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The Use of Analogies in the Nigeria-Biafra War By

A War by Any Other Name: The Use of Analogies in the - War

by Claudia Dessanti

TRN411Y

Dr. Mairi MacDonald

5 April 2016 Dessanti 2

Between July 1967 and , the Federation of Nigeria was embroiled in a bloody . After gaining its independence from Britain in October 1960, the large West

African country struggled to maintain unity among its principal ethnic groups and regions: the

Ibo in the southeast, the Hausa in the north, and the Yoruba in the southwest. In May 1967, after two military coups and a period of systematic mass violence directed at the Ibo population,

Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu invoked the Ibos’ right to self-determination and declared the independence of the Republic of Biafra.1

For the Biafran leadership, it was imperative that they get international support for their . The Federal Military Government (FMG), led by General , had the support of key states including Britain, the , and .2 Thus the Biafrans, militarily outbalanced, consistently made appeals to international audiences, leveraging familiar themes such as , self-determination, and modernity.3 The Nigerians, in turn, persuaded the international community to back its policy of ‘one Nigeria.’

For both the Biafrans and the Nigerians, one approach to generating international support was through analogies. An analogy is a comparison between a familiar situation (base) and an unfamiliar one (target) for the purpose of explanation or persuasion.4 Given that most of the international community knew little about the situation in Nigeria, both sides needed to frame their circumstances in a way that could be understood by foreign audiences. Drawing parallels with other wars, , and was a useful way for each side, and their supporters abroad, to explain the conflict to international audiences while directing sympathies in a particular direction.

The existing literature on the use of analogies in foreign policy focuses on reasoning by analogy. It describes how policymakers, when faced with a foreign policy dilemma, will often Dessanti 3 make decisions based on historical or contemporary cases that they perceive to be similar. These actors rely on schema, or scripts, that act as shortcuts to rationality and allow individuals to make assumptions about what they do not know. For example, American policymakers used the memory of appeasing Adolf Hitler to reason that would only become more aggressive if his demands were met, and they consequently adopted a policy of containing the

Soviet Union in the late 1940s. According to this body of literature, the use of reasoning by analogy generally leads to poor foreign policy decisions.5

Indeed, analogies did at times shape how foreign observers perceived the situation in

Nigeria. As we will see, fear of another or another Holocaust influenced their perception of what the right response was to Biafran secession. However, in the case of the

Nigeria-Biafra War, a focus on reasoning by analogy paints an incomplete picture of the role that analogies played. Often, preferences were shaped by other considerations and analogies were only used post hoc to justify those views. As the examples below will demonstrate, the Biafrans, the Nigerians, and interested actors abroad selected analogies carefully, in a way that was intentional rather than subconscious, in an attempt to affect and justify foreign policy responses to the war. In some cases, analogies also influenced the preferences of foreign actors (reasoning by analogy), while other times they were purely argumentative tools (arguing by analogy).

One of the major themes that lent itself to analogical arguments for the Biafrans was self- determination. By the mid-, the right to self-determination had become an international norm, codified and implemented on numerous occasions.6 Ojukwu, who had a history degree from Oxford University, drew on various precedents that Western audiences were familiar with to make his case.7 In his famous Declaration, he states, “The right to self-determination Dessanti 4 was good for the Greeks in 1822, for the Belgians in 1830, and for the Central and Eastern

Europeans and the Irish at the end of the First World War. Yet it is not good for Biafrans because we are black.” 8 made a similar statement in a broadcast titled Calling Biafrans

Behind Enemy Lines.9 The message to foreign observers was clear: support Biafra’s right to self- determination because doing otherwise would be racist.

The French government used the same logic in justifying its support for Biafran secession. Michel Debré, Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared in a speech to the UN General

Assembly in October 1968 that the Ibo had the same right to self-determination that had been granted in every continent, and that it was unjust to apply different principles to Africans as were applied elsewhere.10 He repeated this in a statement to the National Assembly in November

1968, and to the press in February 1959.11 Throughout the war, the French government supported the Biafrans via indirect arms sales and oratorical sympathy.12 and , two former French colonies, were among only four African states to recognize Biafra’s independence.13

For the French, evoking precedents of self-determination was a useful way to justify intervention in the war whilst concealing less principled motivations. President Charles De

Gaulle’s preference for a divided Nigeria stemmed primarily from his desire to reduce British influence in Western Africa.14 In his speech to the National Assembly, Debré acknowledged that the French had material interests in Nigeria, but insisted that their policy in post-colonial Africa should be guided primarily by fundamental principles.15 While it is certainly possible that the

French government was committed to self-determination in principle, its analogies underplayed Dessanti 5 the importance of material interests. As several historians have pointed out, concern for the rights of the Biafrans was only one of many motivations behind the official French attitude to the war.16

With regards to the theme of self-determination, the Biafrans relied primarily on two specific precedents: the Irish and American independence wars. On several occasions, Ojukwu and Irish commentators explicitly likened Biafra’s secession to the Irish fight for independence from Britain, and Biafran army officers often sang Irish revolutionary songs.17 Similarly, the

Biafrans compared their secession to the 1776 American declaration of independence, and the pro-Biafran lobby repeated the analogy in the .18

By evoking the Irish and American experiences of independence, the Biafrans sought to tap into the collective memories of these peoples. The intention was to remind the Irish and the

American publics of the lesson of their own experiences, namely that independence is about the liberation of a people unrepresented by the existing political configuration. In doing so, the

Biafrans hoped to move their audiences from passive sympathy to a more active, empathetic support for Biafran independence. London’s policy of supporting the FMG certainly strengthened the analogy, as it was reminiscent of violent British resistance to both the Irish and the American episodes.19

