Xinjiang, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Xinjiang, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan Image Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons Xinjiang, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan Subramanyam Sridharan P a g e 1 | 11 Introduction Ever since Op. Bear Trap[1] which led to the induction, the eventual humiliating withdrawal of Soviet military from Afghanistan, that graveyard of all Superpowers, and the ultimate dismantling of the Soviet Union itself within a couple of years in the closing quarter of the previous century, jihadi terrorism, extremism and fundamentalism have engulfed this region of Af-Pak and beyond, spilling over into India, the Central Asian Republics (CAR), South East Asia, China, parts of Asia and Europe, Russia, the Levant et al. Three of the major players, apart from Wahhabi West Asian monarchies and Egypt, involved in the Afghan Jihad were the US, Pakistan, and China, each for their very own reasons. As the adage relentlessly proves, the hands that fed the snake were eventually bitten by it. The US was attacked on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, within its own supposedly impenetrable precincts and that country has not been the same again ever since. Pakistan, the ‘epicenter of worldwide terrorism’ has even been termed as the ‘Terrorist State’ [2] and is thoroughly emaciated today economically, barely managing to exist and that too due almost entirely to China, and is on the verge of being blacklisted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), three decades after the Jihad ended. China has been now and then wracked by terrorism by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) separatists and has been unable to eliminate them altogether even while going to extraordinary and inhuman lengths to retain Xinjiang within itself. This has earned it worldwide condemnation. ETIM was founded in c. 1997 with the three objectives of driving out the Han Chinese from East Turkestan, gaining Independence and establishing an Islamic State there. There is a profound thread that entwines China with Pakistan as far as the Uyghur situation goes in Xinjiang and the endeavor of this paper is to attempt to study that deeply along with its impact in Af-Pak. What also lends urgency to the understanding is the current developments in Afghanistan after the chaotic withdrawal of the US forces, the collapse of the Ashraf Ghani regime and the storming back of the Taliban, supported by China, Russia, Iran, and Pakistan. China’s main goals in Afghanistan now are seven-fold, in decreasing order of priority: prevent Islamist terrorism from spilling over into Xinjiang, provide a form of stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan (that is, Af-Pak) that suits its needs especially with regards to CPEC, access the mineral resources in Afghanistan while denying the same to others, fill in the voids created by the vacation of the US in Asia especially around its periphery, deny India any political space in Afghanistan, collude with Pakistan in further encircling India, and tighten its grip in Russia’s backyard. The current developments also give China an opportunity to further denounce existing notions of democracy in general and American ideology in particular. The History of East Turkestan Islamic Movement On November 6, 2020, the US said that it no longer recognized ETIM as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) [3], an action that China has deeply resented. After the August 26, 2021, Kabul airport attack, the Chinese spokesman again alluded to this, “But it is regretted that the US has taken ETIM off its terror group list. China opposes the US applying a double standard in the fight against terrorism.” By a quirk of fate, the term ‘ETIM’ was itself coined by the then US Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, in c. 2002 while placing it on the UNSC 1267 List of terror organizations associated with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, when not only were the relations between the USA and China on an even keel but also the US needed Chinese assistance and approval in the prosecution of Al Qaeda which had carried out the 9/11 attacks. P a g e 2 | 11 China had then taken the stance that neither the US nor the NATO could unilaterally attack Afghanistan. It had refused to lower its flag to half-mast at the UN Headquarters in New York as a mark of respect for the dead in the 9/11 attacks. It wanted proof that it was indeed Al Qaeda in Afghanistan that had masterminded the 9/11 attacks. As a quid pro quo to gain Chinese assent, the US offered to place the ETIM under the 1267 list and a deal was made. The US also placed ETIM on the US list of terrorist organizations in c. 2002 and even deported two Uyghurs to China. The Jiang Zemin’s period of Presidency in the 90s (President, PRC 1993-2003) had been particularly repressive for the Uyghurs who resorted to retaliation and violence especially as they began to dream