DOCSLIB.ORG

La Guerre Aerienne Isolement Prolonge Sur Le Theatre D'operations

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
La Guerre Aerienne Isolement Prolonge Sur Le Theatre D'operations 230 2 ° Partie : La guerre aerienne isolement prolonge sur le theatre d'operations de la Mediterranee, !'application et la poursuite de la politique de canadianisation prirent un ton particulier pour le 417e. Les remplacements, en particulier, sous la forme de pilotes experimentes pour servir de commandants et de seconds d'escadrilles, furent parfois difficiles a obtenir. Paradoxalement, a d'autres periodes, le probleme etait inverse, alors que les officiers d'etat-major devaient traiter le cas de Canadiens surqualifies pour lesquels il n 'existait aucune possibilite de promotion sur les theatres d'ope­ rations, a mains de les affecter a des escadrons OU des formations de la RAF. Un commandant d'escadrille experimente du 401e, par exemple, pouvait assez facilement etre promu au commandement d 'un autre escadron de chasse de I' ARC au Royaume-Uni, mais son alter ego du 417e n'avait qu 'une seule possibilite s'il voulait rester dans une unite de l 'ARC : ii devait attendre que son propre comman­ dant d'escadron soit affecte ailleurs ou soit abattu. Le 417e etait encore en Angleterre et s'exen;ait pour atteindre Jes normes operationnelles quand, a la mi-fevrier 1942, la Luftwaffe se joignit a la Kriegsmarine (marine allemande) pour realiser la« percee de la Manche »des croiseurs Scharnhorst et Gneisenau et du cuirassier lourd Prinz Eugen, a partir du port de Brest, de l 'Atlantique vers la Mer du Nord. L'echec de la RAF areagir rapidement et de maniere adequate, en depit de !'existence d'un plan de crise detaille pour !'operation Fuller, signifiait une occasion perdue pour Bentley Priory, qui doit accepter une part importante du blame. Quelque 280 avians, Me 109, I IO et FW 190 travaillant par equipes, servirent de chien de garde a la flottille allemande. L'echec, quant aux vols de reconnais­ sance du Coastal Command et du Fighter Command, permit a l'ennemi d'entrer dans le Pas-de-Calais, a mi-chemin du retour, avant que Jes Britanniques ne soient capables de lancer leur premier raid execute par six biplans desuets Fairey Swordfish, de la Fleet Air Arm, armes de torpilles, et de cinq escadrons de chasse designes pour assurer leur protection. L'escadre de Homchurch, se composant des 64e et 41 re Escadrons, devait voler en escorte rapprochee et essayer d'inter­ dire tout tir antiaerien, tandis que les trois escadrons de l'escadre de Biggin Hill, qui comprenaient le 40 le, devaient servir de couverture. Toutefois, un seul de ces cinq escadrons reussit son rendez-vous avec les Swordfish et une importance excessive donnee a la securite fit en sorte qu'aucun d'eux ne comprit reellement !'importance de la tache qu'ils devaient accomplir et que seuls quelques-uns 2 etaient au courant de cette tache4 • Le 4ue Escadron, dirige par le commandant d' Aviation R.B. Newton de la RAF (qui venait tout juste de prendre le commandement), decolla en retard a cause de « conditions meteorologiques defavorables ». Peut-etre semblait-il ne pas y avoir grande urgence, puisque Jes Canadiens avaient re9u I' ordre de ne rechercher que des navires ennemis. La patrouille que l'escadron effectua ne l'amena pas en contact avec le principal convoi ennemi», bien qu'il ait « fait l'objet de tirs de navires antiaeriens sans dommages pour nous-memes ». Une seconde mission, en milieu d'apres-midi, les trouva protegeant le retrait des bombardiers, qui avaient vainement cherche l'ennemi au milieu d'une couver­ ture nuageuse importante43. Le 401e Escadron echoua aussi dans son rendez-vous, retarde par de la confu- Le passage a l'offensive 231 sion quant a la securite, ce qui aurait ete comique s'il n'y avait pas eu des consequences tragiques. Le plan de bataille de Fuller etait enferme dans un coffre­ fort a Biggin Hill, mais l 'officier du renseignement de la station avait pris un jour de permission, oubliant de laisser la combinaison a son adjoint. Ce ne fut qu'au moment ou l'etat-major du groupe s'informa impatiemment quanta l'absence de reponse de l'escadre que les pilotes revurent l'ordre de decoller « pour intervenir dans une bataille entre des navires ennemis allemands et des batiments