Volume 17, Issue 3 March 2, 2017

In a Fortnight: Food Security and Chinese “Comprehensive National Security”

China’s Navy Gets a New Helmsman (Part 1): Spotlight on Vice Admiral By Andrew S. Erickson and Kenneth W. Allen

China Tolerating Vietnam’s South China Sea Activities, For Now By Derek Grossman

China and Saudi Arabia Solidify Strategic Partnership Amid Looming Risks By Chris Zambelis

Renewable Energy and the PLA’s Next Generation of Self-Sufficiency (Part 1) By Wilson VornDick

national security that pulls together traditional In a Fortnight: security issues with domestic stability, economic Food Security and Chinese issues and food security.

“Comprehensive National This connection can be seen in Chinese Presi- dent ’s articulated vision of security. Security” On February 22, Xi presided over a “National Se- curity Work Conference” in which he continued On February 6, China published “Central Docu- his elaboration of his “Overall Security Concept (总体安全观) (81.cn, February 21). Peking Uni- ment No. 1”, its annual statement of agricultural versity International Relations Professor Zi- policy. Two weeks later, on February 20, China's cheng (叶自成) explains that Xi’s concept brings Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) announced that it together a full range of issues, both traditional will begin its annual moratorium on fishing start- (foreign policy and military security) and eco- ing on May 1 (MOA, February 20). Though on nomic (such as food security) (PKU, April 19, the surface somewhat innocuous, China’s agri- 2016). Domestic economic realities will increas- cultural and fishing policies are increasingly in- ingly affect Chinese external security decision- tersecting with its broader national security ob- making. jectives. Both issues are connected by a view of ChinaBrief March 2, 2017

Most attention to Chinese security policy is to produce sufficient food for itself is under given to its military development and foreign re- threat from pollution, urbanization and deserti- lations, particularly the eastern and southern fication. Though China has been able to produce axis encompassing , , and South- most of its own grain, the issue remains a core east Asia. However, the most important “direc- concern for Chinese leaders, as highlighted by tion” for Chinese security thinkers is internal its inclusion in the 2015 National Security Law ( (内). Unsurprisingly China spends more on its 国家安全法). According to Article 22: The State stability maintenance budget (维稳) than it does completes a food security safeguard system, pro- on national defense (China Brief, March 6, 2014). tecting and improving the overall food production Internal security brings sources of potential dis- capacity, improving the system for food reserves, ruption into sharp focus, including social ine- the transport system, and market regulatory quality and land distribution. This casts agricul- mechanisms; completing early warning systems tural and fishing policies in a new light and for food security, ensuring security food supplies makes understanding these policies more im- and quality (ChinaLawTranslate.com, MOD.gov, portant. July 1, 2015).

Agricultural policy, for example, intersects with These concerns have prompted Xi Jinping and concerns about domestic stability and food se- others to call for a reorganization of Chinese curity. Despite rapid urbanization, 44 percent of land, the collection of smaller plots into larger Chinese citizens still live in the countryside ones, and the reorganization of small towns in (World Bank, 2015 [Accessed February 20]). Im- favor of larger ones to free up land. Such policies provements in the lives of China’s farmers has will see greater emphasis ahead of the 19th accounted for a significant proportion of the de- Party Congress as Xi and other leaders attempt crease in those living in the poverty line. How- to deliver policy successes before the meeting. ever, the growing disparity in wealth is a source of tensions, contributing to issues such as rising While Document No. 1 has primarily a domestic crime rates and drug use (See China Brief, Feb- effect, China’s fishing moratorium also affects ruary 6 and September 4, 2015, for discussion of Chinese external security and diplomacy. The these issues). Increased crop production and en- moratorium is meant to protect China’s stocks suring market stability are linked with raising of fish by allowing time for the fish to breed. farmers incomes. With rural governments al- However, the scope of the regulation directly ready under budget strain and crime in the impacts China’s relations with its neighbors. No- countryside on the rise, the success or failure of tably, the moratorium will curb fishing above 12 these policies will have a direct impact on Chi- degrees of latitude, roughly halfway between nese social stability. the northern and southern halves of the South China Sea (see map). Given China’s territorial Though the focus of Central Document No. 1 is claims as demarcated by the “Nine-Dash Line”, rural development and ways to increase the wel- the moratorium will cover much of the Philip- fare of China’s farmers, one section in particular pine and Vietnamese Exclusive Economic Zones is noteworthy: continual increases in grain pro- in the South China Sea. Chinese territorial claims duction to ensure food security. China’s ability are frequently backed up by Chinese Coast

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The made guaranteed access to Scarborough Shoal a condition of its broader rapprochement with China over the summer of 2016, and Philippine fish- ermen were able to access the area shortly after President Duterte’s meeting with Xi Jinping (Rappler, [Philippines] October 28, 2016). Chinese and Philip- pine Coast Guards established a hotline as part of the establishment of a Joint Coast Guard Committee (Philippine Coast Guard, February 22). Chinese fish- ing vessels are also clashing with other governments further afield as they look for untapped shoals, sometimes without other nations’ permission. Indonesia has sunk has sunk hundreds of captured Chinese fishing vessels caught operating illegally in its waters (March 25, 2016). On the other side of the world, an Ar- gentinian Coast Guard Vessel even sank a Chinese fishing ship after repeated warnings about operating in Argentine coastal waters (Global Times, March 17, 2016).

Guard vessels, meaning that the moratorium The role of Chinese food security policy would essentially cut-off much of China’s neigh- in its broader national security concept deserves bors from prime fishing spots. Unsurprisingly greater attention. Domestically, Chinese leaders then, Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesper- are under pressure to deliver economic benefits son Le Hai Binh responded to the moratorium, to their rural citizens while reforming Chinese stating that “Vietnam resolutely opposes and re- agriculture to protect China’s ability to feed it- jects the regulation issued by China” (VNExpress, self. Similarly, China’s demand for fish is quickly February 28). This fishing policy becomes a exhausting local stocks, but regulations—if en- method for to protects its food security forced without negotiation with China’s neigh- by ensuring stocks of fish, but also carries over bors—will quickly bring tensions to a head over into foreign policy, by acting as a way to enforce this limited resource. its territorial claims in the South China Sea. Peter Wood is the Editor of China Brief. You can Access to fish has even been a bargaining chip follow him on Twitter @PeterWood_PDW in China’s dealings with its southern neighbors.

