5 January 2010 [82 (WEST AFRICA) INFANTRY DIVISION ]

A Short History of the :

82 nd (West Africa) Infantry Division

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BACKGROUND and FORMATION

There were four colonies of the United Kingdom in West Africa. These were Nigeria (which was the largest in terms of both area and population), The Gold Coast (renamed as Ghana on independence in 1957), Sierra Leone and The Gambia. Each of the four colonies had their own regiment, which were consolidated into the West Africa Frontier Force in 1900. In 1928, it was granted the title Royal West Africa Frontier Force.

At the outbreak of war, there were five Regular battalions and one Light Artillery battery of The Nigeria Regiment, two Regular and one Territorial Force battalions of The Gold Coast Regiment, one battalion of the Sierra Leone Regiment and one Company based in The Gambia. Over the next couple of years, all four regiments expanded with wartime recruitment.

In 1939 and 1940, the battalions of the Royal West Africa Frontier Force and the King’s African Rifles were formed into two formations, the 1 st and 2 nd African Divisions (later redesignated as the 11 th and 12 th African Divisions). Both divisions contained units from both West and East Africa. These fought in the 1941 campaign to secure Abyssinia, Ethiopia and Somaliland from the Italian Forces.

Following the successful Allied campaign, the 11 th and 12 th African Divisions were eventually withdrawn from Abyssinia and broken up in 1941 and 1943 respectively. In December 1942, the General Officer Commanding West Africa, Lieutenant General GIFFARD visited the War Office and made the suggestion that, following the end of the threat to West Africa from the

w ww.britishm ilitaryhistory.co.uk Page 3 5 January 2010 [82 (WEST AFRICA) INFANTRY DIVISION ] former French colonies, the West African formations could be utilized in Burma. On the 1 st January 1943, the War Office informed Headquarters West Africa Command that a division and a large number of non divisional ancillary units would be required for service in Burma. A fortnight later, the order came for the formation of a second division also for service in Burma.

The second of the two West African divisions was formed on the 1 st August 1943 in Nigeria. It formally assumed command of all the units in Nigeria on the 1 st November 1943 with the three brigades coming under command of the division on this date. Each was organised as a brigade group.

THE DIVISIONAL COMMANDER

The divisional commander was Major General George McIllree Stanton BRUCE, O.B.E., M.C., who was born in 1896. Between 1933 and 1938, George BRUCE had been the commanding officer of the Malay Regiment in Malaya. On the 12 th October 1940, he assumed command of the 204 th Independent Infantry Brigade in the United Kingdom. On the 26 th August 1942, he took temporary command of the 135 th Infantry Brigade in the 45 th Infantry Division, but on the 1 st September 1942, returned to the command of the 204 th Brigade. On that same date, the brigade was redesignated as the 185 th Infantry Brigade and joined the 42 nd Armoured Division. He was promoted to Major General in June 1943, and became the General Officer Commanding Nigeria.

THE BRIGADES IN THE DIVISION

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The 1 st (West Africa) Infantry Brigade comprised three battalions of the Nigeria Regiment, namely the 1st Battalion, 2 nd Battalion and 3 rd Battalions of the regiment. The brigade had been formed on the 3rd October 1939 by the redesignation of the regimental headquarters of the Nigeria Regiment. In June 1940, the brigade was redesignated as the 23 rd (Nigeria) Infantry Brigade, and it came under command of the 1 st African Division (later being retitled as the 11 th African Division). The brigade served with the division in Abyssinia and Somaliland during the campaign to oust the Italian forces from the region. The brigade returned to West Africa in September 1941, and was still serving in Nigeria when it joined this division on its formation. Although the battalions allocated to the brigade were all regular army units, by the time of joining the division many changes in personnel had taken place.

At the time of joining the division, the commanding officer of the brigade was Brigadier Charles Roger Alan SWYNNERTON, D.S.O.. Born in 1901, SWYNNERTON was commissioned into The North Staffordshire Regiment. He had assumed command of the brigade on the 21 st September 1943.

The 2 nd (West Africa) Infantry Brigade had been formed in September 1939 by The Gold Coast Regiment. In 1940, it became the 24 th (Gold Coast) Infantry Brigade and served with the 12 th African Division in the Abyssinian Campaign of 1941. The brigade returned to West Africa in December 1941, joining the division in Nigeria on the 1 st November 1943. Pre-war, The Gold Coast Regiment (based in the country now known as Ghana) comprised two Regular Army battalions and one Territorial Force battalion, the 1 st Battalion, 2nd Battalion and 3 rd Battalion (T.F.). All three mobilized in 1939, and came under command of this brigade. The formation was commanded by Brigadier

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Ernest Walter Davie WESTERN, D.S.O., who assumed command on the 19 th November 1943.

The 4 th (West Africa) Brigade consisted of three battalions of the Nigeria Regiment, namely the 5 th Battalion, 6 th Battalion and 10 th Battalion. The 5 th Battalion was a pre war Regular Army unit, with the other two battalions being war raised service units. The commanding officer was Brigadier Henry GIBBONS, M.C., but he was replaced by Brigadier Abdy RICKETTS, D.S.O., O.B.E. on the 20 th October 1944 whilst the brigade was stationed in India. Brigadier RICKETTS was born in 1905 and educated at Winchester and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. He was commissioned into The Durham Light Infantry in 1925, but two years later seconded to the Shanghai Defence Force. In 1930, he was stationed on the North West Frontier in India. As a Colonel, Ricketts served with the Chindits, taking temporary command of the 3rd (West Africa) Infantry Brigade in April 1944. He transferred from the 3 rd (West Africa) Brigade to command this brigade in October 1944.

THE SUPPORTING ARMS AND SERVICES

The Royal Artillery for the division was not organized on a standard basis of three field regiments, an anti-tank regiment and a light anti-aircraft regiment, having instead a light regiment, an anti-tank regiment and a mortar regiment.

The Commander Royal Artillery was Brigadier Richard Humphrey Middleton HILL, who had three regiments under his command. The 102 nd Light Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel M. C. MUNRO, had

w ww.britishm ilitaryhistory.co.uk Page 6 5 January 2010 [82 (WEST AFRICA) INFANTRY DIVISION ] twenty-four Jeep towed 3.7” howitzers. The 22 nd Anti-Tank Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel FRASER, had thirty-six 6 pounder anti- tank guns which were tractor drawn and, the 42 nd Mortar Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel A. LIDDELL had twenty-four 3” mortars that were head loaded. There was a small Jeep borne Headquarters Royal Artillery.

The factor that made the two West Indian formations unique in the British Army was the use of human porters. Each brigade had an Auxiliary Group, a battalion sized unit comprising unarmed soldiers who head carried supplies and equipment for that brigade. This made the divisions highly mobile and capable of independent operation provided they could be resupplied by air. The two West African formations were in some ways more versatile than the Chindits, which relied on mules for transport. The use of porters was not always understood by commanders, but it allowed the use of both divisions in the flanks of XV Indian Corps in the Arakan.

FIRST DEPLOYMENT IN BURMA

The division remained in West Africa until May 1944. It sailed for India on the 28 th May 1944, travelling via the Suez Canal, and on arrival in India it concentrated in the Ranchi area. The area around Ranchi was unsuitable for training. It reorganised on a standard divisional establishment in October 1944 having moved from Ranchi to Chiringa. At the end of that month, the division began to relieve the 26 th Indian Infantry Division in the upper Kalapanzin Valley at Goppe and Taung Bazaar.

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The division came under the command of XV Corps on 1 st November 1944. In the post monsoon offensive of 1944 and 1945, it was tasked with capturing Buthidaung, in order to support the advance of the 25 th Indian Infantry Division down the Mayu Peninsula, and then to cross the Kalapanzin River and advance south to Htizwe. From there the division was to move into the Kaladan valley and relieve the 81 st (West Africa) Division. The 81 st Division would move back to Chiringa as Corps reserve and then move back to India. Meanwhile, the 82 nd Division would advance southwards down the Kaladan valley to Myebon.

The 82 nd Division was new to XV Corps, it was unfamiliar with the country in which it was to operate and was untried in battle. The first brigade to arrive in the theatre of operations was the 2 nd Brigade, which began to concentrate at Taung Bazaar on 8 th November 1944. By the 11 th November, the brigade had assumed responsibility from the 36 th Brigade from 26 th Indian Infantry Division, which was released for a period of rest and training. On 29 th November, the 4 th Brigade and the divisional headquarters arrived and established themselves at Razabil. By the 8 th December, the 1 st Brigade had arrived to make the division complete. The 1 st and 2 nd Brigades formed up in the vicinity of the tunnels, whilst the 4 th Brigade remained in the Taung – Goppe area.

On the 12 th December 1944, the march from Razabil began with the 1 st Brigade concentrating that evening in an area known as the Htindaw Bowl. This are was also used as a concentration area for divisional and corps troops. Fortunately, the area was not heavily shelled by Japanese troops. South of Taung Bazaar, the Kalapanzin River runs through a broad flat valley, with the valley floor being used for cultivation with paddy fields. The

w ww.britishm ilitaryhistory.co.uk Page 8 5 January 2010 [82 (WEST AFRICA) INFANTRY DIVISION ] valley contained a few isolated hill features, with three in particular astride the road to Buthidaung. The one to the left of the road was known as ‘The Massif’, with the two on the right called West and East Fingers. The gap the road passed through was called ‘The Gate’.

