliver Lindsay, Once a Grenadier: The Grenadier Guards 1945–1995 (London: Leo Cooper, 1996), pp. 31–3. 81. Ritchie disbanded Ferret Force at the end of the year after the new school had been established; he believed Ferret Force ‘would have become redun- dant because the jungle training of the ordinary troops should have improved to such an extent’ by that time. Blair Tarver, , 31 Aug. 1948 WO 208/3931. By the guerrillas’ own account, Ferret Force had threat- ened their operations because they ‘penetrate too deep into the Jungle and stay too long.’ (FARELF to WO/MI2, 4 Sept. 48, WO 208/4103). On the spreading of doctrine, see GHQ FARELF G(TRG), Lessons from Operations, ref CR/FARELF/8023/G(O), 8 Nov. 48, WO 268/9; FARELF, Conference Minutes, 28 Sept. 48, WO 268/8. 82. FARELF, Meeting held at Flagstaff House 19 Aug. 48; author’s interview of General Sir Walter Walker, KCB, DSO (Dorset, 20 Jan. 1993); Charles Allen, The Savage Wars of Peace: Soldiers’ Voices 1945–1989 (London: Michael Joseph, 1990), p. 12; Tom Pocock, Fighting General: The Public & Private Campaigns of General Sir Walter Walker (London: Collins, 1973), pp. 87–8. 83. Walker interview; GHQ FARELF, Quarterly Historical Reports, FARELF Training Centre, Quarter Ending March 1949, WO 268/116. A few years later the school was moved to Kota Tinggi, where it still exists today as a Malaysian training school. The British eventually set up a new Jungle Warfare School in Brunei. See , ‘Notes of a Conference Held by GOC at Malaya District on 11 July 1950,’ WO 231/38, Appendix ‘A,’ pp. 8–9; Lt-Col. John P. Cross, Jungle Warfare: Experience and Encounters (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1989), pp. 182–5. 84. See, for example, Richard Miers, Shoot to Kill (London: Faber and Faber, 1959), p. 31, on the cadre and battalion training of the South Wales Borderers, and Lt-Col. Rowland S. N. Mans, MBE, ‘The Ambush’, Marine Corps Gazette, 47 (February 1963) p. 40, on his training experience as a rifle company commander. 85. Walker interview. 86. Ritchie to USSW, CR/FARELF/2392/SD1, 25 Nov 48, WO 32/12822; the rec- ommendation to increase the garrison was in Ritchie to USSW, CR/FARELF/ 1821/G(O) of 24 Nov 48, but that document was not in the file. 87. Ritchie to USSW, CR/FARELF/2392/SD1. 88. COS(50)100, 28 Mar 50, DEFE 5/20, was the revised near-term war plan. It clearly stated that release to the Far East was not authorized. Judging from minutes of COS meetings, the earlier plan, SPEEDWAY, must have been under a similar embargo. 254 Notes

89. See Richard Aldrich and John Zametica, ‘The rise and decline of a strategic concept: the Middle East 1945–51’, in Aldrich, British Intelligence, p. 254. 90. See the comments of J. J. Paskin in COS(48)150(1), 22 Oct 48, DEFE 4/17; see also Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Secret intelligence for a post-war world: reshap- ing the British intelligence community, 1944–51’, in Aldrich, British Intelligence, pp. 37–8. Sensitive documents of the PHPS were leaked from Australia to Moscow. The US deemed the Australian security situation so bad as to cut off the flow of classified information to Australia in June 1948. Peter Edwards, Crises and Commitments: the Politics and Diplomacy of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1965 (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin/AWM, 1992), p. 51. 91. Lambert to Ritchie, 10 Jan. 49, WO 32/12822; COS(49)6(3), 10 Jan. 49, DEFE 4/19; Brig R. T. Ransome, CR/FARELF/1815/G(O), 28 Jan. 49, WO 268/744. 92. COS(49)6(3) and JP(48)125(Final), 5 Jan. 49, DEFE 6/7, Annex para 5(ii). 93. COS(49)6(3). 94. Short, p. 134. 95. Creech Jones to Cripps, 10 Jan. 1949, DEFE 7/413. 96. SEACOS 879, 29 Jan. 49, DEFE 11/32. 97. COS(49)15(2), 31 Jan. 49, DEFE 4/19, in which the COS discussed SEACOS 878. Price to Minister of Defence, 4 Feb. 49, DEFE 11/32. 98. COS(49)54, 12 Feb. 49, DEFE 5/13; COS(49)138, 22 Apr. 49, DEFE 5/14. 99. COS(49)85, 9 Mar. 1949, DEFE 7/413. 100. See Haron, Table 5, p. 228, and anon., ‘The Federation Army of Malaya’, p. 38. 101. It seems likely that Slim, who had commanded the 2/7 GR in the late 1930s and was ‘’ of the regiment, was responsible for the regiment’s reconversion to infantry. See War Office DDSD(A), Loose Minute to 0164/6709(SD2), 5 Jan. 49, WO 32/12822; Mackay, Appendix I, pp. 324, 326. 102. Ritchie to USSW, CR/FARELF/5950/SD2, 23 Feb. 49, WO 32/12822. 103. Ibid. 104. Ibid. 105. This had already been confirmed in May in War Office to FARELF, 19 May 49, WO 32/12822; Lambert to Ritchie, 6 July 1949, WO 32/12822. 106. Divisional artillery forces usually consisted of three field regiments, but none could be spared at this time. The Army Council ruled that the third artillery regiment would join the Division after mobilization. The Gurkha combat support units had British officers and, in some cases, British NCOs as well. 107. Hamilton, pp. 718–19. 108. See Ronald Lewin, Slim: The Standardbearer (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1976), pp. 267–8; Darby, pp. 38–9, and Cloake, p. 178. Templer was VCIGS to both Montgomery and Slim. 109. Scott, pp. 189–218. 110. Ritchie, Report, p. 30, para. 44. 111. GHQ FARELF [attrib.], ‘Review of Events in the Far East’, The Army Quarterly, 58:2 (1949). 112. Harding was not supposed to take up the post until early autumn, but Ritchie had broken his arm in an accident which prompted Harding’s early Notes 255

arrival. Interview of Field Marshal the Lord Harding, IWM/DSR 8736/50, TS transcript of interview, pp. 270–1. 113. Ibid., p. 271; Carver, Harding, p. 165. 114. Harding interview, p. 274. 115. Ibid., p. 275. 116. Harding to USSW, CR/FARELF/10068/SD2, 31 Aug. 49, WO 32/12822. 117. Ibid. 118. This would have been Hull to Kirkman, MO2/BM/1339(SD2) of 22 Dec. 49, which was missing from the correspondence file in WO 32/12822. 119. Kirkman to Hull, DO/COS/300, 31 Jan. 50, WO 32/12822. 120. Ibid. 121. Ibid. 122. War Office, Minutes of a Meeting Held on 27 February, 1950 on the Permanent Garrison – FARELF, 27 Feb. 50, WO 32/12822. 123. Ibid. 124. Harding to USSW(DMO), CR/FARELF/10719/G(O), 26 Jan. 50, DEFE 11/34. 125. Coates, Appendix A, gives detailed month-by-month statistics for the crucial years of the Emergency; see also Short, pp. 211–17. 126. Until the PLA captured South China, the Federation government had deported thousands of Chinese Communist sympathizers and their fami- lies to China. The practice continued fitfully for several months after 1 October no doubt involving pay-offs to officials of the new government. See DO(50)93, 15 Nov. 50, CAB 131/9; SEACOS 138, 10 Dec. 50, DEFE 11/42; COS(51)20(1), 26 Jan. 51, DEFE 4/39; COS(51)30(1), 12 Feb. 51, DEFE 4/40; COS(51)69(5), 20 Apr. 51, DEFE 4/41; BDCC(FE), SEACOS 196, 19 Apr. 51, DEFE 11/44 127. CP(49)214, 24 Oct. 49, CAB 129/37. Bevin also hoped that by ‘keeping a foot in the door’ in China, Britain would be in a position to take advan- tage of any subsequent friction that might arise between the Russians and the Chinese (paras 4–5); see also Bullock, p. 747. 128. CM(49)62(7), 27 Oct. 49, CAB 128/16. 129. CP(49)248, 12 Dec. 49, CAB 129/37, ‘IV.–Singapore Conference.’ 130. CP(50)75, 21 Apr. 50, CAB 129/39; Short, pp. 214–15. 131. CP(49)248, para. 23. 132. Ibid. 133. Ibid. 134. COS(49)421, 5 Dec. 49, DEFE 5/18, para. 13(a). 135. Ibid., para. 2 136. Ibid., paras 3, 5, 10, 12. 137. Ibid., paras 10, 13(c). 138. Bullock, p. 744, 747. 139. Stubbs, Hearts and Minds, p. 85. 140. CP(50)75. 141. Short, p. 216. For the positions of the all the major players in this issue, see CP(50)75. 142. SEACOS 24, 24 Feb. 50, DEFE 11/34, para. 1. 143. Clutterbuck, Long, Long War, pp. 55–56 and passim. It was Japanese occu- pation forces that created the squatters problem. 144. BDCC(FE)(50)1/1, 11 Feb. 50, DEFE 5/20. 256 Notes

145. Gurney to Creech Jones, No. 127, 10 Feb. 50, DEFE 11/34. 146. Short, pp. 227–9; Carver, Harding, pp. 166–7. 147. Gurney to Creech Jones, No. 127. 148. Harding to USSW(DMO), op. cit. 149. Harding interview, pp. 279–80; Carver, Harding, p. 166. 150. Harding to Slim, 16 Feb. 50, WO 216/333. Contrary to most published accounts, it was Harding who originally conceived the need for a Director of Operations, not Gurney, although Gurney had to be the one to offi- cially request such a post from the Colonial Office. See Gurney to Creech Jones, No. 151, 23 Feb. 50, DEFE 11/34. The position was to be a civil one, and would have operational control over all Security Forces in Malaya, including the RAF, although the senior military would have a right of appeal to their respective Cs-in-C. 151. SEACOS 24, 24 Feb. 50, DEFE 11/34, para. 2(a). 152. Ibid., para. 6. 153. Ibid., para. 8. 154. Ibid., paras. 9, 13(c) and (d). On the subject of lower and higher establish- ment, see Sunderland, Army Operations, p. 31, and Short, p. 225; in SEACOS 24, the BDCC also reiterated an earlier request for heavy bombers (SEACOS 19) and proposed, subject to approval by the Governor of Hong Kong, to move a squadron of Spitfires from the island colony to Malaya. 155. COS(50)33(2), 1 Mar. 50, DEFE 4/29. 156. COS(50)84, 2 Mar. 50, DEFE 5/20. Shinwell forwarded the report to Defence Committee on 9 March. DO(50)14, 9 Mar. 50, CAB 131/9. 157. COS(50)33(2), 1 Mar. 50, DEFE 4/29. 158. Ibid. 159. COS(50)84. 160. DO(50)14, 9 Mar. 50, CAB 131/9. The Chiefs’ outgoing message is in COSSEA 727, 10 Mar. 50, DEFE 11/34. Harding and Slim had corresponded with each other about potential candidates for the new post, two of the more prominent being Maj.-Gen. (later Gen. Sir) Richard Gale and Brig. Fitzroy McLean. Slim appears to have chosen Briggs based largely on his personal knowledge of the man, who had served under him during the Burma campaign and who later commanded British Commonwealth forces in Burma prior to independence in January 1948. Harding also knew Briggs from the and had ‘great confidence’ in him. For details, see Harding to Slim, 16 Feb. 50, WO 216/333; Harding to Slim, 24 Feb. 50, WO 216/333; Slim to Harding, 1 Mar. 50, WO 216/333. Slim’s alternate suggestion was Sir Rob Lockhart, who had been C-in-C India after Auchinleck. Lockhart would in fact succeed Briggs as Director of Operations in 1951. Harding interview, p. 280; CoS FARELF to Slim, 3 Mar. 50, WO 216/333. 161. Coates, Appendix A.1. 162. See Carver, Harding, pp. 166–7, and Short, pp. 233–7. The report is in SEC(50)7, 11 Apr. 50, in COS(50)132 of 19 Apr. 50, DEFE 5/20. Boucher left Malaya in early March for medical leave in the UK, being replaced temporar- ily as GOC Malaya by Maj.-Gen. of fame. Boucher died soon after, though, and Urquhart’s posting was made a regular tour. See Notes 257

John Baynes, Urquhart of Arnhem: The Life of Major General R E Urquhart (London: Brassey’s, 1993), pp. 185, 197, 204. Briggs arrived in on 3 April, completing his whirlwind tour and producing his assessment a week later (Short, p. 233). 163. SEC(50)7 in COS(50)132. 164. Ibid., paras 1–2, 4, 7 and 10. 165. Ibid., para. 11. Such a move, as was the case with the move of 26 Gurkha Infantry Brigade, would require ministerial approval and provisions for emergency reinforcement. Harding suggested a battalion be flown direct to Hong Kong from the United Kingdom in order to make up part of the loss of the commandos while also demonstrating the ability to reinforce at short notice by such a method, still novel at the time. Within FARELF, he would move 26 Field Regiment, RA to Hong Kong, where they could retrain as artillery after their stint as infantry in Malaya. See Chapter 5 for the impact in Hong Kong. 166. Ibid., paras 15(a) to 15(h). 167. Gurney to SSC, No. 329, 17 Apr. 50 (as Appendix II to COS(50)132). 168. Lt.-Gen. Sir Harold Briggs, Report on the Emergency in Malaya from April, 1950 to November, 1951 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1951), p. 7. 169. Ibid., p. 7. 170. Ibid., pp. 8–9. 171. MC(50)1(2), 19 Apr. 50, DEFE 11/35. 172. Ibid. 173. SEACOS 43, 20 Apr. 50, DEFE 11/35. 174. The gist of Harding’s cable are in COS(50)66(3), 26 Apr. 50, DEFE 4/30. 175. COS(50)62(1), 21 Apr. 50, DEFE 4/30. 176. The key documents are included in DO(50)32, 29 Apr. 50, CAB 131/9. Authorization was sent in COSSEA 736, 27 Apr. 50, DEFE 11/35. 177. See Peter Edwards, ‘The Australian Commitment to the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1950’, Historical Studies, 22:89 (1987) 604–16, and Edwards, Crises and Commitments, pp. 94–6; also see the relevant chapters in Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950–1966, Vol. V, The Official History of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1975 (St. Leonard’s, NSW: Allen & Unwin with AWM, 1996). 178. Note by the CIGS, 20 Apr. 50, DEFE 11/35, para. 7.

5 ‘To the Last Round’: the Defense of Hong Kong, 1948–50

1. DO(46)30, 1 Mar. 46, CAB 131/2. 2. Ibid.; for a description of pre-war thinking about Hong Kong, see Christopher M. Bell, ‘Our Most Exposed Outpost’: Hong Kong and British Far Eastern Strategy, 1921–1941,’ Journal of Military History, 60:1 (1996) 61–88. 3. DO(46)30. The Defence Committee confirmed the decision at DO(46)7(1), 8 Mar. 46, CAB 131/1. At the time there were two brigades in Hong Kong pro- viding internal security, the police forces having not yet fully rebuilt them- selves so soon after the occupation. 258 Notes

4. See Murfett, In Jeopardy, pp. 5–7, 18–19, 30, and DO(48)36, 8 May 48, CAB 131/6. This despite the fact that the Army (FARELF) and RAF (FEAF) coun- terparts, as well as the CIC(FE), BDCC(FE), JPS(FE), and JIC(FE) were all located in Singapore. Montgomery was incensed to discover this on his visit as CIGS to the theater in 1947, and managed to persuade his colleagues on the COSC to relocate the Navy’s principal headquarters to Singapore. See COS(47)161(O), 11 Aug. 47, DEFE 5/5. 5. F. S. V. Donnison, British Military Administration in the Far East, 1943–46 (London: HMSO, 1956), pp. 209–10. 6. Nigel Cameron, An Illustrated History of Hong Kong (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 280–81. 7. Ibid., p. 270; Norman Miners, ‘The Localization of the Hong Kong Police Force, 1842–1947,’ The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, XVIII:3 (1990) 311; see also Donnison, pp. 206–7. 8. Miners, p. 311. 9. Donnison, p. 202. Troops were also vital to the restoration and running of essential city services. Law and order was initially the responsibility of the naval task force which reached Hong Kong at the end of August. In mid- September army and Royal Marine Commando units arrived to take over (p. 206); Clayton, p. 246. 10. JP(47)80(Final), 27 June 47, DEFE 6/2. 11. ODC(47)10, 11 Apr. 1947, CAB 131/4. 12. COS(47)122(O), 9 June 47, DEFE 5/4; the Governor of Hong Kong’s thoughts were sent to the COS in telegram 1011 of 17 June 1947, as noted in JP(47)80(Final). 13. JP(47)80(Final). 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. This elaboration of the threat is in JP(47)125(Final), 7 Nov. 47, DEFE 6/3. 17. JP(47)80(Final). The relevant portion of the report reads as if the Joint Planners were unaware of the contents of ODC(47)10, The Role of Colonies in War. The Chiefs approved the JPS recommendations shortly thereafter. Refer to COS(47)81(2), as noted in JP(47)125(O)(T. of R.), 8 Sept. 47, DEFE 6/3. 18. JP(48)3(O)(Preliminary Draft), op. cit., Annex II, section (L) ‘Hong Kong’. 19. Ibid. 20. COS(48)43(O) [CIC(FE)(48)8(P)], 23 Feb. 48, DEFE 5/10, Annex III, para. 9. 21. Ibid., para. 3(f). 22. CIC(FE)(48)8(P), para. 9 and Appendix A, para. 1. 23. Ibid., Appendix A. 24. Ibid., Appendix A, para. 4. 25. To the British, Shanghai had none of the strategic or political pretensions of Hong Kong: its value was purely financial. The British relinquished control over the civil administration and customs of the treaty port to the Chinese government as per the 1943 Anglo-American agreement, and in return the Chinese guaranteed the property and trading rights of the taipans. See George Woodcock, The British in the Far East (New York: Atheneum, 1969), p. 234; Cmd. 6456, Treaty … for the Relinquishment of Extra-Territorial Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters, 11 Jan 43. Though the political position in Shanghai remained tenuous, British and other foreign Notes 259

businesses prospered as never before. By the time of the Communist takeover in 1949, British investment in Shanghai businesses totaled £300 000 000 (Woodcock, p. 234). The prospect of continuing these investments would be one of the reasons underlying the British decision to recognize the Communist government in January 1950. 26. CIC(FE)(48)8(P), Appendix A, para. 5. 27. McAlister, pp. 270–2. In June 1948 the battalion’s strength was 10 British officers, 11 Gurkha officers, 355 Gurkha other ranks, and 184 recruits, the training of which proved to be an enormous drain on the NCO cadre. 28. CIC(FE)(48)8(P), Appendix A, paras 8, 9. The number of battalions does not equate with the predicted deficiencies. Presumably, there was a temporal factor which indicated the need for rotating reliefs for troops that may be operating on the frontier or in the internal security role. 29. DO(48)36, 8 May 48, CAB 131/6; JP(47)125(Final), Annex I. This statement was slightly disingenuous, as Ritchie had, as previously noted, detained the understrength 2/6 Gurkhas in Malaya. Although it was still intended for the Hong Kong garrison, its delay meant that the return home of the 2 Buffs was postponed, which actually placed a higher, albeit temporary, demand on British manpower. 30. DO(48)10(2), 13 May 48, CAB 131/5. 31. The artillery first appears in discussions about the garrison in CIC(FE)(48)8(P). My belief is that the regiment had been posted to Hong Kong as a place holder and probably operated primarily in an infantry, internal security role, rather than as a gunner unit. Once there, Ritchie was loathe to give it up, as is clear from his signal to the War Office of 16 February. 32. The language first appears in JP(47)80(Final) of 27 June 47 (op. cit.) and is derived from an appreciation by the CIC(FE). The phrase ‘heavy attack by a first class power’ thereafter appears in both the draft report to the Defence Committee in JP(47)125(Final) and in the final report given the committee in DO(48)36. Bevin used the phrase in the committee meeting of 13 May, that is, DO(48)10(2). 33. This even though there had been serious tension with China as a result of an incident at Kowloon Walled City, in which the police were used to clear some slums. The police ended up opening fire on some of the squatters, killing one and wounding others. Kuomintang agitators and the local Chinese press called for action against the British, a call answered in nearby Canton by the burning of the British Consulate-General, an act incited by government officials. See Sir Alexander Grantham, Via Ports (London: 1965), pp. 130–3. 34. Ritchie’s comments on the appreciation discussed in CoS FARELF to BGS FARELF, BM/COS/1062/2, 30 July 48, WO 268/8. 35. David Rees, ‘Red Star in the East’, in War in Peace: Conventional and Guerrilla Warfare since 1945, ed. Sir Robert Thompson (New York: Harmony Books, 1981), pp. 12–13. 36. Brig. Peter Young and Brig. Michael Calvert, A Dictionary of Battles (1816–1976) (New York: Mayflower Books, 1977), pp. 171–2. Young states that Hsuchow (which he calls Hwai-Hai) ‘one of the great battles of modern history.’ 37. COS(48)136, 26 Oct. 48, DEFE 5/8. 260 Notes

38. COS(48)168, 19 Nov. 48, DEFE 5/9. 39. Ibid. 40. COS(48)168(7), 24 Nov. 48, DEFE 4/18. 41. Ibid. 42. Letter from the SCOSC to the CO (COS 1992/25/11/8) of 25 Nov. 48, in COS(48)168(7). 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. HK to CO, no. 1068, 23 Nov. 48, in Annex I to COS(48)194, 7 Dec. 48, DEFE 5/10. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. CO to HK, no. 1242, 2 Dec. 48, in Annex II to COS(48)194. 49. HK to CO no. 1068. 50. Statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Annex to COS(49)12, 7 Jan. 49, DEFE 5/13. 51. SEACOS 872 of 15 Dec. 48, as cited in COS(49)101, 23 Mar. 49, DEFE 5/13. 52. Statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Annex and cover to COS(49)12. 53. Ibid. The CIC(FE) responded to this particular criticism in March while addressing comments to a related paper: ‘[We] … wish to correct the impres- sion that [our] views that no threat to Hong Kong would develop sooner than the third quarter of 1949.’ Rather, SEACOS 872 was meant to convey that ‘conditions would deteriorate during the first half of 1949, thereby bringing nearer the several threats to Hong Kong until, by the third quarter of the year, all four threats enumerated might exist’. COS(49)101, 23 Mar. 49, DEFE 5/13. 54. High level discussions about police recruitment do not reflect the actual makeup of the force. While it is true that the vast majority of current and prospective force members was Chinese, the Hong Kong police before the war had contained a sizable Indian contingent (mostly Sikhs and Punjabis), many of which were re-hired after liberation, as well as some Russians and Portuguese (presumably from Macao). In 1950, the Hong Kong Police was 4680 strong, of which about 1800 were Chinese. See Sir Charles Jeffries, The Colonial Police (London: Max Parrish, 1952), p. 83 & Appendix 1, and Miners, pp. 311–12. 55. Statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Annex to COS(49)12. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. Contents of Ritchie to USSW, CR/FARELF/1821/G(O), 24 Nov. 48 are referred to elsewhere, but the actual document remains unlocated; SEACOS 879, 29 Jan. 49, DEFE 11/32. 59. COS(49)54, 12 Feb. 49, DEFE 5/13. 60. Ibid. 61. COS(49)29, 20 Jan. 49, DEFE 5/13 (Part 1), para. 2 (iv), COS column of Appendix to Annex I. 62. The issue of the Malay Regiment’s expansion is discussed in Chapters 4 and 8. Notes 261

63. COS(49)29, which drew upon COS(48)194, COS(49)12, and SEACOS 872 (op. cit.), FO(O)(48)34 and CP(48)299, 9 Dec. 48, CAB 129/31; JP(48)124 (Final), 12 Jan. 49, DEFE 6/7, and discussions in COS(49)8(4), 15 Jan. 49, DEFE 4/19. 64. COS(49)29. Ritchie appears to have been rather more sanguine about the situation than CO officials in London. Although he realized he had to be able to reinforce Hong Kong with a brigade group within a month’s notice, Ritchie told his subordinates he was ‘satisfied we could hold on in HONG KONG’, for ‘whatever Government was in power in CHINA … would want us to continue to run’ the colony. FARELF, Minutes of Part II of the Con- ference Held at GHQ FARELF on 4. Jan. 49, 11 Jan. 49, WO 268/744. 65. The CIC(FE) position was more dire: the redeployment of a brigade group from Malaya to Hong Kong ‘cannot be done until the present emergency in Malaya ceases and even then would depend upon the retention in the theatre of the equivalent of One Brigade held specially to meet the emer- gency.’ See para. 2(a)(v) of the appendix to Annex I of COS(49)29. 66. COS(49)29. 67. Ibid., appendix to Annex I, para. 3. 68. CP(48)299, paras 25 and 29. 69. Ibid. Burma was not part of the Commonwealth, but India and Pakistan were. and the Netherlands are included because of their colonial possessions in Indochina and Indonesia, respectively. The United States is considered because of its position in and the Philippines, and its aid to China. 70. COS(49)29, paras 3 and 12. 71. Ibid., para. 12. 72. Ibid. 73. Reference to SEACOS 878, COS(49)15(2), 31 Jan. 49, DEFE 4/19. 74. Price to Minister of Defence, 4 Feb. 49, DEFE 11/32. 75. COS(49)15(2) (emphasis added). 76. CP(49)39, 4 Mar. 49, CAB 129/32; CP(49)52, 5 Mar. 49, CAB 129/33; COS(49)34(8), 28 Feb. 49, DEFE 4/20; COS(49)34(9), 28 Feb. 49, DEFE 4/20; COS(49)33(3), 25 Feb. 49, DEFE 4/20. 77. COS(49)34(8). 78. The delay was based on the difficulty involved with relieving troops in the Middle East. 79. CP(49)52, para. 2. 80. Malcolm Murfett, Hostage on the Yangtze: Britain, China, and the Amethyst Crisis of 1949 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), Appendix 1, p. 239. The initial exchanges of fire resulted in nearly 300 deaths on both sides. See also Malcolm Murfett, ‘A Pyrrhic Victory: HMS Amethyst and the Damage to Anglo-Chinese Relations in 1949’, War & Society, 9:1 (1991) 123. 81. Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy Since World War Two (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987), p. 128. The senior naval officials in the Far East were aware of the political situation but thought the Communist crossings wouldn’t begin until the 21st, and thought the risk of relieving Consort acceptable. 82. Murfett, Hostage, p. 65; DO(49)12(1), 21 Apr. 49, CAB 131/8. The memoran- dum by the Minister of Defence is DO(49)32, 26 Apr. 49, CAB 131/7. 262 Notes

