DOCSLIB.ORG

Stony Brook University

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

SSStttooonnnyyy BBBrrrooooookkk UUUnnniiivvveeerrrsssiiitttyyy The official electronic file of this thesis or dissertation is maintained by the University Libraries on behalf of The Graduate School at Stony Brook University. ©©© AAAllllll RRRiiiggghhhtttsss RRReeessseeerrrvvveeeddd bbbyyy AAAuuuttthhhooorrr... The Army-Navy Contest for Control of Land-Based Antisubmarine Aviation and the Military Unification Debate, 1942-1948 A Dissertation Presented by George Harold Monahan to The Graduate School In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History Stony Brook University May 2011 Stony Brook University The Graduate School George Harold Monahan n We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy degree, hereby recommend acceptance of this dissertation. Michael Barnhart – Dissertation Advisor Distinguished Teaching Professor, History Department Ian Roxborough - Chairperson of Defense Professor, History Department Nancy Tomes Professor, History Department John B. Hattendorf Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History, Chairman, Maritime History Department Naval War College Newport, RI This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate School Lawrence Martin Dean of the Graduate School ii Abstract of the Dissertation The Army-Navy Contest for Control of Land-Based Antisubmarine Aviation and the Military Unification Debate, 1942-1948 by George Harold Monahan Doctor of Philosophy in History Stony Brook University 2011 This work explores the history of the dispute between the U.S. Army and Navy during World War II over which service would control land-based antisubmarine aviation in the Battle of the Atlantic. Additionally, this work seeks to explore the relationship of this wartime dispute to the post-war military unification movement which culminated in the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. Many lessons learned through the management of the extemporized wartime defense bureaucracy convinced political and military leaders of the need to develop an integrated post-war military-intelligence- diplomatic apparatus for the purpose of defending against foreign threats to national security. In most studies of the issues underlying the 1947 National Security Act, the focus tends to be on those which gave rise to lingering questions touching upon politics and military policy into the Cold War era. These include: the scope and limitations of authority of the Central Intelligence Agency; the control and use of nuclear weapons; the iii roles and missions of the Army, Navy and independent Air Force; the institutionalization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the extent of power exercised by the newly created Secretary of Defense over the unified armed forces. This study in no way seeks to detract from these issues as the overriding concerns which shaped the debate leading to the National Security Act’s passage. While acknowledging the primacy of these issues, however, it is the contention of this present study that the question concerning which military service should rightly control land- based antisubmarine aviation during World War II has largely been overlooked as a significant issue in shaping the military unification debate. This work intends to take what most other studies relegate to a footnote and explore, in significantly greater depth, how this inter-service rivalry affected the wartime management of the Battle of the Atlantic and how, in turn, the wartime interservice rivalry helped shape the post-war military unification debate culminating in the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. iv Table of Contents Introduction………………………………………………………………………...……...1 I. Overview of this Study…………………………………………………...……..2 II. Historiography of the Battle of the Atlantic, Civil-Military Relations, Military Unification and Aircraft Appropriations………………………………………………..…….17 III. Archival Research ……………………………………………………...…….24 Chapter 1 Army and Navy Aviation between the Wars: Inter-service Rivalry over Jurisdiction in Coastal Defense…………………………..….26 I. The Divergent Development of Army and Navy Aviation ………………...….26 II. Aviation and the Interservice Dispute Concerning Roles and Missions in Coastal Defense…………………………………………………..…29 III. Aircraft Development and the Interservice Jurisdictional Dispute…………..42 IV. Deficiencies in Coastal Defense at the Outset of War…………………….....45 Chapter 2 Conflict between the Army Air Forces and the Navy in the Management of the Air War Against the U-boats…………………………………….....48 I. Jurisdictional Disputes and the Concept of an American Coastal Command…………………………………………………….50 II. Divergent Army and Navy Doctrines in the Antisubmarine War…………….66 Figure 1 The Mid-Atlantic Air Gap ……………..