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China’s Navy Gets a New Yubai, Su Zhiqian—and, most importantly, Shen Jinlong (China Brief, September 20, 2016). Helmsman (Part 1): Spotlight Of note, Shen was the last one of this group to on Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong be promoted to Military Region (MR) Deputy By Andrew S. Erickson and Kenneth W. Allen Leader, now Theater Command (TC) Deputy

Leader, grade (December 2014) and the last one A new leader has just taken the helm of the to receive his second star (2016). Normally, when world’s second largest navy. Vice Admiral Shen someone lower in protocol order moves to the Jinlong (沈金龙) reportedly replaced Admiral top of the protocol list or is promoted to the (吴胜利) as PLAN Commander on next grade, this indicates that the others will not January 17, 2017 (Global Times Online, January get a grade promotion and will retire at their 20). On the morning of January 20, Shen offered mandatory age based on their grade. However, Lunar New Year greetings to sailors on patrol in as with many situations under Xi Jinping, certain the Gulf of Aden via video-teleconference (Chi- rules appear to be changing. Specifically, when nese Navy Online, January 20). Authoritative Shen became the PLAN commander, VADM state media reports have offered few details on —a year ahead of Shen in grade and Shen, making it important to analyze a broad ar- time in rank—was simultaneously promoted to ray of Chinese-language sources to distill what the same grade and became the commander of his elevation may mean for China as a maritime the Southern Theater Command. [1] As will be power. Given Xi Jinping’s sweeping and ongoing discussed in Part 2, it is not yet clear if Shen will military reforms, the organizational dynamics become a PLA Central Military Commission surrounding Shen’s rise merit particularly close (CMC), member when Wu retires at the end of examination. Understanding these dynamics can 2017. help outside observers anticipate the identity, experience, promotion of PLAN leaders, as well Several of Shen’s career highlights point to his as the positions that they hold relative to the status as an emerging leader. In August 2014, PLA and its key commands. shortly after the end of Shen, flew to Hawaii commanded a three-ship task force for a port Shen’s Selection call to San Diego had just finished participating for the first time in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), Admiral , long viewed as Wu’s natu- the world’s largest international maritime exer- ral successor as PLAN commander by many, rep- cise (China Military Online, August 6, 2014). In resented China at the 2015 and 2016 Shangri-La September 2016, Shen headed the PLAN dele- Dialogues. Sun is now expected to retire by the gation to the twenty-second International Sea- end of February 2017. Sun’s impending retire- power Symposium at the U.S. Naval War Col- ment opened up possibilities for a set of Vice lege. One pattern common to Chinese bureau- Admirals considered by foreign observers to be cracy is a tendency toward incrementally testing, potential candidates to succeed Wu, namely grooming, and socializing rising leaders over Tian Zhong, Liu Yi, Ding Yi, Weilie, Yuan time. In retrospect, Shen was clearly being groomed.

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Historically, the PLA’s service commanders are Zhao retired as a deputy commander, participa- authorized only one trip abroad per year, while tion in certain senior officer-led visits is an indi- only a few lower-level PLA officers are lucky to cator of grooming for the commander’s position travel abroad at all and are limited to only one (Xinhua, September 10, 2008). For example, as a visit. [2] For example, VADM Zhao Xingfa, who PLAAF deputy commander, Lieutenant General was a PLAN deputy commander in 2008, accom- Liu Shunyao accompanied Defense Minister and panied then Chief of the General Staff, General CMC Vice Chairman Chi Haotian to the United Chen Bingde, to Serbia and Norway. Although

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States in November 1996 and became the com- Apr. Commandant, Dalian Corps Dep- SCPT & RADM 2010 Naval Ship Academy uty Leader mander the next month. [3] In September 1998, Aug. Commandant, Naval Corps RADM one of the PLAAF’s Deputy Political Commissars, 2011 Command College Leader (Nanjing) Grade Lieutenant General Qiao Qingchen, accompa- Sep. Deputy Commander, Corps RADM nied CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Wannian to the 2014 Leader Grade United States and became the political commis- Dec. Deputy Commander, Military Re- RADM sar three months later. 2014 Guangzhou MR and gion Dep- Commander, South uty Leader Sea Fleet Career Background Mar. Deputy Commander, Theater RADM & VADM 2016 Southern Theater Command Command and Com- Deputy Although no information was found concerning mander, South Sea Leader Fleet any direct connection between Shen and Xi Jan. Commander, PLA Theater VADM Jinping, since Xi assumed power in 2012, Shen 2017 Navy Command Leader has risen rapidly. Table 1 provides information * The information in brackets are logical assumptions based on the about Shen’s career since he joined the PLAN as time frame as well as the grade and rank structure. †The PLA’s rank system that was abolished in 1965 was not re-im- an enlisted member in 1974. plemented until 1988.

Table 1: Shen Jinlong’s Career Path Comparison with Former PLAN Commanders

Date Billet Grade Rank 1974 Soldier & Squad None None The PLAN has had eight commanders since its Leader creation in 1949. None of them, including Shen, 1978 Commander, Platoon Platoon None Leader have shared similar career paths. [4] The first [1980]* Navigation Director, [Company None two commanders, and , U/I vessel Deputy Leader] moved from the Army to the Navy and served 1982 CO, Tug Boat [Company None primarily in political commissar roles. Liu Leader] 1990 Coxswain, Submarine [Battalion [LT/LCDR] † Huaqing served in Army, Navy, and weapons de- Hunter Boat Deputy velopment billets, finishing his career as a Vice- Leader] 1992 CO, Frigate Battalion [LCDR/CDR] Chairman of the Central Military Commission Leader and as the last PLA member to sit on the Polit- [1994] Chief of Staff, Frigate Regiment [CDR/LCDR] Dadui Deputy buro Standing Committee. Zhang Lianzhong Leader and Zhang Dingfa served primarily as submarine 1995 Commander, Frigate Regiment [CPT/CDR] Dadui Leader officers, while was a naval aviator. [1998] Chief of Staff, Zhidui Division [CPT/SCPT] Wu Shengli and Shen Jinlong are career surface Deputy Leader officers. As shown in Table 2, the only common [2000] Deputy Commander, Division [CPT/SCPT] progression for Shen and his two predecessors NSF Vessels Deputy Training Center Leader 2002 Commander, NSF Division SCPT Vessels Training Cen- Leader ter Nov. Commander, 10th De- Division SCPT 2004 stroyer Zhidui (Dalian) Leader 2009 Commander, Lushun Corps Dep- SCPT Support Base uty Leader

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is that they all served as fleet deputy com- Russia in 2001, as well as at the PLA National De- manders and commanders. fense University in 2008 and 2012. Available in- formation concerning his background suggests While Shen is not yet well known outside Chi- that he appears to have always been an avid nese military circles, the sixty-year-old brings reader and to have conducted considerable self- wide-ranging professional military education study on military topics. (PME), operational, and international experience to his new position. Shen was born in October On July 20, 2010, Shen was promoted to Rear 1956 in ’s (上海南汇区), Admiral, while serving as the Commandant of now part of Pudong New District. Since joining the Dalian Naval Ship Academy, a corps deputy the PLAN at 18 in 1974, he has served as com- leader-grade billet (People’s Navy, July 21, manding officer of a frigate and chief of staff and 2010). In August 2011, he received a grade pro- motion to corps leader grade and was appointed Commandant of the Nan- jing Naval Command Col- lege (南京海军指挥学院). In this capacity, Shen partici- pated in what was arguably a watershed intellectual event for the PLAN: On Feb- ruary 23, 2012, Shen’s col- lege convened the first In- ternational Escort Forum ( 国际护航研讨会). The two- day event gathered a large number of PLAN officers and 84 foreign participants, including from the United commander of a frigate squadron (大队; dadui). States, to discuss anti-pi- He also commanded the ’s 10th racy experiences in the Gulf of Aden and pro- Destroyer Flotilla (支队; zhidui); and then served spects for further cooperation in that area. as commanding officer of the North Sea Fleet’s Lüshun Support Base (旅顺保障基地) (Mingpao By September 29, 2014, Shen was appointed News Net, January 12). Like Wu before him, Shen Deputy Commander of the South Sea Fleet with was Commandant of the Dalian Naval Vessel the same grade of corps leader (China News Academy ( 大 连 舰 艇 学 院 ; April 2010–August Online, September 30, 2014). On December 30, 2011). Shen was sufficiently well-regarded 2014—less than four months after being ap- within the PLAN to have been sent to advanced pointed Deputy Commander, he received a studies at Russia’s Kuznetsov Naval Academy in grade promotion to Military Region Deputy