83. DO(49)12(1). There was a great deal of concern that young, untrained National Servicemen would be sent abroad, a situation which ministers thought would be hard to defend in Parliament. The committee therefore asked the War Office to be mindful of this concern when determining the actual composition of the brigade group. The War Office chose the 27 Inf. Bde., which existed in name only and whose component units had never trained together. The 1 Leicesters and brigade headquarters staff left almost immediately. The other two infantry battalions notified to move when shipping became available were 1 Middlesex and 1 A&SH. ‘B’ Squadron of 3 RTR, along with supporting artillery, anti-tank, anti-aircraft, and service troops, were also alerted for the move to Hong Kong. See Blaxland, pp. 132–3, anon. ‘Reinforcements for Hongkong – ‘Elements of All Arms’ – Government Measures’, The Times, 6 May 48, and Kenneth Macksey, The Tanks: The History of the Royal Tank Regiment, 1945–1975 (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1979), p. 73. 84. CM(49)30(4), 22 Apr. 49, CAB 128/15. 85. COS(49)59(1), 25 Apr. 49, DEFE 4/21. 86. COS(49)62(6), 29 Apr. 49, DEFE 4/21. 87. Ibid. 88. Ibid. Emphasis added. 89. Ibid. 90. JP(49)44(Final), 29 Apr. 49, DEFE 6/8. 91. Ibid., and DMI [attrib.], Appreciation of the Situation in China, 28 Apr. 49, WO 216/310. 92. JP(49)44(Final). 93. Ibid. 94. Ibid. 95. Ibid. (emphasis added). 96. Ibid. (emphasis added). 97. As noted above, the report was DO(46)30, and the corresponding minute is DO(46)7(1). 98. JP(49)44(Final). 99. CM(49)32(2), 5 May 49, CAB 128/15. 100. Ibid. 101. Not only was some sort of unambiguous statement of intent required, but the unique social and political structure of Hong Kong, which severely limited the number of citizens thought ‘reliable’ by the government, demanded imperial assets for defense. The British government’s irresolute statements to date had damaged morale to the extent that trading in the Hong Kong stock exchange was dropping off and the appeal for recruits for the reconstituted HKVDF was ‘disappointing’. Diversion of Hong Kong’s manpower and economic resources to its defense would be self- defeating, for the colony’s value was economic, and not strategic. ‘The very process of preparing Hong Kong to act as a fortress in war drains away its life blood in peace’, cabled Grantham. See Grantham to Creech Jones, No. 15, and Grantham to Creech Jones, No. 16, annexes to FE(O)(49)27, 11 May 49, CAB 134/287. 102. CM(49)32(2). 103. SEACOS 904 of 12 May 49, noted in JP(49)50(Final), 17 May 49, DEFE 6/9. Notes 263

104. Ibid.; COS(49)70(3), 12 May 49, DEFE 4/21. First Sea Lord Fraser noted that ‘the normal procedure was to prepare plans and then send them to the Cs-in-C for their comments’. 105. JP(49)50(Final), para. 15. Excluding those units already on their way to Hong Kong. the reinforcements this entailed were: Royal Navy: one aircraft carrier; four destroyers or frigates; one small fleet train with replenishment carrier; Army: one infantry division (less one field regiment); one infantry brigade; one armored regiment (less one squadron); one medium artillery regiment; one composite AA regiment; one air observation post squadron; one combined operations bombardment troop; one engineer regiment; RAF: three fighter/ground attack squadrons. 106. Ibid., para. 16(c). 107. Ibid., paras. 16(c), 17, 22(b)(iii), and 22(b)(v). Because the battalions of the strategic reserve served also as training establishments for National Servicemen, their deployment overseas would ‘have serious repercussions on the output of trained men’. Weekend camps and most annual camps for the TA would have to be canceled. Because of the ruling that National Servicemen with less than 16 weeks’ training could not be sent overseas, any units sent from the UK would be at ‘lower establishment’ and in need of individual reinforcement. See ibid., Annex B, paras, 15–16 and 19. 108. Ibid., para. 25. 109. Ibid., para. 25, and Annex B, para. 27(b). 110. No. 3 Commando Brigade was a Royal Marine formation and, as such, belonged to the Admiralty, not the War Office. At full strength a ‘com- mando’ numbered 607 all ranks, somewhat smaller than a fully-manned Army infantry battalion. In 1949 there were three commandos in the 3 Commando Brigade. Wartime Army commandos had been disbanded by this time. See James D. Ladd, The Royal Marines 1919–1980 (London: Jane’s, 1981), p. 267 and Appendix 2, p. 352. 111. JP(49)50(Final), para. 25. 112. Ibid., Annex B, para. 21. 113. Air Marshal Sir Hugh Lloyd, the Air Officer Commanding, Far East, was also present at the meeting to discuss JP(59)50(Final). On the air reinforce- ments Lloyd agreed to the proposals about the types, numbers, and sources of aircraft. 114. COS(49)73(1), 18 May 49, DEFE 4/21. 115. Ibid. 116. Ibid. 117. Ibid. 118. Ibid. The classes referred to were developed as part of the wartime demobi- lization scheme and constituted the only real trained reserve in the British Army at the time, as the National Service scheme had only recently got under way. Class A was based on age and length of service; Class B for men employed in occupations essential to postwar economic reconstruction. See Scott, Appendix 2, p. 278. 119. SAC(49)5(2), 19 May 49, CAB 134/669. The situation in Shanghai was minute 1. The COS aide memoire is attached to the Hong Kong minute, but can also be found at COS(49)183, 18 May 49, DEFE 5/14. 120. SAC(49)5(2). 264 Notes

121. Ibid. 122. The Chifley government continued to refuse to aid the British defense of Hong Kong. New Zealand eventually placed several frigates on call to the Royal Navy, and sent a flight of transport aircraft to Singapore to help ferry supplies to Hong Kong. Edwards argues that the public embarrassment caused the Chifley government by New Zealand’s actions eventually led to Australia sending aircraft to Malaya. See Edwards, Crises and Commitments, pp. 58–60. 123. SAC(49)5(2), amplified in CP(49)119, 24 May 49, CAB 129/35, para. 10. For a recent examination of this unhappy episode, see Bell, pp. 61–2, 81–8. 124. SAC(49)5(2). Once again ministers sought to avoid French or Dutch coop- eration as being counterproductive vis-à-vis Asian opinion. 125. CP(49)118, 24 May 49, CAB 129/35; CP(49)119, 24 May 49, CAB 129/35; CP(49)120, 23 May 49, CAB 129/35. 126. CM(49)38(3), 26 May 49, CAB 128/15. 127. Ibid. 128. Ibid. The Cabinet understood it was likely that the Communists would ini- tially curtail or cut off trade with the colony, but Hong Kong’s value to the Chinese was such that they would probably resume trade after an undeter- mined length of time. 129. Ibid. 130. CP(49)118. 131. DO(49)15(1), 1 June 49, CAB 131/8; Edwards, Crises, pp. 58–60. 132. DO(49)15(2), 1 June 49, CAB 131/8. Unfortunately, Scott does not deal with this episode. 133. CM(49)42(5), 23 June 49, CAB 128/15. 134. Ibid. 135. Bullock, p. 673. 136. CM(49)42(5). The resulting report was in CP(49)177, which has been with- held. See note to Document 170, CM(49)54(2) in Ronald Hyam, ed., The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945–1951. Part II: Economics and International Relations, Series A, Vol 2, (London: HMSO, 1992), p. 398. 137. CM(49)42(5). 138. In its escape the Amethyst collided with and sank a Chinese ship without stopping to help its passengers. While trying to hit the British frigate, PLA shore batteries sank a passenger ship as well as a cargo vessel, a tragedy embarrassed PLA officials tried to pin on the Amethyst. For a detailed account of the Amethyst’s escape, see Murfett, Hostage, ch. 15. 139. CM(49)54(2), 29 Aug. 1949, CAB 128/16. The report, CP(49)177, has been withheld by the government, although its contents can be ascertained from the discussions in this minute, as well as in CRO to UK High Commissioners, no. 326, 7 Sept. 1949, CO 537/4805, No. 86B and JP(49)97(Final), 14 Sept. 49, DEFE 6/10. 140. CM(49)54(2). 141. Ibid. 142. Ibid. While details are not given in the minute, they may have had in mind the international regime that then existed in Tangier, Morocco. 143. Ibid. 144. Ibid. Notes 265

145. CRO to UK High Commissioners telegram no. 326. 146. See Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong (London: Harper Collins, 1993), ch. 17. 147. CP(49)134, para. 4. See Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Defeat Into Victory, 1st edn (London: Cassell, 1956), p. 465; Lyall Wilkes, Festing–Field Marshall: A Study of ‘Front-Line Frankie’ (Sussex: Book Guild, 1991), pp. 63–6; Slim apparently had a high regard for Festing, who he later suggested be the first Director of Operations in Malaya. See, for example, the loose minute by the MA to the CIGS in Harding to Slim, 16 Feb. 50, WO 216/333. Slim was probably behind the appointment of Festing, as he was for Briggs and Lockhart, two other officers whom he knew from his Indian Army and Burma campaign days. Festing was later knighted and became CIGS and Field Marshal. 148. Festing told MacDonald that he ‘would be in a mess now if he were [mili- tary] Governor’, while Grantham ‘at last has a Service Commander in whom he can feel great trust, and whose experience and authority in Service affairs are very high. [Grantham] likes Festing personally, and likes his outlook on things’. See MacDonald to Air Marshal Sir William Elliot, Personal & Private, 3 Aug. 49, MJM 22/8/5–7. Grantham himself said of Festing that ‘He infused confidence and energy all around’ (Via Ports, p. 142). 149. COSSEA 691, 22 June 49, WO 32/13268. 150. See Slim, Defeat Into Victory, and McAlister, p. 273. At the time of his appointment as Commanding General, 40 Inf Div, Evans was the Director of Military Training at the War Office. See Tim Carew, Korea: The Commonwealth at War (London: Cassell 1967), p. 29. His admiration for Slim is evident in his 1969 work Slim as Military Commander. 151. Lt-Gen. , OP INSTR NO. 1 issued by Comd 40 Inf Div Ref 100/G/28/G(Ops), 31 Aug. 49, WO 268/289, Appendix A. 152. HQ 40 INF DIV, Quarterly Historical report of Headquarters, 40th Infantry Division for the period 17 June 49 to 31 Mar. 50, May 50, WO 268/289. There originally were four plans, but the fourth one, DELIBERATION, was later canceled for reasons unknown. 153. This is an approximation based on my analysis of the map traces and divi- sion boundaries given in Operational Instruction No. 1. Unfortunately, the maps from which the traces were derived were not included in the file, and I have instead relied on a 1:50 000 map of the Territory of Hong Kong published by the Survey and Mapping Office, Buildings and Lands Department, Government of Hong Kong, Series HM50CL, edition 9, 1992, sheets 1 & 2. 154. Festing, Operational Instruction No. 1, para. 12 (emphasis in original). 155. Ibid., Appendix D, Plan DECAPITATION. 156. Ibid., Appendices E and F, Plans CRUSHER and DEFIANCE. 157. Wilkes, pp. 69–70; Festing, Operational Instruction No. 1, calls not only for redoubts and observation posts to be built, but also for dummy positions to confuse the enemy. To maintain security of the new positions, they were only to be occupied on the order of General Evans. See Appendix D, Plan DECAPITATION, para. 13. 158. Interview of Colonel Andrew M. Man, ‘The Korean War, 1950–1953’, IWM/DSR 9537/04, transcript pp. 3–4. 266 Notes

159. Man interview, transcript p. 3. Colonel Man commanded 1 Middlesex in both Hong Kong and Korea. This attitude obtained elsewhere: for the 2/10 Gurkhas, ‘The accent on Defence of the Colony, our new role, and the galvanising effect of belonging to an operational Division, bursting with energy and full of new ideas, was a tremendous fillip to morale’ (McAlister, p. 274). 160. The British military representative in Canton, a officer, managed to escape detection by the PLA and was able to communicate in code with the senior intelligence staff officer in Hong Kong about military developments in the Canton region. See Brig. Thomas Haddon, “Looking Back” (TS memoirs), c. 1991, IWM, Haddon Papers, p. 35. 161. See Interview of Brig. George Taylor, IWM SR 9205/03; the arrival of the PLA in the border area was the only occasion on which 3 RTR ‘was required to stow ammunition in [its tanks] in readiness for offensive action.’ See Macksey, p. 74. 162. Grantham, pp. 149–50. 163. The Consul General at Hong Kong (Rankin) to the Secretary of State, No. 309, 3 Nov. 49, in United States. Department of State, FRUS 1949, Vol. VIII: The Far East: China (Washington: GPO, 1978), pp. 576–7. 164. Ibid., pp. 577–78. As Rankin reported, the spirits of Hong Kong’s popula- tion was obviously buoyed by the visit to the colony of Field Marshal Slim at the end of October, and of the Australian statement that ‘Communist China must agree to respect the territorial integrity of its neighbors, ‘notably Hong Kong’, as a prerequisite to recognition.’ Ibid., p. 579. 165. Haddon interview, p. 35. December was also the start of the tramway workers strikes, which at first were thought to portend one of the several scenarios for invasion that involved internal unrest. The JIC discounted this possibility in early January 1950. See COS(50)3(7), 6 Jan. 50, DEFE 4/28; for the salutary effect of deportation on labor subversives, see SEACOS 22, 14 Feb. 50, FO 371/83230. 166. COS(49)161(2), 31 Oct. 49, DEFE 4/26. A more immediate threat was the possibility of Nationalist aircraft violating Hong Kong airspace on their way to attack Communist shipping in the Canton area, and that the Communists might suspect British collusion. See the minute previous to COS(49)161(2), which is titled ‘Threat to Hong Kong’. 167. Memorandum by the CIC(FE) in COS(49)330, 7 Oct. 49, DEFE 5/16. 168. Ibid. 169. Ibid. 170. CP(49)214, 24 Oct 49, CAB 129/37, para. 8. 171. Ibid., para. 4. 172. CM(49)62(7), 27 Oct. 49, CAB 128/16. 173. CP(49)214, para. 10. 174. CP(49)248, 12 Dec. 49, CAB 129/37, para. 3. 175. CP(49)214, para. 10. 176. CP(49)248, para. 4. 177. Ibid., para. 9. 178. Ibid., para. 11. 179. Ibid., para. 11. 180. Ibid., para. 22. Notes 267

181. Ibid., para. 21. 182. Ibid., para. 18. 183. COS(49)421, 5 Dec. 49, DEFE 5/18. 184. Ibid., paras 7–8. 185. See CP(50)75, 21 Apr. 50, CAB 129/39. 186. See, for example, Harding’s comments in COS(50)58(2), 6 Apr. 50, DEFE 4/30. 187. COS(49)421, para. 11; CP(49)248, para. 23. 188. Cabinet approval came on 15 Dec. 9. See CM(49)72(3). 189. See Annex B to CP(50)73, 20 Apr. 50, CAB 129/39; Murfett, ‘A Pyrrhic Victory’, pp. 134–5. 190. CP(50)73, paras 8–18. The Chinese authorities seized the American, French, and Dutch military compounds in January and the British one in April. British firms, especially in Shanghai, were heavily taxed, compelled to buy ‘Victory Bonds’, and forced to retain all workers even though indus- tries were idled by the Nationalist blockade. A number of firms decided to withdraw from China as a result. 191. CP(50)73, para. 10. 192. The then expected loss of Formosa to the Communists ‘would not materi- ally affect our strategic position in the Far East’, but Communist capture of American tanks and high performance aircraft could increase the threat to Hong Kong in the future, a prospect that worried the CIC(FE) to the extent that they suggested in SEACOS 991 that the British bribe Nationalist air- crews to sabotage their own equipment and thus prevent its use by the Communists. See COS(49)171(5), 16 Nov. 49, DEFE 4/26, and the appended draft report, COS 1650/8/11/9. 193. COS(50)69(1), 1 May 50, DEFE 4/30; Grantham, pp. 149, 155; the popula- tion had grown from 600 000 at war’s end to nearly 2.4 million in 1950. See Cameron, p. 280. Cross-border trade resumed in March 1950 with the passage of railroad freight cars across the border (Grantham, p. 152; Cameron, p. 294). 194. On the threat, see SEACOS 22, 14 Feb. 50, FO 371/83230; on the decision to approve the reinforcements, see COS(50)84 in DO(50)14, 9 Mar. 50, CAB 131/9. 195. MacDonald to Hong Kong, No. 66, 24 Feb. 50, MJM 19/7/25-26. 196. SEC(50)7 in COS(50)132, 11 Apr. 50, DEFE 5/20; Gurney and Briggs, the new Director of Operations in Malaya, entirely agreed with the proposal. See Gurney to SSC No. 329 of 17 Apr. 50 (Appendix II to COS(50)132). 197. SEACOS 43, 20 Apr. 50, DEFE 11/35. 198. Festing had developed a blood clot in his brain and had to return to Britain for treatment. See Wilkes, p. 71. For details on his relief, see COS(49)143(2), 28 Sept. 49, DEFE 4/25; COS(49)144(3), 28 Sept. 49, DEFE 4/25. 199. SEACOS 43, para. 2; Grantham to SSC, No. 419, 20 Apr. 50, DEFE 11/35. I see no reason not to accept Grantham’s assertion about marines enlisting on long service engagement (para. ‘J’), but two histories of the Commandos state that large numbers of National Servicemen also served in the Commando Brigade. See Robin Neillands, By Sea and Land: The Royal Marine Commandos, A History 1942–1982 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), p. 135, for which Ladd, p. 268, was probably the source. 268 Notes

200. Comments of Lt-Gen. Mansergh transmitted in Gov HK to SSC, No. 419, op. cit. 201. Mansergh in HK to SSC, No. 416. 202. Grantham, paras 2–4, in HK to SSC, No. 416. 203. Grantham to SSC, No. 427, 21 Apr. 50, DEFE 11/35. He does not substanti- ate this claim. 204. For examples, see LFHK to WO, Sitrep No. 124, 1 Mar. 50, FO 371/83260 FC10112/12; SEACOS 26, 7 Mar. 50, FO 371/83230; LFHK to WO, Sitrep No. 141, 5 Apr. 50, FO 371/83261 FC10112/31; LFHK to WO, Sitrep No. 148, 18 Apr. 50, FO 371/83261 FC10112/37; GOC HK to WO, Sitrep No. 145, 14 Apr. 50, FO 371/83261 FC10112/31; COS(50)69(1), 1 May 50, DEFE 4/30. 205. GOC HK to WO sitrep no. 145, op. cit. 206. COS(50)50(6), 27 Mar. 50, DEFE 4/30. 207. COS(50)66(3), 26 Apr. 50, DEFE 4/30. 208. Interview of Field Marshal Harding, n.d., IWM/DSR 8736/50, transcript p. 289. 209. COS(50)62(1), 21 Apr. 50, DEFE 4/30; DO(50)32, and MAL. C. (50)6, 29 Apr. 50, both in CAB 131/9. 210. COS(50)69(1), 1 May 50, DEFE 4/30 and GOC HK to WO, sitrep no. 159, 5 May 50, FO 371/83261 FC10112/41, which relay disturbing news of Russian assistance to the PLA and of an apparent terror bomb campaign, did not seem to faze Harding. 211. Brig. W. E. Underhill, The Royal Leicestershire Regiment (17th Foot): A History of the Years 1928 to 1956 (Plymouth: Underhill Ltd., 1957), p. 247. 212. JP(50)68(Final), 15 July 50, DEFE 6/13, emphasis added. 213. Ibid. 214. Ibid. ‘Seriously’ meant Russia. 215. Ibid.; Baldwin, p. 161. 216. Ibid. 217. See facsimile of CIA, ORE 29–49, Prospects for Soviet Control of Communist China, 15 Apr. 49, in Michael Warner, ed., The CIA Under Harry Truman, (Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), p. 282; The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State, no. 1619, 27 Sept. 49, FRUS 1949, Vol. VIII, p. 539.

6 Adapting to Reality: the Far East and Cold War Strategy, 1950–54

1. Dockrill, British Defence, Appendix IV, p. 151. By way of contrast, the Labour government’s defense outlays in 1950 and 1951 were 6.6 per cent and 7.9 per cent of GNP, respectively. 2. DO(47)44. This paper’s relation to the Far East is discussed in Chapter 2. 3. The key documents are CIC(FE)(48)1(P), found in COS(48)200, 6 Feb. 48, DEFE 5/9 and COS(48)43(O) [CIC(FE)(48)8(P)] 23 Feb. 48, DEFE 5/10. 4. CIC(FE)(48)8(P), paras 17, ‘Course G,’ and 18(e). The two appendices to this report lay out in detail the strategic importance of Hainan and Formosa as bases for air and naval forces which could interfere with or cut allied sea Notes 269

and air lines of communication, although the Commanders’ primary inter- est in these islands was as bases for operations against China. 5. COS(49)29, 20 Jan. 49, DEFE 5/13 (Part 1). 6. COS(49)29, para. 23. 7. Ibid., para. 12. 8. Ibid., paras 21–2, 27–8. 9. JP(48)69(Revised Final), 15 Sept. 48, DEFE 6/6. For a detailed discussion of the HALFMOON plans, see Steven T. Ross, American War Plans 1945–1950 (New York: Garland, 1988), pp. 89–98. The three allies had agreed to proceed with coordinated plans at a conference in Washington in April 1948. 10. JP(48)101(Final Revise), 17 Mar. 49, DEFE 6/6. See also JP(48)124(Final), 12 Jan. 49, DEFE 6/7. 11. JP(48)101(Final Revise), Annex I, paras 6(c), 11. Although enemy control of Formosa would increase the threat to Allied air and sea lines of communica- tion, the Allied forces necessary to capture it would ‘not … justify the mounting of a combined [that is, amphibious] operation … since this could only be undertaken by the diversion of Allied forces from other and more vital areas’. 12. Ibid., Annex I, para. 13. 13. Ibid., Annex I, paras 10(c), and Annex II, para. 2. 14. Ibid., Annex II, paras 6, 12, 18. The JPS noted that, with respect to Burma, the BSMB was to provide no military assistance for operations against the Karens, ‘bearing in mind that the future constitution of Burma may include a semi-autonomous Karen state’. The accompanying footnote cites a Cabinet decision at CM(49)15(4). 15. JP(48)101(Final Revise), Annex II, paras 32–3. At this point not even a pre- liminary peace conference had been held. 16. COS(49)189 [J.P.S. (48) 101 (Final Revise)], 25 May 49, DEFE 5/14. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. The letter to the COS containing the comments by the CIC(FE) arrived while Ritchie, Air Marshal Lloyd, and Malcolm MacDonald, were all in London for various exercises and ministerial meetings. 20. SEACOS 900, 5 May 1949, FO 371/76034, F6670/1075/61G, in Ovendale, British Defence, document 2.11, pp. 65–6. 21. COS(49)81(1), 1 June 49, DEFE 4/22. 22. DO(49)89, para. 12. 23. Ovendale, English-Speaking Alliance, p. 165; for more detail see, Ovendale’s ‘William Strang and the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee,’ in John Zametica, ed., British Officials and British Foreign Policy 1945–50 (New York: Leicester University Press, 1990), pp. 212–27. 24. Nicholas Tarling, ‘The United Kingdom and the Origins of the Colombo Plan’, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, XXIV:1 (1986), pp. 20, 24. 25. Tarling, ‘Colombo Plan’, passim.; see also Bullock, ch. 20. 26. CP(49)207. It is inexplicably missing from the Cabinet files. The conference would mark the first time ever such a Commonwealth gathering had been held in Asia, an act significant in itself. 27. CM(49)62(8), 27 Oct. 49, CAB 128/16, discusses CP(49)207. 270 Notes

28. CP(50)18, 22 Feb. 50, CAB 129/38. 29. Ibid. 30. There were only 10 712 men in the Australian regular army in 1948, 14 958 in 1949, and 14 543 in 1950. CMF figures for the same years were, respec- tively, 8697, 16 202, and 18 236. See T. B. Millar, Australia’s Defence, 2nd edn (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1969), Appendix B, ‘Personnel in the Armed Forces 1901–1968 For a more recent study of creation of the post-war regular battalions, see Colonel David Chinn, ‘Raising a Regular Infantry Force: Morotai, 1945–46,’ in Duty First: The Royal Australian Regiment in Peace and War, ed. David Horner (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990), pp. 1–23. A contemporary discussion of the Australian Army’s pos- ture can be found in COS(50)77(8), 17 May 50, DEFE 4/31. 31. DO(48)79, 18 Nov. 48, CAB 131/6; DO(48)22(2), 24 Nov. 48, CAB 131/5 32. JP(49)39(S)(T of R), 16 Mar. 49 (Ref S.324), 13 Apr. 49, DEFE 6/8. 33. The treaty, which was signed in San Francisco on 1 September 1951, was quite acceptable to the Chiefs of Staff, for they had been assured by the JCS in their October 1950 meeting that the US was responsible for the Far East and Southwest Pacific, and that Britain, Australia and New Zealand should be responsible for the Middle East. Hence the entire scheme supported British efforts to gain Australian and New Zealand defense commitments to the Middle East. See CP(51)47, 9 Feb. 51, CAB 129/44; CM(51)13(2), 12 Feb. 51, CAB 128/19; CP(51)64, 27 Feb. 51, CAB 129/44; CM(51)16(3), 1 Mar. 51, CAB 128/19; CM(51)19(8), 12 Mar. 51, CAB 128/19; COS(51)40, 25 Jan. 51, DEFE 5/27. 34. JP(50)47, 4 Apr. 50, DEFE 4/31 . 35. Ibid., para. 1. With Allied sea and air control there was no external threat to Indonesia or Borneo, but Chinese Communists posed an internal security threat to Borneo and its oil fields. See paras 3, 12–15. 36. Ibid., para. 61. The Soviets were using ‘all means short of war’, including: ‘(a) A world-wide campaign of propaganda and subversion aimed at weak- ening political and economic stability in all countries outside the Russian orbit; (b) Covert support for communist minorities, whose object is to seize power; (c) The threat of direct intervention by Russian armed forces in sup- port of Russian policy’ (para. 7). 37. Ibid., para. 62. 38. Ibid., paras 64–5. 39. Ibid., para. 66(a). 40. Ibid., paras, 66(b) and (c). 41. Ibid., para. 68. 42. SEACOS 900, op. cit. 43. JP(50)47, para. 69. 44. Ibid., para. 70. 45. See the editorial note on pp. 321–3 of FRUS 1950, Vol. I (Washington: GPO, 1977); Ovendale, English-Speaking Alliance, p. 166. 46. While the USAF and RAF were still monitoring the radioactive cloud from the bomb test, the CIA reported on 20 Sep 49 that the ‘current estimate … is that the earliest possible date by which the USSR might be expected to pro- duce an atomic bomb is mid-1950 and the most probable date is mid-1953’. See facsimile document no. 56 on page 319 of Warner. See also John Notes 271

Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA, revised edn (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), pp. 143–4. 47. Colin McInnes, Hot War, Cold War: The British Army’s Way in Warfare 1945–95 (Washington: Brassey’s, 1996), p. 7. 48. On the decision to fight in Europe, see DO(50)5(1), 23 Mar. 50, CAB 131/ 8, in Ovendale, British Defence, document no. 2.15, pp. 72–3. Earlier British plans, such as SANDOWN, envisaged the evacuation of American and British forces to bases in the United Kingdom and the Middle East. See, for exam- ple, JP(48)109(Final), 3 Dec. 48, DEFE 6/7. The follow-on plan, GALLOPER, was altered to allow for the new continental commitment – see JP(50)68(Final), 15 July 50, DEFE 6/13. For a detailed discussion of US war plans, see Ross, op. cit. 49. Shinwell had been Secretary of State for War until he replaced A. V. Alexander as a result of the Cabinet reshuffle following elections in February 1950. See Emanuel Shinwell, I’ve Lived Through it All (London: Victor Gollancz, 1973), p. 204. Shinwell was generally more active and well-liked than his predeces- sor, meeting on a regular basis with the COS and service ministers, enjoying less supervision from Attlee, and greatly expanded the Ministry of Defence. See Johnson, p. 28. 50. DO(50)45, 7 June 50, CAB 131/9. I have used the version supplied in Appendix I to Yasamee, various documents found on pp. 411–31. 51. DO(50)45, para. 5. 52. Ibid. para. 8. 53. Ibid., para. 9. 54. Ibid., para. 17. 55. Ibid., para. 6. 56. Ibid., para. 13(c). 57. Ibid., para. 13(c). 58. Ibid., paras 11, 16. 59. Reports such as JP(48)101(Final Revise), JP(48)125(Final), and JP(50)47, discussed above. Australia and New Zealand had accepted responsibility for ‘certain aspects of defence in the Anzam [sic] area’, but the Chiefs contin- ued to hope this would not be at the expense of reinforcements for the Middle East. See DO(50)45, paras 36–42, and 56. 60. DO(50)45, para. 40. 61. Ibid., para. 47. 62. Ibid., para. 47. 63. Ibid., paras 48, 57(A.I.b) 64. Ibid., paras 52, 57(A.I.b). 65. Ibid., para. 57(A.I.b). 66. See Cmd. 7361 Statement on Defence 1949, 1949; Cmd. 7895 Statement on Defence 1950, 1950. 67. Carver, Tightrope Walking, p. 15. 68. Efforts to increase the regular content of the services had proved more diffi- cult, and more expensive, than previously realized. See Cmd. 8026, Increase in the Length of Full-Time Service with the Armed Forces, 1950; Scott, p. 258. 69. Scott, p. 258 70. Cmd. 8161, Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War Relating to the Army Estimates 1951–52, 1951, para. 9; Blaxland, pp. 211–12. 272 Notes