………………………81 Figure 2 British Biscay Air Patrols ……………………………………...85 III. The Army Air Forces Anti Submarine Command and the American Bay of Biscay Antisubmarine Offensive………………………….…..92 IV. Conclusion..………………………………………………………………...112 v Chapter 3 The Navy’s Pyrrhic Victory in the Antisubmarine War………………………………..114 I. Unity of Command and the Tenth Fleet: The War Department Outmaneuvered……………………………………...…..116 II. Checkmate and Dénouement: The Arnold-McNarney-McCain Agreement……………………………..….....126 III. Conclusion……………………………………………………………..…...139 Chapter 4 Henry L. Stimson and the Argument for Unifying the Armed Forces……………..…..142 I. The Creation of Separate General Staffs in the Army and the Navy…….......145 II. On Active Service as an Argument for the Next Wave of Military Reform: The Liability of Divided Leadership Made Manifest in the Antisubmarine War……………………………………….…...154 Chapter 5 The Question of Land-Based Naval Aviation in the Armed Forces Unification Debate…………………………………………………………………......160 I. The House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy…………….…..165 II. The Richardson Committee Report and the Eberstadt Report………….......181 III. 1945 Senate Military Affairs Committee Hearings………………………..184 IV. Army-Navy Partisanship and Presidential Intervention…………………...198 V. Henry Stimson and the Post-War Unification Debate…………………..….202 VI. 1946 Senate Naval Affairs Committee Hearings………………………..…204 VII. President Truman Intercedes…………………………………………..….213 VIII. Senate Naval Affairs Committee Hearings Resume………………….…..219 XI. Conclusion..………………………………………………………………...226 Chapter 6 The Unification Issue Settled: The National Security Act of 1947………………….....229 I. Interservice Agreement on Roles and Missions of the Armed Services……..229 vi II. Army Air Forces Opposition to Navy Land-Based ASW Aircraft Development…………………………………………………………240 III. The Senate Armed Services Committee Hearings………………………...243 IV. Senate Floor Debate on S. 758……………………………………………262 V. House Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments Hearings…………………………………………………………265 VI. Final Passage of the National Security Act of 1947………………………285 VII. Conclusion………………………………………………………………..287 Chapter 7 The Redaction of Chapter 20 of On Active Service In Peace and War …..……………288 I. The Redaction of Chapter 20………………………………………………..290 II. Fact-Checking and Final Editing…………………………………………...295 III. Publication of “Time Of Peril” and On Active Service In Peace and War : A Mixed Reception….…………………………….………306 IV. Conclusion..………………………………………………………………..309 Summary……………………………………………………………………………….312 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………...321 vii Introduction This work explores the history of the dispute between the U.S. Army and Navy during World War II over which service would control land-based antisubmarine aviation in the Battle of the Atlantic. Additionally, this work seeks to explore the relationship of this wartime dispute to the post-war military unification movement which culminated in the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. Many lessons learned through the management of the extemporized wartime defense bureaucracy convinced political and military leaders of the need to develop an integrated post-war military-intelligence- diplomatic apparatus for the purpose of defending against foreign threats to national security. In most studies of the issues underlying the 1947 National Security Act, the focus tends to be on those which gave rise to lingering questions touching upon politics and military policy into the Cold War era. These include: the scope and limitations of authority of the Central Intelligence Agency; the control and use of nuclear weapons; the roles and missions of the Army, Navy and independent Air Force; the institutionalization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the extent of power exercised by the newly created Secretary of Defense over the unified armed forces. This study in no way seeks to detract from these issues as the overriding concerns which shaped the debate leading to the National Security Act’s passage. While acknowledging the primacy of these issues, however, it is the contention of this present study that the question concerning which military service should rightly control land- based antisubmarine aviation during World War II has largely been overlooked as a 1 significant issue in shaping the military unification debate. This work intends to take what most other studies relegate to a footnote and explore, in significantly greater depth, how this inter-service rivalry affected the wartime management of the Battle of the Atlantic and how, in turn, the wartime interservice rivalry helped shape the post-war military unification debate culminating in the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. I. Overview of this Study Between the world wars, leaders
Recommended publications
  • Summary Justice: the Price of Treason for Eight World War Ii German Prisoners of War

