In a Fortnight: Food Security and Chinese “Comprehensive National Security”
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Volume 17, Issue 3 March 2, 2017 In a Fortnight: Food Security and Chinese “Comprehensive National Security” China’s Navy Gets a New Helmsman (Part 1): Spotlight on Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong By Andrew S. Erickson and Kenneth W. Allen China Tolerating Vietnam’s South China Sea Activities, For Now By Derek Grossman China and Saudi Arabia Solidify Strategic Partnership Amid Looming Risks By Chris Zambelis Renewable Energy and the PLA’s Next Generation of Self-Sufficiency (Part 1) By Wilson VornDick national security that pulls together traditional In a Fortnight: security issues with domestic stability, economic Food Security and Chinese issues and food security. “Comprehensive National This connection can be seen in Chinese Presi- dent Xi Jinping’s articulated vision of security. Security” On February 22, Xi presided over a “National Se- curity Work Conference” in which he continued On February 6, China published “Central Docu- his elaboration of his “Overall Security Concept (总体安全观) (81.cn, February 21). Peking Uni- ment No. 1”, its annual statement of agricultural versity International Relations Professor Ye Zi- policy. Two weeks later, on February 20, China's cheng (叶自成) explains that Xi’s concept brings Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) announced that it together a full range of issues, both traditional will begin its annual moratorium on fishing start- (foreign policy and military security) and eco- ing on May 1 (MOA, February 20). Though on nomic (such as food security) (PKU, April 19, the surface somewhat innocuous, China’s agri- 2016). Domestic economic realities will increas- cultural and fishing policies are increasingly in- ingly affect Chinese external security decision- tersecting with its broader national security ob- making. jectives. Both issues are connected by a view of ChinaBrief March 2, 2017 Most attention to Chinese security policy is to produce sufficient food for itself is under given to its military development and foreign re- threat from pollution, urbanization and deserti- lations, particularly the eastern and southern fication. Though China has been able to produce axis encompassing Taiwan, Japan, and South- most of its own grain, the issue remains a core east Asia. However, the most important “direc- concern for Chinese leaders, as highlighted by tion” for Chinese security thinkers is internal its inclusion in the 2015 National Security Law ( (内). Unsurprisingly China spends more on its 国家安全法). According to Article 22: The State stability maintenance budget (维稳) than it does completes a food security safeguard system, pro- on national defense (China Brief, March 6, 2014). tecting and improving the overall food production Internal security brings sources of potential dis- capacity, improving the system for food reserves, ruption into sharp focus, including social ine- the transport system, and market regulatory quality and land distribution. This casts agricul- mechanisms; completing early warning systems tural and fishing policies in a new light and for food security, ensuring security food supplies makes understanding these policies more im- and quality (ChinaLawTranslate.com, MOD.gov, portant. July 1, 2015). Agricultural policy, for example, intersects with These concerns have prompted Xi Jinping and concerns about domestic stability and food se- others to call for a reorganization of Chinese curity. Despite rapid urbanization, 44 percent of land, the collection of smaller plots into larger Chinese citizens still live in the countryside ones, and the reorganization of small towns in (World Bank, 2015 [Accessed February 20]). Im- favor of larger ones to free up land. Such policies provements in the lives of China’s farmers has will see greater emphasis ahead of the 19th accounted for a significant proportion of the de- Party Congress as Xi and other leaders attempt crease in those living in the poverty line. How- to deliver policy successes before the meeting. ever, the growing disparity in wealth is a source of tensions, contributing to issues such as rising While Document No. 1 has primarily a domestic crime rates and drug use (See China Brief, Feb- effect, China’s fishing moratorium also affects ruary 6 and September 4, 2015, for discussion of Chinese external security and diplomacy. The these issues). Increased crop production and en- moratorium is meant to protect China’s stocks suring market stability are linked with raising of fish by allowing time for the fish to breed. farmers incomes. With rural governments al- However, the scope of the regulation directly ready under budget strain and crime in the impacts China’s relations with its neighbors. No- countryside on the rise, the success or failure of tably, the moratorium will curb fishing above 12 these policies will have a direct impact on Chi- degrees of latitude, roughly halfway between nese social stability. the northern and southern halves of the South China Sea (see map). Given China’s territorial Though the focus of Central Document No. 1 is claims as demarcated by the “Nine-Dash Line”, rural development and