Pushing forward in the grey light of dawn on the 14th December, the 2 nd (West Africa) Brigade passed through the 51 st Indian Infantry Brigade from 25 th Indian Division and occupied the hills around Buthidaung. The 1 st Bn. The Gold Coast Regiment was tasked with capturing East Finger, whilst the Buthidaung itself was to be taken by the 3 rd Bn. The Gold Coast Regiment. ‘East Finger’ and Buthidaung were cleared by the morning of the 15 th December against little resistance, one bunker being quickly destroyed by tanks from the 19 th Lancers. This day, Friday 15 th December 1944, saw the deaths of three members of the 105 th Battery, 42 nd Mortar Regiment. Major Alan Garvie REEKIE aged thirty-four years, Lieutenant John Hugh Brown PALMER aged twenty-one years and, Sergeant Thomas Vincent ROWLEY aged twenty-five years, were all killed when they ran into an ambush. Major REEKIE and Lieutenant PALMER are both buried at Taukkyan War Cemetery, whilst Sergeant ROWLEY is commemorated on the Rangoon Memorial.

The 425 th Field Company from 25 th Division then began to build jetties and traffic circuits in the vicinity. This immense task meant transporting and launching some seven-hundred boats for the 53 rd Brigade. This was to allow the 2 nd (West Africa) Brigade to establish a bridgehead on the opposite bank of the Kalapanzin River. Late on the 15 th December, the 3 rd G.C.R. managed to put one company across the River Kalapanzin to form a bridgehead without incident. The next day, the bridgehead was expanded to about 1,000 metres from the river as 2 nd Brigade consolidated its gains under

w ww.britishm ilitaryhistory.co.uk Page 9 5 January 2010 [82 (WEST AFRICA) INFANTRY DIVISION ] sporadic machine gun and mortar fire. By the 18 th December, the brigade was operating around the village of Dabrugyaung on the road down the Mayu valley.

As the 2 nd Brigade cleared the ‘Fingers’, the 1 st (West Africa) Brigade commenced its operations. The brigade commander’s plan was for the 1 st Bn. The Nigeria Regiment to lead the brigade along a mule track from the Bowl to Inbauk, where the most forward troops of the 25 th Indian Infantry Division were located, and then onwards to Baguna East. The Brigade Headquarters and 3rd Nigeria Regiment were to follow the 1 st Bn. with the 2nd Bn. in the rear. On arrival at the River Kalapanzin, the 3 rd Bn. were to force a crossing of the river. The twenty-four assault boats and eighteen inflatable boats to be used for the crossing were to be carried by the Auxiliary Group on the men’s heads.

The 1 st Bn. The Nigeria Regiment led the advance without major incident. A company was detached with some mortars to clear an area north of a chaung that skirted the southern edges of the ‘Fingers’ and a fighting patrol was dispatched to check whether any Japanese troops were located in the foothills nearby. Some opposition was encountered near the southern end of the ‘East Finger’, which was dealt with by the detached company in conjunction with the 1 st G.C.R.. The guns from the 5th Indian Field Regiment from the 25 th Indian Division and 6 th Medium Regiment were used to help subdue the Japanese. By the evening of the 15 th December, Nigerian troops had occupied Baguna East, but the patrol sent to the foothills had encountered significant resistance and was recalled.

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In the early hours of the 16 th December, the 3 rd N.R. crossed the River Kalapanzin unopposed and established themselves on a hill feature alongside the road called ‘Sponge Finger’, with the 1 st N.R. protecting the bridgehead. On the morning of the 17 th December, the 3 rd N.R. captured Vital Corner and linked up with the units from the 2 nd Brigade to the north. The next objective for the 1 st Brigade was to cross the Saingdin Chaung to the south of their positions. The 2 nd N.R. was released from divisional reserve and tasked with forming the bridgehead. One company was moved downriver by boats and up into the chaung where it successfully landed and created a bridgehead by the evening of the 17 th December.

On the 18 th December, two more companies were landed together with a troop from 104 th Mortar Battery. The Japanese shelled the bridgehead and patrols found they were blocking all the exits from the area, including the village of Dodan. An attack was launched on the village supported by artillery and mortars, but it failed to dislodge the defenders, even though the Nigerians managed to get into the village. As dusk was approaching, it was decided to withdraw the troops back into the bridgehead.

During the night, artillery fire was concentrated on the village and on the morning of the 19 th December, another company attacked the village. The attack withered in the face of heavy and accurate fire from the defending Japanese troops. To reach the village, the troops had to cross an area of open paddy fields which suited defence, with the Japanese located in deep dugouts and well constructed bunkers. The objective was proving difficult to take, so an air strike and artillery bombardment was ordered. Under the cover of this, a company tried again to take the village, and again they were beaten back.

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Meanwhile, other elements from the 2 nd N.R. were taken by water and then walked to the village of Seinnyinbya which was behind Dodan in order to outflank the Japanese. A skirmish took place as the Nigerians entered the village driving out a Japanese patrol. During this incident, an African soldier calmed walked up to a Japanese soldier who was hiding in a tree and sniping at the Nigerians, and shot him dead. The Nigerian troops in Seinnyinbya were built up and despite the difficult nature of the countryside, they gradually forced the Japanese to retire. By the 22nd December, Dodan was cleared and the 2 nd N.R. was established at Storey on the main road. The battalion had suffered about eighty casualties in taking Dodan, as many as the brigade suffered during the entire campaign in East Africa.

While the 2 nd N.R. was fighting to win Dodan, on the 18 th December the 1 st N.R. had taken some highground north of the village of Kindaung, a key location on the road as it was a bridging point across the Saingdin Chaung. On the 19 th December, a company crossed the chaung and established themselves on some high ground to the north of the road by nightfall. During the night, a Japanese ‘jitter’ party tried to breach the Nigerian’s positions but was driven off. Another company passed through and worked their way southwards, having to force their way through thick jungle. A large feature called ‘Marker’ was the objective, and this was taken on the 20 th December.

The 4 th Brigade, supported by tanks from the 45 th Cavalry, now took over the lead in the advance. The bridge had been mopping up some bunkers in the Buthidaung area as they cleared the area of Japanese. The 4 th Brigade

w ww.britishm ilitaryhistory.co.uk Page 12 5 January 2010 [82 (WEST AFRICA) INFANTRY DIVISION ] continued down the road, while the 3 rd N.R. from 1 st Brigade was sent by boats down the river to take the village of Zedidaung on the 25 th December. At the beginning of January 1945, the 4 th Brigade had reach Htizwe and the division began preparations to cross from the Kalapanzin valley to the Kaladan valley. On the 2 nd January, as a prelude to the advance, the 1 st N.R. took the entrance to a pass known as ‘Luke’ through which the 4 th Brigade was to advance. The brigade moved through the pass to come under command of the 81 st (West Africa) Division which had advanced down the Kaladan valley. The 1 st Brigade concentrated around the western end of ‘Luke’ Pass and the 2 nd Brigade was made responsible for the Corps maintenance area around Buthidaung.

THE MOVE FROM THE KALAPANZIN TO THE KALADAN

The 82 nd Division completed its crossing of the hills from the Kalapanzin valley to the Kaladan, with the 4 th Brigade under the command of Brigadier A. H. G. RICKETTS in the lead. At this stage, the division ceased to be supplied by road and began to rely on air supply. The 4 th Brigade met up with the 81 st (West Africa) Division and went forward to assault Myohaung. The 1 st Brigade also came under the command of the 81 st Division for the capture of Myohaung.

CHANGE IN DIVISIONAL COMMANDER

Admiral MOUNTBATTEN, the Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia, visited the division in the Arakan. On the arrival of the Supreme Allied Commander and his party, they were met by Major General BRUCE who was to drive them around the divisional area. He did not make a good impression on MOUNTBATTEN who described him as “without exception the

w ww.britishm ilitaryhistory.co.uk Page 13 5 January 2010 [82 (WEST AFRICA) INFANTRY DIVISION ] most dangerous and fiery driver I have ever driven with”. BRUCE did not assist the image he left with his visitors by carrying a pair of ivory handled revolvers, in the image of the American General George PATTON. His fiery temper also exhibited itself during the visit, during which he drove MOUNTBATTEN and his party through areas possibly held by the Japanese. About the same time, General WEDEMEYER, the American General who was Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, also visited the division. BRUCE took WEDEMEYER around in his jeep, and during the tour stopped, threw his Stetson hat into the air and fired six rounds through it cowboy style. On the 25 th December 1945, Lieutenant General CHRISTISON visited Major General BRUCE. He was accompanied by Major General Horace H FULLER, and American officer who was Deputy Chief of Staff to MOUNTBATTEN. BRUCE had been drinking, but was determined to drive the party around. He got lost, and they were fired upon by Japanese troops. Lieutenant General CHRISTISON had to take charge and extract the party by conducting a fighting withdrawal. During this time, Major General FULLER became separated, and a counter attack had to be launched to recover him. He was found to have suffered a heart attack, and was seriously ill. Aged fifty-eight, FULLER died later in hospital.

Lieutenant General CHRISTISON made some discrete enquires, and found out that the senior officers of the division had lost confidence in Major General BRUCE. CHRISTION asked BRUCE to meet him, but BRUCE failed to attend. CHRISTISON, therefore, spoke with his Deputy Director of Medical Services, who ordered BRUCE to hospital. The official reason given apparently for BRUCE’s removal was an ‘ingrowing toe-nail’, but BRUCE was obviously severely ill. Later when the Assistant Military Secretary of XV Indian Corps came to see him with a report from CHRISTISON which was critical of BRUCE’s command abilities, BRUCE pulled a revolver on the officer

w ww.britishm ilitaryhistory.co.uk Page 14 5 January 2010 [82 (WEST AFRICA) INFANTRY DIVISION ] and shouted “Tear that up or you’re a dead man”. BRUCE never returned to any command position and retired from the Army in February 1949.