While the Biafrans evoked the American Independence War, the Nigerians conveyed the opposite message with analogies about the American Civil War.20 For example, in a speech delivered in Boston in March 1969, a representative of the FMG asked, “If it was right for

Abraham Lincoln to crush secession and lay the foundations for the United States as it has come to be today, is it so wrong for us in our own time equally to resist secession?”21 The intended lesson of this base, again rooted in collective memory, was that Lincoln was the hero of the Dessanti 6 situation, that the confederates were rebels, and that unity was a good outcome. The American embassy in also used this analogy. When preparing for the arrival of a new ambassador, the embassy produced a statement that they suggested be released upon his arrival. The statement read: “My government and Americans understand this tragic dilemma. America’s survival as a nation was once so threatened and we fought a four-year war to insure ‘one nation ... indivisible.’”22

Roger Morris of the National Security Council called it a “rather strained analogy.”23 In fact, several sources within the United States rejected the analogy between the Nigeria-Biafra

War and the American Civil War. Senator Eugene McCarthy, a member of the pro-Biafran lobby, was one of several American citizens to point out that the similarities were superficial.24

Americans in 1861 did not fear for their security the way the Ibo did, and the United States was not divided along ethnic lines the way Nigeria was.25 The American public, deeply familiar with their own history, easily rejected the Nigerians’ attempt to use the American Civil War as a basis for empathy.

A more recent and nearby example of an attempted secession took place in the Congo in

July 1960, when Moise Tshombe declared the independence of Katanga. Nigerian troops had played a major role in the UN mission that was sent to assist in preserving the territorial integrity of the Congo, a contribution that Gowon was very proud of.26 At the time, most Africans equated

Katanga’s secession as treason against African unity.27 Thus, as Gowon’s country faced its own crisis, the Nigerian leader was quick to seize the historical parallel. Addressing several African diplomats in Lagos on 24 April, Gowon used events in the Congo as a precedent to argue that

Africans should work together in Nigeria to preserve federal unity as they had in the Congo.28 Dessanti 7

Throughout the war, representatives of the FMG repeated the connection at international meetings of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the UN General Assembly.29

Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and Congolese President Joseph Mobutu explicitly rejected the analogy with Katanga. In June 1967, these two African leaders released a statement in which they declared that “Biafra is no Katanga.”30 Then, at an OAU Summit Meeting in

September 1969, the Tanzanian government circulated a memorandum outlining the differences between Katanga and Biafra at length. Katanga’s secession was instigated by foreign economic interests, while in Biafra’s case the opposite was true, and Tshombe, unlike Ojukwu, had been a puppet of those agents. Instead, the memorandum suggested that a more relevant analogy was the dispute over Gibraltar, and lamented Britain’s refusal to apply the same principle of self- determination to Biafra.31 Nyerere would later spearhead the campaign for recognition of Biafra by African states, as the governments of Zambia, Ivory Coast, and Gabon joined him in rejecting the analogy and expressing their support for Biafra.32 Although he had staunchly opposed

Katangan independence, Nyerere believed that each secession had to be judged on its merits and not based on abstract principles.33

By contrast, most African leaders supported Gowon because, reasoning by analogy, they imagined the impact that a precedent of secession would have on their own struggles to maintain the unity of their post-colonial states. Biafran independence was inherently antithetical to the

OAU’s policy of fixed borders, a policy that no amount of pro-Biafra could alter. Sir

Frederic Bennett, a British parliamentary minister, commented that was one of the few

African states with few tribal divisions, allowing Nyerere to take a position that other African leaders could not afford.34 In a radio broadcast during the spring of 1968, the FMG tried to Dessanti 8 change Nyerere’s position by asking rhetorically if he would be willing to recognize the independence of Zanzibar.35 Thus, African leaders who supported Nigerian unity were influenced by analogies they made with their own struggles. In Nyerere’s case, where fragmentation was not a pressing domestic crisis, the FMG used a hypothetical analogy to encourage a similar process of analogical reasoning.

The Nigerian leadership also used the analogy with Katanga to discourage governments outside Africa from supporting Biafra in any way. The memory that they hoped to evoke from events in the Congo was that foreign interference in an African secession had been a foreign policy disaster. In July 1967, the FMG publicly defined its situation as an internal one and warned that foreign interference would be tantamount to another Katanga, a claim that Nigeria’s

Minister of Foreign Affairs repeated at the UN General Assembly in October.36 With the military balance in their favour, the Nigerians sought to discourage foreign governments from intervening in any way, especially given that international public opinion was overwhelmingly against them.

For the Americans, the analogy with Katanga did affect the reasoning behind their non- involvement. Internally, the State Department discussed Katanga as a reason for staying out of

Nigeria, and the National Security Council recommended non-intervention “unless we are prepared to risk another Katanga.” 37 In fact, American policymakers were even afraid to ban the travel of its officials to Eastern Nigeria in case this would remind people of their interference in the Congo.38 To them, the ordeal over Katanga was an expensive mess not to be repeated.

