Abstract 1 ABSTRACT the Year 1992 Marked a Significant Change in The

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Abstract

ABSTRACT

The year 1992 marked a significant change in the foreign policy of India towards Israel that had been lying dormant for nearly four decades. Some important events on the geo–strategic front of the Middle East countries such as Arab, Iran, Iraq and Palestine, etc., compelled India to mull its stand on diplomacy with Israel once against. The state of Israel established in 1948, was recognized by India on September 18, 1950, but the two countries established full diplomatic relations on January 29, 1992. The event that compelled India to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel was Gulf War, which seriously undermined the unity of the Arab world. The subsequent end of the Cold War had a positive impact on the peaceful solution of many international problems. The first sign of a change in India‟s anti-Israel policy appeared in the little known meeting between Prime Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao and Joseph Leibler, a prominent Jewish leader during November 1991 followed by India‟s note for the revocation of the UN Resolution 3379 of November 1975 that had equated Zionism with racism. The official level meeting between India‟s Deputy Chief of Mission, Lalit Mansingh and the Israeli representative Joseph Hadass took place at the Indian embassy in Washington in January 1992. Finally India announced its decision on 29 January, 1992 to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel.

The establishment of diplomatic relations and the transformation of Indian policy on Israel are considered by India as one of the most important milestone in Indian diplomacy

In India, with the changing international scenario subsequent to the end of the Cold War, the view of pro-Israeli microscopic minority gained prominence. There were three main arguments. Firstly, India would be in a better position to involve itself in the West Asian peace process and thereby influencing Israeli policy in favour of Palestinian. Secondly, advantage in specific areas like military modernization, agriculture innovation and global Jewish investment. Lastly, the emergence of an Islamic bloc in the world politics made it essential that India should change its pro- PLO stance and move closer to Israel. Above all, India could not resist acknowledging the fact that by the end of 1980s, Israel had become one of the top most manufacturer and exporter of advanced and sophisticated military and defence equipment to many third world countries. Therefore, India could not afford to lose the

1 Abstract opportunity of shaking hands with Jerusalem and thus foreign relations between India and Israel took an upward turn.

For Israel, a close multifaceted bond with India would have significant political, diplomatic and strategic benefits. Indian support for beleaguered Israel on the international stage would significantly contribute to dispersing much of the animosity manifested towards it by many international organizations and help it break out of the cycle of censure whenever it endeavours to defends its vital interests assertively (Indeed, Israel only seems to receive international approval when it accedes to the demands and pressures of those urging concessions from it). Strategic collaboration would allow Israel to broaden the base of its strategic reliance. It should however be clear that at least in the foreseeable future, such collaboration can be expected only to augment and complement, rather than supplant or replace, Israel‟s reliance on the US. It could broadly follow the lines of growing Turkish –Israeli cooperation, which would dispel any basis for construing it as “anti-Muslim”.

India and Israel have shared much in common during the last six decades. They share common bedrock of parliamentary democracy, common law structures, liberal educational systems, knowledge of the English language and a history of British colonialism. India and Israel as functioning democracies have survived in a sea of hostility surrounded by implacable adversaries and a heavily militarised security environment. Both nations have fought wars in every decade of their existence. Both countries face external and internal security threats in the form of terror attacks from terrorist groups.

During the past several years, Indo-Israel relations have made remarkable progress in diverse fields. The whole gamut of bilateral cooperation can be discussed under four categories: military, strategic, trade, agriculture, science and technology. At the political level the new found warmth was reflected in the frequent exchange of high level visits between the two countries. In the due course of time Indo-Israeli strategic relation‟s assumed new dimension which encompassed three aspects: defence supplies, internal security and counter terrorism.

2 Abstract

USSR affected the Russian military manufacturing capabilities, the arms manufactured in Russia were export- oriented and moderately priced. Israel‟s experience gained during its long war-torn history would be invaluable to India in bolstering security and helping it repel aggressors. Israel‟s expertise in border surveillance, sensor technology and electronic detection could contribute towards prevention of undetected incursions into sensitive regions along the Indian frontier, as occurred in Kashmir. On the strategic military plane, there is emerging recognition that Indo-Israeli collaboration will yield synergic mutual benefits, allowing each to reach objectives neither can on its own. Given the present (and probably future) economic constraints on both sides, India‟s quest for independence in technological expertise and Israel‟s need to maintain a sizeable defence industry to preserve its qualitative superiority over adversaries are goals likely to be beyond either‟s reach individually.

The cooperation between India and Israel in areas such as the economic and agriculture started off with the simple exchange of commodities which is now growing rapidly, covering trade, technology transfer as well as investments into industry. Considering the fact that the two economies are complementary to each other, coupled with an investor friendly environment, the future of trade relations looks bright. As a result of this facilitation, the trade volume between India and Israel has risen by an average of 50% every year from 1992 to 1999. The two way trade had grown steadily from US $ 202 million in 1992 to US $ 1004 million in 2000 and in 2010 it reached US $ 3087 million. India‟s liberalization policies and globalization strategies make Israel well positioned to fulfil the economic and technical demands of India‟s rapidly developing economy. Israel‟s achievement in agricultural technologies as well as better industrial known-how, combined with India‟s large pool of scientific and technical personnel, create a bigger scope for cooperation. Israel‟s expertise in agricultural technology, Agro-Tech, is well known for the world. They have developed remarkable sophistication and expertise in water management methods, especially in drip-irrigation techniques, meant to fight water logging and salinity. This has been one of the focuses of Indian attraction. Moreover, in India, Israeli technology is preferred to European technology on account of almost similar geographical conditions. In the sphere of culture and tourism also both countries are showing an encouraging response to each other and are seen to be making efforts to come closer.

3 Abstract

It is important that both countries should be able to appreciate each other‟s culture which is possible only when there is people to people contact. This requires giving a boost to the tourism sector as well. This is going to benefit the academic community as well as the larger society in learning not only about each other‟s culture but also various other fields.

The manner in which India managed to defend its national interest is a classical instance. Paradoxically, the peculiar features of domestic political system inflicted its own impact on India‟s diplomatic behaviour. All these are strange and interesting phenomenon which the present study has attempted to look into. The following findings are the offspring of the study.

1. The visible shift to domestic, strategic and other considerations, in-lieu of the ethos of social and political aspects which remained the conventional factor in India‟s traditional policy on Israel gave a thrill and thrust to Indo-Israeli relations.

2. India was in a sound political position when she opposed the creation of the State of Israel. But such a position lost its gravity, when Israel became a member of the U.N. in 1949. The tenants of International Law also demanded a shift in the position of India.

3. Non-establishment of diplomatic tie at the time of recognition was a lapse on the part of Indian political leadership by which it wilfully allowed some domestic and other regional (West Asian) factors to influence her diplomatic behaviour. Such a deliberate lapse eventually met India‟s national interest in different ways.

4. The political behaviour of the State of Israel, the aggressive policies it adopted after the Suez Crisis and the sensitive dimension the issue assumed at home inhibited India from forging diplomatic ties with Israel. The earlier political position turned insignificant in the context of „real politik‟ of the region. This is exposed when we look at India‟s covert relation with Israel during times of its national crises.

5. During the period of non-political relationship with Israel, though India was defending its traditional Israel policy, she was really preparing for a policy shift. The changes in international politics and the subsequent political developments in West-Asia were only immediate causes, for the same were the culmination of a

4 Abstract

dual policy followed over all these periods. However, these changes did help India to overcome the domestic criticism on the policy shift.

6. The most political aspect of Indo-Israel relation is security and defence related cooperation. In spite of higher frequency of defence related cooperation on a variety of areas, both governments deliberately put things in a confidential manner. If explored fully, without any inhibition, such a tie would help India meet many of its immediate security challenges in the sub-continental and regional contexts.

7. Indo-Israeli relations have flourished within a short span of time in many traditional areas of mutual cooperation. At the same time, India deliberately did not allow her commitment to the Arab world in general and the Palestinian cause in particular to suffer. On the other hand, India maintained a very balanced diplomatic schedule in West-Asia. This is a very positive symptom and a mature way of exercising diplomacy. India should develop the tendency to the tune of making use of the full potential of Indo-Israeli relations, especially in defence related areas.

8. India‟s simultaneous response to the needs and aspirations of the two pole ends of the forces of West-Asian region will have far-reaching implications to her national interests in the coming years. It would certainly decide the dynamics of India‟s foreign policy.

25The growing ties between these two nations which have even been termed as „natural alliance‟, though, doesn‟t come without the cautionary note pointed out by some serious observers of international politics who rightly view power in international relations in broader sense. According to this view, in the immediate context of growing Indo- Israel ties, what came at stake was India‟s philosophical base of its foreign policy. Enlightened self interest must obviously be the guiding principle of the foreign policy of any country, but, that enlightened national interest must be formulated with a broader mind and a visionary outlook. The immediate compulsions of the international geopolitics, should pragmatically, not blur the long term vision of the philosophical base of any nation‟s foreign policy. In the history of nations, it is sometimes very important to stand for something which may not be so fruitful in the immediate context.

Dedicated To My Beloved Parents

Department of Political Science TELEPHONES : Chairman : (0571) 2701720 ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY AMU PABX : 2700916/27009-21-22 ALIGARH 202002 Chairman : 1561 Office : 1560 FAX : 0571-2700528

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that Mr. Leyaqat Khan, Research Scholar of the Department of Political Science, A.M.U, Aligarh has completed his thesis entitled, “INDIA ISRAEL RELATIONS: A STUDY OF BILATERAL COOPERATION SINCE 1991”, under my supervision. This thesis has been submitted to the Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, in the fulfillment of requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. To the best of my knowledge, it is his original work and the matter presented in the thesis has not been submitted in part or full for any degree of this or any other university.

DR. MOHAMMAD NASEEM KHAN Supervisor

Acknowledgements

All thanks are due to Allah Almighty, the Cherisher and Sustainer of the Universe, Who bestowed upon me the courage, patience and strength during my research work. I bow in reverence to express my gratitude and indebtedness to the Almighty Allah, Whose gracious blessings gave me the required zeal for the completion of this venture in stipulated parameters of time in a successful manner.

With sincere regards and tributes to Late Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, the founder of this prestigious institution, the Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.

This thesis is the ultimate product of my arduous and long journey to obtain my goal. I have not travelled in a vacuum in this journey. By this time, I have worked with a great number of people whose contribution in assorted ways to the research and making of the thesis deserved special mention. It is a pleasure to convey my gratitude to them all in my humble acknowledgments.

With the immense sense of gratitude I would like to pour down my owe and wholehearted gratefulness to my esteemed supervisor Dr. MOHAMMAD NASEEM KHAN, Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, for his precious constructive guidance, constant encouragement, continuous inspiration and sincere motivation. I am much indebted to him for inspiring supervision, affection, generosity, and everlasting enthusiasm throughout the tenure of my research work. His wide knowledge and logical way of thinking have been of great value for me.

I convey my sincere thanks to the Chairman, Prof. Asmer Beg Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, for providing necessary research facilities.

I also extend my profound thanks to Prof. S. Waseem Ahmad, Prof. Mohd. Abid, Prof. Nafees Ansari, Dr. Farhana Kausar, Dr. Nagma Farooqui and all other teachers of the Department whose valuable guidance and good wishes helped me considerably in the pursuit of my work. Words fail to express my deep sense of gratitude to former Chairman Prof. Arif Hameed.

I extend my deep appreciation and special thanks to Dr.Gouhar Sultana for her guidance, encouragement and moral support throughout this tenure.

The financial assistances received from the University Grants Commission as non-NET fellowship during the initial stage of PhD course and are sincerely acknowledged.

Moreover, I wish to acknowledge and give thanks to the staff of Seminar Library, Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University; Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University; Jawaharlal Nehru University Library, New Delhi; Jamia Millia University Library, New Delhi; IDSA Library, New Delhi.

I am immensely thankful to my senior friends Dr. Zafar Alam, Dr. Asif, Dr. Faisal, Dr. Sarim Abbas, Tariq Iqbal, Syed Mazin Zaidi, Sami Shakir, Javed Ahmad, Salim Khan, Shahab Shabbir “BABU BHAI” for their love, support and motivations that helped me to carry out my research work efficiently.

I take this opportunity to express my gratitude to my friends and Juniors for their moral support and encouragement during the tenure of this work, especially Naushad, Ayaz, Amir, Aijaz, Tehseen, Parth, Zeeshan, Sadique, Tausif, Mohsin, Saquib Pasha, Wasi, Rafey, Shamim, Saeed, Shariq Zaidi, Faizan Shahid, Ashraf, Harish, Manzoor, Sadre, Shahid, Kalim,whose fraternization and affability helped me at the moments of distress and exhaustion.

I sincerely acknowledge the support of non teaching staff of the department of Political Science, A.M.U. Aligarh especially Mr. Iqrar, Mr. Hammed, Mr. Asaf, Mr. Sulaiman, Mr Muqeet.

I shall be failing in my duty if I don’t put on record my wholehearted gratitude to my father Ajaz Ahmad Khan and beloved mother Late Shahar Bano whose blessings, inspiration, cooperation, love and unconditional support always helped me. My sisters Tarannum Yasmin, Zeenat Yasmin, Arshi, and brothers Azmat Khan and Nusrat Khan, Brother in Law Inam Azmi, Amjad Khan and Mohd Arif Khan and Sister in Law Shama Afroz and Yasmin Akbar and my beloved nephew and niece Mishqa, Hasan, Zaini, Areeb, Ayesha, Saara, Bushra and Yusuf have been a great source of strength during my entire research work. Without their blessings, inspiration, motivation and understanding it would have been impossible for me to finish my research work.

I would also like to thank Mr. Faisal Ali (from Champion market) for Printing and Formatting in my research work.

I would also like to thank each and everybody who have been directly or indirectly involved in or have been the part of my research work, and who has contributed in any way in completing my work. Every help counts and sometimes the little things in life bring a lot of change. Thank you everybody!

Leyaqat Khan CONTENTS Page No. Declaration Acknowledgement Abbreviations INTRODUCTION 1-6

CHAPTER – 1: INDIA ISRAEL RELATIONS 7-40 FROM 1948 TO 1992 1.1 India and Arab Israel War 1.2 Janta Government and its Relations with Israel 1.3 Gulf War of 1991and India’s Response 1.4 Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Israel

CHAPTER – 2: DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC 41-63 RELATIONS 2.1 An Overview of the Indian Defence Sector 2.2 Israel’s Arms Industry 2.3 Defence Deliberations between India and Israel 2.4 Programmes of Upgradation and Modernization 2.5 Missile Technology 2.6 Electronic Warfare 2.7 Airborne Warning Control System (AWACS) 2.8 Nuclear Cooperation 2.9 Counter Terrorism and Intelligence Cooperation

CHAPTER – 3: TOURISM, CULTURAL AND 64-90 AGRICULTURAL RELATIONS 3.1 Cooperation in Tourism and Culture 3.2 Agricultural Cooperation

CHAPTER – 4: TRADE, SCIENCE AND 91-106 TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION

CONCLUSION 107-114 BIBLIOGRAPHY 115-135 APPENDICES i- xxviii Abbreviations

ACMI - Air Combat Manoeuvring Instrumentation

ADL - Anti Defamation League

AEC - Atomic Energy Commission

AIPAC - America Israel Political Action Committee

AJC - American Jewish Committee

ALH - Advanced Light Helicopters

ARF - ASEAN Regional Forum

ARO - Asian Relations Organisation

ASEAN – Association of South East Asian Nations

AWACS - Airborne Warning and Control Systems

BJP - Bharatiya Janata Party

CII - Confederation of Indian Industry

COIJI - Central Organisation of Indian Jews in Israel

CPI - Communist Party of India

CPI-M - Communist Party of India Marxist

CTBT - Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

DRDO - Indian Defense Research and Development Organization

DSIR - Department of Scientific and Industrial Research

FTA - Free Trade Agreement

GDP - Gross Domestic Product

HAL - Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.

IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency IAF - Indian Air Force

IAI - Israeli Aircraft Industry

IARI - Indian Agricultural Research Institute

IB - Investigation Bureau

IDF - Israeli Defense Forces

IDSA - Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis

IFS - Indian Foreign Service

IIF - International Islamic Front

IIRDIC - Israel Industrial, Research and Development Initiative

Cooperation

IMF - International Monetary Fund

IMI - Israel’s Military Industries

IMDP - Integrated Missiles Development Program

INCM - Indian National Congress Movement

INCP - Indian National Congress Party

ISRO - Indian Space Research Organization

IT – Information Technology

ITPO - Indian Trade Promotion Organization

JDP - Janata Dal Party

JWG - Joint Working Group

KNESSET - The Israeli Parliament

LCA - Light Combat Aircraft

LIC - Low Intensity Conflict LOC - Line of Control

MASHAV - Israel’s International Development Cooperation Program

MEA – Ministry of External Affairs

MFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOSSAD - Agency for Intelligence and Special Operations

MOU - Memorandum of Understanding

NAM – Non- Aligned Movement

NDA - National Democratic Alliance

NGO – Non- Governmental Organisations

NMD - National Missile Defense

NPT - Non-Proliferation Treaty

NSA - National Security Advisor

NSG - National Security Guards

OIC - Organisation of the Islamic Conference

OPEC – Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries

PA - Palestinian Authority

PLO - Palestine Liberation Organisation

PNC - Palestine National Council

PRC - People’s Republic of China

PSLV - Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle

RAFAEL - Israel’s Weapon Development Authority

RAW - Research and Analysis Wing

RPV - Remotely Piloted Vehicles SAAG - South Asia Analysis Group

SCI - Shipping Corporation of India

SHABAK - Israeli Security Service

UAR – United Arab Republic

UAV - Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UF - United Front

UN - United Nations

UNEF - United Nation's Emergency Force

UNO - United Nations Organisation

UPA - United Progressive Alliance

US - United States

WHO - World Health Organisation

WJC - World Jewish Congress

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

INTRODUCTION

The West Asian region, particularly the Gulf region has always been important to the world and was a coveted region due to its oil wealth as well as a strategic location. India had political, economic and cultural contacts with the region since time immemorial. This region had been very important to India for its strategic location as well as its oil wealth. India had to maintain very good relations with the countries of the region and it was India’s good relations with Arabs that governed its relation with Israel soon after independence. India did not recognize Israel after its creation on the ground it was created. Even after it recognized Israel in 1950, it did not establish normal diplomatic relations with Israel till 29 January 1992.India’s relations with Israel lay dormant for about four decades. However the changes in international geo- strategic environment compelled India to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992.

The event that compelled India to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel was Gulf War, which seriously undermine the unity of the Arab world. The subsequent end of the Cold war had a positive impact on the peaceful solution of many international problems. The first sign of a change in India’s anti-Israel policy appeared is the little known meeting between Prime Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao and Joseph Leibler, a prominent Jewish leader during November 1991 followed by India’s note for the revocation of the UN Resolution 3379 of November 1975 that had equated Zionism with racism. The official level meeting between India’s Deputy Chief of Mission, Lalit Mansingh and the Israeli representative Joseph Hadass took place at the Indian embassy in Washington in January 1992. Finally India announced its decision on 29 January, 1992 to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel.

Introduction

During the past several years Indo-Israel relations have made remarkable progress in diverse fields. The whole gamut of bilateral cooperation can be discussed under four categories: political, strategic, military and others. At the political level the new found warmth was reflected in the frequent exchange of high level visit between the two countries. In the due course of time Indo-Israeli strategic relation’s assumed new dimension which encompassed three aspects: defence supplies, internal security and counter terrorism.

The cooperation between India and Israel in areas such as economy and agriculture is now growing rapidly, covering trade technology transfer as well as investment into industries. Defence and military co-operation between the two countries has been a key component of the strategic relationship. Israel has emerged as a major supplier of high tech military equipment to India over the years. India constitutes Israel’s third largest export market for arms and defence equipment.

India’s liberalization policies and globalization strategies make Israel well positioned to fulfil the economic and technical demands of India’s rapidly developing economy. Israel’s achievement in agricultural technologies as well as better industrial known-how, combined with India’s large pool of scientific and technical personnel, create a bigger scope for cooperation in the sphere of culture and tourism also. Both countries are showing an encouraging response to each other and are seen to be making efforts to come closer.

The study divided into four chapters which primarily focuses the various aspects and dimensions of India relations with Israel since 1991.

The first chapter, India’s relations with Israel from 1948 to 1992 is the introductory one which traces the evaluation of the Indo-Israel relation and highlights the main events that compelled India to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel which were, Gulf war which seriously undermined the unity of the Arab World, end of the Cold War, an urgent need for better relations with the US and Pakistan propaganda amongst West Asian states in order to establish an Islamic bloc and internationalise the Kashmir issue and lack of support from the Arab countries during the India-Pakistan wars, etc.

Introduction

The second chapter covers the most important aspect of the Indo-Israel relations, the military relations. In the military field , former Soviet Union affected the Russian military and industrial complex, the Russian exports are export oriented and relatively low priced. Israel is a late entrant in the field of diplomatic relations with India but emerged as an important partner in the military field. Such a partnership is based on India’s realistic assessment of the global and regional security environment as well as its own technological requirements. The chapter emphasizes that India- Israel military relations have grown because it is based on practical considerations as Israel is a source of high technology in military and India requires it and is a good market for Israel.

The third chapter discusses in detail into Israel cooperation in the fields of agriculture, tourism and culture. Israel is a world leader in agro-technological accessories and India being an agricultural country could benefit from Israel a lot. Ever since the normalization of relations the tourism between the two countries have increased. There has been a boost to the cultural contracts too.