of similar visions of freedom as the CAR nations after the breakup of USSR in c. 1992. Though ETIM had existed in various avtar before, it was only the c. 1999 meeting between them and Osama bin Laden which is considered significant and a turning point because they were supposedly offered support by Al Qaeda then [4]. After the reciprocal ‘understanding’ between the USA and the Chinese following 9/11, the Chinese began further tightening the restrictions on the Uyghurs using the ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWoT) as a pretext. This led to even more violence, particularly the 2009 rioting in Urumqi, following a Uyghur-Han incident in faraway Guangdong. The “People’s War on Terror” that Xi Jinping launched in Xinjiang in 2014 following a series of incidents there has completely undermined the lives of the Uyghurs. Restrictions on the practice of Islam, extreme surveillance, disappearance of Uyghurs, illegal detention, brainwashing through incarceration, mass-scale social- engineering, bonded labour, and controls on movements have been extensively employed by the State. While these were happening in Xinjiang, a part of ETIM took part in the Syrian operations along with Al Qaeda’s Jabhat Fateh Al Sham (Front for Conquest of Levant also known Jabhat al-Nusra) under a separate banner Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP). While ETIM concentrates only on gaining independence for East Turkestan from China, the TIP is affiliated with the ideology of Al Qaeda as a Salafist organization. As an epicenter for universal terrorism, Pakistan was also the crucible for TIP which was created there by c. 2008. In the Levant war, the Syrian government forces (known as SAA, Syrian Arab Army) were supported by China for the very purpose of eliminating the TIP. The TIP may be the other face of ETIM which the former cleverly shields in order to escape the various UNSC sanctions such as 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) which pertain only to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities. But here we will make a distinction between TIP and ETIM. So, why are the Uyghurs fighting? The Turkic-speaking East Turkestan region was annexed by the Qing Emperor in the mid-18th Century. As is true of any Empire, much more the Chinese Empire, the edges, which are far away from the Han centre, which is the fertile east and the north-east, have never been under complete control of the emperor. It was the same case in East Turkestan too which the Chinese re-named as Xinjiang meaning ‘New Frontier’, in the last century. There were two periods of Independence for East Turkestan, between 1931 and 1934 first and later 1941-1949 when it existed as Turk Islamic Republic of East Turkestan (TIRET) and the Republic of East Turkestan (RET or ETR, East Turkestan Republic) respectively during those times. ETR was supported by the bordering Soviet Union. The idea of China has not been a fixed geographical entity over times. Though Xinjiang was given autonomy in 1955 and called as the ‘Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region’ (XUAR), Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) destroyed their native culture and religion. The culture revived only during the more tolerant Deng Xiaoping’s time. The ‘re-education’ program of the Cultural Revolution has been again picked up by Mao’s ardent protégé Xi Jinping, using tools such as facial recognition, mobile Apps, Artificial Intelligence (AI) etc., that were not available to Mao, and more than a million Uyghurs are currently under a ‘re-education’ detention program. P a g e 3 | 11 Upon establishing the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) faced some dilemma over the issue of the ethnic minorities (minzu). Roughly 10% of minorities constitute the population of China and they live mostly in an arc from the North-East through North-West and South-West to the South all along the peripheries of core Han-China, that is from Manchuria through Inner Mongolia, East Turkestan (Xinjiang), Tibet, Yunnan, Guanxi to Guangdong. They thus offer a natural buffer against enemies and potential competitors such as Japan, Russia and India. During the Long March, in order to gain their support, Mao Zedong had announced the ‘autonomy’ scheme for the minorities once CCP was in power [5]. Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) came as a result of this promise in c. 1955 though Mao had skirted Eastern Turkestan during his Long March. The Great Leap Forward and the succeeding Cultural Revolution resulted in thousands of Uyghurs escaping to nearby ‘Stan’ regions of the USSR and even as far away as Turkey. As the mighty USSR collapsed by c. 1991 and as the ‘Stan’ regions gained Independence as Central Asian Republics, the Chinese got alarmed and tightened their control over Xinjiang to stop movements of terrorists and influx of arms and ammunition.
Recommended publications
  • Transition in Afghanistan: Filling the Security Vacuum – the Expansion of Uighur Extremism?