Moreover, unlike Katanga’s secession, the situation in Nigeria was not a classic conflict that pitted East versus West, as both Britain and the Soviet Union supported federal unity. So for Washington, the memory of Katanga and a lack of Cold War impetus made official neutrality the preferred policy. Dessanti 9

American policymakers’ preference for non-intervention was also influenced by the ongoing Vietnam War. The American government and some of its citizens saw the Nigeria-Biafra

War, like Vietnam, as another internal crisis with of no strategic importance to their own national interests. As one concerned citizen asked, “Are the Americans warmongers moving from one

Vietnam to another? Think of the lives and money wasted in Vietnam. Those who lost their families in Vietnam know what it is to involve the United States in Nigerian internal matters.” 39

It was not only a matter of willingness but also of capabilities, since by 1969 the American military and economic resources were heavily devoted to the Vietnam War. The State

Department subsequently used Vietnam to justify its policy of neutrality in Nigeria to its own citizens and to the Biafrans.40 Thus, the Vietnam analogy is an example of both reasoning and arguing by analogy.

Meanwhile, domestic pressure within the United States mounted in favour of Biafra and it became increasingly necessary for the government to justify its policy. In effect, ‘neutrality’ was misleading, since the Americans’ refusal to recognize Biafra was automatically a win for the

FMG. During the summer of 1968, in the midst of a lively election season, the pro-Biafra lobby launched an effective publicity campaign. The lobby included journalists, senators from key states, religious leaders, left-wing intellectuals, and Ibo students scattered across university campuses.41 Ironically, Representative Donald Lukens used the Vietnam analogy to urge the government to take a more active stance in Nigeria-Biafra, noting that it made no sense to classify it as an internal conflict while being engaged in Vietnam.42 Throughout his presidential campaign, Nixon avoided the issue as much as possible. After winning the election, he did authorize an increase in humanitarian aid to Biafra, but continued to claim neutrality.43 Nixon, who was elected on the promise of withdrawing from Vietnam, had no appetite for political or Dessanti 10 military embroilment in Nigeria. Furthermore, Washington regarded the OAU’s policy of fixed borders as the best hope for stability in the continent.44

Like its southern neighbour, the Canadian government also used analogies to justify its refusal to recognize Biafra’s independence. Prime Minister mainly drew a parallel between Biafra and Quebec, arguing that intervention in Nigeria would be just as unacceptable as it was for foreign powers to interfere in the question of Quebec’s secession.45 Indeed, it was in

July 1967 that De Gaulle had famously stood on Canadian soil and declared, “Vive le Quebec libre.” 46 Yet the similarities between Quebec and Biafra were superficial, and Canadians were quick to point out the differences. David MacDonald, a Conservative Minister of Parliament, said there was no contradiction in supporting Biafra’s secession while opposing Quebec’s, for the latter did not suffer nearly as much as the former.47 The Globe and Mail published a number of articles reiterating MacDonald’s view.48

Trudeau, however, sincerely feared that Biafra’s secession would set a precedent and encourage separatists in his own country. For him, the analogy with Quebec was more than an argument for non-intervention; it was also a key motivation behind his preferences for unity in

Nigeria. The implications of Biafran secession were so troubling to Trudeau that he wanted to avoid the conversation entirely, and in August 1968 jokingly asked a reporter, “Where’s

Biafra?” 49 Ojukwu encouraged Trudeau to move past his fear and act as a world leader. In an interview with Canadian reporters in September 1968, the Biafran leader advised the Canadian government to seize this opportunity to assert Canada’s foreign policy independence.50

Trudeau ignored Ojukwu’s plea and continued to use a series of additional analogies to justify non-intervention. For example, he said that the Vietnam War and the Spanish Civil War showed how catastrophic it was for foreign governments to intervene in domestic crises. Most Dessanti 11 surprising, however, was his rhetorical question about the Nazis: When the German troops at

Stalingrad were surrounded by Allies with no access to food, should Canada have gone to their assistance because they were starving?51 Certainly, the memory of Stalingrad did not shape

Trudeau’s preference for non-intervention in the Nigeria-Biafra War. Although the analogy with

Quebec was a case of both reasoning and arguing by analogy, it is important to recognize that

Trudeau formed at least some of his analogies deliberately to justify his policy decisions.

Unlike the Americans and the Canadians, the British were actively involved in supporting the FMG. They too used analogies to justify their position. London claimed that it was interfering in the Nigerian conflict just as it had interfered in Tanzania, Zambia, and the Congo when secession threatened them.52 As one official noted, “other Commonwealth countries in

Africa have had, in their times of stress, the wish, desire and necessity to turn to us for help.” 53

The lesson from these events was that Britain had a role to play in preserving unity in its former

African colonies, and the decision to sell arms to the FMG was a logical corollary of British commonwealth responsibility.54

In part, the British preference for Nigerian unity was motivated by a desire to turn its most prosperous former colony into a success story. There were other reasons, however, including the need to protect the investments of Shell-BP and to keep Nigerian oil flowing into

Britain to compensate for shortfalls resulting from the Six Days War in the Middle East.55 In addition, a united Nigeria would put Britain in a better position to retain its influence in the region amid French efforts to undermine it. By comparing the Nigeria-Biafra War to crises elsewhere in Africa, the British government obscured to some extent the particular strategic and economic interests in Nigerian unity and presented territorial integrity as an overarching principle of British post-colonial foreign policy. Dessanti 12

Yet ministers in the British Parliament did not unanimously support their government’s arms sales to Nigeria, and their lively debates on the question were filled with analogies. For instance, Jeremy Thorpe criticized the aforementioned analogy of other British involvement in post-colonial Africa and argued that a better comparison would be with the Sino-Indian War of

1962, in which the British government’s policy of neutrality put it in a stronger position to mediate a solution.56 Frank Allaun and Hugh Fraser said that supplying FMG with arms would turn Biafra into “a situation which will combine many of the features of the Congo in the sixties with those of Vietnam,” and that a ceasefire was preferable.57

Other ministers referred to the Spanish Civil War, arguing that arms sales to one party of a civil war only leads to escalation, to which Prime Minister replied that since the

Nigerian case involved a Commonwealth country it was appropriate for Britain to intervene.58

Philip Noel-Baker made an analogy with the 1932 war between Paraguay and Bolivia to argue that an arms embargo is a necessary first step to ending a civil war.59 In their internal discussions,

British officials were able to use bases that the general population may not have understood. This once again reinforces the idea that commentators were often catering analogies to specific audiences, rather than simply using them involuntarily as part of the reasoning process.