de guerre britanniques ». Un ciel bas, du brouillard et une pluie battante rendirent tout contact visuel impossible avec les Swordfish, tandis que le fait que la Fleet Air Arm et le Fighter Command utilisaient des frequences radio differentes empechait toute communication air-air. Laissant les Swordfish a leur destin- ils furent tous abattus par la Flak et des chasseurs, et seuls cinq des dix-huit membres d'equipage survecurent - les 401e et 128e Escadrons effectuerent une patrouille au nord de Calais et« de nombreux combats aeriens s'ensuivirent, lorsqu'un nombre conside­ rable de Me I09E et F, et de FW 190 engagerent le combat »44. Le 403e Escadron, en tant qu'element de l'escadre de North Weald, revut l 'ordre d' assurer « la superiorite aerienne entre I 4 h 30 et I 5 h, tan dis que l'attaque principale par des appareils du Coastal et du Bomber Command etait en cours »45. L 'escadre decolla a I 4 h IO, comptant se joindre a l 'escadre de Debden, au-dessus de Manston, mais Jes nombreux nuages firent apparemment echouer le processus. En fait, les Canadiens se trouvaient alors a agir de fa~on independante, en trois sections de trois appareils chacune - qui rappelaient la formation en « vie » maintenant discreditee! - menees par leur commandant britannique, le commandant d' Aviation C.N.S. Campbell. Campbell se trouva isole des autres, au-dessus des cotes fran~ai s es, mais apres avoir toumoye brievement avec trois Messerschmitt qui attaquaient deux bombardiers Hudson, ii fut rejoint par deux Spitfire de sa propre section rouge et trois d'un autre escadron. « Les rn9 continuaient a sortir de la base des nuages, mais lorsque [les Spitfire] se dirigeaient vers eux, ils y plongeaient a nouveau. » Pendant ce temps, les sections bleue et jaune revendiquaient un avian ennemi abattu et un autre endommage, dans le desordre de combats a petite echelle dus a une mauvaise coordination des efforts dans un ciel tres couvert. Plusieurs autres pilotes se battirent brievement contre des Messerschmitt alors qu'ils jaillissaient des nuages pour y rentrer a nouveau a basse altitude, mais ne revendiquerent aucune victoire. A la fin de lajoumee, le Fighter Command avait perdu douze pilotes et dix-sept appareils, alors qu' il avait abattu dix-sept chas­ seurs ennemis et revendique la « neutralisation » ou la mort de onze aviateurs allemands. Mais si la bataille tactique se terminait sur un match nu!, il ne faisait aucune doute quant a celui qui avait gagne les batailles strategique, operation­ nelle et publicitaire. Le « Channel block » (blocus de la Manche) avait echoue de maniere honteuse46. Le fiasco de Fuller etant derriere eux et la W ehrmacht passant de nouveau a !'offensive a l'est, les chefs d'etat-major britanniques, une fois de plus, envisa­ geaient la question de savoir comment leurs diverses forces pourraient aider au mieux !'Union Sovietique en 1942. La Royal Navy faisait tout ce qu 'elle pouvait pour s'assurer que les approvisionnements nord-americains atteignent Mour- 232 2 ° Partie : La guerre aerienne mansk. En Afrique du Nord, la Huitieme Armee, depassee et mal dirigee, poursui­ vie par I' Afrika Korps, etait en retraite vers El Alamein et le delta du Nil. Maltese battait pour sa survie et utilisait des ressources en chasseurs. Le Bomber Command s 'employait main tenant ( avec tres peu de succes) adetruire la base industrielle et le moral du peuple allemand. La proposition de l'etat-major de l' Air au Fighter Command etait d'accroitre I'offensive. Ses services de renseignements estimaient que « des pertes totales de 200 chasseurs de jour [ennemis] par mois, dues a n'importe quelle cause, sur le front occidental, entraineraient a long terme un declin de la puissance ennemie et qu'un total de 250 necessiterait un renfort a l'ouest, aux depens de la force de chasseurs monomoteurs allemands en Russie »47. Surles 250 pertes esperees, la moitie devrait etre infligee en combat, tandis que l'autre moitie pourrait provenir d'accidents arrivant au cours des operations ou de l'entrainement. Toutefois, amener l'ennemi a se battre posait le probleme le plus ardu: qu'est-ce qui obligerait le chasseur a venir se battre? Les nouveaux reservoirs largables auxiliaires entraient en service; leur rayon d'action avait augmente d'environ 190 milles (304 km) a partir