World Bank Document

Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR00003705 Public Disclosure Authorized IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H4831; TF98846)

GRANTS

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 6.63 MILLION

(US$9.20 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

AND A Public Disclosure Authorized

PACIFIC REGION INFRASTRUCTURE FACILITY GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$1.79 MILLION

TO THE

INDEPENDENT STATE OF SAMOA

FOR A

Public Disclosure Authorized POST TSUNAMI RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

February 8, 2016

Transport and ICT East Asia and Pacific Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Public Disclosure Authorized

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective August 31, 2015)

Currency Unit = Samoan Tala (SAT) US$1.00 = SAT 2.67 US$1.00 = SDR 0.71

FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CERP Cyclone Emergency Recovery Project CIM Plans Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans COEP Codes of Environmental Practice ECIR East Coast Inland Route ECRCR Enhancing the Climate Resilience of Coastal Resources & Communities Project EIA Environmental Impact Assessment EPP Emergency Project Paper ERAP Enhanced Road Access Project GoS Government of Samoa ICB International Competitive Bidding ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IDA International Development Association ISR Implementation and Status Report LARAP Land Acquisition and Resettlement Plan LARF Land Acquisition and Resettlement Framework LTA Land Transport Authority M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MNRE Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment MoF Ministry of Finance MWCSD Ministry of Women, Communities and Social Development MWTI Ministry of Works, Transport, and Infrastructure NCB National Competitive Bidding PDNA Post-Disaster Needs Assessment PDO Project Development Objective PMU Project Management Unit PPCR Pilot Program for Climate Resilience PRIF Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility PUMA Planning and Urban Management Authority SAT Samoan Tala (domestic currency) SIAM Samoa Infrastructure Asset Management Program TF Trust Fund US$ US Dollar VAGST Value Added General Services Tax VfM Value for Money

Regional Vice President: Axel van Trotsenburg Country Director: Franz Drees-Gross Senior Global Practice Director: Pierre Guislain Practice Manager: Michel Kerf Task Team Leader: Jim Reichert Primary ICR Author: Colleen Butcher Gollach

INDEPENDENT STATE OF SAMOA

Post Tsunami Reconstruction Project (PTRP)

CONTENTS

A. Basic Information ...... i B. Key Dates ...... i C. Ratings Summary ...... i D. Sector and Theme Codes ...... ii E. Bank Staff ...... ii F. Results Framework Analysis ...... ii G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ...... vi H. Restructuring (if any) ...... vi I. Disbursement Profile ...... viii Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ...... 2 Context at Appraisal ...... 2 Original Project Development Objective (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) ...... 3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and Reasons/Justification ...... 3 Main Beneficiaries ...... 4 Original Components (as approved) ...... 5 Revised Components ...... 8 Other Significant Changes ...... 8 Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ...... 9 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry ...... 9 Implementation ...... 12 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance ...... 17 Post-Completion Operation/Next Phase ...... 18 Assessment of Outcomes ...... 19 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation ...... 19 Achievement of Project Development Objectives ...... 20 Rating: Satisfactory...... 20 3.3 Efficiency ...... 21

Justification of Overall Outcome Rating ...... 22 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts ...... 23 Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development...... 23 Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) ...... 24 Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ...... 24 Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ...... 25 Bank Performance ...... 25 a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry ...... 25 (b) Quality of Supervision ...... 26 (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance ...... 26 Borrower Performance ...... 26 (a) Government Performance ...... 26 (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance ...... 27 (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance ...... 27 Lessons Learned ...... 28 Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ...... 29 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing ...... 30 Annex 2. Outputs by Component (after Restructuring) ...... 33 Annex 3. Summary of Borrower’s ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ...... 40 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ...... 45 Annex 5. Map Showing Location of Major Investments in Roads, Bridges and Dual Purpose Pedestrian Paths ...... 47

A. Basic Information

Country: Samoa Project Name: Post-Tsunami Reconstruction Project Project ID: P120594 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-4831-WS, PRIF TF-098846 ICR Date: 12/15/2014 ICR Type: Core ICR Lending Instrument: ERC Borrower: Independent State of Samoa Original Total SDR 6.63 mil. SDR6.603 mil. + Disbursed Amount: Commitment: + US$1.79 mil. US$1.787 mil. SDR6.63 mil. + Revised Amount: US$1.79 mil. Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Land Transport Authority Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility Multi-Donor Trust Fund

B. Key Dates

Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: Effectiveness: 04-06-2011 04-27-2011 5-8-2013 Appraisal: 10-15-2010 Restructurings: 1-5-2015 Approval: 11-02-2010 Mid-term Review: 02-15-2012 08-03-2012 02-28-2015 Closing: 04-30-2013 08-31-2015

C. Ratings Summary

C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate Bank Performance: Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Agencies: Satisfactory Overall Bank Overall Borrower Satisfactory Satisfactory Performance: Performance:

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry No None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of No None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status:

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Rural and Inter-Urban Roads and Highways 100 100 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Natural disaster management 100 100

E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Axel van Trotsenburg James W. Adams Country Director: Franz R. Drees-Gross Ferid Belhaj Practice Manager/Manager: Michel Kerf Charles M. Feinstein Project Team Leader: Jim Reichert Demetrios Papathanisou ICR Team Leader: Jim Reichert ICR Primary Author: Colleen M. Gollach

F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The project's development objective (PDO) is to assist the Government of Samoa (GoS) in its efforts to support the relocation and rehabilitation of communities living in the island of Upolu affected by the tsunami of September 29 2009, through the provision of improved infrastructure access to relocation sites; enhanced transport infrastructure, and assistance to local communities to address future natural disasters.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The PDO was not revised.

(a) PDO Level Indicator(s)1

Original Target Actual Value Achieved at Formally Revised Values Completion or Target Target Values Indicator Baseline Value (PAD 2010: Cr. Years (Cr. 4831-WS; Gr. 4831-WS; Gr. TF098846) TF098846) Restored seawalls and road access to communities affected by the September 29, 2009 Indicator 1 : tsunami. Value 0% 100% 100% Date achieved: 10/15/2010 03/2012 Using advance procurement/retroactive financing, road access for affected communities was progressively completed from April 2010 to Comments mid-2011. Coastal protection works were initiated in September 2011 (include % Achieved (100%) and completed by March 2012. All planned restoration works were achievement) completed within 12 months of project effectiveness and met the end target of 100% by Year 1. Indicator 2 : Improved pedestrian access to relocation areas. Value 0% 100% 100% Date achieved: 10/15/2010 07/2015 This indicator includes measures of:  Upgrading eight 1km to 2km access roads (completed August 2010);  Constructing the East Coast Inland Route, a new 5.2km road Comments (completed July 2015); and (include % Achieved (100%)  Constructing 1,000m of dual-purpose pedestrian access & escape achievement) routes (completed February 2015). The pedestrian routes were dual purpose, both to provide access to relocation areas and emergency escape routes to high ground above simulated future tsunami wave heights, which required specialist design before construction. Indicator 3 : Non-rural roads rehabilitated (core indicator) Value 0 - 28 10.6 Date achieved: 10/15/2010 - 09/2010 The original (pre-restructuring) target was 28km of “more resilient road Partially network,” i.e., all proposed 28km of roads to be constructed or achieved (38%), rehabilitated under the project. In order not to double-count roads but 100% monitored in Indicator 1, the original indicator was replaced by the achieved against Comments International Development Association (IDA) core indicator of non- the target of (include % rural roads only as part of the 2013 restructuring. Inadvertently, the 10.6km agreed achievement) target of 28km was not reduced at restructuring but during the course between the of implementation, the Bank Team and the Land Transport Authority project team and (LTA) agreed to limit the target to this non-rural link road (10.6km), LTA during the reconstruction of which was completed by September 2010. The implementation. road provided an important inland route for resettlement of coastal

1 The indicators in the Data Sheet reflect the approved indicators at Project closing (August 31, 2015). The indicators in the original Financing Agreement (Cr. 4831-WS) were amended through a Level Two Restructuring on May 8, 2013. The original indicators and amendments made and reasons for doing so are set out in more detail in Section 1.3 of the ICR.

iii

Intermediate Results Indicators

Original Target Formally Actual Value Achieved at Values Revised Target Completion or Target Years Indicator Baseline Value (PAD 2003: Cr. Values 4831-WS; Gr. (Cr. 4831-WS; TF098846) Gr. TF098846) Indicator 1 : Access restored and emergency response and clean-up activities carried out Value 0% 100% 100% 100% Date achieved: 10/15/2010 08/31/2015 Emergency works by LTA commenced immediately after the Comments tsunami (September 29, 2009). Access was restored for emergency (include % Achieved (100%) response and clean-up activities within six to eight weeks of the achievement) tsunami. Works were initially funded by GoS and reimbursed under the project’s retroactive financing provision. Indicator 2 : 20km of existing access roads upgraded and sealed Value 0 km 20km 20 km 19.6 km Date achieved: 10/15/2010 08/2010 Shortly after the tsunami, LTA contractors upgraded and sealed existing access roads for emergency evacuation and resettlement purposes. A total of 19.6km was upgraded and sealed, namely Utufaalalafa/ Saleaaumua access roads (4km), Malaela Loop/Saitoa Comments access roads (4km), Mutiatele/Ulutogia access roads (4km), Vailoa, (include % Achieved (98%) Aleipata/Lalomanu Loop access roads (3.1km), Aufaga access road achievement) (2.3km), and Saleapaga access road (2.15km). All works were completed by August 2010. Utilizing national competitive bidding and strong contract management by LTA, construction costs of the access roads were 25% less than appraisal estimates. Indicator 3 : 10km of Lepa-Lalomanu link road upgraded and sealed Value 0 10km 10km 10.6km Date achieved: 10/15/2010 09/2010 The Lepa-Lalomanu Coastal Road was heavily damaged by the tsunami, and its location close to the coastline puts it at risk in the Comments future. An inland agricultural access road was upgraded and sealed Achieved (106% (include % to provide for the voluntary resettlement of communities and to offer more than target) achievement) a safe alternative east-west link road inland. LTA made use of advance contracting for the works, which included 0.6km more than the target length, by September 2010. % of relocated houses with improved access to social/educational/commercial Indicator 4: opportunities

Value n/a 100% 100% 88% Date achieved: 10/15/2010 End of project household survey cited “greatly improved” Comments accessibility by 88% of sampled residents, and only 4% responding Largely Achieved (include % that the roads made no difference. The highest rated improvements (88%) achievement) cited were more accessible health facilities (54%), plantations (52%), churches (42%), shops (40%), and schools (37%). Indicator 5: 9km of existing seawalls repaired Value 0km 9km 9km 11.078km Date achieved: 10/15/2010 01/2012 (03/2012) A total of 11.078 km of high energy coastline was protected by Comments constructing well-designed seawalls at six sites: Utufaalalafa to Achieved (123% (include % Satioa (2.126km); Satitoa to Vailoa, Aleipata (2.176km); Samea to more than target) achievement) Satuimalufilufi (2.430km); Satuimalufilufi to Salua (2.140km); Salua to Faleaseela (1.900km); and Siufaga (0.306km). Indicator 6: Salani Bridge repaired Value 0 100% 100% 100% Date achieved: 10/15/2010 07/21/2010 Salani Bridge, which forms a critical link across the Mulivaifagatola Comments River, was repaired under advance contracting by late July 2010. (include % Achieved (100%) GoS also provided funding for LTA to repair the shoulders and achievement) approaches. Feasible route identified and road designed (for Samusu-Lalomanu Inland Route Indicator 7: and for pedestrian pathways) Value 0 100% 100% 100% Date achieved: 10/15/2010 Year 3 Jan 17,2014 The new east coast (north-south) inland route required considerable community consultations and discussions with landowners and Comments traditional leaders, an environmental impact assessment, and (include % Achieved (100%) specialized drainage designs to cope with high rainfall. Following achievement) the intensive consultations and preparatory work, the detailed designs for the road were completed. Indicator 8: Samusu-Lalomanu Inland Route (ECIR) constructed (around 5km) Value 0 5km 5km 5.2km Date achieved: 10/15/2010 06/16/2015 The works were let concurrently as three lots to two domestic Comments contractors: Lot 1 (2.4km), Lot 2 (1km), and Lot 3 (1.8km). ECIR (include % Achieved (104%) officially opened to traffic on June 16, 2015. Construction of achievement) pedestrian escape routes, which was carried out under a variation to one of the road construction contracts, was completed in July 2015. Indicator 9: 100% Compliance with EMP Value 0 Yes Yes Yes Date achieved: 10/15/2010 08/31/2015 Samoa has well-developed environmental assessment and Comments monitoring procedures for road works, and has adopted modern (include % Achieved (100%) Codes of Environmental Practice (COEP). Appropriate achievement) environmental and social frameworks were developed and monitored

as required by the Planning and Urban Management Authority (PUMA) and the Bank throughout the course of the Project. Indicator 10: Quarterly progress reports against work plans and budgets Value 0 100% 100% 100% Date achieved: 10/15/2010 08/31/2015 Comments Quarterly progress reports, work plans and budgets were prepared (include % Achieved (100%) and submitted in a timely manner by the Project Management Unit. achievement) The final progress report covered the period April to August 2015. Indicator 11: Before and after study of relocated communities Value 0 100% 100% 100% Date achieved: 10/15/2010 08/31/2015 A baseline survey of household socio-economic status was carried out in April 2012 for nine villages. Focus group meetings were held with 11 village mayors, trade store owners and public transport operators in the Aleipata area. The information was used retrospectively to ask about conditions before the tsunami as compared to current conditions (i.e., post-construction of village access roads, the main Lepa-Lalomanu link road, and seawalls). Comments The survey provided insights and anecdotal evidence of improved (include % Achieved (100%) conditions. Focus group consultations were held with nine villages achievement) in February and March 2015. The second, quantitative household survey with the same 11 villages and households (as the April 2012 survey) was carried out in August 2015 and provided quantitative assessments, as originally called for at appraisal. It provided strong evidence of restored and improved access for communities in relocation areas and positive social, economic and safety benefits as a result of the investments made.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

Date ISR Actual Disbursements No. DO IP Archived (US$ millions) 1 09/21/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.00 2 10/09/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.27 3 04/03/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 5.63 4 10/18/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 5.63 5 05/17/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 5.63 6 11/5/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.22 7 06/19/2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 10.98 8 07/21/2015 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 11.14 H. Restructuring (if any)

Board ISR Ratings Amount Restructuring Approved at Disbursed at Reason for Restructuring & Key Date(s) PDO Restructuring Restructuring in Changes Made Change DO IP US$ millions

12/14/2010 IDA CR 4831-WS; Closing date April 30, 2013.