The fourth chapter, ‘Trade, Science and Technology cooperation discusses the technological interdependence of India and Israel on each other. Beside agriculture, trade, science and technology too assumes greater dimension in the bilateral cooperation between both the countries. Way back in 1993 an agreement on science and technology was signed between the two states during the visit of the then Israeli foreign minister Simion Peres. This agreement stood for direct scientific and technological cooperation between governmental agencies academies of science, research institutes, enterprises and institutions of higher education and scientific communities of the two states.

In the last but not least is the concluding part of the entire study, where the major observations and findings are summed up.

The Research Questions

The general questions examined in the study emphasize India’s changing position, perception and policy with regard to Israel in different international political contexts. Along with this, the study tries to examine, why India made a policy-shift on

Introduction

Israel? What are the prospective dimensions of Indo-Israeli cooperation? And what is the strategic implication of Indo-Israeli relations?

Hypotheses

The present study sets forth the following hypotheses:-

1) India’s Israel policy was conditioned by several factors: social, political, economic, religions and strategic ones. However, in the course of time, domestic and other strategic considerations outweighed the others. Such factors continue to limit Indo-Israeli relations even after the establishment of diplomatic relations.

2) Though the Government of India could defend her traditional policy on Israel, it was really preparing for a shift in its policy on Israel. However, the changes in international politics, development in West Asia and the impact of Globalization were the immediate causes for a reconsideration of such a policy shift. In a sense these developments did help the India to overcome the gravity of criticism on the policy shift.

3) India’s political, economic and strategic interests in West Asia continue to be the same, inspite of the phenomenal change in international politics. At the same time, the emerging realities in the global scenario and its impact on the region compelled New Delhi to a policy shift, vis-à-vis Israel. In the changed context, Israel has turned out to be a strategic and balancing factor. India’s response to these contradictory interests will decide the merit and dynamism of her foreign policy in the coming years.

Review of Literature

Review of literature is the mandatory part of any serious and systematic research work. It has become an imperative one since it helps:-

I) To develop a general explanation for observed variations in a behaiour or phenomenon,

II) To identify the potential relationship between concepts and to identify reasonable hypotheses.

Introduction

III) To learn how others have defined and measured key concepts?

IV) To identify data sources that others researchers have used?

V) To develop alternative research designs.

VI) To discover how a research work is related to the work of others.

P. R. Kumarswamy has made his Ph.D thesis on India’s Israel policy. But this study is seen confined to some of the early decisions taken by India on prior to 1980. It is a good endeavour on the part of the author, since he could provide a good number of primary documents for the succeeding Research Scholars.

Farah Naaz, another scholar has also done some investigation in this direction. Though her study “West Asia and India: Changing Perspective” is a general inquiry on India’s strategic position on West Asia. It also helped in assessing India’s diplomatic behavior and strategic calculations vis-à-vis Arab states.

The work of Anwar Alam, “India, Global Powers and West Asia”, deals with evolving political and economic dynamics and interactions of India with global and regional powers in West Asia. It examines India’s multidimensional relations with global powers such as the USA, Russia, China and regional powers and organisations like Iran, Israel, Turkey and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) respectively.

Considering the peculiar significance and the sensitive nature of the topic, some of the professionals were able to provide periodic comments and reviews on the subject. Among them the names of M.S. Agwani, Bansidhar Pardhan, J.N. Dixit, R. Shreekantan Nair are worth mentioning.

Methodology

The proposed study has been made relying on the case study method. However, as per the requirements of the different context, a few other methods have also resorted to. For instance, Document analysis method has been adopted while examining various reports, agreements and related documents of the Government of India and the State of Israel. Besides, as the study otherwise demanded, Historical and Analytical methods have also been considered.

Introduction

The study is based on bilateral relationship between India and Israel. There are a number of factors contributing to the relationship between the two states. The positive development in the West Asia is a direct factor responsible for close ties between the two countries. As such, any setback to the peace process may create a reasonable gap in the relationship between New Delhi and Tel Aviv.

Chapter- 1 INDIA ISRAEL RELATIONS FROM 1948 TO 1991

Chapter -1

INDIA ISRAEL RELATIONS FROM 1948 TO 1992

India was not the only country to warm towards Israel. Russia, China and Turkey also capitalised on the changed circumstances to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel. Other Asian states, such as Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam renewed their diplomatic ties with Jerusalem in that period. India did not want to lag behind China, which had been gradually improving its relations with Israel since the 1980s. The upgrading of relations was, therefore, part of a larger global post-Cold War phenomenon of the urge to normalize relations with a growingly important international actor which possessed advanced technologies and excellent relations with Washington. Israel took the opportunity to improve relations with countries once in the Soviet Orbit (Eastern Europe and Central Asia) and many others, previously reluctant to have full-fledged relations with Jerusalem.

Foreign policy of a country is the offspring of domestic policy. The domestic and foreign policy cannot be completely compartmentalized. They are closely related, in fact, they need an integrated approach. So, national interest becomes the guiding principle in foreign policy. India’s foreign policy makers are fully aware of its national interest as the guiding principle. Nehru, who is the architect of India’s foreign policy, once said, “the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in findings out what is most advantageous to the country”. This is India’s principle in its foreign policy, including in its policy towards West Asia. So, India cannot adopt an isolated foreign policy towards Israel. There are ample facts and evidences that its Israeli policy is conditioned by its policy towards the Arab states and the latter’s policy towards the Jewish state. This pattern of India’s policy towards Israel is due to certain difficulties which it faces in its national interest. So, Indo-Israel relations have to be looked within this broad parameter of Arab-Israeli relations and changes taking place therein, and how India has responded to these changes.

India and Arab Israel Wars

India had vehemently opposed the partition of Palestine, however, accorded the recognition to the state of Israel, later, in September 1950. But with the recognition of Israel, India did not exchange the diplomatic representative between the two states. Israel was, though, later on permitted to open a consulate in Bombay (Now Mumbai).

Chapter -1

Nehru the then Prime Minister of India explained his decision of extending recognition to Israel: 1

“It is not a matter of high principle but is based on how it could best serve and be helpful in that area. We should like the problem between Israel and the Arab countries to be settled peacefully. After careful thought, we felt that recognizing Israel as an entity will need not at this stage exchange diplomatic personnel, and we think it is the correct decision.”

Moreover, India by giving recognition to Israel showed its respect to the decision making body of the United Nations.

India was looking at the conflict between Arabs and Israelis from ideological and principled perspective. So, it was quite obvious that India could not go along with Israelis2. Before the termination of the British mandate over Palestine, Zionist forces moved to occupy the cities and areas in territories allotted for the Palestinian state. By 14 May, 1948 over half of the Palestinian population was forced into exodus, as over two thirds of the Palestinian land became occupied by the Zionist. Ben Gurion admitted before the Mandate ended that, “No Jewish settlement, however remote, was entered or seized by the Arabs, while the Haganah---- captured many Arabs positions. So, on the day do destiny that part of Palestine, where the Haganah could operate was almost clear of Arabs.”

On the eve of 15 May, 1948, while Britain had completed the withdrawal of administration and the army, David Ben Gurion proclaimed the creation of Israel. At this point the Arab league sent a telegram to the U.N. The telegram stated that as a consequence of Zionist aggression, the Arab states, “were compelled to intervene for the sole purpose of restoring peace and security and of establishing law and order in Palestine”, to prevent as well, “the spread of disorder and lawlessness into the neighbouring Arab lands, and to fill the vacuum created by the termination of the Mandate”. 3

However, the intention of Ben Gurion and his terrorist companions were quite different under the garb of filling up the vacuum on account of British withdrawal, they unleashed unprecedented act of terror. The annals of Zionist history are full of

Chapter -1

leaders outdoing other leaders in insisting on the importance of military power and the role of force and terror in the building and safeguarding of the Zionist state. Joseph Trumpeldor, Viladimir Jabatinsky, Ben Gurion and all the Israeli generals asserted that the violence and terror are the backbone of the plan to enforce the Zionist programme. This was necessarily so because the Zionists have, simply invaded a country, evicted the majority of the population, followed this up with further use of force and terrorism. 4

“I would suggest to you to come round in time to the “Greater Palestine” programmed before it is too late. The Basel programme must contain the words “Greater Palestine” or Palestine and its neighbouring land otherwise it is nonsense. You do not get the 10 million Jews into a land of 25000 square kilometres”5 were the words David Trietch sent to Theodore Herzl on 29 October, 1899, express with perfect clarity the inner logic of Zionist policies. 6

“Deir Yassin, massacre has clearly exposed the Zionist policies and also put before the world a shocking example of what the movement stood for. Deir Yassin, an Arab village of the main road to Jerusalem and surrounded by Jewish land had taken no part in the war … on 9 April terrorist bands (Irgun, Lehi, Hagana) attacked this peaceful village and killed most of its inhabitants. “It is imperative that the truth about Mr. Begins and his movement be made known in this country---- The undersigned therefore, take this means of publicly presenting a few salient facts concerning Begin, and of urging all concerned not to support this latest manifestation of fascism”.

Begin, Shamir and Sharon were nothing but a triumvirate of war criminals. Even Ben Gurion described Begin as “a thoroughly Hitlerite type”. 7

“On May 1948, the Israeli state was duly proclaimed and Begin came out of the underground to make his first radio speech. He said, “The Hebrew revolt of 1947-48 has been blessed with success. O God of Israel, keep the soldiers and bless their swords, which give a new birth to the covenant, though, than had sealed with the beloved people and their chosen land forward to the ground! forwarded to Victory! The terrorist had triumphed”.8

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In what the Zionist claim to be a “War of Independence”, five Arab armies, i.e. Egypt, Jordon, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq crossed the border of Palestine on 15 May, 1948. Though the Arab armies were less equipped, in the face of a decisive Israel military superiority and despite the fact that its unified command was held by British military personnel, whose final target was to secure the new-born Israel state, the Arab Armies made limited military successes, while the Egyptian army had reached an advanced line near Tel Aviv, the Jordon and Iraqi armies controlled wide areas including Lydda and Ramallah. As its military position was deteriorating, Israel turned to the U.N. for intervention, charging that the Arab had started the war. On 22 May, 1948, the Security Council convened to discuss the situation and adopted, after a resolution calling upon, “all governments and authorities, without prejudice to the rights, claim or positions of the parties concerned, to abstain from any hostile military action in Palestine, and to that end to issue a ceasefire in order to their military and paramilitary forces”. The tragedy became imminent when the U.N. through its Secretary General, Trygve Lie, upheld Israelis accusation against the Arabs for starting an aggression. Supported by the members of Security Council, the Security General threatened the Arab State and warned of action, including sanctions.

This endorsement by the world body opened a history of injustice against the Palestinians as U.N. had remained silent in the face of Zionist aggression and occupation offering a deaf ear to their complaints ignoring its own resolutions and Charter.9 The war, which ended in favour of Israel brought more Arab territories which were allotted to the Palestinians by the U. N. under the occupation of Israel. It resulted in the forced migration of thousands of Palestinian Arabs to the border of neighbouring Arab States. After this war, Israel was again provided benefits by the U.N. when her application for the membership of the U.N. was approved in May, 1949 by the U.N. Israel’s admission to the U.N. was granted almost after one year of its creation. India voted against Israel’s admission stating that “India could not recognize Israel which has been achieved through the force of arms and not through negotiations.10 India is linked with Arab states by historical, political and economic accords. Arab solidarity with India in her campaign against imperialism and colonialism made India’s foreign policy tinged with an Arab blend. In this kind of circumstances, it was quite obvious that Arab would like India to be along with them.

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Arab influence on India in later years loomed larger and made the latter appear to be more Pro-Arab and anti-Zionist.

Taking recognition as a welcome gesture, the Israeli government made a move for establishing normal diplomatic relations. Dr. Walter Eytan director general of the Israeli foreign ministry paid an official visit to India in March 1952. According to him, it seemed that the Indian Prime Minister had approved the idea of establishing diplomatic ties with Israel. Yet, formal decision had to be taken later, after the general election. The following year when the Egyptian met Nehru in Berne, the government of India had already jibbed what was accomplished with the permission of Indian government to establish an Israeli Consul general in Bombay which is termed as “India’s Diplomatic Siberia”. 11

Nehru was the main architect of India’s foreign policy. He took a great caution in dealing with Israel and later refused to normalize relations with Israel.12 The Jana Sangh, Swatantra party and the Praja Socialist were against the government policy. The Jana Sangha argued that India should adopt more pragmatic foreign policy, because foreign policy, according to them, was policy and not an immutable principle. They said that Israel was the only democratic country in West Asia and it was, therefore, imperative that India must have full diplomatic relations with Israel.13

The Sangha thinking was oblivious of the fact that the so called democratic state of Israel was established at the expenses of the majority of the Palestinians, an act quite contrary to the basic principles of democracy. The main reason for the non- development of normal relations with Israel was due to the earlier principled stands so valiantly taken up by the Indian leadership of the Indian Liberation Movement. The Congress Party after independence dominated the Indian political system and its foreign policy. Its overwhelming majority in the parliament enabled it to overrule agendas set by Jan Sangh to benefit Israel at the expense of Palestinian. So, the non- establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel could be ascribed to the continuation of the policy persuade by the congress in the preceding years. In the early years of the independence, Indian economic position was not sound. India was launching her first plan and could not afford to lose her Arab friends, which were of vital importance for her basic economic needs. Pragmatically, trade relations between India and Arab States were more significant and bigger in volume than Israel. They still are.

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Moreover, remittances which India gets from Indian Community working in these Arab countries are exceptionally high. On the other hand, Indo-Israeli trade was limited and had lessor scope for expansion. The commodity pattern also made Arab countries advantageous for India. India imported from Arab states items like oil, cotton, phosphate, and so on, which have less substitutes, unlike, Israeli diamond and citrus fruits and its products.14 Moreover, since 1973, Indo-Arab trade relations became increasingly important. The question of India’s relations with the region was and is closely linked with the oil economy. On the other side, India’s consultancy if applied sufficiently could help Gulf countries in technology. 15 India’s West Asian policy had to be directed to counter Pakistani propaganda. This is necessary because of two main reasons: - to win the Arabs to her side especially at the U.N. and to look into the popular sentiments of the liberal minded overwhelming population in India. India’s non-establishment of normal relations with Israel also had something to do with Pakistani factor, to give no chance to Pakistan’s propaganda against India among the Islamic nations. 16

The Indian West Asian policy was greatly influenced by her relation with the Arabs and the Arabs Nationalist Movement. The Egyptian revolution in 1952 created a new dimension in Indo-Arab relations, which had a chain reaction to her attitude towards Israel. After the revolution (1952) Nasser’s Egypt assumed the leadership of the Arabs more than ever before. Egypt, which had taken an uncompromising attitude against any form of imperialism and colonialism, represented a form of Non- Alignment. The very structure of her policy, which is governed by revolutionary idea made her not to align herself with any other bloc. This ideological commitment made Egypt support all countries committed to the same objectives.17

Egyptian government’s opposition to imperialism, qualified by non-alignment, found a place with Indian foreign policy makers. India’s and Egypt’s consistent opposition to all forms of imperialism’s intrigues and manoeuvres led to their attacks on the Baghdad pact. This common policy brought India and Egypt closer. This friendship was further cemented during the Belgrade Summit of non-aligned countries.18

India’s relation with Egypt had a major role in her policy towards Israel. Since India’s relations with Egypt were very cordial, it would have been almost impossible

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to move closer towards Israel, which was seen as the outpost of the West and the belligerent state by Egypt. So, India did not take steps towards the normalization of her relations with Israel.19 India was very much against the colonialism and imperialism. After adopting the socialist pattern of society, it strengthened her friendship with the former Soviet Union. Nehru visited Moscow in 1955, which became able to get the Soviet Union’s support in many ways.20 Since 1953, India had continuously rejected Israel’s proposal for developing diplomatic relations. Regarding the clashes, which took place between Arabs and Israelis since the creation of Israel, India came more open and vocal in expressing her condemnation of Israel. Her attitude towards these conflicts (1948, 1956) has been influenced by her national interest. India condemned Israeli alliance with imperial powers because of the large scale aggression. One more thing India found contradictory with Israel was the creation of Israel on religious basis, which was totally against the secular ideology of India.21

The year 1956 was a landmark in the history of West Asia. It marked the emergence of a new regional order. This was precipitated by the Suez Crisis. On 26 July 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company in response to the withdrawal of Aswan Dam loans by contributing powers, which was done in reaction to the Czech arms deal of May 1955 and thus disturbed the regional status quo.22

A conference was convened in London where Nehru assured Nasser that the purpose of India in attending the conference was not to weaken Egypt’s position, but to prevent any unilateral actions to be taken at the conference. In the conference India ardently prevented the western move to aggrandize their economic interest and upheld Egyptian right to nationalize the Canal.23 In spite of a number of diplomatic efforts to solve the problems, Israel, in collaboration Britain and France, launched a sudden and pre-mediated attack on Egypt on 29 October, 195624, India did not expect such a sudden attack and expressed her hope that the United Nations would be able to take steps to prevent extension of hostilities. Nehru publicly condemned Israeli actions and branded it as a case of clear naked aggression.25 He even asked the former Yugoslavia and the Bandung countries to join him in public condemnation of the aggressor.26 India held that Israel had no right to invade the Suez. By invading Egypt and also by joining hands with the imperial forces, Israel lost the sympathy of Afro-Asian nations including India. On the question of Egypt’s denial of passage through the Suez to Israel, India had the opinion that it would be quite natural and obvious that an Arab 13

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country, which was at war with Israel, would show lethargy to the latter’s flag passing the Canal. But this could be solved through peaceful means. 27

Nehru declared in the Lok Sabha on 16th of November, 1956 when he spoke at length regarding the attack on Egypt that the aggression had come as a shock, it was a scandalous case of aggression by two strong powers against weaker country. 28 India played a very constructive role in the crisis through the Afro-Asian meeting and in U.N. India was a co-sponsor of the 19-nations, Asian-African resolution on the question of the withdrawal of the Israeli Anglo-French forces from the Egyptian soil.29 Even opposition parties had joined the government in condemning the aggressor. It was seen as a new phase of colonialism and imperialism. Various political parties urged the government to cut all liason with Britain and denounced India’s membership of the common wealth.30 India’s approach to the Suez Crisis was an outcome of her national interest and her desire to solve the problem in a peaceful manner. As India was one of the principle user of the Canal, her economic activity affected due to its closure, Egypt and India held the British responsible for the Crisis. 31 Throughout the crisis India was busy coordinating the major event with other non-aligned nations. In the initial period India was mostly acting alone, but once the tripartite attacks were launched on Egypt, India supported Egypt fully and unequivocally condemned the aggressors. 32

India also showed strong reactions against Israel in June war of 1967, Indian government blamed Israel for escalating the situation into an armed conflict. Referring to the Indian soldiers in the U.N. emergency force who were killed by Israeli forces. Indira Gandhi condemned the killing as deliberate, unprovoked. The India government as always, took a very Pro-Arab stand and even went to the extent of sponsoring the UAR draft.33 The war also crystallized India’s West Asian Policy into supporting the Palestinian cause. She identified herself closer with the Palestinians and openly supported them in their struggle against the Israeli government.34

India being a non-aligned country was reluctant towards the hostile policy of Israel and condemned the American policy towards the Arabs. Due to Israeli aggression of 1967 against the Arabs, India decided to break off relations even at the consulate level with Israel as an immediate measure and she extended moral support to the deprived Arabs who were the victims of Israeli aggression.35 The Indian

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government in conformity with its Pro-Arab policy condemned the Israeli aggression. Looking at the crisis from a global perspective, the then Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi observed in the Lok Sabha on 6 June, 1967.36

“The world today witnesses a disaster in the West Asia and the situation becomes grave by the hour. If not stopped, this war is likely to expand into a wider one drawing into its vortex other countries and developing perhaps into a world war, it is our solemn duty as a government to help in restoration of peace in the present perilous situation”. Expressing the same concern for West Asia, she said in the Rajya Sabha on the next day, i.e. 7of June, 1967, “The world is in grave peril. Our own national interests are bound up with peace and stability in West Asia”.37 In the U.N. India stressed the need for lasting peace and wanted Israel to withdraw its armed forces to the position held before the commencement of the hostilities. Speaking in the emergency session of the U.N. general Assembly on 21 June, 1967 Mr. Chagla remarked, “the foundation of the lasting peace in this region can be based only on a total, immediate and unconditional withdraw of Israel from the areas now under its occupation.38 He also argued that the dispute cannot be settled through the armed conflict.39

Mrs. Indira Gandhi, while addressing the General Assembly on 14 October, 1967, also stressed the need for solving the problem by “political means” based on the principle of security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the states in the areas.40 In December 1967, Mr. D. P. Dhar, a member of the Indian delegation to the U.N. special committee reiterated the Indian position, which recognized the Palestinians as a people and not merely as refugees. It was also emphasized that the lasting solutions of the many problems existing could be worked out only when the key issue of the refugee problem was dealt with and steps were taken to ensure the just rights of the Arab people of Palestine on the basis of paragraph-II of resolution 194 (III). 41

During the Arab Israeli conflicts through 1967-69 India took side with the Arab and denounced, Israel for attacks on Beirut international airport in December, 1969. India was also unhappy with Israel over her occupation of Al-Aqsa mosque in eastern Jerusalam. At U.N., India urged for the immediate implementation of the Security Council resolution on Jerusalam.42

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India’s stand on June war was not shared by all political parties and public at large. India-Israel relation, though had touched a very low ebb, was viewed by them in the context of Arab’s stands vis-à-vis India crisis in the preceding years. Opposition leaders from Jan Sangh, the Swatantra party, the Praja Socialist Party and the Somyukta Socialist Party criticized the government stand. They advocated that by supporting the Arab unreservedly India unnecessary would encourage the Arabs to adopt more hostile attitudes towards Israel, which could create more tension in the region.43 They also pointed out that India was going out of her way and should stop acting like the fourteenth Arab state. And some people did not endorse government policy of supporting the Arabs blindly.44 opposition members (Excluding the Communists) who did not share governments view on the issue were conditioned by Arab stand on India’s crisis in 1961, 1962 and 1965. When the Indian army took over Goa in December, 1961 Israeli Press accused India maintaining a double standard.45 On the contrary, Egypt closed Suez Canal and did not allow Portuguese arms and ammunitions to flow towards India. A shining example of Indo-Arab fraternity, non- aligned principles and third world solidarity in contrast to Israel’s leaning toward West.