To replace BRUCE, CHRISTISON needed someone to restore discipline and command to the division. He selected Brigadier Hugh Charles STOCKWELL, C.B.E., D.S.O., who assumed formal command of the division at Midday on the 12 th January 1945. Hugh STOCKWELL was born into a military family, being the son of Lieutenant Colonel H.C. STOCKWELL. His father was an officer in the Highland Light Infantry and on retirement became the Chief Constable of Colchester. Hughie STOCKWELL was born in Colchester on the 16 th June 1903. He was educated at Marlborough College and followed his father into the Army. On passing out from the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, Hugh STOCKWELL was commissioned into The Royal Welch Fusiliers in 1923.

In 1929, Stockwell was seconded to the Royal West African Frontier Force and served in West Africa until 1935. On the outbreak of war, STOCKWELL was the Brigade Major for 158 th Infantry Brigade, which comprised three battalions of the Royal Welch Fusiliers. In 1940, he volunteered to join one of the Independent Companies which were being formed for service in Norway. His company was landed at Bodo, and fought a successful rearguard action in the Rognan valley against superior German Forces. For his leadership in the Norway Campaign, STOCKWELL was awarded the Distinguished Service Order.

On his return to the United Kingdom, he was appointed Commandant of the newly established Commando Training School at Inverary in Scotland. He

w ww.britishm ilitaryhistory.co.uk Page 15 5 January 2010 [82 (WEST AFRICA) INFANTRY DIVISION ] returned to his regiment in 1942, and was given command of the 1 st Bn. The Royal Welch Fusiliers, which was part of the 6 th Infantry Brigade in 2 nd Infantry Division. On the 28 th October 1942, STOCKWELL was promoted Brigadier and given command of the 30 th (East Africa) Infantry Brigade, based in East Africa. He relinquished command of this brigade on the 7 th December 1942 and was appointed the commanding officer of the 29 th Infantry Brigade in succession to Brigadier FESTING. At this time, the brigade was located in South Africa having taken part in the Madagascar Campaign.

STOCKWELL took the brigade to India where it became part of the 36 th Indian Infantry Division, commanded by Major General FESTING. When Major General BRUCE was taken ill and relieved of his command, STOCKWELL was a natural choice to lead the division and exert some positive leadership, despite his relatively young age of forty-two to become a divisional commander due to his experience with the Royal West African Frontier Force, and his recent command experience. He had recently been awarded the C.B.E. for his command of the 29 th Infantry Brigade in the Arakan.

THE RELIEF OF THE 81 st (WEST AFRICA) DIVISION

On the 16 th January 1945, the division was ordered to move through the hills to Apaukwa on the Kaladan River in order to relieve the 81 st (West Africa) Infantry Division which was due to be withdrawn to India to rest and refit. The 1 st Brigade led the advance with the 1 st Nigeria Regiment in front. Once again, personnel from the 5 th Auxiliary Group carried assault and inflatable boats, as the Kaladan River was known to be about 800 yards wide and tidal.

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The track followed by the brigade had been made well by the Japanese, but was very arduous, with some very steep climbs in places. The brigade marched for periods of 70 minutes, followed by a twenty minute rest period. On arrival at Apaukla, the brigade met troops from the 81 st Division who had some boats ready for use. Two companies from the 1st Nigeria Regiment were ferried across the Kaladan River. The 1 st Nigeria Regiment marched down the west bank of the river towards Myohaung, the rest of the brigade traveling down the other bank. They consolidated at Minzegyaung on the bank of the Kaladan River. The brigade crossed the river and established themselves at Banyo. One Japanese soldier was captured, being handed over to the divisional commander when he visited the brigade.

The original orders from XV Indian Corps were for the 82 nd (West Africa) Division to relieve the 81 st (West Africa) Division as the latter formation had been in action for over twelve months. Due to the speed of the advance by the two West African formations and the 25 th Indian Division, the plans were modified. The 4 th Brigade was to come under command of the 81 st Division, with the 82 nd Division to follow once it had been relieved at Buthidaung by the 22 nd (East Africa) Brigade. The objective was to capture Myohaung, establish a bridgehead over the River Lemro and then for the 82 nd Division to advance down the Arakan to cut the Japanese lines of communication east of Myebon while the 25 th Indian Division landed on the Myebon peninsula.

THE BATTLE FOR MYOHAUNG

The City of Myohaung (now known as Mrauk U) was the ancient capital of the Arakan. It lies in a pass running east and west through the foothills on the

w ww.britishm ilitaryhistory.co.uk Page 17 5 January 2010 [82 (WEST AFRICA) INFANTRY DIVISION ] eastern side of the River Kaladan and close to the River Lemro. The hills around the city are about three to four hundred feet high above the paddy fields that surround the location. The width of the hill range here is about two miles. The western side of the city is separated from the River Kaladan by about six or seven miles of flat paddy fields, interspersed by several chaungs. The Lemro River is four miles away across flat, cultivated land.

Major General LOFTUS-TOTTENHAM began planning for the capture of Myohaung prior to his division being relieved and moving back to India. The 4th (West Africa) Brigade came under command of the 81st (West Africa) Division, with the rest of the 82 nd (West Africa) Division following behind the 81 st Division.

On the 1 st January 1945, 6 th Brigade regained contact with the Japanese units by moving south from Zidaw along a track through the hills. Enemy troops were also encountered at Makyaze and Point 160. On the 3 rd January the 4 th N.R. took Point 160 and the rest of the brigade closed up behind. The brigade bridged the chaung at Makyaze and made for Point 555 on a ridge running southwards towards Myohaung. The plan was for 6 th Brigade to capture Point 555 and then for 5 th Brigade to advance through 6 th Brigade’s positions and go forward and capture the Thingyittaw Pagoda.

Brigadier CROOK decided to build up his forces on a feature to the north of the ridge, which was called ‘Starfish’ because of its shape on the map. The 1st Bn. The Gambia Regiment made the first attempt to cross the chaung at Makyaze on the 5 th January, but this was stopped by shell-fire. On the same day, the Japanese made a counter-attack on Point 160 but were driven off.

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Due to the opposition encountered, Brigadier CROOK ordered an air-strike on ‘Starfish’, with four squadrons mounting a sustained assault on the Japanese troops occupying ‘Starfish’. The 6 th Brigade tried again on the 8 th January to cross the chaung at Makyaze but were again unsuccessful. The next day, however, the 1 st Bn. The Sierra Leone Regiment crossed the chaung and managed to occupy ‘Starfish’ by the 11 th December.

The 6 th Brigade consolidated on ‘Starfish’, with the 4 th N.R. attacking out from there on the 15 th January. Their objective was Point 425, but they met determined resistance as they advanced along the knife edged ridge where the Japanese were dug in. Attempts to outflank the positions were also met by fierce defence by the Japanese. During the following three days, each company assaulted the Japanese positions in turn, with each one beaten back. Air strikes made little difference on the Japanese bunkers. The 1 st Bn. The Gambia Regiment made a wide encircling move that eventually necessitated the Japanese to pull out and Point 425 was taken. Meanwhile, the 5 th G.C.R. were engaged in a struggle to secure the ridge to the west of Point 425, which they successfully achieved and the 8 th G.C.R. moved down the main road to capture the Thingyittaw Pagoda on the 18 th January.

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Figure 1 The Battle of Myohaung

6th Brigade

5th Brigade

4th Brigade

1st Brigade

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The 82 nd (West Africa) Division was brought forward from the Mayu River area to join the 81 st (West Africa) Division in the operation to capture Myohaung. The plan was to encircle the city with the 5 th and 6 th Brigades driving down from the north, while the 1 st Brigade attacked from the west. The 6 th Brigade commenced clearing the area alongside the Lemro river with the 5 th Brigade on their right still engaged in clearing up in the vicinity of the Pagoda where there were still pockets of Japanese troops in the hills.

Revised instructions were issued by the divisional headquarters on the 21 st January, with the 4 th Brigade from the 82 nd (West Africa) Division also coming under command of the 81 st (West Africa) Division for the operation. The 4 th Brigade was to be brought into the line alongside the 5 th Brigade to attack the city from the hills to the north, with the 6 th Brigade securing the banks of the River Lemro. The 10 th N.R. from 4 th Brigade and the 82 nd Divisional Reconnaissance Regiment both crossed the River Lemro to work their way down the eastern bank towards the ferry crossing leading from Myohaung. The 4 th Brigade was to attack supported by the divisional artillery from the 82 nd Division with the 5 th Brigade supported by the divisional artillery of the 81 st Division. 1 st Brigade was to attack and clear the range of hills to the south of Myohaung and then turn north to meet the other two brigades working their way south.

The Japanese forces defending Myohaung was the Matsu Detachment. Under command of Major General T. KOBA, the detachment comprised the 55 th Reconnaissance Regiment which had been fighting in the Kaladan for the previous twelve months. It had been reinforced by the Headquarters 54 th Infantry Group, III Battalion 111 th Infantry Regiment, III Battalion 154 th

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Infantry Regiment, artillery and engineer troops. The I Battalion 111 th Infantry Regiment from the Matsu Detachment was retained in Akyab.

On the 23 rd January, air attacks were made on key Japanese positions and 4th Brigade commenced its advance. The 9 th N.R. failed to capture a hill feature next to the main road leading north, but the 5 th N.R., after a fight lasting all day, managed to cross the Panzin Chaung to the east of the city. The 42 nd Mortar Regiment was concentrated to support the assault by the 4 th Brigade. The 5 th Brigade started their attack and pressed towards the paddy fields to the east and the ferry crossing point. The Japanese managed to maintain a firm grip on a large hill called Point 404 alongside the river, but the brigade swept in behind the feature.