Amended Project Description in Cr. 4831- WS and TF098846 to: (i) Delete Part A.5: Provision of TA for designing storm-water drainage system for roads under Part B - Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans (CIM Plans). (ii) Delete Part B: CIM Plans (to be implemented under separate Pilot Project for Climate Resilience (PPCR) Enhancing the Climate Resilience of Coastal Resources and Communities Project). (iii) Amend Section IV Expenditure Categories to:  Increase funds for works under Parts A.2 (inland access tracks), A.3 (repair of seawalls) and A.4 (repair of Salani Bridge) by US$855,000 through reductions in other categories (below) and reallocate US$260,000 from the Unallocated category; 04/18/20132 n/a MS MS 5.63  Decrease funds for the original Parts B Community Risk Management Plans (to be implemented under a separate Bank- funded Project) by US$355,500;  Decrease funds for Goods by US$70,000 to US$0;  Decrease amount for Consultants’ services by US$135,500 as no longer need support for CIM Plans; and  Halve amount for training and operating costs, some of which was associated with CIM Plan updating. (iv) Amend Results Framework to rationalize indicators to better measure the Post Tsunami Reconstruction Project (PTRP’s) impact and reduce onerous data collection on indicators considered difficult to define or no longer relevant. (v) Amend Project Closing dates of Cr4831-WS and TF098846 by 22 months to February 28, 2015. Extend closing date of Cr 4831-WS and TF 01/05/2015 n/a MS MS 10.98 098846 by six months to August 31, 2015 to allow for community consultations and

2 The letter from the Bank to inform MoF that the restructuring had been confirmed was dated May 8, 2013. vii

thorough engineering design and environmental impact assessment (EIA) work associated with the final ECIR alignment.

I. Disbursement Profile

viii

Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

Context at Appraisal

1. Samoa consists of nine islands located in the South Pacific just south of the equator with a population of some 190,000 people of whom the majority (99 percent) lives on the main islands of Upolu and Savai’i. The country is highly vulnerable to natural hazards. The World Bank’s Natural Disaster Hotspots study ranks Samoa as the 30th most exposed countries in the world to three or more hazards. As 70 percent of the population lives within 1km of the coastline, exposure to coastal hazards, such as cyclones, tsunamis, flooding, and storm surges, is high.

2. The National Tsunami Plan of Samoa calculates that a wave of between 7m and 9m average run up height will occur approximately every 50-100 years. The last significant tsunami in Samoa had occurred in 1917. Then, on September 29, 2009 a powerful 8.2 (Richter scale) earthquake occurred in the Tongan Trench just east of Samoa and was followed by a similarly significant tsunami that impacted American Samoa, Samoa, and northern Tonga. The tsunami struck in the daylight morning hours when most people were on their way to work or school. The entire capital city of Apia was evacuated to higher ground and post-event assessments found that tsunami education, awareness and evacuation exercises, fortuitously conducted just three weeks beforehand, may have helped to contain the final death toll which nonetheless, was 143 lives of whom half were young children under the age of ten. Twenty villages on the south and south eastern side of Upolu along the Alapeita coastline were destroyed, crushed behind a wall of water of between 6m and 9m high, and many more villages were affected with an estimated 5,274 people left homeless.

3. The Government of Samoa’s (GoS) Post Disaster Needs Assessment supported by the World Bank, United Nations, and Asian Development Bank, estimated the damages and losses equivalent to more than 22 per cent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product. Restoration of water supply systems was identified as the highest priority for recovery. The greatest costs were found in the transport sector, where the coastal road and associated protective sea walls were severely damaged.

4. The GoS has long supported measures to strengthen the country’s resilience to prepare for, and respond to, natural hazards, Prior to the tsunami, with support from the World Bank-funded Samoa Infrastructure Asset Management (SIAM) program (1999-2014),3 communities in all districts throughout the country had been assisted to prepare village-level community risk management plans (Coastal Infrastructure Management or CIM Plans) and Samoa had adopted a comprehensive disaster risk management framework, enabled through the Disaster and Emergency Management Act, 2006. The National Disaster Council, chaired by the Prime Minister and served by the Disaster Management Office, acts as the national coordinating mechanism to oversee disaster risk management in the country. In the aftermath of the 2009 tsunami, GoS prepared a National Tsunami Recovery Plan 2010-2013.

5. The recovery plan, premised on the “build back better” principle, estimated total needs at US$108 million, including US$27.9 million investment required in the transport sector over three years. The plan prioritized transport sector needs as: (i) restoring existing roads; (ii) restoring bridges and main routes; (iii) building new roads to resettled communities; and (iv) reconstructing seawalls. The new roads to resettled communities and in particular, upgrading existing tracks in

3 SIAM was a long-term, two-phase Adaptable Program Lending operation that was designed to contribute to the Bank’s Regional Strategy objective of equitable and sustainable growth, to enhance the economic, environmental and social sustainability of transport and coastal infrastructure assets, and to manage those assets, natural resources and disaster risks through effective partnerships with private sector stakeholders.

strategic locations, was linked to the Government’s commitment to facilitate the voluntary relocation of coastal communities inland, to higher and safer locations and so reduce risk. Given the Bank’s long-term engagement in the transport sector through SIAM, including associated disaster risk management preparedness and reduction activities, GoS requested the Bank to support the recovery plan with respect to reconstructing transport infrastructure and upgrading access for communities who were voluntarily resettling inland away from the coast.

6. GoS’s request was in line with the Bank’s strategy for the Pacific Region at the time of appraisal. A core goal of the strategy was to create an environment that would generate sustainable economic growth and employment by strengthening government capabilities in service delivery, including “safeguarding service delivery by improving resilience to natural hazards,” and improving incentives for private sector-led growth and employment (Pacific Regional Engagement Framework FY2006-2009). The Post Tsunami Reconstruction Project (PTRP) fell within the Bank’s broader development objectives for the Pacific region to help reduce the vulnerability of small island states to economic and physical shocks. In the Samoan context, the Framework recognized the Bank’s previous assistance in infrastructure asset management (SIAM) and cyclone recovery (Samoa Emergency Recovery Project, 2004-2008), and would “continue to assist in consolidating these efforts” (p.25) given the high natural hazard risk profile of the country.

Original Project Development Objective (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)

7. The project development objective as cited in the Project Paper, and subsequent Financing Agreement was to assist GoS in its efforts to support the relocation and rehabilitation of communities living on the island of Upolu affected by the tsunami of September 29, 2009, through the provision of improved infrastructure access to relocation sites, enhanced transport infrastructure, and assistance to local communities to address future natural disasters.

8. The PDO level outcome indicators in the Financing Agreement were:

(i) Restored road access to communities affected by the September 29, 2009 tsunami; (ii) Improved road and pedestrian access to relocation areas; (iii) More resilient road network, that provides continued access to populated areas during and after natural disasters; and (iv) Improved planning through updated Coastal Infrastructure Management (CIM) plans and hazard mapping.4

9. Eighteen intermediate indicators (outputs) contributed to the outcome indicators.

Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and Reasons/Justification

10. The PDO was not changed during implementation.

11. The original PDO outcome and intermediate indicators were amended through a Level 2 restructuring on February 19, 2013 as follows:

 The end-of-project (EOP) date for all indicators was amended from April 30, 2013 to the newly extended project closing date of February 28, 2015;

4 The CIM plan outcome indicator was omitted from the Project Financing Agreement.

 PDO Results Indicator 1 was revised from “restored road access to communities affected by the September 29, 2009 tsunami” to “restored seawalls and road access to communities affected by the September 29, 2009 tsunami;”  Remove the overlap between PDO Results Indicators 1 and 2 by revising Results Indicator 2 from “improved road and pedestrian access to relocation areas” to “improved pedestrian access to relocation areas;”  Replace PDO Results Indicator 3, “more resilient road network, that provides continued access to populated areas during and after natural disasters,” which could not be measured without the occurrence of natural disasters after project closing, and because there was no clear definition of what a more resilient road network would consist of, with the International Development Association (IDA) core indicator “non-rural roads rehabilitated;”  Drop all indicators (intermediate) associated with Component 2, Community Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans. At the request of GoS, the planned three to four CIM plan updates were transferred to the Bank-supported Pilot Program for Climate Resilience Enhancing the Climate Resilience of Coastal Resources and Communities Project (under preparation), where updated CIM Plans were to be carried out countrywide;  Drop Intermediate Results Indicator 1, “coastal protection repaired prior to next cyclone season,” as it was redundant with indicator 9 “km of seawalls repaired;” and  Drop Intermediate Results Indicator 5 “accessibility indicators under normal conditions and under degraded network performance,” as it was found to be ambiguous and it was not clear what was to be measured.

12. As a result of this restructuring, there were three PDO level (outcome) indicators (of which one was an IDA core indicator), and 11 intermediate results indicators, which are used in the final assessment of the Project’s achievements for this Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR).

Main Beneficiaries 13. The project implemented a number of priority physical investments that restored tsunami- damaged arterial and access roads, protective seawalls, and key bridges in the south and south-east of Upolu. It also constructed new alternative, inland routes and road access inland for the large number of households who voluntarily relocated away from hazard-prone coastal villages, and dual purpose access footpaths-cum-escape routes, which are well signed for use in the event of future extreme weather events. The main beneficiaries were community residents (men and women) of the 20 villages that had been damaged by the tsunami and, in particular, the nine villages in the Aleipata area that suffered the highest degree of destruction.

14. More than 80 percent of land in Samoa is held under customary ownership in the name of the matai, or head of the family, who has the authority over family land, which is similar to that of a trustee. The tsunami-impacted families living on lots in the coastal villages also had rights to inland family-held lands for agricultural purposes. After the tsunami, almost all families chose to voluntarily relocate to their inland land holdings. The construction of inland access roads and footpaths greatly facilitated the movement of people and goods between the coast and the new developments. According to a household survey carried out in the affected areas in early 2012, 50 percent of families sell produce from their plantations. Prior to the project investments, villagers either walked, went by horseback, or needed a four-wheel drive vehicle to travel to the plantations. With the upgrading and sealing of the roads, “travel has been made much easier to and from their plantations or the sea to go

4 fishing” with anecdotal evidence that livelihoods were re-established and even strengthened.5 As a result, although most villagers do not own their own vehicle, they now are able to make use of public buses and goods carriers, albeit incurring increased travel costs as recorded by the survey,6 and shared private motor vehicles.

15. Respondents in the 2012 survey noted a positive impact from the road investments as being closer (sic) to shops, closer to plantations, and closer to work. Also cited were school and church being more easily accessible. (Responses not available as disaggregated by gender).

16. While difficult to quantify, a number of trading stores and tourist operators were assisted in their economic recovery by the reinstatement and improvement of transport routes between villages and with the capital city, Apia and its international harbor and airport. The 2012 survey quoted a number of business owners and commercial operators as stating that the road upgrades had “quickened travel times substantially and greatly improved the linkages and travel between villages” and the capital city.

17. Other beneficiaries included eight private construction companies that benefitted from emergency clearance of road debris immediately after the tsunami, and the subsequent four and a half years in the construction of the Lepa-Lalomanu and Samusu-Lalomanu inland roads, upgrading and sealing of eight village access roads, rehabilitation of the Salani Bailey Bridge, construction of dual purpose pedestrian footpaths, and repairs to 14km of seawalls. Works on the roads and seawalls made use of simple, established designs and technology, and where possible, used locally sourced materials. Not only did this provide business opportunities for local consultants and contractors, it created an estimated 30 semi-skilled jobs for locally hired workers, many of whom came from the affected villages. This provided a cash injection into the broader economy and the devastated villages, and may have assisted with the psycho-social recovery of the villagers through the structured employment activities.

Original Components (as approved)

18. The Project had six components, as summarized below. The costs include local taxes, namely 15 percent Value Added General Services Tax (VAGST), which GoS subsequently waived.

Component 1: Upgrading of Existing Access Tracks and Seawalls (US$5.6 million)

19. Under this component, partial retroactive finance was provided for urgent works carried out bythe Land Transport Authority (LTA) immediately after the tsunami to: (i) provide access to relocation areas (upgrading and sealing existing roads); (ii) construct a new link road as an alternative route along the south coast above the disaster zone; (iii) reinstate damaged seawalls and construct new seawalls to protect the east and south coast roads; and (iv) reinstate access between coastal communities on either side of the Mulivaifagatola River. Specifically the following sub-components were included:

1.1 Lepa-Lalomanu Link Road (US$1.1 mil.): Upgrading of an agricultural access road to national road standards to provide road access to relocation areas and to serve as an alternative route along the south coast between Lepa and Lalomanu above the

5 Project Quarterly Progress Report #2, January-March 2012. 6 Prior to moving inland, most villagers spent Samoan Tala (SAT) 5 to SAT 10 per week on transport costs but this increased to SAT 40 per week by 2012. The increase was likely attributable to the longer distances now traveled due to the voluntary resettlement inland.

natural disaster risk zone. The road followed the route of an existing track. 1.2 Upgrading of Short Length Access Tracks (US$2.8 mil.): Upgrade existing tracks from the east and south coast roads through construction of 2km bitumen surfaced secondary and tertiary roads to areas where residents were relocating after the tsunami. Works were undertaken in response to requests from mayors of affected villages. 1.3 Seawalls Repair and Reconstruction (US$1.6 mil.): Repairs to a number of sea walls that were damaged or destroyed in the tsunami and which provide protection against erosion and wave damage for roads along the existing east and south coast. Seawalls were also restored and upgraded along critical lengths of other coastal roads. 1.4 Salani Bailey Bridge Repair (US$0.04 mil.): The Salani Bailey Bridge over Mulivaifagatola River connects neighboring villages and is a key link in the coastal road. An alternative route exists, but entails a long detour. The damage caused to the bridge by the tsunami was repaired under PTRP with GoS funding improvements to the bridge abutments and approaches. 1.5 Technical Assistance (US$0.06 mil.): Technical assistance was provided for storm-water drainage design along upgraded routes. Given the high annual rainfall and intensity of storms in the area, careful analysis and subsequent designs were required to minimize the risk of flooding, erosion and potentially serious damage to assets and/or the surrounding environment.

Component 2: Community Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans (US$0.2 million)

20. The component procured high resolution imagery of the affected and relocation areas, and updated the Coastal Infrastructure Management (CIM) Plans for these areas to assist with infrastructure planning and monitoring, and disaster risk reduction, including:

 2.1 Baseline Mapping of Affected Areas (US$0.01 mil.): Satellite imagery and GPS equipment were acquired for baseline maps in support of the recovery planning activities and as inputs for updates to community CIM plan, including (i) high resolution optical scenes of resettled areas dated after the tsunami event to delineate building footprints, for planning of the new communities, and as an up-to-date base layer for the CIM Plans; (ii) moderate to high resolution optical or radar scenes for eastern Upolu and interior as additional input to the CIM Plans and to support broader resource and hazard identification; and (iii) handheld GPS units to help the Planning and Urban Management Authority (PUMA) within the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE) to geo-reference new structures built in resettled areas.  2.2 Update Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans (US$0.01 mil.): Consulting services were provided to support the consultation and updating of district CIM Plans as originally developed through participatory planning approaches in 2005 and subsequently expanded by GoS to cover the entire country (i.e., no longer restricted to coastal communities) with support from the Bank-funded SIAM Project. The CIM Plans were used to develop community disaster risk management plans and/or climate adaptation strategies at the local level. This sub-component updated the CIM Plans in close consultation with affected communities and coordination with the Disaster Management Office’s risk awareness program for affected communities, including contingency and preparedness actions.