71. The eight battalions were resurrected second battalions from eight different regiments. See Blaxland, p. 214. 72. Dockrill, British Defence, p. 43; percentage calculated from defense expendi- ture for 1949 given in Appendix IV. Attlee approved an immediate increase of £100 million, to which Alexander added a three-year program of £3. 4 billion, which Parliament increased to £3.6 billion in September, making a total of £3.7 billion. See Carver, Tightrope, p. 16. 73. Kenneth Harris, Attlee (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982), p. 470; Carver, Tightrope, p. 19. Such massive expenditures on defense over-heated the economy in 1951, raising prices of raw materials and damaging Britain’s already weakened balance of payments ledger. The program ultimately proved untenable and was scaled-down drastically by the Conservative gov- ernment following its election victory in October 1951 (Dockrill, British Defence, pp. 43–4). 74. DO(51)70, 8 June 51, CAB 131/11, para. 1. 75. Ibid., para. 17. 76. Ibid., para. 30; DO(51)64, 7 June 51, CAB 131/11, paras 8 and 10. 77. Abstract of Army Statistics for 1950/51, WO 384/1. 78. DO(51)70, para. 40. This contention was a contradiction of British objec- tions to American calls for ‘Greater Sanction’ against China beginning in October 1951. In response to American requests to back their intention to launch widespread bombing and naval blockade against China in the event of an armistice breach, the British recoiled, arguing that such action would drive China irreconcilably into the Russian camp and possibly provoking an attack on Hong Kong or even general war with the Communist bloc. 79. Ibid., para. 41. 80. Ibid., para. 41. 81. Ibid., para. 40. 82. Ibid., para. 45. 83. Ibid., para. 47. 84. Ibid., para. 47. 85. Ibid. 86. Ibid. 87. Ibid., para. 52. 88. Ibid., paras 53 and 63.A.I.(c). 89. Dockrill, British Defence, p. 44. The Minister of Health and several junior ministers resigned over the program’s cost to the economy and to the gov- ernment’s social welfare policies. See Harris, p. 478. 90. C(52)253, 22 July 52, CAB 129/54, para. 5. 91. Ibid., para. 5. 92. Grove, p. 82. 93. The version presented by the Chiefs is COS(52)361, 15 July 52, DEFE 5/40; the actual Defence Committee document, D(52)26, CAB 131/12, was being held by the Cabinet Office at the time of my research in London, although it has been approved for release to the public. Alexander admitted that inflation and the Sterling exchanges necessary for maintenance of forces overseas, particularly in Germany, lowered the net savings closer to £200 million – see D(52)253, para. 7. 94. COS(52)361, para. 120. Notes 273

95. Ibid., para. 124. 96. Ibid., para. 126 97. Ibid., para. 126(b). 98. Ibid., para. 127. 99. See the conclusions to John Baylis and Alan MacMillan, ‘The British Global Strategy Paper of 1952’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 16:2 (1993) 200–6. The document was only released in 1993, and with the exception of official historians, no scholar had actually seen the document which had for so long been an object of intense speculation. Until Gowing, the standard source on the paper was Rosecrance, pp. 159–81, which relied partially on interviews and memoirs of people involved in writing the report. Darby – as well as others since – perpetuated this version, which inaccurately describes the paper’s structure and credits it with tenets which in fact were first introduced in 1950. Although scholars managed to dis- cern the main arguments of the paper, its place in the development of strategy from 1947 could not be understood until all the relevant docu- ments had been released. For a more detailed discussion of secondary sources on the 1952 paper, see Baylis and Macmillan, op. cit. 100. COS(52)361, paras 9–10. The Chiefs of Staff, accompanying Churchill in his visit to Washington in January 1952, were briefed in detail on American atomic capabilities. 101. Ibid., paras 10, 12, and 39. 102. Ibid., para. 21. 103. Ibid., paras 13 and 32. 104. Ibid., paras 22–4, 44, 60, 63. 105. Ibid., para. 60. The form and extent of this warning of ‘Greater Sanction’ was the cause of extensive discussion between Britain and the United States. See Chapter 7 for its effect on the security of Hong Kong. See Chapters 9 and 10. 106. The introduction and section on economic factors (Section IX) of the report make the economic motive for the review abundantly clear, and Alexander’s statements in paragraph 5 of C(52)253 confirm this. The only serious attempt to match strategy with resources had been the Harwood Report of 1949, which the Chiefs effectively scuttled. See Barnett, Lost Victory, pp. 88–97. 107. COS(52)361, para. 74. Attlee and a small group of ministers had approved development of a British atomic bomb in January 1947. The first successful test of a bomb occurred in October 1952, about four months after the Chiefs completed their report. See Harris, pp. 288–9; Dockrill, British Defence, pp. 25–6; the most complete account remains Gowing’s. 108. It is not clear if Alexander had given the Chiefs a target funding level as had been the case in the Harwood Report. See C(52)253, para. 6. 109. COS(52)361, paras 78–85. At the time of the review, the Army was heavily engaged in controlling serious anti-British disturbances in Egypt which began in October 1951 when the Egyptian parliament abrogated the 1936 treaty. The threat to families of the garrison prompted the ‘swiftest build- up ever achieved by the British Army in peacetime’. This enormous com- mitment absorbed 3 Inf Div and 16 Para Bde – the entirety of the new strategic reserve – for nearly two years until a base agreement was finally 274 Notes

signed in July 1954 and GHQ MELF was relocated to Cyprus. See Blaxland, pp. 221–35. For a detailed examination of the Egyptian base issue, see David Devereux, The Formulation of British Defence Policy Towards the Middle East, 1948–56 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 110. COS(52)361, para. 89. 111. Ibid., para. 89. 112. Ibid., paras 86 and 90. 113. The Chinese would first have to take Indochina. Ibid., para. 90. 114. Ibid., para. 76. As an indication of this commitment, Australia and New Zealand had stationed two and one fighter squadrons, respectively, in Malta, as part of the UK’s Middle East Air Forces (MEAF). See Millar, Australia’s Defence, p. 49. Nevertheless, the Menzies government’s commit- ment to the Middle East in the event of hot war continued to waver in relation to French prospects in Indochina. See Edwards, Crises and Commitments, p. 110. 115. Ovendale, English-Speaking Alliance, p. 128. 116. See Michael J. Cohen, Fighting World War Three from the Middle East: Allied Contingency Plans, 1945–1954 (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 301, 307; and Devereux, pp. 114–15, and passim. 117. C(52)316, 3 Oct. 52, CAB 129/55. The effect would be a 75 per cent cut in the number of new tanks armed with the 120 mm gun; delay in the build- up of the RAF’s night-fighter and bomber forces; and elimination of 40 minesweepers. Other savings were to be found by reducing targets for war reserves of POL and other stores. See paras 9 and 10. 118. C(52)320, 3 Oct 52, CAB 129/55, paras 8 and 14. 119. D(52)45, 31 Oct 52, CAB 131/12, paras 2–6. 120. Ibid., para. 7. 121. Ibid., para. 9; C(52)202, 18 June 52, CAB 129/53, para. 28. 122. C(52)202, para. 29 123. Ibid., para. 30. 124. D(52)45, para. 19. 125. C(52)393, 5 Nov 52, CAB 129/56, para. 1. 126. Ibid., paras. 2–4. Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose! 127. Ibid., paras 7–8. The actual manpower level of the armed forces in 1952 was closer to 827 000. See Appendix IV to Dockrill, British Defence, p. 151. 128. C(52)393, paras 8–9. 129. Ibid., para. 10. 130. Grove, p. 91. Grove provides a singularly excellent account of the Radical Review, albeit focused on the Royal Navy, in ch. 3. 131. Ibid., p. 91. 132. COS(53)333, 10 July 53, DEFE 5/47, Annex III. 133. Ibid., Annex III, para. 14. 134. Ibid., Annex III, paras 10 and 12. 135. Ibid., Annex III, para. 12. 136. As noted in Chapter 5, one brigade group was the garrison originally approved by the Defence Committee in 1946. Local forces included a vol- unteer infantry battalion and an RAF auxiliary fighter squadron (see COS(53)333, para. 18; and David Lee, Eastward: A History of the Royal Air Force in the Far East, 1945–1972 (London: HMSO, 1984), pp. 127–128). Notes 275

While a return to the original garrison size might seem in order, the popu- lation of Hong Kong had grown from approximately 600 000 in 1946 to over 2.5 million by 1950, and the Communists had gained control of China. Because reducing the garrison to this size was an indication that Hong Kong could not be successfully defended if attacked, it had tremen- dous strategic and policy implications (ch. 7). 137. Even with the Korean armistice of July 1953, the bulk of the British contingent in Korea remained as part of 1 Commonwealth Division until the end of 1954 (Blaxland, p. 208). 138. COS(54)116, 9 Apr. 54, DEFE 5/52. For Churchill’s reaction, Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. VIII ‘Never Despair’ 1945–1965 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1988), pp. 772, 952ff. The Russians had tested their own hydrogen bomb in August 1953, and also called it a thermo-nuclear bomb. 139. The Chiefs of Staff report in the Cabinet files (C(54)249) appears not to have been released. 140. C(54)250, 24 Jul 54, CAB 129/69, para. 3. 141. Ibid., para. 3. The Committee on Defence Policy decided on 16 June 1954, that Britain should proceed with development and production of its own hydrogen bomb (Carver, Tightrope, p. 36). 142. C(54)250, paras 16–18. 143. Ibid., para. 5; see also Grove, pp. 109–11. 144. C(54)250, para. 6. The 1951 rearmament program called for 11 regular divisions, but this was never achieved. At most, 10 divisions existed on paper in the early 1950s, of which most were widely scattered and under- strength; for example, after August 1950, 40 Division had only five infantry battalions in Hong Kong, while two were in Korea as part of the UN Command, and another three battalions were in Malaya. The second battalions of eight regiments had been re-raised in April 1952 as part of the rearmament program (p. 214). 145. C(54)250, paras 6–9. 146. CC(54)37(3), 2 June 54, CAB 128/27; CC(54)47(2), 7 July 54, CAB 128/27. 147. D(54)43, 23 Dec. 54, CAB 131/74, paras 20 and 22(d). 148. ‘Russia has now emerged as a first-class naval Power. We can expect that, concurrently with strategic air operations, major attacks will be made by Soviet naval, land and amphibious forces … against Western Europe and our sea communications.’ See D(54)43, para. 18, and Grove, pp. 97–8, 121. 149. D(54)43, para. 7; also see CC(54)62(1), 1 Oct 54, CAB 128/27. 150. Ibid., para. 9; Cmd. 9391, Statement on Defence 1955; C(54)329, 3 Nov. 54, CAB 129/71, para. 19. 151. C(54)329, para. 19. 152. D(54)53, para. 12; Edwards, Crises and Commitments, pp. 162–3. See also Chapter 9. 153. H. B. Eaton, Something Extra: 28 Commonwealth Brigade 1951 to 1974 (Cambridge: Pentland Press, 1993), p. 161. 154. See Darby, pp. 34–5. This was a not inconsiderable problem, as at any one time the Army would have between 8000 to 16 000 men in transit, the vast majority of whom moved by sea. 276 Notes

7 Between the American Scylla and Chinese Charybdis: Hong Kong, 1950–54

1. JP(48)101(Final Revise), op cit. 2. The Chinese Communist Fourth Field Army, consisting of ethnic Koreans from China’s Liaotung Province, ‘comprised more than a third of the initial attack and accounted for its overwhelming success’. See William N. Stokes, ‘Mao and MacArthur: Rethinking the Korean War,’ Foreign Service Journal, August 1994, 30–4, p. 30. See also Memorandum from Clubb to Rusk, 30 Sept. 50, in FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, p. 829. 3. CM(50)39(4), 27 June 50, CAB 128/17. 4. Ibid. 5. COS(50)96(1), 27 June 50, DEFE 4/32. 6. DO(50)48, 28 June 50, CAB 131/9. 7. This fear already had been expressed during the Cabinet meeting the day before. See CM(50)39(4), op. cit. 8. Comments of Lord Fraser, in DO(50)11(1), 28 June 50, FO 371 FK 1015/139, reproduced as document no. 4, in Yasamee, pp. 7–10. 9. DO(50)11(1). 10. Ibid.; see also Anthony Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War: Volume I, A Distant Obligation (London: HMSO, 1990), pp. 48–9. 11. JP(50)82(Revised Final), 5 July 50, DEFE 6/13. On the British position toward Formosa, see Minutes of a Meeting on 30 June 1950 to discuss Korea, FO 371 FK 1022/59, document no. 9, Yasamee et al., DBPO, pp. 21–4. 12. JP(50)82(Revised Final), para. 12. 13. Ibid., para. 15. 14. Ibid., para. 25. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid., para. 30. 17. DO(50)12(1), 6 July 50, CAB 131/8, in Yasamee, no. 14, pp. 36–41. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. There is no indication in this minute to suggest who said this. 20. COSSEA 751, 7 July 50, DEFE 11/37. 21. See Yasamee, note 2, p. 76. 22. Franks to Younger, no. 2036, 23 July 50, FO 371 FK 1022/222, in Yasamee, no. 25, pp. 76–8. 23. DO(50)15(2), 24 July 50, CAB 131/8; CM(50)50(3), 25 July 50, CAB 128/18. Also see Farrar-Hockley, Distant Obligation, pp. 102–4, and Callum MacDonald, Britain and the Korean War (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 21. 24. Australia’s initial contribution was 3 RAR serving with BCOF, and later added another RAR battalion in 1951. New Zealand raised a mostly volun- teer artillery regiment, while Canada first sent one battalion, then an entire brigade and an armored squadron, as well as artillery. India eventually sent a field ambulance. In 1951 all of the Commonwealth forces were grouped into the 1 Commonwealth Division. See Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War (Manchester: MUP, 1988), pp. 35, 40, and pas- sim.; C. N. Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division, 1950–1953 (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1954). Both volumes of Farrar-Hockley’s Korean War history provide details, as do the Australian official histories, Robert O’Neill, Notes 277

Australia in the Korean War, Vol. 1: Strategy and Diplomacy (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1981) and Vol. II: Combat Operations (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1985). 25. Description of the brigade’s formation can be found in Farrar-Hockley, Distant Obligation, pp. 115–19, and in, Grey, Commonwealth Armies, pp. 37–9. On the diffused state of the ‘brigade’, see Carew, pp. 139–40. The gov- ernment had decided to remove National Servicemen from the brigade, which only further complicated its formation and in part necessitated the calling up of A and B class reservists. 26. COS(50)127(1), 14 Aug. 50, DEFE 4/34; minute, Eliot to Attlee, 17 Aug. 50, CAB 21/2281, Yasamee, no. 38, p. 108. 27. Farrar-Hockley, Distant Obligation, p. 120; Eliot to Attlee, op. cit. 28. AVM Cecil Bouchier had reported that MacArthur had said ‘a little got in fast was better than a lot later on,’ (Farrar-Hockley, Distant, p. 119), while General Bradley reportedly commented that ‘a platoon now would be worth more than a company tomorrow’ (Eliot to Attlee, op. cit.) 29. First discussed at COS(50)127(1), 14 Aug. 50, DEFE 4/34. The First Sea Lord made this contention both at COS(50)127(1), and also at COS(50)128(1), 15 Aug. 50, DEFE 4/34. 30. COS(50)128(1). In fact, the commander of US Naval forces in the Far East had asked the Royal Navy to assist with special operations behind North Korean lines. This request eventually led to the creation of 41 Commando, which operated with the US Marine Corps during the war. Not to be out- done, the War Office considered mobilizing a reserve SAS unit for duty Korea, but the idea went nowhere. See COS(50)132(5), 18 Aug. 50, DEFE 4/35 and related minutes in DEFE 4/35 and 4/36. A few individual British Army officers did participate in special and guerrilla operations, however. See Ed Evanhoe, Darkmoon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996), esp. pp. 103–7. 31. Harding to VCIGS, 18/CIC, 16 Aug. 50, DEFE 11/38. 32. Ibid. 33. Harding to VCIGS, 19/CIC, 16 Aug. 50, DEFE 11/38. His determination that a brigade group of all arms should go was a strong memory nearly 40 years after the fact. See Harding interview, pp. 288–9. 34. Harding to VCIGS, 19/CIC. 35. Ibid. 4 Hussars provided the armored cars, the engineers being 67 Gurkha Engineer Squadron. 36. Ibid. 37. Elliot to Attlee, op. cit. The Chiefs’ representative to the JCS had an office in the Pentagon, while the British Joint Services Mission, headed by the for- mer C-in-C FARELF, General Sir , presumably was housed at the British Embassy. 38. COS(50)131(2),17 Aug. 50, DEFE 4/35. The CO thought the troops should come from Malaya and not Hong Kong, that to do otherwise would be contra- dictory to the Hong Kong policy set forth by the BDCC(FE) in COS(50)290. In response, the First Sea Lord pointed out that that policy had been written under different circumstances from the ones that applied since the outbreak of the Korean War, while the FO rep. revealed that his department’s just- completed study of the situation reported little threat of Chinese attack. 278 Notes

39. COS(50)131(2). 40. Ibid. 41. See note 6, Elliot to Attlee, p. 111, and Harding to Robertson, No. 115, 20 Aug. 50, MJM 19/4/23. 42. With the exception of a select few officers in key command positions, the majority of the men were not informed of Operation GRADUATE – the move to Korea – until Monday, 21 August, leaving less than four full days to pre- pare for embarkation. See Farrar-Hockley, Distant Obligation, p. 126, and Carew, pp. 40–2. 43. Harding interview, p. 289; Man interview, pp. 7–8. 44. Carew, p. 43. 45. See Lt Col. G. I. Malcolm, The Argylls in Korea, 1st edn. (London: Thomas , 1952), p. 1, and Blaxland, p. 137. The headquarters companies absorbed from the support companies the 3 in. mortar, medium machine- gun (Vickers 0.303 in.), and assault pioneer platoons. A special US Army training team was flown out to Hong Kong to instruct British troops on the use of the American 3.5 in. anti-tank rocket launcher. 46. Blaxland, p. 137. 47. Purposely or not, the brigade had just finished a major exercise on Friday the 18th which had involved preparations for an operational move. See Malcolm, Argylls, pp. 2–3. 48. Harding’s presence for the event was fortuitous, as he had informed Brownjohn in 19/CIC (op. cit.) that he would be in Hong Kong from the 23rd on to discuss the Hong Kong defense situation with the BFHK com- mander. 49. Carew, p. 53, and Man interview, p. 8; Harding interview, p. 289. 50. MacDonald, quoted in Carew, pp. 53–4. 51. COS(50)109(3), 14 July 50, DEFE 4/33. 52. These include: JP(50)91(Final), Defence of Hong Kong, 13 July 50, DEFE 6/14; JP(50)92(Final), Reinforcement of Hong Kong, 19 July 50, DEFE 6/14; JP(50)110(Final), Defence of Hong Kong, 5 Sept. 50, DEFE 6/14; COS(50) 115(8), Defence of Hong Kong: Confidential Annex, 21 July 50, DEFE 4/33; COS(50)124(4), Defence Policy for Hong Kong: Confidential Annex, 10 Aug. 50, DEFE 4/34. 53. This is based in part on my analysis of COS(50)290 [BDCC(FE) (50)3(P) (Final)], 3 Aug. 50, DEFE 5/23. 54. Interrogations of North Korean prisoners of war had revealed that advisers of the Russian Military Mission to North Korea, numbering between 2500 and 3000, were in the field with their protégés. See CM(50)46(2), 17 Jul 50, CAB 128/18. 55. COS(50)269, 25 July 50, DEFE 5/22, Annex, para. 2. 56. Ibid., paras 9–10, 17, 27–9. Since 1949, a military airstrip had been built at Sek Kong. 57. Ibid., para. 28. 58. Ibid., para. 29. 59. See Chapter 5. 60. COS(W)828 to Lord Tedder via BJSM, WDC, 21 July 50, FO 371/83397 FC1192/22. 61. COS(50)290. Notes 279

62. Ibid., para. 4(a). See also Chapter 6. 63. Ibid., para. 4(a). 64. With the exception of a few months at the end of 1950, at any one time FARELF normally had two or three battalions resting and retraining. 65. COS(50)290, para. 4. 66. Ibid. 67. Ibid. 68. As discussed in Chapter 5, although the basic policy laid down in 1946 underwent subtle changes and qualifications over the subsequent four years, the basic premise remained the same, namely, that Hong Kong was indefensible against an attack by a major power in occupation of the Chinese mainland. 69. In Malaya, the BDCC(FE) expected the loss of Hong Kong in the cold war to result in the alienation of Chinese allies there, and the irretrievable loss of the fence-sitters. COS(50)290, para. 6. 70. Ibid., paras 9, 11. 71. In the cover letter to the report, the Secretary to the BDCC(FE), B. A. Casey, wrote that the Hong Kong aspects of DO(50)45 seemed only to apply in the event of general war. COS(50)290 was written under the assumptions that a ‘conflict may be with China only’ and localized in the same way as Korea, and that ‘an attack on Hong Kong will not necessarily result in implement- ing plans for a major war (including withdrawal of forces from the Far East)’. See Secretary, BDCC(FE), to SCOSC, Ref. 093/HK, 29 July 50, also in COS(50)290, op. cit. 72. COS(50)290, para. 5. 73. Ibid., paras 12, 13. 74. Ibid., paras 14(a)–(f). 75. Menzies to Attlee, No. 123, 26 May 50, DEFE 11/36. See discussion at the end of Chapter 4. 76. COSSEA 741, 2 June 50, DEFE 11/37; SEACOS 66, 21 June 50, DEFE 11/37. There is a concluding cable, COSSEA 748 of 26 May 50, but this was not found. See COS(50)274 and Appendix (Wild Report), 26 July 50, DEFE 5/22. 77. Wild Report, para. 3. Harding apparently had contemplated the need for theater deception operations prior to Menzies’ suggestion. See COS(50) 118(5), 28 July 50, DEFE 4/34. 78. Wild Report, para. 3. No details are given about the relevant organization. 79. The CIC(FE) in SEACOS 66 had said that ‘they would be ready to make full use of the theatre expert as soon as he could be conveniently provided. … The officer approved to be FARELF deception officer in Singapore was Charles Cholmondeley, a former RAF officer; the Malaya District deception officer was Lt-Col. Michael Calvert, who had already served as a special assistant to Harding and had promoted the raising of the ‘Malayan Scouts’ special force, later renamed as 22 SAS. 80. The MoD retains all of class DEFE 28, Directorate of Forward Plans: Registered Files. A request to the MoD’s Departmental Record Officer for access to the papers was denied. At least 12 files are directly relevant to the Far East, of which 2 are labeled ‘Defence of Hong Kong 1947–1950’ and ‘Defence of Hong Kong 1951–1953’. 81. See Carew, pp. 38, 42, and Man interview, p. 7. 280 Notes

82. These are: COS(52)224, 22 Apr. 52, DEFE 5/38; COS(52)409, 6 Aug. 52, DEFE 5/40; Brownjohn to MinDef NCDB/M/10, 26 Nov. 52, DEFE 11/49. 83. Based upon the comments of Paskin and Fraser in COS(50)131(2), 17 Aug. 50, DEFE 4/35, and, more directly in COSSEA 774, 4 Oct. 50, FO 371 FC 1192/38, Yasamee, no. 61, pp. 167–9. The Chiefs also indicated they were ‘considering the possibility of obtaining American assistance’ in the event of a Chinese attack on Hong Kong, but in any case the British government would also appeal to the UN. See COSSEA 774, para. 9. In an August 1950 telegram (SEACOS 88), the CIC(FE) had made several requests about the resources available for the defense of Hong Kong. Among these were authorization ‘to plan with the Americans the operations of bomber forces in defence of Hong Kong from Formosa or the Philippines. It was agreed that this question should be covered in the report which the JPS were preparing on the Defence of Hong Kong [JP(50)110]’. Unfortunately, JP(50)110 remains closed later in the century. See COS(50)132(4), 18 Aug. 50, DEFE 4/35; JP(50)110(Final), op. cit. 84. Farrar-Hockley, Distant Obligation, pp. 290–1. 85. 28 Brigade (less one battalion) from Hong Kong relieved 27 Brigade in April 1951. Because the relief took place in Korea, the Hong Kong garrison dropped to only two infantry battalions during a period of about six weeks! See Anthony Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War. Volume II: An Honourable Discharge (London: HMSO, 1995), p. 66. Appendix C (pp. 429–34) reproduces ‘Despatch arrangements for 28th Brigade’, which is the minutes of a meeting held in the War Office on 16 March 1951, to ‘examine the best method of relieving 27 Infantry Brigade in KOREA’. On the relief from Hong Kong, see also Eaton, pp. 7–10. 86. Carver, Harding, p. 170; on the extension of the Kai Tak runways to make them suitable for jet fighters, see SEACOS 62, 17 June 50, FO 371/83397 FC1192/18; No. 28 Squadron, RAF received the first Vampires in February 1951. See David Lee, Eastward: A History of the Royal Air Force in the Far East, 1945–1972 (London: HMSO, 1984), p. 123. 87. From as early as February 1949, the Truman administration had sought British collaboration in placing export controls on trade with the Communists. While the British agreed to control military exports, they refused to do so for non-military exports, which were a staple of the entrepôt trade. For a detailed account of US–UK wranglings over the China trade, see Frank Cain, ‘The US-Led Trade Embargo on China: the Origins of CHINCOM, 1947–52’, The JSS, 18:4 (1995) 33–54. 88. For a representative discussion of the problem, see the various documents annexed to COS(50)440, 31 Oct. 50, DEFE 5/25. 89. See CO comments in COS(51)45(5), 9 Mar. 51, DEFE 4/40. 90. HK to SSC, No. 840, 24 July 50, FO 371/83397 FC1192/21. 91. See, for example, the letter from Bevin to Acheson, annexed to Perkins’ memorandum of conversation, 15 July 50, FRUS 1950, Vol. VII, pp. 395–9; Memo from Thorp to Matthews, 9 Feb. 51, FRUS 1951, Vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 1899–1902; and British Embassy to Department of State, 10 May, 1951, FRUS 1951, Vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 427–31. 92. Acheson to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices, 17 Jan. 51, FRUS 1951, Vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 1877–8. Notes 281

