DOCSLIB.ORG

Afghanistan and Transnational War: Interlocking Security Dilemmas and Strategic Challenges

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Afghanistan and Transnational War: Interlocking Security Dilemmas and Strategic Challenges Afghanistan and transnational war: Interlocking security dilemmas and strategic challenges Nishank Motwani A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Humanities and Social Sciences UNSW Canberra November 2015 Abstract Following the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, the United States and Afghan governments have sought, with little success, to resolve Afghanistan’s regional problems through a political framework intended to knit the region together. This thesis investigates the reasons why a regional solution to the conflict in Afghanistan has not gained traction. Traditional understandings of the security dilemma are conceptually refined, operationally expanded and thematically analysed. Conceptually, a distinction is drawn between genuine security dilemmas, involving benign actors, and strategic challenges, involving actors with malign intent. Operationally, bilateral formulations of the security dilemma are expanded to demonstrate the occurrence of multiple interlocking security dilemmas. Thematically, a case study method is used to explore these security conditions in terms of the structural, contextual and cognitive dynamics impeding regional cooperation. Three findings emerge. First, Afghan leaders and their backers have failed to address key structural impediments, such as competing notions of security and regional stability, rival strategic interests and opposing power ambitions. The Afghan Taliban’s absolute goals, Pakistan’s malign orientation, and Saudi Arabia’s anti-Iranian and Salafist ideology have proved most debilitating. Second, the metastases of Southwest Asia’s unresolved contextual reality tax an already rickety mechanism. The legacy of fraught historical relations, territorial disputes, state and non-state spoilers, armed conflict, and the effects of the Indian-Pakistani nuclear deterrent taints the politico-social environment, stymieing efforts to allay entrenched suspicions. Third, advocates of a regional strategy have failed to consider fully how to reshape or moderate the cognitive perceptions of actors. High levels of fear (whether real or imagined), perverse enemy images, trust deficits and uncertainty arising from military postures exacerbate the challenge faced by those seeking an end to the conflict. The thesis concludes that a regional solution seems unlikely. Afghanistan remains trapped in a web of interlocking security dilemmas and strategic challenges, each complicated by structural, contextual and cognitive factors. A better approach would be to strengthen Afghanistan through state-building and to focus diplomatic efforts on persuading or pressuring regional states to resolve their tensions bilaterally. Table of Contents Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... v List of Acronyms and Abbreviations .............................................................................vii List of Figures .............................................................................................................. xi Maps ........................................................................................................................... xiii Chapter 1: Introduction .............................................................................................. 1 1. Theoretical framework ........................................................................................ 2 2. Research methodology ...................................................................................... 5 3. Thesis outline ..................................................................................................... 7 Chapter 2: The history of the Afghan conflict ......................................................... 11 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 11 1. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 ...................................................... 12 2. Post-Soviet withdrawal fragility in Afghanistan and the Afghan civil war 1992– 1996 ................................................................................................................. 22 3. Operation Enduring Freedom ........................................................................... 35 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 37 Chapter 3: Afghanistan’s regional diplomacy and “Heart of Asia” process ........ 39 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 39 1. What is Afghanistan’s region? .......................................................................... 39 2. From regional cooperation to a regional political solution ................................. 53 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 57 Chapter 4: Security dilemma: The emergence and development of the concept 59 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 59 1. The emergence of the security dilemma ........................................................... 61 2. Development of the security dilemma: Uncertainty and fear under anarchy ..... 71 3. Searching for cooperation under the security dilemma ..................................... 85 4. Critics of the security dilemma .......................................................................... 89 5. Properties of a genuine security dilemma ......................................................... 92 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 93 Chapter 5: Operationalising the security dilemma ................................................. 95 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 95 1. Distinguishing between benign and malign security conditions ......................... 96 2. A model for interaction between security dilemmas and strategic challenges . 100 i 3. Refining the security dilemma: Unpacking the structural, contextual and cognitive characteristics of actors ................................................................... 