Canadian Military History
Volume 21 Issue 4 Article 3
2015
“The support afforded by the air force was faultless” The Royal Air Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942
Ross Mahoney
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Recommended Citation Ross Mahoney "“The support afforded by the air force was faultless” The Royal Air Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942." Canadian Military History 21, 4 (2015)
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. : “The support afforded by the air force was faultless” The Royal Air Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942 “The support afforded by the air force was faultless” The Royal Air Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942
Ross Mahoney
peration Jubilee, the raid the offensive use of RAF Fighter on Dieppe, 19 August 1942, Abstract: The failure of Operation Command in the period 1940-1942. O Jubilee, the raid on Dieppe, has partially maintains a specific place in Canada’s In understanding the twin pillars of been attributed to the failure of the cultural memory of the Second World RAF to provide the bomber support doctrine and operations, this article War. Charles Stacey, the Canadian needed to support the landings. challenges the revisionist argument army official historian, stated in This fallacious argument, based on that the failure of the RAF to supply 1948 that, “The raid on Dieppe was hindsight and a lack of understanding bombers doomed Jubilee. It argues of the RAF’s capabilities at this perhaps the most hotly-discussed that in actually seeking to battle the point in the war, requires revision. 1 operation of the war.” The debate This article examines the doctrinal Luftwaffe in the manner that it did over Dieppe is best represented by and operational context of the RAF during Jubilee it provided the most the duologue between Brian Loring forces involved in Jubilee. Prewar appropriate protection that it could Villa and Peter Henshaw over the combined operations doctrine stated for the assault forces. that the key role for air power was role of Vice-Admiral Lord Louis the maintenance of air superiority. Mountbatten and the Chiefs of Staff The absence of heavy bombers at A Doctrinal Problem Committee in the authorisation of Dieppe did not doom the operation. Jubilee, which came to fruition in The RAF contributed significantly to n early June 1940, the Prime Minister the pages of The Canadian Historical the operation by seeking to battle Winston Churchill called for the the Luftwaffe in the manner that I Review in 1998.2 “Joint Chiefs of Staff to propose me it did during Jubilee, and as such, The debates over Jubilee can it provided the most appropriate measures for a vigorous, enterprising be transplanted onto the role of the protection that it could for the assault and ceaseless offensive” against Royal Air Force (RAF) in the raid. forces. German held territory.5 Churchill Villa has argued that, “There was a believed that these operations would degree of callousness in [Air Chief The only work that examines the have strategic effect and the increasing Marshal Sir Charles] Portal’s [chief RAF’s experience remains Norman size of the raids up to Jubilee of the air staff] allowing a largely Franks’ narrative account, which fails illustrates their growing importance Canadian force to go in without to analyse key factors of the RAF’s in British strategy. This led to the the bomber support they needed.”3 performance.4 appointment of Lieutenant-General This fallacious argument, based on This article examines the doctrinal Alan Bourne (Royal Marines) as hindsight and a lack of understanding and operational context of the RAF’s “Commander of Raiding Operations of the RAF’s capability at this point involvement in Jubilee and deals with on coasts in enemy occupation and in the war, requires revision. The the key question of lessons learnt. Advisor to the Chiefs of Staff on historiography on Jubilee has failed It contends that prewar combined Combined Operations” on 14 June to contextualise the RAF’s role in operations doctrine argued that the 1940.6 Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger the raid. Accounts polarise between key role for air power was to maintain Keyes replaced Bourne on 17 July as triumphalism or criticism of the RAF’s air superiority in order to protect director of Combined Operations, claims. Most fail to grasp the context assaulting forces. It then considers as Churchill believed Bourne would in which the RAF launched the raid. this alongside the development of not question Admiralty orders that
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RAF gun camera footage showing an attack on a German twin-engined aircraft, likely a Dornier DO 17, over Dieppe, 19 August 1942. The footage a sequence, starting at the top, of the fighter approaching and then opening fire on the aircraft. In the final frame the German bomber has been hit in the starboard engine which begins to smoke. The fate of this aircraft is not known.
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undermined his position. Keyes they could be successful in the face of air opposition to obscure the value of founded Combined Operations opposing air power. In 1923, the RAF the exercise.”8 Headquarters (COHQ) and led it produced Air Staff Memorandum In 1919, Major-General Warren until 27 October 1941 when the young No.10, which noted that a combined Hastings Anderson, commandant and ambitious Captain Mountbatten operation against an enemy who at the Army Staff College, noted in replaced him. Keyes was replaced had air superiority was “doomed the first combined operations staff because of ongoing disputes with to failure.”7 This did not mean that exercise following the First World Churchill over the latter’s desire to re- they considered combined operations War that in the future this form of title his role as advisor to the Chiefs of impossible, quite the opposite. operation had to take account of all Staff on Combined Operations. Throughout this period, the RAF three services. Anderson stressed The focus on strategic aspects of considered its primary objective that any new Manual of Combined Jubilee has led historians to ignore its in combined operations as being Operations should take note of the doctrinal context. A consideration of the attainment of air superiority. “views and requirements” of the RAF the doctrine that informed operational For example, during the 16th Staff who “must of course be included in decisions is useful in highlighting Course at the RAF Staff College in it.”9 The importance of air superiority the context of the RAF’s decision to 1938, Group Captain Ronald Graham was enunciated as early as 1922, utilise a supporting force that was noted in his lecture, “Introduction to when Air Vice-Marshal John Higgins, predicated on the use of fighters to Combined Operations,” that while director of training and staff duties, fight for air superiority. the addition of air power to the and the RAF representative on the During the interwar period, the pantheon of war had complicated Altham Committee, noted in a paper key question that vexed experts on the character of combined operations, entitled “Some Aspects of Combined combined operations was whether “we should not allow the question of Operations in so far as they affect the