This unfriendly tone of the Israeli press, however, changed in 1962, when China invaded India, India sought military assistance from all over the world. The Israeli response was favourable. 46 Israelis less concerned with India’s predicament have always tried to sell arms to friends and foes alike presently China is also on the buyers list.

The U.S. support to India also helped in that context. So, after 1962 Chinese aggression, a powerful lobby was active in India, which canvassed, for various reasons, in favour of immediate establishment of diplomatic relation with Israel. It is also argued that India should adopt Pro-American policy which would bring India and Israel together,47 and that was imprudent on the part of India to thrust all weight behind the Arab because when she got only lukewarm attitudes from the Arabs in 1962 and 1965.48 Opposition members-Jan Sangh, The Swatantra Party, Praja Socialist, Samyukta Socialist Party were admonished by India’s indifference towards Israel. It was argued that while some countries like U.S.A., U.K., Yugoslavia, Kenya and so on maintained good relation with both Arabs and Israel, why could India also not do the same? It was said that leadership in India should not succumb to Arab 16

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pressure in a bid to appease them. They also argued that majority of the Arabs were with Pakistan and even UAR remained partially neutral. When UAR could remain friendly with Pakistan, India, China, why could India not be friendly with both Israel and UAR. Jan Sangh even asked whether India’s Policy was to be conducted in her interests or in Arab interest. They viewed Israel as a force in the region and as the symbol of stability.49 While they think so they conveniently forget that Israel is the greatest destabilizing factor in the region.

In 1973, war broke out again in West Asia. During the war, India supported the Arabs as she felt that their action could not be termed as aggression as Israel had provoked the war by not adopting a more flexible attitude in negotiating a proper settlement. It declared that “the cause of tension in the area is Israel aggression and the refusal to vacate the territories occupied by armed forces”. Declaring India’s sympathies with the Arabs, it further said that Arab cause based on justice and demanded immediate implementation by Israel of United Nations Resolution 242 (1967) for peaceful solution of the problems. 50

On 6 December, 1973, the then India Foreign Minister Swaran Singh stated that, “Our sympathies for the Arabs are for two reasons. First, they are our centuries old friends and Second, their territories have been occupied following the Israeli aggression”51. Mrs. Indira Gandhi also gave two reasons for India’s sympathy towards Arabs. First, India old and solid relations with Arab required India to “Stand by its friends in the time of their travel” and the Second, Israel’s refusal to Arab lands occupied in the 1967 war and its refusal to honour U.N. resolutions.52

India’s policy towards the Arab-Israel conflict was based on the principled opposition to the acquisition of land by force and it wanted Israel to withdraw to pre- June 1967 frontiers so that progress would be made to resolve the crisis during the Israeli attack the Ministry of External Affairs in its statement condemned Israel and held the view that the intransigence on the part of Israel was the basic cause leading to the outbreak of hostilities. 53

After 1973 Mr. Arafat was called by the U.N. General Assembly to address the world body on 13 November, 1974. Arafat in his historic address stressed the PLO’s willingness and priority for a peaceful solution to the issue. He further stated as, “Today I have come bearing on Olive branch and a freedom fighter’s gun. Do not

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let the olive branch fall from my hand. 54 Responding to Mr. Arafat’s address the then Indian Foreign Secretary, Mr. Kewal Singh made a statement at the U.N. General Assembly on 19 November, 1974, in which he endorsed the views expressed by Arafat at the U.N. India introduced a draft resolution on 21 November, 1974 in favour of the Palestinian people to self-determination . It also stood for the Palestinian national independence and sovereignty.55

Israel after signing the Camp David accord and its subsequent peace treaty with Egypt turned towards Lebanon. In their bid to crush the PLO, Israeli moves were an attempt to bait the Palestinians into provoking a confrontation in southern Lebanon, the Israeli provocation may be an effort to justify an attack that Israel otherwise could not afford to make because of unprecedented international pressure.56 The atrocities committed by the Israeli military during the Lebanese Crisis were very horrific and condemn.

South block expressed her shock over the Israeli aggression on Lebanon. She condemned Israel’s infamous history of misdeeds57 stressed the recognition of the rights of the Palestinians for establishing durable peace in the region. India also puts efforts to solve the problems, though her efforts had Arab tinge.58 In India the Israeli consul. Yosef Hassen, Commented on India’s official stand on the crisis, which is highly objectionable. In a newspaper interview, he bluntly said that Indian politicians were afraid of the Arabs and thereby succumbed to their pressure. This was seen by the government of India as an unacceptable interference in the domestic affairs of India and in retaliation, the Israeli consul was asked to leave the country within forty eight hours. 59

When the extent and gravity of political and diplomatic support of India to PLO was popularly recognized, by yet another significant diplomatic move, on 10 January, 1975, India accorded diplomatic recognition to PLO. Indian was the first non- Arab country to make such a move. Yasser Arafat endorsed the move and hoped that this would strengthen the struggle of the Palestinian people “a very big push forward”.60

The period of 1980’s witnessed a new initiative and intensification of India’s move to strengthen the PLO diplomatically and politically on 26 March, 1980,61 the then Indian Foreign Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao announced in the Parliament that

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India had decided to accord full diplomatic recognition to the office of PLO in New Delhi. 62 After this move Mr. Arafat paid a three day visit to Indian between 28 and 30 March. 1980 on the invitation of Mrs. Gandhi, During his visit Mrs. Gandhi stated that sympathy for the Palestinians has been a part of independent India’s foreign policy from its very inception”. 63 Mrs. Gandhi also reiterated that a just peace and comprehensive solution to the Middle East crisis could be found only with the “full participation of the PLO as an equal partner in any settlement”.64

India’s Palestine policy was further strengthened when Arafat again paid second visit to India as head of the state in exile in May 1982. During his visit he was described as “The symbol of a people afire with the spirit of freedom” by Indira Gandhi.65

The Palestinian agenda surged up to the forefront once again. Tel Aviv too suffered more causality in the Lebanon in 1982 war. On account of the role of the Shinbet, the Israeli secret service evoked greater international sympathy for the Palestinians.66 The PLO had appealed that the United Nations peacekeeping force should replace the Israeli troops in the areas from where they were pulling out.67 Indian solidarity with Arabs and Palestinians in particular could be seen by the very fact that India permitted the PLO to open an office in New Delhi on 10 January, 1975,68 This shows that Palestine factor became the guiding principle towards the West Asian crisis. The Palestinian cause was upheld as a high principle of humanity and the Israeli government was looked upon as aggressor with imperialistic design.

India’s reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon was sharp and harsh. The than Indian Foreign Minister, Mr. Rao referred the matter on 19 June, 1982 as the “enactment of savage drama involving the butchery of our Palestinian brothers and sister. 69 Mrs. Gandhi on 25 July, made a statement in the Lok Sabha condemning the Israeli attack and maintained that “Israeli attempt to wipe out the Palestinian movement cannot succeed in the long run”.70 In September ,1982 Mrs. Gandhi further sent a message to Mr.Arafat in which she praised the PLO’s spirited resistance to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.71

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Janta Government and Its Relations with Israel

Indo-Israel relations had shown a negative trend since the beginning of the fifties. The government policy even sank deeper in the 1960’s. But during the latter parts of 1960’s, there camp up a strong Pro-Israeli lobby in India. The Chinese invasion of 1962 was seen by this group of people as an acid test of friendship. Israel’s transfer of weapon like mortar to India during the crisis was seen as an act of friendship72 since then this lobby had been campaigning for Israel in India. But the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Indo-Israeli relations touched the lowest ebb. The government of India’s sympathy for the Jewish people for their suffering in the past, though had not withered away it was very wary of Zionist actions. The Indian government, along with many nations asked the Israeli government to leave the occupied territories, which were endorsed by the U.N. Security Council resolutions 234 and 338. So, India was standing by the Palestinians cause within and without the United Nations.

The Parliamentary election of March 1977 brought to power the Janata Party headed by Morarji Desai, with the former Jan Sangh leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee as the minister of external affairs.73 On West Asia despite their canvassing for a change when they were in opposition, the Janata Party continued to back the Arabs and the Palestinians. India reaffirmed that for the establishment of the peace in the region, Israel should vacate those territories which they had been occupied since 1967 and allow the Palestinians the right to self-determination or even separate state of their own in which they could live in security and peace. The Indian government also reportedly deplored Israel’s act of aggression and of building Jewish settlements in the occupied territories which aggravated tension between the Israelis and Palestinians.74

The Janata Party stressed clearly that in the international field, it would pursue a genuinely non-aligned policy. It should not only remain non-aligned, but must also appear to be so. The party would follow a policy, which would not show that India was tilting towards a particular bloc.75 So, the non-alignment policy continued to form the cornerstone of India’s foreign policy. In view of this, India had to follow the old policy which had been pursued since independence and there was no shift in it. During the Janta’s rule it examined the foundation of India’s foreign policy and considered non-alignment as one of the cardinal principles of foreign policy. Developing relations

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with Israel would sound to many Indians and Arabs as a turning away from the policy of non-alignment because of the simple reason that Israel was a very close ally of USA. Indo-Israeli ties remained on the shelf during the Janata period. Moshe Dayan, the then foreign minister Israel visited Indian but this trip did not produce the expected results.76

When Moshe Dayan came to India there was no diplomatic relations between India and Israel, even though an Israeli consulate was established in Bombay. The main reason behind the visit was to muster diplomatic relations with India. During his visit Mr. Dayan met with the then Indian Prime Minister and had some discussions with him. Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Desai put his view before Mr. Dayan.77

“You must make peace with the Arabs. The Israelis have suffered from the Nazi’s and the persecution in Europe, but the Palestinians should not be made to pay for that. The refugees should be settled and you had to withdraw from the occupied territories, which would be proclaimed a Palestinian state”.

He further stated:

“Israel was not established fact, the Arab must guarantee her existence, but Israel must take possible the rise of a Palestinian state. The solution is to establish a Palestinian state in the Arab territories, which Israel should evacuate”.

Thus, it is clear from the above discussion that Mr. Desai was firm on Israel’s withdrawal and the emergence of Palestine state. The refusal to allow Israelis to establish a second consulate in New Delhi in addition to the Israel had in Bombay clearly shows that how much Mr. Desai was firm regarding the Palestine issue. Desai also stated that he could be out of the office if the visit of Mr. Dayan were to be published.78 As Dayan himself has recorded that he felt humiliated and was let down by the then Indian Foreign Minister Mr. Vajpayee.

Gulf War of 1991 And India’s Response

The end of the cold war had its ramification on the international political environment. It brought in a different world order and its effect has spread far and wide. The

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disintegration of the former USSR and her socialist block led to the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, and left USA as the only superpower. 79 The USA policy having a free hand in conducting war against Iraq by hijacking the United Nations should also be looked from the end of cold war political angle. In west Asia regional power, in the post-cold war era, was concentrated at two extremes, Iran in the Persian Gulf and Israel. The Gulf regimes mainly rely on the USA as their principle source of security and other Arab states suffered from the collapse of the former USSR. It made Israel unmatched military power in the region.80 This gave Israel to a great extent, a free hand in conducting her foreign affairs.

New Delhi voted for the U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait and rejected Iraq’s linkage of the Kuwaiti and the Palestinian problems. In January 1991, India also permitted the United States military aircraft to refuel in Bombay. The refuelling decision stirred such domestic controversy that the Chandra Shekhar government withdrew the refuelling privileges in February 1991 to deflect the criticisms of Congress (I), which argued that India’s nominal Pro-United State tilt betrayed the country’s non-aligned principles.81 Others argued that India’s Pro-US policies and its support to the United States during the war was the clearest indication of India’s shift from the old practiced non-alignment stand. 82

On the regional level the Gulf war of 1991 witnessed a major realignment of force in the West Asia. The leading Arab countries, including radical Syria joined the hands with the US in waging a divesting war against a fellow Arab country-Iraq.83 On the international level the Gulf crisis confirmed the unchallenged dominance of the US as the principle external influence and power, and signalled the corresponding demise of the Soviet Union as a significant regional actor. The Arab-Israeli conflict is also the area where the US has the greatest potential for being a catalyst for peace in the region.84 the Madrid conference of 1991 in which the Arabs and the Israelis started talking face to face was the clear proof. It is because of this Madrid conference that Israel and PLO recognized each other after two years of the conference, which was managed for the first time after the eight visits of James Baker to the region.85

Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Israel

The decision of having diplomatic relations with Israel came from the Narsimha Rao government in 1992. After the cold war era India’s decision making structure came

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under intense pressure and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel a close ally of the U.S. is the clear evidence of shifting of Indian policy from PLO to Israel.

Narsimha Rao’s decision of establishing the diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992 was a hasty step, which was taken under outside pressure then diplomatic prudence. The first sign of a change in the Indian Pro-PLO and anti-Israel policy appeared little in the meeting, which was held between the then Prime Minister, Narsimha Rao a Zionist leader Isi Joseph Leibler in New Delhi, in November 1991. The discussion centred round the possibility of the establishing diplomatic ties between India and Israel. The Prime Minister’s response, according to Leibler, was more positive and pragmatic than his predecessor. Further Leibler talks with the Indian Prime Minister were facilitated by the U.S. Leibler openly admitted this in his press conference.86

The Leibler-Rao meet was followed a more visible gesture of the government of India under Narsimha Rao softened stance towards Israel when India voted for the revocation of the U.N. resolution 3379 of November 1975 that had equated Zionism with Racism. The fact remained that mere revocation of the resolution did not change the basic character of Israeli state policy, which formed the raison d’etre of the 1975 resolution. The state of Israel was founded, and continues to exist on the basis of a racist ideology, i.e. Zionism. Further, it led one to believe that the earlier motion (and India’s support to it by implication) was a mistake or that Zionism had somehow changed and repented on its past policies. In reality it was neither, as the regime occupying Palestine became more outrageous and belligerent in pursuit of the expansionist dream. Moreover, this was done without taking the Indian public opinion into account, neither a debate was held in the Parliament nor opposition was taken into confidence. India’s long cherished principled stand against Racism was thrown to the winds overnight.

In this context, it would be interesting to note the observation made by the Indian repetitive at the U.N., Rikhi Jaipal, in his statement of explanation of Indian vote in favour of Resolution 3379” 87

“Zionism has deprived, noted the statement, the Arab people of their national right and of the right to self-determination. It is surely understandable that the victims of Zionism should regard it as a form of racial discrimination and it is, therefore,

Chapter -1 proper for the General Assembly also to regard it as such. To condone the evil effects of Zionism would be giving the green light to various other forms of racism endemic in human societies”. Had this fact changed on 16 of December, 1991 i.e. when India, voted for the repealing of the said resolution. The argument that by attending the West Asia Peace Conference in Madrid, Israel had changed itself and shown its desire to work for a peaceful solution of the Palestinian problems did not hold good in the face of the then prevailing situation in the occupied territories. The then prime minister Yitzhak Shamir continued the policy of building new settlements and expanding the existing ones in the West Bank and Gaza as if there was no peace process. There was no let-up in the Israeli policy of brutalization, demolition, detention and deportation vis-à-vis the Palestinians from the occupied territories in the midst of the peace process was an example. This was done despite the fact that the U.N. Security Council passed on resolution strongly condemning it.88 A statement issued on 5th of June, 1992 by the Council of Arab Ambassadors in New Delhi clearly indicated how much had the state of Israel changed around six months after the revocation of the resolution 3379 , while reminding the world of the 25 years of the 1967 Arab Israeli war, the Council statement said that even as apartheid was being dismantled in South Africa, Israel had adopted a “system of racial discrimination against indigenous Palestinian Arabs who are living on their own land as Second Class Citizens.”89

Hence, there were reasons to believe that in this case too it was the US factor, which influenced India’s decision. India succumbed to US pressure after the discussions in New York and voted in favour of the pro-Israeli resolution. There was a general agreement, within the U.N. General Assembly, to proceed with the revocations sometime in 1992. This was obviously to wait and watch till Israel changed itself substantially vis-à-vis Palestinian so as to justify a reversal of the 1975 resolution. But the then US President, George Bush, had his own domestic political calculation and compulsions to push through the repealing of “Zionism is Racism” Resolution as early as possible. It may be recalled that the then Bush administration had virtually irked the powerful American Jewish Lobby on the well-known $10 billion housing loan guarantee to Israel. The US President came down heavily on the Israeli Prime Minister on this issue, and ultimately Shamir had to bow down. Hence the repealing of the 1975 resolution was said to be a balancing act. Moreover, this gesture was essential, argued the Bush administration, to coax Israel to soften its stand towards the peace process. It

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indeed is a ridiculous logic. The fact remained that in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, the US sought to use the U.N. for its own foreign policy ambitions. In this case too, the American diplomatic machinery at the U.N. was pressed into service to put pressure on countries, not excluding India, to support the US move in the revocation of the said Resolution by the General Assembly. Yasser Arafat, during His visit to New Delhi in the following weeks, candidly talked about the American pressure tactics.90 Further, the statement made by the then Indian Prime Minister before the Parliament just two days after India voted in the U.N. vindicated this. While declaring that his government would use foreign policy as a dynamic instrument to further national interests, Prime Minister Narsimbha Rao listed out the overriding priorities of India’s foreign policy in the post-cold war era. They were, preventing any threat to India’s unity and territorial integrity, ensuring geopolitical security by creating a durable environment of stability and peace in India region, creating a framework conducive to the economic well-being to the people by encouraging a healthy external economic environment, and trying to restore, internationally, the centrality and criticality of the development in the evolution of political and economic policies all over the world. A careful analysis of the last two points clearly suggested the reasons as to why the weakling Prime Minister had to follow the US line. Because otherwise in his opinion the loans from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank would not have flowed steadily, resulting in the total collapse of India’s “ambitious economic liberalization” programme. The foreign policy postulates as enumerated by the Indian Prime Minister was nothing but object surrender in the face of difficulties. The Indians were virtually mortgaging their otherwise independent foreign policy stance to the outside dictates, which could harm the nation in the longer run.

On the same day, 18 December, 1991, Yasser Arafat requested an audience with Prime Minister Rao probably to protest against India’s volte-face. The President of the state of Palestine, who in earlier times, visited this country more frequently than any other world leader, was in for a great surprise this time. His visit kept getting postponed on flimsy pretexts, that the Prime Minister was preoccupied with two foreign dignitaries and with the preparations for the Republic Day. It was indeed ironical that Prime Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao, who headed the foreign Ministry for a long time, spearheaded many important Pro-PLO decisions, and above all had to

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establish close personal rapport with the PLO leader, would deny an audience to Arafat under various pretexts. What was more ironical probably was, that while Arafat was having a difficult time in meeting the then Prime Minister , hectic efforts were on to facilitate the meeting of Indian and Israeli diplomats in the US. An official level meeting, highest till then, between the Israeli Representative, Joseph Haddas and the Indian Deputy Chief Mission, Lalit Mansingh, took place at the Indian Embassy in Washington during the second week of January 1992. This meeting clearly indicated that the two countries were very close in establishing full diplomatic ties. In addition, this also brought to the open the active US role in facilitating this breakthrough.91

Finally, New Delhi took the initiative and gave a date, which was not as suitable for the PLO leader as he was tied down by the outgoing West Asia peace negotiations. But still he had to make it in view of the far-reaching developments. The receptions accorded to the visiting Palestinian dignitary were lacklustre at the worst and make believe warm at best. It sought to conceal the subterranean tensions in Indo- PLO relations. During the official level talk with the PLO Chief the Indian Prime Minister reiterated his consistent and unequivocal support for Palestine and the inalienable rights of its people to self- determination. The Prime Minister also assured Arafat of extending all support to the Palestinians in whatever way possible to achieve the twin objective of establishing peace in the region and helping the Palestinian friends. While taking an appreciative note of the on-going West Asia peace process and wishing it all success, Rao underlined the fact that India had a vital interest in peace and stability in a region so close to it. The security situation in West Asia, the Prime Minister added, impinged on India’s security environment. On the whole, India tried to convince the Palestinian leader that it had not abandoned the Palestinian cause totally despite New Delhi’s increasingly softened stance towards Tel Aviv. He was given the impression that while, “our hearts” were still with the struggling and suffering Palestinian people and with the martyrs of Sabra and Shatilla and the Intifada, but “our heads” were adjusting to the dictates of a fast changing World.92

Arafat, on his part, gave a brief assessment of the peace talks. He expressed his strong conviction that India’s participation in the third round of West Asia peace talks, scheduled to be held in Moscow on 28 and 29 January, 1992 was essential, though the modalities were not discussed. However, the most significant announcement from the PLO Chairman came during a press conference on the second day of his stay in New 26

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Delhi,93 “exchange of Ambassadors and recognition of Israel are acts of sovereignty in which I cannot interfere” declared Arafat “I respected any choice of Indian government”. He further added, hoping that such a change would not affect Indo- Palestinian relationship, which was “so strong”.