107 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 135 Chapter 6: Setting the scene—the dynamics of Afghanistan and its stakeholders ................................................................................................................................. 139 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 139 1. The goals and concerns of external actors in Afghanistan .............................. 139 2. Regional summitry but no traction on a regional political solution ................... 173 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 175 Chapter 7: Structural factors impeding a regional political solution .................. 177 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 177 1. Pakistan’s engagement with the Afghan Taliban ............................................ 178 2. Security dilemmas as impediments to a regional political solution .................. 184 3. Strategic challenges as impediments for regional cooperation ....................... 201 4. The regional contagion effect ......................................................................... 218 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 219 Chapter 8: Contextual factors impeding a regional political solution ................. 221 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 221 1. Fraught historical relations and territorial disputes .......................................... 222 2. State and non-state spoilers ........................................................................... 242 3. Risk taking under a nuclear security umbrella ................................................ 253 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 261 Chapter 9: Cognitive factors impeding a regional political solution ................... 263 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 263 1. Regional dynamics of uncertainty, fear and mistrust in Southwest Asia .......... 264 2. The problem of enemy images in Southwest Asia .......................................... 290 3. The dialectics of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear deterrent postures: Consequences for stability ............................................................................. 305 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 314 Chapter 10: Conclusion .......................................................................................... 317 1. Applying the refined security dilemma framework ..........................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Global Agenda Council Reports 2010 Gl Global Agenda Council O
    Global Agenda Council Reports 2010 Global Agenda Council 2010 Reports Global Agenda Council Reports 2010 .weforum.org) ofit; it is tied to no political, no to tied is it ofit; -pr national organization committed to improving the improving committed to organization national The World Economic Forum is an independent an is Forum Economic World The inter partnerships in leaders engaging by world the of state and industry agendas. to shape global, regional in based and 1971, in a foundation as Incorporated is Forum Economic World the Switzerland, Geneva, not-for and impartial partisan or national interests. (www partisan or national interests. Global_Agenda_SRO_Layout 1 13.01.10 10:29 Page3 Global Agenda Council Reports 2010 Summaries of Global Agenda Council Discussions from the Summit on the Global Agenda 2009 Global_Agenda_SRO_Layout 1 13.01.10 10:29 Page4 This publication is also available in electronic form on the World Economic Forum’s website at the following address: The Global Agenda 2010 Web version: www.weforum.org/globalagenda2010 (HTML) The book is also available as a PDF: www.weforum.org/pdf/globalagenda2010.pdf Other specific information on the Network of Global Agenda Councils can be found at the following links: www.weforum.org/globalagenda2010 www.weforum.org/globalagenda2009/interviews www.weforum.org/globalagenda2009/reports www.weforum.org/globalagenda2009/webcasts The opinions expressed and data communicated in this publication are those of Global Agenda Council Members and do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Economic Forum. World Economic Forum 91-93 route de la Capite CH-1223 Cologny/Geneva Switzerland Tel.: +41 (0)22 869 1212 Fax: +41 (0)22 786 2744 E-mail: [email protected] www.weforum.org © 2010 World Economic Forum All rights reserved.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban
    Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban A thesis submitted to the Miami University Honors Program in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for University Honors with Distinction by, Brandon Smith May 2005 Oxford, OH ABSTRACT AFGHANISTAN, 1989-1996: BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THE TALIBAN by, BRANDON SMITH This paper examines why the Afghan resistance fighters from the war against the Soviets, the mujahideen, were unable to establish a government in the time period between the withdrawal of the Soviet army from Afghanistan in 1989 and the consolidation of power by the Taliban in 1996. A number of conflicting explanations exist regarding Afghanistan’s instability during this time period. This paper argues that the developments in Afghanistan from 1989 to 1996 can be linked to the influence of actors outside Afghanistan, but not to the extent that the choices and actions of individual actors can be overlooked or ignored. Further, the choices and actions of individual actors need not be explained in terms of ancient animosities or historic tendencies, but rather were calculated moves to secure power. In support of this argument, international, national, and individual level factors are examined. ii Afghanistan, 1989-1996: Between the Soviets and the Taliban by, Brandon Smith Approved by: _________________________, Advisor Karen L. Dawisha _________________________, Reader John M. Rothgeb, Jr. _________________________, Reader Homayun Sidky Accepted by: ________________________, Director, University Honors Program iii Thanks to Karen Dawisha for her guidance and willingness to help on her year off, and to John Rothgeb and Homayun Sidky for taking the time to read the final draft and offer their feedback.