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Royal Air Force,” that the primary of interpretations about how to the changing technological landscape role for the RAF was air superiority attain this state during the interwar shows there had been an increasing and aerial interdiction. The Altham period. The historiography of the realisation that fighters could take Committee was formed as a joint RAF’s development has stressed its on offensive roles. In a lecture to the service committee under the chair of focus on bombing as the means of Army Staff College in 1938, Graham Captain Edward Altham, Royal Navy achieving air superiority.13 This was noted the increasing use of fighters in order to revise the 1913 edition of not an infallible conclusion in an era but also stressed the problem of the Manual of Combined Operations. of rapidly changing technological achieving air superiority without It evolved out of discussions at the fortunes. In a lecture on “Air denuding the operation of surprise, Army Staff College and the formation Warfare” in 1925, the commandant which was considered vital.16 This of the Dawney Committee in 1920, of the RAF Staff College, Air Vice- issue would take on importance which met to revise the relevant Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham, during the planning of Jubilee. chapter on combined operations in noted that three key methods existed, By the outbreak of the Second the Army’s Field Service Regulations. fighting in the air, bombardment, and World War, it was widely accepted The Altham Committee supervised destruction of means of production.14 that air superiority was a necessary the production of the Provisional The 1925 Manual of Combined pre-requisite for success in combined 1922 Manual of Combined Naval, Operations noted that air superiority operations. Air Vice-Marshal Richard Military and Air Operations that was could be achieved through the Peirse, deputy chief of the air staff formalised in 1925.10 Throughout application of indirect air power (DCAS), noted in 1938 that, “One the period, the Manual of Combined through the destruction of enemy of the greatest difficulties in this Operations remained a jointly authored air forces, lines of communication, form of operation will be the need publication produced under the demoralisation of personnel and the for establishing a favourable air auspices of the Admiralty. Higgins civilian population, and destruction situation.”17 By the time of Jubilee highlighted the RAF’s argument that of material by bombing. Fighters operational experience proved this it considered a combined operation were limited to providing direct air belief correct. as that between more than any one cover over the beachhead.15 By the service. For the RAF the methods it time of the 1938 edition of the Manual The Need for Air Superiority employed in achieving air superiority of Combined Operations, it had become were equally applicable to any form apparent that fighter aircraft should n the two years after the formation of of “joint” operation.11 This broad take on a greater range of operations. ICOHQ there was little opportunity view sat outside of the scope of The provision of adequate fighter for the utilisation of air power in the doctrine, which focussed on cover through the offensive use of support of small-scale raiding amphibious operations involving fighter patrols became one of the operations. Not until Operation all three services due to the RN’s three main uses of air power in Archery, the British commando raid control of the manual’s production support of combined operations, on Vaagso, Norway in December and publication. along with bombardment, and the 1941, did the first truly joint combined Air superiority remained the provision of smoke screens. The operation take place.18 A pattern was cornerstone of the Manual of Combined increasing scope of the 1938 edition set during Archery that was based Operations throughout the interwar of the manual within the context of on the beliefs that underpinned years. The manual was updated in 1922, 1925, 1931 and 1938. The RAF’s strategic doctrine of the period, AP 1300 The War Manual, defined air superiority as a “state of moral, physical and material superiority” over the enemy that would allow freedom of action.12 This fluidic definition of the hubris of air superiority allowed a number Library and Archives Canada PA 210151 Canada PA Library Archives and RAF fighter pilots gather for a group photo after the Dieppe Raid.
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of combined operations, noted that Dynamo was a combined operation in reverse and that until the experience of Dynamo and Norway the use of air power in support of combined operations had been a theoretical concern based on beliefs. He noted that recent experience had proven those beliefs, suggesting that, “If the enemy has a powerful air force, we must prevent him somehow or other from interfering with our landing and our lines of communications.”24 The Battle of Britain highlighted the significance of air superiority in defeating a planned combined operation. While debate remains over the exact aims of the Luftwaffe’s air campaign it is clear that Not visible over the beaches at Dunkirk in 1940, the army dubbed the RAF the “Royal preparations were made to invade. Absent Force.” In fact, RAF operations to protect the beach and the Royal Navy from Oberkommando der Wehrmacht Luftwaffe attacks was conducted some distance from the battlefield and was a major (OKW) planning documents clearly factor in the success of the operation. indicate that for Operation Seelöwe to succeed the Luftwaffe would have the Manual of Combined Operations, problem of building up air strength to wrest control of the air from the and had been illustrated through during a combined operation was RAF. Hitler’s Führer Directive No.16 broader operational experience. considered in numerous exercises made this the primary prerequisite Five fighter squadrons (long-range during the interwar period with of future operations while an OKW Bristol Beaufighters and Blenheims) few adequate solutions found.20 directive of 2 July concluded that the and two squadrons of Handley Page Conversely, the Luftwaffe provided “Invasion of England is quite possible Hampdens supported Archery. Their effective support in what has been under certain conditions of which primary mission was to provide air described as the first modern joint the most important is the gaining superiority. campaign.21 of air superiority.”25 The RAF noted While the RAF lacked knowledge The nature of the counter air that the initial phase of the battle of raiding style combined operations, operations undertaken by the RAF would consist of attacks against it did have experience in other forms during Operation Dynamo at Dunkirk airfields and factories in an attempt of amphibious operations from the earned it the unfortunate epithet to bring Fighter Command to battle Norwegian Campaign, the Dunkirk of the “Royal Absent Force.”22 The and attrite its strength supported evacuation and the Battle of Britain in operations were primarily concerned this view.26 The RAF’s ability to 1940 to reinforce its belief regarding with providing air cover over the hold off Luftwaffe attacks led to the importance of air superiority. evacuation area utilising offensive a shift in strategy towards attacks Norway illustrated the problem of operations. Seventy-five percent of predicated on coercion. The RAF’s conducting a combined operation at operations conducted by the RAF success illustrated that its interwar the end of long and insecure logistics during Dynamo consisted of fighter belief on the difficulty of gaining air tail. The RAF was unable to build up sweeps by large-scale formations superiority in face of first class air enough strength to support ground from Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park’s power had been prescient in the test forces while the RN failed to provide No.11 Group. The success of the RAF of battle. This would prove important adequate carrier air cover in the aided the RN’s ability to withdraw for Jubilee. initial phase. The inability to establish forces and Admiral Bertram Ramsey In the aftermath of the Battle forward air bases led Major-General signalled on 29 May that, “I am of Britain, RAF Fighter Command Bernard Paget, the commander of a most grateful for your splendid launched a strategic fighter offensive British force in Norway, to remark cooperation. It alone has given us that sought to bring the Luftwaffe to that “all the lessons of peacetime a chance of success.”23 Air Vice- battle and attrite its strength. This exercises” had been forgotten.19 The Marshal James Robb, deputy chief strategy of “leaning forward into