Arafat above mentioned statement was extensively reported in and interpreted by the media as clear-cut go-head signal from PLO to India to establish ties with Israel. In reality, this was not so and reflected only a fragmented analysis of the whole thing. A careful reading of Arafat’s subsequent statement in the same press conference, made it evident that the PLO leader’s “clear message” was not so clear. It was a conditional signal. Arafat explicitly emphasized that India’s full diplomatic relations with Israel was not a pre-condition for its association with the peace process.94 In other words, diplomatic relations with Israel were not only the way by which India could be involved in the West Asia peace processes. To substantiate his point, Arafat remarked that Jordon, along with many other Arab countries, represented at the peace conference, were without diplomatic relations with Israel. In other context Arafat stated that he would prefer if India established diplomatic ties with Israel “slowly” to enable the PLO to attain its objective at the peace talks.

Thus, an objective interpretation and correct understanding of Arafat’s massage required that India should have followed a cautions and go-slow policy in establishing full diplomatic ties with Israel. It should have waited till the ground realities in the West Asian theatre changed substantially so as to remove the very basis of its decade’s old anti-Israeli policy. One failed to understand why Indian policy makers were in such a hurry? After all, India had extended formal recognition to the state of Israel long ago, notwithstanding its earlier opposition. From the very beginning, Indian insisted on a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli- Palestinian conflict. It neither encouraged nor supported the PLO position of dismantling the state of Israel. That was enough to convey that India accepted the faith accomplished in West Asia. So, what great difference did it make by establishing diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv? Israel’s mere attendance of the Madrid peace conference in no way reflected a substantial policy change on its part towards the occupied territories and the Palestinian living under military occupation in gross violation of established international law. Further, India did not have a guilt conscience, like the Western power who shut their doors to the Jews during the Holocaust, to compel us to look for 27

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ways to compensate the state of Israel. The architects of independent India’s foreign policy were very clear about the purposes and justification behind an anti-Israeli posture. By then, however, India’s course of action had already been decided. A particular section, within the foreign policy establishment, who claimed themselves to be the realists guided by so called real-politic considerations had vigorously argued for the immediate establishment of ties with Israel. Finally, within a few days of Arafat’s departure from New Delhi, India decided, on 29 January, 1992, to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel. It should not be forgotten that the announcement to this effect was made by the then Indian foreign secretary on the eve of the Prime Minister Rao’s departure for the U.N. Security Council Summit in New York.

It is essential to emphasize that a section, favouring normal and friendly relationship with Israel, had always been there within the foreign policy establishment, and the opinion –making institutions like the media and universities. At times, it even permeated into the political circles. This was mostly due to the persistent lobbying of the Zionist in India. And certainly, the Zionists are unbeatable as far as the subtle art of lobbying and creation of pressure groups within a country’s deciding- making structure is concerned. The establishment of an alien entity, called the state of Israel, on Palestinian land, was largely due to the Zionists success in this field. Hence, India, because of its geo-strategic importance in the world politics, never escaped the attention of the Zionists. So much so that even during the time of Indira Gandhi , who was known for her activism Pro-PLO and anti-Zionist policy, the Zionists did not relent on their persistent efforts to effect a change of mind on the part of India in this regard. They did it when Rajiv Gandhi came to power. In both the times, it was the same person, one Greville Janner, who happened to be the President of the Common Wealth Jewish Council,95 Interestingly, Janner was a member of the British Parliament and belonged to the labour party. He was a Zionist in belief and orientation. Notwithstanding their constant attempts, the Zionists lobby failed to achieve any breakthrough due to two interrelated factors; the then international power balance, and India’s foreign policy orientation, which maintained synthesis between ideology (of anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, antiracism etc.) and the high ideas of the freedom struggle.

This never meant that the pursuance of national interest was a go-by under the euphoria of ideology. But national interest was never computed by the calculus of loss 28

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and profit alone. After all, India stood as a symbol and source of inspiration for most of the third world countries having similar experiences of colonial rule and post- colonial nation building process. As a result, the section championing the cause of the Zionist lobby in India constituted a microscopic minority in the face of a broad anti- Israeli consensus within the country.

There are some main arguments put forward by the realist school, first by establishing the diplomatic relations with Israel, India would be in a better position to involve herself in the West Asia peace process and thereby influence the Israeli policy in favour of the Palestinians.

Those who believed this were probably living in a make believe world, far away from the dynamics of Israeli- Palestinians conflict and negotiations. It has already been stated how Arafat disputed this logic by stating that there were other ways and means by which India could have been involved in the peace process. What was more important was the degree of influence India could have exercised on Israel by becoming part of the peace process. By attending the talks, the Indian Prime Minister or Foreign Minister could, at best, have delivered and addressed the theme of which was known to everybody, including Israelis. The crucial question was: would the Israeli have heeded to it? The Israeli position vis-à-vis the peace talks were governed by the domestic compulsion/ pressures that the then Shamir government was confronted with and not by our sermons. For instance, the shift from the procedural wrangling to matters of substance and the report that the Israeli negotiators in Washington had offered a plan for the Palestinian sell rule in the occupied territories brought the wrath of two right –wing parties. This ultimately brought down the Shamir government for a while. And letter the government survived a no-confidence motion in the Knesset due to the renewed support of one the Tzomet Party.

This exposed how precariously balanced was the Shamir government and how the power equation in Israel and a decisive bearing on its policy towards the Palestinians. Any other consideration was no consideration at all. Here, it may not be an exaggeration to say that even the President of the US, which has been a constant source of support-diplomatic, political, military and economic to the continued economic to the continued existence of Israel from the beginning, at times found it difficult to influence the Israeli government beyond a point. This is for country from

Chapter -1 which Israel receives billions of dollars (approximately $ 5 billion) in foreign aid annually. In view of this it sounded ridiculous to expect that India could influence Israel’s policy even nominally.

Second, it was argued that in concrete terms there were distinct advantages for India in establishing contacts with Israel in specific areas like military modernization, agricultural innovation and investments of global Jewish establishment. India could also benefit in combating militancy in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir from the Israeli experience and expertise in this regard.

Both the arguments were nothing new and had been surfacing off and on. There had been a section, which from time to time argued that India’s non-relationship with Israel put her at a disadvantageous position, preventing New Delhi from playing a positive and purposeful role in bringing the two adversaries closer to a settlement. To what extent India has been playing a role in this regard ever since its full diplomatic relations with Israel is therefore everyone to see. As for the concrete benefits, it may be noted that as far back in the 1960’s the government of Rajasthan has shown interest in Israel’s arid-zone forming techniques. On the question of countering militancy, the problems in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab had cropped up in the 1980’s a period when India took many decisions in support of the PLO. Why did India not establish diplomatic relations with Israel and benefit from its expertise in combating militancy when the problem was at its peak? 96

Apart from the untenability of the above arguments, the main issue, while dealing with Israel was that moral aspects assumed more influence that the so called real politic compulsions which often signified an outright selfish pursuance of national interests without any regard to World peace and human values. Israel was, and perhaps still is a state unlike any other.

The establishment of diplomatic relations, then certainly questioned and diluted India’s commitment to the high deals of non-alignment, which had been the guiding force of our foreign policy during all the decades after independence, Israel represented all that was anathema to the NAM. NAM’s struggle against imperialism, neo-colonialism, racism and the rights of small countries to determine and shape their own future needs no repetition. Of course, there were some who argued that with the discredit of socialism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, imperialism was

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dead and similarly with the collapse of the Cold War, NAM became redundant. Such a view smacked of one’s ideological ignorance and lack of knowledge about the dynamics of international politics. The significance of NAM extends beyond a general resistance to bloc division. It signifies a refusal to the mere political and economic appendage of the center(s) of military, political and economic power. It is a struggle for the protection of the developing countries from external domination and exploitation. Moreover, bloc politics is fast getting replaced by hegemonistic politics. Hence, the relevance of NAM is more than ever before in view of the emerging unipolar (politically) world and the inherent danger of domination over small and economically weak countries. At such a critical juncture, the establishment of ties with Israel meant that India was distancing itself. From the NAM instead of giving direction to the movement in shaping the emerging international order, for instance, by voting along the US line for the repealing of resolution 3379, India for the first time moved away from a collective NAM position. In any case the concrete advantages that people talked about were not so lucrative as to compromise with the basic elements of India’s foreign policy. Third, it was argued that the emergence of an Islamic bloc in world politics made it essential that India changed its Pro-PLO stance and closer to Israel.

The talk of the emergence of an aggressive Islamic block is basically an American projected new horror in the Post-Cold War International Politics.97 While establishing ties with Israel, the Pakistani factor was also utilized to justify the untimely/ hasty decision. It was argued that in the event of the emergence an Islamic bloc, Pakistan would fully exploit it against India. Hence, there was a need to counter this by forging an anti-Islamic alliance along with Israel and the US. The formation of an anti-Islamic alliance was, and still is, in conformity with the US-Israeli design. But one fails to understand how it serves India’s foreign policy goals and national interest. No doubt, the tensions between India and Pakistan is since 1947, but India has even then dealing with the West Asian and North African countries and it has maintained a fairly cordial relationship with the Muslim countries. That the India’s Pro-Israeli policy necessarily meant a dilution of her commitment and support to the PLO and its cause became clear from subsequent events. By establishing the diplomatic relations with Israel, India did not become anti-PLO, but certainly she developed apathy towards it. The contacts between India and PLO since then have been almost

Chapter -1 insignificant. The only high-level official contacts between the two sides was the Rao- Arafat meet in Tunis on 20 November, 1992. This too was a mere courtesy call, which the Indian-Prime Minister paid to the PLO leader during a stopover in Tunis on his way to Dakar for the G-15 Summit. The meeting lasted for about twenty minutes. There was no specific agenda even though Arafat was reported to have briefed Rao about the peace talks in general. 98

As against this, Indo-Israel Cooperation stepped up to mark the new found friendship. This was specially so in the political arena. It appeared that the Indian politicians were indeed suffering from a guilt conscience and wanted to compensate Israel for years of non-relationship. There was almost a scramble among Union Ministers and state Chief Ministers to pay a visit to Israel. In a period of one year from June 1993 – July 1994, as many as nine political leaders visited Israel. In addition, as many as 18 India delegations visited Israel within a period of two years after establishing the diplomatic relations. 99

India’s move to establish diplomatic relations with Israel came into effect during the weak minority government headed by P.V. Narsimha Rao in 1992. Before this move the Narsimha Rao government voted the United Nations Resolution to repeal the longstanding United Nations resolution equating Zionism with racism. Not only this, India even also obtained from voting on a resolution condemning Israel over fresh settlement in the occupied territories, at an International Habitat Conference in Nairobi. 100

When the diplomatic relations were established some claimed that Chandraswami was instrumental in the process, another that it was part of a process of wooing the US, Israel’s mentor. The government claimed it was a key element in India’s overall West Asian strategy, which had been devastated by its less-than categorical stand on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It was said the move would get India a seat at the West Asia peace talks.

Indian officials in Tel Aviv say Palestinian leaders any even the PLO have welcomed India’s participation in the West Asia peace process. Being realists, they realize that India’s establishment of diplomatic ties with Israel was inevitable. Another related worry among secular elements in India is the tendency of the Hindu right – wing to see Israel as a fellow “Muslim-basher”.

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The changes in the relationship between India and Israel and between Israel and its Arab neighbours are the profound consequences of the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a multipolar world. Increasingly, as the world’s remaining superpower shrink to normal size, the responsibility of resolving regional conflicts will devolve on the region. Responsibility and accountability will be spread more evenly. The development of relations between Indian and Israeli or the decision of establishing diplomatic relations is supposed to be part of the overall transformation in policy must be seen as part of this process.

Thus, the period witnessed a very grim situation in Indo-Israeli relations. The hopes which Israel had in the 1950s had vanished in the later years. But in spite of this, it tried to make use of whatever opportunities, it could find to woo Indian friendship. India, on the other hand, gave rays of hope to Israel in early part of the fifties. But, as history reveals, it became more vocal against Israel than before and by 1982, all sign of having diplomatic ties with Israel disappeared in thin air so taking the whole spectrum, we can see that the period referred to is indeed the period of negative dimension.

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References

1. Appadori A. and M.S. Rajan, India’s Foreign Policy and Relations, New Delhi, South Asian Publishers, 1985, pp. 376-377.

2. Srivastava, R.K., “Indo-Israeli Relations: Pulls and Pressure” Mainstream, 6 (15) December, 09, 1967, pp. 18-19.

3. Dr. Khalid El-Sheikh, Palestine a Human Tragedy, New Delhi, pp. 45-46.

4. For Detailed Account of Zionist Terror, See, “Who are The Terrorist”(Beirut-1974) as cited in Abdul Wahab Kayyali, Zionism, Imperialism and Racism, London Oxford University Press, 1779, p. 22.

5. Oscar K. Ranbinwiez, A Jewish Cypriot Project, New York, 1962, p. 17.

6. Ibid.

7. Ben Gurion, Letter to Chain, Guri in 1963, Quoted in “Israeleft” No-108, 15 June, 1977.

8. Menahim Begin, The Revolt English Edition, London, Oxford University Press, 1951, p. 144.

9. Dr. Khalid El-Sheikh, No-3, pp. 44-49.

10. Ibid.

11. Srivastava, R.K. “India-Israel Relations” Indian Journal of Political Science 31, No-3, July-September, 1970, p. 245.

12. Brecher, Michael, Nehru-A Political Biography, London, Oxford University Press, 1959, pp. 571-572.

13. Kishore, Mohammad Ali, Jan Sangh and India’s Foreign Policy, New Delhi, 1969, p. 128-131.

14. Grover, Verinder, (Ed.) International Relations and Foreign Policy of India, Vol-04, New Delhi, Deep and Deep Publications, pp. 555-557.

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15. Mehta, S.S., Indo-Arab Economic Relations, Foreign Trade Review Vol-24 (01) April-June, 1989, p.98.

16. Rajan M.S., Studies on Indian Foreign Policy, New Delhi, South Asian Publisher, pp. 103-105.

17. Moheidin, Khalid, “Foreign Policy Since, 1952: An Egyptian View” in Valikiatis, P.J. (Ed.) Egypt Since the Revolution, London, 1968, pp. 137- 138.

18. Goyal, D.R. and Bhutani S.: Non-Alignment and The Palestine Questions, New Delhi 1985, League of Arab States Mission, p. 17.

19. Padmanabhan, L.K., “India Israel and The Arab World” International Problems 14 (1-2) February, 1975, p. 14.

20. Kanpur, Harish, “India and The Soveit Union” In Rajan M.S. (Ed.) India’s Foreign Policy during the Nehru Era, New Delhi, 1974, p. 111.

21. Raj, Chirstopher, West Asia Conflict and Indian Responses, India Quarterly 41 (1), January-March, 1985.

22. Hewedy, Amin, “Nasser and the Crisis of 1959” In Louis, W.M. Roger and Owen Roger (Ed.) Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequence, London, Oxford University Press, 1971, p.534.

23. Nehru, Jawaharlal, “:India’s Foreign Policy Selected Speeches, September, 1946-April, 1961, New Delhi 1971, The Publication Division Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, p. 534.

24. Rajan, M.S., India in World Affairs, 1954-1956, New Delhi, 1964, pp. 155- 156.

25. Rajan, M.S., No-24, p. 163.

26. Gopal, Sarvepali, “India, the Crisis and the Non-Aligned Nations” In Louis, W.M. Roger and Owen Roger (Ed.) Suez, 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 185.

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27. Brecher, Michael, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon’s View of the World, London Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 77-78.

28. India Lok-Sabha Debates, Part-2, Vol-9 No-3, 16 November, 1956, Calcutta, p. 262.

29. Rajan M.S., No-24, p. 167.

30. Gangal, S.C., “India and the Commonwealth” in Rajan M.S.(Ed.) No-15, p. 184.

31. Brecher, Michel, No-27, pp. 67-79.

32. Gopal Sarvepali, No-26, p.187.

33. Singh, K.R. “India and the Crisis” In Agwani M.S. (Ed.) The West Asian Crisis, 1967, Meerut Meenakshi Prakashan, 1968, p. 78.

34. Man Singh, Surjeet, India’s Search for Power: Indira Gandhi Foreign Policy, 166-1982, New Delhi, 1984, p. 80.

35. Shah Abdul Qayyum, “The Arab Israel Conflict” Centre of West Asian Studies, A.M.U., Aligarh, 1979, p. 100.

36. Foreign Affairs Record, New Delhi, June, 1967, p. 81.

37. Khataybeh Syed Zaki Hamid, India’s Foreign Policy and The Arab World, Jaipur-India, 1993, p.50.

38. Foreign Affairs Record, New Delhi, June, 1969/A/PV/1530, p. 76.

39. Foreign Affairs Record, June, 1967, p. 71.

40. Krishna Gopal and Kokila Krishna Gopal, West Asia and North Africa, New Delhi 1981, V.I. Publications, pp. 272-274.

41. Appadori, A and Rajan M.S., No-1, p. 382.

42. Singh K.R., No-33, P-82.

43. Kozeiki, Rechard J., “Indian Policy Towards Middle East” in Grover, Verinder (Ed.), No-8, pp. 100-109.

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44. Jonsen, G.H., Zionism, Israel and Asian Nationalism, Beirut, The Institute for Palestinian Studies, 1971, p. 237.

45. Ashraf Fahmida, “Indo-Israeli Relations” Strategic Studies, 16(1-2) Autumn and Winter, 1993, p. 100.

46. Damodaran, A.K., “The Heritage of India Foreign Policy Cirea, 1966” in Damodaran, A.K. and Bajpai, U.S. (Ed.) India Foreign: The Indira Gandhi Years, New Delhi, 1990, p. 20.

47. Srivastava, R.K., No-2, p. 17.

48. Kishore, Mohammad Ali, No-13, pp. 128-131.

49. Syed Zaki Hamid Khataybeh, No-37, p. 51-52.

50. Foreign Affairs Record, December, 1973, p. 503.

51. Syed Zaki Hamid Khataybeh, No-49, p. 52.

52. Krishna Gopal and Kokila Krishna Gopal, No-41, pp. 145-146.

53. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol-IV, No-2, Winter, 1975, pp. 180-192.

54. Ibid, pp. 295-296.

55. Jonsen, Michael, The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon, London, Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 1.

56. India, External Affairs-P.V. Narsimha Rao’s Speech at a Fucntion Organized by All India Indo-Arab Friendship Association to Condemn the Israeli Aggression in Lebanon, New Delhi, June 19, 1982, Foreign Affairs Record 28 (06) June, 1982, pp. 163-164.

57. Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report, 1982-83, New Delhi, Government of India, p. 13.

58. The Times of India, 09 June, 1982, New Delhi.

59. International Herald Tribune, January 11, 1975.

60. Ibid.

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61. Hindustan Times, March 27, 1980.

62. Foreign Affairs Record, No-3, March 1980, pp. 75-76.

63. Ibid, pp. 77-79.

64. Foreign Affairs Record, No-5, May 1982, pp. 152-154.

65. “Zionist Teste National Resistance” Link 26 (51), 22 July, 1984, p. 38.

66. “Pre-Emptive Withdrawal” Economic and Political Weekly 20 (4) 26 June, 1985, p. 139.

67. Mehrish B.N., “Recognition of PLO: An Appraisal of India’s Foreign Policy” Indian Journal of Political Science, 36 (2) April-June, 1975, p. 137.

68. Foreign Affairs Record, No-6, June 1982, pp. 163-164.

69. Foreign Affairs Record, No-7, July 1982, pp. 183-164.

70. Foreign Affairs Record, No-9, September 1982, p. 277.

71. Rajan M.S., “India’s Foreign Policy” Problems and Perspectives” in Mishra K.P. (Ed.) Janta Foreign Policy, New Delhi 1979, Vikas Publication House, New Delhi, p. 20.

72. Gangal, S.C., India Foreign Policy, New Delhi 1980, Young Asia Publications, p. 32.

73. Ibid, p.4

74. Singh Surjeet, “Indo-Israel Relations: A Study of Some Aspects of India’s Foreign Policy” in Grover Verinder (Ed.) International Relations and Foreign Policy of India, Vol-4, New Delhi 1992, Deep and Deep Publications, p. 574.

75. Moshe Dayan, Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations, New Delhi 1984, Vikas Publication House, p 26.

76. Ibid, p. 29

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77. Rajan, M.S., The Emerging New World Order, World Focus 14 Vol-9, September, 1993, p. 6.

78. Iqbal, Javed, “Changing Dimension of Indo-Israeli Relationship, Journal of West Asian Studies, Centre of West Asian Studies, A.M.U., Aligarh, 2000, p. 69.

79. Bansidhar Pradhan, Establishing ties with Israel: Prudence/Pressure? Link 34 (23) January, 1994, pp. 29-31.

80. Ibid., pp. 75-76

81. Bansidhar Pradhan, “India’s Policy Towards PLO” in Riyaz Punjabi and A.K. Pasha (Ed.) India and the Islamic World, New Delhi 1998, Radiant Publisher, pp. 74-75.

