The Royal Air Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942
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Canadian Military History Volume 21 Issue 4 Article 3 2015 “The support afforded by the air force was faultless” The Royal Air Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942 Ross Mahoney Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Ross Mahoney "“The support afforded by the air force was faultless” The Royal Air Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942." Canadian Military History 21, 4 (2015) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. : “The support afforded by the air force was faultless” The Royal Air Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942 “The support afforded by the air force was faultless” The Royal Air Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942 Ross Mahoney peration Jubilee, the raid the offensive use of RAF Fighter on Dieppe, 19 August 1942, Abstract: The failure of Operation Command in the period 1940-1942. O Jubilee, the raid on Dieppe, has partially maintains a specific place in Canada’s In understanding the twin pillars of been attributed to the failure of the cultural memory of the Second World RAF to provide the bomber support doctrine and operations, this article War. Charles Stacey, the Canadian needed to support the landings. challenges the revisionist argument army official historian, stated in This fallacious argument, based on that the failure of the RAF to supply 1948 that, “The raid on Dieppe was hindsight and a lack of understanding bombers doomed Jubilee. It argues of the RAF’s capabilities at this perhaps the most hotly-discussed that in actually seeking to battle the point in the war, requires revision. 1 operation of the war.” The debate This article examines the doctrinal Luftwaffe in the manner that it did over Dieppe is best represented by and operational context of the RAF during Jubilee it provided the most the duologue between Brian Loring forces involved in Jubilee. Prewar appropriate protection that it could Villa and Peter Henshaw over the combined operations doctrine stated for the assault forces. that the key role for air power was role of Vice-Admiral Lord Louis the maintenance of air superiority. Mountbatten and the Chiefs of Staff The absence of heavy bombers at A Doctrinal Problem Committee in the authorisation of Dieppe did not doom the operation. Jubilee, which came to fruition in The RAF contributed significantly to n early June 1940, the Prime Minister the pages of The Canadian Historical the operation by seeking to battle Winston Churchill called for the the Luftwaffe in the manner that I Review in 1998.2 “Joint Chiefs of Staff to propose me it did during Jubilee, and as such, The debates over Jubilee can it provided the most appropriate measures for a vigorous, enterprising be transplanted onto the role of the protection that it could for the assault and ceaseless offensive” against Royal Air Force (RAF) in the raid. forces. German held territory.5 Churchill Villa has argued that, “There was a believed that these operations would degree of callousness in [Air Chief The only work that examines the have strategic effect and the increasing Marshal Sir Charles] Portal’s [chief RAF’s experience remains Norman size of the raids up to Jubilee of the air staff] allowing a largely Franks’ narrative account, which fails illustrates their growing importance Canadian force to go in without to analyse key factors of the RAF’s in British strategy. This led to the the bomber support they needed.”3 performance.4 appointment of Lieutenant-General This fallacious argument, based on This article examines the doctrinal Alan Bourne (Royal Marines) as hindsight and a lack of understanding and operational context of the RAF’s “Commander of Raiding Operations of the RAF’s capability at this point involvement in Jubilee and deals with on coasts in enemy occupation and in the war, requires revision. The the key question of lessons learnt. Advisor to the Chiefs of Staff on historiography on Jubilee has failed It contends that prewar combined Combined Operations” on 14 June to contextualise the RAF’s role in operations doctrine argued that the 1940.6 Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger the raid. Accounts polarise between key role for air power was to maintain Keyes replaced Bourne on 17 July as triumphalism or criticism of the RAF’s air superiority in order to protect director of Combined Operations, claims. Most fail to grasp the context assaulting forces. It then considers as Churchill believed Bourne would in which the RAF launched the raid. this alongside the development of not question Admiralty orders that Published© Canadian by Scholars Military Commons History @, Laurier,Volume 2015 21, Number 4, Autumn 2012, pp.17-32. 17 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 21 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 3 RAF gun camera footage showing an attack on a German twin-engined aircraft, likely a Dornier DO 17, over Dieppe, 19 August 1942. The footage a sequence, starting at the top, of the fighter approaching and then opening fire on the aircraft. In the final frame the German bomber has been hit in the starboard engine which begins to smoke. The fate of this aircraft is not known. https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss4/316 2 : “The support afforded by the air force was faultless” The Royal Air Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942 Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2012 Mike by Map drawn undermined his position. Keyes they could be successful in the face of air opposition to obscure the value of founded Combined Operations opposing air power. In 1923, the RAF the exercise.”8 Headquarters (COHQ) and led it produced Air Staff Memorandum In 1919, Major-General Warren until 27 October 1941 when the young No.10, which noted that a combined Hastings Anderson, commandant and ambitious Captain Mountbatten operation against an enemy who at the Army Staff College, noted in replaced him. Keyes was replaced had air superiority was “doomed the first combined operations staff because of ongoing disputes with to failure.”7 This did not mean that exercise following the First World Churchill over the latter’s desire to re- they considered combined operations War that in the future this form of title his role as advisor to the Chiefs of impossible, quite the opposite. operation had to take account of all Staff on Combined Operations. Throughout this period, the RAF three services. Anderson stressed The focus on strategic aspects of considered its primary objective that any new Manual of Combined Jubilee has led historians to ignore its in combined operations as being Operations should take note of the doctrinal context. A consideration of the attainment of air superiority. “views and requirements” of the RAF the doctrine that informed operational For example, during the 16th Staff who “must of course be included in decisions is useful in highlighting Course at the RAF Staff College in it.”9 The importance of air superiority the context of the RAF’s decision to 1938, Group Captain Ronald Graham was enunciated as early as 1922, utilise a supporting force that was noted in his lecture, “Introduction to when Air Vice-Marshal John Higgins, predicated on the use of fighters to Combined Operations,” that while director of training and staff duties, fight for air superiority. the addition of air power to the and the RAF representative on the During the interwar period, the pantheon of war had complicated Altham Committee, noted in a paper key question that vexed experts on the character of combined operations, entitled “Some Aspects of Combined combined operations was whether “we should not allow the question of Operations in so far as they affect the Published18 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015 3 Canadian Military History, Vol. 21 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 3 Royal Air Force,” that the primary of interpretations about how to the changing technological landscape role for the RAF was air superiority attain this state during the interwar shows there had been an increasing and aerial interdiction. The Altham period. The historiography of the realisation that fighters could take Committee was formed as a joint RAF’s development has stressed its on offensive roles. In a lecture to the service committee under the chair of focus on bombing as the means of Army Staff College in 1938, Graham Captain Edward Altham, Royal Navy achieving air superiority.13 This was noted the increasing use of fighters in order to revise the 1913 edition of not an infallible conclusion in an era but also stressed the problem of the Manual of Combined Operations. of rapidly changing technological achieving air superiority without It evolved out of discussions at the fortunes. In a lecture on “Air denuding the operation of surprise, Army Staff College and the formation Warfare” in 1925, the commandant which was considered vital.16 This of the Dawney Committee in 1920, of the RAF Staff College, Air Vice- issue would take on importance which met to revise the relevant Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham, during the planning of Jubilee. chapter on combined operations in noted that three key methods existed, By the outbreak of the Second the Army’s Field Service Regulations. fighting in the air, bombardment, and World War, it was widely accepted The Altham Committee supervised destruction of means of production.14 that air superiority was a necessary the production of the Provisional The 1925 Manual of Combined pre-requisite for success in combined 1922 Manual of Combined Naval, Operations noted that air superiority operations.