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France” began as early as 21 been virtually stalemated October 1940 when Park was due to the tactical advantage ordered to take the offensive enjoyed by the Luftwaffe. When when weather and lack of viewed in conjunction with enemy activity warranted it.27 an appreciation of combined This strategy provided the operations doctrine, the operational context for RAF experience of 1941 and 1942 operations during Jubilee. Air and the orders issued to Leigh- Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, Mallory on 13 April provide the air officer commander-in-chief operational context for No.11 of Fighter Command, and the Group’s operations over Dieppe. new head of No.11 Group, Air The experience reinforced the Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh- belief underpinning the RAF’s Mallory, vigorously pursued it involvement in combined throughout 1941 and 1942. operations doctrine in the Throughout 1941, Fighter interwar years, the need for air Command sought to define superiority. its role as the RAF went from The RAF also participated the defensive to the offensive. in training for combined Operations in 1941 consisted operations. In November primarily of Rodeo, Rhubarb 1941, as the scale of combined and Circus operations. Circus Air Vice-Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory was the air operations increased, COHQ operation made use of bombers officer commanding No.11 Group and as such was the was provided with an air air commander for the Dieppe operation. of No.2 Group, Bomber advisor in the form of Group Command. These operations Captain Alfred Willetts.32 It required effective co-operation these with fighter sweeps in order became clear to Mountbatten that between the two commands and, to attrite Luftwaffe strength, though there was a need to train the RAF in early 1941, they were not always he was to conserve strength where in the requirements of combined successful. From mid-1941 onwards, possible until the introduction of operations and test the beliefs of the fighter offensive took on greater more effective aircraft.29 In 1941 and interwar doctrine. Air Chief Marshal strategic importance as it sought 1942, Douglas and Leigh-Mallory Sir Charles Portal, chief of the air keep Luftwaffe forces away from the faced the problem of balancing staff, agreed. The director of plans, eastern front. Operations continued issues of technological change, which Air Commodore William Dickson, into 1942, and on 13 April Leigh- affected the question of wastage, and examined the issue with the view to Mallory was ordered: the strategic requirements of Fighter posting a “competent” body of men Command’s new role in the British to work with the RN and Army at (a) To pick targets right on the coast, war effort. This led to discussion on COHQ.33 This group of officers would and not try to penetrate. the applicability of the offensive. An form the core of No.1441 Combined (b) To carry out a proportion of… exchange of views between Douglas Operations Development Flight that operations without bombers at all, and his senior air staff officer, Air was based at the Combined Training since the Hun [was] apparently ready Commodore Douglas Evill, in Centre at Inveraray. This unit tested to react even though no bombers March 1941 saw Evill contend that problems that arose as air power [were] present. Circus operations at the time were began to be utilised in ever expanding (c) To employ large numbers of ineffective and should be curtailed roles by COHQ.34 squadrons with a view to out- or stopped until a new method Training of operational units numbering the Hun.28 was found for their employment.30 in the RAF’s functional commands However, Douglas argued that a assumed even greater importance This revised directive was based curtailment of operations would in 1942 as planning for large-scale on the issue of wastage that had not be advantageous, though he operations took priority. On 16 plagued the offensive in 1941 which did agree that there was need for February Portal told Mountbatten led to Douglas’ operational policy further training.31 While the offensive that six squadrons were earmarked being amended on 13 March 1942. provided Fighter Command with for training with the expeditionary Douglas was ordered to resume the opportunity to “lean forward force while the director of fighter Circus operations and supplement into France,” by mid-1942, it had operations, Air Commodore John https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss4/3 21 6 : “The support afforded by the air force was faultless” The Royal Air Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942
Pilots from No.401 RCAF Squadron rest between sorties, 19 August 1942.
Operation Sledgehammer/Roundup and the debate over the invasion of Europe in 1942. It had a clear impact on the RAF because as combined Canadian Forces Photo PL 10627 Photo Canadian Forces operations increased in scale they would require greater air support. This increase had the advantage of allowing Fighter Command to continue its policy of offensive air operations against the Luftwaffe as outlined in the air staff’s directive to Douglas on 13 March. Whitworth-Jones, noted that 15 informed Douglas on 1 May that his The first consideration of Dieppe squadrons were available for training. priorities were: as a target for an operation occurred It was expected that the training at a meeting of the Target Committee regime of No.1441 Flight would (a) The intensification of the day of COHQ on 3 April.42 From here, mirror Fighter Command’s, as it was fighter offensive which calls for an outline plan was produced and this command that would provide reinforcement of 11 Group with Mountbatten received approval for the bulk of forces for any operations. Spitfire squadrons. Rutter on 13 May.43 The plan that Bomber Command was expected to (b) Maintenance of a proper state of emerged envisaged a frontal assault provide units from No.2 Group for readiness of squadrons ear-marked on Dieppe proceeded by bombing training.35 for operation “Region” of the town and airborne assaults By 31 March, commands were (c) The training of fighter squadrons on the gun positions on headlands ordered by the DCAS to, “press in rotation in Combined Operation39 overlooking the town.44 By the time forward as rapidly as possible with the final air plan for Rutter emerged training and preparation for combined In the same month, No.239 Squadron the bombing of Dieppe itself had operations.”36 Douglas was expected was the first unit to go through the been removed, and by the time of to provide units for training as well training at RAF Abbotsinch and Jubilee the use of airborne forces had as supporting Army Co-Operation would later serve during Jubilee. been replaced by commando assaults Command in the preparation of By the time of Jubilee, the RAF was from the sea. As early as 14 April, fighter-reconnaissance operations. prepared to provide the increasing Willets, Mountbatten’s air advisor Training fell into two categories of support needed for the ever-larger on combined operations, questioned operations: air cover over the area of raids being conducted by COHQ. the use of airborne troops.45 However, the operation and support of ground Major-General Frederick Browning, troops in the land phase of the Planning and the commander of Britain’s airborne battle.37 Air Marshal Arthur Harris, Bombing Issue forces, lobbied for their use.46 The the head of Bomber Command, raised key issue related to the allocation questions over the draft orders issued he origins of Rutter/Jubilee lay of transport squadrons equipped to Bomber Command. He replied to Tin Anglo-American discussions with bombers that could be used a letter from the vice-chief of the air in early 1942 to increase the scale and in on-going Bomber Command Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfred frequency of raids.40 On 18 April, the operations. For example, on 11 May Freeman, in his usual acerbic tones Chiefs of Staff Committee approved Harris requested that Nos.12 and 142 when he described it as training for a memorandum that stated that raids Squadrons be given over to Bomber “hypothetical operations.”38 Despite were “to be undertaken in the summer Command for use in Operation Harris’ objection, by May 1942 of 1942 on the largest scale that the Millennium, the thousand bomber training for Combined Operations available equipment will permit.”41 raid on Cologne on the night of became a vital aspect of the functional These discussions fell under the 30/31 May 1942. While not used, it commands’ commitments. DCAS larger hubris of decisions concerning highlights the problems facing the