82. Bansidhar Pradhan, No-102.

83. Times of India, June 6, 1992.

84. The Hindu, 22 January, 1992.

85. Bansidhar Pradhan, “Seeking Clearity in Arafat’s Massage” Link 34 No- 25, 2 February, 1992, pp. 30-31.

86. Bansidhar Pradhan, NO-103,pp 74-75

87. Ibid, pp. 75-76.

88. Ibid, p. 77.

89. Times of India, No. 83.

90. The Hindu,22 January, 1992

91. Ibid.

92. Riyaz Punjabi and A. K. Pasha,(Ed), India and The Islamic World, New Delhi, Radiant Publisher, 1998, p. 74-76.

93. Ibid.

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94. Ibid.

95. A.K. Pasha, “India’s West Asia Policy: Continuity and Change”, Strategic Analysis, 16 (6), September 1993. p. 789.

96. Riyaz Punjabi and A. K. Pasha,(Ed), op. cit., p. 75.

97. Subrahmaniam Swamy, “The Secret Friendship Between India and Israel”, The Sunday, Vol. 10, November- December 1982, p. 20.

98. Bansidhar Pradhan, “Establishing Ties With Israel: Prudence/ Pressure?”, Link, Vol. 34 (23), January 1994, pp. 29-31.

99. Dr. Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, “Indo-Israeli Nexus”, Regional Studies, Islamabad, Vol. 12, Summer 1994, p. 9.

100. Ibid.

Chapter- 2 DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC RELATIONS

Chapter -2

DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC RELATIONS

The year 1992 marked a significant change in the foreign policy of India towards Israel that had been lying dormant for nearly four decades. Some important events on the geo-strategic front of the middle east countries such as Arab, Iran, Iraq and Palestine, etc., compelled India to mull its stand on diplomacy with Israel once again, though this time with adequate seriousness. These events were the end of the cold war between the former USSR and the United States of America; The Gulf war that had revealed the disintegrated nature of the Arab countries. The end of the cold war, in fact, paved the way for many an issue, for example, Arab-Israel; Place dialogues, the need for improved relations with the USA; Pakistan’s propaganda against India in the west Asian countries in order to create an Islamic bloc and to internationalize the issue of Kashmir. Above all, India could not resist acknowledging the fact that by the end of 1980s, Israel had become one of the top most manufacturer and exporter of advanced and sophisticated military and defence equipment to many third world countries. Therefore, India could not afford to lose the opportunity of shaking hands with Jerusalem and thus foreign relations between India and Israel took an Upward turn.

“Military” emerged as the most important area of mutual cooperation between the two countries. In this area, the erstwhile Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) had been a strong and a traditional associate of India. Though the fall of the USSR affected the Russian, military manufacturing capabilities, the arms manufactured in Russia were export- oriented and moderately priced. Israel has emerged as an important partner of India in terms of key requirements in trade, agriculture, defence and military equipment which have been of prime importance.

An Overview of the Indian Defence Sector

Military strength was considered important because of external threats it received from three most prominent neighbours viz., China, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Military might was also required to project India as a strategically and technologically competent regional power in Asia. India has a wide range of modern military industry. Its arms acquisition has been inspired by a number of political, economic and security considerations. As after independence, India had not been free of cross-

Chapter -2 border conflicts with its neighbours. It desperately needed intensify its indigenous arms production as well as increased its import of military apparatuses.

India made a motto of becoming a self-reliant nation as far as military power is concerned. Its two most demanding factors have been hedging against any disruption in the supply of spare parts caused by changes in the international political system and fielding systems that are appropriate for the special conditions of the subcontinent, especially the high altitudes of the Himalayan Mountains, the heat and dust of the Rajasthan desert and the high ambient temperature of the Indian ocean. 1

Local production from indigenous designs was also intended to help the balance of payments and provide employment to those with scientific and technical knowhow who might otherwise would seek opportunities abroad. Indigenous designs were also intended to foster India’s international prestige and save on foreign exchange.2

Though India possessed the desire for technological independence , it had, to a great extent , to import defence and military equipment in large volume every year even post the liberalization privatization globalization era of its economy. It needs nearly 100,000 spare parts to maintain aircraft, tanks, guns, armaments, missiles, naval vessels and other ammunitions procured from the former USSR. Programmes, such as light combat Aircraft (LCA) Main Battle Tank, Arjun and Advanced Light Helicopter. However, indigenous, have a high percentage of imported components.

Almost all the three services of Indian defence System. Army, Navy and Airforce, require components like new lighter aircraft, frigates, missiles and submarine systems in addition to sophisticated electronic warfare system new transports and new helicopters. It also needs to regularly upgrade its communications and air defence systems but the financial constraints of India, restricts it to modernize its defence mechanism at par to Israel or USA. Despite bottlenecks, India has been marching forward in building its indigenous defence and military apparatuses but with not so happy a progress as it still rely on a major chunk of imports from foreign countries like Israel. In fact, Israel’s capability of an advanced manufacturer of arms is authenticated from the fact that most of its arms productions is own and not borrowed from other countries, which in itself, is a conducive factor for establishing military cooperation with any country. India had to seek Israel’s aid in both lethal and

Chapter -2 non-lethal areas of military component like its weapons systems, radar, electronic warfare, communications systems and a gamut of engineering objects used in border fencing. Given the resource limitations India cannot buy much military hardware, India needs to upgrade its existing armaments.

Israel’s Arms Industry

Israel arms industry has come of age in terms of sophistication, technological precision as well as foreign trade of arms and defence products. Its arms manufacturing story began nearly thirty five years ago when it had to face hostile political neighbour like Palestine. The territorial controversy with Palestine has forced Israel to erect itself into a self-relevant arms maker. Security of its homeland was the main concern. By 1965, Israel could make from small arms, ammunition mortars to sophisticated aircraft and electronic products which began to be demanded by foreign countries. Israel was also working on assembling of French planes and other weapons systems. Israel’s military and allied production and research and development companies constitute three different enterprises. Namely, state owned companies such as Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) and TAAS Israel Industries (formerly Israel Military Industries, IMI); public or private companies, such as Elbit, El-op, Tadiran; government or public research institutions. Such as the armament development Authority (RAFAEL). A ministry of defence subsidiary five or six Israeli defence enterprises are among the world’s 100 leading military enterprises and among the few in non-industrialized countries, according to SIPRI. IAI is working with a workforce of about 14000 in 2004. It received a whopping number of new orders in 2001 of $ 2.88 billion, an increase from $ 82.6 billion the previous years. The company’s backlog orders were about $ 4billion of the new contracts, 76 per cent were meant for export, of which 61 percent were in the civilian sector. 3

From the time during 1980s when Israel’s defence sector was expected of giving fillip to the economic growth of Israel, particularly the State –owned enterprise, has increase manifolds. They suffered from the most common limitations of most defence companies across the world-overstaffing, higher salaries, poor management, and reluctance to diversify, conservation, and wasteful production. Israeli defence companies succeeded in drawing attention of India towards her military related needs which could be smoothly fulfilled by Israel’s willingness to

Chapter -2 share its defence productions via business route. This urge was in fact not visible during the period of 1987 to 1992 when permission to exhibit any new RAFAEL systems for export. The defence ministry of Israel, however in 1997 bent its keen and allowed to export RAFAEL’s python-4 infrared guided AAM, regarded best of its kind in the world.

Defence Deliberations between India and Israel

Since 1992, the year India – Israel diplomatic ties were cemented, Israel seemed more than willing to share its technological excellence via a business route with India, but it did not get an adequate response from India. The major areas of common concerns were obviously international terrorism, militant insecurity, and defence skills exchange programmes et al.

According to S. Krishna Kumar, minister of state for defence at that time, “There was no proposal, no initiative no offer for any kind of defence ties with that country – that subject had not even been formally discussed in the Defence Ministry”4

After the detailed examination the possible advantage India can derive from military cooperation with Israel, a defence expert, wrote in The Times of India:

“The biggest advantage of seeking defence cooperation with Israel lies in the fact that its technology is largely indigenous and therefore facilitates technology transfer with no end-user problems, according to the sources. Given the resources crunch, India is not in a position to buy much military hardware. The answer, therefore, lies in up gradation of the existing armament and the acquisition of force multipliers. India is currently seeking force multipliers from the US. India has already entered into contracts with some East European countries, notably Yugoslavia, for up gradation as they have the same equipment of Soviet origin. For example, India had entered into a $ 50 million contract with Yugoslavia for the retrofitting of the T.55 tank fleet with fire control systems. Another $ 50 million contract is being sought by Hugh Corporation of US for thermal imagers needed for the T-72 tanks. Both contracts are unlikely to fructify. While Yugoslavia is

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caught in a fierce civil war the American deal has yet not been finalized.”

Israel is in the best position to solve many of India’s defence problems. Israel, with its advanced military technology and ingenuity, has made excellent armour personnel carriers out of its discarded Centurion tanks. Which are now employed both for border patrolling and supporting Merkava, its main battle tanks. India still has 165 centurions which are proposed to be sold as scrap. Moreover, Israel has mounted its 155 mm gun on old Sherman tanks and produced a medium self propelled gun. The Israel’s were the first in the world to “up-gun” the T-55 tank with the British L/7 gun. India followed suit.

Therefore, ballistic computers needed for India’s T-55 and Vijayanta tanks can be sought from Israel. Even the armour piercing round, like the APFSDS (armour piercing fin stabilizing discarding sabot), can be jointly produced as Pakistan has done with Chinese assistance, according to the sources.

The biggest benefit of defence cooperation with Israel can be in the areas of electronic, optronics, missile technology and riot control equipment. For instance the unmanned surveillance aircraft, Pioneer-1 employed by the US during the Gulf war is of Israeli origin. Though China announced full diplomatic relations with Israel only recently, Tel Aviv has been assisting Beijing in the design of the inertial navigation system for Chinese missiles for at least four years. In this as well for RPV (remotely piloted vehicle), being designed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation, and the indigenous missile programme Israeli contribution can be substantial, according to the sources.

Even in regard to exchange of doctrinal and tactical ideas, it must be noted that there is similarity between the terrain in parts of India and Israel. Israel, which is committed to a forward defence policy, has built linear defences over a period of time, especially in the Golan Heights. This replicates the linear defence on the Indo Pak border. Moreover, Israel has vast experience of fighting in both stony and sand-done waste areas. Given a similar desert terrain in India a regular interaction between the two armies will be useful.5

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M.L. Sondhi, a strategic expert viewed India’s defence relation with Israel, a potential contribution to protect India’s national interest in the following words:

On the practical level, recognition of the convergence of Indo-Israeli interests with the US’s should lead to greater American leniency in interpreting restrictions on technology transfers to India. Involving US companies to Indo –Israeli ventures may make Washington more forthcoming in its attitude. The notion of American participation in defence related spheres raise the question of whether. It may not be broadened to include other fields. As a catalyst for promotion of such trilateral enterprises, the highly successful bilateral US-Israel funds for industrial and agricultural research and development (BIRD and BARD) may be useful models to emulate. These business to business funds have proven their effectiveness, clearly justifying the initial finance allocated to them.

BIRD, established to 1979 with a budget of $ 75 million from each participant has generated business worth $ 2 billion in the US itself. Tax revenues alone on this volume of business have easily repaid the initial allocation. Likewise, BARD has generated about 600 projects. There is little to suggest that expanding the scope of similar funds to include India would not yield even more impressive results.

Israeli and Indian sea power could become a factor of increasing significance Israel’s long term strategic need to strengthen its navy corresponds well with India’s desire to extend its more time capabilities. New Delhi seems to be stressing its seaborne prowess, primarily to patrol its enormously long (8,000 kms) coastline. However, there is emerging awareness of its potential as a strategic second strike facility in case of non-conventional attack, possibly comprising nuclear submarines and a locally built aircraft carrier.

Israeli technological expertise in radar surveillance and sea-to-sea missiles could be fruitfully exploited by India to create a strong sea-based deterrence force that is likely to have a stabilizing effect in the region. Indeed, in several of these areas there have already been reports of bilateral contacts, and in some cases contracts, for installation of Israeli equipment in the Indian Navy, as well for joust development of naval system and patrol vessels.

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Israeli and Indian Motives for the development of maritime power seem to have different but non-conflicting emphases. For Israel patrolling its 200 km long shoreline is undoubtedly important. But it is primarily the need to create platforms for elusive second strike retaliatory capabilities outside its minuscule territorial dimensions that is likely to elevate its navy’s strategic importance. For India, with its enormous land mass, although seaborne second strike capability is attractive, the need to secure the approaches to its 8.000 km long sea front is likely be a more immediate objective. Despite these differences, there still seems ample room for widening the scope of collaboration in this hitherto less prominent (relative to air and land forces) aspect of military cooperation.

On the strategic military plane, there is emerging recognition that indo-israeli collaboration will yield synergic mutual benefits, allowing each to reach objectives neither can on its own. Given the present (and probably future) economic constraints on both sides, India’s quest for in dependence in technological expertise and israel’s need to maintain a sizable defence industry to preserve its qualitative superiority over adversaries are goals likely to be beyond either’s reach individually.

For Israel, a close multifaceted bond with India would have significant political, diplomatic and strategic benefits. Indian support for beleaguered Israel on the international stage would significantly contribute to dispersing much of the animosity manifested towards it by many international organizations and help it break out of the cycle of censure whenever it endeavours to defends its vital interests assertively (Indeed, Israel only seems to receive international approval when it accedes to the demands and pressures of those urging concessions from it). Strategic collaboration would allow Israel to broaden the base of its strategic reliance. It should however be clear that at least in the foreseeable future, such collaboration can be expected only to augment and complement, rather than supplant or replace, Israel’s reliance on the US. It could broadly follow the lines of growing Turkish –Israeli cooperation, which would dispel any basis for construing it as “anti-Muslim”.

India’s potential strategic advantages in its collaboration with Israel are a mirror image of those likely to accrue to the letter. While such collaboration may help Israel reduce the cost of its otherwise unaffordable research and development projects, it would also enable India to enhance its military capabilities in the short run and

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contribute towards the development of a high level of indigenous technological proficiency in the long run.

Israel’s experience gained during its long war-torn history would be invaluable to India in bolstering security and helping it repel aggressors. Israel’s expertise in border surveillance, sensor technology and electronic detection could contribute towards prevention of undetected incursions into sensitive regions along the, Indian frontier, as occurred in Kashmir”.6

The Indian military acknowledged Israel strategic acumen and military performance in war zones and its weapon repertoire for both domestic use and export to an international clientele and gradually engaged in security cooperation with the letter. By the end of the year 1992, the two nations made worked together bettering cooperation on military affairs. A six member Israeli defence team visited India and had meetings with several ministry officials.7

The relations between two countries seemed positive henceforth. In this regard, the then Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Robin, talked very positively of defence ties with India. He had said, “I believe if there is interest on the part of India, I believe there is room for it. We are more than ready to cooperate with India in the field of defence whenever and wherever its suits India.”8

Israeli companies, Elbit and Israeli Aircraft industries (IAI) had revealed in 1993 that they could take up the upgrade programme of Mig-21 because of their expertise in the modernization of ageing aircrafts. Israeli Aircraft industry signed many important projects with Indian Air Force (IAF) including fitting its MIG 21 ground attack aircraft with laser guided bombs. The Israeli Air Force commander visited New Delhi in March 1995 and proffered a defense deal having Airborne Warning and Control Systems, Remotely Piloted Vehicles, access to an air plat-form for anti-detection and anti-jamming manoeuvre and specialized weapons.9

India was also offered high –explosive antitank (HEAT) projectiles, armoured piercing (AP) rounds and tube-launched optically tracked wire-guided missiles in addition to flycatcher and fire-control and detection radar systems.10 Indian Air Force chief visited Israel in 1996 for buying a sophisticated Air Combat manoeuvring instrumentation system, which has been installed at the Jamnagar Air Base. An Israeli

Chapter -2 company specializing in military communications provided hundreds of millions of dollars worth of equipment to New Delhi. Saltam had announced that it would supply tens of millions of dollars worth of artillery (156 mm self- propelled guns) to the Indian Army.11

In the same year, former Indian President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, who was then Head of the Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) also visited Israel, in this connection and the following year in January 1997, President Ezer Weizman visited India. He underlined India as a potential partner in the area of aircraft industry and decided to exchange military attaches between the two countries.12

In the month of April 1997 the first military attaché was send by New Delhi, starting a new historical period in the bilateral relationship. Top defence scientists of India were reported to have visited Israel secretly and toured satellite and missile programmes.13

On the invitation of Lt. General Ammon Lipkin Shahak, Israeli Chief of General Staff, General V.P.Malik, the chief of Army staff, pay a visit to Israel from 8- 13 March 1998. He was the first Army chief of India to be there on the invitation of Israeli Chief of General. On the dinner General Malik said.

“We, the professional soldiers of the Indian Army respect the professionalism and valour of the Israeli soldiers. The history of the wars fought by your army during the last 50 years is a compulsory study for all officers of my Army. And like the soldiers, the scientists too appreciate the giant strides that your country has made, in the scientific field, especially in the field of defence technology.”14

An Indian strategic expert quoting Jane’s Defence Weekly spoke of India purchasing defence equipment from Israel of 14 million worth of light ammunition, basically 50 million bullets, Upgradation of electronic warfare equipment of INS Vikrant had been accomplished with Israeli help.15 In 1998, India finalized a big deal with Israeli Aircraft Industry (IAI) to buy Advanced Electronic Equipment (AEE). 16 The equipment material was developed and manufactured in Israel. India and Israel have been involved in negotiations over AEE for a year and an Indian delegation even

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visited Israel to inspect the equipment. Due to the India’s nuclear tests that had conducted in May 1998, the USA was against the deal. US demanded that Israel should stop these negotiations. In the words of US, the deal violated an international arms control treaty. Israel did not agree and go against the American pressure to cancel the sale of AEE to India.17 Israeli officials assured New Delhi that contracts, negotiated over the past year would be honoured. 18 In September 2001 sanctions against India were lifted clearing the way for the sale of the Phalcon system to India. In January 2001, Shimon Peres Israeli Foreign Minister), during a visit to India refused to divulge details of negotiations for the Phalcon, but said Tel Aviv’s commercial relations with New Delhi, including the military side, are “progressing well”.19

India’s indigenous efforts produce UAVs for attack and reconnaissance missions had not been of effective operations, therefore in 2001, the Ministry of Defence signed a deal with Israel Aircraft industry (IAI) at 7.2 million dollar per UAV. As a result, India had a very tough time containing the Pakistani attacks of Kargil in 1999 which could have been averted provided India had the pilotless spy planes. In the absence of airborne warning and control system aircraft, the Indian navy too had to rely on UAVs. In February 2001, India entered into a defence purchase with Israel of seven Barak ship based anti-missile systems as part of its overall plan to tighten its naval security. The total deal was worth about Rs. 700 crore, with each anti-missile system worth about Rs.100 crore. The Barak system is designed to protect a ship from being targeted by subsonic sea skimming missiles in hostile conditions. The anti-missile is said to travel more than twice the speed of sound.20

In September 2002, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), and Israeli Aircraft Industry (IAI) signed a deal to jointly produce an Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) which is designed for attack, intelligence gathering, anti-tanks and anti- submarine operations. The Israeli spy satellite Ofeq had attracted Indian attention even before the visit 21 of Krishnaswami Kasturirangan, Chairman of the Indian Space Research Organisation, in August 2003. He expressed interest in the Israeli concept of small interest satellites and their employment adding: “Israel has much to offer in terms of cooperative programs of the future.”22

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In April 2003 a 40 million dollar deal was signed between both the countries for an additional Barak system, two were to be procured by year end and 10 more over the next five to seven years, bringing the total to 20.23 During 2003, India signed a 130 million US dollar contract with IAI for 18 Heron UAVs; IAI and India’s HAL set up a division in Hyderabad for maintenance and other services. 24

India is also a Satellite Operating Partner (SOP) in the Eros A, a remote sensing satellite launched in December 2000 by Image Sat International, an Israeli company offering high resolution imagery. The company’s sequence of Eros B satellite provided multi-spectral images of highly improved resolution under a similar SOP mode by which customers could gain ownership of the satellite over a designated footprint.25 In 2003, Indian defence personnel submitted a draft proposal to acquire $ 1.5 million worth of radar systems, which was duly considered by the Indian Ministry of Defence.

Post 1998 nuclear trials by Pakistan, India felt alarmed and rekindled its ambition to acquire effective air defence, thus, it approached Israel for the purchase of airborne Phalcon radar which could be mounted on the Russian built IL-76 transport aircraft; the long range Green Pine radar which can identify the launch of missiles at much further distances; and the Arrow -2 ABM system.

Israel Prime Minister Ariel Sharon arrived in New Delhi on a two day official visit on 9-10 September, 2003. This visit was an important stage in the India-Israel relations. Though not much was evident that specific government to government, defence related Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed, defence and industry personnel from the two countries agreed in principle on several crucial cooperative programmes including joint development of systems aimed at counter terror operations and homeland defence. Top bureaucrats and industrialists from both sides estimated Israeli business made to India at around $ 1 billion per year, irrespective of the package of $ 1 billion worth Phalcon early warning, system that would the two parties conclude later on.26

In an interview with the press in New Delhi, top bureaucrats of the two countries involved in defence matters said that Israel would slowly replace Russia as India’s main partner of defence related apparatus. Major General Amos Yaron, Director General of Israeli Ministry of Defence told reporters.

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“In recent years, we have built up a fairly wide infrastructure for defence cooperation, and this infrastructure will allow Israeli industry in other sections to copy our success. Our cooperation extends across all services branches in all fields. From the areas of air, sea and land, we have been able to help this huge and important country in the movement of crisis, and they don’t forget this.’27

In the same media interaction, Indian Navy spokesperson commodore Vinay Garg had said.