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Leader grade and was appointed as both Com- Los Angeles, Liu Jian, participated in the port mander of the South Sea Fleet (like Wu before call, which involved the Commander of the U.S. him) and deputy commander of what was then Third Fleet (PLA Daily, August 14, 2014). known as the Guangzhou Military Region ( News Online, December 31, 2014). In This deployment meant the PLAN would be both this leadership capacity and as the head of closely observed by most of the world’s other two PLAN PME institutions, he gained consider- major navies. Given that all three phases were able experience in receiving foreign delegations. executed well, Shen’s participation most likely On July 29, 2016, Shen was promoted in rank to helped further his selection as the next com- Vice Admiral but retained the same grade (Peo- mander. ple’s Navy, July 30, 2016). Conclusion From June through August 2014, the guided- missile destroyer Haikou (海口舰; (DDG-171), The aforementioned experiences constitute val- the guided-missile frigate Yueyang (岳阳舰; FF- uable preparation to serve as PLAN commander 575), and the replenishment ship Qiandaohu (千 and likely played a role in Shen’s selection. Be- 岛湖舰; AO-886) formed Task Group 171 to par- yond his documented qualifications, however, it ticipate in RIMPAC 2014 (June 26–August 1) and remains unclear if Shen’s appointment to PLAN a follow-on visit to San Diego (Xinhua, August 2, commander was influenced decisively by inter- 2014; PRC Embassy, USA, August 16, 2014). service rivalry, personal choice by Xi Jinping, the promotion system or some combination of fac- Senior Capt. Zhao Xiaogang, who was the com- tors. Examining and contextualizing Shen’s posi- manding officer of an unidentified East Sea fleet tion of leadership offers potential insights into destroyer flotilla (zhidui), reportedly served as the PLAN’s evolving organization and ongoing the commanding officer during the RIMPAC ex- development as well as its relation to the PLA ercise. Shen then flew to Hawaii, boarded the and its civilian masters. Part 2 of this series will Haikou, and served as the commanding officer further explore these important factors. for the trip to San Diego, where PLAN deputy commander, VADM Tian Zhong, arrived and ap- Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is Professor of Strategy in, parently served as the lead officer. and a core founding member of, the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute. While en route to San Diego, the vessels con- He serves on the Naval War College Review’s Ed- ducted exercises related to the Code for Un- itorial Board. Since 2008 he has been an Associ- planned Encounters at Sea (海上意外相遇规则) ate in Research at Harvard University’s John King with the USN’s USS Lake Champlain (CG-57) and Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. Erickson re- USS Independence (LCS-2) (PLA Daily, August 11, ceived his Ph.D. and M.A. from Princeton Univer- 2014). This was followed by a five-day port call sity and studied Mandarin at Beijing Normal Uni- in San Diego, at which time, Tian Zhong appar- versity’s College of Chinese Language and Cul- ently served as the delegation leader. While in ture. He can be reached through www.andrewer- San Diego, the Chinese Ambassador to the ickson.com. United States, Cui Tiankai, and Consul General of

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Kenneth W. Allen is a Senior China Analyst at De- fense Group Inc. (DGI). He is a retired U.S. Air China Tolerating Vietnam’s Force officer, whose extensive service abroad in- South China Sea Activities, cludes a tour in China as the Assistant Air Atta- ché. He has written numerous articles on Chinese For Now military affairs. A Chinese linguist, he holds an By Derek Grossman M.A. in international relations from Boston Uni- versity. hina’s expanding military presence in the C Notes South China Sea has prompted Vietnam to en- 1. This may be part of a broader trend to- hance its ability to protect its own holdings in ward having officers at the division and the region. In late November, for example, com- above level gain a broader experience mercially available imagery revealed that Vi- first within different branches and then etnam was dredging a new channel at Ladd Reef within different MRs/TCs, Fleets, or on the southwestern edge of the Spratly Islands, MRAF/TC Air Forces. The next step is to perhaps as a precursor to land reclamation or to be involved in joint commands, which improve access to other features (ChinaTimes, would include being a fleet commander December 9, 2016). In the same month, Hanoi and concurrent MR/TC commander or as extended its sole runway and added new hang- a deputy chief of the general staff/Joint ars on Spratly Island. Vietnam also reportedly Staff with a foreign relations/intel portfo- fortified several of its holdings with what appear lio. to be Israeli-built Extended Range Artillery (EX- 2. Kenneth Allen, “Trends in PLA Interna- TRA) precision-guided rocket artillery launchers tional Initiatives under Hu Jintao,” in Roy over the summer (Global Times, August 11, Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tan- 2016). ner, eds., Assessing the People’s Libera- tion Army in the Hu Jintao Era, Carlisle, Curiously, Chinese leaders have not punished Vi- PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2014 etnam for any of these activities or even so much 3. Kenneth W. Allen and John F. Corbett, as complained about them. Instead, Beijing con- “Predicting PLA Leader Promotions,” in tinues to maintain cordial and cooperative bilat- Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel, eds., eral ties, with Chinese President Xi Jinping on Civil-Military Change in China: Elites, In- January 12 hosting Vietnamese Secretary-Gen- stitutes, and Ideas After the 16th Party eral Nguyen Phu Trong in Beijing for bilateral Congress, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies talks. China has probably tolerated Vietnam’s Institute, September 2004). South China Sea activities because it feels in- 4. China’s Navy 2007, Office of Naval Intelli- creasingly confident in its improving military po- gence, sition throughout the region. https://fas.org/irp/agency/oni/china- navy2007.pdf. Indirect Condemnations