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airborne force in 1942. The problems ships HM Ships Calpe and Fernie were assaulted by Nos.3 and 4 of allocating transport squadrons provided control of close support Commando. In the second phase, reduced the commitment of the aircraft with links to Leigh-Mallory 0550 hours to 0730 hours, air cover airborne division to one battalion by at Uxbridge; Air Commodore Cole on and ad hoc direct support were 1 June. the Calpe represented Leigh-Mallory. provided. For example, at 0645 hours, The final air plan for Rutter Cole was instructed to liaise with the No.88 Squadron provided support to visualized five key roles for the other force commanders and direct the Royal Regiment of Canada that RAF; diversionary night bombing, low-level operations. was being held up at Puys on Blue the transport of airborne troops, air During the course of the raid, Beach. The third phase, 0730 hours to cover, reconnaissance and direct air the RAF provided constant air 1030 hours, saw the RAF tasked with support.47 It was expected that 110 cover with operations split into five providing air cover for operations bombing sorties would take place phases starting at 0445 hours and on the ground. This was the greatest as a diversion against Boulogne and finishing at 2245 hours. In total, 70 period of activity for the RAF with “20 two other undecided targets.48 After RAF squadrons and four US Eighth to 30 fighters being constantly in the Exercise Yukon II, it was decided Army Air Force squadrons were area.” The penultimate phase, 1030 that Rutter would take place on 4 tasked to support Jubilee. The first hours to 1410 hours, saw the RAF July, however, prevailing weather phase, 0445 hours to 0550 hours, saw continue to provide air cover while conditions led to its postponement attacks on the beaches and defences the withdrawal from the beaches was and eventual cancellation after 8 with Douglas Bostons laying smoke undertaken. Additionally, limited July. The debate over the decision to while escorted bombers attacked the direct air support was provided for remount the operation has been well beach front. Wing Commander G.C. the withdrawing forces. During this documented.49 However, by 14 July Surplice of No.226 Squadron flew one phase Luftwaffe tactics against the the operation had been resurrected as of the first smoke laying operations attacking forces changed with larger Jubilee.50 It is clear that Leigh-Mallory of the day and reported taking off mixed formations of fighters, fighter- was supportive of any decision in the dark and encountering light bombers and bombers being utilized. to remount Rutter.51 The revised anti-aircraft fire during the operation. The final phase, 1410 hours to 2245 Jubilee air plan saw the RAF focus His aircraft was attacked by a Focke- hours, saw air cover provided for the on providing air cover with direct Wulf FW190, which his gunner, Pilot fleet returning to the UK.54 air support a secondary priority. Officer L.J. Longhurst, claimed as it The operation cost the RAF 108 These operations continued through turned away with smoke pouring aircraft while Luftwaffe records the daylight hours with the most from its engine.53 At the same time show that their losses totalled no intensive periods coming during the Hawker Hurricane fighter-bombers more than 48 aircraft with the loss landing and withdrawal. Low-level and Supermarine Spitfires attacked of 21 fighter pilots.55 However, it fighter and bomber attacks supported gun batteries on the flanks, which was initially assumed that RAF and assault forces and provided smoke- laying where appropriate. Aircraft from Army Co-Operation Command provided tactical reconnaissance within the battle area and along the lines of approach to Dieppe.52 While Dieppe was not bombed, a diversionary raid remained part of the plan with aircraft from the US 8th Army Air Force attacking the airfield at Abbeville, a purely military target. Canadian Forces Photo PL 10706 Photo Canadian Forces Command and control was provided through No.11 Group Headquarters at RAF Uxbridge. The headquarters
A Spitfire from a Canadian squadron is refuelled following a sortie to Dieppe, 19 August 1942.
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A formation of aircraft over Dieppe, 19 August 1942
Luftwaffe losses were even. At a War wounded and able to be return to aided the attackers, the planners had Cabinet meeting on 22 August the service. However, the Luftwaffe to contend with considerations that foreign secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, lost 38 percent of its fighter pilots as would have ameliorated against its described the Luftwaffe as having killed while another 29 percent were effectiveness. These considerations been roughly handled.56 Leigh- classified as missing.61 The Luftwaffe include the applicability of use of Mallory claimed that “Reports since suffered an attrition of 67 percent, a bombers to the raid and the issue of received indicate that the German rate that was unacceptable for the authorisation from the War Cabinet. Air Force…lost between 150 and return that occurred during Jubilee. The Manual of Combined 200 aircraft.”57 Despite this apparent From 1942 onwards, there was a Operations contended that the use discord between Leigh-Mallory’s general decline in both the quality of bombing depended on, “the claim and the actual records, the key and quantity of German fighter number of aircraft available and indicator of the RAF’s relative success pilots; therefore, a high attrition rate other operations required of them,” on the day relates to pilot losses. exacerbated the problem.62 and that, “In most cases the general Of RAF losses, 33 percent of pilots Despite its relative success, the struggle for air superiority, local were classified as safe.58 This means key criticism of the RAF’s planning operations in defence of the landing that they were picked up either by for Jubilee lay in the decision to against enemy aircraft, and spotting friendly craft or by the air/sea rescue cancel the pre-bombardment that and reconnaissance duties will have (ASR) organisation. Leigh-Mallory had been part of the initial outline prior claims.”65 In this light, the in his covering letter to his report plan for Operation Rutter. Villa decision can be viewed as conforming to the secretary of state for air on has noted that, “Without heavy to prescribed doctrine. The use Jubilee praised the work of the ASR air bombardment, the disparity of heavy bombers also faced the organisation and lamented the loss in fire-power proved fatal to the problem of denuding the operation of several of the Dover station’s craft, Canadian and British invaders.”63 of surprise. While this contention which had been operating outside of This fatalistic post-facto analysis has may appear as fallacious reasoning the range of the air cover umbrella.59 percolated into recent works with for what some have claimed was These were the last vessels to leave historian Robin Neillands writing a poor operational decision, it was the battle area and some of the last that Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory’s based on operational experience. missions performed by the RAF were decision to cancel the bombing, The growing scale of raids in 1942 to provide air cover for these vessels.60 “fundamentally undermined the had seen greater use of air power Additionally, another 13 percent possibilities of success at Dieppe.”64 that had not always been successful. PMR 86-246 Photo Canadian Forces of pilots were classified injured or While bomber support may have During Operation Chariot, the raid