In addition to self-determination and foreign intervention, another theme that the Biafrans and their supporters used analogies to elevate was genocide. They claimed that the Ibo faced the same fate as the Armenian Christians in the Ottoman Empire, the indigenous peoples of South

America, the Sudanese, and the Jews in Germany.60 analogy was particularly common. It came from a variety of sources including the Tanzanian Foreign Minister, the British journalist Norman Cousins, the President of the World Jewish Congress, a Swedish , several priests, editorials in The Washington Post and The Sunday Review, British parliamentary Dessanti 13 ministers, Biafran propaganda pamphlets and press statements, and Ojukwu himself.61 Ironically, officials in Lagos, including former head of state , flipped the analogy on its head and described Ojukwu as a power-hungry “black Hitler.” 62

By the 1960s, the Holocaust had not yet emerged as a symbol of genocidal violence, but it still served as a powerful memory for international audiences.63 The lesson, “never again,” was well-known and well-articulated.64 It suggested to its audiences that the international community had a responsibility to support the Ibo from the FMG in a way that they had failed to do for the

Jews. The comparison was problematic, for there was no evidence of an intent to exterminate the

Ibo in Nigeria.65 Some found the analogy distasteful and one American journalist called it “sheer self-delusion.” 66 Nonetheless, its message was powerful and in January 1970, its repeated use forced Gowon to assure the international press that there would be no Nuremberg trials in

Nigeria.67

Taking the Jewish analogy further, the Biafran leadership and its supporters compared the

Biafrans to the Israelis. They portrayed them as two modern and hard-working minorities, surrounded and persecuted by , that deserved their own state.68 In addition to making the analogy explicitly on several occasions, many Biafrans had Star of David symbols on their trucks and Ojukwu displayed a novel about in his residence when being interviewed by foreign journalists.69 In Britain, one parliamentary minister remarked, “The Ibos are not a usual type of

African. They have in many ways the attributes of the Jews.” 70 The Globe and Mail and the

Tanzanian government made similar statements.71

The Israel-Biafra connection resonated the most in the United States, where sympathy with the Israelis was high. broadcasts about the war repeatedly referred to the Ibo as

“God’s chosen people,” a phrase evocative of the Israelis.72 Moreover, and Dessanti 14

The Washington Post explicitly used the Jews of Israel as a reference point to explain the situation of the Ibo.73 Even Henry Kissinger, in a memorandum to President Nixon, wrote, “The

Ibos are the wandering Jews of - gifted, aggressive, Westernized; at best envied and resented, but mostly despised by the mass of their neighbors in the Federation.” 74 In this statement, Kissinger betrays both a sense of respect for the Ibos’ plight and a wariness of their

“aggressive” tendencies.

For Kissinger and many other Americans, the analogy with Israel was more than just an argument to convince others to support Biafra; it also shaped their own perceptions of the conflict. The American Jewish Congress supported the Biafrans throughout the war, and in

December 1968 it produced a memorandum, titled The Tragedy of Biafra, which called for an increase in humanitarian relief and drew an explicit connection with the Jewish experience.75 In this case an analogy was not being used to conceal other interests; it was a case of both reasoning and arguing by analogy. For the Biafrans themselves, the analogy with Israel was undeniably a useful way to generate international support. This is not to say that their self-identification with the Jews was insincere, only that their repetition of the analogy was strategic.

The Biafran leadership did not only seek sympathy and support from Western audiences.

They also appealed to Soviet audiences in an attempt to reverse the Kremlin’s policy of supporting the FMG militarily, and again used analogies to make their case.76 For instance, a

Biafran radio broadcast in compared the the situation in Nigeria to a symbolic

Soviet experience:

The 30,000 Biafrans massacred last year by the northern Nigerian feudalists may appear as a cold arithmetic figure to someone thousands of miles away from the scene. But the Soviet authorities should remember one [words indistinct] of that historic episode [words indistinct] of Lenin and led him to vow to overthrow the czarist regime. It was a personal touch of czarist brutality; it was the murder of his beloved older brother by the czarist police.77 Dessanti 15

The language was intentional. Words like ‘feudalists’ carried powerful resonance with the Soviet people, serving as a symbol for everything that their country resisted, and by suggesting an analogy between Vladimir Lenin and Ojukwu, the Biafrans transferred the heroic value of the former onto their own leader.

Evidently, foreign governments and commentators, the Nigerians, and the Biafrans each made a number of analogical arguments consistently throughout the war, both to affect and to justify foreign policy responses. Moreover, they selected most analogies intentionally, with a shrewd understanding of the message it would send to particular audiences. Firstly, they chose bases that their intended audiences were familiar with. However, when audiences had first-hand experience with the base, they easily criticized the analogy, as Nyerere criticized the FMG’s references to Katanga. The most effective analogies were those that tapped into the collective memories of the audience, such as the Irish and American wars of independence.78

Secondly, these actors chose analogies that contained clear similarities with events in

Nigeria. Since many foreign observers were unfamiliar with the situation in Nigeria-Biafra, these similarities did not need to be very rich, and most were in fact superficial.79 The Spanish Civil

War and the attempted secession of Quebec bore little resemblance to the Nigerian conflict, but they were relevant in important ways that obscured (intentionally or unwillingly) important differences.