93. For a contemporary view of Hong Kong trade losses, see, for example, the telegram from US Consul General at Hong Kong (McConaughy) to the Secretary of State (Acheson), 1 Nov. 51, FRUS 1951, Vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 2042–6; for a more recent, scholarly evaluation, see Cain, pp. 47–8. True to its entrepreneurial heritage, Hong Kong used its fortuitously abun- dant supply of refugee labor and capital to recast itself as a successful manufacturing center. See Cameron, pp. 295–8; Grantham, pp. 167–8; Welsh, pp. 451–3. 94. Richard J. Aldrich, ‘’The Value of Residual Empire’: Anglo-American Intelligence Co-operation in Asia after 1945’, in Richard J. Aldrich and Michael F. Hopkins, eds. Intelligence, Defence and Diplomacy: British Policy in the Post-war World (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1994), pp. 232–6. 95. Ibid., p. 248, and Desmond Ball, ‘Over and Out: Signals Intelligence (Sigint) in Hong Kong’, Intelligence and National Security, 11, no. 3 (July 1996), pp. 479–81. 96. Nine US Navy ships visited Hong Kong in February 1950 alone. See Commodore J. M. Brownfield, HK 16/64, 31 Mar. 50, ADM 1/21839. The New York Times reported the army officer as Major William Saunders, for- mer assistant military attaché in China in Canton. The posting was taken as ‘evidence of the close American interest in the defense of Hong Kong against possible Communist attack’. See Tillman Durdin, ‘U.S. Officer Joins Hong Kong Staff’, The New York Times, 8 Sept. 49 1949, 15. 97. Harold Hinton, ‘Acheson Denies Hong Kong Pledge; Says Help Will Depend on Events’, The New York Times, 13 Aug. 49, 1–2. 98. NSC 73/4, 25 Aug. 50, FRUS 1950, Vol. I, p. 388, para. 41.c. 99. COS(50)332, 28 Aug. 50, DEFE 5/23. A US infantry regiment is primarily a fighting organization generally consisting of three battalions. Thus the offer of two regiments (presumably of army infantry, the letter is not pre- cise) would mean six US infantry battalions in Hong Kong – larger than the current British garrison! 100. Ibid. 101. COS(50)139(7), 30 Aug. 50, DEFE 4/35. A fairly accurate estimate of the Chinese view. See Gaddis, p. 78. 102. COS(50)447, 31 Oct. 50, DEFE 5/25. Tedder told Bradley that British forces in Hong Kong ‘are adequate to resist internal disturbances or a small-scale attack from without, but they are not adequate to hold off a full-scale attack by the Chinese communists. Should such an attack occur, it would presumably lead to an appeal to the UN, but nevertheless the [British] would hope that the hostilities might be localized’. See Agreed Memorandum, Summary of United States – United Kingdom Discussions on the Present World Situation, 20–24 July, 1950, Washington, D.C., FRUS 1950, Vol VII, p. 464. 103. According to the July 1950 draft of NSC 73 (see FRUS 1950, Vol. I, p. 335) and National Intelligence Estimate 25, 2 Aug. 51, in FRUS 1951, Vol. I, p. 123. 104. See COS(51)23(1), 2 Feb. 51, DEFE 4/39; DO(51)7(3), 2 Apr. 51, CAB 131/10. 105. According to a State Department official working in Hong Kong at the time, the impetus was a comment made by a Chinese Communist journal- ist to the correspondent of The New York Times that implied the Chinese 282 Notes

were preparing to invade. Author’s interview of Joseph Yager, McLean, Virginia, September 1996. See also Sir Roger Makins, Washington to FO, No. 51 OTP Hong Kong. Evacuation, 6 Jan. 51, CAB 21/2557. On the British reaction, see Grantham, p. 170. 106. COS(51)48(6), 14 Mar. 51, DEFE 4/41. 107. Ibid. 108. Ibid. and COS(51)197, 14 Apr. 51, DEFE 5/30. 109. The agreed report (see FRUS 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 64–71) addresses only Southeast Asia. The report registered by the COSC (COS(51)318, 29 May 51, DEFE 5/31) is inexplicably missing from the PRO files, while the min- utes (COS(51)319, 29 May 51, DEFE 5/31) are of little help on the subject. 110. Marshall to Acheson, 9 Apr. 51, FRUS 1951, Vol. VII, Part 2, pp. 1949–50. 111. Ibid. 112. Ibid. 113. CP(50)221, 6 Oct. 50, CAB 129/42. 114. See Chapter 6. 115. CP(51)47, Annex, para. 3. 116. For the JCS position, see Allison to Jessup, 4 Jan. 51, FRUS 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 133. The US Chiefs also considered Indonesia as a potential member. 117. MacDonald, pp. 62–3. For a detailed account of the exchange, see Farrar- Hockley, Honourable Discharge, pp. 250–60. Eden’s memoirs are too general to be of any great help, and he blurs discussions in Paris with those in Rome. See Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle: the Memoirs of The Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden, K.G., P.C., M.C. (London: Cassell, 1960), pp. 16–18. Likewise, his biographer skims over the issue, focusing instead on personal friction between Eden and Acheson. See Robert Rhodes James, Anthony Eden (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1986), pp. 352–3. 118. Memorandum of Conversation by Barnes, 28 Nov. 51, FRUS 1951, Vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 1189–93. 119. Sir Roger Makins, the British Ambassador, raised the issue at the end of November. See Johnson to Matthews, 21 Nov. 51, FRUS 1951, Vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 1154–6. 120. COS(51)195(3), 3 Dec. 51, DEFE 4/50. 121. COS(52)53, 22 Jan. 52, DEFE 5/36, p. 7. 122. Ibid., p. 7. 123. Ibid., p. 7. 124. The JPS brief prepared for the British delegation to the talks was changed – apparently because of suggestions made by the FARELF Chief of Staff, Major-General Nigel Poett, during his stop in London on his way to the Washington meetings – to include consideration of planning with the USAF to assist in the colony’ defense, but the British record of the meeting (COS(52)53), makes no mention of such an appeal. On Poett’s role, see COS(52)9(5), 18 Jan. 52, DEFE 4/51 and Nigel Poett, Pure Poett: The Memoirs of General Sir Nigel Poett, KCB, DSO and bar (London: Leo Cooper, 1991), p. 106. 125. COS(52)53, p. 9. 126. Report by the Ad Hoc Committee on South East Asia, 5 Feb. 52, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, pp. 40–4. Notes 283

127. The French also opposed a blockade of China, thinking it would be inef- fective and provoking China into invading Indochina. 128. Davis to JCS, 5 Feb. 52, FRUS 1952, Vol. XII, Part 1, pp. 36–9. 129. Ibid, para. 12(f). 130. NSC 124/2, 25 June 52, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, p. 132. 131. In January 1951 the JCS had ordered US Pacific Command to prepare plans on evacuation, but told the commander he could not reveal their existence to any foreign nationals (presumably including the British). See JCS 81939 to CINCPAC, 25 Jan. 51, File CCS 381 S.3, RG 218, Box 14, NARA. The new instructions to collaborate with the British were in JCS 932447 to CINCPAC, 27 Feb. 52, as shown in FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, p. 278. It is not clear if the exchange of evacuation plans was satis- factory to the British. The brief for the January tripartite talks were amended to include seeking joint planning with the US Air Force for ‘co-operation in the defence of the Colony,’ but this appears not to have been pursued in actuality – see amendments to JP(51)223 in COS(52)2(1), 4 Jan. 52, DEFE 4/51, as well as the original, JP(51)223(Final), 3 Jan. 52, DEFE 4/51. Elliot’s brief contained no such instructions, instead pressing generally for air action in support of local defense efforts in Hong Kong or Indochina. See COS(52)11(5), 22 Jan. 52, DEFE 4/51; JP(52)8(Final), 21 Jan. 52, DEFE 4/51. 132. COS(52)110, 12 Feb. 52, DEFE 5/37. It would appear from comments made in March 1952 by CAS Slessor, that the DC approved a new policy for Hong Kong in June of 1951 (see Note by CAS on JP(52)22(Final), which is appended to COS(52)42(2) & JP(52)22(Final), 21 Mar. 52, DEFE 4/52. Logged as DO(51)74 and not present in CAB 131 at the PRO, it most likely was based on JP(50)179(Final), 5 Dec. 50, DEFE 6/15, and its successor, JP(50)180(Final), 16 Dec. 50, DEFE 6/15. These suggested the policy of maintaining in Hong Kong only the minimum garrison necessary to main- tain internal security and public morale, and act as a deterrent to attack. 133. CBFHK appreciation, (annex to COS(52)110). 134. The land attack had to be held in the New Territories, as any withdrawal from them would so severely undermine the defense as to require with- drawal. CBFHK appreciation, para. 9. 135. CBFHK appreciation, paras 2(c), 3(a), 5. On the aerial reconnaissance restrictions, see COS(50)143(7), 6 Sept. 50, DEFE 4/35. Mansergh’s appreci- ation made an implied request for greater latitude to launch such missions if he suspected a Chinese build-up for an attack, but how this played out is not known, for all the relevant 1952 Chiefs of Staff files have been with- held. 136. Since 1949, the British had constructed a rudimentary military airfield at Sek Kong in the New Territories. 137. CBFHK appreciation, paras 6, 6(d), 13(a). 138. COS(52)110, letter from CIC(FE) to SCOSC, ref 094/23, 1 Feb. 52, para. 8. Emphasis added. 139. Ibid., paras 2–6. 140. Ibid., para. 8. The CIC(FE) cite principally political vice military reasons for this: ‘… although American naval and air forces might be made available, the United State commitments reinforced by the political objections, 284 Notes

precludes the deployment of United States land forces in the Colony’ (para. 7). The political objections were those of the Americans, as indicated by paragraph 10, but it will be remembered from above that the Foreign Office and Colonial Office both rejected the American ambassador’s offer to have two regiments train in Hong Kong. 141. Ibid., para. 9. 142. Ibid., para 10. On American support they wrote: ‘we do not believe that they would fail to give us every assistance in their power to cover an evacuation’. 143. JP(52)22(Final), 6 Mar. 52, DEFE 4/52. 144. Note by the CAS on JP(52)22(Final), para. 7, appendix to COS(52)42(2), op. cit. 145. Ibid., paras 7 and 9. 146. Ibid. 147. Ibid., para. 4. 148. COS(52)42(2). 149. Ibid. 150. Ibid. 151. COS(52)187, 29 Mar. 52, DEFE 5/38. 152. On the US–UK discussions, see COS(52)55(2), 22 Apr. 52, DEFE 4/53; COS(52)57(1), 25 Apr. 52, DEFE 4/53; another cryptic reference is made in item ‘B’ on SEACOS 261 of COS(52)38(3), 11 Mar. 52, DEFE 4/52. On the deception plan, see COS(52)224, 22 Apr. 52, DEFE 5/38. 153. COS(52)224, para. 3. 154. Ibid., paras 6 and 8. 155. By reference, SEACOS 270 informed the COS about General Hart’s visit, but no details are given, and the telegram is not in the file. See COS(52)89(11), 23 June 52, DEFE 4/54. The Foreign Office account, FE Dept, Visit of General Hart, CG FMF to Hong Kong, 1952, FO 371/99360 FC 1631/2G, has been retained by the department. 156. COS(52)647, 27 Nov. 52, DEFE 5/43, para. 6. 157. COS(52)324, 24 June 52, DEFE 5/40. The Hong Kong portion refers to COS(52)54(3), the crucial part of which the MoD has retained. 158. COS(51)514, 6 Sept. 51, DEFE 5/33. 159. Keightley, ‘Talk by the Commander-in-Chief on the C.I.G.S. Conference June 1952’, (Singapore: 1952) Keightley Papers. 160. Ibid. 161. COS(52)647. Radford’s memoirs indicate he was serious about Hong Kong. See Admiral Arthur W. Radford, From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: the Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1980), p. 294. 162. Report by the Staff Planners to the Military Representatives to the ANZUS Council, Pearl Harbor, 25 Nov. 52, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, p. 247. 163. Ibid., pp. 247, 253. 164. Ibid., p. 253. 165. Ibid., p. 255. 166. COS(53)1(4), 1 Jan. 53, DEFE 4/59. 167. Allison-Radford memcon, 4 Feb. 53, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XIV, Part 1, p. 143. Notes 285

168. Gerhart to Bradley, 3 Mar. 53, RG 218, Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman’s File, General Bradley, 1949–53, Box 7, File 091 China 1953, NARA. 169. They may appear in those portions of the JCS files at the NARA which are closed to the public, or in Admiral Radford’s CINCPAC papers at the Navy’s Operational Archives, which are closed in their entirety. No hint is given in any of the FRUS volumes. 170. COS(53)107, 19 Feb. 53, DEFE 5/45. 171. COS(53)107. Churchill had been both Prime Minister and Minister of Defense for the first several months of his government, until he appointed Field Marshal Harold Alexander, Earl of Tunis, as Defense Minister in March 1952. See Gilbert, p. 709, n. 2. 172. COS(53)107. 173. Ibid. 174. COS(53)27(4), 24 Feb. 53, DEFE 4/60. 175. JP(53)44(Final), 12 Mar. 53, DEFE 4/61. 176. COS(53)35(4), 16 Mar. 53, DEFE 4/61; D(53)5(1), 26 Mar. 53, CAB 131/13; COS(53)43(1), 31 Mar. 53, DEFE 4/61. 177. COS(53)209, 4 May 1953, DEFE 5/46; COS(53)59(4), 7 May 53, DEFE 4/62. 178. ‘Report of the Conference … Held at Pearl Harbor, 6–10 Apr. 1953’, n.d. FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, pp. 303–6. 179. COS(53)238, 21 May 53, DEFE 5/46. 180. ‘Report by the Staff Planners … on the Conference Held June 15 to July 1’, 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, p. 321. 181. Ibid., p. 321. The report says two infantry divisions less two battalions. The annex with the projected forces needed was not reproduced in the FRUS version, but JP(53)101(Final), 23 July 53, DEFE 4/64, para. 12 states 50 aircraft. 182. Report by the Staff Planners, p. 321. 183. Ibid., p. 321. 184. Ibid., p. 321. 185. Ibid., pp. 325–6. According to Admiral Radford, the BDCC(FE) had had some reservations about the strengthening of Hong Kong’s defenses, but what these reservations were is not apparent from Keightley’s July conver- sation with the Chiefs of Staff. See CJCS to Wilson, 4 Dec. 53, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, p. 356. 186. Report by the Staff Planners, p. 325. 187. COS(53)93(5) Annex, 28 July 53, DEFE 4/64. 188. Ibid., p. 2. I believe by ‘facilities’ Keightley meant the new airfield, radar and communications equipment called for in the planners report. According to the JPS study of the report and other documents, the Americans ‘were clearly most interested’ in the reinforcement option. See JP(53)101(Final), op. cit. paras 12–13. 189. COS(53)93(5). 190. NSC 148, 6 Apr. 53, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, p. 289. This docu- ment superseded NSC 124/2, which had restricted US assistance to Hong Kong only to cover an evacuation. The clause in NSC 148 about further military assistance had in fact been the policy laid down in 1950 in NSC 73. 286 Notes

191. COS(53)93(5). 192. This is not surprising as the conference was consumed by the impending defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu. See Report of the Five Power Military Conference, June 54, DEFE 11/141; an extract Report of the Five- Power Military Conference of 3–11 June 1954, Washington, 11 June 54, appears in FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, pp. 554–63. There had been another meeting in February, but the record of it at the PRO (COS(54)144, 5 May 54, DEFE 5/52) remains closed until the 21st century. 193. Minutes of Meeting Held in the Department of State, subj: Meeting on Southeast Asia Pact, 24 Aug. 54, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, p. 788. 194. State to Embassy London, No. 5179, 4 Apr. 54, in FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XIII, Part 1, pp. 1238–40. On the Eisenhower-Churchill correspondence see Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945–1992 (New York: Twayne, 1994), p. 202. 195. JP(53)103(Final), 6 Aug. 53, DEFE 11/96, para. 3. 196. COS(53)333, 10 July 53, DEFE 5/47. These assumptions were not without critics. See, for example, COS(53)332, 9 July 53, DEFE 5/47. 197. COS(54)69, 2 Mar. 54, DEFE 5/51, para. 12. 198. COS(54)69, op. cit. 199. Ibid., paras 5–6. 200. Ibid., para. 7. This is a reference to the plans of the Five Power Staff Agency, which were discussed in the previous section. 201. COS(54)19(3), 19 Feb. 54, DEFE 4/68. 202. When this memorandum was presented to the Defence Committee in March 1954, the Korean armistice had been in effect for nearly eight months, but the British still had five infantry battalions, an armored regi- ment, and several artillery regiments serving with 1 Commonwealth Division in Korea. See Blaxland, p. 208. 203. Source: COS(53)333, Appendix B. There is some discrepancy over the num- ber of infantry battalions present in the two brigades in Hong Kong in 1954. This document cites 5 as the planned number, and one published source confirms this (Macksey, p. 85), whereas some other documents claim only four battalions were present, as does Blaxland (p. 466). It is pos- sible that the HKVDF may have been counted as the fifth battalion, or that an additional battalion had been retained from Malaya. 204. Eden’s comments to the Cabinet in CC(54)29(1), 15 Apr. 54, CAB 128/27. 205. Ibid. 206. On the Cabinet’s decision to alert the force for Korea, see CC(53)36(1), 24 June 53, CAB 128/26. On the COSC discussion of the BDCC(FE)’s and Grantham’s telegrams, as well as its own concerns, see COS(53)83(5) [SEA- COS 345], 2 July 53, DEFE 4/64. Churchill had told Eisenhower of the Hong Kong brigade on 24 June. See Gilbert, p. 845. 207. CC(54)29(1). 208. COS(54)114(4), 2 Nov. 54, DEFE 4/73. This even though the troops to be released by the reduction were necessary to help in the build up of a Far East strategic reserve. The Australians and New Zealanders agreed to Harding’s proposal in Melbourne to establish a Commonwealth brigade group for this purpose. The 28 Commonwealth Brigade, which had served in Korea, was re-raised for this new role in 1955. Notes 287

209. See Blaxland, p. 466, and McAlister, p. 112, which describes the garrison in 1956. 210. J. A. Williams, ‘Korea and the Malayan Emergency – the Strategic Priorities’, JRUSI 118:2 (1973) 56–62. 211. Gaddis, p. 78.

8 Manpower, the Strategic Reserve, and the Malayan Emergency, 1950–54

1. See Chapter 7 and Williams, ‘Korea and the Malayan Emergency’. 2. DO(50)45, 7 June 50, CAB 131/9, para. 56. 3. Richard Stubbs, Counter-Insurgency and the Economic factor: the Impact of the Korean War Prices Boom on the Malayan Emergency, Occasional Paper No. 19 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974). 4. Ibid., p. 13. Government expenditure on defense, police and Emergency requirements rose from $82 million in 1948 to $296 million in 1953, a 350 per cent increase (pp. 13–14). At the same time, the Federation of Malaya government actually ran budget surpluses of several hundred million dollars! (p. 12) The number of police rose from 11 000 in 1947 to 73 000 in 1952 (including 41 000 ‘Special Constables’). When the prices boom sub- sided, the number of regulars dropped to 48 000. Nearly 250 000 Malays served in part-time auxiliary police and home guard units. See David M. Anderson, Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism and the Police, 1917–65 (Manchester: MUP, 1992), p. 110. 5. * From Hong Kong. 26 Gurkha Inf Bde reinforced South Johore for frame- work operations. ** From MELF. See Army World-Wide Order of Battle as at 3 July 1950, Appendix B to DO(50)50, Situation in Korea: Note by Chiefs of Staff, 5 July 50, CAB 131/9; Far East Land Forces order of battle in Smith, Counter-Insurgency Operations, p. 12; and confirmatory passages on various units in the Malaya chapters of Blaxland. 6. GSO I (Tng) GHQ, FARELF, ‘Training Organisation and Facilities in FARELF’, para. 25, enclosure one to Colonel Robert H York, ARMLO Singapore, Report R-92-53, ‘Training, Organization and Facilities in Malaya and Singapore’, 8 May 53, Intelligence Document 1174136, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, RG 319, NARA (author’s FOIA request of 31 July 1993). 7. Briggs, Report on the Emergency, Appendix ‘A’, p. 46, para. 17. 8. DO(50)45, paras 48, 52, and 57.A.I(a). 9. Blaxland, p. 210. 10. Cmd. 8026, Increase in the Length of Full-Time National Service with the Armed Forces (1950); Cmd. 8161, Memorandum of the Secretary of State for War Relating to the Army Estimates 1951–52 (1951); Farrar-Hockley, Distant Obligation, p. 115; Blaxland, p. 211. 11. UK HC in New Zealand to CRO, No. 526, 19 Aug. 50, FO 371/84477 FZ1016/32. COS(50)335, 29 Aug. 50, DEFE 5/23. These volunteers went to Malaya as ‘C’ Squadron, 22 SAS. 12. CO brief on Use of colonial manpower in the cold war, Jan. 1951, CO 537/5324, No. 27. For more background detail, see Colonial manpower in the cold war, 1–15 Aug. 1950, CO 537/5324. 288 Notes

13. JP(50)170(Final), 29 Dec. 50, DEFE 6/15, paras 10 & 14(c). 14. JP(50)170(Final), para. 11. The WO anticipated a shortage of 350 majors and captains by January 1952. See COS(51)188(5), 19 Nov. 51, DEFE 4/49. 15. JP(50)170(Final), paras 12–13, 14(d). 16. Ibid., para. 10. 17. Ibid. and SEACOS 128, 22 Nov. 50, DEFE 11/42. 18. JP(50)170(Final). 19. COS(51)14(2), 18 Jan. 1951, DEFE 4/39. 20. COS(51)26(3), 7 Feb. 1951, DEFE 4/40. As Commander of 14th Army in Burma, Slim had had two African divisions under his command. His more positive evaluation of them was based on his experience in the Indian Army and of the multinational complexion of his army command. See Slim, Defeat Into Victory, pp. 165–6, 353. 21. Reference to DO(51)59, Mar. 51, in DO(51)13(1), 28 May 51, CAB 131/10; SSC to Colonial Governors in Africa, 94004/14/51, 19 Mar. 51, DEFE 11/44. 22. FM Sir William Slim, Malaya: points arising from a discussion between CIGS and General Harding, 8 Mar. 51, WO 216/619. 23. SSC to Colonial Governors in Africa, 94004/14/51, 27 Apr. 51, DEFE 11/44. Uganda was a possibility for another battalion. See Gov Uganda to SSC, No. 106, 22 Mar. 51, DEFE 11/44. MacDonald had some initial trepidation about political implications involved with deploying the Fijians, but he changed his mind after speaking with Harding and Gurney. See MacDonald to SSC, no. 191, 1 Sept. 50, MJM 19/7/31. 24. The First Sea Lord had asked for the redeployment in part to permit the Royal Marines to resume training for their amphibious warfare role, some- thing they were unable to do while on active service in Malaya. See COS(51)228, 17 Apr. 51, DEFE 5/30; COS(51)74(3), 1 May 51, DEFE 4/42. 25. COS(51)582, 11 Oct. 51, DEFE 5/33; COS(51)168(5), 22 Oct. 51, DEFE 4/48. Specifically, Operation WARBLER, which is discussed in Coates, p. 151. 26. The Military Implications of the Situation in Malaya, 19 Nov. 51, WO 216/450, para. 6. 27. Ibid., paras 7–10. These were charged words, as they reflected the priorities of the Global Strategy paper. 28. Haron, p. 235. 29. SEACOS 128, 22 Nov. 50, DEFE 11/42. 30. On the prices boom, see Stubbs, op. cit. The shortages were noted in JP(50)170(Final), 29 Dec. 50, op. cit., para. 17(b)(ii) and in Slim’s notes on points arising from his discussion with Harding, op. cit. 31. Briggs, Report, Appendix F, ‘Combined Appreciation of the Emergency Situation, 4th June 1951’, p. 67; C(51)26, 20 Nov. 51, CAB 129/48, Annex I, Conclusions of the BDCC(FE). The WO was asked to consider the use of offi- cers who had served in the Indian Army as one possible source of candidates. But facing an overall shortage of some 350 infantry majors and captains in 1952, the WO could not agree to any further expansion of the Malay Regiment that required more British officers. COS(51)188(5), 19 Nov. 51, DEFE 4/49. 32. Viscount Chandos, The Memoirs of Lord Chandos (London: The Bodley Head, 1962), p. 366. 33. Ibid., p. 379; C(52)16, 28 Jan. 52, CAB 129/9, paras 9–10. Also see the chap- ter on the Malay Regiment in Lunt, especially p. 384. Of those British Notes 289

officers then serving with the Malay Regiment, only 28 per cent were vol- unteers, the rest being compulsorily posted from British battalions. ‘Inevitably, the officers compulsorily posted were not of the right quality’. See D(52)6(2), 22 May 52, CAB 131/12. 34. D(52)22,16 May 52, CAB 131/12, Appendix A, paras 2–3. 35. Ibid., paras 4–5. As Lunt notes, there were no less than 214 British officers on secondment to the Federation Army in 1966, of which 28 were colonels and -colonels, 90 majors, 88 captains, and 16 subalterns (p. 385). D(52)6(2), op. cit. 36. Unfortunately, Haron’s work ‘The Malay Regiment’ not only avoids any discussion of the shortage of British officers but also tends instead to dwell on the flood of British Indian Army officer applications to the Malay Regiment that came about the time of Indian independence in 1947 (see, for example, pp. 288–90). Lunt alludes to an improvement in the officer shortage (p. 384), but gives no numbers. Cloake recounts Templer’s involvement in getting Lyttelton’s assistance on the matter, but merely states that he ‘got what he wanted’ in the way of more officers (see p. 246). For some colorful commentary on getting FARELF staff officers to serve with the Malays, see Scott to Keightley 13 Jun 52, Keightley Papers, Miscellaneous Personal Papers file. 37. Haron, p. 217. The author identifies Dempsey by position only; Dempsey replaced Slim as C-in-C ALFSEA on 8 Dec. 45 and departed on 19 Apr. 46. 38. During the period of the abortive Malayan Union, the Defence Committee had approved a plan for a Malay division. See Haron, pp. 223–5, 227–9. 39. COS(50)132, 19 Apr. 50, 11 Apr. 50, DEFE 5/20. 40. FM Sir William Slim, Notes of Talk with Gen. Keightley, 30/10/51, 30 Oct. 51, WO 216/439. 41. Ibid.; COS(51)174(5), 31 Oct. 51, DEFE 4/48; Short, p. 252. 42. At least 6000 went to Singapore, and several thousand more to China. See Short, p. 302. 43. Cloake, p. 246. 44. Short, p. 339; the quotas called for 40 per cent Malaya, 40 per cent Chinese, and 20 per cent Indians and other ethnic groups. See anon., ‘The Federation Army of Malaya’, p. 38. 45. Haron, pp. 235–6. Percentages do not equal 100 per cent because of rounding. 46. COS(52)168(2), 9 Dec. 52, DEFE 4/58; SEACOS 311, 10 Mar. 53, FO 371/106999 FZ1145/6/G.; Cloake, pp. 246–7; anon. ‘The Federation Army’, p. 38. 47. The division, with its headquarters at Taiping, was responsible for North Malaya. See Cloake, p. 244, and anon., ‘The Federation Army’, p. 38. 48. Adapted from Sunderland, Army Operations, Fig. 2, p. 32. 49. COS(52)406, 31 July 52, DEFE 5/40; COSSEA 883, 1 Aug. 52, DEFE 11/49. 50. SEACOS 883, 23 Aug. 52, DEFE 11/49. 51. COS(52)168(2), op. cit. 52. COS(53)126(1), 10 Nov. 53, DEFE 4/66. 53. COS(54)205 [(BDCC(FE)(54)4], 23 June 54, DEFE 5/53. The problem was first specifically addressed by the JPS in July 1952. See COS(52)404, 31 July 52, DEFE 5/40. 54. COS(54)205, op. cit. 290 Notes

55. Discussed in Chapter 10. 56. Minute from Lloyd to Dening, 2 Aug. 50, FO 371 FT 10310/14, doc. no. 32, in Yasamee. 57. Record of Conversation with the Foreign Office, 11 March 1950, in FRUS 1950, Vol. VI, p. 50. As the hereditary prime minister, the Maharajah the de facto head of the Nepalese government; the King was little more than a bird in a gilded cage. 58. Ibid., p. 50. 59. Tuker, Gorkha, pp. 245–8; Leo Rose, Nepal: Strategy for Survival (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 189–90. Rose asserts that New Delhi’s support of the NNC was predicated on its use of non-violent means for reforming the Nepalese government, and that it was embarrassed by subsequent events. The NNC and the Nepal Democratic Congress (NDC) joined forces in March 1950, whereafter the combined parties took the name ‘National Congress.’ For the sake of continuity and to avoid confu- sion with the Congress Party of India, I refer to the combined party as NNC. 60. The suspicions were fueled by an abusive, anonymous note to the Maharajah written on official Brigade of Gurkha stationery and posted from Malaya, although it was believed the letter was written in India. See Katmandu to FO, No. 88, 11 Aug. 50, 11 Aug. 50, FO 371/84281 FN 1201/32; Falconer to Harding, letter, ref 2261/15/50, 15 Aug. 50, FO 371/84282 FN 1201/38. 61. Harding to USSW, CR/FARELF/5950/SD2, 23 Oct. 50, WO 32/14623. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid. 64. Hull to Scott, ref 0164/6709(SD 2), 9 Nov. 50, FO 371/84282 FN 1201/43. 65. Girilal Jain, India Meets China in Nepal (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1959), pp. 20–1; Tuker, Gorkha, pp. 260–1; Foreign Office, ‘Gurkha Troops’, 22 Nov. 50, FO 371/84282 FN 1201/50. Although the Maharajah remained as Prime Minister and his brother as CinC and Defense Minister, the Ranas’ rule was effectively over. In April the King abolished the hereditary pre- miereship, and assumed most of the Maharajah’s powers; in June he ousted the Defense Minister. Tuker, Gorkha, pp. 262–3. 66. Paragraph 8, Annexure III, Tripartite Agreement of December 1947. 67. Falconer to Harding, No. 152, 15 Nov. 50, FO 371/84282 FN 1201/45. 68. FARELF to CG SEA, 3071 AG, 20 Nov. 50, FO 371/84282 FN 1201/50. 69. DSD to CoS FARELF, 47135 SD 2b, 1 Jan. 51, WO 32/14623.; Singapore to FO, No. 1057, 31 Dec. 50, WO 32/14623. There is a tantalizing passage in MacDonald’s telegram which indicates some sort of British covert (diplo- matic?) action to assist the Maharajah during the invasion: ‘… whether the Maharajah knows it or not, he does owe us something for having extricated him from the predicament in which he found himself a month or so ago’. 70. FO to Singapore, No. 592, 11 Oct. 51, DEFE 7/1922. In October 1951, the King dismissed the government and with it the Maharajah Prime Minister, Mohan Shamsher. He subsequently formed a new 12-member Cabinet, eight of whom were from the NNC, including the new Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, M. P. Koirala. Despite this increase in the Congress Party’s grip on the government, the King, ‘strangely enough’, also appointed the Maharajah’s brother and son to the Cabinet (Tuker, Gorkha, p. 264). Notes 291