The 1 st Brigade had faced a difficult march to get into position to launch their attack. They started off at Htizwe and took three days to reach the west bank of the Kaladan River. They started to cross the Kaladan on the 20 th January and had to cross several chaungs before they approached Myohaung from the west. The 2 nd N.R. managed to push a patrol to the outskirts of the city where they surprised a party of Japanese soldiers trying to destroy a bridge leading into the city. A firefight ensued which drove the Japanese back, but serious clashes continued for the next two days. An African non- commissioned officer Sergeant Ibrahim WADAI (NA/32204) was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for his gallantry during this incident for clearing the bridge almost single handed. He was destined never to receive his award however, for he was killed in action on the 27 th February 1945. He is commemorated on Face 104 of the Rangoon Memorial.

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The 1 st N.R. had been taken by landing craft to the southern end of the hills and concentrated close to their objective Point 268 by the 23 rd January.

The main attack on the city took place on the 24 th January, with units from all the West African colonies drawn from both divisions taking part. In the south, the 1 st N.R. assaulted Point 268 supported by the 30 th Indian Mountain Regiment and an air strike by eight Thunderbolts. The companies went forward as soon as the air strike had ended with the leading company showing great speed in securing the hill. The 1 st N.R. then turned north to join up with the 3 rd N.R. who had taken Point 326. The 2 nd N.R. pressed on through the southern outskirts of the city to link up with the 3 rd N.R.. the 4 th Brigade continued to press down from the north as the 5 th Brigade moved to the ferry crossing and riverbank. The Japanese realised they were being squeezed and quickly evacuated the city. On the 25th January, troops from the 4 th Brigade entered Myohaung to find it deserted, and the 5 th Brigade found Point 404 likewise empty of Japanese troops. Patrols from the 1 st N.R. and 2 nd N.R. dealt with some parties of Japanese troops withdrawing to the south to try to get over the Paungdok Chaung, but otherwise the Japanese had gone.

THE PURSUIT FROM MYOHAUNG

The 82 nd (West Africa) Division concentrated in Myohaung for a short rest. The 1 st Brigade pressed on however to exploit the capture of Myohaung and secure the crossing of the Lemro River. This was achieved with little opposition. The West Africans continued to press the Japanese towards the 4th /18 th Royal Garhwal Rifles from 25 th Division who were now at Pulibauk. The villages of Hpontha fell to the 1 st Brigade on the 29 th January, with

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Minbya falling to the 22 nd Anti-Tank Regiment on the 1 st February. On the 2nd February, the Garhwalis patrolled towards Minbya and confirmed it was unoccupied by the Japanese and made contact with the West African Division.

The 82 nd (West Africa) Division was tasked with pursuing the Japanese in the South Arakan advancing on two parallel routes; the first down the Yaw Chaung to Kywegiseik and the second down the Lemro River to Kangaw. On the 22 nd January 1945, units from the 25 th Indian Infantry Division had landed at Kangaw to act as a block on the retreating Japanese forces. The 82 nd (West Africa) Infantry Division was to drive the Japanese onto the block at Kangaw in order to destroy the Japanese Army left in the Arakan.

The division moved in several columns. To the west and closest to the sea, the 22 nd (West Africa) Anti-Tank Regiment (acting as infantry) and the 81 st Reconnaissance Regiment moved down the west bank of the River Lemro. The 4 th Brigade traveled down the River Lemro in river craft with the objective of taking Hpontha, with the 1 st Brigade clearing the left (east) bank of the river. The 2 nd Brigade was in reserve.

The 1 st Brigade detached the 1 st Bn. The Nigeria Regiment which stayed on the west bank of the river and made for Minbya. The battalion set off on the 27 th January, with the first patrols entering Minbya on the 29 th January, to find it unoccupied. There were a few minor skirmishes, before the battalion crossed the River Lemro to rejoin the brigade on the 4 th February at Hpontha. However, ‘C’ Company did not rejoin the brigade as many personnel had fallen ill with what turned out to be chicken pox.

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The rest of the 1 st Brigade crossed the River Lemro on the 27 th January using whatever means were available locally. At this point, the River Lemro is about 300 yards wide, being described as a nice clear stream with a gentle current. The brigade found that the Japanese had made a usable track which the division took advantage of. On the 29 th January, the 3 rd Bn. The Nigeria Regiment entered Hpontha without opposition. The next day, however, the 3 rd Bn. The Nigeria Regiment bumped into Japanese troops in prepared positions near the village of Sittaya. The positions covered the southern bank of the Ta Ywe Chaung, which was being used by the division for transporting troops and supplies. Therefore, the 3 rd Bn. The Nigeria Regiment was ordered to clear the area.

The 2 nd Brigade was called forward and divided up into three columns to head down the eastern bank of the River Lemro, with the 22 nd (West Africa) Anti-Tank Regiment advancing down the western bank. The 81 st (West Africa) Reconnaissance Regiment returned to its parent division and India. The 4 th Brigade and 82 nd (West Africa) Reconnaissance Regiment advanced down the Tawye Chaung further to the east of the 2 nd Brigade heading for Dalet. The intention remained to drive the retreating Japanese back onto the 25 th Indian Division at Kangaw.

The 2 nd Brigade made good progress, overcoming small Japanese groups of troops that attempted to delay them. On the 8 th February, they reached the village of Kani, driving a Japanese unit from a hill position immediately to the north-east of the village. The next day, the 9 th February, now only nine miles from Kangaw, the brigade came under the command of the 25 th Indian

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Division. The opposition strengthened as the brigade closed in on Kangaw, with the village of Gyethinka being cleared by the 1 st G.C.R. who killed fourteen Japanese soldiers for the loss of one African soldier injured. On the 10 th January, the 3 rd G.C.R. crossed the Gyethinka Chaung and the brigade continued to advance southwards.

Meanwhile, the advance of the 4 th Brigade was slower, as it had to cut its way through some dense jungle in the foothills of the Arakan Yomas. The brigade was in regular contact with small Japanese groups trying to escape from the advancing Allies. On the 8 th February 1945, the 10 th N.R. came across a strong Japanese position near the village of Kyaukpandu. The Japanese were dug in covering the chaung with machine gun and rifle fire. The two leading companies climbed a hill feature onto a ridge, later called ‘Banana Ridge’. As the Nigerians dug on themselves, they were attacked and the forward company was forced to retire back through the other company’s positions. The two companies were attacked on eight occasions during the night, so early on the morning of the 9 th February the rest of the 10 th N.R. came up to join the two companies on Banana Ridge. A company was ordered to attack the Japanese troops who had established themselves on Banana Ridge, which they did with great valour, but were repulsed. The fighting ebbed and flowed for the next hour, before the Nigerians withdrew having sustained heavy casualties. For his gallantry during that day and the following days, Major 297655 Cecil Ernest KALSHOVEN was awarded the Military Cross.

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Cyril Ernest KALSHOVEN was born in Pretoria on the 17 th March 1915. He joined the Army on the 2 nd July 1940 as a Second Lieutenant on the General List. On the 6 th August 1945, he transferred to the Rhodesian Forces, eventually dying in Bulaweyo on the 31 st July 1972.

In addition to Major KALSHOVEN, two Nigerians were awarded the Military Medal for their gallantry on Banana Ridge; Sergeant NA/28387 Yaro ZURU and Lance Corporal NA/50620 Bagudu LAMURDE. Their awards were gazetted on the 24 th May 1945.

During the night of the 11 th /12 th February, the Japanese withdrew about five hundred yards along the ridge, so one company of the 10 th N.R. moved forward to occupy these positions. They found about twenty dead Japanese soldiers lying alongside some fallen Nigerians. The 9 th N.R. moved up around and the right of the 10 th N.R.. They tried to outflank the Japanese positions on Banana Ridge, but were prevented from doing so by Japanese defenders. The 5 th N.R. came up behind the 10 th N.R. and sent one company out to the left of Banana Ridge. The 30 th Indian Mountain Regiment came up in support, and a strip was built by the brigade to evacuate wounded personnel by light aircraft.

Preparations were made for an operation to clear the Japanese from Banana Ridge and the area around Kyaukpandu, but then orders were changed. The 4th Brigade was detailed to follow the 1 st Brigade over the hills towards Dalet.

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The brigade began to withdraw on the 18 th February, the same day the battle for Kangaw ended. It consolidated around Kaw. Having done so, reports were received that the Japanese had withdrawn. The 5 th N.R. was therefore ordered to move down the Yaw Chaung to Kweguseik, which they reached on the 22 nd February to find abandoned Japanese ammunition dumps and stores. The next day, contact was made with the 7 th Bn. 16 th Punjab Regiment advancing up from Kangaw, and the pursuit was over.

THE FINAL PHASES

The central Arakan battles were now moving into their final phases. One of the main problems affecting the Corps was that of supply. It was decided, therefore, to reduce the troops forward in the area. The 81 st West Africa Division had already left for India and it was decided that the 25 th Division should be next to go due to its twelve months on the front line. The 26 th Division was placed next in line to be withdrawn as it had been longer in action overall than the 82 nd (West Africa) Division. The 3 rd Commando Brigade was to be withdrawn for a rest having spearheaded three assault landings. In addition, the 50th Tank Brigade was earmarked for withdrawal, as the scope for tanks in the Arakan was so limited.