Component 3: East Coast Inland Route (Samusu-Lalomanu) (US$4.6 million)

21. This component provided a new inland road to both improve access to and for communities relocating inland from the east coast, and to provide a secure transport link between Samusu and Lalomanu. The need for such a road had been highlighted in the CIM Plans of the district, and the voluntary relocation inland of the population as a result of the tsunami increased the urgency for its construction. The component provided the following:

 3.1 Route Alignment Study, Design and Supervision (US$0.5 mil.): Consulting services to undertake a route alignment study, develop detailed designs, and supervise construction of the new road.  3.2 EIA of ECIR (US$0.1 mil.): The sub-component undertook a comprehensive environmental impact assessment of the new route.  3.3 Compensation Cost (to be determined): Compensation costs associated with land acquisition or compensation along the new route for affected persons were fully covered by GoS counterpart funding.  3.4 Road Construction (US$4.0 mil.): Costs to construct the new road.

Component 4: Dual-Purpose Pedestrian Access Routes (US$0.6 million)

22. The 10km narrow coastal plain on the south coast between Lepa and Matautu is constrained by a near-vertical 100m to 200m high escarpment that forms a physical barrier between the coast and inland area communities and prevented evacuation by the coastal communities prior to the tsunami. The component provided new and improved pedestrian access routes up the escarpment at regular intervals, both to facilitate access for resettled families between their new homes and the coast, and to serve as evacuation routes in the event of a tsunami or cyclone, through:

 4.1 Feasibility, Design and Supervision of Pedestrian Accesses (US$0.1 mil.): Investigating and designing pedestrian routes and supervising their construction.  4.2 Construction of Pedestrian Access Improvements (US$0.5 mil.): Constructing footpaths and stairways to provide access and emergency evacuation routes for pedestrians in coastal areas.

Component 5: Project Management and Support (US$0.3 million)

23. The Project financed support to implement the Project, including:

 5.1 Project Management (US$0.23 mil.): Support for in-house project management, administration, and monitoring activities by LTA and MNRE; and  5.2 Monitoring and Evaluation (US$0.07 mil.): Support for technical assistance to establish the Project evaluation framework and conduct before-and-after analysis of the Project’s impact on access to relocation areas and road network performance and resilience in the south-east corner of Upolu.

Component 6: Unallocated Funds (US$0.5 million): Although not a component, this was intended for contingencies and unforeseen needs. It is included here for completeness.

Revised Components

24. At the request of GoS, a Project Restructuring (Level Two) was processed and approved on April 18, 2013. As part of the restructuring, the following changes were made to the components:

a. Component 2 activities (CIM Plans) were transferred to the Bank-supported, second investment project under the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience, namely, the Enhancing the Climate Resilience of Coastal Resources and Communities Project (ECRCR). Under ECRCR, CIM Plans would be updated for the country as a whole, rather than being limited to three or four communities. This allowed for more specialist and cost-effective coverage of these items.

b. Reallocation of the US$200,000 from Component 2 to Component 4 to ensure there would be sufficient funds for the dual-purpose pedestrian access routes.

c. Reallocation of the Unallocated Funds (Component 6) to Component 1 ($390,000) to retroactively cover works variations, and Component 5 ($110,000) to extend the Project Management Unit’s (PMU’s) existing contract to manage day-to-day administration of the project during the 22 month project extension (to February 28, 2015) that was effected as a result of the restructuring. See the Financing Tables in Annex 1.

Other Significant Changes

25. The Project closing date was extended on two occasions.

26. On April 18, 2013, following a request from GoS, the closing date was formally extended by 22 months from an original closing date of April 30, 2013 to February 28, 2015. GoS had requested the extension because the detailed engineering designs for the East Coast Inland Route (ECIR) from Samusu to Lalomanu took longer than expected due to the need to thoroughly consult with affected communities along the alignment. At appraisal, an indicative alignment for ECIR was scoped and initial community consultations held regarding the proposed alignment. As a result of both the initial consultations and subsequent engineering inputs by LTA, a revised route was identified, which required additional time for new consultations to be carried out. It is worth noting that ECIR was the first new “greenfield” road to be constructed in Samoa in more than 40 years and as such, the responsible agencies themselves were learning as part of the design and construction process. In addition, the design of the dual-purpose pedestrian access routes, incorporated in the design services contract for ECIR was also held back as the required environmental impact assessment (EIA) for ECIR was rebid by LTA in an effort to attract a higher quality of responses. Furthermore, the need for a Land Acquisition and Resettlement Action Plan (LARAP) was triggered by the new inland route, and its preparation was included as part of the EIA consulting services. As the details of specific crops and trees, and affected customary land occupiers took some time to identify and finalize, the road detailed design work could not begin until the EIA had been completed. Although procurement for the road design consulting services continued to proceed, the final step of awarding the contract was held up, pending the processing of the request for a Project closing date extension.7

27. On January 5, 2015 a second extension to the Project’s closing date was approved, this time by six months to August 31, 2015, to: (i) allow sufficient time for community consultations; (ii) plan the locations and construction of pedestrian escape routes; and (iii) erect signage on ECIR and the

7 The design contract was negotiated and ready for award on October 17, 2012, but insufficient time would have remained to design and construct the works, hence the award was held in abeyance.

8 escape routes. Following the design inputs on ECIR, before the construction works could commence, carefully managed consultations and individual negotiations with affected customary land occupiers in eight villages were needed to ensure that the sensitive issues relating to traditional land usage and possible loss of crops and trees were both legally and socially dealt with, and thus compliant with both GoS and Bank safeguards requirements. Once construction had commenced, there were a small number of lingering grievances raised by affected residents in the last year of implementation, particularly regarding the discharge of water runoff from the road into their properties. One or two reneged on earlier agreements to allow contractor access to the site, which resulted in further delays. GoS had requested the extension of the closing date to ensure that full construction of ECIR and the dual purpose pedestrian routes could be completed and all Project funds fully utilized.

Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

28. Project preparation, design and quality at entry is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

29. The Bank’s longstanding engagement in the transport and disaster risk management sectors in Samoa through Phases I and II of the Infrastructure Asset Management Program (SIAM) and the Cyclone Emergency Recovery Project (CERP)8 helped to put in place the foundations for sound recovery and reconstruction. As examples, the 2006 Disaster and Emergency Management Act, establishment of response and recovery planning mechanisms and structures, and commercialization of LTA’s functions underpinned the early, well-coordinated planning and direction provided by the central Government for the recovery efforts, as well as the subsequent effective public-private sector partnerships for efficient and cost-effective reconstruction respectively. For example, national competitive bidding and strong contract management by LTA, resulted in final construction costs of the 19.6km upgraded access roads at 25 per cent less than the cost estimates made at appraisal.

30. Project design drew on recommendations made by the GoS’ Post Disaster Needs Assessment that had been supported by a World Bank-led team of experts joined by the United Nations Development Program and the Asian Development Bank (all mobilized in the country within two weeks of the tsunami), and the Bank’s experience in post-disaster reconstruction in the Region, including specific lessons learned from the Samoa CERP ICR. Relevant lessons learned as incorporated into Project design (as detailed in the Project Appraisal Document) are summarized below.

 Structural investments should be designed to incorporate the natural hazard and climate risks they will face and not merely to previous standards.9 Project designs included inputs by a specialist drainage engineer to assess the flood risks and flood management options to safeguard the new road infrastructure and incorporate consideration of longer term climate risks.

 Reallocating resources from existing projects affects the ability to attain long-term development goals and is less effective than specific reconstruction lending. The flexibility of the Rapid Response to Crisis and Emergency Policy (OP/BP 8.00) of the Bank to allow for retroactive financing of expenses incurred by GoS during the relief

8 Following the devastating impacts of 2004 Tropical Cyclone Heta. 9 The passage of Cyclone Rene on February 14, 2010 and the tsunami warning following the Chile Earthquake of February 27, 2010, although fortunately did not materialize into significant events in Samoa, were continuous reminders of the potential risks faced by the country.

and early recovery stages of the disaster, for post-Board disclosure of Environmental and Social Safeguards documents and shorter time frames to process civil engineering and reconstruction activities.

 Project design should be simple, based on extensive participation by local communities and beneficiaries, and take into account local implementation capacity. The project took advantage of the previously prepared (under SIAM) CIM Plans that were drafted in close consultation with the communities before the tsunami had occurred and had already identified a number of mitigation options and existing plantation tracks for relocation of roads and paths to reduce cyclone and tsunami risks within the affected areas. The works proposed under the Project – repairs and reconstruction of existing seawalls and roads, improvement of tracks and construction of a new road with associated drainage – were based on simple, conventional, technology and similar in nature and scope to the type of works that the Ministry of Works, Transport & Infrastructure (MWTI), LTA, and their consultants and contractors had been designing and implementing under the SIAM (Phases I and II) Program over the past decade and resulted in little variance between cost estimates made at appraisal and the eventual bid and construction prices. LTA managers and staff (mostly long-serving MWTI staff transferred to LTA shortly before the Project) had acquired extensive design and construction supervision experience. LTA maintains an accurate database of the national road network (Samoa Asset Management System) from which accurate data on individual road lengths and mapping could be obtained to prepare bid documents.

 In small countries with relatively small construction sector methodologies for calculating contracts and tendering process needs to be carefully designed and flexible allowing for “slice and package”10 approaches and the possibility of bids to be repackaged or re-advertised. This operation anticipated slice and package bidding for the road upgrades and road construction which resulted in, for example, a single contractor winning both Lots 1 and 3 on the Lepa-Lalomanu link road construction and an estimated saving of Samoan Tala (SAT) 120,000 (about US$46,200).

 Supervision needs to be relatively intensive. This is especially true for emergency operations, when many details are left to be addressed during implementation.

31. As a result of the intensive preparatory design work by the Bank and the strong leadership provided by GoS as coordinated by Ministry of Finance, PTRP development objectives were closely aligned with the Government’s reconstruction priorities as set out in its National Tsunami Recovery Plan 2010-2013 and all premised on the principle of “build back better.” The Project directly addressed slightly less than half of the identified US$27.9 million for transport sector reconstruction and new construction needs that, at the time, were beyond the financial ability of GoS.

32. The Project clearly fell within the ambit of the Bank’s broader development objectives for the region (as elaborated in the Pacific Regional Engagement Framework FY2006-2009) to help reduce the vulnerability of the small island states to economic and physical shocks by enabling risk reduction through the voluntary relocation of communities to safer locations and to strengthen government capabilities in service delivery, including “safeguarding service delivery by improving

10 Slice and Package: A large homogeneous contract is sliced into smaller similar contracts that are bid simultaneously so as to attract the interest of both small and large firms. Firms may offer bids on individual contracts (slices) or on a group of similar contracts (packages) and award is made to the combination of bids offering the lowest cost to the Employer.

10 resilience to natural hazards” and improving incentives for private sector-led growth and employment. These synergies helped to ensure strong and sustained leadership and oversight by the Ministry of Finance as chair of the Project Steering Committee through the four and a half years of implementation. In addition, the Bank was timely in its initial response (the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment, or PDNA, mission visited Samoa within two weeks of the tsunami), design (appraisal and negotiations of the new Project took place within nine months of receiving GoS’s official request for support), and in assisting Samoa to garner early co-financing support from the Australian Government through the Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility, or PRIF (in principle approval within six to eight weeks of the tsunami).

33. PTRP’s development objective was conceptually simple but ambitious and well-focused and ultimately proved to be effective. The construction of strategic, all-weather inland access and links successfully facilitated the voluntary resettlement inland to safer locations of a large number of households who had previously lived on hazard-prone land. The ambitious resettlement was made possible by the cumulative effects of the Government’s vision in recognizing and being willing to support the spontaneous population movement and its (GoS’s) early request for enabling support, and the speed with which the access roads were constructed (making use of 40 percent of advance contracting and retroactive financing as allowed under OP/BP 8.00), which all served to capitalize on the post-tsunami willingness of households to voluntarily relocate. It was further enabled (after delay) by the provision of basic potable water supplies by other agencies (e.g. the Samoa Red Cross) to some of the relocated communities, and the fact that the affected coastal households already owned the inland allotments and so no compulsory (and often times) lengthy land acquisition was needed. This success of the voluntary relocation and thus the ab initio risk reduction of at risk communities holds important lessons for resilience building throughout the vulnerable Pacific Island countries.

34. However, although PTRP’s development objective directly supported this transformation, the PDO level indicators did not include a measure of whether or not this was achieved. One of the intermediate indicators was the “% of relocated houses with improved access… to social/educational/commercial opportunities.” Fortunately, during the course of implementation, it appears that LTA and the PMU misread the wording of the indicator and did in fact monitor and report on the “% of households that relocated” even though the indicator wording per the Project design was slightly ambiguous.

35. Most project risks were identified at appraisal. Based on the Bank’s previous experience in Samoa, risks focused on the volume of on-going projects, and procurement and contract management that LTA and contractors were experiencing and which would intensify through the requirements of PTRP’s reconstruction activities. Project design, therefore, incorporated a provision for supplementary project management, and technical and specialized engineering support for LTA. It further called for implementation “to be stretched” over a two-year period, which although ideal for a reconstruction project, and strongly called for by the Government during preparation, proved to be too ambitious. While the major portion of works were completed in the first 12 months of the project, the new East Coast Inland Road, as the only new road to be constructed in 40 years, proved more complex than initially anticipated, both in terms of the engineering designs required for the difficult terrain to be traversed, and the time consuming, but necessary, environmental and social studies and consultations required by the works. Misjudging the complexities associated with this new road and underestimating the associated challenge of acquiring the needed land was a noteworthy shortcoming of the project’s design. The cost and time required to carry out extensive community consultations and repeated meetings with some landowners to overcome resistance to the road were directly responsible for a second extension of PTRP’s closing date. Additional resources to address these challenges during implementation should have been anticipated during preparation.

36. An important risk, while identified at design, but not systematically monitored during implementation, was that of inter-agency coordination in the reconstruction activities needed to underwrite and sustain the voluntary relocation of at-risk coastal communities. The ultimate success of the Project was dependent on the reinstatement of not only road and footpath access as provided under the Project but also of power, water, telecommunications and other complementary services in the affected areas. The need for coordination was recognized at appraisal as posing a substantial risk, but measures to hold “regular meetings at key stages of implementation” and expansion of the Steering Committee, in practice, proved to be insufficient. According to LTA and PMU records, close to 100 percent households from the affected coastal villages had moved inland within 18 months of the tsunami. However, over the next 18 months, around 14 percent of these subsequently began to drift back to the coast citing the lack of potable water and power in the inland villages as their reason for the reversal.11 As funding for these “lifeline” services in the inland villages becomes available, some households are once again moving inland.