Thirdly, the analogies alluded to powerful lessons and themes that were often gross oversimplifications of reality.80 For Americans, the Vietnam War and Katanga’s secession were simply classified as disasters. Analogies tend to provoke emotions like guilt or fear, which guide audiences to respond in a certain way. These emotions are what make reasoning by analogy so erroneous, but provoking them intentionally is what makes analogies powerful tools of Dessanti 16 persuasion.81 Accordingly, the actors who employed analogies chose ones that prescribed the particular foreign policy response that they supported.82 Obviously, the link between lesson and prescription is the most important criteria for arguing by analogy, whether for justification or advocacy of particular policy responses.

Overall, the Biafrans and their supporters used analogical arguments more consistently than the FMG. To some extent, the Nigerian leadership had less of an incentive to make international appeals because the military balance was so overwhelmingly in their favour. On the other hand, the FMG did take steps to affect public opinion, including its invitation to a team of foreign observers to investigate claims of genocide.83 It also used radio broadcasts, speeches at diplomatic summits, and interviews with the international press as means of counter- propaganda.84 Thus, the FMG’s inability to use analogical arguments as effectively as the

Biafrans was not for lack of trying.

Rather, the imbalance in the use of analogies reveals how important international appeals were to the Biafrans. For them, unlike for the FMG, international support was a prerequisite for success, and they consequently devoted significant resources to this end. The Biafrans employed several public relations firms and foreign photographers to spread its message, and used Radio

Biafra to broadcast messages in English, French, Spanish, Hausa, Yoruba, Tiv, Igala, and Idoma each day. As a result of their efforts, international public opinion and media outlets were overwhelmingly on their side.85

Furthermore, the Biafrans’ plight lent itself better to powerful analogical arguments.

Themes of self-determination, secession, and genocide resonated on an emotional level with foreign audiences. Regardless of their logical validity, these comparisons provoked collective empathy in ways that appeals to territorial integrity never could. Ultimately, however, victory in Dessanti 17 the court of public opinion was not enough to push foreign governments to recognize Biafra’s independence. Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States acted according to perceived national interests and often used analogies of their own as justifications. Even French policy, although supportive of Biafra, was motivated primarily by strategic and economic interests.

Meanwhile, the FMG’s case for fixed borders (with or without explicit analogies to support it) was powerful enough to determine the reactions of other states plagued with their own crises in federal unity, including Canada and most members of the OAU.

Although not always effective, the ways in which various actors made comparisons during the Nigeria-Biafra War demonstrates their perceptiveness about the persuasive power of analogies. As we have seen, reasoning by analogy does not fully explain the use of analogies during this conflict. It does not account for the analogies that clearly had no significant influence on policy preferences, such as Trudeau’s reference to Stalingrad. As a result, it ignores the calculated thought process that went into selecting each base. More importantly, reasoning by analogy gives agency to foreign policymakers alone, and none to the Biafrans and the Nigerians who fed analogies to foreign audiences in a bid for their support.

Indeed, this mirrors the way in which the era of African decolonization is too often discussed, from the perspective of outsiders, a tendency that is revealed by the term

‘decolonization’ itself. The outside world, during and after decades of colonial rule, discussed

Africa and Africans using their own paradigms and defined the continent in relation to the (more civilized) “other.” We see this tendency in Nigeria-Biafra, as foreigners drew parallels with familiar situations in order to formulate responses. In fact, this continued after the war as well; in his 1972 book about the Nigeria-Biafra War, British journalist John de St. Jorre writes: “The

Nigerian Civil War was not just another African skirmish. It bears closer comparison with the Dessanti 18

American and Spanish Civil wars. Like the American conflict, it was a war about nationhood and self-determination: like the Spanish civil war, it concerned outside intervention and the struggle between the great powers.” 86

Négritude was a rejection of the tendency to define Africa in relation to the “other,” an assertion of African identity on its own terms. To borrow from Michael Onyebuchi Eze, intellectuals of Négritude rejected a long-standing ‘history from above‘ and replaced it with

‘history from below.’87 Yet during the Nigeria-Biafra War it was not only foreign commentators who framed the situation in relation to comparable events elsewhere. The Nigerians and the

Biafrans did this themselves, building their rhetoric around precedents and themes that resonated abroad. In part this is because Gowon and Ojukwu, like other post-colonial African elite, had been educated in British schools and imported this language when they returned. But as we saw during the Nigeria-Biafra War, local actors did more than echo Western discourse, they appropriated it to further their own agendas. The language they used was often more than an involuntary product of their upbringing; it was an intentional strategy to appeal to specific audiences. In other words, Biafran and Nigerian leaders were well aware that defining their situations according to “other” could be politically expedient, especially when directed at foreign audiences, for it could evoke sympathy and material support.