71. See Cross, In Gurkha Company, pp. 44–5, wherein the author recounts three personal experiences of Communist-directed actions which he contends was part of an effort to ‘draw off Gurkha soldiers from [Malaya] and to dis- credit them as well’ (p. 44). It is not known whether the NNC had any role in this mischief or not, but it was implicated in attempts by the ‘All Burma Nepali Association’ to prevent British recruitment of Gurkhas discharged from the Burma Rifles (they refused to accept Burmese nationality). See Rangoon to FO, no. 97, 23 Dec. 50, FO 371/84282 FN 1201/54. 72. Proud to Perowne, ref 2266/17, 15 June 52, FO 371/101148 FN 1017/1(C); Proud to Perowne, ref 2266/23, 2 Oct. 52, FO 371/101148 FN 1017/1(F). 73. COS(52)653, 2 Dec. 52, DEFE 5/43, para. 1. 74. British Indian Army recruiting traditionally was conducted at the Indian border cantonment of Gorakhpore, volunteers either coming of their own accord or shepherded by Gurkha pensioners. See Smith, Johnny Gurkha, pp. 26–7. For more detail on Gurkha recruiting, see Chapter 3 of Smith’s Friends and Cross, In Gurkha Company, pp. 136–44. In the 1948–54 period, Headquarters, British Gurkhas in India, temporarily maintained recruiting and processing facilities in Gorakhpore and Ghum, which it later shifted to depots at Lehra and Jalapahar on the Indian side of the Nepal border. As per agreement with India, HQ BGI kept a transit facility at Barrackpore, outside Calcutta, until air trooping between Nepal and Malaya was introduced in the late 1950s. See Annexure I to the Tripartite Agreement, para. 3, op. cit.; Annex to D(54)24, 28 May 54, CAB 131/14, paras 8–11, 14; and Colonel R. G. Leonard, Nepal and the Gurkhas (London: HMSO, 1965), p. 135. 75. COS(52)495, 8 Sept. 52, DEFE 5/41. 76. See COS(52)495, and comments of Tahourdin (FO) and Higham (CO) in COS(52)132(3), 18 Sept. 52, DEFE 4/56. On the Malayan army, see anon., ‘The Federation Army of Malaya’. 77. COS(52)132(3). 78. Ibid. 79. Ibid. As the minute reads, Brownjohn’s suggestion appears as a bit of revela- tion to the others, who appear not to have even considered this option! 80. UK HC in India (Acting) to CRO, No. 1168, 22 Sept. 52, DEFE 7/1922. 81. For an example dealing with Gurkha successes in killing Communist guer- rillas in Malaya, see MacDonald to SSFA, info New Delhi saving HC FOM, No. 533, 22 Sept. 52, MJM 19/7/41. and Proud to Perowne, ref 2266/23, 2 Oct. 52, FO 371/101148 FN 1017/1(F). 82. CRO to UK HC in India, No. 1754, 24 Oct. 52, DEFE 7/1922. 83. UK HC in India to CRO, No. 1386, 12 Nov. 52, DEFE 7/1922. At this time there were approximately 20 Gurkha battalions in the Indian Army. 84. Ibid. 85. Recruitment of Gurkhas to the British Army, MO2/coll/15, 1 Dec. 52, WO 216/252, para. 3. 86. COS(52)653, para. 4. 87. Ibid., para. 7. This memorandum is the same as the 1 Dec. 52 paper in WO 216/252, op. cit. Seven years covered a Gurkha’s first four-year enlistment and first re-enlistment of three years. British Gurkhas became eligible for a pension after 15 years’ service, and this was the preferred term for any agreement, although the War Office realized this was politically improbable to achieve. 292 Notes

88. COS(52)164(3), 2 Dec. 52, DEFE 4/58. 89. COS(52)653, para. 9. 90. Ibid., para. 10. 91. Ibid., para. 11. 92. COS(52)164(3). 93. CRO to UK HC in India, No. 2126, 23 Dec. 52, DEFE 7/1922. 94. Ibid. 95. Harding to Symon, CRO Ref CIGS/BM/45/5960/5, 11 Dec. 52, WO 216/652. 96. UK HC in India to CRO, No. 18, 8 Jan. 53, DEFE 7/1922. 97. Ibid. 98. CRO to UK HC in India, No. 681, 4 May 53, DEFE 7/1922. 99. In August 1952, the King once again dissolved the government and appointed the old Maharajah’s brother, Kaiser Shamsher, as his principal adviser (Tuker, Gorkha, pp. 265–6). In June of 1953, M. P. Koirala was recalled as Prime Minister (Tuker, p. 266), but it should be noted that the Brigade of Gurkhas liaison in Katmandu had previously reported that ‘the Koirala brothers and other influential ministers seem to be convinced of the usefulness of our Gurkha Brigade to Nepal; we have heard not a word against us or our recruitment from the hills; and there is nothing that one can see yet which will affect the Gurkhas willingness to serve with us, nor the necessity for him to earn his living by military service abroad’. See Proud to Perowne, ref 2266/15, 3 May 52, 3 May 52, FO 371/101148 FN 1017/1(B). 100. See Annex to D(54)24, op. cit., para. 11. 101. Besides 1 Fiji and 1 and 3 KAR, the other units were: 2 KAR; 1 N. Rhodesia Reg; 1 Rhodesian African Rifles; 1, 2, & 3 RAR; and 1 & 2 NZ Regt. See John Scurr, The Malayan Campaign 1948–60, (London: Osprey, 1982), p. 5. A squadron of the New Zealand SAS replaced the Rhodesian SAS squadron in 1955. See W. D. Baker, Dare to Win: the Story of the New Zealand Special Air Service (Nashville: Battery Press, 1987), pp. 57–67.

9 Siam and the Commonwealth Defense of Malaya

1. Section on Siam in JP(48)3(O)(Preliminary Draft), 15 Jan. 48, IOLR L/WS/ 1/1075. 2. The two countries signed a border agreement in 1949 which permitted armed police to conduct hot pursuit of insurgents into each others’ territory given certain restrictions. The agreement was bolstered in August 1952 by the establishment of a joint Siamese–Malay ‘Frontier Intelligence Bureau’ at , a joint Special Branch team at Songkhla in Siam, and a series of joint Police Field Force operations which by 1954 effectively eliminated Siam as an assured sanctuary for the MRLA. See Short, pp. 374–5. 3. R. Sean Randolph, The United States and Thailand: Alliance Dynamics, 1950–1985 (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1986), p. 10. 4. COS(49)81(1). The CIC(FE) communicated their support for a mission to the Chiefs in SEACOS 880. See COS(49)39(12), 9 Mar. 49, DEFE 4/20. Notes 293

5. This was actually the term used by Bevin in a memorandum to Acheson. See FRUS 1949, Vol. VII, Part 2, p. 1135. 6. COS(49)81(1). Military relations with the Siamese were good, especially after implementation of a liaison arrangement to control insurgent activi- ties on the Siam–Malay border. See JP(48)101(Final Revise), para. 18. 7. COS(49)124(2), 26 Aug. 49, DEFE 4/23. 8. JP(51)77(Final), 25 Apr. 51, DEFE 6/17; COS(51)261, 27 Apr. 51, DEFE 5/31. 9. COS(50)353, 12 Sept. 50, DEFE 5/24, paras 6–7, 13–14; Randolph, pp. 10–13. 10. COS(49)175(5), 23 Nov. 49, DEFE 4/26. 11. Siam (Thailand) received $10 million of the MDAP’s $75 million allotted in early 1950 to assist states confronted by Communist China. For a good con- temporary précis of Thailand’s shift to US assistance, see FRUS 1950, Vol. VI, pp. 1529–39. 12. Ibid., esp. p. 1530. 13. Randolph, pp. 14–15, 20. The US also helped secure for Thailand the first ever World Bank loan to a Southeast Asian nation amounting to $25.4 mil- lion. The economic and military aid was tied to an Economic and Technical Cooperation agreement in September 1950 and a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement in October 1950. The US established a Military Advisory Assistance Group in Bangkok to supervise the distribution of equipment and assist in the training of the Thai armed forces. 14. COS(51)261, para. 12. 15. COS(50)89 [BDCC(FE)(50)1/1], 26 Apr. 50, DEFE 11/35. 16. COS(50)307 [BDCC(FE)(50)4(P)], 19 Aug. 50, DEFE 5/23, paras 3 and 4. 17. Ibid., para. 4. 18. Ibid., paras 5–8, Annex para. 9. The available forces were the ‘Gurkha Division plus one independent Gurkha infantry brigade and the Malay Regiment. These formations will be considerably short of their full comple- ment of supporting arms until the units required to make them up to estab- lishment arrive from the United Kingdom.’ 19. Ibid., Annex, Part 1, para. 27. 20. Ibid., paras 10 and 11. 21. COS(50)353, 12 Sept. 50, DEFE 5/24, paras 9–10. 22. Ibid., para. 23. 23. Ibid., para. 12. For a description of the earlier plan, see Hack in Aldrich, British Intelligence, pp. 309–10, which is based in part on Chit Chung Ong’s ‘“Operation Matador” and the Outbreak of War in the Far East’, Ph D thesis, London School of Economics, 1985. 24. COS(50)353, paras 13 and 17. 25. Ibid., paras 8, 18 and 25(a). 26. Ibid., paras 20–1. The Commissioner-General’s office also suggested offering to conduct a general-purpose aerial photographic survey of Siam that would be of help both to Bangkok and to the making of maps and target folders for the British. 27. COS(50)376, 23 Sept. 50, DEFE 5/24. It emerged from the discussions that Pibul was more concerned about the northwestern frontier with Burma than he was about any potential threat from Indochina. He was supportive of the idea of a ‘Pacific Pact’, but he was strongly opposed to the inclusion of the French in any such organization. 294 Notes

28. SEACOS 101, 15 Sept. 50, DEFE 11/38. 29. COS(50)171(2), 18 Oct. 50, DEFE 4/37. Even if implemented on time, Operation MATADOR would have failed because Japanese air and naval supremacy in the region allowed them to use amphibious assaults to out- flank established defense positions. The air and naval threat from Communist China and Russia was expected to be minimal and well within the ability of the local forces to counter it. Murfett, In Jeopardy, p. 122. 30. COS(50)100, 28 Mar. 50, DEFE 5/20, paras 74 and 75, and Appendix G1. The land forces portion of the appendix indicates that one division (pre- sumably 40 Inf Div in Hong Kong) and 3 Commando Brigade (in Malaya) were to move to the Middle East by Dϩ3 months, a clear indication that in global war Hong Kong was to be abandoned. 31. Interestingly, the distribution of GALLOPER to the CIC(FE) was not authorized. 32. JP(50)114(Final Revise), 19 Oct. 50, DEFE 6/14. 33. Ibid. 34. COS(50)426, 1 Nov. 50, DEFE 5/25, paras 3 and 6. 35. Ibid. In a prescient comment, the Chiefs admitted that ‘Malaya would assume increased importance in global strategy if her loss was likely to lead to a considerable threat to the Australian and New Zealand Homelands. In this event there could be little contribution of Australian and New Zealand forces outside the ANZAM theatre.’ Annex paras 6, 19 and Appendix B, para. 2. 36. Ibid., Annex para. 13. 37. COS(50)447, 31 Oct. 50, DEFE 5/25. 38. COSSEA 795, 22 Dec. 50, DEFE 11/42, para. 4. 39. COS(50)512, 7 Dec. 50, DEFE 5/26. The main concern was that Australia and New Zealand might shift their defense priorities from the Middle East to Malaya and Southeast Asia. In fact, the Chiefs were upset by the fact that Menzies insisted a delegation of Australian planners on their way to London first stop in Singapore. The Chiefs directed the CIC(FE) to ensure that the ‘Australian Planners did not become involved in any operational planning [while] in Malaya.’ See COS(51)1(8), 2 Jan. 51, DEFE 4/39, and COS(51)2(6), Defence of Malaya, 3 Jan. 51, DEFE 4/39. 40. This name first appears in SEACOS 143, 21 Dec. 50, DEFE 11/42. The code name of the plan to occupy it was the aptly chosen IRONY, the first refer- ence to which I have found is in JP(50)179(Final), 5 Dec. 50, DEFE 6/15. 41. SEACOS 143. 42. SEACOS 142, 18 Dec. 50, DEFE 11/42, para. 4. 43. Ibid., para. 5. 44. Ibid., para. 9. 45. Ibid., para. 18. 46. Singapore to FO, No. 20, 5 Jan. 51, DEFE 11/43, para. 4. 47. Ibid., para. 6. 48. MacDonald must have been aware of a JIC(FE) estimate which detailed a new threat from the Chinese Communist Air Force on the order of 100 fighter/ground attack and light bombers operating from Siam, possibly leav- ened with Russian ‘volunteers’ flying jet fighters. In global war the GALLOPER plan would leave only 16 fighter aircraft in the Far East. See SEACOS 162, 12 Jan. 51, DEFE 11/43. 49. Ibid., para. 11. Notes 295

50. Yasamee, note 2, pp. 295–6. 51. Ibid. See also COSSEA 816, 12 Feb. 51, DEFE 11/43, para. 4. 52. GALLOPER was later renamed BINNACLE. At the time of research, its successor plan, CINDERELLA, was only available in fragments which did not reveal the full scope of planning for the Far East. Nevertheless, a clear reference to the fact that CINDERELLA did not call for the withdrawal of land forces is to be found in COS(52)72, 29 Jan. 52, DEFE 5/36. The next plan, SYCAMORE, stated that land forces should remain in Malaya in the early stages of global war. Nevertheless, the British thought if a global war was imminent, the possibil- ity of transferring land forces from Malaya to the Middle East might have to be reconsidered, bearing in mind the risk to internal security in Malaya. See COS(52)324, 24 June 52, DEFE 5/40, para. 54. 53. CIC(FE)(51)1/1(P), 12 Jan. 51, DEFE 11/43, para. 4. All planning documents were to be marked TOP SECRET and caveated with the special code word BIGOT (para. 36). 54. Ibid., paras 5, 6 and 25. 55. This would require careful balancing of forces, as there was also a requirement to organise civil government of the occupied area. Ibid., paras 27 and 30(d). 56. COS(51)23(4), 2 Feb. 51, DEFE 4/39. 57. COS(51)412 [BDCC(FE)(51)3], 12 July 51, DEFE 5/32, Annex paras 2 and 10. 58. Ibid., Annex paras. 13(b) and 20(b). Enactment of GALLOPER would leave FARELF only 18 infantry battalions. 59. Ibid., para. 2(e). There would also be grave deficiencies in air forces and anti-aircraft defenses, although Commonwealth naval forces would be able ‘to establish [only] local maritime superiority for specific operations’ (paras. 2(a), 2(j)–2(p)). 60. Ibid., Annex para. 28. 61. Ibid., paras 3(a)–(d) (emphasis added). Since there was no way Singapore could conduct a defense without reinforcements, there was obviously little point in planning a defense that would surely fail. Still, this last supposition was likely intended to give added weight to calls for more resources. 62. JP(51)120(Final), 13 Sept. 51, DEFE 6/17. 63. Ibid. This was somewhat of a distortion and in terms of the June 1951 BDCC(FE) report, decidedly misleading. 64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. However, Australia could be subjected to ‘sporadic’ submarine and air attacks. 66. This was Plan CINDERELLA. See COS(52)72, 29 Jan. 52, DEFE 5/36, Annex paras 5–8. 67. Ibid., Annex para. 9. In fact, based upon a new ‘northern tier’ defense con- cept, Britain had greatly diminished its own intended wartime role in the Middle East. See Chapter 10 in Cohen, Fighting World War Three. 68. JP(52)32(Final), 7 Mar. 52, DEFE 4/52, paras 10, 11 and 20. Neither did they think the US likely to provide forces for Siam. 69. Ibid., para. 22. 70. COS(52)38(1) [JP(52)32(Final)], 11 Mar. 52, DEFE 4/52. 71. Ibid. 72. D(52)2(1), 19 Mar. 52, CAB 131/12. The committee discussed D(52)5, 14 Mar. 52, CAB 131/12, a revised draft of JP(52)32(Final). 296 Notes

73. Ibid. This interpretation is confirmed by COS(52)188, 29 Mar. 52, DEFE 5/38. 74. COS(52)224, 22 Apr. 52, DEFE 5/38. 75. Ibid. 76. The report was originally commissioned in February. See JP(52)28(O)T of R, 19 Feb. 52, CAB 21/3449. The actual report was found attached to COS(52)77(3) [JP(52)28(Final)], 5 June 52, DEFE 4/54. See JPS Annex paras 22–3. 77. Ibid., JPS Annex paras 24–6. 78. As approved in COS(52)77(3); the COS report is at COS(52)303, 10 June 52, DEFE 5/39. 79. COS(52)404, 31 July 52, DEFE 5/40. 80. COS(52)109(8), 29 July 52, DEFE 4/55. 81. COS(53)15, 12 Jan. 53, DEFE 5/44. Templer’s visit was completely fortuitous and had been hastily arranged when the aircraft carrying him from London to Singapore developed engine trouble and stopped in Bangkok for 12 hours. See Cloake, p. 299. 82. See, for example, Bennett to Scott, Ref 1215/61/52G, 30 July 52, FO 371/101184 FS1195/10/G; COS(52)168(2), 9 Dec. 52, DEFE 4/58; COS(52)713, 24 Dec. 52, DEFE 5/43. 83. COS(53)47, 23 Jan. 53, DEFE 5/44; COS(53)9(5), 20 Jan. 53, DEFE 4/59. 84. COS(52)713. Actually, the letter discussed the necessity of the Cabinet tak- ing rapid action in either IRONY (which required four months’ preparation) or RINGLET conditions. 85. COS(53)47, Annex paras 19 and 21. 86. Ibid., Annex paras 22–3. 87. COS(53)99, 17 Feb. 53, DEFE 5/44. Apparently a version of the report con- sidered by the DC. 88. D(53)2(3), 11 Feb. 53, CAB 131/13. Churchill changed his mind on the issue in May. See FO, Defence of Malaya – occupation of the Songkhla Position – revelation to the US, 22 Apr. and 1 May 53, FO 371/106999 FZ1195/10 and 12/G. As discussed below, the British did not reveal the plan to the Americans until the summer of 1954. 89. Ibid. 90. Ibid. 91. Ibid. This was COS(53)99, approved at COS(53)9(5), 20 Jan. 53, DEFE 4/59. 92. D(53)7(4b), 29 Apr. 53, CAB 131/13; Gilbert, p. 821. 93. D(53)7(4b). 94. JP(53)79(Final), 12 May 53, DEFE 6/24, Annex para. 4. This was one brigade less than called for by the unmodified RINGLET. 95. Ibid., Annex para. 7. 96. JP(53)101(Final), 23 July 53, DEFE 4/64. 97. COS(53)380, 6 Aug. 53, DEFE 5/48, para. 11. It is not clear if the Australian and New Zealand planners had been briefed on the plans, but the British representative, Maj.-Gen. Sixsmith, almost certainly did know of them. 98. JP(53)124(Final), 3 Dec. 53, DEFE 6/24, Annex I, para. 14 99. The reason for the extra division was to protect the lines of communica- tion, with which the JPS concurred. The Staff planners assumed all ground forces would come from the Commonwealth, as would naval forces for the west coast and a large number of the required air forces. Ibid., Annex I paras 14, 15, and 18. Notes 297

100. COS(53)616 [BDCC(FE)(53)5], 21 Dec. 53, DEFE 5/50. 101. COS(54)21, 19 Jan. 54, DEFE 5/51. 102. COS(54)34(3), 26 Mar. 54, as noted in COS(54)97 [JP(54)18(Revised Final)], 30 Mar. 54, DEFE 5/52. 103. JP(54)18(Revised Final), para. 2. 104. Ibid., para. 2. 105. Ibid., para. 3. 106. Ibid., paras 9 and 10. 107. Ibid., para. 9. Presumably, the British would have to reinforce internal security units in Malaya. 108. Ibid., para. 21 and COS(54)10(5), op. cit. 109. JP(54)18(Revised Final), para. 22. 110. COS(54)10(5), 26 Jan. 54, DEFE 4/68. 111. Ibid. 112. Ibid. 113. COS(54)36(3), 31 Mar. 54, DEFE 4/69. 114. Malcolm MacDonald, ‘The Situation in Indo-China’, 31 Mar. 54, FO 371/112050 DF1071/155, para. 16. 115. JP(54)45(Final), 7 May 54, DEFE 6/25. 116. Select Siamese police and army officers had for years attended courses at the FARELF Training Centre (FTC). See FTC, Quarterly Historical Report, FARELF Training Centre, Quarter Ending March 1949, 26 May 49, WO 268/116 as one example. 117. Templer managed to clear up some lingering, but minor, problems with the Siam–Malaya Police Agreement. See Bangkok to SEA Dept. FO (Ref: 1032/84/54), 15 May 54, and Cloake, Templer, pp. 322–3, which describes Phao’s somewhat salacious hospitality. 118. General Sir , Memoirs, Vol. 2 (Toronto: Privately Published, 1986), p. 513. The trip report can be found as an annex to ch. 53, pp. 520–3. 119. Bangkok to FO, No. 154, 13 May 1954, DEFE 11/114. See also Bangkok to FO, No. 155, 13 May 54, DEFE 11/114. Indeed, the US Ambassador had done so, but getting JCS approval was extremely difficult, as Adm. Radford opposed such bases because they dissipated forces which he thought should be directed solely against what he saw as the source of aggression in Southeast Asia: China. See the Editorial Note on a conversa- tion between Dulles and Robert Cutler, in FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, pp. 485 and 523. Eisenhower was more favorably inclined to the plan because he thought ‘we should not lose any asset [Thailand] we don’t have to lose’. 120. CinC FARELF to CIGS, op. cit. 121. COS(54)57(1), 18 May 54, DEFE 4/70. 122. Ibid. 123. SEACOS 393, 20 May 54, DEFE 11/114, paras 2(a) and 2(b). 124. Ibid., paras 2(d) and 2(e). 125. See the Annex to Special Report to the NSC (Tab 2), 15 July 54, and Document 433 (Editorial Note) in FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 2, pp. 735–6. 126. COS(54)205, 23 June 54, DEFE 5/53, para. 6; COS(54)295, 7 Sept. 54, DEFE 5/54, Annex paras 1–2. 127. Ibid., Annex para. 2. 298 Notes

128. Ibid., Annex para. 2. 129. Ibid., Annex para. 2. 130. Ibid., Annex para. 4. 131. COS(54)294, 7 Sept. 54, DEFE 5/54, Appendix A, para. 4. 132. COS(54)332, 26 Oct. 54, DEFE 5/55, para. 8. 133. Ibid., paras 6 & 21(a) and comments of the Joint Administrative Planning Staff. The shortages were first noted in COS(54)295, op. cit. 134. COS(53)500, 7 Oct. 53, DEFE 5/49, para. 5. 135. Alexander to Menzies, 29 June 53, DEFE 13/58. Alexander had first discussed the matter with Menzies at the June Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference in London. See O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War, Vol. 1, p. 345. 136. David Lee, ‘The National Security Planning and Defence Preparations of the Menzies Government, 1950–1953’, War & Society, 10:2 (1992), pp. 129–30. This had become apparent when members of the JPS conferred with the Australian and New Zealand planners from 24 August to 3 September. See COS(53)439, 9 Sept. 53, DEFE 5/48. 137. COS(53)105(3), 15 Sept. 53, DEFE 4/65. 138. Ibid. 139. COS(52)158(3). 140. COS(53)439, op. cit. 141. David Lee, ‘Australia and Allied Strategy in the Far East, 1952–1957’, JSS, 16:4 (1993), p. 515. 142. COS(53)501, 8 Oct. 53, DEFE 5/49, para. 7. 143. Ibid. Oddly enough, however, they still wished for New Zealand to plan only a Middle East deployment (para. 20). 144. COS(53)130(4), 17 Nov. 53, DEFE 4/66. 145. Edwards, Crises and Commitments, p. 163. 146. COS(54)109(1), 20 Oct. 54, DEFE 4/73. 147. Edwards, Crises and Commitments, pp. 167–8; on the change in the New Zealand effort, see COS(54)109(2), 20 Oct. 54, DEFE 4/73. On the Australian plans to send a corps in global war and of lesser forces in a Cold War contingency, see COS(54)393, 22 Dec. 54, DEFE 5/55, Annex I. As Loewen told the Australians, no reinforcements would be forthcoming from the UK in the event of global war, but up to a division might be flown in to marry up with stockpiled equipment if the defense of Malaya was ini- tiated in cold war circumstances (Annex I, paras 13–14). On the ANZAM Planners discussions, see the series of planning studies in DEFE 11/55. 148. This was the first overseas deployment of Australian ground troops in peacetime, but as mentioned in earlier chapters, Australia had committed RAAF units to Malaya and the Middle East. See Ian McNeill, To Long Tan: the Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950–1966 (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin/AWM, 1993), pp. 6–7; Eaton, pp. 159–67. 149. COS(54)393, 22 Dec. 54, DEFE 5/55, Annex I, para. 13. The local units to be raised were those of the Federation Army and possibly additional volun- teer units from Singapore. 150. Ibid., Annex I, para. 14. Probably a reference to 3 Inf Div, the main part of the UK strategic reserve and recently released from internal security duties in the Middle East. Notes 299

151. Ibid., Annex I, para. 15. 152. Ibid., Annex I, paras 17–18 and 26(b)(ii). At this time Australia’s regular army had only 24 000 men, which although more than double the num- ber it had in 1948, obviously constrained whatever contribution it could make in peacetime. In 1954 the Australian Army also had 83 000 men in the reserves, the source for the three division corps. See Millar, Appendix B. 153. Ibid., Annex I, para. 21. Probably an outgrowth of the Five Power talks, SEATO, and US–UK politico-military talks – see Chapter 9. 154. Ibid., Annex I, paras 22 and 28. New Zealand was to send one division to Malaya in hot war, and approximately a brigade group in Cold War circumstances. 155. ANZAM Planners Study No. 3, Part I, Dec. 54, DEFE 11/55, Appendix para. 14(b)(i), and Annexure II, para. 28. 156. Contrary to Rowell’s earlier assurances to Loewen. 157. ANZAM Planners Study No. 1, Dec. 54, DEFE 11/55, para. 17. 158. Ibid., para. 21. 159. As discussed in Chapter 6, the British became amenable to this reallocation following developments in the Egyptian base negotiations, the develop- ment of the hydrogen bomb, and the promise of the Baghdad Pact. See Devereux, pp. 92–6, 191–3. 160. Buskell to Laxton, Cabinet Office, ref.: FE/TS.51/5/Plans, 24 Mar. 53, CAB 21/3449. 161. Interviews with Major Geoffrey Hodgson, Brigadier Paul Crook, Colonel H. B. H. Waring; correspondence with Brigadier A. C. Heywood and Colonel Kensey Comerford-Green. 162. Interview with, and letter to the author from, David F. Bayly, Chief Scientific Adviser to C-in-C FARELF. The experiment involved trying to burn all the foilage on an island. The tropical conditions prevented it from being fully successful, and the idea was eventually abandoned. 163. Hillis to Twiss, ref COS 362/19/2/52, 22 Feb. 52, DEFE 11/47; BDCC(FE)(52)5, 11 Feb. 52, DEFE 11/47. 164. See, for example: COS(51)252, 26 Apr. 51, DEFE 5/31; COS(51)381, 20 June 51, DEFE 5/32; COS(52)8 [Ref BDCC(FE)(51)8], 2 Jan. 52, DEFE 5/36; COS(53)551, 29 Oct. 53 (Ref 109/2/C), 6 Nov. 53, DEFE 5/49. 165. Among others, discussed in, SEACOS 101, 15 Sept. 50, DEFE 11/38; COS(53)437, 7 Sept. 53, DEFE 5/48.