    Sources of Tension in Afghanistan and Pakistan: A Regional Perspective Transition in Afghanistan: Filling the Security Vacuum – The Expansion of Uighur Extremism? Raffaello Pantucci and Edward Schwarck May 2014 CIDOB Policy Research Project CIDOB BARCELONA CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS With support from TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN: FILLING THE SECURITY VACUUM – THE EXPANSION OF UIGHUR EXTREMISM? Raffaello Pantucci and Edward Schwarck Raffaello Pantucci is Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services his paper aims to map out as clearly as possible the current threat Institute for Defence and Security from Uighur extremist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and as- Studies (RUSI). His research focuses on certain whether these groups will develop into a regional threat terrorism and China’s relations with T Central and South Asia. over the next few years. Edward Schwarck is Research Fellow It will be argued that Uighur Sunni-jihadist groups in Afghanistan and Pa- and Head of the Asia Programme at the Royal United Services Institute for kistan are unlikely to be able to fill the security void in either country after Defence and Security Studies (RUSI). His the West’s withdrawal. Traditionally, these groups have struggled to gain research centres on domestic security in China – particularly in Xinjiang – and traction within the global jihadist community. China has also done an ef- Chinese foreign policy in the Asia- fective job of building regional relationships that means local governments Pacific region. would block their ascension into power. Furthermore, the number of Ui- ghur militants remains marginal, suggesting that, at worst, they might be able to take control of some small settlements.
    [Show full text]
  • Griffith Asia Quarterly
    See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil: Middle Eastern Reactions to Rising China's Uyghur Crackdown Author Shichor, Yitzhak Published 2015 Journal Title Griffith Asia Quarterly Downloaded from http://hdl.handle.net/10072/340315 Link to published version http://pandora.nla.gov.au/tep/141524 Griffith Research Online https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au 62 Griffith Asia Quarterly See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil: Middle Eastern Reactions to Rising China’s Uyghur Crackdown Yitzhak Shichor* Abstract: This paper addresses the issue of China’s rise in the Middle East through the prism of the Uyghur and Xinjiang issues. Given the Middle East’s contemporary and vociferous denunciations of the perceived ‘persecution’ of Muslims throughout the globe, we would expect a harsh reaction to China’s ongoing maltreatment of its Muslims in general, and the Uyghur, in particular, primarily from the centre of global Islam. This paper argues however that this has not been the case, particularly at the official level, where Middle Eastern government’s have been constrained in their response to China’s repression of the Uyghur by a number of factors, including China’s growing strategic and economic weight in the region and their own authoritarian political practices. Introduction One of the most notable implications, and indicators, of China’s global rise is the caution with which it is treated by other countries, not only the less powerful but also the great powers. Expressed by various communities, governments, leaders, politicians and even academics that avoid ‘upsetting’ the Chinese – this caution has been determined not only by China’s increasing economic importance (given the parallel global economic downturn), but also, perhaps primarily, by China’s firm assertion that it will by no means tolerate external interference in its internal affairs.
    [Show full text]
  • THE JOURNAL of CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES Volume: XXII 2015 ISSN: 0975-086X
    THE JOURNAL OF CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES Volume: XXII 2015 ISSN: 0975-086X Chief Editor Prof. G. N. Khaki Editor Prof. G. M. Mir Associate Editors Dr. M. Raffiudin Makhdumi Dr. Darakhshan Abdullah Dr.Dr. Mohammad Tareak A. AfzalRather Mir Dr.Dr. Tareak M. Afzal A. Rather Mir Technical Assistance Nazir A. Doshab Dr. Fayaz A. Loan Centre of Central Asian Studies University of Kashmir Srinagar, J&K, India © Publisher, Centre of Central Asian Studies, University of Kashmir. No part of this Journal may be reprinted in original or translated without the explicit permission of the Publisher. The views expressed in this volume of the Journal are opinions of contributors and can not be associated with the Publisher or Editorial Board. The Journal is peer reviewed, refereed and indexed in EBSCOhost and ProQuest. The Journal is also available online through EBSCO Host Database: Political Science Complete on web.ebscohost.com; and on the University of Kashmir web page http://ccas.uok.edu.in. Scope of the Journal: The Journal welcomes original papers on any aspect of Central Asia, preferably, contemporary problems and emerging regional issues. Print Year: 2016 Price: ` 900 / $ 20 Printed at Mehak Printing Press, New Delhi, India. Contents Contributors i-iii Turkey’s Foreign Policy Shifts Towards Syria M. Thowhidul Islam 1-22 Connect Central Asia Policy And Indian Outfoxing Bawasingh 23-34 Revisiting Al-Farabi’s Legacy Engaging with the Culture of Political Islam M. Maroof Shah 35-72 Caspia Genesis Of Energy Politics R. G. Gidadhubli 73-81 Scope and Feasibility of Islamic Banking And Finance Model Kazakhstan & Indian Perspective Bilal A.