“Our modernization programme will be based heavily on the integration of Israeli weaponry and subsystems on all our new platforms.” He cited maritime patrol aircraft, submarine and platforms with longer reach and sustainability at sea as three investment priorities, and had noted that a range of Israeli subsystems was being evaluated for same.28 The Indian Army as a part of land warfare and special operation had struck a deal of about 15,000 Tavor automatic assault rifles and 40,000 Israeli made weapons. In September 2003, The Indian government approved the purchase of electronic warfare for Indian warships from government owned Rafael, Haifa worth $ 105 million.29

In 2004, Defexpo, a defence export trade exhibition was organized in New Delhi. In this exposition, government owned Indian and Israeli firms like the Indian Ordinance factory Board (OFB) and Israel Military Industries (IMI) showcased their co-produced extended range precision shells for the Indian Army and potential third country exports under an agreement. As per the deal, the two firms would jointly produce explosive and Cargo shells for .52 calibre cannons being used in the Indian Army. The Cargo shell carries 49 anti-tank and anti-aircraft bomblets, and equipped with a self-destructing fuse. The IMI-OFB collaboration ensured that the Indian Army is equipped with the best artillery ammunition for its .52 Calibre guns, allowing the Indian Artillery Forces to set new standards for range of action and firing power in the modern battlefield. Other defence companies of Israel, which participated in the Defexpo were Elta systems, Ashdod, The Elisra Group, Bene Beraq, Azimuth technologies, Ra’anana , Tadiran Communications and Holon.30

The agreement between the IMI and OFB was in important development towards India’s bilateral ties with Israel as India led Israel’s most preferred market for

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its large volume of defence products. India was a potential customer which Israel would not let go easily. According to Israeli industry experts, India and Israel expedited the process of acquiring specific ground and ship based versions of Barak- 8, and ship or ground–based versions of the new phased array radar under development by Elta system built for the Israeli Air Force.

In February 9-13, 2005 during the Aero India 2005 defence explosion & a senior scientist with the state owned defence research and development Organisation (DRDO) said that the government allocated $ 581 million in January to carry out development of India first submarine launched cruise missile with the expanded range of 2500 Kilometres. The missile employs a strap-on-navigational system augmented by Global positioning system equipment, and has a circular error probability of 25 meters, the DRDO scientist said.31

At the Aero India 2005 explosion a formal deal was signed between India and Israel, under which Tel Aviv would help New Delhi in the development of remote vehicles. Under this agreement, Israel would help India’s Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE) to develop its leading Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) laboratory to develop three new UVs. 32

Due to political sensitivities in the national and international arena in July 2006, the then defence minister Pranab Mukharjee was forced to call off his visit to Israel. Left parties demanded from the Government that Indian sever all military ties with Israel in wake of the bloody conflict in Southern Lebanon., Look at this, IAF Chief, Air Chief Marshal S.P. Tyagi and Navy Vice Chief, Vice- Admiral Venkat Bharathan, among others have made “secret” trips to Israel. During this visit, ACM Tyagi also reviewed the progress of the $ 1.1 billion “Phalcon” project, with the first of the three AWACS (airborne warning and control systems) scheduled for induction in November 2007.33 In December 2006 India had inked a Rs.900 crore deal with Israeli defence firm ELTA Systems medium power radars for the IAF. As part of the offset clause, ELTA had decided to source radar components worth Rs. 250 crore from L&T and Astra Microwave.34

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Indian defence expert Ashok K. Mehta in this regard had said:

“The key attraction of military cooperation with Israel is that it provides access to Western and Eastern military technology. The test of defence ties came during the Kargil war when the Indian Army and Air Force were supplied at short notice, with military hardware both from off the shelf and the Israeli Defence Force’s operational inventory. In addition to unarmed vehicles (UAVs) , Israel provided intelligence and satellite photo-imagery. Similar assistance was given during operation Parakaram.”

Israel’s defence industry is the show-case for electronic warfare and reverse engineering. Next to Russia, it has emerged as the second largest arms supplier to India, worth nearly $2 billion. There was never any doubt about the sale of three $ 1 billion airborne early warning and control systems called Phalcon by Israel to India. The Phalcon can track up to 60 targets at a time over an 800 km radius. This will enable the optimum exploitation of Brahmas and other standoff missiles.

When Israeli arms merchants first set foot in Delhi, they made a picture of frustration and despair. They made a picture of frustration and despair. But their patience and virtuosity were amply rewarded when contracts began pouring in. The arm’s entire tank fleet will be linked with Israeli radio set. Hand-held thermal imagers, night vision devices, jammers, detection equipment including sensors and UAVs are either on the ground or in the pipeline. Specialised counter–terrorism equipment is an order for police and paramilitary forces too. The IAF has two squadrons of surveillance searcher a MI Heron 11 UAVs. Three more squadrons are under raising. Israelis are involved with the modernisation of the air combat fleet. The Navy too, has its shares of UAVs, Barak missiles and others electronic warfare systems.” 35 In 2007, IAI signed $ 2.5 billion deal with India to develop an anti- aircraft system and missile for India. This was the biggest defence deal in the history of India- Israel relations. Yitzhak Nissan, CEO of IAI visited India to finalise the deal with the heads of defence establishment and the President.36

Defence Secretary Shri Vijay Singh visited Israel in November 2008 for the Seventh India- Israel Joint working group meeting on defence cooperation and discuss joint weapons development projects, additional sales of Israeli equipment to the

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Indian military and anti-terrorism strategies. This development in the defence sector was seen as a significant expansion in the India- Israel strategic partnership.37 In 2008, Israel emerged as the largest arms supplier to India.38 In December 8-10, 2009, The Israeli Chief of Defence Staff Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi made a historic visit to India to strengthen the defence relations between the two courtiers. He assured every help to India in fighting terrorism.39

Programmes of Upgradation and Modernization

Upgradation and modernization of defence technology has been a vital necessity of India’s military capability. Major security threats from Pakistan and China compelled India to take up this objective with renewed seriousness. Even though India could build its indigenous military light combat aircrafts, Arjun and MBT but they all required imported components from Israel, Russia, France etc. The defence tactics and skills developed by Israel have won world wide recognition which has enabled it to establish itself as the leader in the world of arms market; one of the basic fact behind the success of Israel’s defence system is said to be her performance in the war.40 Mutual meetings between India and Israel past 1992, has resulted in smooth purchase and acquisition of sophisticated military hardware and technology from Israel.

The offer for upgradation of MiG-21s include improved radar and head-up display and multi-function display system for weapon handling facilities and ballistic calculations. Besides this the other modification include, the installation of the opher that transforms clumb bomb into smart weapons, a display system and sight helmet for effective utilization of advanced air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, air-frame durability and increase in fuel capacity.41

Israel was attracted to India’s ambitious Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project. The Israeli aviation companies offered to collaborate in the light weight weapon delivery system, aerospace composite material components, range finder target designator lazer, E.C.M. and counter E.C.M. system. India made a defence contract with Saltam System Limited of Israel and as per the contract, $47.5 billion has been earmarked to upgrade 180 artillery pieces of Indian Army.42 India and Israel signed defence deal worth $2 billion, which include the purchase of Falcon Early Warning Aircraft, Surface to surface Missiles and Air-Surveillance Radar etc.43

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Missile Technology

Missile technology is an important area of bilateral cooperation. Israel’s Arrow-Anti-Missile System is an advanced version of missile over the Patriot ones which were used in the Gulf War during 1990-91. Israel also upgrade the Phantom 2000 and Barack missile. It is involve in manufacturing the next generation of Surveillance Satellites and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) like Hunter and Searcher, Helstar which is a unmanned helicopter are all high end sophisticated security hardware that India showed interest. India also pursued high speed unmanned aircraft Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) which Israel has a monopolistic edge in the international market.44 This vehicle is suited for intelligence capture, surveillance and counting radar equipment and similar targets. Hence, India could use RPVs effectively both in war times and during peace.45 It is believed that during the Kargil crisis Israel helped India with some important and similar military and intelligence equipment. It is a different matter that the Government of India did never accept candidly of undergoing any such aid. In fact, Israeli assistance was frankly admitted and endorsed by India’s former Foreign Secretary, J.N. Dixit.46

Electronic Warfare

Israel had offered India a cache of defence technology including electronic warfare to India. Israel includes active Airborne Helicopter, Gun Location Radar, a Search Wave Radar, a system for ship to counter low-flying missile, forward looking Infra-Red for helicopter / aircraft, laser guided bombs and kits etc.47 Israel also provided upgradation of India’s T-55 tanks with British guns and conversion of its 165 obsolete centurion Tanks into first class armoured vehicles for development in border areas.48

Airborne Warning Control System (AWACS)

The misadventure of India in preventing the obnoxious Kargil attack by Pakistan left India completely rattled. There were hue and cry in media and public discourse over the lack of infallible surveillance capabilities of the countries. The Kargil skirmishes by Pakistan led New Delhi to expedite the process of acquiring the AWACS manufactured by Israel. This urgency was caused by the need to keep round

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the clock vigil on any suspicious movement in India and Pakistan airspace, along the Line of Control and the international borders.49

Nuclear Cooperation

Post 1991 economic liberalization India intensified its nuclear projects, but with not much publicity. The Pokhran-II nuclear test fire by India range the international security alarm, especially of the United States, inviting some important economic and strategic embargoes. However, it did not unsettle Israel as it was already an established nuclear power50 and in fact, it provides a business opportunity for Israeli defence industry. Like India has belligerent neighbours always upping some troubling security threats against India, Israel has also been surrounded by Arab States, which have been perennial security concerns. Both India and Israel share some common concerns vis a vis access to nuclear capability by the Arab states ultimately helping Pakistan against attacking India and against Israel as well by the Arab States. Post Pokhran II test the common concerns of these two states attained heightened seriousness when the United States received resistance to its nuclear initiatives in the congress. Even now, both the countries avoid signing Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and prefer arguments in defence.

However, India kept any kind of discussions and deals over nuclear capability under the carpet and tried its best not to publicise to the international media. Though the two countries deny such contacts, it is beyond doubt that the two countries are capable nuclear powers. Actually, India does not need nuclear technology from Israel, nor the latter require any such aid. In a wider perspective, nuclear collaboration between the two countries is not a significant matter for them.

Counter Terrorism and Intelligence Cooperation

In the contemporary international political scenario terrorism gained imminence chiefly after the decline of the Cold War era. Terrorism with its multi – faceted natures and contexts has been plaguing almost every democratic as well as Kingdom Country across the world. India and Israel are also amongst such countries to face terror threats by rebellious resistant groups which imperil civilian and political normalcy. To counter such a menace, both countries rely on bolstering their military and intelligence apparatuses. While India faces terror threats from Jihadi outfits like

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Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hizbul Mujahideen, Israel counters militant outfits of the Hizbollah variant.

India and Israel have a defence coordinating committee and a combined ministerial commission on terror related matters. The two countries share their military experiences regularly. Such endeavours have been the result of relentless mobilization by L.K.Advani, then Indian Deputy Prime Minister and former National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra, who wanted a triple alliance of India-US-Israel on terrorism. Mishra had suggested, “The US, India and Israel have been the prime targets of terrorism. They have to jointly face the same ugly face of modern day terrorism.”51

Israel is the top-most target of terror attacks and suicide bids which forces it to adopt a no compromise and shoot-first policy against ultras. However, India needs to change its tactics of dealing with fundamental forces on similar lines and cannot just write off this menace by simply importing technology and techniques. Between Advani’s visit in June 2000 and Shimon Peres’s visit to Delhi in January 2001, an Israeli counterterrorism team including military intelligence specialists and senior police commanders paid a visit to India- administered Kashmir and other regions of the country that are grappling with anti-government militants to assess India’s security needs.52

After the September 11 attack on the World Trade Centre in 2001, the terror ghost assumed a shared motto of “Jihad” against the US, Israel and India. It became imperative that these three nations would share a common plank in the “War against terror” whereby India would share its intelligence inputs with the US and Israel. As some terrorist organizations use Islamic fundamentalism as the garb of cross –border violence, here arise the need of maintaining a kind of triangular forum, as advocated by a section of the Indian elite class, having India, US and Israel to combat terrorist menace.53

Israel was of great help to India in minimizing the magnitude of the losses India might have experienced during the Kargil War with Pakistan. The military intelligence sharing mechanism of Israel has been of immense relevance even after the Kargil conflict and that has become an important base of Indo-Israel strategic relations. It is believed that in the context of open Jihad declared against India by

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some religious extremist groups, Israeli intelligence inputs prove to be of excellent use, therefore, it necessitates the need of an improved diplomatic relation between the two countries.

Some major security threats that India and Israel face are aviation piracy, naval piracy, important defence and industrial installations besides personal security of every important political and corporate personalities. Such threat predicaments demand prompt intelligence gathering and sharing. The India- Israel defence security ties was cemented when Home Minister L.K. Advani visited Israel with his diplomatic officials in June 2000. He met high-profile officials of the Israeli intelligence agency, Mosad and state police officials and discussed ways and means counting terrorism, particularly in the context of Pakistan.54

Mr. Ehud Barak, former Prime Minister of Israel addressed the Hindustan Times Leadership Initiative Conference on November 16, and met with the Prime Minister, and the National Security Adviser during his stay in India. In a statement issued on 12 September 2005 India welcomed the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and four settlements in the Northern West Bank as a positive development and the beginning of a process that would culminate in a mutually acceptable, negotiated settlement in accordance with the Roadmap and the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.55

Special Envoy Ambassador C.R. Gharekhan, visited Israel from 14-16 November 2005 and met several leaders of Israel. In a statement issued on 15 November 2005; India welcomed the Agreement on Movement and Access concluded between Israel and the Palestinian Authority regarding opening of the Rafah border crossing; travel between Gaza and the West Bank; and for building a sea port in the Gaza Strip.56 Other official level exchanges included the fifth round of the talks on Joint Working group on counter terrorism, and the second round of dialogue on non-proliferation in March 2006 in Israel; visit of the former National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra at the invitation of the Tel Aviv Univesity in June 2006; goodwill visit of the two Indian Naval Ships INS Mumbai, and INS Brahamputra, to Israel in June 2006; the visit of the Chief of the Indian Air Force, and Vice Chief of Naval Staff in September 2006, and the meeting of the Joint Working Group on

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Defence in November 2006 in which the Indian delegation was led by Defence Secretary Shekhar Dutt.57

From Israel, former Foreign Minister, Shlomo Ben Ami, visited India in August 2006, and the Chairperson of the Parliamentary Friendship League between India and Israel in the Knesset, Prof. Shlomo Breznitz, visited India in November 2006. The National Security Adviser of Israel, Ilan Mizrahi visited India from 27-30 November 2006, and the Minister of Trade, Industry, and Labour of the State of Israel, Eliyahu Ben Yishai visited India from 3-8 December 2006. Other official level exchanges during the year included the sixth round of the talks on the Joint Working Group on counterterrorism, the third round of dialogue on non-proliferation in March 2007 in New Delhi; port calls by the two Indian Naval training ships INS Sujata, and INS Shardul at Haifa, Israel from 23-27 September 2007.58

Thus, having analysed the bilateral character of Indo-Israel relations, spotted and identified its basic features, sensed the areas of common interests, prospects and limitations, it appears that the bilateral relationship between the two States is being keenly observed by many in different quarters. Given the backdrop of the ‘sensitivity’ of the relations, this discussion will not remain complete, unless the strategic implication of the relationship is examined, the following chapter is an attempt to this.

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References

1. Farah Naaz, West Asia and India, Changing Perespectives, Shipra Publications, Delhi, 2005, P. 122.

2. Ibid, p. 122.

3. Strategic Digest, Vol. 32, No.3, March 2002, pp. 561-62.

4. The Statesman, 28 February, 1992.

5. The Times of India, New Delhi, 1 February, 1992.

6. M.L. Sondhi, An Ariel view of India, The Pioneer, New Delhi, 23 August, 2003

7. Telegraph, Calcutta (Kolkata), 29 May, 1992.

8. Strategic Digest, Vol. 23, No.12, December, 1993, pp. 2011-14.

9. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 8 April, 1995.

10. Ibid.

11. “Israeli company targets arms sales to India,” Press Trust of India (PTI), BBC Monitoring South Asia, New Delhi, 5, February, 2003.

12. Ministry of External Affairs Report, 1996-97, New Delhi 1997.

13. Ibid.

14. Mahendra Ved, Slow and Steady, Growing Security Ties with Irael, The Times of India, New Delhi, 30 March, 1998.

15. Ibid,

16. Farah Naaz, op. cit., No.1, p. 127

17. Ibid p. 127

18. The Statesman, New Delhi, 20 August, 1996.

19. Strategic Digest, Vol. 32, No.3, March 2002, pp. 521-22

20. Shishir Gupta, India to Buy Missile Defence System from Israel. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 11 February, 2001

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21. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Relies on Israel for VAV Needs”, Defence News, 18 August, 2003.

22. Barbara Opall- Rome, “Israel Seeks Partners for Military Space” Defence News, 18 August, 2003.

23. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Imports Naval Missile Defences”, Defence New, 23 May, 2003.

24. “India Acquires Green Pine Radars from Israel”, Times of India, 28 June 2002.

25. Defence News, 22 September, 2003

26. Krishan Gopal, “Sarbfit Sharm, India and Israel: Towards Strategic Partnership”, Authorspress Publication, Delhi, 2007, p. 349.

27. Ibid,p. 349.

28. Ibdi, p.350.

29. Ibid, p. 350.

30. Ibid, p. 351.

31. Defence News, 21, February, 2005.

32. Strategic Digest, Vol.35, No.4, April 2005, pp. 463-64

33. Times of India, New Delhi, 2 October, 2006.

34. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 31 December, 2006.

35. The Pioneer, New Delhi, 10 September, 2003

36. Ynetnews. Com, 1995-06-20, Retrieved 2012-11-09 (net)

37. Ministry of External affairs Annual Report 2008-09, p. 50.

38. The Jerusalem Post, 15 Feb. 2009.

39. Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report, 2009-10, p 48

40. P.R. Kumarswamy, “Indo Israeli Military Relations: Prospects and Limitations”, India Defence Review, New Delhi, Vol. 8 (3), July 1993, p. 46.

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41. Atul Aneja, “Israeli know How for India”, The Hindu, New Delhi, April 19, 1993.

42. The Statesman, New Delhi, December 18, 1993.

43. The Hindu, New Delhi, July 18, 2001

44. P.R. Kumarswamy , “Indo-Israeli Military Relations : Prospects and Limitation”, Indian Defence Review, New Delhi, Vol.8(3), July 1993, p.46.

45. Ibid.

46. R.Shreekantan Nair, Dynamics of a Diplomacy Delayed : India and Israel, Kalpaz Publications, Delhi, 2004, p.105.

47. Atul Aneja, N.41.

48. The News, December 6, 1993.

49. The Hindustan Times, April 6, 2000.

50. Frank Barby, Invisible Bomb: The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East, London : IB Tourist and Co., 1989 , p. 25.

51. The Hindu, New Delhi, May 10, 2003.

52. Ibid, 23 November, 2001.

53. P. Shreekantan Nair, N. 46, p. 171.

54. The Hindu, June 15, 2000.

55. Ministry of External Affairs Report 2005-06

56. Ibid.

57. Ministry of External Affairs Report 2006-07.

58. Ministry of External Affairs Report 2007-08.

Chapter- 3 TOURISM, CULTURAL AND AGRICULTURAL RELATIONS

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TOURISM, CULTURAL AND AGRICULTURAL RELATIONS

In the past, that is, prior to diplomatic relations, there were limited points of contact between India and Israel. But after developing diplomatic ties, trade relations between these two countries have been growing.1Soon after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two states in January 1992, the Consulate in Bombay was made Consulate General. In addition, there was also an honorary Consulate in Calcutta (now Kolkata). Since 1992 various agreements have been signed between India and Israel. Prior to 1992 there was little direct trade between India and Israel. However, trade in diamonds was carried through Indian merchants in Israel.2

Moreover, India had brisk economic relations with the Arab world, which dates back to the ancient times. In those times, India with exportable surplus of resources like coffee, tea, spices and other consumer goods had been a centre of big competitive market to the West and to the Arab World. India’s trade relations are not only confined to the consumer and commodity products but also entered potential fields like engineering goods, gems, jewellery, chemicals and so on, which has widened the scope for trade. Further, India depended much on the Arab world for its oil consumption. This indicates that Indo-Arab trade relation is a complementary and not competitive one.3 This emerging trade relationship and mutual economic dependency led to the increasing economic and technological cooperation between India and the Arab World in the subsequent periods. During the later years, it turned out to be a fact that India’s main imports from the Arab states consisted of oil, cotton, phosphate and dates, where the Arab states have alternative and easy source of supply of tea, textile, jute and light engineering goods, India’s alternative of oil, cotton, phosphate are too far away to be commercially advantageous to her.4

Actually, the oil factor and the Indian manpower in the Gulf region influenced the economic relationship further. Some believed that these strategic and economic factors have largely conditioned India’s West Asia policy in a bigger way. The same view was substantiated by M.C. Chagla, as “Even our material interest dictated the very same policy which we were preserving. There was a large volume of trade between India and Arab countries and this would be jeopardized if we adopt a pro- Israeli policy”.5

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Because of the tremendous trade relationship between India and the Arab States, the state of Israel remained off from the policy priorities of India in the region for a long run. But by 1990’s some events in the world changed the very character of global politics. It also brought technological progress and shifted traditional approaches to economic policies. Further, the end of the Cold War has unleashed a wave global political integration and the Marrakesh Agreement of 1994 changed the rules of the global trade.6 This changed scenario probably brought both India and Israel closer to each other which resulted in the establishment of diplomatic relations between these two States in 1992. But the low level of diplomatic relations was a deterrent for the development in trade. According to the Israeli Consul General Giora Becher:7

“The official Indian policy on trade with Israel is still preventing the public sector from dealing with us even if it means spending more money or buying less quality products else where. Further more, although there is no restriction whatsoever on the private sector to do business with Israel, the political atmosphere prevailing between the two countries makes many Indian businessmen believe it is better not to be engaged in many commercial contacts with their Israeli counterparts.”