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on St. Nazaire on 28 March 1942, the the meeting on 5 June. Finally, a key following general principles: use of bombers alerted the defenders issue facing planners was a standing (a) The intentional bombardment of to the approaching operation due to order from the War Cabinet relating civil populations as such is illegal. their peculiar bombing patterns and to the use of heavy bombers over (b) It must be possible to identify the they failed to provide the planned occupied territory. Mountbatten had objective. diversion.66 The inclusion of bombers noted this issue in a meeting of the (c) The attack must be made with for Rutter was based on the insistence Chiefs of Staff Committee as early as reasonable care to avoid undue loss of the other services. On 21 April, 13 May and it was fully explored in of civil life in the vicinity of the target. it was accepted that the target his appreciation for Rutter.72 (d) The provisions of Red Cross would be Dieppe itself.67 Despite Even before the fall of France in conventions are to be observed.74 its initial inclusion in the planning June 1940, the War Cabinet laid down for Rutter direct bombing of Dieppe rules governing bombing in France. This made Harris adamant that if was removed at the meeting on 5 These were amended in July 1940 Bomber Command was to be used June. However, diversionary attacks to take account of the armistice and then it had to be under conditions remained an important element of drew attention to the concerns raised that fitted these considerations. Thus, air plans for both Rutter and Jubilee. over targets where civilian casualties cancelling the pre-bombardment Direct bombing was removed could be incurred.73 Sir Archibald made sense given that these for several reasons. First, the issue Sinclair, the secretary of state for conditions could not be guaranteed, of surprise was paramount in Leigh- air, directed that military objectives and that it might risk the loss of Mallory’s reasoning. This was based could be attacked in France. They surprise. on operational experience. Second, included military forces, works and The bombing of targets in France Harris noted that for operational fortifications, establishments and was a sensitive political subject that reasons any attack would have to depots, shipyards and factories, lines affected the conduct of combined go in after morning twilight. Given of communications and transport, operations. The St. Nazaire raid the tight schedule of operations and other objectives of military highlighted the problem of accurate for Rutter, this would leave the necessity. While this suggests that targeting in occupied-territory as bombers a window of five minutes bombing could have been used cloud cover had abrogated the for any operation.68 After the to support Rutter/Jubilee it is the bombers’ effective use.75 It is clear decision was taken to remount the reference in paragraph 3 of the Annex, that Churchill’s policy towards the operation as Jubilee Leigh-Mallory which highlights the complexity of bombing of France was guided by made this operational factor clear the issues that hampered Bomber four key concerns. First, the fear of in an undated memorandum on Command operations in this sphere. pushing the Vichy regime into the “The Employment on Bombers” It noted that: hands of Germany. Second, Churchill that was certainly circulated before did not want to damage relations the meeting at COHQ on 24 July 3. Bombardment by naval and air with the US who maintained links despite Villa’s claim that this was forces is to be confined to military with Vichy having granted them produced in September 1943.69 Leigh- objectives and must be subject to the full diplomatic recognition. Third, Mallory made clear the difficulty of coordinating Bomber Command operations with the requirements of the operation.70 The primary aim of the RAF was to provide effective air cover, and battle the Luftwaffe for air superiority, and thus the appearance of bombers five minutes before the attack would cause problems.71 The concern of causing casualties to assaulting forces played a role in Leigh-Mallory decision making at Canadian Forces Photo PMR 81-6978 Photo Forces Canadian
The crew of a German 20 mm anti- aircraft gun searches for targets over Dieppe, 19 August 1942.
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Top left: An air photo of Dieppe taken during the battle. A large fire can be seen burning in a building on the seafront while other plumes of smoke are created by the burning landing craft on the beach. Centre and bottom left: Scenes of the air battle over Dieppe: A twin-engined aircraft is photographed in its final seconds before it plunges into the sea; Lazy contrails trace the path of aircraft on a summer day. Canadian Forces Photo PMR 84-376 Photo Canadian Forces Churchill had to maintain good relations with Charles de Gaulle and the Free French forces based in the UK. Finally, Churchill was politically sensitive to the issue of civilian casualties in occupied territory.76 The impact of the sinking of the French Fleet at Mers-el-Kebir on 3 July 1940 had strained relations between Britain and France and it remained an important element of Vichy responses to British actions.77 However, this did not mean that targets in France, both in Vichy and occupied-territory, could not be attacked. A complex relationship between the air staff,
Canadian Forces Photo PMR 86-262 Photo Canadian Forces relevant operational commands, the War Cabinet and Churchill existed to debate the merits of attacking specific targets in occupied territory. For example, the Renault factory at Billancourt was attacked on 3 March 1942. However, the operational conditions for this attack fit the conditions laid down by the War Cabinet.78 Often discussions over targets in France were protracted, as with the attack on the Schneider works at Le Creusot on 17 October 1942 that was first suggested on 9 April.79 Even into 1944, Churchill remained concerned over attacking targets in France. One of the underlying issues concerning the Transportation Plan was civilian casualties. Churchill Canadian Forces Photo PMR 86-288 Photo Canadian Forces feared postwar retribution and it took the threat of General Dwight Eisenhower’s resignation to force through acceptance of the plan.80 Despite this Churchill quipped at Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder on 3 May 1944 that, “You will smear