    Summary Justice: the Price of Treason for Eight World War Ii German Prisoners of War

    SUMMARY JUSTICE: THE PRICE OF TREASON FOR EIGHT WORLD WAR II GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR A Thesis by Mark P. Schock Bachelor of Arts, Kansas Newman College, 1978 Submitted to the Department of History and the faculty of the Graduate School of Wichita State University in partial fulfillment of Master of Arts May 2011 © Copyright 2011 by Mark P. Schock All Rights Reserved SUMMARY JUSTICE: THE PRICE OF TREASON FOR EIGHT WORLD WAR II GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR The following faculty members have examined the final copy of this thesis for form and content, and recommended that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts with a major in History. ___________________________________ Robert Owens, Committee Chair ___________________________________ Robin Henry, Committee Member ___________________________________ William Woods, Committee Member iii DEDICATION To the memory of my father, Richard Schock, and my uncle Pat Bessette, both of whom encouraged in me a deep love of history and country iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to thank my adviser, Dr. Robert Owens, for his incredible patience with an old dog who had such trouble with new tricks. Special thanks go to Dr. Anthony and Dana Gythiel whose generous grant allowed me to travel to the National Archives and thus gain access to many of the original documents pertinent to this story. I’d also like to thank Colonel Jack Bender, U.S.A.F (ret.), for his insight into the workings of military justice. Special thanks are likewise due to Lowell May, author of two books about German POWs incarcerated in Kansas during World War II.
  • The Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force in Anti-Submarine Warfare Policy, 1918-1945

    The Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force in Anti-Submarine Warfare Policy, 1918-1945

    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of Birmingham Research Archive, E-theses Repository THE ROYAL NAVY AND THE ROYAL AIR FORCE IN ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE POLICY, 1918-1945. By JAMES NEATE A thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for the degree of MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY School of History and Cultures College of Arts and Law The University of Birmingham September 2012 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT This thesis examines the roles played by the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force in the formulation of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) policy from 1918 to 1945. Its focus is on policy relating to the use of air power, specifically fixed-wing shore-based aircraft, against submarines. After a period of neglect between the Wars, airborne ASW would be pragmatically prioritised during the Second World War, only to return to a lower priority as the debates which had stymied its earlier development continued. Although the intense rivalry between the RAF and RN was the principal influence on ASW policy, other factors besides Service culture also had significant impacts.
  • Army Co-Operation Command and Tactical Air Power Development in Britain, 1940-1943: the Role of Army Co-Operation Command in Army Air Support

    Army Co-Operation Command and Tactical Air Power Development in Britain, 1940-1943: the Role of Army Co-Operation Command in Army Air Support

    ARMY CO-OPERATION COMMAND AND TACTICAL AIR POWER DEVELOPMENT IN BRITAIN, 1940-1943: THE ROLE OF ARMY CO-OPERATION COMMAND IN ARMY AIR SUPPORT By MATTHEW LEE POWELL A thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY School of History and Cultures College of Arts and Law The University of Birmingham September 2013 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT This thesis examines the impact of the developments made during the First World War and the inter-war period in tactical air support. Further to this, it will analyse how these developments led to the creation of Army Co-operation Command and affected the role it played developing army air support in Britain. Army Co-operation Command has been neglected in the literature on the Royal Air Force during the Second World War and this thesis addresses this neglect by adding to the extant knowledge on the development of tactical air support and fills a larger gap that exists in the literature on Royal Air Force Commands. Army Co-operation Command was created at the behest of the army in the wake of the Battle of France.
  • British Domestic Security Policy and Communist Subversion: 1945-1964

    British Domestic Security Policy and Communist Subversion: 1945-1964

    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Apollo British Domestic Security Policy and Communist Subversion: 1945-1964 William Styles Corpus Christi College, University of Cambridge September 2016 This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy William Styles British Domestic Security Policy and Communist Subversion: 1945-1964 This thesis is concerned with an analysis of British governmental attitudes and responses to communism in the United Kingdom during the early years of the Cold War, from the election of the Attlee government in July 1945 up until the election of the Wilson government in October 1964. Until recently the topic has been difficult to assess accurately, due to the scarcity of available original source material. However, as a result of multiple declassifications of both Cabinet Office and Security Service files over the past five years it is now possible to analyse the subject in greater depth and detail than had been previously feasible. The work is predominantly concerned with four key areas: firstly, why domestic communism continued to be viewed as a significant threat by successive governments – even despite both the ideology’s relatively limited popular support amongst the general public and Whitehall’s realisation that the Communist Party of Great Britain presented little by way of a direct challenge to British political stability. Secondly, how Whitehall’s understanding of the nature and severity of the threat posed by British communism developed between the late 1940s and early ‘60s, from a problem considered mainly of importance only to civil service security practices to one which directly impacted upon the conduct of educational policy and labour relations.
  • Additional Historic Information the Doolittle Raid (Hornet CV-8) Compiled and Written by Museum Historian Bob Fish