By the early 1990 all this started changing around the time that India and Israel established the diplomatic relations, India globalize its economy and opened its doors to economic cooperation with the West and the rest of the world. Subsequently, there was a government to Government interaction between the two states which led in forging of a framework for the trade and economic cooperation. In May 1993, the two states signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), and this followed by the signing of an agreement on such cooperation in December 1994. This agreement came into action from August 28, 1995. This agreement grant the Most Favoured Nation, MFN status to both the countries and allowed for import of Indian goods to Israel without import permits, except where such permits are required, from all countries under Israeli custom regulations. 8

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The agreement on customs cooperation was signed in January 1996. Under the standards of cooperation MoU the standards Institution of Israel (SII) and the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) have agreed to cooperate in testing of the quality of goods in both the countries. The industrial Research and Development cooperation MoU envisaged the setting up of a fund to finance Research and Development projects in the private sector, which cover the developments of products and applications of commercial use.9 the final draft of the agreement was initiated in January 1996, besides this, the agreements on double taxation and bilateral investments were also signed in January 1996. These agreements have smoothened the frame work for trade and economic cooperation between the two states. The double taxation treaty signed by both the countries widened the business relationship between the two markets.10 Despite of imposing new taxes, this treaty ensured that an entity conducting business in the other country will not be exposed to double taxation on the same income both in the country of origin and in the country of residence.

As a result of this facilitation, the trade volume between the two countries has risen by an average of 50% every year from 1992 to 1996. Steadily from $186 million in 1992 to $ 386 million in 1995 and from $456 million in 1996 it reached to $1004 million in 199911 (see also Table No.1). This was five times the level of trade in 1992. Amiram Halevy, the Israeli counsellor for Economic Affairs remarked that “it was something unexpected”. He further said, “A level of one billion $ bilateral trade was targeted only for the year 2000, but in reality it turned out to be better than expectation”12. But in 2000 the bilateral trade reached to $1009 million. However it declined to $857 million in 200113. The trade between the two states is almost limited to two major items in both sides. That is, rough diamonds and chemicals together form about 63% of Israel’s export to India. While as the polished diamonds and cotton yarn account for approximately76% of Indian exports to Israel.14.

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between these two states, many delegates from both the countries visited each other for exploring the market opportunities. The delegates from Israel included Ministers of External Affairs, Finance, Industry, Trade, Telecom, Agriculture and various other dignitaries from different firms and associations.15 But the recent visit of Israel Premier Ariel Sharon to India in September 2003 is considered very important as he was the first Israeli 66

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Prime Minister who visited India since the establishment of the diplomatic relations between the two countries. Six bilateral agreements in different fields have been signed during his visit16. From the Indian side, the high level delegation included Ministers of Finance, Commerce, Agriculture and Chief Ministers of various states. These visits have led to the signing of a series of bilateral agreements between the two governments.17 The outcome of these exchanges of visits by the delegations of both the countries was the increased cooperation and Joint Ventures in industries and trade Israelis believe that the Joint ventures could be the best way of doing business with India.18

Joint Ventures

Joint venture is an area where both the countries find common areas of cooperation. Ofri, the Israeli Economic Counsellor stated: 19

“The best way to promote trade between India and Israel is through joint ventures, as India has a well trained workforce of dedicated engineers and scientists as well as technology minded companies. While Israel has good connection with the US and Europe, India has direct access to Asia and the third world.”

In this context, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. and Solel of Israel has jointly set up a solar power plant at accost of Rs. 4 billion in Rajasthan.20 The first ever Indo- Israel joint venture was made between Plastro Gvat and Indian company- Finolex in February 1992 in the field of Drip irrigation.21. Also, a phosphate plant has been setup with joint collaboration of the Gujarat industrial cooperation and Titegarh Steel mills with Rolem fertilizers of Israel.22 Some other Israeli companies which have agreed for the joint venture were : Amcor and solar (solar energy), Rahan (tissue culture), Tahal (water management), Gadot (citric acid), Zinkal (irrigation pipes), Netafim(drip irrigation), Dan (irrigation ) and others.23

Both the countries also have signed an agreement on the establishment of a Joint Business council. In late 1992, a high power delegation of Manufacture’s Association of Israel visited India in a bid to explore markets for their products. However, the first industrial mission to Israel was led by Jamshed Irani, the president

Chapter -3 of the Chamber of Indian Industry in September 1992. This was initiated by a mutual programme in Joint ventures, trade agreements and mutually beneficial export and import programmes.24 And as part of it CII signed on MoU with Manufactures Association in September 1992. It has been assumed that Israel’s access with the US and EEC could be converted for better market access to Indian goods. Likewise, India’s links with South East Asian countries could be utilized for Israel’s access to the region.

After the establishment of ambassadorial relation in 1992 a brisk and probably never ending traffic at the highest level has been going on not just at the government level but also at the level of private industrialists and businessmen. A number of projects in electronics, computer and agricultural sectors are operating under Israeli experts. The active development of Indo-Israeli economic cooperation within the short time is an amazing phenomenon. The India-Israel Business Alliance formed in October 1996 to promote the business industry and trade has a dynamic impact on cooperate sectors. To continue the momentum of the bilateral trade between the two countries commerce Minister Mr. Arun Jaitely visited with a high-level delegation to Tel Aviv in January 2004 to attend the third session of the India-Israel joint trade and economic Committee.25

Indian companies also have shown their keen interest in doing business with the Israeli counterpart. The Confederation of Indian Industry CII, organized a seminar on “Indo-Israeli Business Opportunities” on 15 April 1993. The Manufacture’s Association of Israel (MAI), was represented by it’s the then president. Mr. Dov Lautman. In his presentation, he underlined the advantageous position of both India and Israel in trading with each other. While the India can provide Israel cheap labour, both skilled and unskilled, Israel can provide India with advanced technology. More over, the absence of language barrier will also help trade and make its future prospect brighter.26

During 1999, a series of high-level contacts between the Information Technology Associations of India and Israel were initiated in order to exploit the competitive advantages the two countries possessed in the fast growing field. The electronics and computer software export promotion council (EPC) and Electronic

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Industrial Association of Israel have signed a MoU. Also, National Association of Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM), signed an agreement for closer cooperation with their counterparts. Israeli association of software houses (IASH). Above all, a major development in 1999 was the finalization of the details of an agreement for Joint Research and Development between D.S.I.R. and the chief scientist of Israel. They together moved for an area of cooperation between the two states in the area of Bio-technology, Life science technology, Pharmaceuticals, Agricultural food technology, Scientific and Medical instrumentations, Electronics, Automation, Aero space and Environment.27

Besides, the 14th International Agricultural Exhibition, Agritech- 99 was held at Haifa from September 5-9, 1999. This was attended by a large number of visitors from India. During the same period, two delegations of small Business Authority of Israel and Federation of Israeli Chambers of Commerce made direct talks with their counterparts in India. Because of these developments, India Trade Promotion Organization (ITPO), held a first ever India week in Tel Aviv in May 2000 to project the Indian Industrial strength and business opportunities to the Israel Market28. Over hundred leading Indian companies participated in the India week programme, which turned out to be a milestone in the trade relations between the two countries.29

Many delegations from India and Israel visited each other’s country in order to increase awareness and to explore the economic ties. Notable visitors from Israel were the ministers of External Affairs. Industry and Trade, agricultural and the delegations from the Manufactures Association of Israel, Federation of Israeli Chamber of Commerce, Electronics Association of Israel as well as several top raking companies.30 However the visit of Israeli Premier. Ariel Sharon with his delegation to India in September 2003 is considered as the most important one from the Israeli side. During his stay both the countries signed six agreements in different fields. 31 Ministers of Finance, Commerce, Agriculture, and the many State Chief Ministers and the representatives of various Industrial Associations have been visited to Israel from the Indian side. During these visits, a number of bilateral agreements were signed between the two governments.32 But the visits of the Indian Home Minister Mr. Lal Krishna Advani followed by the visit of the Indian External Affairs Minister, Mr.

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Jaswant Singh to Israel in 2000 are considered the most important visits from the Indian side so far. 33

Cooperation in Tourism and Culture

After the commencement of diplomatic relations, the number of Indian tourists to Israel and Israeli tourists to India increased considerably. This was mainly due to the historical and other cultural peculiarities of the two states. One of the Israeli ambassadors to India expressed his words.34

“Every corner in Israel is history……….Israel is great centre of attraction of tourists. The major centres are Bethlehem, Nazarath, and the Sea of Galilee and so on. Another is Kibbuts, which is the only communist society. There are minor collective farming communities in which a member does not have property but works according to What Marx said- according to his ability and according to his needs. It is a unique phenomenon.”

In the early 1992, soon after the establishment of diplomatic relations 3000 to 4000 visas had been issued to Indian citizens to visit Israel. This included pilgrims, businessmen, tourists and those visiting their relatives.35 Similarly, the Israelis are also fascinated by the Indian tradition, culture and civilizations. This is evident from the number of visitors who visited India. By 1993, i.e. after the establishment of the ambassadorial relations between the two states 50,000 Israelis visited India..36 In 2000, their number reached approximately to one Lakh.37

When Shimon Peres visited India in May 1993 Agreements in Tourism and culture were signed between the two states.38 The agreement on tourism envisaged for mutual promotion and publicity. It also undertakes to take measures for simplifying the formalities required for trips. Shimon Peres visited India with a large number of Israeli industrialists and businessmen. This was significant because it showed that Israel was earnestly interested in India and in doing business with India.39 Peres believed that India and Israel could set up joint ventures in many fields were Israel had a strong scientific research base.40 According to him Israel was more than eager to extend its cooperation to India in the technological and agricultural fields.41

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When Peres visited India, the Arab League issued a statement in Delhi and appealed Indian government to use its influence with Israel to make it stop its policy of economic siege and starvation in the occupied territories. The left parties and the Janata Dal also urged the government to make full bilateral ties with Israel conditional on Tel Aviv’s recognition of an Independent Palestinian State. The BJP was in a celebratory mood from the very outset, characterizing the Peres visit as a vindication of its foreign policy platform. Peres evidently reciprocated the BJP’s feeling and became the first visiting dignitary after a long time to meet the leader of the opposition, L.K. Advani. In fact, Peres was the first important foreign leader to meet the BJP leader after the demolition of the Babri Masjid.42

Tourism has become a common spot for people to people contact. Though tourists as such do not flow heavily to Israel, the visitors consist mainly pilgrims visiting to the holy city of Jerusalem. In August 1997 the government of India opened its Tourist office at Tel Aviv to encourage bilateral touism43. As such bilateral tourism is supposed to flourish in the specific context of cultural contacts between the two societies.

Actually, the cultural cooperation between the two societies dates back to the very emergence of both the states. In their days of persecution some of the Jews found shelter in India. The cultural and the tradition of India protected their identity and promoted their well being. The absence of diplomatic relationship was not at all a hurdle for closer cultural interaction between the two societies. Hence, Jewish are fascinated to India and its culture. This could be seen in Israel that same of the streets in Israel are named after Tagore and Gandhi. India’s appreciation for Jewish artists was open in 1960’s as the famous Jewish Violinist, Yehudi Menuhin, was chosen to receive the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International understanding in 1968 .44 The Israeli Consulate, after its establishment in Bombay has initiated variety of cultural programmes to catch up with the trend. This included symposia, debates, lectures, exhibition and literary events by this time, the veterans from both the societies have travelled to each other’s capital.

In 1993, India and Israel signed a cultural agreement and a framework programme for cultural cooperation for the period of 1993-1996, the agreement for

Chapter -3 the exchange of Scholars between Tel Aviv University and Banaras Hindu University. The Israeli Academy of Science and Humanities and University Grants Commission and Barllan University and Hyderabad University were made in June 1994.45 As per the same Israel agreed to seven scholarships annually to students from India for Post- Graduate and Post-Doctoral studies. The scholarships cover West Asian and International Studies, Jewish culture, Hebraic Studies and Agriculture46. As part of the academic exchange programme, the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), organized an annual seminar with the Jaffe Centre for Strategic studies, Tel Aviv University. More over, during the visit of Israeli Minister for Education, A.R. Ubinstein, in January 1996, a proposal for the establishment of a chair in Hebrew Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University has been proposed and agreed upon.

Inspite of these academic collaborations, there was fast growing cultural exchanges between the two societies. Leading cultural performers and groups have travelled between Delhi and Jerusalem, Mumbai and Tel Aviv and performed in front of packed houses. These visits have touched nearly every sphere of culture, music, dance, art, literature and so on. The major highlights of these activities included some cultural festivals organized in both the countries. This included the visit of Zubin Mehta to Israel and the Israel Philanthropic orchestra to India in 1994 and the participation of Zakir Hussain in the 1996 Israel festival in Jerusalem.47 The other important cultural exchanges included, The Gathering 1995, the screening of films and discussion with film director, Arnon Zodak in 1997. Israel’s participation in the Delhi International Book Fair, 1996 and Shalom India events.48

Similarly, India’s representation in Israel included the annual Indian participation in the Jerusalem film Festival and Vikram Seth’s visit to Jerusalem poet festival in 1997. This also included the Publication of the Hebrew translation of ‘A Suitable Boy’ and Mallika Sarabahai’s dancing programme. During March 1998 in response to the visit of a 33 member Isreli dance group of India, a 6 member Bharatantyam troop led by Alarmel Valli visited Israel.49

In addition to this, the bilateral scholarship programmes allow young Israelis to learn about Dance, Music and Sanskrit in India. Equally, a large number of Indian students visit Israel to study about west Asia, the Hebrew language, Literature and

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Agriculture. In this context, the cultural treaty, signed in 1993 meant the exchange of mutual support for sharing the two cultures within the framework of the treaty. Two detailed cultural exchange programmes (CEP), have also been signed and implemented. The second CEP was also signed during the visit of President Ezer Weizman in late December 1996. This included future plans for a further increase of exchanges between museums, more academic interaction and mutual participation in Golden Jubilee Celebrations in 1997 and 1998.50 The joint committee for CEP met again in early 2000 and signed a new cooperation plan for the year 2000-2002.51

Again in 1997, Israeli embassy organized the Shalom India Festival, a month long celebration to mark India’s 50th anniversary and five years of diplomatic relations. The festival included a fashion show, a dance performance, a food festival and film shows. In 1998 also, Israel’s leading theatre actress and film actress, Gila Almagor visited India. Later, in the same year a leading Jazz quintet from Israel collaborated with Ustad Zakir Hussain to produce a joint performance in Delhi. In 1999 also, the Embassy organized a festival to celebrate Israel’s 50th anniversary. The festival featured the diversity of Israel’s culture. This was held in eight states; from Orissa in the East to Gujarat in the West, from Tamil Nadu in the South to Rajasthan in the North. Another joint project was a workshop on Israel by two prominent artists- Menashe Kadishman of Israel and Jalin Das of India.52

Finally, with the opening of an Israeli Cultural Centre in New Delhi, a new chapter was added to the already initiated cultural exchange programmes and schemes. This included Hebrew classes, lectures, film shows, cultural discussions and expansion of the Department of East Asian studies at Tel Aviv University to include a track in Indian and Sanskrit studies’53. It was also envisaged to plan similar programmes at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi and at Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

These varying cultural programmes have attained its own novelty and wisdom that the CEP was accepted by many in both the countries. This and the like programmes facilitated the students, artists of both the societies to actively learn about the features of their respective cultures and traditions. Minister of State for Urban Employment and Poverty Alleviation, Kumari Selja, visited Israel from 24-27

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September 2005, to attend the “International Conference for Women Leaders on Gender and Migration issues under the Millennium Development Goals”.54

Significant exchange at the level of the people is evident from the fact that about 30,000 tourists from Israel visit India every year for an extended stay of six months to one year. The demand for visas to visit India has been increasing steadily, and the Embassy in Tel Aviv has issued 25, 409 visas during the period January – October 2006.55 Four Israeli youth of Indian origin participated in the “Know India Programme” organized by the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs in May –June 2006. An official from the Israeli Foreign Office participated in the 41st Professional Course for Foreign Diplomats organized by the Foreign Service Institute held from 4 October 10 November 2006 in New Delhi. Separately, during the current year, within the framework of India-Israel Cultural Exchange Programme, ICCR has sponsored five students from Israel for pursuing year long study courses in the fields of Indian dance, Language (Hindi), Philosophy and Yoga in India.56

The exchanges in the field of culture included the performances given by Pandit Hariprasad Chaurasia, and Priyadarshini Govind at the “Israel Festival” held in My 2006, and later the participation of Aparna Sen in the International Women’s Film Festival held in Israel in September 2006, in which three of her movies were also shown. An Israeli dance troupe “Kamea Company” participated in the ‘Navrtri Mahotsav 2006’ held in Gujarat in September –October 2006. Malayalam poet Tachomm Poyil Rajeevan participated in ‘Sha’ar International Poetry Festival’ organized in Jaffa (Israel) in November 2006. A delegation from the Archaeological Survey of India, led by Director General C. Babu Rajeev visited Israel in November 2006, and held discussions with the Antiquities Department of the State of Israel with a view to explore opportunities for cooperation. 57

The year 2007 marked the 15th Anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Israel. To mark the 15th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Israel as well as the 60th anniversary of India’s independence, Embassy of India in Tel Aviv, in cooperation with ICCR organized “Indian festival” from 16-22 August 2007. In addition, a film Festival of India was also organized in Tel Aviv from 18-30 August 2007 to mark the occasion.

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Four Israeli students availed of scholarships to study in India under the Indo-Israel Cultural Exchange Programme (CEP). Five Indian students joined Israeli institutions under the reciprocal scholarship schemes offered by the Israeli government. Under the “Known India Programme” (KIP) organized by the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) three Israeli youth of Indian origin participated from 29 August 15 September 2007.58

Outsourcing of visa application services became operational in Embassy in Tel Aviv with effect from 15April 2007 through three service providers. Amidst continued increase in demand for visas to visit India, the Embassy in Tel Aviv issued 19,346 visas during the period April-October 2007. During the same period 51 OCI registration certificate and 7 PIO cards were issued to the persons of Indian origin in Israel.

We continued our active involvement with activities of the Indian Diaspora and supported various events, including the 19th Annual Maiboli Sneha Sammelan held in Lod (Israel) organized by editorial board of “Maiboli”, a Marathi quarterly magazine published in Israel by the Indian Jewish community hailing from Maharashtra (1 April 2007); evening of Indian – Cochini folklore held in Nevatim by the Jewish community of cochini origin (9 august 2007);anniversary celebrations of the Indian Jewish Synagogue in Lod (30 July 2007) and Magen Shlom Synagogue in Ramle (3 September 2007) ; and inauguration (9 September, 2007 ) of the “Heritage Museum for Indian Jewry” in Dimona.59

The Indian Council for Cultural Relations signed a MoU with Tel Aviv University, to establish a rotating Chair in Indian studies. A team comprising the Vice-Chancellors of Jawaharlal Nehru University, Jamia Millia Islamia University, North East Hill University and the University of Calcutta, visited Israel from 6-12 July, 2008. A Kuchipudi dance group led by Ms. Vyjanthi Kashi and a Hindustani violin group led by Ms. Anupriya Deostale, sponsored by ICCR, performed at the Karmiel dance Festival on 24 July, 2008.60

An ICCR sponsored Carnatic vocal group visited Israel and participated in the Oudh Cultural Festival 2009 from 15-20 November, 2009. An Odissi Dance group led

Chapter -3 by Smt. Rajshree Behera and also sponsored by ICCR, gave cultural performance in Israel from 24-28 November, 2009.

Agricultural Cooperation

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, the cooperation in the Agricultural sector has turned out to be a solid and unique one. So far, a number of Joint venture Agricultural projects were initiated in India, mainly in the fields of irrigation, water management fertilizers, greenhouses, chemicals, pesticides, insecticides, tissue culture, horticulture, use of solar energy, animal husbandry, dairy development and so on. Israel’s know—how in agriculture, pertaining to these areas and power and food industries were also included in the joint venture projects. 61

Actually, in short history of bilateral relations between the two countries cooperation in Agricultural sector, is one of the best exploited and explored one by the two parties. By the signing of an agreement for cooperation in the field of agriculture, in December 1993, it assumed unique dimensions. The agreement was signed between Balram Jhakar, the then Indian Agriculture Minister and his counterpart Yaakov Tour. Also they held wide ranging discussions on promoting bilateral cooperation in this sector.62 Both the states have agreed that the application of the technology in India would also lead to the solution of the intractable problems of water logging and soil alkalinity. This technology could be successfully applied in confronting deserts in Rajasthan and Gujarat and in increasing agricultural productivity in the semi-arid areas of Maharashtra”.63

Israel has utilized its marginal water resources to make the desert bloom. Its strides in horticulture, aquaculture and floriculture and arid-zone farming hold applications for India. Indians hope to use Israeli expertise to do the same in Rajasthan and other semi-arid states. 64 Earlier, Tel Aviv had organized an Agro-Tech exhibition in May 1993. Maharashtra the then Chief Minister Sharad Pawar led a six member delegation to the exhibition in Israel. The delegation included Union Agriculture Secretary M.S. Gill and Punjab Minister for cooperation and others. About 600 farmers from Maharashtra and more about 300 more from Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Punjab and Haryana were also there. The exhibition had generated great interest in the Indian farming community. The delegation had 76

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acquired and familiarized themselves with the technologies for optimum water use and productivity.65

Subsequently, several proposals for joint ventures especially in the areas of seed production and manufacture of agricultural machinery have been formulated pilot-projects and turnkey projects have also been identified for promoting Indo- Israeli cooperation in the Agricultural sector. Besides, a travelling seminar was also organized jointly by the Israeli and Indian experts and arranged a visit to Indra Gandhi canal and desert areas of Rajasthan. It was hoped that the same would help in evolving appropriate water management and micro-planning in these areas.