Implementation

37. The Project was declared effective on April 27, 2011, four and a half months after signing of the Financing Agreement on December 14, 2010. The use of Additional Conditions of Effectiveness was limited. Therefore, in spite of GoS and LTA being heavily stretched in post-disaster recovery responsibilities, the Project became effective close to the planned date.12

38. The Project was restructured after two years of implementation to: (i) transfer Component 2 activities (CIM Plans) to a larger Bank-supported Pilot Project for Climate Resilience (PPCR) Project under preparation at the time and which would carry out comprehensive CIM Plans updating throughout the country; and (ii) make modest adjustments to the funding category allocations and the results framework intermediate indicators. PTRP’s closing date was extended twice at the requests of GoS, for a combined total of 28 months so as to allow adequate time for the EIA, detailed engineering designs, community and landowner consultations, and finally, the construction, of the new ECIR and pedestrian paths. ECIR (between Samusu and Lalomanu was the first major new road outside of any existing alignment to be constructed in Samoa since 1971 and required intensive inter- agency, engineering design and community consultations that had not been fully anticipated at the time of appraisal.

39. The Project was not at risk at any time and all activities were completed within budget. The construction costs of ECIR closely matched the appraisal estimate but 12.8 percent (US$0.5m) of the costs were finally met by a related road project supported by the Bank (Enhanced Road Access Project - ERAP), as a larger than appraised amount was spent on the construction of the much-needed pedestrian escape routes and seawalls along the steep and high energy coastline. During PTRP’s first year, rapid procurement and construction of the Lepa to Lalomanu road, the eight inland access roads, and reinstatement of the key Salani Bridge took place. From late-2012, IP was rated as Moderately Satisfactory and the project closing date was extended on two occasions (by a total 28 months) as a result of the challenging design, EIA and community consultation processes needed for the new (‘greenfield’ alignments) of ECIR and pedestrian access routes through difficult terrain. Nonetheless, all works were finally fully completed within the extended closing date.

11 See Project Quarterly Progress Report No. 14, January to March 2015, Annex C. 12 Effectiveness was three weeks after the planned date, accommodated through a formally agreed extension to the effectiveness date (letter from IDA to MoF dated April 13, 2011)

40. When the project closed on August 31, 2015, all activities were completed and all project development objective outcomes were 100 percent achieved (see Data Sheet). A summary of project outputs by component is provided in Annex 2.

41. The factors that contributed to successful implementation or gave rise to problems during implementation are summarized below by component and provided in more detail in Annex 2.

Component 1: Upgrading of Existing Access Tracks and Seawalls (US$6.84 million; 57.2 percent of total Project cost)

42. This core component was the most successful from several perspectives. Firstly, within 11 months after the tsunami, and to ensure that the affected communities were not caught unprepared in next cyclone season, LTA quickly used its own resources to fully clear debris, open up key affected main roads and, making use of the Project’s advance procurement facility (OP/BP 8.00), engaged contractors to upgrade and seal existing access roads off the east and south coast arterial roads for emergency evacuation and resettlement. A total 19.6km (against a target estimated at appraisal of 20km) were upgraded and bitumen sealed and completed by August 2010.

43. Retroactive financing was utilized by LTA to upgrade an existing agricultural track between Lepa and Lalomanu (10.6km, against the appraisal target of 10km) to national road standards to provide an alternative route along the south coast above the natural disaster risk zone. The work was completed in September 2010. Retroactive financing too was used to reimburse LTA for repairs it made to the approaches and debris-damaged abutments of the Salani Bailey Bridge across the Mulivaifagatola River, which enabled LTA to quickly reinstate a key east-west link on the southern coastal route by July 21, 2010. LTA also made use of retroactive financing to restore and upgrade seawalls along critical lengths of the coastline, in all defending 9km of shoreline, all completed by January 2012 (again fully meeting the appraisal target).

44. All works were reconstructed and upgraded to high design standards and met the targets set both at appraisal and by the later Project restructuring and made use of specialized engineering inputs (once again using advance contracting) for the detailed design of storm-water drainage to reduce risks of flooding and erosion in the high rainfall area. The works were all carried out by six domestic contractors who, rather than increasing prices under the reconstruction circumstances, became noticeably competitive and responsive to the business opportunities being let. Final construction costs of the eight access roads were 25 percent less than the estimate at appraisal, and the Lepa to Lalomanu link road only 2.3 percent higher than appraised. The savings allowed for additional strengthening of the protective works along the coastline. As planned originally, 9km of coastline was protected, but at a cost of 44 percent more than the estimate at appraisal.

45. The working arrangements between the affected communities, local village leadership and LTA were collaborative from the early identification and prioritization of works to the employment opportunities created for affected villagers as semi-skilled day labor on the contracts. Ex-post site visits by the Bank’s project team to each of the subprojects confirmed that most are being well utilized, operated and, with coordination by the Mayors, maintained by community groups.

Component 2: Community Coastal Infrastructure Management (CIM) Plans (US$0 million; 0 percent of total Project cost)

46. The roads (above) had been identified under previously prepared village Coast Infrastructure Management (CIM) plans and were put forward as priority reconstruction needs by the Pulenu’u (village Mayors). Component 2 was to have updated the mapping of affected and relocation areas,

13 and revised the existing CIM Plans. However, at the request of GoS (October 2, 2012), these activities were transferred to the second investment project under the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience, which planned to update CIM Plans countrywide, and which permitted more comprehensive and cost- effective coverage of these items. The transfer was formally processed as part of a Level 2 restructuring approved on May 8, 2013 before any activities under the Project could take place.

Component 3: East Coast Inland Route (Samusu-Lalomanu) (US$3.91 million; 32.7 percent of total Project cost)

47. A suitable road corridor was roughly scoped at appraisal and subsequently more closely identified. LTA, with assistance from GoS Ministries, discussed and agreed the final route with the village Pulenu’u and residents at a number of meetings in late 2011. Procurement for consulting engineering design and supervision services commenced in early 2012. However, the final contract award (evaluated in October 2012) was held in abeyance until an extension to the Project’s closing date was processed in order to ensure sufficient time for implementation.

48. Once design was completed, the Engineer’s Estimate for the works was SAT 12.2 million and higher than the appraisal estimate of SAT 9.1 million. Factors contributing to the higher estimate included changes in the exchange rate of the domestic currency to US$, unexpected and costly stream crossings along the route, and remedial works needed to ensure minimum safety and environmental standards at the conveniently located Lalomanu Quarry site. Prior works on the protective measures along the coastline (Component 1) had resulted in higher than appraised expenditure on that Component. Because ECIR was a high priority for GoS, it sought options to cover the shortfall in funding. GoS and the Bank subsequently agreed to finance the shortfall in funding for the works contracts (up to US$500,000, 12.5 percent of the final construction costs) from the Enhanced Road Access Project, which was also being implemented by LTA.

49. Compensation to affected land owners was paid for loss of trees using the GoS approved and updated national schedule of compensation. However, due to the larger than anticipated number of trees finally affected, compensation costs increased from the original estimate of SAT 200,000 to SAT 800,000, which LTA fully met from its own resources.

50. Works were competitively awarded in three Lots of 2.4km, 1km and 1.8km to two domestic contractors and works on two of the Lots initially progressed well and ahead of schedule although clearing of a final 730m of land was delayed due to a chief of the district reversing his earlier agreement to allow construction of the road over his land. In the case of the third Lot, after some initial delays by the contractor in mobilizing, works were further delayed in the last year of implementation when five of the customary land owners asked for additional compensation and for a diversion in the road after raising grievances regarding discharge of water runoff onto their properties. The provisions in the LARAP were followed and LTA provided counterpart funds for crop compensation triggered by the new ECIR. LTA’s Public Relations Officer met with affected land owners and after some time, was able to resolve all the issues, albeit that there are a few lingering concerns regarding the drainage of runoff. The works were completed within the extended Project closing date and within budget (supplemented by the ERAP funds for a portion of the works due to an earlier over-expenditure on urgently needed coastal protection works at various sites under Component 1).

51. The maintenance period for the three contracts ended after the project’s closing date. With experience gained on past Bank-funded projects, LTA handled this by requesting the release of retention funds from the Project before the closing date on the basis of bank guarantees to cover the full retention period.

52. Project design had assumed that the participatory processes to be used in updating the CIM Plans would mitigate the risks associated with customary landowners’ agreement to the alignment of the new road. After Component 2 had been cancelled (transferred to the PPCR project under preparation at the time), the consultation processes were not as strong as needed. Even if Component 2 had remained under PTRP, the Project design could have explored this risk posed by a new road more fully and specified a supplementary social specialist and customary land rights or other measures to support LTA, just as it had provided for specialist engineering support to address drainage design risks under Component 1.

Component 4: Dual-Purpose Pedestrian Access/Escape Routes (US$0.79 million; 6.6 percent of total Project cost)

53. Rather than procure and thereafter have to manage multiple separate contracts, a variation to one of the road construction contracts was processed to construct the pedestrian escape routes. These were carried out under day-work charges (time basis), which simplified approvals, processing times and contract administration. Specific locations were identified using a generic design adaptable to all selected sites prepared by consultant engineers. Development consent for the paths was lodged with the responsible authority (Planning and Urban Management Unit, MNRE) on October 17, 2014. Although the time needed for MNRE to locate all landowners and obtain their individual consents took longer than the originally planned six months, the escape routes were fully completed in July 2015.

Component 5: Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation (US$0.41 million; 3.4 percent of total Project cost)

54. The design of the Project Management and monitoring and evaluation component, the institutional arrangements (limited to only two implementing agencies), and oversight by a well- representative Steering Committee (including expanded membership by utility agencies for coordination purposes) were based on recent experience with SIAM and CERP, and so based on proven approaches.

55. LTA engaged the services of a qualified and experienced supervising engineer for the duration of the Project to ensure that all works were constructed according to specification and contracts managed effectively.

56. The PMU led the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities and provided financial management each of which are reported on in relevant sections of the ICR below.

Monitoring and Evaluation Design, Implementation and Utilization

57. &E activities of the Project was based on the Results Framework of development objective outcome and intermediate outcome indicators. The Results Framework was included in the Project’s legal agreements, and so were more onerous to adjust to respond to changed circumstances during implementation. In retrospect, the Framework should have been omitted from the Financing Agreement as part of the 2013 restructuring. While values for the indicators were largely available from existing sources and did not pose a challenge to collect, the indicators tended to focus on Project activities themselves and the development objective indicators were more akin to output indicators than a measure of overall outcomes. While the objective to support the relocation of communities could be monitored and finally evaluated through the various indicators, the objective to support the rehabilitation of tsunami affected communities was more problematic. Only the intermediate indicator #4 (percent of relocated houses with improved access to social/ educational/ commercial

15 opportunities) spoke to this second objective. The household surveys and focus group discussions conducted throughout implementation yielded useful information in this respect but the overarching goal of the Government to enable to strengthen the resilience of communities by the reduction of risk (through voluntary relocation) was not included for measurement.

58. The PMU led M&E activities and during the first two years of the Project, collecting data and the quality of the information was acceptable. Data was gathered through a combination of primary and secondary research tools. The bulk of the monitoring data needed to be collected on the ground through a combination of site visits and interviews. Progress on the roads was primarily captured from LTA’s Samoa Asset Management System database. Socio-economic data was captured through interviews with local leaders, families and traders living in the Project area.

59. However, for a year after the Project was restructured (May 2013 through February 2014), no formal reporting was made on the restructured Project’s performance indicators. The PMU was tasked with providing relevant data for the revised indicators to retrospectively cover the entire implementation period of the Project, but this was not done satisfactorily.

60. Three extensive socio-economic surveys were undertaken by social specialists in December 2011, February 2012, and February to March and August 2015. Information was collected from residents and users of each of the upgraded tracks and main road rehabilitated under the Project, using the following survey instruments:

i. Group consultations with village mayors held in Apia on February 19, 2015 at the MWCSD hall;

ii. Group consultations with women’s representatives to the respective Village Councils and other women’s groups, as well as representatives from youth groups in the Aleipata District;

iii. Personal interviews with randomly selected households on each upgraded track and four traders and two transport operators; and

iv. A separate quantitative household survey of 172 respondents (49 percent male, 51 percent female), which was undertaken in August 2015 to establish whether the main project objectives had been achieved.

61. The surveys were carried out in the ten villages of Lalomanu, Lepa, Saleapaga, Ulutogia, Vailoa, Satitoa, Malaela, Mutiatele, Saleaaumua and Utufaalalafa. Survey results identified design issues (for example regarding route alignment and drainage discharge) for further attention by LTA engineers and provided GoS and the Bank with the views of residents regarding the relevance and overall satisfaction with the Project investments.13 For example, a female Matai (leader) representing one of the families affected by ECIR publically articulated the community’s appreciation for the road. She identified a key part of the assistance as being ECIR and associated access routes as together they provide an effective means of escape, as well as an improved level of security and comfort in continuing to live along and make use of the coastline.

13 However, it must be noted that although both men and women were equally represented in the sampled households, the analysis of the data was not gender disaggregated and as such, the different needs and views of men and women was not reported on.

Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

62. PTRP triggered safeguards policies on Environmental Assessment (OP4.01) and Involuntary Resettlement (OP4.12), and compliance was considered satisfactory throughout implementation. The Bank’s standard safeguards procedure is to have environmental documents publically disclosed prior to Board submission, but since PTRP had to be processed rapidly, they were prepared and disclosed after Board approval, as allowed for under OP/BP 8.00-Emergency Procedures.

63. Environment (OP4.01). The tsunami caused widespread damage to roads, seawalls, beaches, trees and crops, and buildings. PTRP was designed to restore the physical structures in their original positions using sound engineering principles. The Project was classified as a Category B project requiring partial assessment at appraisal. A set of operating procedures was agreed for routine smaller works with minimal environmental impacts that were considered localized and manageable (dust generation, generation of solid and liquid wastes from workers, and similar), based on a set of Codes of Environmental Practice (COEPs) that are compulsory in Samoa on all publicly financed civil works contracts. Larger sub-projects, with potentially higher environmental impacts and beyond the scope of the COEPs, were the subject to Environmental Management Plans (EMPs) drawn up and approved by PUMA. The requirement for an EIA was triggered in the case of the new Samusu-Lalomanu inland route. Once the new alignment was determined, an Environmental Specialist was contracted by LTA to independently prepare the EIA, which was reviewed and approved by MNRE as part of the Development Consent application requirements for the works.

64. Both the EMPs and Land and Resettlement Framework (LARF) were adopted and legally binding on GoS as one of the conditions of project effectiveness. The EMP compliance target was 100 percent throughout the life of the Project and was met in all years. Both Bank and counterpart safeguard experts in PUMA monitored and ensured that safeguard conditions were observed. Safeguards assessments carried out during implementation were Satisfactory.

65. The condition of the Lalomanu Quarry was a cause for concern during implementation. Lalomanu Quarry was the preferred source of aggregate for use by the ECIR contractors due to its convenient location to the main works sites, but required some protective works to be carried out in order to comply with Samoa’s COEP 8 for Quarry Development and Operations.

66. Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12). The exact route alignments of the roads and pedestrian routes under Components 3 and 4 had not been confirmed at the time of appraisal. A Land Acquisition and Resettlement Framework was prepared and disclosed by GoS prior to effectiveness. Only the new Samusu-Lalomanu Inland Route, as a new road and not in an existing alignment, potentially raised the need for acquisition of freehold land parcels. However, once the exact alignment was determined, no formal land acquisition was needed as the whole site is under customary tenure and triggering of the “Taking of Lands Act,” which is administered by MNRE, was not necessary.

67. LTA's Legal Division prepared legal agreements in perpetuity with each of the eight villages involved and these were countersigned by the relevant Matai’i (Chiefs) in each case. The agreements will be registered in the MNRE Land Records and constitute permanent evidence of the agreements. A full LARAP was prepared by a specialist and endorsed by MNRE. The LARAP was based on the guidelines provided in the LARF and Samoa Codes of Environmental Practice. It provided details of specific land parcels affected and to be surveyed for specific impacts on details related to land owners, magnitude and cost of project affected land (none) and other assets that may require compensation. It was documented and disclosed on GoS and Bank websites. The LARAP identified individual occupiers whose crops would be disturbed by the road and set out the compensation to be applied. Affected landowners were compensated by LTA from its own resources at a final total cost of SAT

800,000 primarily due to the large number of old coconut plantation trees needing removal and disposal to prevent rhinoceros beetle infestation. The process was well implemented and documented in Aide-Memoires.

Fiduciary

68. Procurement. A total of 25 works and services contracts were procured under PTRP, including advance procurement before the Project became effective. Contracts for the three ICB road works were announced through the LTA website. Works for the eight national competitive bidding (NCB) contracts were announced through local and national newspapers. Nine works contracts were awarded using the Shopping (Request for Quotations) method. Market response was generally positive with all works (including the three international competitive bidding, or ICB, contracts) competitively awarded to domestic contractors. In the case of Component 1 road works, bid prices were some 25 percent lower than the estimate at appraisal. In the case of Component 3, as a result of the slice and package approach, one contractor was awarded two Lots with a resultant estimated saving of SAT 120,000 (about US$46,200).

69. Procurement performance was rated as either Satisfactory or Moderately Satisfactory throughout implementation. LTA demonstrated strong ownership and took on responsibility for procuring and evaluating all works and services contracts. However, due to LTA’s own small size and other responsibilities, the Project Management Team/PMU, responsible for providing implementation support, was provided feedback by the Bank project team that it also needed to assist LTA by drafting bid documents and review packages to ensure completeness and compliance with procedures before submission was made to the Bank for no objection purposes. Unfortunately, this was not always heeded in a timely way, which contributed to protracted procurement processes in, for example, the ECIR EIA and design contracts.

70. Financial Management. Financial management under the project was Satisfactory. The financial management arrangements made use of systems established under the SIAM-2 project whereby a Special Account was not established, and expenditures were reimbursed. Basically, GoS pre-financed Project expenditures and submitted Withdrawal Applications for reimbursement by the Project. The PMU was responsible for the day-to-day financial management activities including accounting, budgeting, internal control, funds flow, financial reporting and auditing. While the PMU monitored the Project budget, it did a poor job of estimating funds required and interim Financial Management Reports were not always submitted on time. However overall, Project audits reported no significant weaknesses in internal controls.

71. Counterpart funds were not required except for compensating affected landowners for crops, which amounted to SAT 800,000 and were provided in a full and timely manner by LTA from its own resources. LTA provided a further US$34,050 from its own sources for repairs to the approaches and abutments to Salani Bridge.

72. The Project Financing Agreements stated that eligible expenditures under both the IDA Credit and PRIF Trust Fund (TF) Grant were to be 100% financed (i.e., inclusive of taxes, being 15 percent VAGST). In line with the approach used under SIAM-2, GoS agreed to forego the VAGST.

Post-Completion Operation/Next Phase

73. The roads and seawalls rehabilitated under PTRP have been incorporated into LTA’s Samoa Asset Management System database and are regularly maintained with annual budget provisions. The LTA Act of 2007 sets out sources of revenue for LTA, which includes “levies and fees imposed

18 on road users by the Authority” and “all money appropriated by Parliament.” In terms of the Act, following natural disasters (e.g., the 2009 tsunami), LTA may be called upon by the Minister to assist with the immediate post-recovery efforts and reconstruction works, all of which are clearly beyond LTA’s typical routine or periodic maintenance programs with some of the small village access roads outside the prescribed national road network. In these instances, LTA was reimbursed for direct costs incurred through PTRP funds. In keeping with country-wide practices, village access roads are being maintained by the men in user communities with coordination provided by local leaders.

74. PTRP has enabled a large number of households to voluntarily relocate inland to safer locations. While there is a risk that households may, over time, drift back to the coastline, indications from the social surveys are such that once reliable, potable water and power supplies can be supplied to the inland villages, residents are likely to remain inland given their demonstrably improved access to economic livelihoods (plantations), health, education and social and cultural facilities.

75. In keeping with the needs of a small country with limited human and financial resources, the design of the investments requires straightforward, planned periodic inspections and general maintenance, such as vegetation control. From site visits carried out by the Bank Team, LTA appears to be monitoring and carrying out maintenance for the project works.

Assessment of Outcomes

Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

76. Rating: Substantive.

77. Relevance of objectives. The development objectives of PTRP directly supported the Government’s commitment at the time of appraisal to facilitate the voluntary and smooth relocation of communities from hazardous to safer locations. The objectives remain relevant to the Government’s recently prepared Strategy for the Development of Samoa 2012-2016, which articulates ongoing national to a number of relevant strategic areas including:

 supporting cost effective infrastructure;  enforcing construction standards for roads and drainage, including pedestrian safety and climate resilience;  strengthening disaster preparedness, response capacity, and implementing revised CIM Plans; and  mainstreaming climate change and disaster risk management.

78. At the global level, Samoa’s past efforts to enhance the sustainability of assets, manage its natural resources and respond to disaster risks through an effective partnership with private sector stakeholders are well recognized as demonstrated by it being among only 16 countries worldwide selected to receive substantial Climate Investment Funds. It continues to implement the activities, which are seen as being able to result in deep and transformational change.

79. Project objectives are also consistent with the Bank’s current Country Partnership Strategy 2012-2016, which calls for “strengthened planning systems and public expenditure management” as being “critical to ensure efficiencies and maintain service delivery standards.” It confirms that “given vulnerabilities, targeted investments to improve Samoa’s long-term resilience to natural disasters and climate change will be a key focus for new Bank engagement.”

80. Relevance of design and implementation. Project design was relevant to the needs of GoS and people of Samoa in the aftermath of the 2009 tsunami. Implementation by LTA with strong inter-donor coordination and consultations with affected communities was appropriate and consistent with the reconstruction efforts undertaken across the country. As called for by the current country strategy, PTRP’s three main components (1, 3 and 4) targeted LTA to work in partnership with the increasingly capable private sector to address disaster reconstruction needs and ensure high service delivery standards. By enabling the voluntary relocation of villagers to inland locations away from the coastline, PTRP was able to support transformational change and improve the Aleipata district’s long-term resilience to natural disasters and climate change.

Achievement of Project Development Objectives

81. Rating: High.

82. PTRP’s development objective was to assist GoS in its efforts to support the relocation and rehabilitation of communities living in the island of Upolu affected by the tsunami of September 29, 2009 through the provision of improved infrastructure access to relocation sites, enhanced transport infrastructure, and assisting local communities to address future natural disasters.

83. With the exception of Indicator 3, which had a target that originally included all roads to be rehabilitated under the project, PDO level indicators were fully achieved (see Data Sheet) and the Indicator 3 target as agreed during the course of implementation between LTA, PMU and the Bank Team (albeit not formally revised) was easily achieved.

84. Regarding the long term “rehabilitation” of the communities, according to the results of longitudinal household surveys that interviewed the same households in the same villages in 2012 and 2015, the overwhelming responses from the residents in the affected area is that PTRP’s development objectives were achieved, as illustrated in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Baseline and Final Survey of Residents

85. Construction of ECIR and upgrading of the Lepa-Lalomanu route both provided significant outcomes by providing all-weather alternatives to the coastal roads. These investments in the strategically located roads were a key factor in enabling the relocation of previously at-risk communities. The roads also contributed to climate resilience of the communities they served as they are located outside risk areas. People are safer due to the construction of numerous pedestrian access routes that serve as evacuation routes in the event of extreme weather events.

3.3 Efficiency

Economic Rate of Return and Cost Effectiveness

86. The project was an emergency response operation and no economic or financial analyses were carried out during appraisal.

87. However, the following is a summary assessment based on a Value for Money (VfM) approach to rate the extent to which the project was implemented efficiently and effectively with due regard to economy and quality. The VfM is rated as Substantive based on a number of criteria (below), all of which rate the project positively:

 Project investments met the objectives for which they were conceived – rated Positive (justification: see section 3.2 achievement of PDO);

 The financial, human and physical resources consumed in realizing the investments made were consistent with acceptable norms – rated Positive (justification: see section 2.3 Fiduciary Compliance);  Overall, actual costs were within one percent of estimates provided at appraisal (justification: see Annex 1);  The process through which the investments were realized are consistent with accepted rules and regulations – rated Positive (justification: see section 2.2 Implementation);  The quality of finished structural investments were constructed to the durable standard agreed upon and competitive bidding processes gave rise to acceptable and fairly priced unit rates – rated Positive (justification: see sections 2.2 and 2.3); and  The impact and utilization of the investments is to the degree expected – rated Positive (justification: see section 3.2 achievement of PDO).

Financial Rate of Return

88. PTRP added approximately 35.6km of upgraded or new roads to the Samoa road network and 9km of seawalls. At appraisal, it was recognized that this would add to the overall cost of road maintenance in Samoa, but as the country had a strong road maintenance capability, it was estimated that LTA had the capacity to maintain these road and seawall investments. This capacity had been developed for more than ten years with Bank support as part of the SIAM projects. Successful reforms in the sector included the outsourcing of routine and emergency road maintenance to the private sector under a system of annual performance-based road maintenance contracts, and the recent establishment of LTA as a semi-autonomous government agency with its own Board, qualified staff and funding from a combination of earmarked road user charges and GoS budget allocations.

89. However, the recently completed Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) prepared for SIAM Phase II found that in 2014, LTA’s road maintenance expenditure was SAT 20.0 million per year, of which only SAT 14.0 million was able to be raised from the fuel levy. The shortfall of SAT 6.0 million per year is provided as an equity payment by the Government on which the LTA is required to pay the Government 7 percent interest annually, giving rise to a growing cumulative level of debt. The ICR for SIAM also found that LTA’s financial performance is being further undermined by a number of unfunded mandates that it is required to attend to, including responding to carry out rapid road clearance and opening works during extreme climatic events. The costs of meeting such community service obligations have not always been met with additional funding from the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and as such, the sustainable self-financing of LTA’s operations is a bit uncertain.

90. Under PTRP, LTA was reimbursed US$3.99 million for eligible expenditures on emergency works carried out shortly after the tsunami between September 30, 2009 and December 14, 2010. However, from December 20, 2010 through May 20, 2011, at the behest of GoS, LTA contracted additional road and seawall reconstruction in an amount of SAT 17,194,581 ( about US$7.38 million) (see Annex 2). These works were not financed under the Project and it is not clear if GoS will reimburse LTA for these expenditures, which would add to financing burden of the Authority and potentially further jeopardize its long-term financial health. However, LTA continues to closely monitor this financial situation and to make well-justified annual representations for reimbursement.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

91. Rating: Satisfactory.

92. As the project was restructured and Component 2 (CIM Plans) deleted from the project, consideration was given to a possible split evaluation of the overall outcome rating (viz. before and after restructuring taking into account the revised Results Framework). However, taking into account that the restructuring did not amend the development objectives or any key associated outcome targets and that no activities had commenced under Component 2 at the time of restructuring, it was decided that a split evaluation was not warranted. The overall rating is based on: (a) the ongoing relevance of the project to both the Government’s national programs and the Bank’s Regional Strategy (see Section 3.1);

(b) a review of achievements of the main project objectives and positive assessment of the likelihood of long term sustainability of the outcomes (see Section 3.2);

(d) the efficiency assessment (see Section 3.3).

Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

93. Socio-economic data is not routinely collected by GoS. However, the baseline and end of project social surveys and meetings with village mayors confirmed that other than during the months following the tsunami, there was/is no food insecurity in the three main affected districts. The local economy of the Aleipata area is largely based on agriculture and tourism. The Samoa Bureau of Statistics’ Samoa Socio-Economic Atlas 2011 identified that the labor-force participation rate in the affected districts was slightly above the national average (42 percent to 45 percent compared to the national average of 41 percent) whereas the more recent (August 2015) Project-funded household survey found that a 64 percent of respondents were economically active, and that those not in any form of active economic activity were still in school or were people with disabilities or elderly. While the two databases are not entirely comparable, the end of project survey does reinforce the priorities expressed in the earlier focus group discussions that the rehabilitated roads had improved ease of access to plantations (farmlands), work and shops. Forty nine percent of respondents in 2015 said that their main source of income was from selling agricultural produce and that the improved transport links provided under the project would have facilitated access to input supplies and to markets.

94. According to residents interviewed, access to health care facilities, schools and churches has also improved. In 2012, 43 percent of respondents were within 5 minutes to 30 minutes travel time to a health care facility, this had increased to 69 percent in 2015. Similarly, 29 percent of respondents took 5 minutes to 30 minutes to travel to school in 2012, and this had increased to 55 percent in 2015, as a direct result of the project funded road improvements.

95. Both 2012 and 2015 household surveys sampled approximately an equal number of men and women respondents. However, the final data was not disaggregated by gender and the specific needs and priorities of men and women cannot be extracted. According to the Government of Samoa’s 2008 Household Income & Expenditure Survey, nationally, 22 percent of heads of household are women but the “gender of the head of household plays [only] a small role in determining income poverty,” with women having higher cash incomes than men. More could have been done in the design of the roads to incorporate solar street lighting at bus-stops and similar to aid women and

23 children’s security, and to monitor the equal opportunity of men and women to paid employment in the reconstruction works.

96. It must be emphasized that the link made in the Project’s development objectives between the provision of enhanced (‘climate-proofed’) infrastructure to assisting communities to address future extreme weather events by the ab initio avoidance and reduction in exposure14 to future disasters was ambitious. It was no small feat that GoS, with Project support, was able to achieve the objective.

Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

97. On-going commercial opportunities for several private operators in roads as a result of the contracts offered on these and other World Bank supported projects (SIAM, ERAP), and the creation of an estimated 30 semi-skilled jobs for locally hired workers, many of whom came from affected villages.

Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome 98. Rating: Moderate.

99. There are three changes that may occur in the operating environment that would be detrimental to PTRP’s development outcome.

100. Natural hazard risk. The probability is almost certain, and the consequences of natural hazard risk would be major to catastrophic. If unmitigated, these could threaten the Project’s development outcome. However, a couple of follow-on projects have been approved that will continue to support a reduction in natural risks throughout Samoa, and strengthen the capabilities of individuals, communities and national agencies to better manage risk at their own level as appropriate, leading to greater overall resilience.