10 Limited Liability and the Defense of Southeast Asia 1950–54

1. Cmnd. 2834, Documents Relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China Conflict 1945–1965 (London: HMSO, 1965) p. 9. 2. JP(48)101(Final Revise), op cit., para. 21; this theme is found throughout various minutes and memoranda. For example, see FE(O)(48)8(1), 4 Dec. 48, CAB 134/285. 3. JP(48)3(O)(Preliminary Draft), op. cit., Section J, French Indo-China. 4. C. Mary Turnbull, ‘Britain and Vietnam, 1948–1955’, War & Society, 6:2 (1988), p. 110. 300 Notes

5. COS(49)29, 20 Jan. 49, DEFE 5/13 (Part 1). 6. GHQ FARELF, ‘Review of Events in the Far East’, The Army Quarterly, 58:2 (1949), p. 145. 7. In fact, the British had presumed such a scenario since at least as early as February 1948. See COS(48)43(O) [CIC(FE)(48)8(P)], 23 Feb. 48, DEFE 5/10. 8. COS(49)29, para. 10. 9. SEACOS 900, 5 May 49, FO 371/76034 F6670/1075/61G. 10. COS(49)81(1), 1 June 49, DEFE 4/22. 11. Ibid. 12. On the Saigon talks, see Lunn-Rockliffe to Gibbs, ref 3/Int/a. Subj: Conference between French and British C-in-C in the Far East at SAIGON, 3 Mar. 1950. On the SAC discussion, see SAC(50)3, 31 Mar. 50, CAB 134/670. 13. Ibid., Conclusion (c). 14. COS(50)315, 22 Aug. 50, DEFE 5/23. Despite the fact that the greatest source of Viet Minh supplies came across the border with China, the French told the British they were ‘convinced that the main centre of organising traffic in illegal arms to the Viet Minh is centred in Siam’ and that the Chinese and Viet Minh were establishing a reserve supply base in the Paracel Islands. 15. Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years 1941–1960, United States Army in Vietnam (Washington: USACMH, 1985), pp. 98–104. 16. COS(50)95(6), 26 June 50, DEFE 4/32. 17. OCGUKSEA: Visit to Singapore of the United States Joint Defence Survey Mission (Melby Mission), 14 Aug. 50, DEFE 11/38, p. 3 18. Ibid., p. 4. 19. Ibid., p. 4. 20. Harding told the group how he had toured the Indochina frontier in a German Ju-52 transport aircraft manufactured in 1933 which the French used for their ‘main bombing missions’ (ibid., p. 5). A similar experience by an American officer is noted in Spector, p. 106. 21. COS(50)132(1), 18 Aug. 50, DEFE 4/35. 22. OCGUKSEA memorandum, op. cit., pp. 4–5. 23. Ibid., p. 6. 24. Extensive Chinese material and advisory support has long been known, but a 1993 article provides compelling evidence that the border campaign was actually commanded by a general of the PLA. See Qiang Zhai, ‘Transplanting the Chinese Model: Chinese Military Advisers and the First Vietnam War, 1950–1954’, The Journal of Military History, 57:4 (1993) 689–715. On the battle of Dong Khe and the decimation of French Union forces from Cao Bang and That Mhe leading to the loss of Lang Son, see Jacques Dalloz, The War in Indo-China, 1945–54, trans. Josephine Bacon (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1990), pp. 126–7 and Edgar O’Ballance, The Indo-China War 1945–1954: a Study in Guerilla Warfare (London: Faber and Faber, 1964), pp. 114–16. 25. COS(50)401, 6 Oct. 50, DEFE 5/24, p. 2. With Chinese arms and supplies, the French strategy of denying all-important rice-producing areas to the Viet Minh who had hitherto lacked supporting arms had completely changed with the provision of Chinese arms and supplies. 26. Ibid., para. 10. Notes 301

27. Ibid., paras 18–19. 28. SEACOS 111, 2 Oct. 50, FO 371/83650 FF1193/47, para. 2. 29. Ibid., para. 3. 30. Ibid., para. 8 31. Ibid., para. 12. 32. MacDonald went to London in October to put across his views to the Foreign Office before traveling to Paris to meet with French minister to per- suade them to transfer power to the Associate States. See Record of a Meeting to discuss the general situation in South-East Asia and the Far East, in Yasamee, Doc. 66, pp. 180–3. On his visit to Paris, see note 7 on p. 183 and Turnbull, p. 113. 33. The Cabinet approved the broad outlines of British policy, found in CP(50)200, 30 Aug. 50, CAB 129/41, at CM(50)55(4), 4 Sept. 50, CAB 128/18. Bevin was surprisingly silent on Indochina, telling his French and American counterparts that ‘he had nothing to add on the discussion of Indochina or on other problems in Southeast Asia’. He thought that ‘Present undertakings were moving forward and there did not appear to be anything requiring ministerial discussion.’ See SFM Min-4, FRUS 1950, Vol. III, p. 1228. Bevin’s report to the Cabinet on the meetings (CP(50)221, 6 Oct. 50, CAB 129/42) do not even mention Southeast Asia. On the staff talks, see the editorial note in FRUS 1950, Vol. VI, pp. 905–6. The French had asked for tripartite staff talks since February 1950. See Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 16 Feb 50, FRUS 1950, Vol. VI, pp. 730–3. 34. See Paper Presented by the Tripartite Drafting Group, Document 8 [D-6a], and SFM Min-4, (op. cit.) in FRUS 1950, Vol. III, pp. 1173 and 1228. 35. COS(51)57(5), as noted in COS(51)197. A brief on military action in the event of a Chinese offensive never went forward because there was no agreed Allied policy for the defense of Southeast Asia on which to base it. See the note on the preparatory briefs in para. 5 of JP(51)114(Final), 27 Aug. 51, DEFE 4/46. 36. COS(51)260, 27 Apr. 51, DEFE 5/31, para. 9. 37. Ibid., para. 11. 38. Ibid., para. 10. 39. Ibid., paras 7 and 8. 40. Ibid., para. 17. 41. COS(51)261, 27 Apr. 51, DEFE 5/31, para. 3. 42. Ibid., paras 5 and 9. 43. Ibid., para. 15. FARELF had supplied some small arms and ammunition but little more. 44. Ibid., para. 13. British concerns about the loyalty of some Burmese troops and the involvement of the Burma Armed Forces commander in arms traf- ficking led them to restrict arms supplies below requested levels. 45. COS(51)319, 29 May 51, DEFE 5/31. 46. Ibid., p. 19. 47. Ibid., p. 18. 48. Ibid., p. 16. 49. Ibid., p. 3; Conference Report on Tripartite Military Talks in FRUS 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, para. 42, p. 69. 302 Notes

50. JP(51)114(Final), 27 Aug. 51, DEFE 4/46, para. 9. This version was found appended to COS(51)137(3), 29 Aug. 51, DEFE 4/46. 51. DO(51)70, 8 June 51, CAB 131/11. For more details, see Chapter 6. JP(51)114(Final), para. 12. 52. Ibid., para. 85; on the BDCC(FE)’s recommendations made in SEACOS 230, see COS(51)136(11), 27 Aug. 51, DEFE 4/46. 53. Ibid., para. 73. 54. Ibid., para. 75. 55. Ibid., paras 76–9. 56. JP(51)114(Final), para. 13. 57. COS(51)137(3), 29 Aug. 51, DEFE 4/46. 58. Ibid. 59. DO(51)106, 15 Sept. 51, CAB 131/11. On 1 Commonwealth Div, see para. 6. 60. See narrative given in The Acting Secretary to the Secretary in Rome, No. 55, 21 Nov. 51, in FRUS 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, p. 115. 61. Ibid., p. 116. 62. William J Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indo- china (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 117–18; O’Ballance, pp. 165–6. 63. The Secretary of State to Embassy Paris, No. 3743, 29 Dec 51, FRUS 1951, Vol. VI, Part 1, pp. 130–1. 64. JP(51)223(Final), 3 Jan. 52, DEFE 4/51, appended to COS(52)2(1), 4 Jan. 52, DEFE 4/51. 65. COS(52)2(1), p. 3. 66. JP(51)223(Final), para. 16, and Appendix on Force Availabilities for Support of Indo-China, para. 10 67. COS(52)2(1), comments of Robert Scott, Foreign Office. 68. JP(51)223(Final), Appendix paras 6–8. ‘No other troops could arrive in time.’ 69. COS(52)2(1). 70. Ibid. In the run-up to the strategic review of 1952, Slessor asked ‘(b) Was it not possible that the Far East had supplanted the Middle East as the ‘third pillar’ of our strategy? (c) Were we not in danger of losing the Middle East by way of the Far East and the Indian sub-continent? (d) During the next two or three years, while we still held preponderance of atom bombs, might we not be well advised to take a chance in Western Europe (where the threat of the atom bomb was critical) and attempt to plug the whole in the Far East (where soldiers counted for more than bombs)?’ See COS, Review of Global Strategy, 31 Mar. 52, DEFE 32/2. 71. Ibid., and JP(51)223(Final), para. 7. 72. Spector, p. 150. The withdrawal absorbed some 20 000 French Union troops and casualties on both sides were heavy. Fall contends that the loss of Hoa Binh was ‘in fact almost as expensive for the French as the loss of the bor- der posts in 1950 or the later siege of Dien Bien Phu’. See Bernard Fall, Street Without Joy, 1994, reprint edn (Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1961), p. 60; O’Ballance, p. 166; 73. For the source of these concerns, see D(52)5, 14 Mar. 52, CAB 131/12, paras 1–4. 74. JP(52)32(Final), 7 Mar. 52, DEFE 4/52, paras 3–6. Notes 303

75. Ibid., paras 8, 9, 11, 13, 16, 20 and 22. For a detailed discussion of the evo- lution of this plan, see Chapter 9. 76. D(52)2(1), 19 Mar. 52, CAB 131/12, emphasis added. At the end of March, Churchill appointed Field Marshal Viscount Alexander of Tunis as Minister of Defence. 77. Ibid. 78. Ibid. 79. GHQ FARELF, ‘Review of Events in South-East Asia and the Far East’, The Army Quarterly, 66:1 (1953) 17–21. 80. Fall, Street Without Joy, pp. 80–105. O’Ballance cites French casualties as more than 1200 (p. 184). 81. COS(52)679, 12 Dec. 52, DEFE 5/43. 82. Ibid., para. 17(d). 83. Ibid. 84. Singapore to FO, No. 680, 8 Dec. 52, DEFE 11/81. 85. COS(53)21(6), 10 Feb. 53, DEFE 4/60. A few days later, the VCIGS, Lieutenant-General Sir , told the committee that the COS ‘should militarily support every effort to divert French Division from Europe to Indo-China.’ If they didn’t send the reinforcements then, they would be even less likely to do so once the German forces had been rebuilt in Europe. Robert Scott enumerated the political difficulties, and in the end no action was taken by the COSC. See COS(53)27(5), 24 Feb. 53, DEFE 4/60. 86. COS(52)158(2), 18 Nov. 52, DEFE 4/57. For Eden’s ‘advice’ to the French on what was needed, see Full Circle, pp. 83–4. On the EDC, see Klaus Larres, ‘Reunification or Integration with the West? Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany in the early 1950s’, in Aldrich, Intelligence, Defence and Diplomacy, pp. 42–75, and Saki Dockrill, ‘The Evolution of Britain’s Policy Toward a European Army 1950–54’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 12:1 (1989). 87. SEACOS 321, 29 Apr. 53, DEFE 11/62, paras 1–2. 88. COS(53)56(3), 30 Apr. 53, DEFE 4/62. 89. Ibid. 90. COSSEA 918, 30 Apr. 53, DEFE 11/62. 91. Report of the Staff Planners on the Conference Held June 15 to 1 July 1953, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, Section V, pp. 324–7. 92. Ibid. 93. Ibid., Annex I, para. 14. For a more detailed discussion of the plan and its ramifications for the British plans, see Chapter 10. 94. Ibid., Annex I, paras 14–16. 95. Ibid., Annex I, para. 26. 96. Ibid., Annex I, para. 26. 97. Spector, pp. 170–1. 98. COS(53)75(1), 22 June 53, DEFE 4/63. This was a reference to SEACOS 342, 16 June 53, DEFE 11/406. 99. SEACOS 341, 16 June 53, DEFE 11/406. 100. COS(53)75(1); reference to SEACOS 343, 19 June 53, DEFE 11/406. The Chief of Staff of the US Air Force also thought reinforcements of at least two divisions were the answer. See Spector, p. 171. 304 Notes

101. O’Daniel to Radford, No. 8163/8234, 30 June 53, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XIII, Part 1, pp. 624–5; GHQ FARELF, ‘Review of Events in South-East Asia and the Far East’, The Army Quarterly, 67:1 (1953), pp. 14–15. 102. Duiker, pp. 140–1. 103. Only ten battalions were sent. See O’Ballance, pp. 197–8. 104. Dalloz, pp. 166–7. 105. Ibid., p. 163; Eden, pp. 86–7. 106. Cmnd. 2834, Documents Relating to British Involvement, p. 12 (see also Document 13, pp. 60–5. 107. GHQ FARELF, ‘Review of Events in South-East Asia and the Far East’, The Army Quarterly, 68:1 (1954), p. 20. 108. Loewen, Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 510, and Appendix A to Chapter 54; Bernard Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place: the Siege of Dien Bien Phu, De Capo paperback edn (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1967), p. 109. 109. Loewen, Memoirs, p. 510, and Appendix A to Chapter 54; Turnbull, p. 116. 110. Loewen to Harding, ref DO/CIC/17, 9 Apr. 54, WO 216/865, para. 19. 111. Ibid., para. 18. 112. COS(54)36(3), 31 Mar. 54, DEFE 4/69. 113. Ibid. 114. Ibid. 115. Harding to Loewen, ref CIGS/BM/50/7142, 23 Apr. 54, WO 216/865; Loewen to Harding, op. cit., para. 13. Harding was actually a little more sanguine about the positive effects of a French victory than was Loewen. See Harding to Loewen, 24 Mar 54, WO 216/865. 116. Cmnd. 2834, Documents on British Involvement, Statement by Dulles to the Overseas Press Club of America, 29 Mar. 1954, Document No. 14, p. 66. 117. State to Embassy London, No. 5179, 4 Apr. 54, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XIII, Part 1, pp. 1238–40. 118. Geoffrey Warner, ‘Britain and the Crisis over Dien Bien Phu, April 1954: the Failure of United Action’, in Dien Bien Phu and the Crisis of Franco- American Relations, 1954–1955, ed. Lawrence Kaplan et al. (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1990), pp. 64–6; Eden, pp. 92–5. Eden evidently thought India’s support of a collective defense organization was vital to its success. However, since Indian political opinion suspected that the US was not interested in reaching a real settlement at Geneva, it was likely to work against an organization which it saw merely as a means of perpetuating Western aggression against China and nationalist movements in Asia. 119. Ibid., p. 67. 120. Ibid., p. 67. 121. Duiker, pp. 160–1; Radford, pp. 398–9; Chalmers M. Roberts, ‘The Day We Didn’t Go to War’, in Marvin E. Gettleman, ed., Viet Nam: History, Documents, and Opinions on a Major World Crisis (New York: Fawcett, 1965), pp. 96–101. 122. Eden, p. 102. 123. Ibid., pp. 103–4. 124. Ibid., p. 105. 125. Cmnd. 2834, Documents Relating to British Involvement, Document No. 16, p. 67. 126. Ibid. Notes 305

127. COS(54)47(1), 26 Apr. 54, DEFE 4/70. 128. Ibid. 129. Ibid. 130. Ibid. In his memoirs, Radford wrote that the British Chiefs seemed ‘to maximize the risks of expansion of the war by intervention at this time and the requirements for ground forces to be furnished by the Western powers to achieve victory’. See Radford, p. 408. 131. Ibid., p. 408. See also Radford to Dulles and JCS, No. 4725, 26 Apr. 54, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XIII, (Part 2), pp. 1416–17. 132. COS(54)57(1), 18 May 54, DEFE 4/70. 133. The British only revealed the details of this plan when Lord Alexander traveled to Washington in July 1954. Gilbert, p. 994. 134. COS(54)47(1). Harding hinted to Radford that one of the reasons Britain would not contemplate involvement in Indochina was because its Cold War strategic reserve was tied down in Egypt. Harding appealed to Radford for help in gaining Egyptian agreement to the new basing arrangement as a means of freeing the strategic reserve. Churchill made a similar appeal in a letter to Eisenhower. See Churchill to Eisenhower, 21 June 54, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, pp. 569–70. 135. Radford, p. 408–9. 136. Ibid., p. 409. 137. Ibid., pp. 408–9; Gilbert, p. 973. 138. Radford, p. 409; Gilbert, p. 409. 139. Eden to Makins, No. 535, 12 June 54, DEFE 11/141, p. 8. 140. Report of the Five Power Military Conference, June 54, DEFE 11/141, para. 3. 141. JP(54)50(Final), 27 May 54, DEFE 11/114; Geoffrey Warner, ‘From Geneva to Manila: British Policy toward Indochina and SEATO, May–September 1954’, in Kaplan, p. 153. 142. Ibid., paras 17–19. 143. Ibid. para. 18. 144. CIGS to VCIGS, JH 7, 9 June 54, DEFE 11/141. 145. Report of the Five Power Military Conference, para. 22. 146. Cmnd. 2834, Documents Relating to British Involvement, p. 16. 147. Ibid., pp. 14–15. 148. Turnbull, p. 119; for the COS position, see COS(54)332, 26 Oct. 54, DEFE 5/55, para. 6. 149. Warner, p. 157; this is clear from the study group’s discussions. See JSG MC-5, 16 July 54, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, pp. 623–6. COS(54)68(1), 8 June 54, DEFE 4/70; see also COS(54)86(3), 28 July 54, DEFE 4/71. Joint UK-US Study Group on Southeast Asia, 17 July 54, DEFE 11/83. A published version can be found in FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, pp. 631–42. Eden, pp. 143–4. 150. Warner, p. 158. 151. COS(54)259, 12 Aug. 54, DEFE 5/54. 152. The treaty text is reproduced as Appendix 1 to George Modelski, ed., SEATO: Six Studies (Canberra: F W Cheshire, 1962), pp. 289–92. Although it was New Zealand which asked for the insertion of the economic development clause, the idea probably originated in the UK. See Draft Southeast Asia Collective Security Treaty, SEAP D-2, 2 Aug. 54, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, p. 689. 306 Notes

153. Harding stated on July 28 that ‘Effective internal security in [Siam, Burma, and Indonesia] was vital’, not the creation of ‘massive armed forces’. See COS(54)86(3). 154. COS(54)259, para. 22. 155. Darby, p. 64. 156. Warner, pp. 158–9. 157. COS(53)93(5), 28 July 53, DEFE 4/64. 158. Referring to British acceptance of partition of Vietnam, Dulles predicted, with some accuracy, that the ‘British would seek to … get ANZUS to guarantee a buffer north of Malaya to protect Malaya and Hongkong. Thus cleverly, the British would be able to pass as the peacemakers and go between for east and west, and would strengthen their ties with India and Malaya, without any real expense by the UK.’ Memorandum of Conversation by Robert Cutler, FRUS 1952–1954, Vol. XII, Part 1, pp. 524–5. 159. JP(51)223(Final), 3 Jan. 52, DEFE 4/51, para. 2. 160. COS(52)2(1), 4 Jan. 52, DEFE 4/51. 161. Blaxland, pp. 221–35.

11 Conclusion

1. John Garnett, ‘Defense Policy-Making’, Contemporary Strategy II: The Nuclear Powers, ed. John Bayliss et al. (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 10. 2. On the independent deterrent, see Lawrence Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons (London: Macmillan for RIIA, 1980); Gowing, Independence and Deterrence; A. J. R. Groom, British Thinking About Nuclear Weapons (London: Frances Pinter, 1974); and John Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State: the United States, Britain and the Military Atom (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983). On the issue of jointness at the ministerial and theater command level, see Michael Howard, The Central Organisation of Defence (London: RUSI, 1970), and Johnson, Defence by Ministry. 3. Scott, pp. 88–9. 4. Source for data: Abstract of Army Statistics, WO 73/175–81; WO 384/1–14. 5. Ibid. 6. From the 1870s on, the Army was theoretically evenly distributed between home and overseas through the Cardwell system of paired battalions. Throughout most of its life, however, there was a chronic mismatch between the paired battalions. In periods of intense activity such as during the Punjab frontier campaign of 1898, there were only 56 000 men at home and 78 000 abroad. See Edward M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, 1868–1902 (New York: Manchester University Press, 1992), pp. 20–1; 62–3, 173. In 1938, the num- ber of soldiers overseas stood at 90 634 (46 per cent) while the number at home was 106 704. See Bond, Map 2, pp. 118–19. 7. Darby, p. 236. 8. Edwards, Crises and Commitments, p. 329. 9. Michael Carver, Out of Step: The Memoirs of Field Marshal Lord Carver (London: Hutchinson, 1989), p. 352. Carver was appointed C-in-C FARELF in July 1966, and later became C-in-C Far East, the joint theater command. Notes 307

10. See Ovendale, British Defence Policy, document 4.1, p. 132, which is based upon a December 1964 diary entry of a cabinet minister. 11. On the FTC aspect, see John P. Cross, A Face Like a Chicken’s Backside: an Unconventional Soldier in South East Asia, 1948–1971 (London: Greenhill Books, 1996), pp. 207–28; for a first-hand account of the British Advisory Mission to Saigon, see Sir Thompson, Make for the Hills, pp. 122–49. 12. Lt-Gen. Stanley R. Larsen and Brig. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Jr, Allied Participation in Vietnam, Vietnam Studies (Washington: DA, 1975), pp. 22–4. In 1966, when the government was contemplating the elimination of the Brigade if Gurkhas over the course of three years, the Adjutant-General of the British Army, General Sir Reginald Hewetson, approached the US Army attaché in London with the proposal, and he forwarded the idea on to General Westmoreland in Saigon. Select Bibliography

I Archival sources

A. Public Records Office, Kew, Admiralty Office records ADM 1 Admiralty & Secretariat Papers

Air Ministry records AIR 2 Air Ministry: Registered Files AIR 8 Chief of the Air Staff AIR 23 Overseas Commands

Cabinet Office records CAB 21 Cabinet Office: Registered Files CAB 79 War Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee Minutes CAB 80 War Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee Memoranda CAB 128 Cabinet Minutes from 1945 CAB 129 Cabinet Memoranda from 1945 CAB 130 Ad Hoc Committees: General and Miscellaneous Series CAB 131 Defence Committee: Minutes and Memoranda CAB 134 Cabinet Committees: General Series from 1945

Colonial Office records CO 820 Military Original Correspondence, 1927–51 CO 825 Eastern Original Correspondence, 1927–51 CO 974 Defence – Register of Correspondence CO 1022 South East Asia Department: Original Correspondence, 1950–56 CO 1023 Hong Kong and Pacific Department: Original Correspondence CO 1030 Far Eastern Department: Original Correspondence

Foreign Office records FO 371 Foreign Office: General Correspondence Files FO 1091 Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South East Asia: Registered Files

Ministry of Defence records DEFE 4 Chiefs of Staff Committee: Minutes of Meetings, 1947–61 DEFE 5 Chiefs of Staff Committee: Memoranda, 1947–62 DEFE 6 Chiefs of Staff Committee: Joint Planning Staff Reports, 1947–63 DEFE 7 Registered Files: General Series, 1942–79

308 Select Bibliography 309

DEFE 11 Chiefs of Staff Committee: Registered Files, 1946–68 DEFE 13 Private Office Papers, 1950–76 DEFE 32 Chiefs of Staff Committee: Secretary’s Standard File, 1946–61

Prime Minister’s Office PREM 8 Prime Minister’s Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1945–51 PREM 11 Prime Minister’s Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1951–64

War Office records WO 32 Registered Files: General Series (1845–1985) WO 33 O and A Papers (1853–1965) WO 106 Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence (1837–1961) WO 208 Directorate of Military Intelligence (1917–68) WO 216 Chief of the (Imperial) General Staff: Papers (1935–64) WO 231 Directorate of Military Training: Papers (1940–64) WO 268 Quarterly Historical Reports: Far East Land Forces (1946–50) WO 291 Military Operational Research

B. India Office Library and Records, London, England L/WS Files L/MIL Files

C. National Army Museum, London, England Papers of Field Marshal the Lord Harding of Petherton Papers of General Sir Robert Lockhart

D. Imperial War Museum, London, England Document and book collection Papers of Field Marshal the Lord Harding of Petherton Papers of Brigadier L. F. Field Papers of Brigadier T. Haddon Papers of Major-General D. Ashton L. Wade

Sound record collection interviews David F. Bayly-Pike Brigadier Michael Calvert John G. Figgess Field Marshal the Lord Harding of Petherton Colonel Andrew M. Man Sir John W. F. Nott Lord Rhyl (Nigel Birch) Brigadier George Taylor Colonel James C. White 310 Select Bibliography

E. Gurkha Museum, Winchester, England Manuscript collection

F. Liddell Hart Archives for Military Records, London, England Papers of General Sir

G. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland RG 318 Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff RG 319 Records of the Army Staff

H. Durham University Library, Durham, England Papers of the Rt Hon. Malcolm J. MacDonald

II Privately held papers

Papers of Field Marshal Sir Papers of General Sir Papers of General Sir Charles Loewen

III Personal communications

A. Interviews General Sir Walter Walker, 1993 Brigadier Paul Crook, 1995 Major Geoffrey A. Hodgson, 1995 Colonel H. B. H. Waring, 1995

B. Correspondence Brigadier A. C. Heywood, CBE, LVO, MC David F. Bayly-Pike Brigadier Maurice Tugwell Colonel Kensey G. Comerford-Green General Sir Walter Walker

IV Published documents

Ashton, S. R., ed. The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 1951–1957, 3 vols. British Documents on the End of Empire (London: HMSO, 1994). Great Britain. Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. Series, (London: HMSO, 1946–65). Hyam, Ronald, ed. The Labour Government and the End of Empire 1945–1951, 3 vols. British Documents on the End of Empire (London: HMSO, 1992). Mansergh, Nicholas, ed. The Transfer of Power 1942–7: Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India, 12 vols (London: HMSO, 1974). Select Bibliography 311

Ovendale, Ritchie. British Defence Policy Since 1945. Edited by Kevin Jefferys, Documents in Contemporary History (New York: Manchester University Press, 1994). Tinker, Hugh, ed. Burma: The Struggle for Independence 1944–1948, 3 vols (London: HMSO, 1983). United States, Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, serial 1948–1954 (Washington: GPO, 1974–87). Yasamee, H. J. and Hamilton, K. A., eds., Korea: June 1950–April 1951, Vol. IV: Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series II (London: HMSO, 1991).