des terrains d'aviation du I Ie Groupe et dans cette limite, la priorite etait attribuee aux objectifs potentiels des Circus, en fonction de leur importance economique et des dommages qui pouvaient leur etre infliges par une assez petite force de bombardiers. Les centrales electriques avaient la priorite et six industries principales venaient en second; il y avait en tout cinquante-huit objectifs : quarante et un en France, douze en Belgique et cinq aux Pays-Bas48. II restait a savoir si l'un d'eux presentait suffisarnment d'importance pour amener la Luftwaffe a se battre. Une comparaison des capacites de chacun des adversaires semblait favoriser les Allemands. « Cette annee, nous sommes dans une situation pire qu'en l94I dans le domaine des chefs de formation et des pilotes experimentes », declaraient des analystes de Bentley Priory. Ils poursuivaient en speculant qu'a «cause du nombre considerable qui avait ete envoye outre-mer ... ii semble raisonnable de supposer que le Fighter Command a ete plus vide de pilotes experimentes que les forces de chasse ennemies sur le front occidental » - une supposition qui ne tenait pratiquement pas compte des pertes allemandes a !'est.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Army Co-Operation Command and Tactical Air Power Development in Britain, 1940-1943: the Role of Army Co-Operation Command in Army Air Support
    ARMY CO-OPERATION COMMAND AND TACTICAL AIR POWER DEVELOPMENT IN BRITAIN, 1940-1943: THE ROLE OF ARMY CO-OPERATION COMMAND IN ARMY AIR SUPPORT By MATTHEW LEE POWELL A thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY School of History and Cultures College of Arts and Law The University of Birmingham September 2013 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT This thesis examines the impact of the developments made during the First World War and the inter-war period in tactical air support. Further to this, it will analyse how these developments led to the creation of Army Co-operation Command and affected the role it played developing army air support in Britain. Army Co-operation Command has been neglected in the literature on the Royal Air Force during the Second World War and this thesis addresses this neglect by adding to the extant knowledge on the development of tactical air support and fills a larger gap that exists in the literature on Royal Air Force Commands. Army Co-operation Command was created at the behest of the army in the wake of the Battle of France.
    [Show full text]
  • British Domestic Security Policy and Communist Subversion: 1945-1964
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Apollo British Domestic Security Policy and Communist Subversion: 1945-1964 William Styles Corpus Christi College, University of Cambridge September 2016 This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy William Styles British Domestic Security Policy and Communist Subversion: 1945-1964 This thesis is concerned with an analysis of British governmental attitudes and responses to communism in the United Kingdom during the early years of the Cold War, from the election of the Attlee government in July 1945 up until the election of the Wilson government in October 1964. Until recently the topic has been difficult to assess accurately, due to the scarcity of available original source material. However, as a result of multiple declassifications of both Cabinet Office and Security Service files over the past five years it is now possible to analyse the subject in greater depth and detail than had been previously feasible. The work is predominantly concerned with four key areas: firstly, why domestic communism continued to be viewed as a significant threat by successive governments – even despite both the ideology’s relatively limited popular support amongst the general public and Whitehall’s realisation that the Communist Party of Great Britain presented little by way of a direct challenge to British political stability. Secondly, how Whitehall’s understanding of the nature and severity of the threat posed by British communism developed between the late 1940s and early ‘60s, from a problem considered mainly of importance only to civil service security practices to one which directly impacted upon the conduct of educational policy and labour relations.
