Through the Imperial Lens the Role of Portugal in the Nigeria- Biafra War
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Through the Imperial Lens The Role of Portugal in the Nigeria- Biafra War Arua Oko Omaka Although Portugal played a prominent but controversial role in the Nigeria- Biafra War, its interest remains largely neglected in the historiography of the war. Portugal and some of its colonies in Africa—Guinea- Bissau and São Tomé— provided the principal channels through which Biafra imported arms and supplies. Te Nigerian government and its British ally believed that Portugal not only provided access routes to Biafra but also facilitated the recruitment of mercenaries and the provision of military equipment for Biafra. Tis article aims to fll the gap in the historiography of the Nigeria- Biafra War by arguing that Portugal’s imperial interests in Africa informed its roles in the war. Portugal’s assistance to Biafra helped sustain the confict, thereby diverting the attention of the world community away from its unpopular policies in Africa. Tis research is based on archival documents in the UK, Canada, and the United States that have not been adequately explored in studies of the war. Introduction Te Eastern Region seceded from the Nigerian federation in May 1967 afer the political crises that led to the massacre of members of the Eastern Region Afer teaching at the University of Toronto, Arua Oko Omaka joined the Department of History and Strategic Studies at Federal University, Ndufu Alike Ikwo, Nigeria. His contact address is aruaojum@yahoo .com. © 2019 Association of Global South Studies, Inc. All rights reserved. Journal of Global South Studies Vol. 36, No. 1, 2019, pp. 186–209. ISSN 2476- 1397. 186 The Role of Portugal in the Nigeria- Biafra War 187 living in northern and western Nigeria.1 Leaders of the Eastern Region consid- ered secession to be the only way to guarantee the safety of life and property of their people.2 Te Nigerian government interpreted the secession of Eastern Nigeria (Biafra) as a rebellion and decided to preserve the unity of Nigeria by taking military actions against Biafra.3 Te government’s attempt to crush the Biafran “rebellion” led to the outbreak of a war that lasted from July 1967 to January 1970. Te Nigeria- Biafra War attracted the interest and attention of European and Asian powers for a variety of reasons. Te British were inter- ested in a united Nigeria, for example, because of their huge economic invest- ment in the oil- rich Niger Delta region, while the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) got involved in the confict in order to open a major wedge into the capitalist region of West Africa that had previously been closed to it. France provided both arms and humanitarian aid for Biafra on the grounds that Biafra had the right to self- determination.4 Although France emphasized humanitarian concerns as its reason for supporting Biafra, it also hoped that the independence of Biafra would help weaken British infuence in the West African subregion. China, in contrast, provided Biafrans with arms because they saw them as freedom fghters struggling against imperialism and Russia’s growing infuence in Nigeria.5 Te Scandinavian countries collectively pro- vided humanitarian aid for Biafra but discretely avoided any form of political involvement. Te USSR succeeded in penetrating the Nigerian government by quickly supplying arms and technical expertise to Nigeria. Te efect of the Russian arms intervention in Nigeria was to seal the fate of Biafra, as the western powers believed that they could not aford to allow Russia to come between them and the Nigerian government, regardless of public opinion and the sympathy for Biafra in Britain and America. Britain, which was initially reluctant to supply arms to the Nigerian government, later did so when it became obvious that it was losing its traditional prestige and infuence in Nigeria because of the Soviet arms intervention there. Britain and the United States could have saved Biafra if they wanted, but humanitarian considerations were secondary to Cold War calculations in western diplomacy regarding Africa. Te intersection of the Brit- ish and Soviet interests in the confict led to a massive supply of arms to the Nigerian government. Interestingly, Portugal had no clear interest in the confict. In their seminal article “Te Nigeria- Biafra War: Postcolonial Confict and the Question of 188 Journal of Global South Studies (Spring 2019) Genocide,” Lasse Heerten and A. Dirk Moses argue that the Estado Novo dic- tatorship in Portugal and the South African and Rhodesian apartheid regimes secretly supported Biafra on morally ambiguous grounds, presumably to weaken Nigeria.6 Nigerian political scientist Josiah Elaigwu has speculated that Portu- gal might have supported Biafra because a fragmented Nigeria would have pro- vided a distraction from the mounting pressure it was experiencing to end its colonial regime in Africa.7 Portugal certainly played a strategic role by provid- ing the main link between Biafra and the outside world. John Stremlau, a