This was not only true for the Biafrans and the Nigerians in the 1960s, but it continues to be true today, as African statesmen employ Western rhetoric to encourage foreign aid, foreign direct investment, and development loans from institutions like the World Bank. “[T]he discourse of democracy,” writes Jean-François Bayart, “is no more than yet another source of economic rents.”88 Articulating a truly African identity is thus postponed as African governments Dessanti 19 opt for discourse that resonates with foreigners and is thereby rewarded by them. The rest of the world, for its part, continues to encourage history from above by refusing to understand Africa on its own terms. For the time being, Africa continues to be defined in relation to the “other” both locally and internationally. 1 Stanley Diamond, “Who Killed Biafra?” Dialectical Anthropology 31.1-3 (2007): 350. 2 Roy M. Melbourne, “The American Response to the Nigerian Conflict, 1968,” Issue: A Journal of Opinion 3.2 (1973): 35. 3 Many authors have analyzed the Biafrans’ use of propaganda. Douglas Anthony discusses how the Biafrans and their supporters increasingly relied on the theme of modernity as claims of genocide were rejected (Douglas Anthony, “ ‘Resourceful and Progressive Blackmen’: Modernity and Race in Biafra, 1967-70,” Journal of African History 51.1 (2010): 41-61). Roy Doron focuses on the theme of genocide and how the Biafrans managed to use propaganda effectively, both at home and abroad, despite limited access to communication resources (Roy Doron, “Marketing Genocide: Biafran Propaganda Strategies during the , 1967-70,” Journal of Genocide Research 16.2-3 (2014): 227-246). Ojukwu’s brings out all of these themes (Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, “The Ahiara Declaration (1 June 1969),” accessed 2 April 2016, http://www.biafraland.com/ ahiara_declaration_1969.htm). 4 Keith Shimko, “Metaphors and Foreign Policy Decisions,” Political Psychology 15.4 (1994): 662; and Yan Chang, “On Rhetorical Functions and Structural Patterns of Analogy,” Theory and Practice in Language Studies 2.12 (2012): 2587. 5 For a discussion of reasoning by analogy in foreign policy, see: Ernest R. May, “Lessons” of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); David Houghton, “The Role of Analogical Reasoning in Novel Foreign Policy,” British Journal of Political Science 26.4 (1996): 523-552; Shimko, “Metaphors and Foreign Policy Decisions,” 655-71; Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Deborah W. Larson, Origins of : A Psychological Explanation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). By contrast, Taylor and Rourke provide one of the few discussions on how analogies are used as post hoc justifications for foreign policy decisions (Andrew Taylor and John Rourke, “Historical Analogies in the Congressional Foreign Policy Process,” Journal of Politics 57.2 (1995): 460–68). 6 Eric D. Weltz, “Self-Determination: How a German Enlightenment Idea Became the Slogan of National Liberation and a Human Right,” The American Historical Review 120.2 (2015): 462. 7 Ojukwu completed part of his secondary studies in England before attending Oxford University, where he graduated with a history major in 1955 with honours (Encyclopedia of World Biography, s.v. “Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu,” accessed 20 March, 2016, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/ Chukwuemeka_Odumegwu_Ojukwu.aspx). 8 Ojukwu, “The Ahiara Declaration.” 9 Doron, “Marketing Genocide,” 239. 10 Michel Debré, “Déclaration de M. Debré aux Nations Unies (7 Octobre 1968),” in et le Biafra, ed. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (Paris: Services d’Information et de Presse, 1969), 22-23. 11 “La position française sur la question du Biafra a été affirmée d’une manière claire et nette. Elle ne change pas: les Ibos ont le droit de déterminer eux-mêmes leur destin; ils l’ont, parce que c’est là un principe qui vaut sur tous les continents, et qu’il n’y a aucune raison de le limiter à certains conflits ou à certaines parties de la terre.” (Michel Debré, “Déclaration de M. Debré au Déjeuner - Débat de la Presse Diplomatique (12 Février 1969),” in France et le Biafra, ed. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (Paris: Services d’Information et de Presse, 1969), 25). For his speech to the National Assembly, see: Michel Debré, “Déclaration de M. Debré à l’Assemblée Nationale (7 Novembre 1968),” in France et le Biafra, ed. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (Paris: Services d’Information et de Presse, 1969), 23-24. 12 Diamond, “Who Killed Biafra?” 343. 13 Gabon followed the French lead, while President Félix Houphouet-Boginy of the Ivory Coast supported the secession independently of French pressure, and may have even encouraged De Gaulle to adopt an active pro- Biafran position (Melbourne, “American Response,” 36). 14 Diamond, “Who Killed Biafra?” 343. 15 “Il est vrai que nous avons des intérêts au Nigeria, que nous entendons garder nos relations avec Lagos et que nous souhaitons un règlement pacifique. Mais, comme je l’ai dit devant l’ONU, je crois préférable, pour la valeur de la politique française en Afrique, que nous la rattachions à un principe fondamental plutôt qu’à des intérêts matériels.” (Debré, “Déclaration à l’Assemblée Nationale,” 24). 16 See, for example: Daniel Bach, “Le Général De Gaulle et la Guerre Civile au Nigeria,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 14.2 (1980): 262-65; Melbourne, “American Response,” 36; and Diamond, “Who Killed Biafra?” 343. Dessanti 21