 ERAP will upgrade, rehabilitate and or reconstruct existing road sector assets to higher standards to strengthen resilience, and revise standards for maintaining and constructing roads and bridges to be more climate resilient.  Enhancing the Climate Resilience of Coastal Resources and Communities Project will provide training to targeted Districts to update and implement their CIM Plans and provide community grants for village-level projects that target coastal resilience.  Enhancing the Climate Resilience of the West Coast Road Project will strengthen the country’s most important road to be more resilient to extreme weather events by elevating low sections of the road and installing drainage, and paving shoulders for much of its length.

101. Political risk. The risk that further financial autonomy for LTA is not approved and that the current annual appropriations by Parliament to LTA’s maintenance budget are not pegged to inflation or are reduced for other priorities. The probability is possible and the consequences moderate.

14 Extreme weather events or hazards cannot be prevented. However, it is only when hazards meet human settlement that a disaster may occur. Disasters are the result of a combination of not only exposure to a particular hazard, but also the conditions of vulnerability (susceptibility to be adversely affected) that are present, and compounded by insufficient capabilities or measures to reduce or cope with the potentially negative consequences of that hazard. Thus, by coastal communities voluntarily moving out of harm’s way, their level of risk was significantly reduced.

102. If unmitigated, this would result in moderate risk to the Project’s development outcome of well-maintained inland link roads to facilitate the livelihoods and well-being of the population that has voluntarily has resettled inland from the high risk coastal villages on Upolu. LTA plans to have an independent review of its operations and regulations to strengthen its financial autonomy and to flexibility set its own commercial tariffs for road users.

103. Technical risks. These are negligible. LTA demonstrated strong technical ability and ownership in overseeing the design and supervising the construction of all rehabilitation works. Large works contracts under PTRP were implemented by local contractors, thus demonstrating local capacity to implement works to the high, durable design standards set by the project. In addition to LTA’s reputation of capably outsourcing road maintenance, GoS has recognized the critical role roads play in providing access during extreme weather events and is committed to ensuring adequate funding to maintain the country’s network of roads. Finally, the reconstructed and repaired structures and roads are captured in LTA’s asset maintenance program, which counterpart staff has reported as being adequately funded for the past four years.

Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank Performance a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

104. Rating: Moderately Satisfactory.

105. The Bank responded in a timely manner to the Government’s request to provide financial support to reconstruct transport sector assets damaged by the tsunami. Within ten days of the tsunami, an identification mission had been fielded. Appraisal and negotiations took place rapidly, and although Board approval was forthcoming 13 months after the tsunami, adequate provision was made under the Emergency Reconstruction Loan instrument for advance contracting of up to 40 percent of PTRP’s overall funds. As a result, LTA was able to proceed with all necessary activities and was subsequently reimbursed. Activities designed under the project, responded directly to GoS high priority needs as identified in its Tsunami Reconstruction Plan and for which it had insufficient own- funds to adequately respond and in particular, provided support to the Government to achieve its ambitious objective to facilitate the voluntary relocation inland of coastal communities, thus strengthening their longer tem resilience.

106. The project team drew from lessons of experience elsewhere. Proven, high design standards for the seawall structures and roads were also introduced, making investments relatively durable against future natural hazards. Using plans, engineering standards and existing implementations structures and procedures project design called for the engagement and consultation with interest groups within affected communities throughout implementation, which helped to inform the final designs, alignments and priorities of the investments. This assisted in building a degree of local ownership and sustainability of the solutions. Finally, given Samoa’s small size and limited portfolio, project design was kept simple and with initially only two implementing agencies. The size of the project and its scope of activities also meant that domestic contractors were able to successfully bid for works and local construction capabilities could be retained within Samoa.

107. However, as detailed in paragraph 35, the complexities of building ECIR, particularly in terms of engineering and the extensive consultations and repeated meetings with landowners, were underestimated at appraisal. Furthermore, the Results Framework indicators largely failed to capture

25 one of the most important outcomes of the project, namely the extent to which voluntary and sustained relocation of at risk communities was achieved.

(b) Quality of Supervision

108. Rating: Satisfactory.

109. The Bank conducted regular supervision missions although only one Implementation and Status Report (ISR) was filed in each of 2011 and 2012. However, this did not impact the implementation progress of the project. LTA counterpart staff and the PMU regularly inspected physical works in the field, and carried out rapid appraisal interviews with community members. Bank task team members provided counterpart staff with timely feedback on technical, procurement and safeguards issues, facilitating fast decision-making and smoother implementation. The task team was also proactive in restructuring the project and in making amendments to the monitoring indicators. Over the course of the project there were only two task team leaders, thus providing a degree of continuity to the Borrower. The Project Team could have been more proactive in urging LTA and the Steering Committee to deal with the lingering drainage grievances among some community members.

110. Rating: Satisfactory.

111. Through regular and consistent supervision and a collegial working relationship with counterpart officials, the project team assisted in ensuring that PTRP was implemented relatively smoothly and fully achieved its development objectives.

Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance

112. Rating: Satisfactory.

113. The Government showed strong leadership in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami in coordinating the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment and then in coordinating the assessments of different donors to prepare a consolidated National Tsunami Recovery Plan. This was then used to coordinate recovery and subsequent reconstruction efforts. It showed particular vision in reading the mood of affected and traumatized communities to voluntarily relocate inland to safer locations and proactively sought Bank’s and PRIF’s assistance to physical enable this relocation through new and upgraded access routes and to coordinate the provision of other basic services. While resources were limited, significant facilitation of this population movement was achieved and is likely to be permanent.

114. GoS maintained an active Project Steering Committee throughout the life of the Project to provide oversight and timely decision-making, as needed. For example, by recognizing the potential for the larger PPCR Project to take on Component 2 activities and recognizing the availability of funds under ERAP to partially finance ECIR.

115. A shortcoming in the performance of GoS was its oversight of the PMU’s contract, and its decision not to extend the PMU’s contract15 in the final six months of the Project. Not extending the contract placed a heavy burden on LTA for project administration, reporting and end of project close out, and likely contributed to the delays in completing the designs for ECIR and associated public consultations during implementation. However, GoS chose not to because there was a limited number of activities remaining to be implemented, LTA had demonstrated strong ownership, there was a shortage of funding for ECIR, and GoS questioned whether the contract with the PMU represented value for money.16

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

116. Rating: Satisfactory.

117. LTA management and staff were fully engaged in the design of PTRP and its subsequent implementation. It contracted specialist drainage design and supervision services to supplement its capacity, and overall, delivered the components within the extended closing dates and on budget, thereby achieving the development objectives.

118. LTA received good support from the PMU on the social consultations, and at times, on project reporting. However, for reasons that are not clear, this support dropped dramatically throughout the last two years of implementation, which contributed to excessive back and forth on tender packages and poor reporting. The Project Team regularly reminded the PMU about the need to fully support LTA, and to report on PTRP’s revised performance indicators, but to little avail. After its contract was not extended, the PMU did continue to provide limited financial management, but had to be pushed to prepare the final Project Progress Report, which it did after PTRP had closed.

119. Rating: Satisfactory.

120. This commitment and performance of the Government and LTA throughout PTRP’s implementation resulted in the PDO’s being achieved and, despite delays caused by intensive community consultations, efficient management of issues as they arose. GoS’s limited oversight of the PMU contract was unfortunate and may have caused unnecessary delays during the final years of implementation. However, executing agency’s commitment and LTA’s consistently strong performance make the Borrower’s overall performance satisfactory.

15 GoS signed the contract with the PMU, not LTA. 16 Throughout implementation, PMU staff charges and inputs never varied, regardless of work load. This is contrary to the time-based contracts that the PMU had signed. As a result, a variation to the PMU’s contract was requested and approved in November 2013, before it was realized that the PMU was likely overcharging for its support to LTA. The variation increased the ceiling amount by about US$200,000 (SAT 451,000), and over the last year of PTRP, resulted in very high expenses for managing a few ongoing tasks. This additional funding could have been used to offset the shortfall in funding for ECIR, and GoS approached the Bank to use funds from another Bank project (ERAP) to cover the shortfall, which amounted to about US$381,100. Had the PMU been charging in accordance with time-based principals, a second, and possibly the first, variation would not have been needed. As such, GoS was reluctant to increase the contract a second time and felt that the PMU should finish out the project without additional funding and a formal contract extension.

Lessons Learned 121. The first two lessons learned are from past projects, but are worth restating given their ongoing relevance.

 Structural investments should be designed to incorporate the natural hazard and climate risks they will face and not merely to previous standards. In a country as at risk to natural hazards as Samoa where, for example, a significant and destructive cyclone occurs every five years, sound engineering principles calls for reconstruction design standards that are able to withstand future hazards.17 Project designs should include inputs from specialist drainage engineers and hydrologists to assess flood risks and flood management options to safeguard the new road infrastructure, and explicitly incorporate consideration of longer term climate risks.  In small countries with relatively small implementing agencies and construction sectors, proven and familiar technologies for designs and procedures for bidding works should be used to encourage the participation of local companies, ensure competition to contain construction costs, and efficiency and sustainability of project investments. Under PTRP, design solutions were not overly complex and made use of proven local technical approaches and available materials. Eighteen of the twenty-five procurements used NCB, local Shopping, or comparison of cvs as selection methods. As such, the participation of domestic contractors and consultants for works and services was strong and this, coupled with strong contract management by LTA, ensured that construction costs, even during periods of peak reconstruction activity, were contained. There were several positive returns on this, such as: (i) a single contractor winning both Lots 1 and 3 on the Lepa-Lalomanu link road, which resulted in an estimated savings of SAT 120,000 (about US$46,200); (ii) final construction costs of the access roads were 25% less than appraisal estimates; and (iii) the creation of up to thirty jobs within affected communities.  The need for effective community consultations and ongoing engagement during works, while time consuming, should be carried out early on in preparation and throughout construction in order to minimize disruptions and delays during implementation. The project successfully made use of existing institutional arrangements for implementation and sought early and thereafter periodic, formal consultations with local communities through traditional and local government leadership to establish priority routes for upgrading roads and to resolve complex customary land tenure authorizations. However, the incidences of customary land owners subsequently reneging on earlier agreements, while limited, could have been addressed in a more timely way by stronger specialist social support to the predominantly engineering-oriented Land Transport Authority.  Well-harmonized coordination amongst donor partners was a critical success factor in deploying much needed emergency infrastructure support following a severe weather disaster and sustained coordination may have further enabled the permanent, voluntary relocation of affected residents. Within two weeks of the devastating September 2009 Tsunami, a team from the World Bank, together with colleagues from the United Nations and the Asian Development Bank, worked with GoS to prepare a PDNA, which contributed directly to the provision of a US$10 million IDA credit, together

17The passage of Cyclone Rene on February 14, 2010 and the tsunami warning following the Chile Earthquake of February 27, 2010, although fortunately did not materialize into significant events in Samoa, were continuous reminders of the potential risks faced by the country.

with US$1.79 million grant from the Government of Australia as co-financing. The access roads to open up inland village settlements were complemented by funding for basic services, such as water (Samoa Red Cross) and power supplies.  The rapid construction of strategically located transport routes based on community priorities in post-disaster situations can effectively capture both high level country commitment and local community willingness to voluntarily relocation to less hazardous locations. PTRP supported GoS to effect permanent, voluntary relocation of residents away from the high risk coastline through timely and strategic transport investments (coupled with the provision of other basic lifeline services, in particular an assured potable water supply and power). Identification of priority access roads and alignment of the new road were carried out in close consultation with affected communities and the use of OP/BP8.00 for emergency procedures allowed for up to 40 percent of project funds to be advance procured (using streamlined procurement procedures) and subsequently retroactively financed once the project was effective which greatly facilitated early and visible investments on the ground. This collaborative approach with communities has better prepared the country to address future natural disasters.

Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies

122. The Borrower prepared its own ICR, which is included as Annex 3.

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)

Appraisal Estimate % of Appraisal Actual/ Component (April 2013 Appraisal Estimate Latest Restructure) (Original Project) Estimate (a) (b) 1. Upgrade Existing Tracks and Seawalls 5.60 5.99 6.84 122.2% 2. CIM Plans 0.20 0.00 0 0% 3. East Coast Inland Route 4.60 4.60 3.91 85.1% 4. Dual-Purpose Pedestrian Access Routes 0.60 0.80 0.79 131.3% 5. Project Management and Support 0.30 0.41 0.41 136.5% Total Baseline Costs: 11.30 11.95 105.8% Contingencies/ Unallocated 0.50 0.00 Total Project Costs: 11.79 11.79 11.9518 Project Preparation Fund 0.00 0.00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 Total Financing Required/Disbursed: 11.79 11.79 11.95 101.3%

(b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest

Type of Estimate Estimate Percentage of Source of Funds Cofinancing (US$ mil.) (US$ mil.) Appraisal

Borrower ~0.077 0.34219 444% International Development Association Credit IDA- 10.00 10.17 101.7% Grant Pacific Regional Infrastructure Facility 1.79 1.78 99.4% TF098846 Totals (excl. Borrower): 11.79 11.95 101.4%20

Total Funding US$ mil. % IDA + TF 11.79 100 GoS 021 0 Totals: 11.79 100.0

18 Excludes SAT 800,000 (S$308,000) paid by LTA to: (i) compensate affected households for loss of crops along ECIR; and (ii) US$34,050 for approaches and abutments to Salani Bridge. 19 See previous footnote. 20 US$74,685 undisbursed/cancelled from IDA and US$2,277 from PRIF TF at project close due to favorable exchange rate gains during implementation. 21 LTA and GoS carried out an estimated SAT 3m (~US$1.16m) in emergency works after the tsunami that was not reimbursed by PTRP. LTA also spent SAT 800,000 to: (i) compensate affected households for loss of crops along ECIR; and (ii) US$34,050 for approaches and abutments to Salani Bridge.

Annex 2. Outputs by Component (after Restructuring) 1. This Annex sets out financial resources expended under each component (planned and actual), and summarizes the completed sub-component outputs. 2. LTA gave immediate priority to physical reconstruction works to open up inland transportation links on the south coast and inland access routes and to commence strengthening seawall structures. PTRP’s design included a provision for advance contracting and retroactive financing of up to US$4.7 million (40 percent of the proposed IDA and PRIF funding), and so was able to reimburse LTA’s own early efforts, some of which were able to be completed even before Project negotiations were finalized.22 The retroactive financing was subject to verification that the activities had been implemented in compliance with national law and the Bank's safeguards policies.