prom- inent scholar of the Nigeria-Biafra War, noted that church groups and Biafrans dealt with the Portuguese on a commercial basis.8 Given that there had been no previous relationship between Portugal and the seceding part of Nigeria, it was difcult to explain Portugal’s strange friendship with Biafra and to discern what interest was served by its support for Biafra. Biafrans used Portugal and some of its colonies in Africa— Guinea- Bissau and São Tomé— as organizing centers and supply routes for arms and equipment. Portugal reached an understanding with the Biafran government that enabled it to use Lisbon and Portugal’s colonies in Africa as transit routes. Te Nigerian government, which wanted a quick military victory and to preserve the unity of the country, naturally interpreted Portugal’s agreement with Biafra as an unfriendly act that helped prolong the confict.9 Without Portuguese assistance, Biafra would have capitulated earlier than it did. Te Nigerian government con- sidered reporting Portugal to the United Nations but chose not to do so for politi- cal reasons. Raising Portugal’s complicity with Biafra at the United Nations would have further internationalized the confict, thwarting the chances of achieving the quick military victory the Nigerian government desperately wanted. Tis article advances the discourses and interpretations of the international politics of the Nigeria-Biafra War by arguing that Portuguese imperial policy in Africa largely infuenced its role in the Nigeria-Biafra War. Te war broke out at a time when the entire African continent was undergoing decolonization and Portugal was under pressure to liberalize its unpopular policies in Africa and negotiate a peaceful handover to African leaders. By supporting Biafra, Portu- gal diverted the attention of African leaders away from campaigning against its unpopular policies in Africa. Portugal saw the war as an opportunity to use Afri- cans’ own argument about the primacy of the right to self-determination against them. Portuguese imperial policy in Africa thus provides a window to understanding the international dimension of the Nigeria-Biafra War. Tis The Role of Portugal in the Nigeria- Biafra War 189 article focuses mainly on the British and Nigerian approaches to Portugal’s standpoint. Te reason that this research relies chiefy on documents from British, Canadian, and US archives is that Portugal’s diplomatic archives have not yet declassifed their fles on the Nigeria- Biafra War. A Reassessment of Portuguese Colonial Policy in Africa Portugal has a long history in Africa. It was the frst colonial power in Africa and the last to divest its territories on the continent. Social and political devel- opments in Africa and historical conditions in the global community forced colonial powers to hand over authority to indigenous African leaders. Soon afer World War II, the agitation for political independence among African and Asian countries increased. By the late 1960s, when powerful European countries such as Great Britain, France, and Belgium had completed the decolonization of their former colonies, Portugal, a relatively weak and poor state in industrialized Europe, was still hesitant about the future of its African colonies, which it seman- tically camoufaged as “overseas provinces.”10 Te delay in the decolonization process of Portuguese colonies can be attrib- uted to a number of factors. Portugal was beclouded by a Christian paternal- ism toward Africa and the assumption that its colonial policy was best for its territories.11 Portugal believed that its Roman Catholic tradition and its long contact with diferent cultures and races of the world specially equipped it to maintain good relations with people of all backgrounds. Its leaders ofen argued that they were building a multiracial society in Africa.12 Armindo Monteiro, a Portuguese minister of the colonies in the 1930s and the Portuguese ambassa- dor to Britain in the 1940s, asserted that destiny had entrusted Portugal with the responsibility of raising Africans and their territories to the level the Por- tuguese had attained and that Portugal had successfully created a harmonious society in Brazil without racial hatred.13 Portuguese scholars appeared to have shared this same perspective. For instance, Gilberto Freyre, a famous Brazilian historian and cultural interpreter, formulated the theory of Lusotropicalism, whereby he argued that people of Portuguese background were preordained to lead the world toward racial harmony and to build a global empire that would be made up of people of various colors, religions, and languages.14 Te Portuguese believed that successful colonization must be based on union with the indigenous people; this is why they did not support the principle of 190 Journal of Global South Studies (Spring 2019) racial prejudice. Portugal’s Organic Charter of the Colonies and Overseas Administrative Reform of 1933 empowered white settlers in Africa to act as protectors of the “Natives.”15 As protectors, they had the duty of promoting the preservation and development of the indigenous people.