ways to increase the wel- the moratorium will cover much of the Philip- fare of China’s farmers, one section in particular pine and Vietnamese Exclusive Economic Zones is noteworthy: continual increases in grain pro- in the South China Sea. Chinese territorial claims duction to ensure food security. China’s ability are frequently backed up by Chinese Coast 2 ChinaBrief March 2, 2017 The Philippines made guaranteed access to Scarborough Shoal a condition of its broader rapprochement with China over the summer of 2016, and Philippine fish- ermen were able to access the area shortly after President Duterte’s meeting with Xi Jinping (Rappler, [Philippines] October 28, 2016). Chinese and Philip- pine Coast Guards established a hotline as part of the establishment of a Joint Coast Guard Committee (Philippine Coast Guard, February 22). Chinese fish- ing vessels are also clashing with other governments further afield as they look for untapped shoals, sometimes without other nations’ permission. Indonesia has sunk has sunk hundreds of captured Chinese fishing vessels caught operating illegally in its waters (March 25, 2016). On the other side of the world, an Ar- gentinian Coast Guard Vessel even sank a Chinese fishing ship after repeated warnings about operating in Argentine coastal waters (Global Times, March 17, 2016). Guard vessels, meaning that the moratorium The role of Chinese food security policy would essentially cut-off much of China’s neigh- in its broader national security concept deserves bors from prime fishing spots. Unsurprisingly greater attention. Domestically, Chinese leaders then, Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesper- are under pressure to deliver economic benefits son Le Hai Binh responded to the moratorium, to their rural citizens while reforming Chinese stating that “Vietnam resolutely opposes and re- agriculture to protect China’s ability to feed it- jects the regulation issued by China” (VNExpress, self. Similarly, China’s demand for fish is quickly February 28). This fishing policy becomes a exhausting local stocks, but regulations—if en- method for Beijing to protects its food security forced without negotiation with China’s neigh- by ensuring stocks of fish, but also carries over bors—will quickly bring tensions to a head over into foreign policy, by acting as a way to enforce this limited resource. its territorial claims in the South China Sea. Peter Wood is the Editor of China Brief. You can Access to fish has even been a bargaining chip follow him on Twitter @PeterWood_PDW in China’s dealings with its southern neighbors. 3 ChinaBrief March 2, 2017 China’s Navy Gets a New Yubai, Su Zhiqian—and, most importantly, Shen Jinlong (China Brief, September 20, 2016). Helmsman (Part 1): Spotlight Of note, Shen was the last one of this group to on Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong be promoted to Military Region (MR) Deputy By Andrew S. Erickson and Kenneth W. Allen Leader, now Theater Command (TC) Deputy Leader, grade (December 2014) and the last one A new leader has just taken the helm of the to receive his second star (2016). Normally, when world’s second largest navy. Vice Admiral Shen someone lower in protocol order moves to the Jinlong (沈金龙) reportedly replaced Admiral top of the protocol list or is promoted to the Wu Shengli (吴胜利) as PLAN Commander on next grade, this indicates that the others will not January 17, 2017 (Global Times Online, January get a grade promotion and will retire at their 20). On the morning of January 20, Shen offered mandatory age based on their grade. However, Lunar New Year greetings to sailors on patrol in as with many situations under Xi Jinping, certain the Gulf of Aden via video-teleconference (Chi- rules appear to be changing. Specifically, when nese Navy Online, January 20). Authoritative Shen became the PLAN commander, VADM state media reports have offered few details on Yuan Yubai—a year ahead of Shen in grade and Shen, making it important to analyze a broad ar- time in rank—was simultaneously promoted to ray of Chinese-language sources to distill what the same grade and became the commander of his elevation may mean for China as a maritime the Southern Theater Command. [1] As will be power. Given Xi Jinping’s sweeping and ongoing discussed in Part 2, it is not yet clear if Shen will military reforms, the organizational dynamics become a PLA Central Military Commission surrounding Shen’s rise merit particularly close (CMC), member when Wu retires at the end of examination. Understanding these dynamics can 2017. help outside observers anticipate the identity, experience, promotion of PLAN leaders, as well Several of Shen’s career highlights point to his as the positions that they hold relative to the status as an emerging leader. In August 2014, PLA and its key commands. shortly after the end of Shen, flew to Hawaii commanded a three-ship task force for a port Shen’s Selection call to San Diego had just finished participating for the first time in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), Admiral Sun Jianguo, long viewed as Wu’s natu- the world’s largest international maritime exer- ral successor as PLAN commander by many, rep- cise (China Military Online, August 6, 2014).