*** Chinese leaders have issued only indirect con- demnations of recent Vietnamese activities in

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the South China Sea. For example, Beijing’s for- (FMPRC, December 15, 2016; FMPRC, December eign ministry officially responded to the re- 9, 2016). ported deployment of EXTRA by stating that “China has indisputable sovereignty over the Bilateral Relations Remain Positive Nansha Islands [the for the Spratly Islands] and their surrounding waters.” Despite their mutual suspicion, Chinese and Vi- The ministry further noted that “China has al- etnamese leaders have remained remarkably ways firmly opposed the illegal occupation of cordial and cooperative in multiple dimensions parts of China’s Nansha Islands and reefs by cer- of the bilateral relationship. In late December, tain countries and their illegal construction and for example, Vietnam hosted a two-day confer- military deployments on these islands and reefs” ence on enhancing economic cooperation with (China Daily, August 11, 2016). It is noteworthy China (Xinhua, December 28, 2016). On defense, that Beijing issued such measured and generic both sides routinely hail their cooperation. In statements given the provocative nature of the February 2009, Vietnam and China finalized the PRC media report. Indeed, even the often-stri- demarcation of their border. Since then, Hanoi dent state-run media outlet Global Times gave and Beijing have engaged in a series of confi- Vietnam the benefit of the doubt, stating that it dence-building measures that have included de- hoped the report was “only speculation from fense minister discussions and joint exercises Western media” and the two sides should prac- along the border, the most recent of which was tice restraint to avoid a crisis (Global Times, Au- a “joint anti-terror” border exercise in July 2016 gust 11, 2016). (VietnamNet Bridge, November 2, 2016; The Dip- lomat, July 30, 2016; Xinhua, August 30, 2016). China’s reaction to other Vietnamese actions has been similarly circumspect. The foreign ministry, Even in the most contentious of domains, the for instance, responded to reports that Vietnam maritime domain, China and Vietnam tend to had expanded its runway by urging the “relevant look past their differences. In mid-January, after country”—Vietnam was not specifically meeting with counterparts in Beijing, Vietnam- named—to “truly respect China’s sovereignty ese Secretary-General Nguyen issued a joint and legitimate rights and interests” and to “im- “communiqué” stating that the two sides mediately stop its illegal occupation and con- planned to “manage well their maritime differ- struction and withdraw their personnel and fa- ence, avoid actions that complicate the situation cilities” (FMPRC, November 18, 2016). Beijing’s and escalate tensions, and safeguard the peace defense ministry also declined to identify Vi- and stability of the South China Sea.” To be sure, etnam regarding the runway issue (China Mili- maritime differences are assiduously avoided in tary Online, November 30th, 2016). Both minis- favor of cooperation. In November, for instance, tries instead left it up to Xinhua to later identify the Chinese and Vietnamese coast guards took Vietnam as the country in question (Xinhua, No- part in a joint patrol to monitor fishing areas of vember 18th, 2016). Separately, Hanoi’s dredg- the Gulf of Tonkin (People’s Army Newspaper ing activities at Ladd Reef prompted the foreign [Vietnam], November 9, 2016). Moreover, in a ministry to make similarly indirect statements symbolic step, the Chinese navy in October made a first-ever port call to the international

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port within Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay (The Diplo- can be launched from a range of surface ships, mat, October 23, 2016). Indeed, Xi Jinping in No- such as Gepard-class frigates or Molniya-class vember called for China and Vietnam to work to- corvettes, and from one of its six acquired Kilo- gether to maintain stability in the South China class submarines. In addition, Vietnam’s air force Sea—well after reports that Hanoi had deployed continues to modernize its fixed-wing aircraft, EXTRA on disputed features (Xinhua, November which now features 36 Sukhoi Su-30s, in the 20, 2016). hopes of providing Hanoi with maritime strike capabilities throughout the region. Confidence Borne of Military Superiority China has deployed more high-profile defenses Beijing probably keeps bilateral relations cordial on Woody Island, the main island in the dis- and productive in spite of Vietnamese actions puted Paracel Island chain within closer proxim- because it maintains overwhelming military su- ity to Vietnam. Beijing in mid-February 2016 de- periority in the region. China’s “Southern Thea- ployed two batteries of eight Hongqi-9 (HQ-9) ter Command” fields diverse capabilities at mul- surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers to Woody tiple locations to keep the balance of power well Island that enabled highly capable targeting of in Beijing’s favor. These include guided missile aircraft and missiles out to 120 nautical miles destroyers, nuclear-missile equipped submarine (Guancha, February 17, 2016). The deployment forces, long-range supply vessels, coast guard of this system—derived from the Russian-built and other maritime enforcement ships, marine S-300—is a permanent fixture and not tied to forces with dedicated amphibious capabilities, exercises like the previous two deployments multiple launch brigades for land-based mis- (China Brief, March 28, 2016). Beijing may also siles, and air assets ranging from bombers to seek to use recently constructed facilities multi-role fighter aircraft (China Brief, July 22, throughout the Spratlys to house additional 2016). SAMs, though this remains unclear for the mo- ment. Beijing’s considerable arsenal has enhanced its confidence to the point that China has decided Separately, in October, Beijing opened its first only to quietly bolster its military defenses on desalination plant in the South China Sea on disputed features. In November, for example, Woody Island, providing an important source of the Center for Strategic and International Stud- fresh water to grow and sustain the present ies’ Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative as- population there of approximately 1,500 resi- sessed that China over the summer had de- dents—most of whom are Chinese military per- ployed close-in weapon systems (CIWS) and sonnel. In late December, Beijing initiated regu- anti-aircraft artillery on all of its holdings in the lar charter flights between Woody Island and Spratly Islands. According to expert analysis, Hainan to “improve the work and living condi- CIWS could be effective against sea-skimming tions of the city’s public servants and stationed cruise missiles, while anti-aircraft artillery could soldiers” (Xinhua, December 22, 2016). With the provide point defense for airfields and radar in- desalination plant in place, Beijing will also have stallations (AMTI, December 14, 2016). Vietnam more fresh water available to help reduce the has been actively acquiring cruise missiles that negative effects of operating weaponry in a high

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salt environment (The Diplomat, October 4, China’s military assets in the region. For exam- 2016). China might eventually decide to perma- ple, for years Vietnam has been trying to procure nently station its fighter aircraft like the J-11B— from India the Brahmos sea-skimming super- which rotated through the island in 2015— on sonic anti-ship cruise missile, which could signif- Woody Island, though sufficient fuel storage and icantly endanger Chinese surface combatants. hangar space would still be required (Defense Recent reports also indicate that New Delhi News, November 8, 2015). might sell Hanoi the medium-range Akash SAM that might threaten China’s fighter aircraft oper- Limits to Chinese Tolerance? ations if acquired (Asia Times, January 11).

Judging from China’s response thus far, it is fair Finally, seasonal frictions over access to fishing to say that Beijing has chosen to tolerate recent and natural resources in the South China Sea Vietnamese construction activities in the South could prompt increasingly aggressive Chinese China Sea. However, China has a range of op- tactics against Vietnamese vessels that might tions to express its displeasure with Hanoi, such trigger an overtly military response. This week as emplacing a new structure in disputed waters, Vietnam slammed the imposition of a Chinese conducting military exercises, or stepping up fishing ban from May to August in waters near sovereignty patrols in the region. the Paracel Islands—a tactic Beijing has em- ployed annually since 1999. In this regard, the Any of these responses is possible, especially as next few months should be instructive as to the tensions predictably rise in the South China Sea future trajectory of the relationship. during the spring. In May 2014, for example, Bei- jing decided to emplace the Haiyang Shiyou oil Derek Grossman is a senior defense analyst at the rig in disputed waters, resulting in a months- nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. He long standoff between Chinese and Vietnamese formerly served at the Defense Intelligence coast guards until Beijing finally decided to re- Agency as the daily intelligence briefer to the As- move the rig. It is unclear what motivated China sistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific to move the rig into the area in the first place, Security Affairs at the Pentagon. The views ex- but the tactic was clearly designed to put pres- pressed in this article are those of the author and sure on Vietnam’s sovereignty claims. do not reflect the official policy or position of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of De- Chinese leaders might change their calculus if fense, or the U.S. government. they believe Vietnam is trying to enlist the sup- port of the U.S. or other partners to settle bilat- *** eral disputes. Hanoi’s burgeoning security rela- tionships with Japan, India, and the U.S. will be particularly sensitive to China. Beijing might also decide to more assertively and overtly challenge Vietnam if it assesses that Hanoi has acquired capabilities that can more effectively challenge