    [Show full text]
  • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis Volume 7, Issue 1 | January/ February 2015
    Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis www.rsis.edu.sg Volume 7, Issue 1 | January/ February 2015 A JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH Annual Threat Assessment GLOBAL THREAT FORECAST By Professor Rohan Gunaratna SOUTHEAST ASIA Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore SOUTH ASIA Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka CENTRAL AND EAST ASIA Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and China MIDDLE EAST Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen and Qatar AFRICA Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and Somalia SOUTH AMERICA Colombia Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis Volume 7, Issue 1 | January/ February 2015 1 Building a Global Network for Security Executive Summary Annual Threat Assessment 2015 e are happy to publish Volume 7, Issue 1 (January / February 2015) of the Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis (CTTA) by the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. W From a terrorism and counter-terrorism perspective, the year 2014 was particularly significant.W This was due as much to the potential impact of drawdown of U.S. and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) from Afghanistan as to the declaration of the establishment of a so -called Islamic Caliphate by the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS). While the former has emboldened old and established groups like Al Qaeda Central, the Afghan Taliban, the Tehrik-e- Taliban Pakistan and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, among others, the claim of the establishment of the “so called Islamic State” by ISIS seem to have galvanised disparate elements within the Muslim world, drawing fighters in thousands to Iraq and Syria and spurring radicalisation and extremism in many countries on an unprecedented scale.
    [Show full text]
  • The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) - Council on Foreign R
    The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) - Council on Foreign R... http://www.cfr.org/china/east-turkestan-islamic-movement-etim/p9179 Backgrounders The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) Authors: Beina Xu, Online Writer/Editor, Holly Fletcher, and Jayshree Bajoria Updated: September 4, 2014 Introduction The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is a Muslim separatist group founded by militant Uighurs, members of the Turkic-speaking ethnic majority in northwest China's Xinjiang province. The U.S. treasury department listed ETIM as a terrorist organization in 2002 during a period of increased U.S.-Chinese cooperation on antiterrorism in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks. The group and its ties to Muslim fundamentalism have compounded Chinese concerns about the rising threat of terrorism within the country as its restive western regions faced a spate of terrorist attacks in 2014. What is the East Turkestan Islamic Movement? Experts say reliable information about ETIM is hard to come by, and they disagree about the extent of ETIM's terrorist activities and ties to global terrorism. Xinjiang province, where the group is based, is a vast, sparsely populated area that shares borders with eight countries, including Afghanistan and Pakistan. The first mention of ETIM surfaced around 2000, when a Russian newspaper reported that Osama bin Laden had pledged funds to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and ETIM during a 1999 meeting in Afghanistan. Reportedly founded by Hasan Mahsum, a Uighur from Xinjiang's Kashgar region, ETIM has been listed by the State Department as one of the more extreme separatist groups. It seeks an independent state called East Turkestan that would cover an area including parts of Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR).
    [Show full text]
  • China Brief Vol 14 Issue 10.Pdf
    ChinaBrief Volume XIV s Issue 10 s May 23 Volume XIV s Issue 10 s may 23, 2014 In This Issue: IN a ForTNIghT Briefs by David Cohen and rup Narayan Das 1 The ChaNgINg LaNDSCape oF aNTI-ChINeSe JIhadists By Jacob Zenn 4 ChaLLeNgeD By ChINa, aSeaN STaTeS Seek CoMMoN reSpoNSe By prashanth parameswaran 7 Despite a limited role in attacks on Chi- na, Turkmenistan Independence Party Costa rICa aT a CroSSroaDS IN CourTShIp WITh BeIJINg leader Abdullah Mansour has brought it By r. evan ellis 10 to the attention of jihadists. China Brief is a bi-weekly jour- nal of information and analysis covering Greater China in Eur- In a Fortnight asia. China Brief is a publication of ‘Development is the Key to peace’: chinese leaDers Discuss The Jamestown Foundation, a Future oF asia private non-profit organization based in Washington D.C. and By David cohen is edited by David Cohen. hile tensions in the south china sea have gone from bad to worse, with The opinions expressed in riots in vietnam targeting chinese businesses and a range of asean states China Brief are solely those W of the authors, and do not exploring ways to counter chinese actions (see “challenged by china, asean necessarily reflect the views of states seek common response,” in this issue), Xi’s Wednesday speech at the The Jamestown Foundation. shanghai conference on interaction and conference Building in asia (cica) seemed to take place in a different world. rather than focusing on conflict, he spoke about china’s role in building a “peaceful, stable and cooperative new asia” (people’s Daily online, may 21).