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the good name of the Royal Air mode of operation until greater increased after 1943 they were Force across the world.”81 He also scientific and navigational aids not always beneficial; operational telegraphed Roosevelt on 7 May to became available from 1942 onwards. research reports questioned the express his, and the War Cabinets Despite the problem of targeting, efficacy of their use for anything concern over what he described as the Dieppe had been previously been other than morale reasons.86 Given slaughter of French civilians.82 attacked, however, by the time of the the geography of Dieppe, it is hard Additionally, the RAF lacked the raid it was considered an unsuitable to imagine what advantage the use of capability to attack pinpoint targets at target for the Bomber Command heavy bombers would have actually this stage of the war. The Butt Report main force. In 1943, Bomber given the attackers. of August 1941 made it clear that Command’s Operational Research Bomber Command struggled to hit Section produced an assessment that Lessons Learnt targets. Only one in three attacking raised questions of the efficacy of the aircraft hit within five miles of their command’s use based on its available ne of the key issues raised by objective.83 The problem of precision strength, effectiveness and nature of OJubilee is that of whether the cost targeting had been identified as early the target.85 Dieppe was considered was worth the sacrifice. Mountbatten as 11 October 1939 when Air Vice- a wasteful target given the force made rigorous attempts to defend Marshal Arthur Conningham noted requirements required to attack the necessity of the raid up to his that his crews in No.4 Group were it. This was a reasonable assertion death. As late as 1974 he continued to having difficulty locating targets at given the aim of Bomber Command. argue in the pages of the Journal of the night.84 Bomber Command would While the use of heavy bombers Royal United Services Institute (JRUSI) adopt area bombing as it main in support of ground operations that Jubilee had been a necessary
An RAF Boston (with its bomb bay doors open) flies over the naval task force at Dieppe. At least one ship is in the process of laying a thick smoke screen to hide the vessels from German coastal batteries. Canadian Forces Photo C3080 Photo Canadian Forces
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precursor to Operation Overlord when he stated that countless lives were saved during Overlord because of the lessons learnt at Dieppe.87 This post-facto defence of his own actions was undoubtedly born out the fact that, as his official biographer noted, Dieppe was one of the two great criticisms that blighted his career.88 Indeed, the text of the JRUSI article came from his address to the Canadian Dieppe Veterans and Prisoners of War Association on 28 September 1973 where he sought to justify the reasons for the raid. It is clear that this was specious reasoning on the part of Mountbatten who tried to stretch the verity of his claims by ignoring other theatres of operation. The attempt to analyse lessons learnt from the operation began soon after with Captain John Hughes- Hallett, the Jubilee naval force commander, supervising a quick post-mortem process that saw the production of a combined report on the operation and a separately produced “Lessons Learnt” document. A key element of this document was the reports by the individual force commanders. Leigh- Mallory submitted his report on 5 September 1942. In his covering letter to Sir Archibald Sinclair, secretary of state for air, Leigh-Mallory outlined his view that in overall terms the operation had been a success from the perspective of the air force.89 Leigh-Mallory praised the work of the squadrons providing air cover and noted that this “was the most satisfactory part of the Operation.” Notably Leigh-Mallory also praised the work of the air-sea rescue organisation that picked up 20 Top: The use of heavy bombers was cancelled for the attack on Dieppe, American heavy pilots in the course of the operation.90 bombers were tasked with diversionary operations. Here, the crew of a US B-17 Flying Leigh-Mallory’s key concern related Fortress, “Dixie Demo” leave their aircraft following their participation in Operation to the provision of adequate aerial Jubilee. recognition training for RN gunners Above: The air photo captures the explosion of bombs dropped by American B-17s on who had posed serious problems of the German aerodrome at Abbeville/Drucat on 19 August 1942. Key to the annotations: A. Bombs bursting in the northern dispersal area; B. Bomb bursts in a dispersal area; C. command and control (C2) for the Bomb bursts on the northern end of the NE/SW runway; D. Bomb bursts on the eastern system then in place. While Leigh- end of the E/W runway; F. Bomb bursts on a light anti-aircraft position; H. Bomb bursts Mallory praised the standard of work on a heavy anti-aircraft position; I. Bomb bursts on the outskirts of the aerodrome. undertaken by his own controllers
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on both Calpe and Fernie it is clear Operations Aflame and Coleman. anti-aircraft fire from supporting from the discussions both before While there were advantages to this RN destroyers.100 The problem of and after the operation that this was type of operation, it was ultimately a C2 at such an intimate level of a problem that had to be examined dead-end by late 1942 with prevailing operations had been highlighted in in order to fully apply air power in operational issues such as the impact the interwar years when HMS Nelson combined operations.91 Given the that weather would have on fighter had been used as a HQ ship during criticism in the historiography over operations and bombing accuracy.95 exercises off the Yorkshire coast bombing it is interesting to note that However, in 1943 it received renewed in 1934.101 This was one of Leigh- Leigh-Mallory’s comments on this vigour when Operation Starkey, Mallory’s concerns after the debacle subject were purely of an operational a sham British and Canadian of Exercise Yukon II in preparation nature. He noted that bombing was amphibious invasion in the Boulogne for Operation Rutter.102 This concern not as useful as smoke laying in initial area of France, became an important led Mountbatten to initiate an inter- landing operations and that plans element of Operation Cockade, a plan service committee to explore the issue to utilise the light bombers of No.2 designed to pin down German forces in early 1942.103 The report led to the Group to attack reinforcements had in Western Europe.96 Key to this was development of HMS Bulolo and come to nothing due to the lack of the desire to bring the Luftwaffe Largs as headquarters ships, however German troop movement.92 to battle. Starkey was launched on they were not available for Jubilee Overall, various reports on Jubilee 16 August and culminated on 9 and the attacking forces had to rely highlighted three key conclusions on September. It sought to feign the on adapted destroyers that were not the RAF experience. First, combined movement of a large number of sufficient for the job. Jubilee acted as a operations could be used as a means troops and to deceive the Germans trigger for the extended development of drawing the Luftwaffe to battle, into believing that a major operation of the headquarters ship concept as it thus, allowing Fighter Command was to take place in the area of illustrated the dire need for specialist to attrite its strength. Second, there Boulogne.97 RAF Fighter Command ships to serve in this role. This was a need to improve the command supplied 72 squadrons that provided was reinforced by Bulolo’s success and control (C2) functions which air cover and hoped to fight a major during Operation Torch. However, supported such operations. Finally, air battle using a RN force as bait. it was clear that the headquarters there was a significant attempt to Ultimately, Starkey failed. It did ships could not completely resolve address the utility of bombing as a have an impact on the planning for the complicated issues of C2 for air means of supporting such operations. deception operations for Overlord, operations. The ultimate result was The “Lessons Learnt” report also in particular Fortitude South, which the development of fighter direction highlighted concerns over the scale