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Department of the CMC, asserted that President Renewable Energy and the Xi Jinping conceives of energy construction as PLA’s Next Generation of an integral part of the national security plan to include expansion and construction of more re- Self-Sufficiency (Part 1) newable energy resources. Additionally, Zhao By Commander Wilson VornDick identified two important and ongoing trends in his remarks: the revolution in national energy This is the first in a two-part series on Chinese and the full integration of civilian and military energy security and renewable energy. (civ-mil) development, that will enhance the Chi- nese “wartime ability to fight.” From Zhao’s comments, it would appear that China is securit- n December 2016, China unveiled one of its I izing renewable energy, as part of a broader en- 可再生能源 most ambitious renewable energy ( ) ergy strategy (能源戰略). But before the military initiatives thus far with plans to invest over $360 role in renewables can be assessed, it is essential billion as part of the Chinese National Energy to examine some key aspects of renewable en- Administration’s (NEA) new “Thirteenth Five- ergy. 可再生能源发展 十三五 规划以实 Year Plan” ( ” ” ) (NDRC.gov, December 2016). This initiative pro- Primer on Renewable Energy motes the adoption of more non-fossil energy sources by 2020 and will be a benefit not only China has relied primarily on fossil fuels for its for the soot and smog-cloaked cities of China, energy needs. With the exception of hydro- but also create up to 13 million jobs, conserve power (水电) harnessed from its large network scarce resources such as water, and buoy the of dams and extensive historical use, alternative flagging Chinese renewable energy sector (Na- energies were largely unknown in China until the tional Energy Administration of China, January mid-1990s. Renewables slowly gained promi- 5). While this announcement garnered praise nence as technologies were transferred to China from the international community, a second an- through business ventures and research con- nouncement a few days later for the Implemen- ducted in Western corporate and university la- tation Plan for Frontier Power Grid Construction boratories. Later, this transfer of renewable tech- that ties in the Chinese constabulary and military nology increased rapidly as Chinese companies forces went largely unnoticed (China News, Jan- merged and acquired Western companies, or uary 10). through their own internal research and devel- opment efforts. State-owned energy providers This joint plan between the NEA, the Logistics then tapped into renewable companies as part Department of the Central Military Commission of their energy production portfolio. As a result, (CMC), and the China Southern Power Grid a mix of both private and public Chinese entities Company aims to resolve the “electricity prob- are now heavily involved in the renewable en- lems” of the PLA and the Border Defense Force ergy sector. by 2020 (NEA; China Southern Power Grid Com- pany, [accessed February 10]). Zhao Keshi, a Recognizing the potential and necessity of re- member of the CMC and director of the Logistics newable energy, the Chinese government has

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funded renewable energy initiatives and re- the WTO for dumping solar panels on the Amer- search, such as the Chinese Meteorological Ad- ican market (Reuters, [accessed February 17]). ministration’s Wind and Solar Energy Resource Meanwhile, Beijing’s Sinovel Wind Group was Center ( 中国气象局-- 风 能 太 阳 能 资源 中心 ) sued in both American and Chinese courts by its (CMA, January 10). China now harnesses a wide previous wind turbine software supplier, Massa- variety of renewable energy sources, from bio- chusetts-based AMSC, for “unauthorized” use of mass (生物质发电约), to wind power (风电), to AMSC’s proprietary software (Bloomberg, [ac- ocean energy (海洋能), to solar power. Green- cessed February 27]). peace estimates that China installed an average of one wind turbine every hour of every day in The Chinese military is not the first or only to ex- 2015 and covered the equivalent of one soccer plore renewables. The U.S. Navy has invested field every hour with solar panels (Greenpeace, heavily in biofuels as part of the “Great Green January 10). However, renewable energy sources Fleet” initiative, while the Department of De- are unequally distributed across China. While fense has invested in a variety of programs (U.S. solar power is ubiquitous and the most accessi- Navy, February 17; DoD-NREL, February 17). ble throughout China, hydroelectric power gen- However, China has sought to expand the use of eration, such as the Three Gorges Dam (三峡大 renewables both at home and abroad, especially 坝), is severely limited to rivers and lakes. The where it is making strategic leasing arrange- same is true for ocean energy generation along ments. A recent article in the Natural Science the coast and wind power. Interestingly, wind Edition of the Journal of University by energy could play an integral part in power gen- both PLA University of Science and Technology eration for military and constabulary forces po- and the Dalian Naval Academy personnel as- sitioned in the restive and contentious areas sessed the potential for wind power generation within and bordering China. This is because the in and around the Gwadar Port area in Pakistan, strongest and most effective wind currents for site of a future PLA-Navy base (Chinamil, De- capturing energy are located primarily in the cember 1, 2016). [2] As the article points out, the west, in Xinjiang and Xizang, or along the south- researchers hoped their efforts would promote eastern coast, adjacent to , the South sustainable development in Gwadar and provide and East China Seas, and Taiwan. a “demonstration” for Chinese projects abroad. In addition, the report’s release coincided with Yet, China’s successes in renewable energy have an infusion of more than $500 million by China not gone unnoticed. A few years ago the U.S. into renewable energy resources in Pakistan State Department launched a series of collabo- through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, rative efforts between American and Chinese a $45 billion dollar agreement to build infra- companies. However, there have been a string structure projects which include wind and solar of high-profile events that have diminished the ventures (CEPEC News, February 23, 2016). In the prospects for future cooperation. Primarily, a future, it is likely China will deploy renewables to downturn in renewable energy sector damp- other recently established leases in the Maldives, ened global enthusiasm in the early 2010s. This Djibouti, or one of its many land-based satellite was followed quickly by multiple lawsuits tracking stations. In another study, personnel in against China. In 2012, America sued China in