The dispositions of XV Corps at this time were the 26 th Division was on Ramree Island, the 25 th Division was in the Kangaw area and Myebon peninsula with the 3 rd Commando Brigade. The 51 st Brigade from the 25 th Division was already concentrating in Akyab prior to moving back to India. The 82 nd (West Africa) Division had arrived at Kangaw, with the 1 st and 4 th Brigades en route from Hpontha to An as the Japanese tried to withdraw through the An pass back into central Burma. There were known to be a

w ww.britishm ilitaryhistory.co.uk Page 28 5 January 2010 [82 (WEST AFRICA) INFANTRY DIVISION ] large Japanese force at Tamandu, so the 82 nd Division was to advance on that town from the north. An assault landing was to take place west of An to be undertaken by the 25 th Indian Division.

The corps commander decided to establish a bridgehead at Ru-Ywa near An. The 53 rd Indian Infantry Brigade from 25 th Indian Division was chosen to lead the assault. The commandos conducted several reconnaissance patrols and landings in the area in order to select suitable sites for the landings. With their work complete, they said goodbye to the 25 th Division. It was appreciated that the Japanese had elements of the 111 th Regiment, where although the 1 st and 3 rd Battalions had suffered heavy casualties, the 2 nd Battalion had not been engaged. The 154 th Regiment was also in the area, where again the 1 st and 3 rd Battalions had suffered heavy losses but the 2 nd Battalion was on detached duty in Mandalay. The third regiment of the 54 th Division, the 121 st had not been heavily engaged as was therefore relatively up to strength. The 54 th Reconnaissance Regiment was also present, minus its 2 nd squadron, which had been wiped out at Myebon.

THE LANDINGS AT RU – YWA

At 10.30 hours on the 16 th February, the two leading battalions of the 53 rd Indian Brigade touched down on their selected beaches. It took the Japanese three days to react against the landings. On the 20 th February, because of the intense Japanese shellfire on Oboe Red beach, another beach was opened up called Roger Green. The 2 nd West Africa Brigade was transported down from Kangaw and landed on the beaches between the 18 th and 22 nd February. The West Africans passed through 53 rd Brigade and advanced some four miles east. Next, elements of the 74 th Brigade were

w ww.britishm ilitaryhistory.co.uk Page 29 5 January 2010 [82 (WEST AFRICA) INFANTRY DIVISION ] taken from Myebon where they had concentrated and also landed at Ruywa. The 14 th /10 th Baluch and 7 th /16 th Punjab Regiments were ferried direct from Kangaw to Ruywa. This placed a strain on the transport arrangements but they coped well to reinforce the landings.

By the 28 th February, the 14 th /10 th Baluch Regiment had advanced north halfway towards Tamandu. There had been sporadic resistance, but no organised resistance from the Japanese. There were some fierce and heavy counter attacks leading to some confused fighting, but this started to fade away by the 4 th March. The main resistance was expected at Tamandu and with the threat of most of the aircraft being diverted to the Fourteenth Army in ten days, speed was of the essence. The 74 th Brigade were ordered to take a feature called Snowdon on the approach to Tamandu.

THE ADVANCE TOWARDS AN

The 82 nd (West Africa) Division had been ordered to destroy the Japanese troops in the vicinity of An. Major General STOCKWELL decided to concentrate the 1 st and 4 th Brigades in firm bases east of the Dalet Chaung ready to commence the advance on the 24 th February. The 82 nd (West Africa) Reconnaissance Regiment led the advance south from Kangaw, followed by the 1 st Brigade and then the 4 th Brigade. The Reconnaissance Regiment began to find the country increasing difficult to penetrate, but only met slight resistance. They had to cut their way through dense bamboo to make tracks through the area. The 1 st Brigade crossed the Me Chaung on the 18 th February, and then driving back a Japanese outpost, reached the Dalet Chaung opposite Kweshi. The fact there were still Japanese troops in the area became evident when a party of about forty emerged from the hills.

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The Reconnaissance Regiment responded quickly and caused some casualties before the Japanese withdrew back into the hills, leaving behind their packs. They attacked again that night, but the Nigerians drove them off. The remnants of this party remained in the area however regularly causing a nuisance to the West African troops as the passed through.

Before the 1 st and 4 th Brigades could cross the Dalet Chaung it was necessary to clear the hills to the west of the loop in the river. The 3 rd N.R. launched some attacks to gain the objectives, but the dense jungle proved difficult to force the Japanese back. Meanwhile, the 1 st N.R. were busy making and improving a track to the northern tip of the western loop of the river. The Dalet Chaung at this point is tidal, with a strong current in either direction as the tide ebbed and flowed. A small number of rubber boats were available to carry the troops across, being guided and pulled across by use of parachute cord strung across the river. The 1 st N.R. made the first crossing during the night of the 24 th /25 th February 1945. There was no opposition so the battalion moved forward to concentrate on some high ground about a mile south of the crossing point. The 3 rd N.R. crossed the river the following night by using a ford discovered a short distance downstream and began to advance on Dalet.

Then the 82 nd (West Africa) Reconnaissance Regiment, located at the junction of the Me Chaung and Dalet Chaung, reported significant Japanese troop movements up the right bank of the Dalet Chaung. The Japanese seized the high ground west of the village of Kweshi and effectively blocked the two crossing points used by the 1 st N.R. and 3 rd N.R.. The 2 nd N.R. was ordered to clear the Japanese troops away from the crossing points, but were unable to do so. A company of 1 st N.R. which had remained at Kweshi also

w ww.britishm ilitaryhistory.co.uk Page 31 5 January 2010 [82 (WEST AFRICA) INFANTRY DIVISION ] became involved, and fierce fighting broke out during the night of the 26 th /27 th February. The fighting continued throughout the 27 th February, with the 2 nd N.R. becoming exhausted having suffered heavy casualties. The 4th Brigade was called up with 10 th N.R. taking over the hill originally captured by the 3 rd N.R.

A planned attack on the Japanese positions took place on the 1 st March 1945, being undertaken by the 9 th N.R. supported by the mountain artillery and an air strike. 9th N.R. assaulted the hill as soon as the air strike had finished, but they failed to dislodge the Japanese. Five-hundred 3.7” shells were fired by the mountain gunners on the hill prior to another attack by the 10 th N.R., which was unfortunately also unsuccessful. Despite this fighting, the 3 rd N.R. moved forward and captured the town of Dalet, sending one company to occupy a hill feature that became called the ‘Big Contour’. During this battle, the commanding officer of the 10 th N.R., Lieutenant Colonel 64606 Claude Anthony WADE, M.C., was killed. He was thirty years of age with his parent regiment being the King’s Own Scottish Borderers. He is now buried in Grave 5.C.7. at the Taukkyan War Cemetery. The new commanding officer of the 10 th N.R. was Lieutenant Colonel Nigel C. STOCKWELL, a cousin of the divisional commander Hughie STOCKWELL.

The following day, the 5 th N.R. also lost their commanding officer. Lieutenant Colonel 31717 Leonard OLIVER was killed on the 2 nd March 1945. His parent regiment was the West Yorkshire Regiment (Prince of Wales’s Own). OLIVER is now buried in Grave 10.A.8 of the Taukkyan War Cemetery in Myanmar.

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Figure 3 – The Crossing of the Dalet Chaung

Dalet Chaung Kweshi

Me Chaung

Dalet Town

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A CHANGE IN ORDERS

The XV Indian Corps at this time was ordered by Lieutenant General LEESE to reduce its operations consistent with a reduction in air supply capability. This meant the 82 nd (West Africa) Division would now have to be supplied by land from a base to be established at Tamandu. The division was tasked with destroying the Northern Group of the Japanese 54 th Division, comprising the 111 th and 154 th Regiments and the 54 th Reconnaissance Regiment, although all Japanese units were considerably reduced in strength. This led to Major General STOCKWELL having to revise his plans for the division. He issued new orders for the division on the 1 st March. The 1 st Brigade was to advance to Letmauk on the road from Tamandu to An through the Arakan Yomas. The 2 nd Brigade was to move to Ru-Ywa, and then form a firm base on the road from Tamandu to Letmauk. The 4 th Brigade was to clear the Tamandu to Letmauk road in order to maintain the division. The 82 nd (West Africa) Reconnaissance Regiment and 30 th Indian Mountain Regiment were both under command.

But before this could be achieved, the current position on the Dalet Chaung had to be stabilized. By the 3 rd March, the 1 st Brigade was concentrated around Dalet and Big Contour. The brigade then started to move south, having to cross the Dalet Taung Chaung. The Nigerians found the Japanese opposing the crossing by use of a ford, and they also were occupying some hills overlooking the road and ford. An attack was launched on the 4 th March by the 3 rd N.R., supported by mortars from the division. They kept going all day, but could not throw back the Japanese troops. It was accepted that this position could not be forced without severe casualties, so an attempt was made further to the west. On the morning of the 5 th March, a company from 1st N.R. passed through the bridgehead and occupied a hill about one

w ww.britishm ilitaryhistory.co.uk Page 34 5 January 2010 [82 (WEST AFRICA) INFANTRY DIVISION ] kilometer south of the chaung. The Japanese reacted quickly, and violently attacked the Nigerians dug in on the hill. They were repulsed but succeeded in breaching the company’s position. By the evening, all the British officers and non-commissioned officers in the company had been wounded, so the company was withdrawn back into the beachhead. One platoon was left behind, but they managed to successfully extract themselves to rejoin the battalion in the afternoon on the 7 th March. The platoon commander, Sergeant 6853483 Frederick Edward HEDLEY who came from North London, was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal on the 2 nd August 1945.