    Additional Historic Information the Doolittle Raid (Hornet CV-8) Compiled and Written by Museum Historian Bob Fish

    USS Hornet Sea, Air & Space Museum Additional Historic Information The Doolittle Raid (Hornet CV-8) Compiled and Written by Museum Historian Bob Fish AMERICA STRIKES BACK The Doolittle Raid of April 18, 1942 was the first U.S. air raid to strike the Japanese home islands during WWII. The mission is notable in that it was the only operation in which U.S. Army Air Forces bombers were launched from an aircraft carrier into combat. The raid demonstrated how vulnerable the Japanese home islands were to air attack just four months after their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. While the damage inflicted was slight, the raid significantly boosted American morale while setting in motion a chain of Japanese military events that were disastrous for their long-term war effort. Planning & Preparation Immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, President Roosevelt tasked senior U.S. military commanders with finding a suitable response to assuage the public outrage. Unfortunately, it turned out to be a difficult assignment. The Army Air Forces had no bases in Asia close enough to allow their bombers to attack Japan. At the same time, the Navy had no airplanes with the range and munitions capacity to do meaningful damage without risking the few ships left in the Pacific Fleet. In early January of 1942, Captain Francis Low1, a submariner on CNO Admiral Ernest King’s staff, visited Norfolk, VA to review the Navy’s newest aircraft carrier, USS Hornet CV-8. During this visit, he realized that Army medium-range bombers might be successfully launched from an aircraft carrier.
  • America's Undeclared Naval War

    America's Undeclared Naval War

    America's Undeclared Naval War Between September 1939 and December 1941, the United States moved from neutral to active belligerent in an undeclared naval war against Nazi Germany. During those early years the British could well have lost the Battle of the Atlantic. The undeclared war was the difference that kept Britain in the war and gave the United States time to prepare for total war. With America’s isolationism, disillusionment from its World War I experience, pacifism, and tradition of avoiding European problems, President Franklin D. Roosevelt moved cautiously to aid Britain. Historian C.L. Sulzberger wrote that the undeclared war “came about in degrees.” For Roosevelt, it was more than a policy. It was a conviction to halt an evil and a threat to civilization. As commander in chief of the U.S. armed forces, Roosevelt ordered the U.S. Navy from neutrality to undeclared war. It was a slow process as Roosevelt walked a tightrope between public opinion, the Constitution, and a declaration of war. By the fall of 1941, the U.S. Navy and the British Royal Navy were operating together as wartime naval partners. So close were their operations that as early as autumn 1939, the British 1 | P a g e Ambassador to the United States, Lord Lothian, termed it a “present unwritten and unnamed naval alliance.” The United States Navy called it an “informal arrangement.” Regardless of what America’s actions were called, the fact is the power of the United States influenced the course of the Atlantic war in 1941. The undeclared war was most intense between September and December 1941, but its origins reached back more than two years and sprang from the mind of one man and one man only—Franklin Roosevelt.
  • OH-486) 345 Pages OPEN

    OH-486) 345 Pages OPEN

    Processed by: TB HANDY Date: 4/30/93 HANDY, THOMAS T. (OH-486) 345 pages OPEN Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division (OPD), U.S. War Department, 1942-44; Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1944-47. DESCRIPTION: Interview #1 (November 6, 1972; pp 1-47) Early military career: Virginia Military Institute; joins field artillery; service in France during World War I; desire of officers to serve overseas during World Wars I and II; reduction to permanent rank after World War I; field artillery school, 1920; ROTC duty at VMI, 1921-25; advanced field artillery course at Fort Sill; Lesley J. McNair; artillery improvements prior to World War II; McNair and the triangular division; importance of army schools in preparation for war; lack of support for army during interwar period; Fox Conner. Command and General Staff School at Leavenworth, 1926-27: intellectual ability of senior officers; problem solving; value of training for development of self-confidence; lack of training on handling personnel problems. Naval War College, 1936: study of naval tactics and strategy by army officers. Comparison of Leavenworth, Army War College and Fort Sill: theory vs. practical training. Joseph Swing: report to George Marshall and Henry Arnold on foul-up in airborne operation in Sicily; impact on Leigh- Mallory’s fear of disaster in airborne phase of Normandy invasion. Interview #2 (May 22, 1973; pp 48-211) War Plans Division, 1936-40: joint Army-Navy planning committee. 2nd Armored Division, 1940-41: George Patton; role of field artillery in an armored division. Return to War Plans Division, 1941; Leonard Gerow; blame for Pearl Harbor surprise; need for directing resources toward one objective; complaint about diverting Normandy invasion resources for attack on North Africa; Operation Torch and Guadalcanal as turning points in war; risks involved in Operation Torch; fear that Germany would conquer Russia; early decision to concentrate attack against Germany rather than Japan; potential landing sites in western Europe.
  • 'The Admiralty War Staff and Its Influence on the Conduct of The