    [Show full text]
  • Redalyc.Terrorist Threat in 2014
    UNISCI Discussion Papers ISSN: 1696-2206 [email protected] Universidad Complutense de Madrid España Gunaratna, Rohan Terrorist threat in 2014 UNISCI Discussion Papers, núm. 34, enero-abril, 2014, pp. 97-101 Universidad Complutense de Madrid Madrid, España Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=76729583006 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Journal's homepage in redalyc.org Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 34 (Enero / January 2014) ISSN 1696-2206 TERRORIST THREAT IN 2014 Rohan Gunaratna 1 S. Rajanaratnam School of International Studies Abstract: The threat of international and national terrorism is projected to grow in 2014. With half of the countries in the world suffering from political violence and ideological extremism, terrorism will remain the tier- one national security threat to the stability of most countries in 2014. Keywords: Terrorism, Extremism, National Security. Resumen: La amenaza que supone el terrorismo nacional e internacional crecerá en 2014. Con la mitad de los Estados del mundo sufriendo la violencia política y el extremismo ideológico, el terrorismo seguirá siendo la amenaza de primer nivel para la estabilidad de la mayoría de los Estados en 2014. Palabras clave: Terrorismo, extremismo, seguridad nacional. Copyright © UNISCI, 2014. Las opiniones expresadas en estos artículos son propias de sus autores, y no reflejan necesariamente la opinión de UNISCI. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of UNISCI.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan and Transnational War: Interlocking Security Dilemmas and Strategic Challenges
    Afghanistan and transnational war: Interlocking security dilemmas and strategic challenges Nishank Motwani A thesis in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Humanities and Social Sciences UNSW Canberra November 2015 Abstract Following the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, the United States and Afghan governments have sought, with little success, to resolve Afghanistan’s regional problems through a political framework intended to knit the region together. This thesis investigates the reasons why a regional solution to the conflict in Afghanistan has not gained traction. Traditional understandings of the security dilemma are conceptually refined, operationally expanded and thematically analysed. Conceptually, a distinction is drawn between genuine security dilemmas, involving benign actors, and strategic challenges, involving actors with malign intent. Operationally, bilateral formulations of the security dilemma are expanded to demonstrate the occurrence of multiple interlocking security dilemmas. Thematically, a case study method is used to explore these security conditions in terms of the structural, contextual and cognitive dynamics impeding regional cooperation. Three findings emerge. First, Afghan leaders and their backers have failed to address key structural impediments, such as competing notions of security and regional stability, rival strategic interests and opposing power ambitions. The Afghan Taliban’s absolute goals, Pakistan’s malign orientation, and Saudi Arabia’s anti-Iranian and Salafist ideology have proved most debilitating. Second, the metastases of Southwest Asia’s unresolved contextual reality tax an already rickety mechanism. The legacy of fraught historical relations, territorial disputes, state and non-state spoilers, armed conflict, and the effects of the Indian-Pakistani nuclear deterrent taints the politico-social environment, stymieing efforts to allay entrenched suspicions.
    [Show full text]
  • Transition in Afghanistan: Filling the Security Vacuum – the Expansion of Uighur Extremism?
    Sources of Tension in Afghanistan and Pakistan: A Regional Perspective Transition in Afghanistan: Filling the Security Vacuum – The Expansion of Uighur Extremism? Raffaello Pantucci and Edward Schwarck May 2014 CIDOB Policy Research Project CIDOB BARCELONA CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS With support from TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN: FILLING THE SECURITY VACUUM – THE EXPANSION OF UIGHUR EXTREMISM? Raffaello Pantucci and Edward Schwarck Raffaello Pantucci is Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services his paper aims to map out as clearly as possible the current threat Institute for Defence and Security from Uighur extremist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and as- Studies (RUSI). His research focuses on certain whether these groups will develop into a regional threat terrorism and China’s relations with T Central and South Asia. over the next few years. Edward Schwarck is Research Fellow It will be argued that Uighur Sunni-jihadist groups in Afghanistan and Pa- and Head of the Asia Programme at the Royal United Services Institute for kistan are unlikely to be able to fill the security void in either country after Defence and Security Studies (RUSI). His the West’s withdrawal. Traditionally, these groups have struggled to gain research centres on domestic security in China – particularly in Xinjiang – and traction within the global jihadist community. China has also done an ef- Chinese foreign policy in the Asia- fective job of building regional relationships that means local governments Pacific region. would block their ascension into power. Furthermore, the number of Ui- ghur militants remains marginal, suggesting that, at worst, they might be able to take control of some small settlements.