Due to the casualties the 1 st Brigade had sustained over the past few days, it was restricted to patrolling activity only for two or three days to recover. The 2 nd Brigade having reached Ru-Ywa moved inland to the head waters of the Me Chaung (a river of the same name as that which empties into the Dalet Chaung, but this one is to the south with its head near Letmauk and its mouth near Tamandu). The brigade advanced with determination despite Japanese troops harassing their movements. The 22 nd (West Africa) Anti- Tank Regiment was used to keep the lines of communication open for the brigade. On the 6 th March, two companies of the 1 st G.C.R. and two companies from 2 nd G.C.R. managed to block the Tamandu to An road. There was hand-to-hand fighting in the vicinity, with the roadblock under attack from both directions. The pressure and desperation of the Japanese to clear the block meant the 2 nd Brigade could not maintain the block. The brigade skillfully disengaged and moved into the hills to the west of the road.

The 4 th Brigade managed to extract itself from the Dalet area on the 1 st and 2nd March, and led by the 82 nd (West Africa) Reconnaissance Regiment, they found tracks to take them down the western side of the Dalet Chaung

w ww.britishm ilitaryhistory.co.uk Page 35 5 January 2010 [82 (WEST AFRICA) INFANTRY DIVISION ] towards Tamandu. The brigade headquarters and 9 th N.R. reached Tamandu on the 7 th March.

The situation of the division on the 9 th March was that the 1 st Brigade was still in the Dalet area, the 2 nd Brigade was located alongside the Tamandu to An road near Letmauk, and the 4 th Brigade was engaged around Tamandu trying to build a firm base for divisional operations.

During March, the 25 th Indian Division increased the pressure on the Japanese. They captured a position called Snowdon and before reserve ammunition could be brought forward or the position consolidated, the Japanese counter attacked and drove the Allies off. Furious hand to hand fighting took place but finally Snowdon East was retaken. The Japanese still held the top of the pass on the road between An and Tamandu, in particular two features that dominated the road called Whistle and Strong. Further west was another feature called Pig that they also occupied. On the 5 th March, the 7 th /16 th Punjab Regiment attacked Pig at the point of a bayonet, succeeding in capturing it.

Meanwhile, the 4 th West Africa Brigade was brought down to the positions of the 74 th Brigade, in order to be ferried across a chaung and link up with the 1st Brigade. The 5 th Bn. Nigeria Regiment crossed the chaung and commenced an outflanking movement on the area. The rest of the West African Brigade followed however, they were held up by small packets of Japanese troops.

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Figure 3 – The Ru-Ywa and Tamandu Area

Taungmaw

Kolan

Letmauk

Dalet Chaung

Tam andu

Strong Whistle Shaukchon

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THE FIGHTING AROUND TAMANDU

The village of Tamandu had been taken by units from the 74 th Indian Brigade which had landed at Ru-Ywa at the beginning of March. The Japanese continued to hold some hill features to the north of Tamandu on either side of the road to An. On the 3 rd March, units from the 74 th Indian Brigade had occupied Point 582 on the right of the road and a feature which was called ‘Pig’ on the left side of the road. The 3 rd Bn. 2 nd King Edward VII’s Own Gurkha Rifles, who were occupying Point 582, were counter-attacked by a strong Japanese force. A fierce battle lasted for the whole of the 4 th March as the Gurkhas fought to retain the feature. Despite heavy casualties, the Gukhas drove the Japanese off the feature.

On the 5 th March, the 7 th /16 th Pubjab Regiment were directed to move onto Point 582 and then launch an attack on ‘Whistle’, and then cross the road to take ‘Strong’. The 5 th N.R. were ordered to pass through these positions and then take another feature called ‘Dog’ about a mile further on. Whistle was successfully captured but Strong held out. The 5 th N.R. therefore had to undertake a wide outflanking move towards Dog. Late on the 5 th March, the 5th N.R. managed to capture part of Dog. On this date, twenty-four year old Rifleman Bhanbhagta Gurung from the 3 rd /2 nd Gurkhas won the Victoria Cross for his conduct on ‘Snowdon’.

On the 6 th and 7 th March, the 5 th N.R. tried to push on but were counter- attacked. They managed to make some progress but were held up on the steep ridge that formed part of the feature. Another attack planned for the 8th March was called off as the 4 th Brigade was ordered to hold its positions. The 9 th N.R. assembled behind the 74 th Brigade in order to pass through as

w ww.britishm ilitaryhistory.co.uk Page 38 5 January 2010 [82 (WEST AFRICA) INFANTRY DIVISION ] soon as Strong was captured. However, Strong was still holding out so the 9th N.R. had to follow the route taken by the 5 th N.R.. The 10 th N.R. were tasked with being ferried up the Dalet Chaung to be landed beyond Strong and to link up with the 5 th N.R.. The brigade faced difficulties because of a shortage of water but concerns about the position of the 2 nd Brigade meant that risks had to be taken to relieve them. This is where the unarmed soldiers of the Auxiliary Groups became so important as they were able to carry, usually through head loading, the water and supplies needed by the fighting troops.

The 10 th N.R. were ferried up the Dalet Chaung after dark on the 8 th March, passing within fifty feet of the Japanese positions on Strong to be landed unopposed. Their objective was a tall feature called ‘Cat’, but the battalion failed to secure the location. The 9 th N.R. were shelled by the Japanese located on Strong which caused some delay in their march. The 74 th Indian Brigade made further attempts to capture Strong on the 10 th March but the Japanese held on. They also held onto some positions on both Cat and Dog, but when the 9 th N.R. managed to establish a block on the road behind Strong, the pincers were closing in on the Japanese. They began to realise the position they were in, so on the night of the 10 th /11 th March, they withdrew from Strong through a very narrow gap between the British forces. On the morning of the 11 th March, patrols from the 9 th N.R. and 10 th N.R. found that the Japanese had withdrawn from Cat and Dog as well.

The 4 th Brigade continued their advance towards Letmauk and the relief of the 2 nd Brigade, leaving the 74 th Indian Brigade to consolidate around Tamandu. The brigade was supported by tanks from the 19 th Lancers, 102 nd Light Regiment, 8 th Field Regiment and a troop of 5.5” medium guns. The

w ww.britishm ilitaryhistory.co.uk Page 39 5 January 2010 [82 (WEST AFRICA) INFANTRY DIVISION ] brigade made good progress, including 9 th N.R. taking two thickly wooded features called ‘Lion’ and ‘Tiger’ on the 13 th March. 10 th N.R. then took the lead, overcoming several ambushes en-route. They captured some high ground outside Kolan allowing the 9 th N.R. to capture the village on the morning of the 16 th March. On the 17 th March, the 10 th N.R. entered the village of Letmauk and seized a feature the far side of the Letmauk Chaung that dominated the area. This bluff was rushed in the twilight of the evening by a company led by Captain TOLMIE, who surprised the Japanese and put them to flight as darkness fell.

One company from the 9 th N.R. and one from the 10 th N.R. were sent around on a right hook to block the An road beyond Letmauk. The 4 th Brigade was desperate to reach the 2 nd Brigade, but increasingly faced determined opposition as the Japanese themselves were desperate to keep their escape route through the Arakan Yomas open to allow the evacuation of the remains of their 28 th Army. The road at this point ran through a gorge alongside the Me Chaung, with the Japanese well dug in. The 9 th N.R. attacked up through, but were beaten back with severe casualties, losing their second-in- command, adjutant and signals officer in one burst of machine gun fire. One company of the 5 th N.R. had only two europeans remaining, with Captain Ross TOD being seriously injured during an attack leaving Sergeant KENT as the sole non-African soldier. It became apparent that although the 2 nd Brigade was only two miles away, the exhausted troops of the 4 th Brigade would not be able to break through to them.

The 1 st Brigade managed to arrive in the area on the 20 th March. The brigade forced a way across the Dalet Taung Chaung by soldiers swimming across to find a suitable route. The Japanese had secured a foothold on ‘Big

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Contour’ and refused to be budged. The breakout began at 04.30 hours on the 11 th March, when the 2 nd N.R. and 1 st (West Africa) Field Company deployed a floating brigade they had built and secured a bridgehead. The 1 st N.R. followed and then the 3 rd N.R. withdrew off Big Contour and the brigade successfully evaded the Japanese to reach Shaukchon on the 16 th March and Letmauk on the 20 th March.

In the meantime, the Japanese had reinforced their troops between the 2 nd Brigade and Letmauk. On the 15 th March, a shell landed on the Brigade Headquarters of the 2 nd Brigade injuring Brigadier WESTERN and his brigade major and killing his G.S.O. 3. The Gold Coast soldiers of the brigade remained firm, however, and continued to harass the Japanese. As Brigadier WESTERN had to be evacuated, Lieutenant Colonel B. E. HAZELTON assumed command of the brigade on an acting basis until the arrival of Brigadier Adam Tyrie WILSON-BRAND who assumed command on the 24 th March.

On their arrival at Letmauk, the 1 st Brigade were ordered to break through the block and relieve the 2 nd Brigade. Brigadier SWYNNERTON started by trying to capture some hills to the east, but the brigade was repulsed, so he switched his line of attack to the south of the road. The 22 nd Anti-Tank Regiment was placed under his command. The 1 st N.R. captured Point 838 but they could not continue down the ridge. The ridge was only twelve feet wide, clear at the top but with the sides covered in dense bamboo. Mortar bombs were used to set fire to the bamboo to burn out the defenders. The 3rd N.R. captured a prominent hill called ‘Camel’ and pushed forward into densely wooden country. The 1 st N.R. gradually pushed forward, supported by the 2 nd N.R. and 22 nd Anti-Tank Regiment. The break through to Point 1269 and 2 nd Brigade’s positions was made on the evening of the 24 th March.