    [Show full text]
  • Communique for May 2017
    CAMPUS Volume XX No. 104 May 2017 Source: Pedro Szekely Top Summer Vacations on a Budget, p 10 Get Your Benefits ASAP MTA Sued Over By Maleeha Lodhi your learning objectives, ASAP is more space for the new advisors com- here to help you. ing in. If everything goes well, we In Queensborough Community The ASAP offices were originally will be going back in the summer.” Inaccessible College, there are many programs located in the W building next to the In order to be eligibile for ASAP, available to help us reach our goal bookstore, however, through this students must: Subway Stations while minimizing our stress. One of summer, the ASAP building will be in 1. Have earned no more than 15 the programs available for most QCC the science building, in the basement credits By Samea Chowdhury students is the Accelerated Study in underneath the cafeteria. 2. Have maintained a 2.0 GPA Associates Program (ASAP). Not “We are here in the science build- 3. Have qualified for in-state People with disabilities face many only is ASAP available in QCC, but ing right now because our program is tuition, which means they must be barriers in transportation. Many dis- it is offered in other two year colleges expanding and hiring more advisors,” residents of the New York state abled people stay at home instead of as well. ASAP was created to increase explained Danielle Izzo-Buckner, the 4. Complete FAFSA form even if going out because it’s such a hassle for the graduation rate, and the transfer senior student manager in the ASAP you are not eligible for financial aid them to find modes of transportation for rate to four year colleges.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy
    Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy July 18, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R45818 SUMMARY R45818 Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy July 18, 2019 Afghanistan has been a significant U.S. foreign policy concern since 2001, when the United States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military Clayton Thomas campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban government that harbored and supported it. Analyst in Middle Eastern In the intervening 18 years, the United States has suffered approximately 2,400 military Affairs fatalities in Afghanistan, with the cost of military operations reaching nearly $750 billion. Congress has appropriated approximately $133 billion for reconstruction. In that time, an elected Afghan government has replaced the Taliban, and most measures of human development have improved, although Afghanistan’s future prospects remain mixed in light of the country’s ongoing violent conflict and political contention. Topics covered in this report include: Security dynamics. U.S. and Afghan forces, along with international partners, combat a Taliban insurgency that is, by many measures, in a stronger military position now than at any point since 2001. Many observers assess that a full-scale U.S. withdrawal would lead to the collapse of the Afghan government and perhaps even the reestablishment of Taliban control over most of the country. Taliban insurgents operate alongside, and in periodic competition with, an array of other armed groups, including regional affiliates of Al Qaeda (a longtime Taliban ally) and the Islamic State (a Taliban foe and increasing focus of U.S. policy). U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Taliban Fragmentation FACT, FICTION, and FUTURE by Andrew Watkins
    PEACEWORKS Taliban Fragmentation FACT, FICTION, AND FUTURE By Andrew Watkins NO. 160 | MARCH 2020 Making Peace Possible NO. 160 | MARCH 2020 ABOUT THE REPORT This report examines the phenomenon of insurgent fragmentation within Afghanistan’s Tali- ban and implications for the Afghan peace process. This study, which the author undertook PEACE PROCESSES as an independent researcher supported by the Asia Center at the US Institute of Peace, is based on a survey of the academic literature on insurgency, civil war, and negotiated peace, as well as on interviews the author conducted in Afghanistan in 2019 and 2020. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Andrew Watkins has worked in more than ten provinces of Afghanistan, most recently as a political affairs officer with the United Nations. He has also worked as an indepen- dent researcher, a conflict analyst and adviser to the humanitarian community, and a liaison based with Afghan security forces. Cover photo: A soldier walks among a group of alleged Taliban fighters at a National Directorate of Security facility in Faizabad in September 2019. The status of prisoners will be a critical issue in future negotiations with the Taliban. (Photo by Jim Huylebroek/New York Times) The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace. An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website (www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject. © 2020 by the United States Institute of Peace United States Institute of Peace 2301 Constitution Avenue NW Washington, DC 20037 Phone: 202.457.1700 Fax: 202.429.6063 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.usip.org Peaceworks No.
    [Show full text]
  • United States, Taliban and Fundamentalism in Afghanistan
    American International Journal of Available online at http://www.iasir.net Research in Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences ISSN (Print): 2328-3734, ISSN (Online): 2328-3696, ISSN (CD-ROM): 2328-3688 AIJRHASS is a refereed, indexed, peer-reviewed, multidisciplinary and open access journal published by International Association of Scientific Innovation and Research (IASIR), USA (An Association Unifying the Sciences, Engineering, and Applied Research) United States, Taliban and Fundamentalism in Afghanistan: The Growing Instability in Afghanistan Naseer Ahmed Kalis Senior Research Fellow, Department of Strategic and Regional Studies, University of Jammu, J&K, India- 180006 Abstract: This paper aims to elucidate the causes of perpetual instability in Afghanistan since September 11, 2001. It argues that the foreign powers are responsible for “rolling back the stability” and making it a “zone of instability”. United States and Soviet Union, ‘the dancing evils of Cold war’, propel the Afghan descent towards extremism. United States produced so called Mujahedeen and freedom fighter and equipment them with weapons for their strategic interest (to roll back Soviet Union). After winning its Strategic Interest, United States estranged from these Freedom Fighters and remained a silent spectator. When these freedom fighters launched their full-fledged extremism and even not spared United States, United States act as a “wounded bear” and fought the longest war of its history without any conclusion and finally withdraw its NATO forces ‘by force not by choice’. This paper conclude that it is now the responsibility of neighbouring states like Pakistan, Russia, China and India to take comprehensive steps to stabilize Afghanistan and to made security alliances to make Afghanistan a zone of peace.