V Doctoral dissertations

Albert, J. J. ‘Attlee, the Chiefs of Staff and the Planning of Commonwealth Defence between VJ Day and the Outbreak of the Korean War’, Oxford, 1986. Haron, Nadzan. ‘The Malay Regiment 1933–55: a Political and Social History of a Colonial Military Establishment in Malaya’, University of Essex, 1988. Kaplan, Thomas S. ‘In the Front Line of the Cold War: Britain, Malaya and S. E. Asian Security, 1948–55’, Oxford, 1990. Osborn, Robert Bruce. ‘Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck: the Indian Army and the Partition of India’, University of Texas, 1994. Zaroughi, M. ‘Propaganda and Psychological Warfare in Guerrilla and Counter- Guerrilla Warfare: the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960’, University of Reading, 1992.

VI Articles

Anon. ‘The Federation Army of Malaya’, British Army Review, 4 (1957) 38–43. Ball, Desmond. ‘Over and Out: Signals Intelligence (Sigint) in Hong Kong’ Intelligence and National Security, 11:3 (1996) 474–496. Barnett, Correlli. ‘Total Strategy & The Collapse of British Power’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 136:4 (1991) 1–6. Barnett, Correlli. ‘The British Illusion of World Power, 1945–1950’, The RUSI Journal 140:5 (1995) 57–64. Baylis, John and MacMillan, Alan. ‘The British Global Strategy Paper of 1952’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 16:2 (1993) 200–6. Bell, Christopher M. ‘“Our Most Exposed Outpost”: Hong Kong and British Far Eastern Strategy, 1921–1941’, Journal of Military History, 60:1 (1996) 61–88. Boyd, Admiral Sir Denis. ‘The Services in the Far East’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 95:577 (1950) 41–51. Cain, Frank. ‘The US-Led Trade Embargo on China: the Origins of CHINCOM, 1947–52’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 18:4 (1995) 33–54. Carter, Gradon. ‘Biological Warfare and Biological Defence in the United Kingdom 1940–1979’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 137:6 (1992) 67–74. Des Chene, Mary. ‘Soldiers, Sovereignty and Silences: Gorkhas as Diplomatic Currency’, South Asia Bulletin, 12:1–2 (1993) 67–80. Dockrill, Saki. ‘The Evolution of Britain’s Policy Toward a European Army 1950–54’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 12:1 (1989) 38–62. 312 Select Bibliography

Edwards, Peter. ‘The Australian Commitment to the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1950’, Historical Studies, 22:89 (1987) 604–16. Gregorian, Raffi. ‘“Jungle Bashing” in Malaya: Towards a Formal Tactical Doctrine’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 5:3 (1994) 338–59. Infantryman [pseud.]. ‘A New Organisation for the Infantry’, The Army Quarterly, 53:2 (1947) 199–208. Jeffery, Keith. ‘The Eastern Arc of Empire: a Strategic View 1850–1950’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 5:4 (1982) 531–45. Jeffery, Keith. ‘Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency Operations: Some Reflections on the British Experience’, Intelligence and National Security, 2:1 (1987) 118–49. Jones, Tim. ‘The British Army, and Counter-Guerrilla Warfare in Transition, 1944–1952’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 7:3 (1996) 265–307. Jong-Yil, Ra. ‘Special Relationship at War: the Anglo-American Relationship during the Korean War’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 7:3 (1984) 301–17. Kratoska, Paul H. ‘The Post-1945 Food Shortage in ’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 19:1 (1988) 27–47. Lee, David. ‘The National Security Planning and Defence Preparations of the Menzies Government, 1950–1953’, War & Society, 10:2 (1992) 119–38. Lee, David. ‘Australia and Allied Strategy in the Far East, 1952–1957’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 16:4 (1993) 511–38. Miners, Norman. ‘The Localization of the Hong Kong Police Force, 1842–1947’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 18:3 (1990) 296–315. Murfett, Malcolm. ‘A Pyrrhic Victory: HMS Amethyst and the Damage to Anglo- Chinese Relations in 1949’, War & Society, 9:1 (1991) 121–40. Nixon, Lt-Col. C. ‘A Future for the Colonial Forces’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 98:590 (1953) 261–8. Ong, Chit Chung. ‘Major General and the Defence of Malaya, 1935–38’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 17:2 (1986) 282–306. Ovendale, Ritchie. ‘Britain, the US and the Cold War in South East Asia, 1949–50’, International Affairs, 58:3 (1982). Piggott, Lt-Col. F. J. C. ‘Occupying Japan’, The Army Quarterly, 54:1 (1947) 109–17. Stockwell, A. J. ‘“A widespread and long-concoted plot to overthrow the govern- ment in Malaya”? The origins of the Malayan Emergency’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 21:3 (1993) 66–88. Stokes, William N. ‘Mao and MacArthur: Rethinking the Korean war’, Foreign Service Journal, 71:8 (August 1994) 30–4. Tarling, Nicholas. ‘Rice and Reconciliation: the Anglo-Thai Peace Negotiations of 1945’, The Journal of the Siam Society, 66:2 (1978) 59–111. Tarling, Nicholas.’The United Kingdom and the Origins of the Colombo Plan’, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 24:1 (1986) 3–34. Tinker, Hugh. ‘The Contraction of Empire in Asia, 1945–48: the Military Dimension’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 16:2 (1988) 218–33. Turnbull, C. Mary. ‘Britain and Vietnam, 1948–1955’, War & Society, 6:2 (1988) 104–24. Walsh, Major J. M. ‘British Participation in the Occupation of Japan’, The Army Quarterly, 57:1 (1948) 72–81. Select Bibliography 313

Williams, J. A. ‘Korea and the Malayan Emergency – the Strategic Priorities’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 118:2 (1973) 56–62. Zhai, Qiang. ‘Transplanting the Chinese Model: Chinese Military Advisers and the First Vietnam War, 1950–1954’, The Journal of Military History, 57:4 (1993) 689–715.

VII Books and memoirs

Aldrich, Richard J., ed. British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945–1951 (New York: Routledge, 1992). Aldrich, Richard J. The Key to the South: Britain, the United States, and Thailand during the Approach of the Pacific War, 1929–1942 (London: OUP, 1993). Allen, Charles. The Savage Wars of Peace: Soldiers’ Voices 1945–1989 (London: Michael Joseph, 1990). Anderson, Brigadier Robert C. B. History of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 1st Battalion, 1939–1954 (Edinburgh: T & A Constable 1956). Anderson, David M., ed. Policing and Decolonisation: Politics, Nationalism and the Police 1917–65 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992). Arnstein, Walter L. Britain Yesterday and Today: 1830 to the Present, 4th edn (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1983). Baker, W. D. ‘Dare to Win’: the Story of the New Zealand Special Air Service (Nashville: Battery Press, 1987). Baldwin, Stanley Simm. Forward Everywhere: Her Majesty’s Territorials (New York: Brassey’s (UK), 1994). Ball, Simon J. The Bomber in British Strategy: Doctrine, Strategy, and Britain’s World Role, 1945–1960 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995). Barclay, Brigadier C. N. The First Commonwealth Division: The Story of British Commonwealth Land Forces in Korea, 1950–1953 (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1954). Barnett, Correlli. Britain and Her Army 1509–1970: a Military, Political and Social Survey (London: Allen Lane the Penguin Press, 1970). Barnett, Correlli. The Lost Victory: British Dreams, British Realities 1945–1950 (London: Macmillan, 1995). Bates, Peter. Japan and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force 1946–52 (London: Brassey’s, 1993). Baylis, John, ed. British Defence Policy in a Changing World (London: Croom Helm, 1977). Baylis, John et al., eds. Contemporary Strategy, Vol. II: The Nuclear Powers, 2nd edn (London: Croom Helm, 1987). Baynes, John. The History of the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles); Volume IV: The Close of Empire 1948–1968 (London: Cassell, 1971). Baynes, John. Urquhart of Arnhem: the Life of Major General R E Urquhart, CB, DSO (London: Brassey’s, 1993). Beckett, Ian, ed. The Roots of Counter-Insurgency: Armies and guerrilla warfare, 1900–1945 (New York: Blandford Press, 1988). Blackwell, Michael. Clinging to Grandeur: British Attitudes and Foreign Policy in the Aftermath of the Second World War, Contributions to the Study of World History, No. 36 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993). 314 Select Bibliography

Blaxland, Gregory. The Farewell Years: the Final Historical Records of The Buffs, Royal East Kent Regiment (3rd Foot), 1948–1967 (Canterbury: Queen’s Own Buffs Office, 1967). Blaxland, Gregory. The Regiments Depart: a History of the British Army, 1945–1970 (London: William Kimber, 1971). Blaxland, Gregory. The Middlesex Regiment (Duke of Cambridge’s Own) (The 57th and 77th of foot). Edited by Lt-Gen. Sir , Famous Regiments (London: Leo Cooper, 1977). Boardman, Robert. Britain and the People’s Republic of China 1949–74 (London: Macmillan Press – now Palgrave, 1976). Bond, Brian. British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). Bredin, Brigadier A E C, DSO, MC. The Happy Warriors (Dorset: Blackmore Press, 1961). Briggs, Lt-Gen. Sir Harold. Report on the Emergency in Malaya from April, 1950 to November, 1951 (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1951). Brittain, Vera. Pethick-Lawrence: a Portrait (London: Allen & Unwin, 1963). Brown, Judith M. Modern India: the Origins of an Asian Democracy, The Short Oxford History of the Modern World, ed. J. M. Roberts (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). Brookes, Andrew. V Force: the History of Britain’s Airborne Deterrent (London: Jane’s, 1982). Bruce, Phillip. Second to None: the Story of the Hong Kong Volunteers (London: Oxford University Press, 1991). Bryant, Arthur. Triumph in the West: a History of the War Years Based on the Diaries of Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (New York: Doubleday, 1959). Bullock, Alan. The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, 3 vols; Vol. III: Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary (1945–1951) (London: Heinemann, 1983). Buszynski, Lesek. Soviet Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986). Cady, John F. The History of Post-War Southeast Asia: Independence Problems (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1974). Calvert, Michael. Fighting Mad. 1990 edn (New York: Bantam Books, 1964). Cameron, Nigel. An Illustrated History of Hong Kong (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). Caplan, Lionel. Warrior Gentlemen: ‘Gurkhas’ in the Western Imagination (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1995). Carew, Tim. Korea: the Commonwealth at War, 1st edn (London: Cassell, 1967). Carver, Michael. Harding of Petherton, Field Marshal (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1978). Carver, Michael. War Since 1945 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1981). Carver, Michael. Out of Step: The Memoirs of Field Marshal Lord Carver (London: Hutchinson, 1989). Carver, Michael. Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy Since 1945 (London: Hutchinson, 1992). Chandos (Oliver Lyttelton), Viscount. The Memoirs of Lord Chandos (London: The Bodley Head, 1962). Chapman, F. Spencer. The Jungle is Neutral, 1989 reprint of original 1949 edn (London: Chatto & Windus, 1949). Select Bibliography 315

Charters, David. The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945–47 (London: Macmillan Press – now Palgrave, 1989). Charters, David A., Marc Milner, and J. Brent Wilson (eds), Military History and the Military Profession (London: Praeger, 1992). Clayton, Anthony. Forearmed: a History of the Intelligence Corps (London: Brassey’s (UK), 1993). Clayton, Anthony and David Killingray. Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in British Colonial Africa, Monographs in International Studies, Africa Series Number 51 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1989). Cloake, John. Templer, Tiger of Malaya: the Life of Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer (London: Harrap, 1985). Clutterbuck, Brig. Richard. The Long, Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam (Washington: Praeger, 1966). Clutterbuck, Brig. Richard. Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya, 1945–1963 (London: Faber and Faber, 1973). Coates, John. Suppressing Insurgency: an Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1954 (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1992). Cohen, Michael J. Fighting World War Three from the Middle East: Allied Contingency Plans, 1945–1954 (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1997). Crockett, Anthony. Green Beret, Red Star (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1954). Crook, Brigadier Paul. Came the Dawn: 50 Years an Army Officer (Tunbridge Wells: Spellmount, 1989). Cross, John P. In Gurkha Company (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1986). Cross, John P. Jungle Warfare: Experiences and Encounters (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1989). Cross, John P. First In, Last Out: an Unconventional British Officer in Indochina 1945–46 and 1972–76 (London: Brassey’s, 1992). Cross, John P. A Face Like a Chicken’s Backside: an Unconventional Soldier in South East Asia, 1948–1971 (London: Greenhill Books, 1996). Dalloz, Jacques. The War in Indo-China, 1945–54, translated by Josephine Bacon (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1990). Danchev, Alex. Oliver Franks: Founding Father (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). Darby, Philip. British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947–1968 (London: Oxford University Press for RIIA, 1973). Dennis, Peter and Jeffrey, Grey. Troubled Days of Peace: Mountbatten and South East Asia Command, 1945–46, edited by Ian F.W. Beckett, War, Armed Forces and Society (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987). Dennis, Peter and Jeffrey Grey. Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950–1966, Vol. V: The Official History of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1975 (St. Leonard’s, NSW: Allen & Unwin with AWM, 1996). Devereux, David. The Formulation of British Defence Policy Towards the Middle East, 1948–56 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990). Dewar, Michael. Brush Fire Wars: Minor Campaigns of the British Army since 1945 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984). Dockrill, Michael. British Defence Since 1945 (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989). Dockrill, Michael and John W. Young, eds. British Foreign Policy 1945–56 (London: Macmillan Press – now Palgrave, 1989). Donnison, F. S. V. British Military Administration in the Far East, 1943–46 (London: HMSO, 1956). 316 Select Bibliography

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ABC (American–British–Canadian) 271n59, 274n114, 294n39, Planning, 16, 24, 30, 62, 112, 117 298n148 ACFE (Air Command Far East) see and Malaya, 6, 74–5, 134, 146, 180, FEAF 183, 185, 189, 190, 192, 193, Acheson, Dean, 98, 103, 116, 148, 197, 198, 199–202, 228, 229, 150, 151 264n122, 298n148 Airey, Lieutenant-General Sir and the US, 117, 151, 254n90 Terence, 156–7 see also ANZAM, ANZUK, ANZUS, Alanbrooke, Field Marshal Lord, 21–2, Colonial and Dominion Forces, 37, 117 Five Power Ad Hoc Committee Aleutians, 118 and FPSA Alexander, Albert, 14, 57, 64, 90, 97, 239n8, 271n49 Bangkok, 114, 196 Alexander, Field Marshal Lord, 125, Bao Dai, 26, 103, 114, 116, 204, 206 129, 130, 158, 198, 272n93, BAOR (British Army of the ), 7, 273n106, 285n171 108, 134, 156, 165, 169, 208, Amethyst, HMS, 90–1, 98, 105, 108, 218, 232–3 114, 264n138 Barnett, Correlli, 1–3, 12 Annam, see French Indochina Batu Arang, 57 ANZAM (Australia–New Zealand– BCOF (British Commonwealth Malayan area), 117, 185, 198, Occupation Forces), 97, 117, 200, 202, 228, 271n59, 294n35 276n24 ANZUK (Australia–New Zealand–UK BDCC(FE) (British Defense force), 236 Coordinating Committee, Far ANZUS (Australia–New Zealand–US East), 7, 8, 26, 55, 59, 69–73, 89, mutual defense treaty), 117, 151, 105, 114, 118, 133, 168, 170, 157, 158, 164, 215, 228, 270n33, 258n4 306n158 and defense of Hong Kong, 89, 93, Attlee, Clement, 12, 14–16, 18, 20–1, 105, 106, 143–6, 154–5 36, 38–9, 63, 64, 71, 74, 91, 95, and defense of Malaya, 182–6, 191, 99, 102, 139, 141, 145, 241n45, 196–8 271n49 and French Indochina, 195, 205–6, Auchinleck, Field Marshal Sir Claude, 207–8, 213–14 37 Berlin, 216 Australia, 21, 62, 68, 102, 116, 117, blockade, 49, 52, 65, 89, 107 120, 124, 133, 214, 222, 235, Bevin, Ernest, 14, 16, 18, 67, 71, 236, 270n30, 294n35, 299n152 87, 95–6, 98–9, 103–5, 115, 116, and Hong Kong, 96–8, 134, 135, 141, 148, 241n45, 255n127 145, 152, 155–6, 266n164 BFHK (British Forces Hong Kong), 99, and Korean War, 139, 179, 199, 148, 153, 160 276n24 Bihar, 173 and the Middle East, 115, 117, 155, BJSM (British Joint Services Mission), 186, 189, 198, 199, 270n33, 65, 277n37

323 324 Index

Black Swan, HMS, 90 National Service, 35, 61, 64–5, 74, Borneo, 17, 24, 26, 29, 131, 185, 194, 106, 122–3, 138,141, 165, 167, 201, 234–5, 270n35 179, 231–2, 234, 262n83, Boucher, Major-General Sir Charles, 263n107, 267n199, 277n25 48, 55, 58, 69–70, 71, 252n58, ‘fire brigades’, 59–61, 74, 75, 89, 94, 256n162 107, 167, 225 Bouchier, AVM Cecil, 277n28 TA (Territorial Army), 35, 62, 66, Bradley, General Omar, 139, 149, 159, 94, 108, 125, 132, 190, 192, 185, 277n28, 281n102 193, 223, 229, 263n107 Bretton Woods, 28 divisions: 1 Infantry, 56; 2 Infantry, Briggs, Lieutenant-General Sir Harold, 56, 192; 3 Infantry, 192, 210, 71–3, 167, 169, 256n160, 223, 273n109, 298n150; 17 265n147 Gurkha Infantry, 48–9, 62–4, British Army 128, 173, 179, 184, 186, 218; Anti-Aircraft Command, 132 40 Infantry, 100, 107, 108, 184, Army Council, 64, 254n106 275n144, 294n30; 7 Armored, Cardwell system, xiv, 244n7, 306n6 56; 1 Commonwealth, 179, structure of, xiv, 5, 24, 33–5, 49, 198, 210, 275n137, 276n24, 121–2, 123, 132, 165, 169, 208, 286n203 231–2 brigades: 2 Guards, 60–1, 62, 65, 75, deployment of: xiv, 5, 13, 33, 56, 87, 101, 107, 184; 3 74, 84, 121–2, 228–9, 231–4, Commando, 72–3, 94, 101, 242n63, 243n71, 306n6; 105, 107, 136, 138, 139, 144, re-structuring affected by, 70, 166, 169, 184, 263n110, 75, 89, 94, 107, 263n107 294n30; 16 Parachute, 125, inter-theater movements of, 30, 60, 192, 210, 223, 257n165; 18 62, 74, 75, 89, 94, 105, 107, Infantry, 166; 26 Gurkha 128, 138, 140–1, 169, 172, 184, Infantry, 71, 100, 105, 107, 199, 257n165, 275n154 166, 257n165; 27 Infantry, 100, strength/size of, 24, 33–5, 49, 123, 107, 141, 146, 262n83, 280n85; 125, 131, 132, 167, 169, 231–3, 28 Infantry, 100, 280n85; 28 272n71, 275n144, 306n6 Commonwealth, 199, 222; 29 lower/higher establishment, 44, 56, Infantry, 139–41, 146; 48 71, 74, 141, 233, 251n42, Gurkha Infantry, 166; 63 263n107 Gurkha Infantry, 166 role in global war, 24, 119, 229 regiments, armored: 3 RTR, 100, role in cold war, 110, 121–2, 125, 140, 262n83, 266n161; 4 133, 165 Hussars, 59, 71, 72, 100, 166, and the Far East, 30, 122, 125, 169, 277n35; 13/18 Hussars, 74, 166 231, 251n46 regiments, artillery: 44; 26 Field, 47, and the Middle East, 122, 125 58, 166, 257n165, 259n31 and Western Europe, 122, 125, 133, regiments, infantry: Guards, 34, 60; 169, 229 Parachute, 34; Special Air manpower shortages, 35–6, 37, 45, Service, 131, 235, 277n30, 74, 75, 124, 141, 168, 179, 279n79 241n46, 248n91, 288n31, battalions: 3 Grenadiers, 252n73; 289n36 2 Coldstreams, 253n73; 2 Scots regular soldiers, 122, 124, 167, 232, Guards, 253n73; 2 Buffs, 267n199, 271n68 259n29; 1 Devon, 47, 57; Index 325

British Army – continued CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), battalions – continued 229 2 KOYLI, 47; 1 Leicesters, Ceylon, 4, 16, 21, 116 262n83; 1 Suffolk, 56; 1 Chiang Kai-shek, 87, 88 Seaforth, 47, 57; 1 A&SH, 141, Chiefs of Staff, 7, 14, 22, 57, 59, 62–3, 262n83; 1 Inniskillings, 57, 58, 68, 74, 78, 82, 84–5, 91, 104, 107, 82; 1 Middlesex, 141, 262n83, 111–13, 119, 121, 123, 125–8, 266n159; 1/2 GR, 41, 47, 46, 57; 129, 130–1, 133, 136, 138, 145, 2/2 GR, 46, 47; 1/6 GR, 46, 47, 148, 149–50, 155, 157–8, 160, 247n73; 2/6 GR, 46–7, 81, 84, 161–3, 185, 197–8, 217–19 247n73, 259n29; 1/7 GR, 46, 47, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 8, 71, 91, 247n73; 2/7 GR, 46, 47; 1/10 114, 139, 155, 168, 175, 184, 188 GR, 46, 47, 247n73; 2/10 GR, Anti-Aircraft Sub-Committee, 18 46, 47, 81–2, 247n73, 266n159; Chifley, Joseph, 74, 264n122 41 Commando RM, 277n20 Chin Peng, 52, 249n2 squadrons: 67 Gurkha Engineer, China, Republic of, 24, 25, 27, 29, 43, 277n35 53, 59, 136, 211 see also Colonial and Dominion and Hong Kong, 78, 80–3, 87, 105, Forces, Great Britain, Global 148, 259n33, 266n166, strategy, armed forces for and 267n192 Gurkhas see also Formosa British Pacific Fleet, 78 China, Peoples’ Republic of Broome, Richard, 252n58 strategic threat, 67, 88, 108, 111, Brownjohn, Lieutenant-General Sir 112, 114, 118, 124, 127, 156, Nevil, 140, 141, 168, 175–6, 182, 203–5, 209, 211, 219, 229, 184 294n29 Brunei, 17, 234–5, 253n83 recognition of, 67–8, 77, 102–5, Pact, 15, 19, 49, 107, 115 108, 227, 255n127, 259n25 BSMB (British Services Mission and Hong Kong, 71, 77, 80, 87, Burma), 25, 112, 113, 269n14 89–90, 92, 96, 99, 101, 104, Burma, 4, 16, 21, 24, 25, 40, 46, 52, 105–7, 108, 110, 137, 140, 60, 68, 95, 112, 114, 116, 118, 142–3, 147, 151–2, 153, 162, 168, 189, 203, 205, 208–9, 215, 227, 267n192, 272n78, 220, 228, 269n14 281n102 Butler, Richard, 129–30 and Malaya, 67, 69, 72, 106, 124, 128, 180, 182, 186, 213 Calcutta Conference, 250n9 and French Indochina, 103, 104, Calvert, Brig. Michael, 146, 110, 118, 120, 124, 137, 140, 279n79 180, 182, 204, 205, 208, 211, Cambodia, see French Indochina 212, 219 Canada, 68, 96, 120, 139, 179, 221, and Burma, 110, 113, 118, 120, 229, 276n24 204, 212 see also Colonial and Dominion and Siam, 111, 113, 118, 124, 180, Forces 197, 204, 212 Canton, 92, 101, 102, 137, 259n33, and Tibet, 137, 173, 174 266ns160, 166 and Viet Minh, 182, 204, 205, 206, Carpentier, General Jean, 206–7 217–18, 220, 300ns14, 24, 25 CCP (Chinese Communist Party), 54, and Korean War, 123–4, 146, 147, 60, 102, 108 151 326 Index

China, Peoples’ Republic of – continued 33, 289n36; King’s African PLA (Peoples’ Liberation Army), 67, Rifles, 169; Federation, 171 69, 72, 77, 82, 83, 90, 91–2, 93, battalions: 1 KAR, 292n101; 2 KAR, 98, 101, 106, 136, 137, 142, 292n101; 3 KAR, 292n101; 1 N. 147, 151, 153, 264n138, Rhodesia Regt., 292n101; 1 268n210, 276n2, 300n24 Rhodesian African Rifles, CCAF (Chinese Communist Air 292n101; 1 RAR, 292n101; Force), 142–3, 144, 147, 151–2, 2 RAR, 292n101; 3 RAR, 153, 294n48 276n24, 292n101; 1 NZ Regt., Cholmondeley, Charles, 146, 279n79 292n101; 2 NZ Regt., 292n101; Churchill, Sir Winston, 109, 125, 130, 1 Fiji, 167, 292n101; 1 Malay, 161, 190, 192, 213, 217, 218, 220, 47; 2 Malay, 47; 5 Malay, 170; 285n171, 305n134 6 Malay, 170, 171; 7 Malay, CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 171, 172 108, 228, 270n46 African troops, 168–9, 288n20 CIC (FE) (Commanders-in-Chief, Far ‘Ferret Force’ 58, 61, 252ns58, 59, East), 7, 8, 28, 43, 110–11, 253n81 113–14, 150, 258n4 HKVDF (Hong Kong Volunteer and Malaya, 27, 63, 84, 145, 185 Defence Force), 79–80, 81–2, and Hong Kong, 63, 79, 80, 84, 85, 83, 84–6, 262n101, 286n198 86, 102, 145, 150, 153–4, Rhodesian volunteers (SAS), 167, 280n83 292n101 and French Indochina, 206–7 Royal Australian Air Force, 75, 97, and Siam, 112, 181, 197 179, 298n148 Clutterbuck, Sir Richard, 56 Royal Australian Navy, 179 Cochinchina, see French Indochina Royal Canadian Air Force, 179 ‘cold war’ (as Communist technique), Royal Canadian Navy, 179 5, 53, 83, 113, 119, 120, 126, 212, Royal New Zealand Navy, 97, 179 270n36 Royal New Zealand Air Force, 179 Colombo Conference, 116, 118, 207, Royal South African Air Force, 179 221 Cominform, 52 Colonial and Dominion Forces, 4, Commonwealth Signal Organisation, 20–1, 36, 43, 63, 128, 133, 165, 148 167–8, 171–2, 179, 229, 234–5, ‘Confrontation’, 234–5 270n30, 276n24, 298n148, Consort, HMS, 90 299n152 ‘Continental Commitment’, xiii, 231, Commonwealth Strategic Reserve 241n40, 271n48 Force, 133, 180, 198, 199, 200, Creech-Jones, Sir Arthur, 57, 59, 63, 202, 228, 235, 286n208 69, 85–6, 98, 252n54 divisions: 1 Federation, 171, 179, Cripps, Sir Stafford, 39 228; 1 Commonwealth, 179, Cyprus, 8, 128, 242n63, 274n109 198, 210, 275n137, 276n24, Cyrenaica, 242n63 286n203 Czechoslovakia, 16, 49, 52 brigades: 28 Commonwealth, 133, 199, 222, 286n208 Darby, Philip, 1–3, 6, 273n99 regiments: Malay, 43, 49, 56, 62, Davis, Vice-Admiral Arthur, USN, 152 63–4, 70, 72, 74, 86–7, 113, 131, Davis, John, 252n58 167, 168, 169–70, 172, 175, de Lattre de Tassigny, General Jean, 185–6, 187, 252n57, 288ns31, 209, 210, 211 Index 327