    [Show full text]
  • Trenchard's Doctrine: Organisational Culture, the 'Air Force Spirit' and The
    TRENCHARD’S DOCTRINE Trenchard’s Doctrine: Organisational Culture, the ‘Air Force spirit’ and the Foundation of the Royal Air Force in the Interwar Years ROSS MAHONEY Independent Scholar Email: [email protected] ABSTRACT While the Royal Air Force was born in war, it was created in peace. In his 1919 memorandum on the Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force, Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard outlined his vision for the development of the Service. In this strategy, Trenchard developed the idea of generating an ‘Air Force spirit’ that provided the basis of the RAF’s development in the years after the First World War. The basis for this process was the creation of specific institutions and structures that helped generate a culture that allowed the RAF to establish itself as it dealt with challenges from its sister services. This article explores the character of that culture and ethos and in analysing the early years of the RAF through a cultural lens, suggests that Trenchard’s so-called ‘doctrine’ was focussed more on organisational developments rather than air power thinking as has often been suggested. In 1917, during the First World War and in direct response to the challenge of the aerial bombing of Great Britain, the British government decided to create an independent air service to manage the requirements of aerial warfare. With the formation of the Royal Air Force (RAF) on 1 April 1918, the Service’s senior leaders had to deal with the challenge of developing a new culture for the organisation that was consistent with the aims of the Air Force and delivered a sense of identity to its personnel.
    [Show full text]
  • Supreme Air Command: the Development of Royal Air Force Practice in the Second World
    SUPREME AIR COMMAND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ROYAL AIR FORCE COMMAND PRACTICE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR By DAVID WALKER A Thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham For the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY School of History and Cultures College of Arts and Law The University of Birmingham January 2017 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT This thesis examines the development of RAF high command of the Metropolitan Air Force (MAF) during the Second World War. It sheds new light on the re-organisations of the Air Ministry in 1934, the RAF Command structure in 1936, and the tri-service debate in 1937 concerning the RAF proposal to establish a Supreme Air Commander (SAC). It reveals that while frontline expansion created an impetus for re-organisation, it was operational readiness that was the dominant factor in the re-structuring of the RAF. It examines the transition in RAF frontline organization from the mono-functional command system of 1936 to the multi- functional organisation that emerged after 1943 by looking at command structure and practice, personalities, and operational thinking.
    [Show full text]
  • Dr Noble Frankland on Writing Official History
    The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors concerned and are not necessarily those held by the Royal Air Force Historical Society. Copyright © 1997 by Royal Air Force Historical Society. First Published in the UK in 1997 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without the permission from the Publisher in writing. Printed by Fotodirect Ltd, Brighton. Tel (01273) 563111 Royal Air Force Historical Society 1 THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY No 17 President: Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Michael Beetham GCB CBE DFC AFC Vice-President: Air Marshal Sir Frederick Sowrey KCB CBE AFC Committee Chairman: Air Vice-Marshal N B Baldwin CBE Vice-Charman Air Vice-Marshal A F C Hunter CBE AFC MA LLB General Secretary: Group Captain J C Ainsworth CEng AFRAeS Membership Secretary: Dr Jack Dunham PhD CPsychol AMRAeS Treasurer: Desmond Goch Esq FCAA Members: Wing Commander A J Brookes BA FRSA RAF J S Cox BA MA *Dr M A Fopp MA FMA FIMgt *Group Captain A P N Lambert Mphil RAF Air Commodore H A Probert MBE MA A E F Richardson Derek H Wood Esq AFRAeS *Ex officio members 2 CONTENTS Page 1. SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT AND EXPERIENCE OF OFFICIAL MILITARY HISTORY 5 Lecture by Dr Noble Frankland CB CBE DFC MA Dphil 2. 10th ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING 21 Royal Air Force Club 10th June 1996 3.