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Xi’an at the PLA’s Construction Engineer Re- west of Beijing, is the “nationally designated al- search Institute and the Energy Evaluation Cen- ternative energy production base.” [1] Both the ter for Building tested energy-saving techniques Chinese and American Yingli websites tout Yingli in residential buildings that can be cross-applied as the world’s leading producer of photovoltaic to commercial, industrial, or military facilities. [3] (PV) modules with nearly 65 million produced This civ-mil component in China’s renewable en- thus far (Yingli Solar [accessed February 10]). An- ergy sector cannot be understated. other leader in solar power, Zhu Gongshan, the founder of GCLPoly, has one of the longest and Civil-Military Integration in Renewables most diverse histories in the energy sector. Zhu began with the construction of a thermal power China’s 2015 Military Strategy contends that ac- plant in Taicang in 1996 by teaming up with celerated civ-mil integration will be key to un- Kong Continental Mariner Investment, whose specified, sectors. To aid civ-mil cooperation, largest shareholder was the powerful Poly “stronger policy support” will be initiated to “es- Group. Historically, Poly has maintained close tablish uniform military and civilian standards ties with the PLA and ’s family. In for infrastructure, key technological areas and 2006, Zhu transitioned to renewables. Rather major industries . . . It is also necessary to push than follow other Chinese companies’ lead and forward with the shared utilization of military ca- focusing on downstream production, Zhu pabilities and those of other sectors” (Defense started by producing polysilicon, the raw mate- White Paper, May 29, 2015). As such, the overlap rial of PV panels. After success there, he transi- in civ-mil cooperation is manifest for a number tioned again to solar power plant construction of reasons. First, it is important to point out that and silicon wafer production in 2009. This time renewable energy systems can be easily repli- he received an investment of $700 million by the cated and applied by both government and government-backed sovereign wealth fund, commercial entities, respectively called govern- China Investment Corporation. ment off-the-shelf (GOTS) or commercial off- the-shelf (COTS). Second, a number of key fig- The same civ-mil connection is present in the ures in the renewable energy sectors have back- wind sector. Zhang Chuanwei served 10 years in grounds in the Chinese military and maintain the PLA before starting Ming Yang Wind Power close relations with military industries and gov- Group. He is noteworthy for pioneering turbine ernment, paralleling the civ-mil integration that leasing by partnering with the Chinese bank the 2015 Military Strategy commands. Three are ICBC and intends to make Ming Yang the global particularly noteworthy: one in solar, one in the leader in offshore wind power through more in- broader renewable energy portfolio, and one in tegrated turbines, energy storage, and grid wind. technology.

Miao Liansheng spent 13 years as a PLA soldier, However, China’s heavy civ-mil relationship in but now leads Yingli Green Energy Holding Co. renewable energy has not gone unnoticed, es- Ltd., a New York-listed solar company. Miao’s pecially in the U.S. In 2010, Congress launched hometown of Baoding, about 100 miles south- an investigation when it was discovered that Suntech, with ties to the PLA, was the largest

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supplier to a solar plant at Nellis Air Force Base spread environmental devastation as well as as- in Nevada. As a result, Congress inserted Sec- sociated social distortions. As Yuan points out, tions 846 and 858 into the 2015 National De- in 2013, the 3rd Plenary Session of 18th Com- fense Authorization Act that prescribed that the munist Party Congress rolled out reforms, spear- Defense Department comply with the Buy Amer- headed by the Central National Security Com- ican Act when purchasing most photovoltaic de- mission and the Central Leading Group for Com- vices, effectively shutting out Chinese suppliers. prehensively Deepening Reform to address [4] In 2012, the Obama Administration with the these six dilemmas. backing of the Committee on Foreign Invest- ment in the United States (CFIUS) blocked con- In his assessment, Yuan contends that Xi’s em- struction of a wind farm adjacent to a sensitive phasis on energy security is a national, global, U.S. Navy development facility in Oregon. While and strategic issue. First, politically, Xi needs to China Daily did not specify, Reuters pointed out combat the powerful oil clique and ratchet down the direct connection between Ralls Corpora- corruption of the state-owned energy enter- tion, its parent company (Shanghai-listed Sany prises. Second, China should promote the trans- Heavy Industry Co.), and Sany’s chairman Liang formation of its energy infrastructure and revo- Wengen, previously a senior representative to lutionize its energy sector to promote economic multiple Chinese National Congresses (China growth, diversity, and sustainability. Third, China Daily, September 29, 2012; Reuters, September should deepen foreign energy cooperation initi- 29, 2012). The PLA’s role in China’s energy de- atives through diplomatic means, such as “One velopment and strategy is less surprising given Belt, One Road” and the Asian Infrastructure In- China’s larger energy security issues. vestment Bank. Fourth, China should develop fossil fuel alternatives to not only lessen the det- Chinese Energy Strategy rimental environmental impacts they cause but also to alleviate the negative social distortions Graduate research by Yuan Weicheng from Tai- they create. For example, spontaneous local en- wan National University identifies six dilemmas vironmental protests have increased in fre- that China faces with regards to its energy secu- quency throughout China over the last few years rity. [5] First, China inordinately focuses on the to the chagrin and concern of China’s leader- coal industry which distorts broader economics. ship. Fifth, the PLA will play a pivotal role in both Second, China’s large imports of oil and gas are protecting China’s oil reserves and securing beholden to political risk. Third, these imports China’s vital and strategic energy routes that traverse vulnerable, strategic sea-lanes, such as span from Africa to the South China Sea. In con- the Malacca Straits and the Horn of Hormuz. clusion, China, under Xi’s leadership, will adopt Fourth, Chinese state-owned energy enterprises a more proactive and comprehensive approach are split by political factions and rife with cor- to energy strategy in response to its unfavorable ruption. Fifth, it is difficult for China to maintain condition. Indeed, this transformation has be- its strategic oil reserve up to the International gun and is manifest in some recent, renewable- Energy Agency’s recommended 90-day limit. Fi- focused activities by the PLA. nally, China’s energy demand is causing wide- Conclusion

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The deep connections between China’s energy overall and the world’s second biggest importer of sector and its government are not entirely new crude oil, China’s Middle East policy continues to be or novel. However, what is unique is how these driven by the need for secure sources of energy. The connections have emerged in the emergent re- China National United Oil Company (Chinaoil), a newable energy sector. Broadly, China’s em- joint subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corpo- brace and advancements in renewable technol- ration (CNPC) and Sinochem Corporation, alone ogies and techniques over the past two decades purchased 7 million barrels of Middle East crude in has been remarkable. Amid the background of January 2017 (Yibada.com [New York City], February globalization, China now has mastered a sector 5). Unsurprisingly, China’s closest partner in the begun and largely driven by foreign competi- Middle East, Saudi Arabia is home to roughly 18 tors. Indeed, the tables have turned. As the pre- percent of the world’s total oil reserves and is the viously mentioned dossiers indicated, the PLA world’s top exporter of crude. The two countries’ re- has played an important, albeit understated role lationship was solidified in 2009 when China sur- as an incubator and financier for some of the passed the United States as the top destination of leading commercial efforts in renewable energy. Saudi oil exports. Although Russia overtook Saudi The next article in this series will examine the Arabia as China’s number one supplier of oil in role of the PLA in China’s national energy strat- 2016, China’s reliance on Saudi oil will remain cen- egy. tral to its energy security calculus (Gulf Business Commander Wilson VornDick received a B.A. [Dubai], January 17). from George Washington University and studied at East China Normal University in Shanghai. His However, multiple state-level bilateral exchanges in assignments include the Chinese Maritime Stud- 2016 point to an evolving relationship that trans- ies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College and the cends oil. Sino-Saudi relations witnessed an unprec- Pentagon. The views presented in this article are edented expansion in bilateral security cooperation those of the author and do not necessarily repre- in 2016 in the form of their first ever joint counter- sent the views of the Department of the Navy or terrorism exercise (al-Jazeera [Doha], October 23, Department of Defense. 2016). The increasing pace of Sino-Saudi contacts points to a more expansive phase of bilateral rela- *** tions over a convergence of interests in the security sphere. The increasingly security-focused elements on display in China’s relationship with Saudi Arabia China and Saudi Arabia represent the latest sign of China’s growing appe- Solidify Strategic Partner- tite for showcasing its military capabilities beyond its borders. At the same time, given Saudi Arabia’s ship Amid Looming Risks predicament, China’s growing engagement with the By Chris Zambelis kingdom exposes it to a multitude of risks.