was reconsidered in light of problems tenders (FDTs) manned by specially of operations, use of smoke, the of conception that plagued Starkey. trained fighter direction officers. use of airborne forces as well as the Deception had been at the core FDTs were equipped with ground aforementioned issue of C2.93 of these planned operations with control intercept radar and the Perhaps the least useful lesson Mountbatten claiming that Coleman relevant intelligence streams to allow learnt was Leigh-Mallory’s attempt to would be the deception plan for the control of fighter aircraft over the link the use of combined operations Operation Torch.98 Starkey also began invasion area, a role that decreased to an offensive fighter strategy; in to change the attitude prevalent in pressure on headquarters ships, effect, intruder-based operations the RAF that air superiority could which took on a greater oversight using commandos as bait rather be gained during the course of a role in 1944. This revised system than bombers. This was not an combined operation. By Overlord, would prove itself during Operation unreasonable conclusion given that it was recognized that this was a Overlord.104 after Dieppe the Germans began prerequisite that would have to be The problem of fire support reinforcing positions in France and gained beforehand. in combined operations was a key Norway. Leigh-Mallory wrote to The force commanders in their lesson identified by Hughes-Hallett Mountbatten on 22 August stating individual reports that formed who noted that the RAF part was that, “I feel that we might profitably the Combined Report on Jubilee of vital importance.105 Throughout conduct a future operation on rather highlighted the question of C2.99 late 1942, COHQ began studying the different lines.” He saw the success of The key experience revolved around question of fire support through its No.4 Commando’s operation against the loss of HMS Berkeley, which Assault Committee, which simply the Hess Battery as a blueprint for was sunk by the Luftwaffe because stated that, “In all stages of the action future operations.94 Two operations of the RAF’s inability to engage all forms of air support would be an made it as far as the planning stage, below 3,000 feet for fear of friendly urgent requirement.”106 A technical https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss4/3 29 14 : “The support afforded by the air force was faultless” The Royal Air Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942
sub-committee was set-up to examine supporting combined operations afforded by air forces was faultless” “Whether the requirements of fire with offensive air power. Without overstates the operation’s success, it support in assaults could be met by air cover, Jubilee would have been an is clear that the RAF considered their bombing, gunfire from ships, or a unmitigated disaster. Given that only experience as positive and they did combination of both.”107 Despite the one ship, HMS Berkeley, was lost due learn lessons from Jubilee.114 In line obvious need to examine the issue to bombing highlights its importance. with developments from operations of aerial bombardment it was not Indeed, Hughes-Hallett wrote that in the Mediterranean, attempts dealt with in any meaningful manner “The fighter cover afforded by No.11 were made to integrate improved until Leigh-Mallory raised the issue Group was magnificent and the…loss C2 systems for future combined at Exercise Rattle in June 1943.108 of one ship…should be regarded as… operations. Additionally, scientific Leigh-Mallory’s personal experience fortunate.”110 attempts were made to examine how of Jubilee clearly highlighted the Contemporary Canadian views bombing could be used to support importance of aerial bombardment highlight the complexity of the operations. Jubilee acted as a trigger to him. This line of experience in operation and lessons learnt by the for developments that emerged conjunction with reports emanating RAF. Captain G.A. Browne of the in the course of 1943 and these from the Mediterranean, in particular Royal Canadian Artillery, who served improvements were evident during Operation Corkscrew, the invasion as a forward observation officer, Operation Overlord. However, the of the Italian island of Pantelleria, commented on the cancelling of the path between failure at Dieppe and would form a vital source of aerial bombardment to preserve the success on D-Day was not the direct information in the planning for element of surprise that: line suggested by Mountbatten. Overlord. Air Vice-Marshal Ronald Graham formed an inter-service Further, is surprise easier to committee under the auspices of obtain, than the preparatory heavy Notes the Chiefs of Staff Committee to air bombardment which in our examine the problem of fire support case would quite probably have . 1 C.P. Stacey, The Canadian Army 1939-1945: for amphibious operations. This succeeded where surprise, or rather An Official Historical Summary (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1948), p.83. the hope of surprise, failed?111 committee submitted its report in 2. Brian Loring Villa, Unauthorized Action: early 1944 and it emphasised the need Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid, 1942 for the use of air power by noting In contrast Lieutenant J.E.R. Wood of (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Peter J Henshaw, “The British Chiefs of that all action would be joint, and the Royal Canadian Engineers, who Staff Committee and the Preparation of that the effort fell into three tasks: was captured on Red/White beach, the Dieppe Raid, March- August 1942: silencing coastal defences; drenching commented after the war that: Did Mountbatten Really Evade the Committee’s Authority?,” War in History fire during the assault; and provision 1, no.2 (July 1994), pp.197-214; Brian Villa of support during the build up of the Some of our people later claimed and Peter Henshaw, “The Dieppe Raid bridgehead.109 they never saw the Air Force. Of Debate,” Canadian Historical Review 79, no.2 (June 1998) pp. 304–15. course they didn’t. They were too 3. Villa, Unauthorized Action, p.162. Conclusion – busy up top keeping the Luftwaffe 4. Norman Franks, The Greatest Air Battle: Dieppe, 19th August 1942 Success or Failure? off us. I can truthfully say we were (London: Grub Street, 1997). not machine gunned on that beach 5. Winston Churchill, The Second World t is clear that the debate over the except by our own people after we’d War, vol.2: Their Finest Hour (London: Cassell, 1950), p.217; Bernard Fergusson, effectiveness of the RAF during folded up. That means the R.A.F. did I The Watery Maze: The Story of Combined Jubilee remains contentious. A its stuff.112 Operations (London: Collins, 1961), p.47. broader analysis of the context 6. Fergusson, The Watery Maze, p.47, Robin Neillands, The Dieppe Raid: The Story of in which the RAF was operating Conversely, the Luftwaffe’s 8th the Disastrous 1942 Expedition (London: highlights the idea that the RAF did Abteilung wrote that the key lesson Aurum Press, 2006), p.25. indeed pursue the right strategy to for the Allies lay in understanding 7. The National Archives, Kew, London (TNA), AIR 8/71, Air Staff Memorandum support Jubilee. RAF strategy stressed that air supremacy was what was No. 10 – Methods of Supporting the the importance of air superiority and required in any future Combined Landing of a Military Force on Enemy it was widely accepted that this Operation.113 This is what the RAF Territory, July 1923. 8. Emphasis in original. Royal Air Force was the overriding consideration had been arguing since the early Museum (RAFM), Hendon, London, AIR in combined operations. A simple 1920s. 69/204, RAF Staff College, 16th Course: statistical analysis of losses does little While the War Cabinet’s “Introduction to Combined Operations,” lecture by Group Captain R Graham DSO, but misunderstand the problems of conclusion that the “Support DSC, DFC, 10 October 1938, pp.1-7.