    [Show full text]
  • 254 Part Two: the Fighter War Nals Between RAF Middle East, RCAF District HQ in Cairo, and RCAF Overseas Headquarters
    254 Part Two: The Fighter War nals between RAF Middle East, RCAF District HQ in Cairo, and RCAF Overseas Headquarters. Consistent with the policy of Canadianization, Overseas Head­ quarters wanted the appointment filled with one of its own, but there was no RCAF officer in the theatre whom the RAF considered qualified. Air Vice­ Marshal Broadhurst, the DAF's commander, felt that 'owing to the lack of operational experience of the Squadron as a whole, that strong leadership and an officer of outstanding operational experience should be posted' to No 4 I 7. He and Wing Commander Patterson finally reached a compromise which Edwards, in London, accepted somewhat reluctantly, in the appointment of Squadron Leader P.S. Turner, DFC and Bar, who had 'turned around' No 41 I Squadron in 1942. Turner had since served in Malta and, more recently, as a senior controller in the Sector Operations Room in Heliopolis, Egypt. Other than his failure to be in the RCAF, the twenty-nine-year-old Turner's qualifi­ cations were near perfect. With at least ten enemy aircraft destroyed and four or more 'probables,' two DFCs, and more than seven hundred hours of combat flying to his credit, he had a reputation as a disciplinarian where business was 7 concerned, 'deadly serious' in the air but 'one of the boys' in the mess; ' and he was a Canadian, who understood and appreciated the foibles of his fellow countrymen, whatever badges he might wear. Army Co-operation Command had played an important role in developing and propagating the concept of air support of ground forces, but, as a training and experimental formation, it still lacked the communications and command structure to operate in the field; and since it was 'now necessary to pass from the phase of development to the phase of action,' it could be dispensed with.
    [Show full text]
  • Intelligence As Public Administration
    Intelligence and the Machinery of Government: Conceptualising the Intelligence Community1 Dr. Philip H.J. Davies Director, Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies School of Social Sciences Brunel University Uxbridge, Middlesex UK UB8 3PH Biography Dr. Philip H.J. Davies is Director of the Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies at Brunel University, and Convenor of the Security and Intelligence Studies Group of the UK Political Studies Association. He is the author of MI6 and the Machinery of Spying (2004) and co-author of Spinning the Spies: Intelligence, Open Government and the Hutton Inquiry (2004) and The Open Side of Secrecy: Britain’s Intelligence and Security Committee (2006). He is currently completing a comparative study of national intelligence in Britain and the United States tentatively entitled They Come Not Single Spies: Intelligence and Government in Britain and the United States to be published by Praeger in 2010. Abstract This article argues that the failure to address intelligence agencies as public organizations part and parcel with the overt machinery of government constitutes a significant lacuna both in the specialist study of intelligence and the broader discipline of public administration studies. The role and status of intelligence institutions as aspects of the machinery of central government is examined, along with the prospects of certain key paradigms in the field for understanding those institutions are considered. Finally, the implications for the wider study of decision-making, policy and public management will be examined. Keywords Intelligence, security, core executive, public management, interdepartmentalism, interagency, public choice, neoinstitutionalism 1 The spy is as old as history, but intelligence agencies are new.
    [Show full text]
  • The Royal Air Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942
    Canadian Military History Volume 21 Issue 4 Article 3 2015 “The support afforded by the air force was faultless” The Royal Air Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942 Ross Mahoney Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Ross Mahoney "“The support afforded by the air force was faultless” The Royal Air Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942." Canadian Military History 21, 4 (2015) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. : “The support afforded by the air force was faultless” The Royal Air Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942 “The support afforded by the air force was faultless” The Royal Air Force and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942 Ross Mahoney peration Jubilee, the raid the offensive use of RAF Fighter on Dieppe, 19 August 1942, Abstract: The failure of Operation Command in the period 1940-1942. O Jubilee, the raid on Dieppe, has partially maintains a specific place in Canada’s In understanding the twin pillars of been attributed to the failure of the cultural memory of the Second World RAF to provide the bomber support doctrine and operations, this article War. Charles Stacey, the Canadian needed to support the landings. challenges the revisionist argument army official historian, stated in This fallacious argument, based on that the failure of the RAF to supply 1948 that, “The raid on Dieppe was hindsight and a lack of understanding bombers doomed Jubilee.
    [Show full text]
  • King's Research Portal
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by King's Research Portal King’s Research Portal DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2015.1115237 Document Version Peer reviewed version Link to publication record in King's Research Portal Citation for published version (APA): Dylan, H. (2016). Thinking About Defence Intelligence: Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, Denis Capel-Dunn, Kenneth Strong and the Joint Intelligence Bureau as foundation for the Defence Intelligence Staff. Intelligence and National Security, 31(6). DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2015.1115237 Citing this paper Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination, volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. •Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research. •You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain •You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.