Energy, Economics, and Diplomacy hile the wider Middle East remains convulsed by W conflict and instability, China’s influence and inter- The outcome of the Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mu- ests in the region continue to expand in a familiar hammed bin Salman al-Saud’s three-day visit to pattern. As the world’s largest consumer of energy

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Beijing in August 2016 is further illustrative of the January 17). China is also Saudi Arabia’s biggest oil growing amity between China and Saudi Arabia. customer and overall largest trading partner. Xi’s The ambitious and multi-titled grandson of King visit was the first stop on a three-nation Middle East Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud—Prince Salman also tour that would also bring him to Egypt and Iran. serves as Saudi Arabia’s second Deputy Prime Min- His trip was the first by a Chinese president to the ister and Defense Minister—has emerged as the kingdom in seven years. Xi’s talks with King Salman face of the kingdom’s drive to reform, modernize, resulted in the elevation of the current bilateral re- and diversify its economy under its Vision 2030 plan lationship to what was termed a “comprehensive (al-Arabiya [Abu Dhabi], April 26, 2016). Salman vis- strategic partnership.” Both leaders appeared side- ited at the invitation of Chinese Vice Premier Zhang by-side at the King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Gaoli, shortly ahead of the September 4–5 meeting Research Center in Riyadh to remotely inaugurate of the eleventh annual meeting of the Group of 20 the Yanbu Aramco Sinopec Refining Company (G20) in Hangzhou. Salman’s meetings with Vice (YASREF) oil refinery (YASREF, February 9, 2016; Premier Zhang yielded fifteen memorandums of Xinhua, January 21, 2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, understanding (MOUs) governing cooperation in January 20, 2016). Located in Yanbu Industrial City the energy, mining, housing, finance, infrastructure, along the Red Sea in the kingdom’s al-Medina Prov- and public works sectors. The MOUs also outlined ince, YASREF represents a joint venture between the plans to help finance reconstruction projects in ar- Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Aramco) and the China eas affected by earthquakes in China, collaboration Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec). In- between the Chinese Ministry of Science and Tech- itiated in 2012 at an initial investment of $10 billion, nology and King Abdulaziz City for Science and the effort represents China’s single-largest invest- Technology, and future cultural exchanges. Prince ment in Saudi Arabia. Aramco holds a 62 percent Salman also met with officials representing the Bank stake while Sinopec holds a 37 percent stake in of China, Bank of China for Telecommunications, YASREF (YASREF, February 9, 2016). YASREF is a full- and the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank conversion refinery and the first overseas refinery (Asharq al-Awsat [London], August 30, 2016). The constructed by Sinopec. two sides also announced the creation of a joint bi- lateral strategic body to act as a framework for fu- Xi used the occasion to praise the state of Sino- ture bilateral contacts (al-Arabiya, August 30, 2016; Saudi relations and emphasize the kingdom’s role Xinhua, August 30, 2016). Prince Salman also met in China’s OBOR initiative. Recognizing the signifi- with China’s Defense Minister Chang Wanquan in cance of China’s emphasis on establishing a web of an exchange that yielded a commitment to further regional trade and communication lines, Saudi Ara- advance Sino-Saudi security cooperation (Xinhua, bia has since expressed interest in joining the August 31, 2016). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Express Tribune [Karachi], October 1, 2016). Both sides also Similarly, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s January reiterated their agreement on a range of range of 2016 visit to Saudi Arabia yielded a host of energy regional topics, including combatting terrorism. and trade agreements. China imported approxi- Numerous agreements governing cooperation in mately 1 million barrels per day of crude oil in 2016 the energy, communications, technology, environ- from Saudi Arabia, accounting for around 20 per- ment, culture, aerospace, and scientific sectors were cent of its overall energy demand (Gulf Business, also concluded (Xinhua, January 21, 2016).

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meeting with Syrian Defense Minister and Deputy As the last country to recognize the People’s Re- Prime Minister General Fahd Jasim al-Furayj in Da- public of China in 1990, Sino-Saudi relations have mascus, Chinese Rear Admiral Guan Youfei reaf- grown markedly from their previous state of passive firmed China’s support for the Ba’athist regime and indifference to Cold War tensions. Saudi Arabia’s relayed a commitment to increase Sino-Syrian mili- strategic alliance with the United States took prec- tary cooperation. Youfei also conveyed China’s con- edent over all else in foreign affairs. The changing cerns about the prevalence of Chinese and other geopolitical landscape has prompted Saudi Arabia ethnic Uighur militants associated with the al- to revise its foreign policy. Much has been said of Qaeda-affiliated Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) who former U.S. president Barrack Obama’s declaration have joined the most radical factions within the Syr- of a U.S. strategic pivot towards Asia. Saudi Arabia ian insurgency (Diplomat [Tokyo], January 27; South has initiated its own strategic pivot of sorts toward China Morning Post [Hong Kong], August 16, 2016). Asia and, in particular, China (al-Monitor, March 13, TIP is implicated in a host of attacks in China’s Xin- 2014). In doing so, Saudi Arabia is seeking to diver- jiang-Uighur Autonomous Province and beyond. sify its portfolio of foreign relations to offset what it perceives to be a decline in U.S. global influence and Security Affairs a shift in the U.S. Middle East calculus. Saudi trepi- dation over the prospects of a U.S. détente with Unlike its energy, economic, and diplomatic as- Iran, disagreements over the conflict in Syria, and a pects, the security dimension of China’s relationship host of other issues have propelled the kingdom to with Saudi Arabia has received less scrutiny. Histor- seek out new partners. ically, the security dimension in Sino-Saudi relations has been quite limited. The extent of Sino-Saudi se- China’s highly touted friendship with Iran also is curity relations is generally attributed to Saudi Ara- likely to weigh heavily on Saudi thinking. In this con- bia’s acquisition of China’s Dongfeng-3 (DF-3; text, Saudi Arabia’s overtures to China also reflect NATO CSS-2 [“East Wind”]) nuclear-capable inter- an effort to offset the extensive inroads that have mediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in the late already been achieved in Sino-Iranian relations. A 1980s (China Brief, October 24, 2002). The conclu- visit by a delegation representing Yemen’s Houthi sion of the missile deal occurred prior to the 1990 rebellion to Beijing in November 2016 is also likely establishment of formal diplomatic relations be- to have raised suspicions about China’s intentions tween both countries. Saudi Arabia is also known to in Yemen’s civil war given the diplomatic efforts to have subsequently acquired DF-5 (CSS-5) intercon- end the conflict. Saudi Arabia is determined to re- tinental ballistic missiles from China. Saudi Arabia is verse Houthi gains through military action and re- also reported to have procured the yet more ad- assert its influence in Yemen while China has advo- vanced DF-21 missile system in 2007, allegedly with cated for a peaceful resolution of the conflict (Mid- U.S. approval (Middle East Institute, February 9, dle East Observer [Stockholm], December 3, 2016; 2016; Nuclear Threat Initiative, August 2015; De- al-Araby al-Jadeed [London], December 1, 2016). fense-Update [Qadima], May 2, 2014; Diplomat, China’s continued support for Syrian President Ba- January 31, 2014). Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of Chinese shar al-Assad in Syria represents another potential ballistic missile platforms served to enhance the concern given Saudi Arabia’s support of efforts to kingdom’s deterrent capacity against Iran, Iraq, and topple the Ba’athist regime. During an August 2016