    [Show full text]
  • The Question of Afghanistan and Its Impact on US Relations with Pakistan
    1 Draft, Please Do Not Copy without Explicit Permission from Author The Question of Afghanistan and its Impact on U.S. Relations with Pakistan: The Need for Pragmatic Engagement Abstract: Relations between the U.S. and Pakistan have always been cyclical, oscillating from collaboration and friendship to noncooperation and enmity. A core reason for this is a failure by consecutive American administration to understand the nature of the Pakistani political system, in which social groups are central. Accordingly, U.S. policymakers have expectations and make demands that often manifest through the rubric of democracy promotion. The paper identifies two key obstacles to democracy promotion in Pakistan: ungoverned territories and social identity groups. The section examines these elements in respect to Afghanistan. The reason for that is because the second section expands the argument by shifting attention to U.S. policymakers who appear to have place Afghanistan at the heart of U.S. engagement in South Asia. In doing so, it is argue that as long as Afghanistan remains key to U.S. national security concerns, American interaction with Pakistan remains limited because the relations are not about the U.S. and Pakistan per se, but rather on how Pakistan can help the U.S. meet its national security interests in Afghanistan. Students of history and politics quickly learn that nothing is certain nor absolute, as even definite and incontrovertible evidence may obscure deeper complexities that define inter-state relations, as far too often, common interests trump values. This may explain why foreign policy analysis tends to be grounded in case studies, and less in theoretical scrutiny.
    [Show full text]
  • The Afghanistan-Pakistan Wars, 2008–2009: Micro-Geographies, Conflict Diffusion, and Clusters of Violence
    The Afghanistan-Pakistan Wars, 2008–2009: Micro-geographies, Conflict Diffusion, and Clusters of Violence John O’Loughlin, Frank D. W. Witmer, and Andrew M. Linke1 Abstract: A team of political geographers analyzes over 5,000 violent events collected from media reports for the Afghanistan and Pakistan conflicts during 2008 and 2009. The violent events are geocoded to precise locations and the authors employ an exploratory spatial data analysis approach to examine the recent dynamics of the wars. By mapping the violence and examining its temporal dimensions, the authors explain its diffusion from traditional foci along the border between the two countries. While violence is still overwhelmingly concentrated in the Pashtun regions in both countries, recent policy shifts by the American and Pakistani gov- ernments in the conduct of the war are reflected in a sizeable increase in overall violence and its geographic spread to key cities. The authors identify and map the clusters (hotspots) of con- flict where the violence is significantly higher than expected and examine their shifts over the two-year period. Special attention is paid to the targeting strategy of drone missile strikes and the increase in their number and geographic extent by the Obama administration. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: H560, H770, O180. 15 figures, 1 table, 113 ref- erences. Key words: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Taliban, ­­Al- Qaeda, insurgency, Islamic terrorism, U.S. military, International Security Assistance Forces, Durand Line, Tribal Areas, Northwest Frontier Province, ACLED, NATO. merica’s “longest war” is now (August 2010) nearing its ninth anniversary. It was Alaunched in October 2001 as a “war of necessity” (Barack Obama, August 17, 2009) to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, and thus remove the support of this regime for Al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization that carried out the September 2001 attacks in the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • Dr. Bhagat Singh Biography by Chapman
    Doctorji: An Exhibit on the Life of Dr. Bhagat Singh Thind Exhibit Dates: November 17, 2016 – January 15, 2016 Dr. Bhagat Singh Thind was born on October 3, 1892 into a well-known military Kamboj Sikh Thind family in the village Taragarh/Talawan in District Amritsar, Punjab. His father S. Buta Singh Thind was retired as a Subedar Major from the British Indian Army. His mother Icer Kaur died when Dr. Thind was only a child, but left an indelible mark on him. Dr. Thind’s ancestors had served in the Sikh army of Maharaja Ranjit and before that, in the Marjeewra Sikh fauj of the 10th Lord and earned a reputation as a warrior family. S. Buta Singh Thind and his family and relations were very dedicated Sikhs and actively participated in Sikh Morcha for possession of lands belonging to Gurudwara Pheru, at Lahore in 1924 and earlier in Nankana Sahib Morcha in 1921, where out of eighty-six Singh Shaheeds, thirty-two were the Kamboj Singhs. S. Buta Singh Thind was jailed for several years and lost his military pension as a consequence. In this Gurudwara Morcha, S. Buta Singh also persuaded several other Kamboj Singhs, if Shekhupuru, to actively participate in the movement. Dr. Bhagat Singh Thind had clearly inherited his love for Sikhism and humanity from his devoted Sikh parents and relatives. After his high school graduation in 1908, Dr. Thind attended Khalsa College, Amritsar and obtained his College Degree. While a student at Khalsa College, Dr. Thind studied American history and the literature of Emerson, Whitman, and Thoreau.
