How and Why Did Ariel Sharon Become Prime Minister and How Did the Politics Violence Impact on His Electoral Success in 2001?
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BEN-GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT HOW AND WHY DID ARIEL SHARON BECOME PRIME MINISTER AND HOW DID THE POLITICS VIOLENCE IMPACT ON HIS ELECTORAL SUCCESS IN 2001? THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS JENNFER SCHARFSTEIN UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF: BECKY KOOK ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR AND DORON SHULTZINER, LECTURER DECEMBER 2013 1 Abstract There are two questions that are examined in the thesis. They are: Why and how did Ariel Sharon become Prime Minister? How did the political violence impact on his electoral success in 2001? When looking at these questions there are a few specific events that had a significant impact on Sharon and the election. The main event is the second Intifada, and the perception of violence that went along with it. Public opinion of Sharon was slowly shifting prior to the elections, and by the time the vote came around, there had been daily violence for months, and people were ready for a change. There are three main theories within the literature that can help explain, at least from the aspect of the electorate, how Sharon came into power. The first theory states that the electorate will vote against the party, or person, in powers, regardless if they are right-wing or left-wing. The second theory outlines a polarization that will take place, whereby the electorate is forced further to the right or left, depending on where their political allegiance laid previously. The final they discussed is one in which there is a shift to the right. People become more hardline in their views, and subsequently, they want a more hawkish leader fighting for them. The author used the research gathered in order to reach a conclusion as to which theory pertains to the case of Ariel Sharon and the elections in 2001. There are three specific factors which are analyzed in relation to Sharon’s success. Political factors at the time of both his election as leader of Likud, and his election as Prime Minister are crucial to understanding what happening in 2 2001. Along with the political factors, both historical factors and public opinion are scrutinized in order to accurately reach a conclusion about the elections. The February 2004 elections witnessed the largest victory in Israeli history, as well as the lowest turnout in Israeli history. All of the factors come together to give a clear picture of what lead to the election of Ariel Sharon on February 6, 2001. 3 Table of Content Page Abstract I Introduction 1 I. Methodology 2 II. Literature Review 3 Chapter One: Sharon’s Political History 11 I. Early Years 11 II. 1981-1983: Lebanon and Resignation 15 III. 1983-1999: A Quiet Time 19 Chapter Two: Likud Elections 1999 and Barak’s Resignation 23 I. September 1999 – Primary Elections 27 II. The Aftermath of Camp David 31 III. Intifada 31 IV. Barak’s Resignation, Netanyahu’s Challenge, and Sharon’s 34 Big Opportunity Chapter Three: The Election I. Introduction 40 II. Public Opinion and Polls 41 a. Table 1 43 III. Campaign January 16 – February 1, 2001: ‘Only Barak can make Sharon the Prime Minister of Israel’ 46 IV. Voter Turnout and Its Impact on the Election 50 Conclusion 55 References 60 4 Introduction Why and how did Ariel Sharon become Prime Minister? How did the political violence impact on his electoral success in 2001? In order to reach a conclusion on these research questions it is necessary to understand the public opinion surrounding Sharon prior to the elections, along with his reputation throughout his years in government and in the public eye. In this thesis I examine the dramatic change in Sharon’s reputation and the impact of the Second Intifada on his electoral victory. Furthermore, I explore and evaluate factors that enabled Sharon’s election, specifically political factors, historical factors and public opinion. Along with this I analyze in which ways Sharon’s campaign made use of the electorates’ perception of the violence, looking specifically at his use of the second Intifada in campaigning and his portrayal of Barak’s reputation while Prime Minister, from the time of his failure at Camp David in 2000. I argue that the Intifada caused a shift to the right in the electorate, which in turn benefitted Sharon and gave way to the main focus of his electoral campaign; one in which he could play off of the perception of violence held by the citizens of Israel. Moreover, I argue that Sharon was seen as the only (or default) option for Prime Minister at the time, and not necessarily the best option. As this research shows, he was able to climb to the position of Prime Minister due to haphazard political circumstances surrounding Netanyahu’s resignation from Likud’s leadership in 1999 and because of internal political factors in the Likud at the time of the Second Intifada. 5 Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister in 2001 with a record high percentage of the vote, showing that it was clearly a security win. The election that was called in 2001 was a special case in Israel because for the first and only time it was a direct election for the Prime Minister only: the Knesset did not change. Eighteen years earlier Sharon was removed from the position of Minister of Defense and was condemned over his role in the Lebanon War and the massacre at Sabra and Shatila. Security is always a leading issue in Israeli elections, and the election of 2001 was clearly marked with security concerns over the near outbreak of the Second Intifada. It has been demonstrated in the literature that public perception of political violence can have a large impact on elections. During the 2001 elections this model seems to apply. Not only did the perception of violence appear to have impacted on the electoral results, so too did the candidates’ manipulation of that very perception and the security issue more broadly. Methodology In order to test the impact of the political violence on the elections I analyzed a number of different sources. These sources include public opinion polls, which were used to examine any changes in Sharon’s popularity up to and during the campaign in 2001, campaign speeches given by both Sharon and his opposition, as well as the campaign materials that were used during the ‘campaign propaganda time’ which is allotted to each candidate leading up to the election (specifically commercials). 6 I gathered material from many of the polling companies in Israel, along with data collected in the book series Elections in Israel. I was fortunate to arrange an interview with former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who was close to Sharon at important historical junctures. I have integrated his unique perspective into the thesis. His first hand experience with Sharon and the election campaigns proved to be invaluable. Through an analysis of the primary materials it is possible to test the impact of the Intifada on the electoral campaign of Ariel Sharon on the one hand, and the outcomes of the election on the other. Literature Review There are three main approaches to the study of the impact of terrorism on elections that will be addressed here. The first approach argues that the electorate will vote against the party that was in power when the attack happened (Montalvo 2012; Bali 2006; Bali 2007; Chari 2004). Evidence for this approach comes mainly from the Spanish case study. In Spain, in 2004, the right-wing Popular Party (PP) was leading the government, and it was under the control of this government that Spain became involved in the War in Iraq. The PP did not obtain parliamentary approval before involving troops in the war, “even though all major parties and over 85 per cent of all Spaniards were against the war” (Chari 2004: 954). It is because of this participation that Madrid became the target of a deadly terrorist attack on March 11, 2004. Montalvo theorizes that: 7 If terror acts happen close to election times, then the effect of the political race and the increased media attention amplifies the discussion on incumbents’ merits or mistakes. In fact this was the case in the terrorist attacks in Madrid. The incumbent party had decided to participate in the war in Iraq against the general opinion of Spanish citizens, and the attacks were linked quickly to Spain’s participation in the war. This led voters to recall many other instances that they did not like about the policies supported by the incumbent party during the previous four years” (Montalvo 2012: 105). The attack came mere days before the elections of March 14, 2004, and the result was an unexpected upset for the incumbent PP party, who, until the results were tallied, was expected to win with a 4 per cent lead. Chari outlines some of the reasons for the electoral results that came as a result of the attacks. Immediately following the attack the PP placed blame on the ETA (Basque terrorist group), and continued to blame them even after information came out that contradicted this accusation. The Spanish public was growing weary of the lack of transparency from the PP, as well as some of their policy decisions; namely their involvement in the war. By the time the results of the election were tallied the PP lost almost seven per cent of its vote from the previous election, and the Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) won with a five per cent margin (Chari 2004: 958). It is important to understand how the terrorist attacks were able to catalyze this kind of turn-around.