3. In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, a significant proportion of the affected population chose to voluntarily relocate inland from their vulnerable coastal settlements. The Project was but one, albeit key, part of a multi-sector reconstruction effort aimed at providing access and a range of basic services to the affected areas so as to facilitate this voluntary movement and so reduce the risk to the population during future events. Table 2a: Outputs by Component Component 1: Upgrade Existing Access Tracks and Seawalls (EPP: US$5.6m; actual: US$6.84m) 1.1 Lepa-Lalomanu link road: 10.6km completed Design and construction for upgrading an existing agricultural track to national road standards, providing road access to relocation areas and for an alternative route along the south coast between Lepa and Lalomanu, above the natural disaster risk zone. 1.2 Upgrading of short length access tracks: 19.55km completed  Utufaalalafa & Salea’aumua (2km)  Malaela loop & Satioa (2km)  Mutiatele & Ulutogia (2km)  Vailoa Aleipata & Lalomnu loop (2km)  Aufaga (2km)  Upper Saleapaga (2.15km)  Poutasi road tai (0.83km)  Salei (0.85km)  Aufaga beach (0.21km)  Satalo-tai (0.71km) 1.3 Sea walls repair and reconstruction: 9km coastline completed East coast sea walls:  Satitoa (0.92km)  Satitoa to Vailoa (2.18km)  Ulutogia & Vailoa (0.87km) South coast seawalls:  Lalomanu (1.032km)  Saleapaga (1.21km) Other seawalls:  Poutasi (0.7km)

22 An amount of US$3.99 million was successfully reimbursed to GoS/LTA for expenditures incurred between September 30, 2009 and December 14, 2010 under the IDA Credit and an amount of US$700,000 reimbursed from the PRIF TF for eligible expenditures incurred between January 15, 2010 and February 10, 2011.

 Manono-Mulifanua (0.766km)  Utufaalalafa to Satitoa (2.13km)  Samea, Mulifanua, Satuimalufilufi (2,44km)  Satuimalufilufi to Salua Manono (2.15km)  Salua Manono toFalese’ela (1.91km)  Siufaga Savaii (0.3km) 1.4 Salani Bridge repair: completed. 1.5 Technical assistance: completed  Drainage engineer  Route/alignment design  EIA and LARAP preparation  Pedestrian access design Component 2: Community Infrastructure Management Plans (EPP: US$0.2m; actual: US$0m) 2.1 Baseline mapping of affected areas (high resolution imagery): completed, but not funded under Project. 2.2 Update Coastal Infrastructure Management (CIM) plans: cancelled and transferred to PPCR project. Component 3: East Coast Inland Route (Samusu-Lalomanu) (EPP: US$4.6m; actual: US$3.91m) 3.1 Route alignment study, design and supervision: completed. 3.2 EIA of ECIR: completed. 3.3 Compensation: determined and completed (fully funded by LTA). 3.4 Road construction- 5.2km-completed:  Lot 1: Samusu-Mutiatele (2.4km)  Lot 2: Mutiatele to Ulutogia (1km)  Lot 3: Ulutogia to Lalomanu (1.8km) Component 4: Dual-Purpose Pedestrian Access Routes (EPP: US$0.6m; actual: US$0.79m) 4.1 Feasibility, design and supervision of pedestrian accesses: completed. 4.2 Construction of 1km of pedestrian access improvements (to a value of US$0.5m): completed. Component 5: Project Management and Support (EPP: US$0.3m; actual: US$0.41m) 5.1 Project Management  In-house project management, administration, and monitoring activities by LTA: completed.  Project Management Unit: completed early (February 2015 - contract not extended after project closing date was extended for second time). 5.2 Monitoring and Evaluation Before-and-after analysis of the impact of the Project on access to relocation areas and road network performance and resilience in the south-east corner of Upolu: before, during and after surveys completed.

Table 2b: Emergency Works Post-tsunami (roads and seawalls) financed by LTA (Not for reimbursement from the Project)

The factors that contributed to successful implementation or gave rise to problems during the course of implementation are provided below, by component. Component 1: Upgrading of Existing Access Tracks and Seawalls (US$6.84 million; 57.2 percent of total Project cost)

1. This core component was the most successful from several perspectives. Firstly, within 11 months after the tsunami, and to ensure that the affected communities were not caught unprepared in next cyclone season, LTA quickly used its own resources to fully clear debris, open up key affected main roads and, making use of the Project’s advance procurement facility, and engage contractors to upgrade and seal existing access roads off the east and south coast arterial roads for emergency evacuation and resettlement. A total 19.6km (against a target estimated at appraisal of 20km) were upgraded and bitumen sealed, namely: Utufaalalafa/Saleaaumua (4km); Malaela Loop/Saitoa (4km); Mutiatele/Ulutogia (4km); Vailoa/Aleipata/Lalomanu Loop (3.1km); Aufaga (2.3km); and Saleapaga (2.15km). The roads had been identified under previously prepared village CIM Plans and were put forward as priority reconstruction needs by the Pulenu’u (village Mayors). Works were completed by August 2010.

2. Retroactive finance also was utilized by LTA to upgrade an agricultural access road between Lepa and Lalomanu to national road standards so road access to the main relocation areas and to provide an alternative route along the south coast above the natural disaster risk zone, would be available. The road

followed the alignment of an existing track and was upgraded over an eventual length of 10.6km (against the appraisal target of 10km) and was completed by September 2010. Retroactive finance too was used to reinstate the Salani Bailey Bridge across the Mulivaifagatola River, thus reinstating a key east-west link on the southern coastal route. LTA used its own resources to fund repairs to the approaches to the bridge and the debris-damaged abutments. The bridge was fully reinstated by July 21, 2010. Finally, LTA made use of retroactive finance to restore and upgrade seawalls along critical lengths of the high energy coastline, in all defending 9km of shoreline, all completed by January 2012 (again fully meeting the appraisal target).

3. The bid documents for roads in Component 1 were based on works quantities derived from typical cross-sectional areas, in the absence of any survey data relating to existing ground levels. To confirm the actual quantities and provide some cost control, it was necessary for LTA to contract the services of private surveyors to do before and after surveys of road centerline profiles. The services were procured in each case through local shopping and carried out satisfactorily.

4. All works were reconstructed and upgraded to high design standards and met the targets set both at appraisal and by the later Project restructuring. Given the risk of future extreme weather events and high rainfall experienced along the south coast of Upolu, specialized engineering inputs were contracted in December 2010 (making use of advance contracting) for the detailed design of storm-water drainage to reduce risks of flooding, erosion and potentially serious damage to the roads and surrounding environment. As a result of the strong efforts of the LTA staff, a total of 15 contracts were competitively procured, awarded and managed over an 18 month period.23 The works were all carried out by six domestic contractors who became noticeably competitive and responsive to the business opportunities being let. Overall, of the eight shorter access roads, final construction costs were 25 percent less than the estimate at appraisal, and the Lepa to Lalomanu link road only 2.3 percent higher than appraised. The savings allowed for additional strengthening of the protective works along the coastline. As planned originally, 9km of coastline was protected, but at a cost of 44 percent more than the estimate at appraisal.

5. The working arrangements between the affected communities, local village leadership and LTA were collaborative from the early identification and prioritization of works to the employment opportunities created for affected villagers as semi-skilled day labor on the contracts. Ex-post site visits by the Bank’s project team to each of the subprojects confirmed that most are being well utilized, operated and, with coordination by the Mayors, maintained by community groups.

Component 2: Community Coastal Infrastructure Management (CIM) Plans (US$0 million; 0 percent of total Project cost)

6. This component would have updated the mapping of affected and relocation areas, and revised the existing community-level Coast Infrastructure Management (CIM) plans through close community consultation for the tsunami-affected areas. The CIM Plans were to assist with infrastructure planning and monitoring, and disaster risk reduction. However, at the request of GoS (October 2, 2012), these activities were transferred to the second investment project under the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience, which planned to update CIM Plans countrywide, and which permitted more comprehensive and cost-effective coverage of these items. The transfer was formally processed as part of a Level 2 restructuring approved on May 8, 2013.

23 A total of sic contracts were procured by RFQ during phase 2 of Component 1, sub-component 1.3 for seawall repair and reconstruction of tsunami affected areas. Six local contractors won contracts and all physical works commenced September 2011 and were completed February 2012.

Component 3: East Coast Inland Route (Samusu-Lalomanu) (US$3.91 million; 32.7 percent of total Project cost)

7. A suitable road corridor approximately one kilometer inland and roughly following the 35m contour was identified. With assistance from GoS Ministries, the route was discussed with the village Pulenu’u and residents at a number of meetings in late 2011. The route was well supported by local residents and rapid progress was made in preparing terms of reference (February 2012) for consulting services to finalize the route alignment and prepare detailed design and supervise the works. The request for proposals was issued to shortlisted firms in mid-June 2012 and a request for no objection to award the contract in October 2012. However, the contract award for the design of the route was held in abeyance because it would not have been possible to complete the planned works within the Project’s closing date, which required an extension.

8. Once design was completed, the Engineer’s Estimate for the works was SAT 12.2 million and higher than the appraisal estimate of SAT 9.1 million. Factors contributing to this higher estimate included unexpected and costly stream crossings along the route, and remedial works to ensure minimum safety and environmental standards (as established under COEP 8 for Quarry Development and Operations) at the conveniently located Lalomanu Quarry site. Because ECIR was a Government priority, it sought options to cover the shortfall in funding. GoS and the Bank subsequently agreed to finance the shortfall in funding for the works contracts (up to US$500,000) from the Enhanced Road Access Project, which was also being implemented by LTA.

9. Compensation to affected land owners was paid for loss of trees using the GoS approved and updated national schedule of compensation. However, due to the larger than anticipated number of trees finally affected, compensation costs increased from the original estimate of SAT 200,000 to SAT 800,000, which LTA fully met from its own resources.

10. Works were competitively awarded in three Lots of 2.4km, 1km and 1.8km, comprising chip seal, culvert drains, and concrete speed humps at key intersections to physically reduce speeds and remind drivers of the intersection ahead (following Australian Rural Roads Design standards). The contractor for Lot 2 took some time to fulfill the conditions of contract and provide all necessary documentation, including delivering a performance bid and providing acceptable environmental management and quarry management plans. LTA issued a formal warning letter and the contractor responded positively.

11. The contractor for Lots 1 and 3 initially progressed well and ahead of schedule on the works. However, it was prevented from clearing the final 730m of land on Lot 1 due to a chief of the district reversing his earlier agreement to allow construction of the road over his land. In the case of Lot 3, the contractor was not able to commence work as five customary land owners asked for additional compensation and for a diversion in the road.

12. As identified at appraisal, land acquisition or compensation might pose a risk of delays or cost increases. The provisions in the LARAP were followed and LTA provided counterpart funds for crop compensation triggered by the new ECIR. As such, the Project faced no cost increase, per sê. Nonetheless, the grievances (above) raised by landowners in the last year of implementation, particularly regarding discharge of water runoff onto their properties and a few landowners reneged on earlier agreements to allow contractors access to the site (both for sections of ECIR and one of the pedestrian routes), resulted in disruptions to the works. LTA’s Public Relations Officer met with affected land owners and after some time, was able to resolve all the issues, albeit that there are a few lingering concerns regarding the drainage of runoff. The works were completed within the extended Project closing date and within budget (supplemented by the ERAP funds for a portion of the works).

13. The maintenance period for the three contracts ended after the project’s closing date. With experience gained on past Bank-funded projects, LTA handled this by requesting the release of retention funds from the Project before the closing date on the basis of bank guarantees to cover the full retention period.

14. Project design had assumed that the participatory processes to be used in updating the CIM Plans would mitigate the risks associated with customary landowners’ agreement to the route alignment. After Component 2 had been cancelled (transferred to the PPCR project under preparation at the time), the consultation processes were not as strong as needed. Even if Component 2 had remained under PTRP, the Project design could have explored this risk posed by a new road more fully and specified a supplementary social specialist and customary land rights or other measures to support LTA, just as it had provided for specialist engineering support to address drainage design risks under Component 1.

Component 4: Dual-Purpose Pedestrian Access/Escape Routes (US$0.79 million; 6.6 percent of total Project cost)

15. Rather than tender separate contracts, a variation to one of the road construction contracts to construct the pedestrian escape routes. These were carried out under day-work charges (time basis), which simplified approvals, processing times and contract administration. Specific locations were identified using a generic design adaptable to all selected sites prepared by consultant engineers. Development consent for the paths was lodged with the responsible authority (Planning and Urban Management Unit, MNRE) on October 17, 2014. However, given the time needed for MNRE to locate all landowners and obtain their individual consents, the approval process took longer than the anticipated six months. The escape routes were fully completed in July 2015.

Component 5: Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation (US$0.41 million; 3.4 percent of total Project cost)

16. The design of the Project Management and monitoring and evaluation component, the institutional arrangements (limited to only two implementing agencies), and oversight by a well-representative Steering Committee (including expanded membership by utility agencies for coordination purposes) were based on recent experience with SIAM and CERP, which offered proven approaches.

17. LTA engaged the services of a qualified and experienced supervising engineer for the duration of the Project to ensure that all works were constructed according to specification and contracts managed effectively.

18. The PMU led the M&E activities and, during the first two years of the Project, collecting information and data and the quality of the information was acceptable. The data was gathered through a combination of primary and secondary research tools. The bulk of the monitoring data needed to be collected on the ground through a combination of site visits and interviews. Progress on the roads was primarily captured from LTA’s Samoa Asset Management System database. Socio-economic data was captured through interviews with local leaders, families and traders living in the Project area.

19. However, for a year after the Project was restructured (May 2013 through February 2014), no formal reporting was made on the restructured Project’s performance indicators. The PMU was tasked with providing relevant data for the revised indicators to retrospectively cover the entire implementation period of the Project, but this was not done satisfactorily.

20. Three extensive socio-economic surveys were undertaken by social specialists in December 2011, February 2012, and February to March and August 2015. Information was collected from residents and

users of each of the upgraded tracks and main road rehabilitated under the Project, using the following survey instruments:

i. Group consultations with village mayors held in Apia on February 19, 2015 at the MWCSD hall; ii. Group consultations with women’s representatives to the respective Village Councils and other women’s groups, as well as representatives from youth groups in the Aleipata District; iii. Personal interviews with randomly selected households on each upgraded track and four traders and two transport operators; and iv. A separate quantitative household survey of 172 respondents (49 percent male, 51 percent female), which was undertaken in August 2015 to establish whether the main project objectives had been achieved.

21. The surveys were carried out in the ten villages of Lalomanu, Lepa, Saleapaga, Ulutogia, Vailoa, Satitoa, Malaela, Mutiatele, Saleaaumua and Utufaalalafa. The results of the surveys identified design issues for further attention by LTA and provided GoS and the Bank with the views of residents regarding the Project. For example, a female Matai (leader) representing one of the families affected by ECIR publically articulated the community’s appreciation for the roads. She identified a key part of the assistance as being the ECIR and the associated access routes as together they now provided an effective means of escape, as well as an improved level of security and comfort, in continuing to live along and make use of the coastline.

Annex 3. Summary of Borrower’s ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

A. The background to the project

1. The 2009 Samoa earthquake was an 8.1 Mw submarine earthquake that took place in the Samoan Islands region at 06:48:11 local time on 29 September 2009 (17:48:11 UTC, 29 September) At a magnitude of 8.1, it was the largest earthquake of 2009.