    [Show full text]
  • Xinjiang, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan
    Image Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons Xinjiang, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan Subramanyam Sridharan P a g e 1 | 11 Introduction Ever since Op. Bear Trap[1] which led to the induction, the eventual humiliating withdrawal of Soviet military from Afghanistan, that graveyard of all Superpowers, and the ultimate dismantling of the Soviet Union itself within a couple of years in the closing quarter of the previous century, jihadi terrorism, extremism and fundamentalism have engulfed this region of Af-Pak and beyond, spilling over into India, the Central Asian Republics (CAR), South East Asia, China, parts of Asia and Europe, Russia, the Levant et al. Three of the major players, apart from Wahhabi West Asian monarchies and Egypt, involved in the Afghan Jihad were the US, Pakistan, and China, each for their very own reasons. As the adage relentlessly proves, the hands that fed the snake were eventually bitten by it. The US was attacked on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, within its own supposedly impenetrable precincts and that country has not been the same again ever since. Pakistan, the ‘epicenter of worldwide terrorism’ has even been termed as the ‘Terrorist State’ [2] and is thoroughly emaciated today economically, barely managing to exist and that too due almost entirely to China, and is on the verge of being blacklisted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), three decades after the Jihad ended. China has been now and then wracked by terrorism by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) separatists and has been unable to eliminate them altogether even while going to extraordinary and inhuman lengths to retain Xinjiang within itself.
    [Show full text]
  • 10 Pakistan's Nuclear Program
    10 PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM Laying the groundwork for impunity C. Christine Fair Contemporary analysts of Pakistan’s nuclear program speciously assert that Pakistan began acquiring a nuclear weapons capability after the 1971 war with India in which Pakistan was vivisected. In this conventional account, India’s 1974 nuclear tests gave Pakistan further impetus for its program.1 In fact, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan’s first popularly elected prime minister, ini- tiated the program in the late 1960s despite considerable opposition from Pakistan’s first military dictator General Ayub Khan (henceforth Ayub). Bhutto presciently began arguing for a nuclear weapons program as early as 1964 when China detonated its nuclear devices at Lop Nor and secured its position as a permanent nuclear weapons state under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Considering China’s test and its defeat of India in the 1962 Sino–Indian war, Bhutto reasoned that India, too, would want to develop a nuclear weapon. He also knew that Pakistan’s civilian nuclear program was far behind India’s, which predated independence in 1947. Notwithstanding these arguments, Ayub opposed acquiring a nuclear weapon both because he believed it would be an expensive misadventure and because he worried that doing so would strain Pakistan’s western alliances, formalized through the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Ayub also thought Pakistan would be able to buy a nuclear weapon “off the shelf” from one of its allies if India acquired one first.2 With the army opposition obstructing him, Bhutto was unable to make any significant nuclear headway until 1972, when Pakistan’s army lay in disgrace after losing East Pakistan in its 1971 war with India.
    [Show full text]
  • Comparative Constitutional Law SPRING 2012
    Comparative Constitutional Law SPRING 2012 PROFESSOR STEPHEN J. SCHNABLY Office: G472 http://osaka.law.miami.edu/~schnably/courses.html Tel.: 305-284-4817 E-mail: [email protected] SUPPLEMENTARY READINGS: TABLE OF CONTENTS Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 .................................................................1 Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. S-26. An Act respecting the Supreme Court of Canada................................................................................................................................11 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) .............................................................................................12 Kenya Timeline..............................................................................................................................20 Laurence Juma, Ethnic Politics and the Constitutional Review Process in Kenya, 9 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 471 (2002) ..........................................................................................23 Mary L. Dudziak, Working Toward Democracy: Thurgood Marshall and the Constitution of Kenya, 56 Duke L.J. 721 (2006)....................................................................................26 Laurence Juma, Ethnic Politics and the Constitutional Review Process in Kenya, 9 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 471 (2002) .......................................................................................34 Migai Akech, Abuse of Power and Corruption in Kenya: Will the New Constitution Enhance Government
    [Show full text]