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By the evening of the 26 th March, the 2 nd Brigade had been withdrawn to area around the airstrip at Letmauk, from where the injured were evacuated. The 2 nd Brigade then made its way back to Tamandu to rest and refit.

The Japanese attacked the section of the perimeter held by the 2 nd Auxiliary Group, but did not penetrate into the divisional area. Apart from some patrol activity, the Japanese troops appeared the thin out from the Letmauk area as they withdrew to An and the Salween valley.

At the end of March 1945, the division was ordered to pull back from Letmauk and move back to Tamandu and then to move southwards down the coast to the area of Tanlwe and Taungup. By this time, the 25 th Indian Division had been withdrawn back to Akyab. The 22 nd (East Africa) Brigade had landed at Ru-Ywu to relieve the 74 th Indian Brigade as soon as possible. Initially, the 74 th Brigade was too heavily engaged to be released. It was decided that Strong would have to be captured before the brigade could be released, which was achieved on the 11 th March. This was the final action fought by the 25 th Indian Division.

In order to clear the rest of the southern Arakan, the 4th Indian Brigade from the 26 th Indian Division crossed over from Ramree Island. They landed at five places on the Mai Chaung in the vicinity of Letpan. On the 15 th March, the 2 nd /13 th Frontier Force Rifles established a road block south of Letpan. The 2 nd /7 th Rajputs had reached Pada, about three miles south of Lamu. The advance was supported by tanks from the 146 th Regiment, Royal Armoured Corps.

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On the 17 th March, 22 nd (East Africa) Brigade was concentrated at Ruywa and came under command of the 82 nd (West Africa) Infantry Division. The 22 nd (East Africa) Infantry Brigade had originally been formed on the 19 th September 1939 in East Africa. The brigade had served in the Abyssinian Campaign of 1941. It had also served in Madagascar, East Africa and Ceylon before arriving in Burma on the 10 th December 1944. The brigade was organised as an independent brigade group, and was foreseen to be a reinforcement formation for the 11 th (East Africa) Infantry Division which had been deployed in Burma. The brigade, however, was sent to the Arakan to come under command of the XV Indian Corps.

The formation was commanded by Brigadier Reginald Forster JOHNSTONE. He was born on the 14 th May 1904, and educated at Charterhouse and Cambridge University where he gained a B.A. degree. In 1943, JOHNSTONE had been appointed the commanding officer of the 2 nd Battalion, The Royal Scots (The Royal Regiment), which was based at Gibraltar. He assumed command of the brigade on the 13 th June 1944 whilst it was based in East Africa. The brigade comprised the 1 st (Nyasaland) Battalion, King’s African Rifles (Lieutenant Colonel R. D. BLACKIE), 3 rd Battalion, The Northern Rhodesia Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel J. W. E. MacKENZIE) and 1 st Battalion, Rhodesian African Rifles (Lieutenant Colonel G. H. W. GOODE).

On the 18 th March, the 22 nd Brigade was ordered to move south and link up with the 4 th Indian Brigade from 26 th Division, which was outside Taungup. After its landings, the 4 th Indian Brigade was pressing south with such vigour that it was difficult for the supplies to keep up. By the 19 th March, the

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2nd/13 th Frontier Force Rifles had pushed the Japanese out of Sabyin. By the 22 nd March, the 2 nd /7 th Rajputs had overcome resistance at Zani and were only nine miles from Taungup. The 22 nd (East Africa) Brigade found little or no opposition in front of its advance. On 24 th March, the 1 st /18 th Royal Garhwal Rifles passed through the Rajputs and penetrated a further two miles south. By 30 th March, the leading troops of the 22 nd Brigade had arrived in Letpan and the 4 th Indian Brigade was forming up for the final assault on Taungup. The 36 th and 71 st Brigades from the 26 th Division were still on Ramree Island and not involved in operations, so they were withdrawn. It was only necessary to relieve the 4 th Indian Brigade and the 22 nd (East Africa) Brigade was catching it up fast.

On the 1 st April, Major General STOCKWELL issued his divisional orders. The 1st Brigade, with 82 nd (West Africa) Reconnaissance Regiment, 1 st Light Battery, 105 th and 106 th Mortar Batteries and the 22 nd Anti-Tank Regiment under command was to follow up the Japanese withdrawal and contain the enemy forward of Letmauk. The 2 nd (West Africa) Brigade was ordered south to Taungup together with the 22 nd (East Africa) Brigade. The 4 th Brigade was ordered to concentrate at Shaukchon. STOCKWELL assumed command of all formations now deployed in the southern Arakan, including the 4 th Indian Brigade from 26 th Indian Division and the 22 nd (East Africa) Brigade, with effect from the 5 th April 1945.

On the 3 rd April, the 2 nd Bn. The Green Howards captured Hill 370 some three miles north of Taungup and, on the next day the 22 nd Brigade began to move along the banks of the Tanlwe Chaung with a view of getting behind the Japanese positions. On the 5 th April however, the Japanese launched a determined counter attack on Hill 370, succeeding in driving the Allies troops

w ww.britishm ilitaryhistory.co.uk Page 44 5 January 2010 [82 (WEST AFRICA) INFANTRY DIVISION ] off the feature. Later in the day, the Allies put in two attacks to retake the hill, the first was unsuccessful, but the second achieved the result.

The 22 nd (East Africa) Brigade encountered increased resistance in the vicinity of a ridge called ‘Chevalier’ on the Taungup to Prome road, some twelve miles east of Taungup. The 3 rd N.R.R. deployed to the right and 1 st R.A.R. to the left along the ridge. The battalions commenced patrolling in the area. On Saturday 7 th April 1945, whilst leading one such patrol from the 3 rd N.R.R., Lieutenant 333936 Harold Pursglove BOOTH was killed. His platoon came under fire from a Japanese machine gun post and he was hit whilst withdrawing the unit. Twenty-three year old Harold BOOTH came from Kasama in Northern Rhodesia, and was the only Northern Rhodesia born officer to be killed in a Northern Rhodesia Regiment unit during the war. He is commemorated on Face 19 of the Rangoon Memorial. On his death, Sergeant BWALYA assumed command and successfully withdrew the platoon after ensuring that Lieutenant BOOTH was dead.

On the 10 th April, the 1 st Brigade came upon several large groups of Japanese soldiers, so it was decided to bring the brigade back to Letmauk. On the 11 th April, the 2 nd N.R. ambushed a large party of Japanese troops marching in threes down the road, apparently unaware that Letmauk was still held by the West Africans. The Japanese suffered heavy casualties with the survivors disappearing into the jungle. Then the brigade started to be attacked by Japanese troops coming from the north, and they also cut the road near Shaukchon. The 10 th N.R. from the 4 th Brigade, which was still in the area, was used to restore the situation there. The rest of 4 th Brigade had by this time embarked at Tamandu to be ferried down to Taungup, whilst the 2nd Brigade was driven down by motor transport.

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The 2 nd Brigade found the road blocked by a Japanese force at locations called ‘Lion’ and ‘Tiger’. The first they knew was when a lorry convoy was ambushed. On the 13 th March, the commanding officer of the 7 th Auxiliary Group was flown in to take command. He raised a force from the 2 nd and 7 th Auxiliary Groups and successfully dealt with the Japanese causing the problems in the area.

Letmauk was now considered by Major General STOCKWELL to be untenable, in addition to which, the supply dumps at ‘Wetherby’ (also known as ‘Devonshire’) just to the north of Tamandu were now vulnerable with no troops to protect them, 1 st Brigade was ordered by XV Indian Corps on the 12 th April to withdraw back down to Wetherby and Tamandu. The 82 nd Reconnaissance Regiment and 3 rd N.R. had to clear groups of Japanese soldiers en-route so that the brigade reached Tamandu on the 15 th April 1945. The brigade desperately needed some time to rest and refit. Casualties had been severe, with the brigade losing thirty-nine officers and twenty-five British non-commissioned officers killed or wounded since commencing operations. There had been virtually no replacements, so units had to be reorganised. The brigade continued, however, to send out patrols towards Letmauk and onwards to An. A patrol from brigade headquarters and 1 st N.R. entered An on the 13 th May, by which time the Japanese had fled from the area.

Divisional Headquarters of the division had opened at Kindaunggyi, just to the north of Taungup on the 5 th April. The 1 st Brigade was concentrating around Tamandu to the north, with the 2 nd and 4 th Brigades concentrating

w ww.britishm ilitaryhistory.co.uk Page 46 5 January 2010 [82 (WEST AFRICA) INFANTRY DIVISION ] around Kindaunggyi. The 22 nd (East Africa) Brigade was under command in the area and the 4 th Indian Brigade was still under command on this date. The relief of the 4 th Indian Brigade commenced on the 11 th April. The 22 nd Brigade commenced a wide left hook inland of Taungup to cut off the Japanese escape route. On the 15 th April, troops from the 4 th Indian Brigade entered Taungup town, but could not hold the town. By the 17 th April, the relief of the 4 th Indian Brigade by the 2 nd (West Africa) Brigade was complete and the 4 th Indian Brigade sailed for Ramree Island. The 2 nd Green Howards, however, were transferred from the command of the 4th Indian Brigade to the 4 th (West Africa) Brigade on the 17 th April 1945.

Typical of the little actions that took place regularly during operations, Corporal Musa DOKI was leading a patrol of four soldiers from 9 th N.R. when they bumped into a Japanese patrol of similar strength, led by an officer. DOKI shot the officer and two others, and then charged the other two, setting on fire with the use of grenades. He recovered the officer’s sword and an invaluable map. He was awarded the Military Medal for his actions.