    'The Admiralty War Staff and Its Influence on the Conduct of The

    ‘The Admiralty War Staff and its influence on the conduct of the naval between 1914 and 1918.’ Nicholas Duncan Black University College University of London. Ph.D. Thesis. 2005. UMI Number: U592637 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U592637 Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 CONTENTS Page Abstract 4 Acknowledgements 5 Abbreviations 6 Introduction 9 Chapter 1. 23 The Admiralty War Staff, 1912-1918. An analysis of the personnel. Chapter 2. 55 The establishment of the War Staff, and its work before the outbreak of war in August 1914. Chapter 3. 78 The Churchill-Battenberg Regime, August-October 1914. Chapter 4. 103 The Churchill-Fisher Regime, October 1914 - May 1915. Chapter 5. 130 The Balfour-Jackson Regime, May 1915 - November 1916. Figure 5.1: Range of battle outcomes based on differing uses of the 5BS and 3BCS 156 Chapter 6: 167 The Jellicoe Era, November 1916 - December 1917. Chapter 7. 206 The Geddes-Wemyss Regime, December 1917 - November 1918 Conclusion 226 Appendices 236 Appendix A.
  • The United States Navy Looks at Its African American Crewmen, 1755-1955

    The United States Navy Looks at Its African American Crewmen, 1755-1955

    “MANY OF THEM ARE AMONG MY BEST MEN”: THE UNITED STATES NAVY LOOKS AT ITS AFRICAN AMERICAN CREWMEN, 1755-1955 by MICHAEL SHAWN DAVIS B.A., Brooklyn College, City University of New York, 1991 M.A., Kansas State University, 1995 AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2011 Abstract Historians of the integration of the American military and African American military participation have argued that the post-World War II period was the critical period for the integration of the U.S. Navy. This dissertation argues that World War II was “the” critical period for the integration of the Navy because, in addition to forcing the Navy to change its racial policy, the war altered the Navy’s attitudes towards its African American personnel. African Americans have a long history in the U.S. Navy. In the period between the French and Indian War and the Civil War, African Americans served in the Navy because whites would not. This is especially true of the peacetime service, where conditions, pay, and discipline dissuaded most whites from enlisting. During the Civil War, a substantial number of escaped slaves and other African Americans served. Reliance on racially integrated crews survived beyond the Civil War and the abolition of slavery, only to succumb to the principle of “separate but equal,” validated by the Supreme Court in the Plessy case (1896). As racial segregation took hold and the era of “Jim Crow” began, the Navy separated the races, a task completed by the time America entered World War I.
  • SENATE JANUARY 25 Manufactured from Agricultural Or Forest by Mr