17 Bateman provides several examples of this explicit and implicit connection. For example, in an interview with the Irish Independent, Ojukwu said, “We always feel the Irish would understand our problem because it is a repetition of Irish history.” (Fiona Bateman, “Ireland and the Nigeria-Biafra War: Local Connections to a Distant Conflict,” New Hibernia Review 16.1 (2012): 60-62). 18 George A. Obiozer, The United States and the Nigerian Civil War: An American Dilemma in Africa, 1966-1970 (Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 1993), 80. For an example of an American citizen making this analogy, see: Carl Barus, “Biafra’s Right to Independence,” letter to the editor, The New York Times, 22 August 1967. 19 Bateman, “Ireland and the Nigeria-Biafra War,” 62. 20 Obiozer, The United States and the Nigerian Civil War, 80. 21 Chief , “Enahoro Presents Federal Case to USA, March 1969,” in Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, vol. 2, ed. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 354). 22 Memorandum from Roger Norris of the National Security Council to Henry Kissinger, 22 September 1969, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Part 1, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969-1972, Document 121. 23 Ibid. 24 Obiozer, The United States and the Nigerian Civil War, 72-3; Barus, “Biafra’s Right to Independence;” and Carol McNeil, “To Rescue Biafra,” letter to the editor, The New York Times, 22 February 1969. 25 Obiozer, The United States and the Nigerian Civil War, 72-3. 26 John J. Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 20-21. 27 “Nigeria: Hell-Bent for Dissolution,” The New York Times, 4 June 1967. 28 Stremlau, International Politics, 52. 29 Patrick Ediomi Davies, “Use of Propaganda in Civil War: The Biafra Experience,” (PhD thesis, LSE, 1997), 196. 30 Radio Biafra, “Nyerere, Mobutu say ‘Biafra is no Katanga,’” Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Africa, 21 June 1967. 31 Government of Tanzania, “Tanzania’s Memorandum on Biafra’s Case,” in Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, vol. 2, ed. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 429-439. 32 Davies, “Propaganda in Civil War,” 198; Douglas Anthony, “ ‘Ours is a War of Survival’: Biafra, Nigeria, and Arguments about Genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 16.2-3 (2014): 218. 33 Stremlau, International Politics, 133. 34 Frederic Bennett, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 779, 13 March 1969, cols. 1651-2. 35 Lagos Nigeria Domestic Service, “Betrayal by Nyerere,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, West Africa, 14 April 1968. 36 Kaduna Nigeria BCNN, “Kaduna Examines Anglo-American ‘Frameup,’” Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Africa, 12 July 1967; and “Nigeria Sees Biafra as Another Katanga,” The London Times, 12 October 1968. 37 Obiozer, The United States and the Nigerian Civil War, 80; and Memorandum from Edward Hamilton of the National Security Council to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow), 25 May 1967, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 385. 38 Congressman Joseph Resnick voiced this concern to Congress in May 1967 (Radio Biafra, “US Congressman Praises Ojukwu’s Stand,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Africa, 15 May 1967). 39 Sam Oyedeji, “Nigeria’s Fight for Unity,” letter to the editor, The New York Times, 11 February 1969. 40 Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, 21 , Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Part 1, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969-1972, Document 59. 41 On the other hand, black Americans supported the FMG. “Blacks were thoroughly aware that Nigeria was the most important Black African country. That it should succeed was their sincere hope, for it was an overseas symbol of their aspirations for America. They keenly wanted their African cultural roots to prove capable and vigorous.” (Melbourne, “American Response,” 39). The list of pro-Biafran senators includes (among others) Edward Kennedy, Eugene McCarthy, Edward Brooke, and Allard Lowenstein (Memorandum from Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, 28 January 1969, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-5, Part 1, Documents on Sub-Saharan Africa, 1969-1972, Document 25). Some senators supported the Biafrans’ political cause, while others simply wanted to see more humanitarian relief (Zdenek Cervenka, The Nigerian War, 1967-1970. History of the War; Selected Bibliography and Documents (Frankfurt: Bernard & Graefe, 1971), 122). For a description of the activities of the pro-Biafra lobby during the summer of 1968, see: Melbourne, “American Response,” 33-42. 42 “Cease-Fire is Urged in Biafra,” The Washington Post, 12 January 1969. 43 Melbourne, “American Response,” 41. Dessanti 22