2. A tsunami was generated which caused substantial damage and loss of life in Samoa, American Samoa, and Tonga. The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center recorded a 3-inch (76 mm) rise in sea levels near the epicenter, and New Zealand scientists determined that the waves measured 14 metres (46 ft) at their highest on the Samoan coast. The quake occurred on the outer rise of the Kermadec-Tonga Subduction Zone. This is part of the Pacific Ring of Fire, where tectonic plates in the Earth's lithosphere meet and earthquakes and volcanic activity are common.

3. Countries affected by the tsunami in the areas that were hit are American Samoa, Samoa and Tonga (Niuatoputapu) where more than 189 people were killed, especially children, most of them in Samoa. Large waves with no major damage were reported on the coasts of Fiji, the northern coast of New Zealand and Rarotonga in the Cook Islands. People took precautions in the low-lying atolls of Tokelau and moved to higher ground. Niue was reported as reasonably safe because it is high. There were no reports of high waves from Vanuatu, Kiribati, New Caledonia and the Solomon Islands.

4. The most severely hit area in Samoa and likely the whole region was the project area of the coastal Aleipata district at the eastern end of the island of Upolu. This created the greatest loss of life from a natural disaster experienced in Samoa's modern history.

5. The World Bank promptly responded to the resultant state of emergency with an Emergency Grant Fund of US$ 11.79 million and action was immediately commenced by the Samoa Land Transport Authority. The intentions of the project were, rather than just reinstate existing facilities along the coast, to develop access to the higher inland areas and encourage resettlement above Tsunami and cyclonic storm surge exposed areas.

6. Shortly after the tsunami and making use of the advance procurement facility, LTA contractors undertook upgrading and sealing of existing access roads for emergency evacuation and resettlement. A total 19.6km were upgraded and sealed, namely Utufalalafa and Saleaumua access roads (4km); Malaela loop and Saitoa access roads (4km); Mutiatele and Ulutogia access roads (4km); Vailoa, Aleipata and Lalomanu loop access roads (3.1km); Aufaga access road (2.3km); and Saleapaga access road (2.15km). Works were completed by August 2010.

7. The Lepa-Lalomanu coastal road was heavily damaged by the tsunami and being located close to the coastline and is at risk in the future. An inland agricultural access road was upgraded and sealed to provide for the voluntary resettlement of communities and to provide a safe alternative inland east-west link road in the future. LTA made use of advance contracting for the works which were fully completed (0.6km above the target length) by September 2010.

8. Additional components of the project were:

 Construction of a 5.2km inland all weather escape route from Samusu to Lalomanu connecting the eight newly sealed access roads so as to allow direct access to the Lalomanu Hospital and the highland route to Apia.  Construction of Escape Routes up the face of the near vertical, up to 200m high escarpment

extending from Lepa to Lalomanu. To allow pedestrian evacuation to a level above likely wave height.

9. The initial works under Component 2 were executed without a formal design and essentially by eye, which is a method commonly used in Samoa to gain quick results on lower standard roads. However to achieve the all-weather ability requirement the Samusu to Lalomanu had to be built to Ausroad Standards, this required Consultant design and supervision input plus an Environmental Impact assessment and was constructed on customary ownership lands being predominantly very old largely unutilised coconut plantations and areas of subsistence agriculture. These requirements, as would be expected, extended the construction time scale very significantly and compromised the emergency basis of the Grant, but were necessary to achieve the desired results and satisfy Bank safeguards.

C.3 East Coast Inland Route & C.4 Pedestrian Access/Escape Routes W9A, 9B, 9C & C.4 Construction Works

C.3 East Coast Inland Route, Samusu to Lalomanu & C.4 Pedestrian Access/Escape Routes Design and Supervision

10. As described in the background section, this more complex road built to Ausroad standards required full investigation and employment of an Environment specialist Consultant and a separate Engineering Consultant.

11. The Bank’s no objection letter was received to proceed with bidding for the Engineering Consultant on 11th June 2012 and the invitations issued to the short listed companies on the 13th of June.

12. The final Consultant Evaluation Report was completed and Beca International in association with OSM Consultants and Soloi Survey Services had the highest technical/financial points

13. A submission was made to the Tenders Board on 8th October 2012 to undertake contract negotiations with the Board approval received on the 17th October 2012; however a major difficulty occurred during the October 2012 Bank Mission when it was advised that there may not be extension of funding beyond the April 2013 cutoff date. It would have been impossible to design and construct the works by that date.

Commencement of Design Investigations

14. The agreement for the extension of time was approved by the Bank and signed by Government in late April 2013. This extended funding by 22 months from the end of April 2013 until end of February 2015. Hence LTA immediately proceeded with the award of the Design/Supervision contract to the Beca group with the formal contract signed on 30th May 2013.

15. They commenced on site investigations and surveys on the 20th May 2013 but the design phase became somewhat protracted and full bidding documents did not become available until January 2014.

Land Acquisition and Crop Compensation

16. The proposed route alignment plans was received from the consultant and marked out on site. A team from the Land Transport Authority, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment and Ministry of Women Community & Social Development conducted negotiations with the eight affected villages during October 2013 and showed them the proposed alignment in detail to the affected occupiers.

17. Seven of the eight villages readily agreed to the proposed alignment and the use of the land without compensation. Saleaumua, although in agreement with the road, wished to have a major diversion which would add some two kilometres. This was not possible as it would increase the cost of the road by around 3-4 million tala. It took several weeks to resolve this situation but agreement was finally reached and the road built fully as planned.

Crop Compensation

18. The only request from some fifty percent of the villages was for crop compensation. This was addressed by the Steering Committee and an estimate of likely compensation cost being calculated for budgetary purposes. If compensation was to be paid it was decided that in fairness this would apply to all, including those that did not request compensation.

19. The Land Transport Authority assumed responsibility for the recording and processing of all claims and also for disbursement of payments out of its own budget which amounted to nearly SAT$800,000.

Land Agreements

20. The Legal Division of the Land Transport Authority also prepared signed legal agreements with all eight villages which allow use of the affected lands for road purposes in perpetuity. These have been lodged for permanent record with the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment.

Construction Contracts W9.A, W9.B & W9.C

Contractor Selection

21. Advertising for Contractors was commenced under National Competitive Bidding on 23rd January 2014 with bids closing 24th February. However the Bank subsequently ruled this must be under International Competitive Bidding as the Engineer's Estimate came close to the US$5 million threshold. This required suspension of the bidding process and splitting the works into three separate packages, due to the much higher contractor qualifications required under ICB. This restricted the ability of local contractors to qualify and the works were unlikely to attract overseas bids due to the reduced package sizes.

22. The bidding process hence commenced over again with another 30 day bidding period applicable once the Bank approved the revised documents and advertising for bids immediately recommenced.

23. Bids closed on 7th April 2014 and preparation of the three Bid Evaluation Reports undertaken. These were submitted to the Bank and a detailed list of questions received on 1st May 2014 but basically approving awards at the prices submitted as recommended with Variations then to be prepared to reduce costs to the US$4,000,000 budget by post award negotiations.

24. Without including VAGST the lowest compliant set of bids was SAT$1,400,000 or some US$700,000 over the US$4,000,000 grant. The Prime Minister, as Minister for Finance, wrote to the Bank requesting assistance on this shortfall and they have responded with two alternatives:

1) As a one off exception, negotiations may be held with the selected Contractors prior to contract award to try to bring the cost down to budget if possible. 2) Sufficient funds may be diverted from ERAP to make up the shortfall which will be replaced at a later date.

25. A formal request was issued for option 2 by Ministry of Finance on 27th June 2014 requesting the second option as it allowed the full extent of the works to be executed without reduction in quality.

26. An additional factor was that due to the bidding delays it would be difficult to fully complete the works by end of February 2015, hence ERAP funding would be available to cover any additional time beyond that.

27. There then remained some six months within the original grant of what was intended to be a nine month contract. However during a review mission by the Bank in early October it was decided that an application would be made to Washington extending the closing date of funding from 29th February 2015 to 31st August 2015.

28. Because of this it was not necessary to proceed with an intended VO reducing costs all three contracts so the full extent of works were possible and the existing completion dates continued.

Contracts W.9A and W.9C were awarded to Ott Constructors Ltd for the amounts of: W.9A - SAT$ 5,463,534.43 - completed 14th March 2015 W.9C - SAT$ 3,143,144.35 - completed 14th March 2015

Contract W.9B was awarded to Silva Transport Co. Ltd for: SAT$ 3,542,417.34 - completed 15th June 2015

29. Works began promptly and the two Contractors were able to finish the works within the contracted dates and all contracts are currently within the 12 month Guarantee Periods.

C.4 Pedestrian Access/Escape Routes

30. Possible route locations were determined and a detailed field inspection undertaken to determine their feasibility. The consultant's Feasibility Study was received until 3rd February 2014 and has subsequently approved by the Bank and LTA.

31. Beca’s contract for C.4 covered preparation of this feasibility study only and they were hence requested to lodge a detailed priced proposal for the continuation of their services into the design and supervision phases. This proposal was received which was considered technically sound, but the fees represented some 25% of the available construction budget of US$500,000. It has hence been rejected and a more affordable revision requested.

32. A second reduced proposal was received on 15th June 2014 close to available budget and was accepted by LTA and the Bank. A Variation Order was issued to Beca to meet this additional input.

33. Possible route locations were determined and marked on site. LTA discussed these locations with land owners and all were in agreement since they can see the safety benefits that will accrue. A set of construction documentation was prepared showing all intended locations and a generic design given to the Contractor which was adapted to each site as required.

34. Construction needed to be on a time basis and the extent of works finally executed were based on utilizing the full US$500,000 funds available.

Construction

35. An application to PUMA was made on 5th October 2014 and the approval of this was finally received on 2nd April 2015. PUMA indicate a likely approval time of two months from date of application and this inexplicable delay severely interfered with commencing the works.

36. The Bank gave approval to undertake the construction without a Variation Order to Ott Constructors’ W.9A & W.9C contracts and cover the extra cost under day works charges since split between the two contracts each was less than the 15% cost overrun limit. This was divided as W.9A = SAT$ 672,069.77 & W.9C = SAT$ 407,574.73

37. The need for Samoan Tenders Board separate approval was necessary and in fact took two months to achieve due to a very slow review by the Attorney General office of if it was allowable to issue such a Variation without rebidding the works. There was no time to go through the whole bidding process within the remaining project funding period. Awaiting this would not have allowed works to be completed within the remaining time period but the Contractor proceeded in the meantime on the basis of the Bank approval.

38. Construction on site commenced during the week 7th to 10th April 2015 and were completed on 14th June 2015.

Comments on the Program

39. This emergency program has created a large improvement in the community's ability to withstand Tsunami and storm surge events. This will greatly reduce, or eliminate the heavy loss of life encountered.

40. The developed road infrastructure has allowed good access to the large area of fertile agricultural land inland from the coast with likely economic benefits. Indeed it is Government's long-term policy is to establish a satellite town at Aleipata and this together with the port, slipway and planned airport provide a solid basis for this development.

41. The Engineer's Estimate for the construction contract for the East Coast Road was around US$5 million which was on the threshold of International Competitive Bidding but is was considered very unlikely that overseas companies would be interested given the remote location. There were also some local companies that had the capacity for this scale of construction but could not meet the annual turnover minimums required by the Bank. Because of this the works had to be split into three packages for National Competitive Bidding which whilst it did work out, greatly increased the administrative burden on the small project staffing within LTA available to manage the contracts.

42. These minimums are based on much larger countries and economies. The small country of Samoa cannot meet this scale of annual turnover and it places a burden on local contractors bidding for not only this but other Bank projects, although they have demonstrated the capacity to adequately construct most of these. This limitation should be further addressed to encourage fairer competition.

43. The original intention of the escape routes was to reach the summit of the escarpment, however this was quite physically impossible within the available budget. The escarpment is from 100 to 200 metres high and essentially vertical over two thirds of its height. The routes have therefore been constructed to an average height of 33 metres. This should allow safe escape from the tsunami experienced although of course it is impossible to calculate what height could be reached in the future. Assisting this is that a Tsunami siren alarm has been installed which should provide earlier warning and more adequate escape to higher ground.

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team Members

Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending Demetrios Papathanasiou Sr. Infrastructure Specialist EASNS Team Lead Amin Saskai Mohammad Team Assistant EACNF Angela Nyawira Khaminwa Social Development Specialist EASER Carlos Ricardo Escudero Lead Counsel Consultant LEGLA Changkun Yang Infrastructure Specialist EASNS Colleen Butcher-Gollach Consultant, Program Design Specialist EASIN Edward Anderson Disaster Risk Management Specialist EASIN Evelyn Villatoro Sr. Procurement Specialist EAPPR Glen D’Este Consultant Transport Specialist EASNS John Lowsby Consultant Engineer EASIN Josefo Tuyor Sr. Environmental Specialist EASPS Mark Walker Chief Counsel LEGES Stephen Hartung Sr. Financial Management Specialist EAPFM Fiona Doube Team Assistant EACNF Supervision/ICR Demetrios Papathanasiou Sr. Infrastructure Specialist GTIDR Team Lead Jim Reichert Sr. Infrastructure Specialist GTIDR Team Lead Cristiano Costa e Silva Nunes Sr. Procurement Specialist GGODR Procurement Sean David Michaels Operations Analyst GTIDR Transport and ICT David Bruce Whitehead Financial Management Specialist GGODR Financial Management John Lowsby Consultant GSURR Civil Engineer Oliver Whalley Consultant GTIDR Engineer Stephen Paul Hartung Financial Management Specialist GGODR Financial Management Victoria Florian Lazaro Operations Officer GSURR Safeguards Colleen Butcher-Gollach Disaster Reconstruction Specialist GSURR ICR Primary Author Claire Marion Forbes Consultant GSURR Safeguards Shruti Pandya Team Assistant EACNF Johanna van Tilburg Sr. Social Development Specialist OPSPF Counsel Josefo Tuyor Sr. Environmental Specialist OPSPF Safeguards Mark David Ansell Procurement Specialist GGODR Procurement

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Cost Cost Staff Time Staff Time Stage of Project Cycle (Bank Budget) (TF013209) Staff Weeks US$ /1 Staff Weeks US$ /1 Lending FY10 11.28 50,435.65 FY11 0.02 5,657.11 Lending Totals: 11.30 56,092.76 Supervision/ICR FY11 4.33 17,830.92 FY12 16.64 72,500.70 FY13 30.21 93,016.94 FY14 7.26 34,718.42 FY15 5.93 35,876.11 Supervision/ICR Totals: 26.90 126,207.73 37.47 127,735.36 Overall Bank Lending/SPN Totals: 38.20 182,300.49

Combined Bank and TF013209 Staff Weeks: 75.67. Combined Bank and TF013209 Costs: US$310,035.85.

NOTES: /1 Includes travel and consultant costs.

Annex 5. Map Showing Location of Major Investments in Roads, Bridges and Dual Purpose Pedestrian Paths