Major General STOCKWELL ordered his two West African brigades to take and hold Taungup. The town is situated on the southern bank of a chaung of the same name and is surrounded by paddy fields. The paddy fields are dominated by a large jungle clad hill to the east of the town. During the night of the 26 th /27 th April, 4 th (West Africa) Brigade (less 9 th N.R. which was protecting divisional headquarters but with 2 nd Green Howards attached) crossed the Taungup Chaung against slight opposition, while the 2 nd Brigade attacked the large hill to the east.

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On the 28 th April 1945, the command of the 82 nd (West Africa) Division and 22 nd (East Africa) Brigade passed to the direct control of Allied Land Forces South East Asia as XV Indian Corps was withdrawn back to India in preparation for the invasion of Malaya.

On the 28 th April, the 4 th (West Africa) Brigade secured the occupation of Taungup having cleared the area of Japanese. The 4th Brigade then linked up with the 2 nd Brigade which had established themselves on the large hill. On the 29 th April, patrols from the division extended out some seven miles east of Taungup. 22 nd Brigade was now advancing down the road towards Prome. They came up against a roadblock eleven miles from Taungup, which was cleared by a joint attack by 2 nd Brigade and 22 nd Brigade. 22 nd Brigade continued to push on, reaching Yebawgyi on the 15 th May. The next day, Milestone 60 from Prome was reached without meeting any Japanese troops. The brigade was finding, however, large quantities of abandoned stores, ammunition and equipment along the road.

The 4 th Brigade pushed on south along the coast. They occupied Sandoway on the 10 th May and Gwa on the 13 th May. All organised Japanese resistance in the Arakan had now ceased, although some small groups continued to emerge from the jungle over the next two or three months.

On the 23 rd May 1945, Brigadier SWYNNERTON of the 1 st Brigade assumed temporary command of the division. The division now took up monsoon quarters with the divisional headquarters located at Kingdaunggyi area, where they were joined by 1 st Brigade. 2 nd Brigade was located at Taungup and the 4 th Brigade at Sandoway. Major General STOCKWELL returned to

w ww.britishm ilitaryhistory.co.uk Page 48 5 January 2010 [82 (WEST AFRICA) INFANTRY DIVISION ] command on the 14 th July 1945. The division was still in Burma when the Japanese surrendered on the 15 th August 1945.

At the end of hostilities, the division had marched a long distance down the Arakan coast. The 1 st Brigade had covered two-hundred and eighty five miles, 2 nd Brigade two-hundred and seventy four miles, and 4 th Brigade four- hundred and twenty eight miles. The scale and nature of the operations conducted by this division are borne out in the fact it suffered by far the highest casualty rate of any formation in XV Indian Corps. Twenty-nine officers were killed, ninety-four injured and two posted as missing during combat operations from December 1944 until May 1945, ie, six months. Nineteen British non-commissioned officers had been killed, with sixty-one injured and one missing. Four-hundred and twenty eight African soldiers had died on active service, with one-thousand, four-hundred and seventeen wounded and thirty-four missing. This makes a total casualty list of two- thousand and eighty-five men. In comparison, the 25 th Indian Division suffered one-thousand, three-hundred and seventy four casualties, the 26 th Indian Division six-hundred and six, and the 81 st (West Africa) Division four- hundred and thirty-eight. The Japanese are estimated to have suffered about nine-thousand, three-hundred casualties.

THE END OF THE WAR AND DISBANDMENT

The division remained in Burma as part of the garrison there following the surrender of the Japanese Forces on the 15 th August 1945. Only three divisions remained in Burma, the 17 th and 19 th Indian Infantry Divisions and the 82 nd (West Africa) Infantry Division, all under command of the 12 th Army.

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The 12 th Army was responsible for internal security in Burma, and the establishment of a peacetime Burmese Army.

In May 1946, the 12 th Army was redesignated as Burma Command. The British and Commonwealth forces in Burma were being scaled down further as Burma moved towards independence. The decision was taken to commence disbanding the 82 nd (West Africa) Infantry Division with the personnel being returned either to their home country in West Africa or to the United Kingdom. Major General STOCKWELL relinquished command of the division on the 28 th May 1946 as the formation was broken up. By September 1946, the last of the personnel had left Burma and the division was officially disbanded.

Major General STOCKWELL went on to achieve high rank in the British Army. When the division was disbanded, he returned to the United Kingdom and was awarded the Companion of the Order of the Bath (C.B.). In 1946, he was given command of the Home Counties District in the U.K. but a year later in 1947, he gained an operational command with the 6 th Airborne Division which was then deployed in Palestine. He commanded that division during the difficult period of the British withdrawal from Palestine. In 1948, he was made Commandant of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in the rank of Major General. In 1949, he was created a Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire (K.B.E.) and was knighted. In 1952, he was made General Officer Commanding the 3 rd Infantry Division and District Officer Commanding East Anglia District, a dual responsibility but under a single command.

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In 1952, he was promoted Lieutenant General and appointed General Officer Commanding Malaya, which was undergoing the communist insurgency at the time. In 1954, he returned to Europe and was made commander of the I British Corps in the British Army of the Rhine. In 1956, when the Suez Crisis escalated, Stockwell was taken from his command in B.A.O.R. and given command of the Ground Forces for the Suez Operation. Despite the political problems, operationally the military operation in November 1956 was a success. For his leadership, Stockwell was awarded a Bar to his D.S.O..

In 1957, Stockwell was promoted General and made the Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War. He held this post for the normal period of two years, before becoming Adjutant General to the Forces in 1959. He was created Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath (G.C.B.) in 1959. In 1960, he returned to Europe as the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe. He held this post for four years, stepping down in 1964 and now aged 61 years of age, retired from the Army.

General Stockwell held various other appointments, he was Colonel of the Royal Welch Fusiliers from 1952 to 1965, Colonel of the Royal Malay Regiment from 1954 to 1959, Colonel Commandant of the Army Air Corps from 1957 to 1963, Colonel Commandant of the Royal Army Educational Corps from 1959 to 1964, and an Aide de Camp General to Her Majesty The Queen from 1959 to 1962.

Following his retirement, he continued his hobby of painting, but directed most of his energy towards countryside conservation, being Chairman of the

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Kennet and Avon Canal Trust from 1966 to 1975 and a member of the British Waterways Board from 1971 to 1974.

General Sir Hugh STOCKWELL died on the 27 th November 1986 at Swindon in Wiltshire from Leukemia, aged 83 years. Despite never attending the Staff College (which was normally seen as a prerequisite for promotion to senior positions in the Army) Hugh STOCKWELL reached the top of the British Army. A tall man, who normally had a close cropped moustache, he has been described as a natural leader with a friendly and unassuming manner. He achieved this through experience and was seen by some as one of the most brilliant and courageous field commanders of his time.

On the 28 th May 1946, Brigadier SWYNNERTON left the 1 st (West Africa) Infantry Brigade having written a short history of the brigade. What jobs he did over the next four years is not known, but in 1950 he was appointed Military Attaché in Turkey. He retired in 1954 in the rank of Honorary Major General, having been awarded the Companion of the Order of the Bath (C.B.). On the 28 th September 1954, he was appointed Commandant of The Nigeria Regiment, a post he held until March 1958. He was also Colonel of The North Staffordshire Regiment from 1955 until its amalgamation in 1959. He died in 1973.

Brigadier RICKETTS left the brigade on the 31 st May 1946 when the division was broken up. In 1952, he was appointed Commanding Officer of The British Brigade in Korea. He was awarded the Commander of the British Empire (C.B.E.) in 1952 for services in Korea. In 1955, he was

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Brigadier JOHNSTONE, who commanded the 22 nd (East Africa) Infantry Brigade left the brigade in 1946 when it was disbanded. In 1947, he was appointed commanding officer of the 24 th Infantry Brigade stationed in Trieste, Italy. In 1950, he was awarded the C.B.E. and appointed as Deputy Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office. In 1953, he was made the Deputy Adjutant General of the British Army of the Rhine (possibly on promotion to Major General) and in 1956 assumed his last role in the army as the Director of Personnel Services at the War Office in the rank of Major General. He was awarded the Companion of the Order of the Bath in 1958 and retired in 1959. He died in 1976.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Arakan operations, 1942-1945 (Official history of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War, 1939-1945. Campaigns in the Eastern Theatre / Bisheshwar Prasad)

History of the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series – The War Against Japan Volumes I, II, III, IV and V. Major General S WOODBURN-KIRBY Published in 1965. Reprinted by the Naval and Military Press 2004.

The History of the Royal West African Frontier Force. Colonel A HAYWOOD and Brigadier F A S CLARKE

The Story of the 25 th Indian Division – The Arakan Campaign – Printed and Published by G.S. Borker at Wagle Process Studio & Press Ltd, Lakshmi Building, Pherozshah Mehta Road, Fort Bombay under the authority of the Director of Public Relations, War Department, Government of India.

‘Loyalty and Honour’ – The Indian Army September 1939 – August 1947 – Parts I, II and III by Chris Kempton, The Military Press, Milton Keynes 2003.

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Solah Punjab – History of the 16th Punjab Regiment – Gale and Polden 1967

A Short History of the 1 st (West African) Infantry Brigade in the Arakan 1944-45 – Written by Brigadier C. R. A. Swynnerton – Printed by E.G. Aylmer at Tracker Press & Directories Ltd, Bentinck Street, Calcutta.

The British Army Overseas 1945 – 1970 – Malcolm Bellis 2001.

British Army Overseas – 3 September 1939 – www.pages.cthome.net/dryan/orders/ukover.html

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