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Israel after its requests for U.S. missile and other ad- A delegation led by Meng Jianzhu, a special envoy vanced defense systems were rejected. The Chi- of Xi’s, traveled to Riyadh in November 2016 to nese-supplied missiles are operated by the Royal meet with King Abdulaziz to discuss a range of se- Saudi Strategic Missile Force and are deployed in curity issues. Both sides announced a commitment numerous locations, including the Al-Sulayyil Stra- to forge a five-year plan to increase bilateral secu- tegic Missile Base, southwest of the capital Riyadh. rity cooperation (Arab News, November 7, 2016; It is one of at least two missile bases reportedly con- Middle East Observer, November 7, 2016). Jiazhu’s structed by China in the 1980s (ababiil.net [Yemen], visit followed a milestone in Sino-Saudi security re- July 1, 2015). lations. China and Saudi Arabia staged their first joint counterterrorism exercise in October 2016. The security umbrella afforded by the longstanding Dubbed “Exploration 2016,” the exercise was held U.S.-Saudi strategic relationship remains the foun- over a fifteen-day period in China’s southwestern dation of the kingdom’s national security strategy. city of Chongqing. The exercise featured Special Saudi Arabia’s reliance on U.S. weapons platforms is Forces units attached to the Royal Saudi Land further illustrative of its dependence on the United Forces and their People’s Liberation Army (PLA) States. Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s largest im- counterparts. The exercises, which featured two 25- porter of weapons, having surpassed India in 2014 member contingents representing both countries, as the single-largest arms importer overall. The were designed to improve the respective capacities kingdom is also the single-largest importer of U.S. of both countries to conduct counterterrorism, hos- defense systems (SIPRI, February 2016). Neverthe- tage rescue, and other complex operations (South less, Saudi Arabia has demonstrated at least a pass- China Morning Post, October 27, 2016; Asharq Al- ing interest in purchasing additional Chinese de- Awsat, October 27, 2016; Asharq Al-Awsat, October fense systems, including the jointly produced Chi- 23, 2016). nese-Pakistani JF-17 fighter (The News International [Karachi], November 17, 2016). Saudi Arabia is also Looming Risks reported to have reached a deal with China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (CAIG) for the pur- A snapshot of Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical picture re- chase of a number of medium-altitude, long- veals some of the risks China faces as its engage- endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) capa- ment with the kingdom grows. Despite its autocratic ble of conducting intelligence, surveillance, and re- character, Saudi Arabia has been spared the wave connaissance operations as well as targeted strikes of upheaval witnessed elsewhere in the Arab world. (Arab News [Jeddah], September 1, 2016). Saudi Even as it confronts a domestic terrorist challenge Arabia is also rumored to have expressed an interest in the form of a resilient al-Qaeda and self-anointed in potentially developing a submarine with Chinese Islamic State, heightened sectarian tensions, and assistance (Tactical Report [Mansourieh], Septem- growing displays of popular dissent, Saudi Arabia ber 2, 2016). has managed to present an image of constancy. Its reality is far more complex. Saudi Arabia is beset President Xi’s January 2016 visit to Saudi Arabia with a litany of challenges to its domestic security, yielded a commitment from both sides to increase political stability, economic viability, and regional bilateral security cooperation, especially in the standing. The fall of oil prices has undermined the counterterrorism arena (Xinhua, January 20, 2016). kingdom. The removal of a number a number of

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economic sanctions levied against Iran following in Saudi Arabia or the wider Middle East. Just as im- the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement portant, there are no indications to suggest that has helped facilitate the steady return of Saudi Ara- China has its sights set on overtaking the United bia’s archrival into energy markets. The growth of States as the region’s dominant military actor. Saudi the U.S. shale industry has likewise helped to chip Arabia remains a critical member of an entrenched away at the kingdom’s comparative advantage in U.S. regional alliance network, a reality that is not the oil sector. In a measure designed to help bolster likely to have been lost in Beijing. At the same time, oil prices, Saudi Arabia helped the Organization of China’s rising influence in the Middle East does pro- the Petroleum Exporting Countries reach an agree- vide it with tangible strategic advantages, including ment to slash production, but any short-lived in- crucial leverage that could be brought to bear over creases in the price of oil are not likely to offset the the United States in a future crisis in the South China kingdom’s many structural challenges (Economist Sea or other possible friction points in Asia or else- [London], December 3, 2016). Given the blows to where down the line. China’s interests in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and other Arab countries beset by instability in recent years, Chris Zambelis is a Senior Analyst specializing in the potential destabilization of Saudi Arabia would Middle East affairs for Helios Global, Inc., a risk man- have major repercussions for Chinese interests. agement group based in the Washington, D.C. area. Saudi Arabia’s problems extend to the foreign pol- He is also the director of World Trends Watch, Helios icy front. Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen has Global’s geopolitical practice area. The opinions ex- been disastrous. Saudi Arabia has also failed to pressed here are the author’s alone and do not nec- achieve its objectives in Syria and other fronts. De- essarily reflect the position of Helios Global, Inc. spite its official repudiation of extremism, Saudi Arabia remains the ideological wellspring of the *** *** *** austere Wahhabist and Salafist philosophies that have helped to nurture violent radical Islamist cur- China Brief is a bi-weekly journal of information rents worldwide. This includes ideological move- and analysis covering Greater China in Eurasia. ments that have helped spawn extremists in China China Brief is a publication of The Jamestown or are otherwise targeting Chinese interests abroad. Foundation, a private non-profit organization

Conclusion based in Washington D.C. and is edited by Peter Wood. While Sino-Saudi relations will continue to flourish, The opinions expressed in China Brief are solely the kingdom’s precarious geopolitical predicament those of the authors, and do not necessarily re- exposes China to multiple energy and economic flect the views of The Jamestown Foundation. risks. The security facets of the bilateral relationship will likely draw the most attention, although are no For comments and questions about China Brief, indications that they will exceed its energy, eco- please contact us at [email protected] nomic, and diplomatic facets even as the kingdom is likely to invite closer security cooperation. Despite its impressive inroads, China is in no position to dis- place or otherwise categorically offset U.S. influence

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