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. 9 TNA, ADM 116/2086, Anderson to (JSCSC), Shrivenham, OKW Directives 44. TNA, AIR 20/9503, History of the Secretary of the Directorate of Staff for the Invasion of UK: Operation Seelowe, Combined Operations Organisation, Duties, War Office, 7/01/1920. Summer and Autumn 1940, pp.1-3. 1940-1945 (1956), p. 39. 10. Kenneth Clifford, Amphibious Warfare
of Bombers; AIR 16/746, Minutes of 83. Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality, p.1; Randall 104. TNA, DEFE 2/421, A report on the Role the 1st Meeting of the Combined Force Wakelam, The Science of Bombing: and Operation of British Headquarters Commanders at Combined Operation Operational Research in RAF Bomber Ships and Fighter Direction Tenders in Headquarters, 24 July 1942. Villa, Command (Toronto: University of Toronto the Assault on the Continent of Europe, Unauthorzed Action, note 64, p.289. Press, 2009), p.24. June 1944: Operation “NEPTUNE,” 70. TNA, AIR 16/746, Employment of 84. Wakelam, The Science of Bombing, p.20. September 1945. Bombers. 85. Ibid,, p.187. 105. TNA, ADM 239/350, Lessons Learnt, p.1. 71. TNA, DEFE 2/542, Planning Notes for 86. Ian Gooderson, Air Power at the Battlefront: 106. TNA, DEFE 2/1024, Fire Support for a Operation “RUTTER,” 11 May 1942. Allied Close Air Support in Europe, 1943-45 Seaborne Landing on a Heavily Defended 72. TNA, DEFE 2/546, Extracts from Chiefs (London: Frank Cass, 1998), pp.125-64. Coast, Part 1 (1943), p.2. of Staff Meeting No.42 dated 13 May 1942. 87. Earl Mountbatten of Burma, “Operation 107. TNA, AIR 20/9503, History of the 73. TNA, CAB 66/10/15, Bombardment Jubilee: The Place of the Dieppe Raid Combined Operations Organisation, Policy in France – Memorandum by the in History,” Journal of the Royal United 1940-1945 (1956), p.120. Secretary of State for Air, 22 July 1940. Services Institute for Defence Studies 119, 108. TNA, AIR 20/5229, RATTLE 74. TNA, CAB 66/10/15, Annex II to WP no.1 (March 1974), p.25. Programme, 23 June 1943; AIR 20/5229, (40) 186 – Revised Instructions by His 88. Philip Ziegler, Mountbatten: The Official Air Bombardment – The Problem of Majesty’s Government to govern the Biography (London: Fontana, 1986), p.186. Neutralising Coast Defences, 24 June Conduct of all forms of Bombardment, The other key criticism was the partition 1943. 31 May 1940. of India in 1947. 109. TNA, DEFE 2/1025, Fire Support for a 75. TNA, AIR 20/9503, History of the 89. TNA, AIR 16/871, Covering Letter to the Seaborne Landing on a Heavily Defended Combined Operations Organisation, Report by the Air Force Commander on Coast, Part 2 (1943), pp.1-2. 1940-1945, (1956), p. 39. Operation “Jubilee”: Raid on Dieppe, 5 110. Captain J. Hughes-Hallett, “Dieppe 76. Lindsey Dodd and Andrew Knapp, September 1942. Raid: Despatch on the Raid, 18-19 ‘“How many Frenchmen did you kill?’ 90. TNA, AIR 16/871, Covering Letter. August 1942,” The London Gazette, 12 British Bombing Policy towards France 91. TNA, AIR 16/871, Covering Letter, p. 3. August 1947, p.3823. The dispatch was (1940–1945),” French History 22, no.4 92. TNA, AIR 16/871, Covering Letter. originally submitted on 30 August 1942 (December 2008) p.472. The title to this 93. TNA, ADM 239/350, Raid on Dieppe: and published after the war in 1947. article comes from a letter from Churchill Lessons Learnt. 111. Department of History and Heritage to Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder. 94. TNA, DEFE 2/67, Leigh-Mallory to (DHH), Ottawa, Canada, Canadian See; TNA, AIR 37/1012, Letter Churchill Mountbatten, 22 August 1942, p.1. Military Headquarters (CMHQ) Report to Tedder, 10 July 1944 95. TNA, AIR 20/4529, DBO to ACAS (P) No.89, The Operation at DIEPPE, 19 Aug 77. Brett Bowles, “‘La Tragédie de Mers‐el‐ reference Operation “COLEMAN,” 19 42: Personal Stories of Participants, 31 Kébir’ and the Politics of Filmed News in October 1942; AIR 20/4529, DFO to ACAS December 1942, p.A-9. France, 1940–1944,” The Journal of Modern (P) reference Operation “COLEMAN,” 19 112. DHH, CMHQ Report No.142, Operation History 76, no.2 (June 2004), pp.347-388. October 1942. “JUBILEE”: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 78. Rex Cording, “The Other Bomber Battle: 96. John Campbell, “Operation STARKEY, 42, Further New Information, 18 July An Examination of the Problems that 1943: A Piece of Harmless Playacting?” 1945, para.15. arose between the Air Staff and the Intelligence and National Security 2, no.3 113. TNA, AIR 20/7701, Extract from 8th AOC Bomber Command between (1987), pp.92-113. Abteilung Staff Study on Operations at 1942 and 1945 and their Effects on the 97. TNA, AIR 40/312, Report by the Air Force Dieppe, 27 March 1944. Strategic Bomber Offensive” (PhD thesis, Commander on Operation “STARKEY,” 114. TNA, CAB 122/259, War Cabinet to Joint University of Canterbury, 2006), pp.85, 16th August-9th September 1943, 16 Staff Mission, 21 August 1942. 114; Matt Perry, “Bombing Billancourt: September 1943, p.1. Labour Agency and the Limitations of 98. TNA, AIR 20/4529, Covering Letter to the Public Opinion Model of Wartime Outline of Operation “COLEMAN,” 18 France,” Labour History Review 77, no.1 October 1942. (April 2012) pp.49-74 99. TNA, ADM 239/350, Lessons Learnt, 79. Dodd and Knapp, ‘“How many p. 1; DEFE 2/551, The Dieppe Report Frenchmen did you kill?,”’ p.473. (Combined Report, October 1942), p.143. 80. On the debates surrounding targeting see; 100. TNA, ADM 267/108, Extracts from Vincent Orange, “Arthur Tedder and the Weekly Intelligence Reports: HMS Transportation Plan” in John Buckley, Berkeley – Sunk by Bombs – 19.8.1942, Ross Mahoney is a PhD candidate at the ed., The Normandy Campaign, 1944: 18 December 1942. Centre for War Studies at the University of Sixty Years On (Abingdon: Routledge, 101. RAFM, AIR 69/156, RAF Staff College, 15th Birmingham, UK. He is currently writing 2006), pp.147-157; Peter Gray, “The Course: “The Naval Aspect of Combined a thesis provisionally entitled, “The Strategic Leadership and Direction of the Operations” lecture by Commander J W Forgotten Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Royal Air Force Strategic Air Offensive Cuthbert RN, 3 November 1937; Richard Trafford Leigh-Mallory and Leadership Against Germany from Inception to 1945 Harding, “Amphibious Warfare, 1930- Development and Succession Planning (PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 1939” in Richard Harding, ed., The Royal in the Royal Air Force, 1892-1937.” 2009), pp.238-243; Cording, “The Other Navy, 1930-2000: Innovation and Defence His supervisors are Air Commodore Bombing Battle,” pp.199-274. (London: Frank Cass, 2005), pp.55-57. (ret’d) Dr Peter Gray and Professor Gary 81. Arthur Tedder, With Prejudice: The War 102. TNA, DEFE 2/546, Minutes of Meeting Sheffield. His research interests are Air Memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force held on 25th June at COHQ for Power History, Theory and Doctrine, Lord Tedder GCB (London: Cassell, 1966), Operation “RUTTER”; AIR 20/832, Leadership, Command and Morale, and p.530; Solly Zuckerman, From Apes to Support Communications in Combined Strategic and Organisational Culture. He Warlord: The Autobiography (1904-1946) Operations, 14 January 1942. is a recipient of the Royal Aeronautical of Solly Zuckerman (London: Hamish 103. TNA, AIR 20/832, Inter-Service Society’s Aerospace Speakers Travel Hamilton, 1978), p.256. Committee on Communications in Grant. In 2011, he was a West Point 82. Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Combined Operations: Interim Report Fellow in Military History at the United vol.V: Closing the Ring (London: Cassell, No. 2 – Support Communications in States Military Academy. 1951), p. 467. Combined Operations.
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