44 Boaz Atzili, “When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict,” International Security 31.3 (Winter 2006/07): 144. 45 Denis Smith, “Biafra: A Case Against Trudeau’s View,” The Globe and Mail, 30 October 1968. 46 “Biafra Backed by De Gaulle, Canada Cited,” The Globe and Mail, 19 September 1968. 47 Terrance Wills, “A Quebec Torn Like Biafra Would be Encouraged to Secede, MP Says,” The Globe and Mail, 13 January 1969. 48 See, for example: Smith, “Biafra: A Case Against Trudeau’s View;” C. J. Sumvan, “Biafra,” The Globe and Mail, 27 May 1969; and James Smyth, “Nigeria,” The Globe and Mail, 24 January 1969. 49 David R. Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1998), 75. 50 Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, Biafra: Selected Speeches and Random Thoughts of C. Odumegwu Ojukwu (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 217. 51 Smith, “Biafra: A Case Against Trudeau’s View.” 52 Radio Biafra, “Eke Views OAU Monrovia Meeting, Wilson Trip,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, West Africa, 18 March 1969. 53 Maurice Foley, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 779, 13 March 1969, col. 1573. 54 This is contrary to Diamond’s claim that the British Labour government at the time did not even hide behind clichés like “commonwealth responsibility” to justify its support for the FMG (Diamond, “Who Killed Biafra?” 356). To some extent, that rhetoric was still used in British justifications. 55 Chibuike Uche, “Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War,” The Journal of African History 49.1 (2008): 111. 56 Jeremy Thorpe, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 779, 13 March 1969, cols. 1597, 1600. 57 Hugh Fraser, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 779, 13 March 1969, col. 1614; and Frank Allaun, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 773, 18 , col. 883. 58 Captain W. Elliot, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 770, 24 October 1968, col. 1589; also see John Tilney, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 786, 10 July 1969, col. 1662. 59 Philip Noel-Baker, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 766, 12 June 1968, cols. 284-5. 60 For example, see: John Lee, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 766, 12 June 1968, col. 256; Anthony, “‘Ours is a War of Survival,’” 210; and John Young, “How Can the War in Nigeria be Stopped?” The London Times, 3 December 1968. 61 Anthony, “‘Ours is a War of Survival,’” 218; Obiozer, The United States and the Nigerian Civil War, 60; Memorandum, Phil Baum (Director, Commission on International Affairs, American Jewish Congress) to Chapter and Division Presidents, Chapter and Division CIA Chairmen, CRC’s, and Field Staff, “The Tragedy of Biafra: A Report by the American Jewish Congress” (15 December 1968), 37; Atutumama H. Okotie, “A Critical Analysis of the Rhetoric of CBS, ABC, and NBC Television News Coverage of the Nigerian Civil War,” PhD dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1982), 141; George W. Cornell, “Biafra Relief Falling Short,” The Washington Post, 2 November 1968; William Chapman, “‘Biafra Lobby’ Melds Left and Right,” The Washington Post, 19 January 1969; M. C. Njoku, “Report on Nigeria,” letter to the editor, The Washington Post, 29 April 1968; Bernard Lebas, “Biafra’s ‘Win or Die’ Struggle,” The London Times, 9 August 1967; Frank Allaun, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 769, 27 August 1968, col. 1468; and Anthony, “‘Ours is a War of Survival,’” 209-210, 217-8. 62 Lloyd Garrison, “Nigeria: Two Men Who are Preparing to Reap a Whirlwind Chain-Smoking Scholar Anathema to Ibos,” The New York Times, 25 June 1967; and Nnamdi Azikiwe, “Azikiwe Speaks his Mind on his Role in Biafra and Nigerian Crisis (21 September 1969),” in Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, vol. 2, ed. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 422. 63 Anthony, “‘Ours is a War of Survival,’” 217. 64 Michael Desch, “The Myth of Abandonment: The Use and Abuse of the Holocaust Analogy,” Security Studies 15.1 (2006): 107. 65 Ibid., 208. 66 James Johnson, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 769, 27 August 1968, col. 1480; and Young, “How Can the War in Nigeria be Stopped?” 67 Okotie, “Television News Coverage,” 142. 68 In one interview with The New York Times, Ojukwu said, “The Israelis are hard-working, enterprising people. So are we. They’ve suffered from pogroms. So have we. In many ways, we share the same promise, and the same problems.” (“Urbane Secessionist: Chukuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu,” The New York Times, 31 May 1967). 69 “Biafra Feels Jewish Link: Identifies With Israel in Quest for Nationhood,” The Baltimore Sun, 30 March 1969; and “Urbane Secessionist,” The New York Times. Dessanti 23

70 James Johnson, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 766, 12 June 1968, col. 274. 71 William Norris, “Nigeria: Peace is in the Offering,” The Globe and Mail, 2 . The Tanzanian government released a statement when it recognized the independence of Biafra. The statement read: “Tanzania has recognized the State of Israel and will continue to do so because of its belief that every people must have some place in the world where they are not liable to be rejected by their fellow citizens. But the Biafrans have now suffered the same kind of rejection within their state that the Jews of Germany experienced.” (Government of Tanzania, “Tanzania Recognizes Biafra (13 April 1968),” in Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, vol. 2, ed. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 206-211). 72 The phrase is also evocative of the founding fathers of America (the Pilgrims). Okotie, “Television News Coverage,” 57-8. 73 “Nigeria: Hell-Bent for Dissolution,” The New York Times; and Donald H. Louchheim, “East Nigeria Became Biafra in an Air of Impending Tragedy,” The Washington Post, 4 June 1967. 74 Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, 28 January 1969, FRUS 1969-1976, E-5, 1, Sub-Saharan Africa 1969-1972, Doc. 25. 75 Memorandum, Phil Baum to Chapter and Division Presidents etc., “The Tragedy of Biafra” (15 December 1968). 76 By September 1967, Ojukwu was also appealing to mainland (Melbourne, “American Response,” 35). 77 Radio Biafra, “ Discusses Moscow Position on Biafra,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Africa, 5 August 1967. 78 Analogies are most persuasive when they have high base-specificity (Brian B. Whaley and Austin S. Brabow, “Analogy in Persuasion: Translator’s Dictionary or Art?” Communication Studies 44.3-4 (1993): 247). Jervis argues that first-hand experience of a base leads to better analogical reasoning; by extension, I argue that for the purpose of arguing by analogy, first-hand experience makes the audience less willing to accept analogies that are unsound (Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 246). 79 When the audience has little understanding of a subject, the soundness of the analogy matters less (Whaley and Brabow, “Analogy in Persuasion,” 249). 80 As Cohen writes, for communities in crisis it is important to have a story that alludes to the core themes of that crisis (Paul A. Cohen, History and Popular Memory: The Power of Story in Moments of Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 193). The lessons that people will associate with particular events depends on their identities, and often those lessons are over-generalizations of reality - sometimes categorized as simply “success” or “failure” (Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 223, 233). 81 Writing about reasoning by analogy, Desch states that “historical analogies often provoke powerful emotions like fear or guilt. Such extreme emotions are rarely conducive to reasoned judgement” (Desch, “The Myth of Abandonment,” 111). 82 The key to analogies is that they prescribe solutions (Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 221). 83 Doron, “Marketing Genocide,” 239. 84 Several of these documents can be found in Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, vol. 2, ed. A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (London: Oxford University Press, 1971). 85 Melbourne, “American Response,” 34-6; and Doron, “Marketing Genocide,” 240. 86 John de St. Jorre, The Brothers’ War: Biafra and Nigeria (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), 179. 87 Michael Onyebuchi Eze, The Politics of History in Contemporary Africa (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 96, 107, 151. 88 Jean-François Bayart, “Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion,” African Affairs 99.395 (2000): 226. Bibliography

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