    [Show full text]
  • TERRORIST THREAT in 2014 Rohan Gunaratna
    UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 34 (Enero / January 2014) ISSN 1696-2206 TERRORIST THREAT IN 2014 Rohan Gunaratna 1 S. Rajanaratnam School of International Studies Abstract: The threat of international and national terrorism is projected to grow in 2014. With half of the countries in the world suffering from political violence and ideological extremism, terrorism will remain the tier- one national security threat to the stability of most countries in 2014. Keywords: Terrorism, Extremism, National Security. Resumen: La amenaza que supone el terrorismo nacional e internacional crecerá en 2014. Con la mitad de los Estados del mundo sufriendo la violencia política y el extremismo ideológico, el terrorismo seguirá siendo la amenaza de primer nivel para la estabilidad de la mayoría de los Estados en 2014. Palabras clave: Terrorismo, extremismo, seguridad nacional. Copyright © UNISCI, 2014. Las opiniones expresadas en estos artículos son propias de sus autores, y no reflejan necesariamente la opinión de UNISCI. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of UNISCI. 1 Rohan Gunaratna is Head of RSIS's International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore. He is author of "Inside al Qaeda" published by Columbia University Press. 97 UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 34 (Enero / January 2014) ISSN 1696-2206 1. Introduction The year 2013 has been the most violent since the beginning of the contemporary wave of terrorism. Although al Qaeda core has decreased in size, the group has become even more influential. With its extraordinary presence on the web, al Qaeda is guiding its associates to fight back.
    [Show full text]
  • China's Foreign Policy in Afghanistan
    China’s foreign policy in Dirk van der Kley Afghanistan October 2014 CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent policy think tank. Its mandate ranges across all the dimensions of international policy debate in Australia — economic, political and strategic — and it is not limited to a particular geographic region. Its two core tasks are to: • produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s international policy and to contribute to the wider international debate. • promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing an accessible and high-quality forum for discussion of Australian international relations through debates, seminars, lectures, dialogues and conferences. Lowy Institute Analyses are short papers analysing recent international trends and events and their policy implications. The views expressed in this paper are entirely the author’s own and not those of the Lowy Institute for International Policy. CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On 31 December 2014 NATO will hand over its final security responsibilities to local Afghan forces. The handover will raise new questions for Chinese policy in Afghanistan. On the one hand, Beijing wants a stable Afghanistan. It does not want the country to become either a haven for Uyghur militancy, or for instability to spread through the region. On the other hand, Beijing is reluctant to become too deeply involved in Afghanistan, conscious of the West’s difficult experience over the last decade and fearful of attracting the attention of international terrorist groups. Against this backdrop Beijing is unlikely to make any meaningful security commitment to Afghanistan.
    [Show full text]
  • B COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May
    2002R0881 — EN — 27.08.2009 — 041.001 — 1 This document is meant purely as a documentation tool and the institutions do not assume any liability for its contents ►B COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan (OJ L 139, 29.5.2002, p. 9) Amended by: Official Journal No page date ►M1 Commission Regulation (EC) No 951/2002 of 3 June 2002 L 145 14 4.6.2002 ►M2 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1580/2002 of 4 September 2002 L 237 3 5.9.2002 ►M3 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1644/2002 of 13 September 2002 L 247 25 14.9.2002 ►M4 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1754/2002 of 1 October 2002 L 264 23 2.10.2002 ►M5 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1823/2002 of 11 October 2002 L 276 26 12.10.2002 ►M6 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1893/2002 of 23 October 2002 L 286 19 24.10.2002 ►M7 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1935/2002 of 29 October 2002 L 295 11 30.10.2002 ►M8 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2083/2002 of 22 November 2002 L 319 22 23.11.2002 ►M9 Commission Regulation (EC) No 145/2003 of 27 January 2003 L 23 22 28.1.2003 ►M10 Commission Regulation (EC) No 215/2003 of 3 February 2003 L 28 41 4.2.2003 ►M11 Commission Regulation (EC) No 244/2003
    [Show full text]