Defence Committee (Cabinet), 7, 8, ‘Force 136’, 52, 58, 252n58 36, 39–40, 60, 71, 78, 82, 90, 97, Formosa (Taiwan), 24, 105, 111, 112, 110, 122, 128, 131, 132, 133, 137, 114, 136, 137, 140, 143, 146, 138, 139, 154, 155, 162, 168, 170, 267n192, 268n4, 269n11, 280n83 188, 190 see also ‘China, Republic of’ Dempsey, Lieutenant-General Sir ‘Forward Planning’ (deception), 145, Miles, 170 155 Dien Bien Phu, 195, 196, 216–18, FPSA (Five Power Staff Agency), 159, 220, 222, 302n72 161, 164, 193, 214, 220 Don Khe, 206 France, 103, 111, 114, 118, 133, 142, Dulles, John F., 151, 158, 161, 216, 151, 152, 193, 205, 207, 212, 214, 217, 218, 222, 306n158 216, 220 Franks, Sir Oliver, 149–50, 151 East Anglia, 220 Fraser, Admiral Lord, 137, 139–40, 168 EDC (European Defense Community), French Foreign Legion, 206 214, 220 French Indochina, 24, 26, 53, 68, 111, Eden, Sir Anthony, 129, 151, 158, 112, 113, 114, 116, 118, 120, 133, 213, 217–18, 220 146, 195, 203–24 Egypt, 127, 132, 169, 171, 273n109, Allied intervention and, 218–21, 305n134 228 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 123, 158, British policy toward, 204–7, 161, 196, 217, 218, 219, 305n134 212–13, 214, 217–18, 224, Elizabeth II, Queen, 198 227–8 Elliot, Air Marshal Sir William, 91, defense of, 207, 209–12, 218, 220 152 Elysée Agreement, 204, 205 Evans, Major-General Geoffrey, 100, French withdrawal from, 189, 191, 265n157 205, 211, 212–13, 221 Letourneau Plan, 215 FARELF (Far East Land Forces), 7–9, Malaya and, 172, 182, 189–90, 42–5, 48, 50, 53–4, 64, 107, 140, 192–3, 201, 208, 219 156, 171–2, 188, 193, 208, 222, military assistance to, 122, 136,137, 223, 228, 232–3 185, 205–6 and training, 61, 65–7, 75, 136, Pau conference, 207 141, 167, 188, 235, 252n59, reinforcements from France for, 253ns81, 83, 258n4, 279n64 211, 213–14, 215–16, 217, 223, composition and strength, 64, 65, 226, 303n85 71, 72, 74, 75, 81, 84, 86, 107, strategic importance of, 26, 111, 131, 136, 141, 144, 171–2, 188, 195 199, 235, 295n58 Viet Minh campaign in, 192, 204, LEP (locally enlisted personnel), 212, 213, 215–17 43–5, 64 see also Viet Minh and China, FEAF (Far East Air Forces), 8, 55, 147, Peoples’ Republic of and 258n4 French Indochina Festing, Lieutenant General (later FM) Sir Francis, 99–100, 106, Gage, Sir Berkeley, 196 265ns147, 148, 267n198 Gale, General Sir Richard, 256n160 Five Power Ad Hoc Committee, 152, Garnett, John, 231 154, 212, 214–15 Geneva Conference, 163, 195, 203, Five Power Defense Arrangement, 236 216, 217, 218–20, 221, 223 328 Index

Gent, Sir Edward, 50, 53, 57, 82, Zones’, 21; ‘Future Defence 252n54 Policy’(1947), 22–7, 102, 200; Germany (West), 3–4, 56, 107, 122, deterrence, 22, 23, 121, 125–6, 123, 192, 229 131, 203, 225, 230; armed Gibraltar, 242n63 forces for, 22, 23, 80, 107, Gowing, Margaret, 273n99 121–3, 124, 125, 130, 132, 133, Grantham, Sir Alexander, 79, 84, 99, 134, 166, 184, 225; strategic 103–4, 105, 106, 163, 265n148 reserve forces, 37, 84, 94, 107, Gray, Police Chief, 71 112, 122, 123, 124, 125, 131, Great Britain: balance of payments, 133, 138, 166, 167, 169, 171, 12, 14, 125, 128–30, 272n73; 192, 208, 210, 211, 223, 225, defense budget, 14, 50, 110, 122, 235, 236, 298n150, 305n134; 123, 125, 129–30, 132, 231, ‘broken back warfare’, 126, 237n7, 272n72, 73, 89, 93, 132–3; ‘Defence Policy and 287n4; as ‘Third Power’, 15–16, Global Strategy’ (DO(50)54), 240n25; colonial policy, 16–17, 109–10, 120–3, 125, 128, 133, 79, 132; defense policy, 17–18, 145, 165,167, 209, 226, 110, 117, 120–1, 125, 225–36; 273n99; cold v. hot war foreign policy, 15–16, 116, 120, requirements, 62–3, 70, 80, 91, 181, 225–7; and Korean war, 93, 94, 102, 107–8, 110, 114, 138–41, 226, 277n28 118, 120, 121–2, 124, 127, 132, Global strategy: and nuclear 169, 180, 184, 208; and weapons, 18, 23, 110, 121, 127, rearmament, 123, 125, 127, 132, 133, 211, 225, 230, 231, 130, 165, 167, 208, 223, 228, 242n61, 273n107, 275n141; 237n7, 272ns72, 89, 93, non-military aspects, 120, 121, 275n144; Cold War, 121, 122, 225; and containment, 127, 124, 126–7, 129, 132, 133, 163, 132; and limited liability, 134, 226; ‘Radical Review’, 128–33, 164, 203, 208, 224, 226–7, 230, 161–3, 273n106; 306n158; ‘main support areas’, Commonwealth role, 22–3, 63, 19–20, 23, 241n43; sea lines of 82, 117, 124, 127, 129, 168, communication, 20, 23, 78, 180, 200–1, 224, 225, 230; 120, 225; air offensive, 19–20, US/Allied role, 109, 115, 127, 22–3, 68, 112, 113, 119, 126, 129, 131, 180, 225, 226, 230 128, 132, 225, 242n59; and the Far East strategy: 24–31, 110–34; Middle East, 19–20, 23, 62, 66, ‘Far East Strategy and Defence 110, 115, 117, 120, 124, 128, Policy’, 112, 113, 117; in Cold 129, 132, 134, 156, 187, 189, War, 62–3, 88, 102, 113, 127, 199, 201, 225, 230, 241n45, 180, 185, 200, 226, 229; in hot 294n30, 295n67, 302n70; and war 62, 81, 88, 102, 113, 118, the Far East, 20, 23, 30, 62–3, 180, 184–5, 187, 200; 66, 81, 88, 111–13, 117, 121, non-military aspects, 25, 27, 124, 130–1, 133, 156, 163, 180, 29–30, 88, 103, 110–11, 113, 187, 189, 200–1, 203, 211, 226, 116, 118, 119, 203, 221–2; lines 302n70; and Western of communication, 26, 28–9, Europe/NATO, 115, 119, 120, 78, 112, 118, 159, 268n4, 121, 122, 126, 127, 128, 133, 269n11; and Middle East, 28, 134, 156, 211, 223, 225; and 31, 43, 62, 66, 75, 107, 118, Korean War, 123; ‘Defence 121, 127, 128, 186–7, 189, 199, Index 329

Great Britain: balance of payments – development of Gurkha division, continued 42–3, 44, 45–6, 49, 62–4, 66, Far East strategy – continued 75, 87, 168, 174, 178–9, 226, 230; importance of 254n106 Malaya, 27–9, 89, 128, 163, strength of, 46–8, 50, 56, 234, 235, 169, 180, 184, 186–7, 189, 199, 247n73, 248n80, 248n103, 223; local defense forces, 63–4, 259n27 113, 121, 179; Commonwealth ’MGBG,’ 48–9 role, 63, 96–7, 109, 114, 116, Communist subversion of, 165, 118, 128, 179, 180, 199, 200, 175–6, 291n71 222, 224, 227–8, 229; US/Allied development as artillery, 56, 59, 64, role, 88, 109, 111–12, 118, 157, 254n101 180, 200, 201, 203, 209–11, role of, 37, 42–3, 48, 62–3, 66, 75, 214, 222, 227–8; collective 81, 128, 168, 173, 178 defense, 111–12, 114, 116, 119, reduction of, 235, 307n12 127, 200, 203, 204, 214, 217, see also British Army 218–9, 221–2, 304n118; Gurney, Sir Henry, 67–8, 69, 71, containment, 114–15, 116, 118, 146, 169, 170–1, 252n54, 124, 127, 159, 203, 205; 256n150 deception, 145–7, 155–7, 164, 190, 227; importance of Hack, Karl, 6 Gurkhas, 176, 177, 178; Hainan, 111, 268n4 deterrence, 203, 211, 291n81; Haiphong, 204 offensive action, 220–1 Hanoi, 212 Greece, 4, 53 Harding, Lieutenant-General (later Griffiths, James, 71 Field Marshal Lord) Gua Masang, 58, 59 C-in-C FARELF, 7–8, 65–6, 67–8, Gurkhas 69, 71–4, 101–2, 104, 105, requirement for, 36, 38–9, 235, 106–7, 136, 138, 140–1, 142, 307n12 146, 147, 167, 169, 170, 174, origins of, 36 176–8, 206, 209, 254n112, poll (August 1947), 40–1, 234 256n160 decision on units, 38, 39, 40, 42, CIGS, 159, 160–1, 163, 192, 195, 234, 246n56, 247n65 196, 198–9, 214, 217, 219, 220, Indian objections to, 38, 175, 234 305n134 tripartite talks/agreement, 38, 39, Haron, Nadzon, 170 40, 50 Hart, Lieutenant-General Franklin M., restrictions on use, 40, 42, 44, 174, USMC, 156 176 ‘Harwood Report’, 273n106 ‘opt’ (December 1947), 42, 47, 50, Hawaii, 139 234, 248n80 Hewetson, General Sir Reginald, numerical restrictions, 41–2, 44–5, 307n12 66, 173, 174–5, 179, 247n65 HKLF (Hong Kong Land Forces), 77, basing of, 40–2, 47–8 106, 142 ‘Brigade of Gurkhas’, 48, 165, Ho Chi Minh, 104, 120, 204, 206 176–7, 234, 235 Hoa Binh, 212, 302n72 recruitment of, 42, 66, 173, 174, Hodgson, Major Geoffrey, 239n21 175–6, 245n39, 291n71, 74, 87, Hollis, Lieutenant-General Sir Leslie, 292n99 38 330 Index

Hong Kong, 27, 47–9, 77–108, Hull, Major-General Richard, 174 135–64, 227, 267n193 Hyderabad, 44, 247n66 value of to UK, 79–80, 96, 102, 164, 225, 262n101 India, 16, 21, 23, 25, 40, 44, 49, 103, Hong Kong Police, 79, 85, 257n3, 113, 114, 116, 118, 173, 179, 186, 260n54 196, 204, 205, 217, 221, 276n24 as intelligence post, 148, 266n160, and strategic value of, 16, 21, 283n135 242n59 operations against China from, 102, and Gurkhas, 37–8, 173, 175–7, 234 135, 149–50, 152, 157, 158, and Nepal, 38, 44, 50, 173–4, 176, 159–60, 164 177, 234 defense of: garrison, 64, 78–82, 83, Indian Army, 21, 168, 230, 243n71, 85, 106, 130, 131, 137, 143, 251n46 144, 146–7, 153, 161–4, and Gurkhas in, 41, 42, 44, 47, 174, 259n29, 274n136, 280n85, 234, 247ns65, 66, 67, 291n83 286n198; 1946 policy, 78–80, Indonesia, see Netherland East Indies 92, 279n68; decisions on International Commission (Vietnam), defense, 91–3, 95–7, 102, 221 142–3, 148, 153, 203, 279n71, Iraq, 132 283n132; and effect on strategy of, 77–8, 81, 102, 156; Japan, 4, 24, 25, 43, 49, 112, 113, reinforcements for, 70, 77, 81, 117, 118, 124, 136, 151, 204, 211, 83–4, 89–90, 94–5, 97, 102, 219, 230 153–4, 156–8, 159–60, see also BCOF 257n165, 263n105; and JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff), 139, 141, Malaya, 57, 59, 66, 68, 70–1, 149, 151, 152, 157–8, 185, 196, 72, 73, 82, 84, 86–7, 89, 94, 210–11, 219, 277n37 105, 135, 138, 141, 143, 144, JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee), 8, 163, 200, 261n65; internal 18, 19, 91, 101, 104, 106, 142, security, 78–80, 83, 85, 100, 194, 205 105, 106, 131, 147, 154, 257n3, JIC(FE) (Joint Intelligence Committee, 259n31, 266n165, 281n102; Far East), 8, 53, 153, 199, 205, deception, role of, 135, 145–7, 258n4, 294n48 155–7, 164, 190, 227; and Jinnah, Mohammed, 16 Korean War, 137, 140–2, 152, JPS (Joint Planning Staff), 8, 62–3, 75, 278ns42, 45; and trade with 80, 91–2, 93–4, 107, 112–13, Communists during war, 147, 118–19, 121, 133, 137–8, 142–3, 150, 280n87; evacuation, 84, 154, 158–9, 167–8, 184, 190–1, 102, 145, 152, 153, 154, 155, 193, 194, 195, 198, 208, 209–10, 159, 161–2, 281n105, 283n131; 212 US assistance to, 148–9, 152, JPS(FE) (Joint Planning Staff, Far East), 153, 154, 158–61, 164, 190, 8, 199, 258n4 217, 219, 227 Johore Bahru, 57, 61 see also Colonial and Dominion Forces, HKVDF, China, Republic Kashmir, 174 of, and Hong Kong and China, Katmandu, 173 Peoples’ Republic, and Keightley, General Sir Charles, 8, 156, Hong Kong 159, 160, 169, 171, 191, 214, Howard, Sir Michael, xiii 216 Index 331

Kennan, George, 115 116, 142, 175, 181, 183–4, 186, Kennedy, Paul, 1, 3 195, 197, 199, 205, 206, 208, 216, , 169 252n54, 265n148 see also Colonial and Dominion Maharaja of Nepal (Rana family), 37, forces 41–2, 173, 174, 290ns59, 65, Kerans, Lieutenant-Commander, 98 69, 70, 292n99 Keynes, John Maynard, 12, 14 Malacca, 17 Kirkman, Major-General John, 66 Malaya, Federation of, 17, 24, 25, Kirkpatrick, Sir Ivone, 194 27–8, 46, 117, 204 KMT (Kuomintang), 52, 53, 211, 228, value of, 28, 128, 186, 200, 225 250n12, 259n33 and Chinese, 67–8, 71–2, 104, 124, Koirala, M. P., 290n70, 292n99 128, 170–1, 227, 255n126, Korea, 25, 112, 133, 136, 138, 207, 279n69 211, 275n137, 286n203 police/Special Branch, 53, 54–6, 58, North Korea, 136, 142, 278n54 63, 70, 71, 73, 146, 166, 171, South Korea, 136, 138, 179 287n4, 292n2 Korean War, 109, 122–3, 128, 136–42, MSS (Malayan Security Service), 151, 179, 207, 216, 226, 229, 53 276n2 army, 170, 175, 179, 289n35, Kota Tinggi, 253n83 298n149 Kra Isthmus, see Malaya, defense of, defense of: 180–202, 203, 219, Songkhla position 293n26; resources for, 182–3, Kuala Lumpur, 48, 146 186, 187, 188–9, 190–1, 192–3, , 27 197–8, 200, 201, 215, 293n18, Kupchan, Charles, 3, 230 296ns94, 99, 298n147; in cold war, 187, 199; in limited war, Labuan, 17, 27 182–4, 189, 200, 201; in global Lai Chau, 213 war, 184–5, 187–9, 199; Lai Tek, 249n2 collective defense, 183–5, 197, Lambe, Admiral Sir Charles, RN, 199; lines of communication, 239n21 184–5, 191, 296n99; Songkhla Laniel, Joseph, 216 position (ROEDEAN), 180, Laos, see French Indochina 183, 185–7, 190–3, 196, 201, Lee, David, 6 212, 214, 215, 219–20, 222, Lend-Lease, 12, 14 296n97 Liddell Hart, Sir Basil, xiii see also Plans, Malayan Emergency, Lloyd, Air Marshal Sir Hugh, 95, 114, Hong Kong, defense of, and 250n14, 252n54, 263n113 Malaya, Siam, and Malaya and Lockhart, General Sir Rob, 256n160 French Indochina, and Malaya, Loewen, General Sir Charles, 8, 196, China, Peoples’ Republic, and 199–200, 216–17 Malaya and United States, and London, HMS, 90 Malaya ‘London Controlling Section’, 145 Malaya Committee (Cabinet), 73–4, Lyttleton, Sir Oliver, 170, 192 107 Mansergh, Lieutenant-General Robert, MacArthur, General Douglas, 139, 106 146, 277n28 Mao Tse-tung, 120, 124, 164, 223 MacDonald, Sir Malcolm, 7, 54–5, 57, Malayan Emergency, 52–76, 82, 166, 58–9, 68, 69, 82, 95, 103, 114, 177 332 Index

Malayan Emergency – continued Navarre, General Henri, 214, 215, director of operations for, 69–71, 216, 218 256ns150, 160 Nehru, 40, 96, 116, 175, 176–8 resources for, 55–8, 63–4, 69–74, Nepal, 37, 38, 40–2, 44, 128, 173, 105, 140, 166, 169–72, 287n4 175, 176, 177, 178, 290ns59, 69, effect on strategy of 112, 144, 70, 292n99 295n52 Nepal Democratic Congress, 290n59 and Korean War 128, 137, 140, 166, Netherlands, 24, 111, 151, 205 170, 287n4 Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia), ‘Briggs Plan’, 72–3, 138, 140, 144, 29, 52, 111, 113, 114, 205 166 New York City, 208, 209 Malta, 242n63, 274n114 New Zealand, 21, 68, 116, 117, 120, ‘Manila Pact’ see ‘SEATO’ 124, 133, 214, 222, 235, 236, Mansergh, Lieutenant-General Sir 294n35 Robert, 153, 159, 283n135 and Middle East, 115, 117, 154, Marshall, George C., 150 186, 198, 199, 270n33, 271n59, Maxwell, Sir Alexander, 71 274n114, 294n39 McBride, Philip, 188–9 and Malaya, 6, 74, 134, 146, 183, McLean, Brig. Fitzroy, 256n160 185, 192, 193, 198, 199, 200, MCP (Malayan Communist Party), 201, 228, 299n154 52–4, 63, 67, 234, 250n9 and Hong Kong, 96–7, 134, 145, MDAP (Mutual Defense Assistance 152, 154, 156, 264n122 Program), 119, 181–2, 206, and Korean War, 167, 179, 276n24 293n11 and the US, 117, 151 Melbourne, 117, 199, 200, 216 see also ANZAM, ANZUK, ANZUS, MELF (Middle East Land Forces), 8, Colonial and Dominion forces, 56, 66, 127, 128, 232–3, Five Power Ad Hoc Committee 274n109 and FPSA Menzies, Sir Robert, 75, 103, 145, 156, Newboult, Sir Alec, 58, 59 190, 198, 199, 294n39 NNC (Nepalese National Congress), MI5, 53 173–5, 290ns59, 70, 291n71 MI6, see Secret Intelligence Service Noel-Baker, Philip, 96, 97 Montgomery, Field Marshal Bernard, NSC 73, 148–9, 152, 285n190 16, 22, 35, 39–40, 59–60, 64, NSC 124/2, 152, 285n190 258n4 NSC 148, 161, 285n190 Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis, 16 Nyasaland, 169 MRLA (Malayan Races’ Liberation Army), 52, 54, 55, 56, 58, 68, 72, Okinawa, 139 136, 292n2 Operations: GRADUATE, 278n42, Mukden, 83 LORRAINE, 213; MATADOR, 183, 201, Murfett, Malcolm, 6 294n29; OVERLORD, 119

Na San, 213 Pakistan, 4, 16, 46, 186, 221, 247n66 Nanking, 81, 83 Palestine, 4, 49, 55, 57, 253n73 National Service, see British Army Panama, 139 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Panmunjon, 151 Organization), 7, 19, 107, 115, Paris,159 123, 125, 151, 159, 193, 210, 211, Pearl Harbor, 159 220, 222, 223, 225, 229 Peking, 105, 120 Index 333

Penang, 17 Rome, 151, 210 Persia, 138 Rosecrance, Richard, 6 Pethick-Lawrence, Lord, 38 Rowell, Lieutenant-General Sir Phao, General, 196 Sydney, 199–200 Philippines, 112, 118, 136, 143, 200, Royal Marines, 106, 263n110, 219, 221, 280n83 267n199 PHPS (Post Hostilities Planning see also British Army, brigades, Section), 24, 254n90 3 Commando Phu Doan, 213 Royal Navy, 90, 101, 127, 132, 133, Phuoc Tuy, 236 239n11, 263n105, 277n30 Pibul Songgram, Marshal, 26, 114, Russia, 5, 120, 216 181, 183–4, 191, 196, 293n27 central threat, 4, 17–18, 23, 25, Plans: BINNACLE, 295n52; CINDERELLA, 275n148 156, 295n52; CRUSHER, 101; intent to attack West, 4, 15, 18–19, DECAPITATION, 100; DEFIANCE, 101; 102, 120–1, 123, 126 DELIBERATION, 265n152; and nuclear weapons, 19, 119, 121, DOUBLEQUICK, 112; GALLOPER, 184, 126, 132, 220, 270n46, 186, 187, 271n48, 294n48, 274n138 295ns52, 58; HALFMOON, 112; threat to Far East, 29, 52, 82, 90, IRONY, 187–91, 192, 193, 195, 197, 106, 111, 112, 126–7, 186, 200, 201, 296ns84, 94; RINGLET, 268n210, 294n29 191–6, 197, 200, 201, 296n84; and Communist China, 102–5, 111, SANDOWN, 271n48; SPEEDWAY, 112, 120, 124, 127, 142, 152, 253n88; SYCAMORE, 156; WARRIOR, 153, 186, 220, 255n127, 197–8, 199, 200, 228 294n48 Poett, Major-General Sir Nigel, 146, and French Indochina, 104, 212 282n124 and Korean war, 142, 278n54 Poland, 221 Ryukyus, 68, 112, 118 , 43 Portugal, 24, 151 Sabah, 26 Potsdam, 113 Saigon, 205, 235 Puerto Rico, 139 Salan, General Raoul, 213, 214 Punjab Boundary Force, 40, 247n73 Sandys, Duncan, 130, 133 Pusan, 139 Sarawak, 17, 26 Saunders, Major William, 281n96 Radford, Admiral Arthur, USN, 156–8, Scott, Leonard V., 50 214, 218–20, 305n134 Scott, Robert, 187 RAF (Royal Air Force), 55, 58, 98, 132, SEATO (South East Asia Treaty 136, 147, 152, 153, 225, Organization), 117, 133, 222, 263n105, 270n46 228, 229, 235, 236 Redman, Lieutenant-General Sir , 48 Harold, 303n85 Shamsher, Kaiser, 292n99 Redmond, Brigadier, 45 Shamsher, Mohan, 290n70 Rhodesia (Southern), 167 Shanghai, 27, 64, 80, 89, 258n25, see also Colonial and Dominion 267n190 forces Sharkey, Lawrence, 250n9 Ritchie, General Sir Neil, 7, 44, 45–6, Shepherd, General Lemuel C., USMC, 48, 53, 61, 62, 64, 65, 81, 82, 86, 156 87, 89, 95, 114, 205, 252n54, Shinwell, Emanuel, 71, 97, 120, 138, 253n81, 254n112, 277n37 141, 149, 188–9, 271n49 334 Index

Siam, 24, 68, 95, 112, 118, 180–202, ‘strategic sufficiency’, 3, 164, 230–1, 203, 204, 221 236 Communist subversion, 181, 191, Struble, Arthur, USN, 193, 194, 195, 208 209 and Burma, 181, 293n27 Stubbs, Richard, 166 defense of, 184, 191, 195, 197, 220, Sudan, 242n63 293n26 Suez Canal Zone, 127, 166, 169, 218, and Malaya, 54, 60, 69, 72, 172, 223, 273n109 180–202, 292n2 and French Indochina, 180, 181, Tarling, Nicolas, 1–2 182, 195, 219, 300n14 Tedder, Air Marshal, 141, 143, 149, military aid to, 68, 112, 113, 114, 150, 281n102 180, 181, 189, 195, 208, 228, Templer, Lieutenant-General Sir (later 293ns11, 13 Field Marshal Lord) Gerald, 64, US air bases, 196, 297n119 89–90, 171, 172, 191–2, 196 strategic value of, 26, 181, 189 ‘Ten Year Rule’, 30 Singapore, 17, 24, 26, 27, 30, 43, 46, Thailand, see Siam 49, 52, 55, 57, 61, 68, 72, 78, Thompson, Sir Robert, 235, 252n58 131, 150, 199, 200, 205, 209, Tibet, 137, 173, 174, 178 235–6, 258n4, 295n61, 298n149 Tizard Committee, 18 SIS (Secret Intelligence Service), 53 Tonkin, see French Indochina Sixmith, Major-General E. K. G., 159, Tribhuvana, King, 173, 174 296n97 Trieste, 133 Slessor, Air Marshal Sir John, 154, Tripartite Talks (UK–US–French), 150, 210, 211, 226 151, 152, 208, 209–12, 214, 218, Slim, Field Marshal William, 5, 7, 64, 283n131 65, 71, 73, 75–6, 91, 95, 97, 139, Truman, Harry S, 12, 119, 127, 136, 148–9, 151, 159, 168–9, 171, 211, 148, 151, 280n87 254n101, 266n164, 288n20 Tsingtao, 230 SOE (Special Operations Executive), Turkey, 128 see Force 136 Songkhla, see Malaya, defense of, UK–USA Intelligence Agreement, 148 Songkhla position United Nations, 17, 22, 96, 97, 98, South Africa, 21, 68 105, 118, 124, 136, 145, 147, 148, see also Colonial and Dominion 149, 182, 207, 227, 280n83, forces 281n102 South East Asia Collective Defense UN Command (Korea), 139, 146, 179, Treaty, 161, 182, 197, 200, 203, 182, 275n144 221–2, 228 United States, 4, 14, 15, 17–18, 111, Soviet Union, see Russia 115, 120, 214, 216, 237n7 Sri Lanka, see Ceylon and Far East, 115–16, 117, 118, 119, Strang, Sir William, 115 136, 180, 185, 193, 203, 205, ‘strategic core’, 4, 5, 108, 134, 163, 208, 211, 222, 226, 270n33 201–2, 223, 225, 229, 230, 236 and Hong Kong, 81, 87, 96, 97, 98, ‘strategic deficiency’, 3 134, 135, 138, 145, 147–64, strategic overextension, 1–2, 3, 20, 190, 217, 280n83, 281n96, 226, 231 282n124, 283n140, 285n190 strategic periphery, 4–5, 108, 134, and Malaya, 180, 190, 193, 197, 230, 236 200, 215, 228 Index 335

United States – continued Vanguard, HMS, 132 and China: 68, 87, 103, 124, 137, Viet Minh, 182, 192, 194, 195, 201, 138, 147, 149, 150, 151, 197, 204, 205, 207, 209, 212, 213–14, 212, 214, 216, 222; and ‘united 215, 216–17, 219, 220, 221, 226, action’, 217, 218; and ‘Greater 300ns14, 24, 25 Sanction’, 151, 272n78, see also French Indochina and 273n105 China, Peoples’ Republic, and and Japan, 124, 151 Viet Minh and French Indochina, 136, 185, Vietnam, see French Indochina 205, 207, 214, 215, 216, 217–21 Vietnamese National Army, 213, 215 and Siam, 180, 181–2, 194, 195–6, 197, 293ns11, 13 Walker, Lieutenant-Colonel (later and Korea, 136–7, 138–41, 144, General Sir) Walter, 61 147, 150 Wallinger, Sir Geoffrey, 195 and nuclear weapons, 110, 112, Washington, DC, 151, 152, 213, 220 121, 123, 126, 131, 220, 230, Wavell, Field Marshal Lord, 37, 38 273n100 West Indies, 242n63 Urquhart, Major-General Roy, Westmoreland, General William, 256n162 307n12 USAF (US Air Force), 23, 214, 270n46, WEU (Western European Union), 15, 282n124, 283n131 49, 225 USMC (US Marine Corps), 156, see also Brussels Pact 277n30 Wild, Colonel H. N. H., 146 US Navy, 214 Wilson, Harold, 235 US Pacific Command, 148, 283n131 US Pacific Fleet, 136 Yunnan, 204 Uttar Pradesh, 173