    [Show full text]
  • Battle of Britain
    The Battle Re-Thought A Symposium on the Battle of Britain Sponsored jointly by the Royal Air Force Historical Society and the Royal Air Force Staff College, Bracknell 25 June 1990 Joint Editors Air Commodore Henry Probert Mr Sebastian Cox ii THE BATTLE RE-THOUGHT Copyright ©1991 by the Royal Air Force Historical Society First Published in the UK in 1991 by Airlife Publishing Ltd British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data available ISBN 1 85310 292 X All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without the permission from the Publisher in writing. Printed by Livesey Ltd, Shrewsbury Airlife Publishing Ltd 101 Longden Road, Shrewsbury, SY3 9EB, England THE BATTLE RE-THOUGHT iii Contents Preface 1. Opening Remarks: Air Vice-Marshal A F C Hunter 2. Chairman’s Introduction: Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher Foxley-Norris 3. The Dowding System: Mr Derek Wood 4. The Battle of France: Mr John Terraine 5. The Luftwaffe and the Battle of Britain: Dr Horst Boog 6. The British Commanders: Dr Vincent Orange 7. The Intelligence Aspect: Mr Edward Thomas 8. August and September 1940: Group Captain Tom Gleave 9. Digest of the Group Discussions A. The System B. The Tactics C. Intelligence D. The Commanders E. The Strategy F. Writing the History 10. Lessons for Today: Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Knight 11. Chairman’s Closing Remarks Biographical Notes on the Main Speakers The Royal Air Force Historical Society iv THE BATTLE RE-THOUGHT Preface To mark the 50th Anniversary of the Battle of Britain, the RAF Historical Society and the RAF Staff College convened a joint seminar at Bracknell on 25 June 1990.
    [Show full text]
  • The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1940-1943
    The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1940-1943 A History of Army Co-operation Command Matthew Powell The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1940–1943 Matthew Powell The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1940–1943 A History of Army Co-operation Command Matthew Powell Cwmbran , United Kingdom ISBN 978-1-137-54416-2 ISBN 978-1-137-54417-9 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-54417-9 Library of Congress Control Number: 2016947263 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identifi ed as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifi cally the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfi lms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specifi c statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication.
    [Show full text]
  • Royal Engineers Journal
    THE ROYAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL Vol LXXV DECEMBER 1961 No 4 CONTENTS Corps Notes . 51 Rock Tunnelling . Major G. Home 353 The Lines of Torres Vedras General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall 383 Electrical and Mechanical Engineering in the Royal Engineers . Major J. McDowell 393 Camp Century, Greenland . Warrant Officer Class I, P. W. James 402 Jubilee of the Royal Engineers' Association . 409 The Carriage of Heavy Lifts by Sea . .Lieut.-Colonel R. C. Gabriel 415 The Use of Gellants in Anti-Corrosive Paints . Major D. M. Esson 429 Kitchener's Orders for the 1911 Coronation . Lieutenant J. R. Sargant 432 Balance of Payment . Colonel H. Nelson 433 One-inch Maps of Great Britain .Colonel J. R. Rawlence 436 Boundary Journal . 437 Correspondence, Memoirs, Book Reviews, Technical Notes . 446 PUBLI ERS At INSTITUTION OF RE OFFICE COPY AGE DO NOT REMOVE C Specialised Postal Coaching for the Army PRACTICAL AND WRITTEN Staff College and Promotion Examinations Specially deised Postal Courses to provide adequate practice for written and oral examalo-An maps supplied-Complet Model Ansers to all Tets--Exert gudance by experienced Anny Tutors-Aduthoritie Study Notes-Al Titdon conducted through the med of the post-Air Mal to Ocers overseas-Modete fees pyable by nstlents. * * * ALSO INTENSVE COMMERCIAL TRAINING FOR EMPLOYMENT ON RETIREMENT Write today for particulars and/or advice, stating examination or civilian career in which interested, to the Secretary, (M12), MetropolitanCollege, St. Albans ADVERTISEMENTS i NEW FACTORY BUILDINGS at ROCHESTER for ELLIOTT-AUTOMATION LIMITED Z ''*1. 11;6 ~~i1 1 Architects: Quantity Surveyors: Yorke, Rosenberg & \lardall Cyril Sweett & Partners Con.
    [Show full text]