    SENATE JANUARY 25 Manufactured from Agricultural Or Forest by Mr

    328 CONGRESSIONAL -RECORD-SENATE JANUARY 25 manufactured from agricultural or forest By Mr. WALTER: ing of the evening let Thy peace be upon products; to the Committee on Agriculture. H R.1467. A bill to record the lawful ad­ our hearts. Amen. By Mr. CASE: mission to the United States for permanent H. R. 1453. A bill to provide that veterans residence of Rev. Julius Paal; to the Com- . THE JOURNAL of the present war suffering with tuberculous mittee on Immigration and Naturalization. On request of Mr. THOMAS of Utah, and or neuropsychiatric ailments shall receive the H. R. 1468. A bill for the relief of Mr. and same domiciliary or hospital care as veterans Mrs. Samuel Azer; to the Committee on by unanimous consent, the reading of the of the World War; to the Committee on Claims. Journal of the proceedings of Thursday, World War Veterans' Legislation. By Mr. MURRAY of Wisconsin: January 21, 1943, was dispensed with, and By Mr. DOUGHTON: H. R. 1469. A bill for the relief of Robert the Journal was approved. H. R.1454 (by request). A bill to amend the Beckwith, Julius Buettner, and Emma M. CALL OF THE ROLL Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, as amended, Buettner; to the Committee on Claims. a11d for other purposes; to the Committee on Mr. THOMAS of Utah. I suggest the Ways and Means. absence of a quorum. By Mr. FULMER: PETITIONS, ETC. The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk H. R. 1455. A bill to amend the Agricul­ 1 XXII, tural Adjustment Act of 1938 so as to provide Under clause of rule petitions will call the roll.
  • 4 Convoy Presentation Final V1.1

    4 Convoy Presentation Final V1.1

    ALLIED CONVOY OPERATIONS IN THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC 1939-43 INTRODUCTION • History of Allied convoy operations IS the history of the Battle of the Atlantic • Scope of this effort: convoy operations along major transatlantic convoy routes • Detailed overview • Focus on role of Allied intelligence in the Battle of the Atlantic OUTLINE • Convoy Operations in the First Battle of the Atlantic, 1914-18 • Anglo-Canadian Convoy Operations, September 1939 – September 1941 • Enter The Americans: Allied Convoy Operations, September 1941 – Fall 1942 • The Allied Convoy System Fully Realized: Allied Convoy Operations, Fall 1942 – Summer 1943 THE FIRST BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC, 1914-18 • 1914-17: No convoy operations § All vessels sailed independently • Kaiserliche Marine use of U-boats primarily focused on starving Britain into submission § Prize rules • February 1915: “Unrestricted submarine warfare” § May 7, 1915 – RMS Lusitania u U-20 u 1,198 dead – 128 Americans • February 1917: unrestricted submarine warfare resumed § Directly led to US entry into WWI THE FIRST BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC, 1914-18 • Unrestricted submarine warfare initially very effective § 25% of all shipping bound for Britain in March 1917 lost to U-boat attack • Transatlantic convoys instituted in May 1917 § Dramatically cut Allied losses • Post-war, Dönitz conceptualizes Rudeltaktik as countermeasure to convoys ANGLO-CANADIAN CONVOY OPERATIONS, SEPTEMBER 1939 – SEPTEMBER 1941 GERMAN U-BOAT FORCE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR • On the outbreak of WWII, Hitler directed U-boat force
  • September, 1921] the AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL 461. Hampton

    September, 1921] the AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL 461. Hampton

    September, 1921] THE AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL 461. hampton he came to take charge of the Operations Section of the Air Department, Admiralty, but only remained there for a few months as his health would not stand unaccustomed office work. In the autumn of 1916 he was appointed com­ manding officer to commission Pulham, the first rigid airship station to be com­ pleted in this country. He was recalled from there to the Admiralty again in June, 1917, to take up the responsible duties of Captain Superintendent, Lighter than Air, in the Air Department. In November, 1917, he assumed the title of Superintendent of Airships when the Airship Section of the Air Department became the Airship Department, Admiralty, on the transfer of aeroplanes and seaplanes to the Air Board. This position he held until the signing of the Armistice, and for some time thereafter, and it was almost entirely due to the effect of his personality that the Board of Admiralty embarked upon a greatly increased pro­ gramme of airship construction, which included twelve rigid airships and a large number of the non-rigid type. When airships were transferred to the Air Ministry at the end of 1919 he went to Kingsway in a somewhat indefinite appointment to assist in fitting the various portions of the Airship Department into the appropriate departments of the Air Ministry organisation. At the time of his death he was Commanding Officer of Howden Airship Base. Though it is not possible to detail his many parachute descents here, it must not be forgotten that during all the period from 1916 onwards he took any and every opportunity of jumping off in a parachute from every type of aircraft— balloon, kite-balloon, airship and aeroplane—-for no other reason than to give others a lead and prove to the authorities and the public that the parachute offers a means of saving life in case of accident.