In this context, the planned development of linkages between Ben-Gurion Desert University of Negev and an Indian Academic and Research Institute such a Rajasthan Agricultural University was envisaged to promote the scientists of the two countries in an exchange of ideas in the fields of desert stabilization, water management, ply-green house technology and so on. India was very much optimistic in exploring the cooperation in this sector. She felt satisfied that the industry level collaboration were being underway for manufacture of drip irrigation system, tissue culture, hybrid seed production and manufacture of farm machinery. Further, a MoU to stabilize cooperation in this sector was also finalized.66

Israel was also ready to share their technology to the demands from India. A five day visit to India by the then Israeli president, Ezer Weizman in December 1996 opened a new chapter in Indo- Israeli cooperation. His visit was the first ever visit to India by the head of the state of Israel. Visualizing the future role of India he stated, “the 21st century belongs to East-China, Japan, Indonesia and India will take its place in the technology world. 67 Regarding the cooperation between India and Israel, he argued, we will help each other, not teach each other .68 During his visit to India bilateral agreements were signed between the two countries.69 President Weizman who was leading the delegation of the Israeli businessman who came to India in December 1996 offered his country as a base for re-exporting Indian goods to the US, Europe and other countries with which Israel has close political and economic links. Israel has free trade agreements with the Western markets, which, according to the Israeli delegation, will help India to access these markets more easily. It may be noted

Chapter -3 that Israeli Economy would also get an outlet to the rich markets of East and South East Asia through India.70 During president Weizman’s visit in December 1996, an Indo- Israeli Research and Development Farm were inaugurated in the Indian Agricultural Research Institute (IARI) at Pusa in New Delhi.71 The farm would demonstrate the Israeli know –how in high-tech agriculture and would endeavour to find different techniques and methods of cultivation suitable for the diverse agro climatic zones of India.72 The demonstration farm in Pusa institute is a joint venture undertaken by the government of Israel and India. The farm is operating since November 1999. Within this farm, through training programmes local farmers are given instructions on various effective measures of crop growing as well as water conservation to increase the growth yield. The purpose of the farm is to demonstrate the cultivation of different kinds of crops, through the use of sophisticated irrigation technology and methods of crop protection, two fields in which Israel has special expertise. The farm serves as a centre for training in various aspects related to the farm technologies, management and so on the farm grows some kinds of crops, vegetables and flowers.73

Also, during the same visit, a cotton demonstration farm in Alkola in Maharashtra was established in collaboration with the state government and agriculture development company, AGRIDEV, in Israel Further, a series of projects with many state governments in India have been initiated. This included the projects between the Punjab Agro-Industries cooperation and Ozcot Company of Israel and the Indo-Israel demonstration farm in the field of dairy development in Karnal. Besides, the proposal for setting up a hundred cows dairy farm by Israeli design, the Israeli Dairy Board and Punjab government signed a MoU to established the modern satellite dairy farm in Punjab.”74

Tahal, the Israeli water management company is engaged in Rajasthan, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu for waste land development, irrigation and water and modern agricultural pilot projects. Israeli company in the field of agriculture has provided turn-key projects for the establishment of tissue culture laboratories in India. Way back in 1997, an executive agreement was signed between the two nations for future programme of action in this sector. This also included the programmes for establishment of green houses, open field facilities. Infra structure and technical 78

Chapter -3 assistance, training and management for specific periods.75 A steering committee was also constituted comprising experts from both the countries to monitor the entire programmes. It was also decided to provide twenty-five training scholarships for participants from India, particularly in the fields of irrigation, protected agriculture and horticultural production.

Thus, the collaboration in agriculture has turned out to be one of the most attractive and explored one by both the states since the commencement of the diplomatic relations.

So far, there are some 150 joint ventures between India and Israeli companies. Most of them are in the sphere of agriculture Israeli’s famous drip irrigation systems are jointly manufactured in three different locations in India. These ventures enjoy participation by Israel’s leading agricultural companies. Agriculture is still the field for which Israel is best known in India, as can be witnessed in Indian participation in Agritech, Israel’s tri annual agricultural exposition (held last in 1996 and 1999). However, cooperation also exists in other sectors, such as telecommunications, including joint manufacturing of high speed modems, voice-mail systems and fiber optic production and software where a couple of companies have setup their offices as well as R and D centres in India.76 This indicates that both the states have shown the interest towards the areas of common interests and mutual benefits.

Ephahim Dowek in an interview stated.77

“We have a special experience of developments, which we think is nearer to the needs of developing countries like India, because it is the summing up of a new experience of the last 50 years.” Israel’s agricultural sector is characterized by an intensive system of production stemming from the need to overcome the scarcity in natural resources, particularly water and arable land. The constant growth in agricultural production is due to close cooperation between researchers, farmers and agriculture related industries.

Necessity being the mother of invention, Israel’s agro technologists learned early on how to overcome such hurdles as low rainfall, lack of fertile soil, hot summer reasons, and a scarcity of investment capital. Then, as today, they were backed by a

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network of research stations, academic establishments and an agricultural extension service, turning this small country into one large agricultural experimental station. There is no doubt that the results have been impressive; high-tech irrigation methods coupled with high-yield crops and intensive animal husbandry have made it possible to feed a population that has grown from 650,000 in 1948 to 6.3 million in 2004 with not more than 440,000 hectares of cultivated land (of which about 210000 are irrigated), and at the same time to increase exports steadily Israel has achieved record yields in many agricultural products ; the average milking cow produces 9400 litres of milk a year, compared with 6900 litres in Denmark and the United States and 5,800 in Holland; it averages, 180-200 tons of tomatoes per hectare per year, compared with 80 tons in the United States.

Despite the decrease in the number of farmers, agriculture still plays a significant role in Israel’s economy. Total agriculture production in 1998 accounted for 2 per cent of GDP. Approximately 66400 people are involved in agriculture. This number represents about 2.9 per cent of the country’s total workforce. The average income of those employed in 1998 was $1.600 every month. In the early 1950s, one full time agricultural employee fed 17 people, but today one full time employee fed 95 people. Agriculture export in Israel reached 6 per cent of the country’s total exports. A fresh produce and processed food exported mainly to Western Europe. In India, out of 65 crore acres of land, 35 crore acres are under agriculture. If every acre production from these 35 crore acres can support five-six people, than India can feed around 500-600 crore people. India must learn from Israelis how to increase the productivity quickly.

As regards vegetables, they represent approximately 18.3 per cent of Israel’s total agricultural production. In 2001, Israel produced 1,991 million tonnes of vegetables over an area of 50,000 hectares. Some 1,25,900 tonnes of vegetables valued at $135.5 million were exported in 2001. They account for 14.1 per cent of total exports of Israel’s fresh produce. In addition to the export of fresh vegetables, processed vegetables are also exported. For example, approximately 70 per cent of processed and canned corn are exported, and 65 per cent of processed tomatoes. The total production of vegetables for processing in 2001 was around 48000 tons. To enable the growth of vegetables under a wide range of climatic and topographical 80

Chapter -3 conditions, a number of technologically advanced growing methods are utilized in the vegetable sector, including greenhouses with climate control systems and soil less culture. Some 2500 hectares of vegetables are grown in greenhouses and tunnels using various agro technologies. The main crops cover 825 hectares of tomatoes, including cherry tomatoes, 382 hectares of cucumbers, 432 hectares of peppers, 191 hectares of melons (under plastic tunnels), and 10 hectares of greenhouse melons.

Soil less culture eliminates many hazards that arise when using soil as a growth medium, and allows greater control over irrigation and fertilization. Some 200 hectares are grown using this method. While tomatoes grown in the open field reach yields of 60-80 tonnes per hectare, an average of 200-300 tons can be grown in greenhouses under controlled climate conditions. Peak yields have been reached a record 500 tones. On the other hand, in India with several efforts of researchers and specialists, the average yield of tomatoes per hectare comes out to be 30-40 tonnes in open cultivation.

In order to reduce the use of pesticides, net houses are being used increasingly for production in the summer in Israel. The farmers in Israel and other countries have introduced new varieties of different vegetable crops, such as tomatoes, melons, cucumbers, onions and peppers. Seed production is suited to local conditions and is monitored closely to help maintain high quality. New varieties of strawberries are able to bear fruit throughout the winter, from November onwards. These new varieties excel in both shape and quality, and growing technologies have been introduced to the farmers.

The climate in arid zones, characterized by long hours of sunshine and relatively high temperatures, can be exploited to produce high-quality vegetables during the off-season of competitors overseas. It has overcome some of the most extreme climatic conditions in the world- very hot and arid summers, cold winters with sudden flash floods – to grow melons, peaches and pecans, and arise fish a top – quality dairy cattle in the middle of the desert; and has developed strains of vegetables that grow in the deserts’ undrinkable brackish water. Having conquered local needs, Israeli agro-technologists embarked on the second revolution, turning their attentions and imaginations to the export market, and creating the technologies, nearly all

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developed by Israeli universities and research institutes, to meet demands for ever increasing produce yields.

The Agro-Advantage Maharashtra Exhibition that was inaugurated in Mumbai on November 6, 1998, gave a great boost to trade in agriculture between India (particularly Maharashtra) and Israel. Enthusiastic participation by the Israeli side was keenly observed. For example, a panel of Israeli firms from the agricultural sector participated in the Expo, with Walid Mansour, consul general of Israel in Mumbai, participating, in the seminar and exhibition. Yaakov Tsur, former agriculture minister of Israel, spoke on the “Relevance of Israeli Experience –Indian Context”. A clear and lucid picture of agriculture in Israel was presented by Amiram Zakay of ADAMIT Resources International of Israel who chaired one of the sessions in the Seminar. (ADAMIT is leading company specializing in packaging food products and vegetables for maintaining freshness). The Israel Export Institute, which is a nodal promotional organization, co-sponsored by the Trade and Industry, Ministry of Israel and private industries, was represented by Yitzhak Kariati.78

India and Israel on 11 May 2006 signed a three –year work plan for cooperation in agriculture. The first work plan of its kind, it is expected to lead to a breakthrough in advancing practical cooperation. Union Agriculture Minister Sharad Pawar and his Israeli counterpart, Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development Shalom Simhon, signed the work plan on behalf of their respective governments in Tel Aviv. During his visit to Israel, Pawar also hold discussions with the Israeli Vice- Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tzipi Livni. Pawar visited in Israel as head of a high –level delegation to Agritech 2006, a tri-annual international agricultural event showcasing the latest technologies in the field. The minister was accompanied by senior delegates from Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Nagaland.

The areas of focus elaborated in the word plan include development of agri- business projects, collaborative research and development, academic and farmer-level exchanges and cooperation in gene bank resources. Israel will transfer technologies and techniques relating to post-harvest management and value addition for fruits, vegetables and dairy products; energy efficient and cost- effective greenhouse structures; development of the diary sector; and water management, including 82

Chapter -3 recycling of domestic waste-water for irrigation. Eighty per cent of the water used in agriculture in Israel is recycled waste-water. Collaborative research will include the development of crop-specific irrigation and fertilization schedules for Indian produce (suggested crops include mango, pomegranate, tomato, garlic, capsicum and more). The two countries also plan to set up a joint research and development fund, offering seed money for joint projects promoting agricultural innovation. The work plan also includes attention to Extension Service Systems, providing the individual farmer with real time solutions and access to agricultural know how and research and development- an area well developed in Israel.79 Pawar last visited Israel in November 2005, as a special envoy of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to the memorial service held for late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

Bilateral relations with Israel continued to widen in a multifaceted manner, including in the fields of science and technology, commerce, agriculture, cultural exchange, and people to people interaction. The continued exchanges in various fields helped consolidate the relationship that entered into its fifteenth year in 2006. Sharad Pawar, Minister of Agriculture, Food and Civil Supplies, Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution, led a delegation consisting of the Chief Ministers of the States of Gujarat, Nagaland, and Rajasthan, along with eight other State Ministers, officials, and business persons, for participation in the “Agritech Exhibition” in Israel from 9- 11 May 2006. He met with his Israeli counterpart, and an inter-Governmental Action Plan for cooperation in Agriculture was signed between the two sides. He also met with Vice-Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Israel, Tzipi Livni. Secretary (Agriculture and Cooperation), Dr. P.K. Mishra, led a delegation to Israel from 1-8 April, 2008. An Action Plan for Bilateral Agricultural Cooperation for 2008-10 was agreed to during the visit.

Thus, the collaboration in tourism, culture and agriculture has turned out to be the one of the most attractive and explored by both the states, since the commencement of bilateral relations. The vivid and varying cultural programmes have attained its own novelty and wisdom that the C.E.P. was accepted by many in both the countries. So far, out of 200 joint ventures made, nearly 100 are in the field of agriculture. This is a clear indication of both the state’s spirit of commitment and enthusiasm shown towards area of common interests and mutual benefits.

Chapter -3

Table 1 Israel - India bilateral trade (1992-2010)

Israel’s Export India’s Export Bilateral Trade Years (in US$ million) (in US$ million) (in US$ million) 127 75 202 1992

228 129 357 1993

363 151 514 1994

313 190 503 1995

311 251 562 1996

365 293 658 1997

332 343 675 1998

531 397 928 1999

551 453 1004 2000

470 413 883 2001

648 608 1256 2002

883 703 1586 2003

1123 1021 2146 2004

1191 1214 2405 2005

1283 1267 2550 2006

1372 1291 2663 2007

1374 1410 2784 2008

1483 1457 2940 2009

1592 1495 3087 2010

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References

1. Bansidhar Pradhan, “Indo-Israeli relations (ties) after the Peres visit”, Link , 35(41), May 23, 1993, p.18.

2. Human Development Report , 1999.p. 28.

3. R.K. Srivastava, “Indo-Israeli Relations Pulls and Pressures”, Mainstream, December 9, 1967, pp. 18.

4. Ibid.

5. M.C. Chagla, Roses in December An Autobiography, Bombay (Mumbai), 1973, pp. 391-392.

6. No.2 Human Development Report.

7. Gulu Ezekiel, “Indo- Israeli Ties Waiting to Break into the Open ”, Pioneer, January 14, 1992.

8. Initiatives: Israel –India Business Guide on Israeli Industry -1996, Israeli- Asia Business -1996 , pp. 10.

9. ibid.

10. Zeev Weiss, “Double taxation treaty”, No. 8, p. 25.

11. “Indo- Israeli trade -1999: Reaching $ 1 billion earlier than expected” Economic Department of Embassy of Israel, January 2000, pp. 1,

12. Ibid.

13. Bombay Chamber International Trade News, Vol. IV, No.7, July 2002, pp. 19- 20.

14. UNI, Backgrounder, New Delhi, “India- Israel relations” Vol. XXII, No.6, February 6, 1997, p.2.

15. Israel Today- Mumbai, Vol 3, No.5, September –October 1997, p. 13.

16. Hindustan Times and Times of India September 8 & 13, 2001.

17. No.15, Israel Today.

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18. K.P. Bhanumathy, “Indo-Israeli Ties Gathering Strength”, Mainstream, 32(18) March 19, 1994, p. 33, Also “Israel 40 Years of Independence”, The Times of India, April 14, 1994.

19. The News, Islamabad, June 8, 1993.

20. Ibid.

21. “Israel; 40 Years of Independence” Times of India, April 14, 1994.

22. Ramesh Takur, “Relevance of Israel to India”, The Economic Times, April 26, 1993.

23. “Indo-Israel Trade” News from Israel, 41(5) September /October 1994, p.4.

24. The Economic Times, March 17, 1993.

25. K.P. Bhanumathy, “Reinforcing Indo-Israel relations”, Mainstream, February 15, 1997, p. 35. Also for commerce Minister see The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, January 9, 2004.

26. The Hindu, 17, April 1993.

27. No.11, Also Embassy of Israel, New Delhi Report -2001.

28. Ibid, Also Bombay Chamber International Trade News, Vol.IV, No.7, July 2000, p.20.

29. Ibid.

30. “Indo-Israel economic cooperation”, Israel Today, Vol.3, No.5, September , October 1997, p.14.

31. Hindustan Times and Times of India, September 9 &10, 2003.

32. No.30.

33. S.Rajen Singh, “India and Israel: Towards Greater Cooperation”, India Quarterly, Vol. VII, No.4, October, December 2001, p. 138. Also Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Report 2000-01.

34. Dr. Yohoyada Haim’s Interview, Tourism India, Thiruvananthapuram, Vol.2, June 2, 1999, pp.5. 87

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35. Gora Becher’s Interview , The Week (Kochi) March 8, 1992.

36. The Economic Times, May 17, 1993.

37. Israeli Embassy Information Department, New Delhi, 2001.

38. Foreign Affairs Record, Vol.39, No.5, May 1993, pp. 136.

39. Bansidhar Pradhan, “Indo-Israeli Relations after the Peres visit”, Link, 35(4) , May 23, 1993, p.18.

40. V.P. Dutt, “India’s Foreign Policy in Changing World”, New Delhi, 1999, p. 275.

41. Times of India, March 2, 1993.

42. Valsan Cherian, “Building Friendship”, Frontline , June 8, 1993.

43. India’s Foreign Relations Israel, www meadev com. in.

44. Farah Naaz, “Indo-Israel Cultural Cooperation Agricultural Trade and Culture”, Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, Vol. 23 (6) September 1999, pp.901.

45. UNI , Backgrounder, No. 14, pp. 8.

46. Embassy of Israel, New Delhi (report) 2001.

47. R. Sreekantam Nair, “Dynamics of diplomacy delsyed : India and Israel”, Delhi -2004, pp. 154-155.

48. Ibid, Also UNI, Backgrounder, No. 14, pp.13.

49. Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), ICCR Activities in Indo- Israeli bilateral relations, ICCR, New Delhi, 2000, pp. 1.

50. No. 14, pp.13.

51. Embassy of Israel, “Indo-Israel trade 1999”, January 2000, pp. 1, Also No.11.

52. Embassy of Israel, “Indo-Israel Cultural Cooperation”, New Delhi, 1999.Also Embassy of Israel Report, New Delhi, 2001.

53. No.14, pp.13.

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54. Ministry of External Affairs Report 2005-06.

55. Ministry of External Affairs Report 2006-07.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ministry of External Affairs Report 2007-08.

59. Ibid.

60. Ministry of External Affairs Report 2008-09.

61. Israel Today, Vol.3, No.5, September –October 1997, pp.13.

62. Foreign Affairs Record, Vol.3, No.5, September –October 1997, pp.13.

63. Ibid, pp. 133, Also No.47, p. 157.

64. Frontline, June 4, 1993, p. 112.

65. Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. 39, No.5 May 1993, pp. 132. Also Frontline, June 4, 1993, p. 112.

66. R. Sreekantan Nair, “Dynamics of Diplomacy Delayed India and Israel”, Delhi , 2004, p 157.

67. K.P. Bhanumathy, “Reinforcing Indo-Israel Relations”, Mainstream, Vol.XXXV, No.10, February 15, 1997, p. 35 Also, Annual Report of Ministry of External Affairs ,New Delhi, 1996-97,

68. Ibid.

69. Israel Today, Vol.3, No.5, September –October 1997, p. 13.

70. “A New Israeli initiative”, Frontline, Vol.14, No.12, February 1997, p. 57.

71. Israel Today, Vol. 3, No.5, September –October 1997, pp.13.

72. No.44, p.897.

73. “Indo-Israel R and D Demonstration farm “Embassy of Israel, New Delhi- 1999, pp. 2, Also paper issued by Embassy of Israel New Delhi, August 2001.

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74. Israel Today, Vol.3, No.5, September –October 1997, p.13.

75. Ibid.,

76. Bombay Chamber International Trade News, Vol. IV No. 7, July 2002.

77. Ephraim Dowek’s Interview, Frontline, June 4, 1993, p. 114.

78. Israel at the Agri Expo, Israel Today, Vol. 4, No. 6, Nov –Dec, 1998, p. 22, as cited by Farah Naaz, Indo-Israel Cooperation: Agriculture, Trade and Culture, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 33, No. 6, September 1999, p. 898.

79. The Hindu, New Delhi, 12 May, 2006.

Chapter- 4 TRADE,SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL RELATIONS

Chapter -4

TRADE, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION

Besides agriculture, science and technology too assumes greater dimensions in the bilateral cooperation between India and Israel. Way back in 1993, an agreement on Science and Technology was signed between the two states during the visit of the then Israeli foreign minister, Shimon Peres. This agreement stood for direct scientific and technological cooperation between governmental agencies, academies of science, research institutes, and enterprises, institutions of higher education and scientific communities of the two states.1

However, a detailed work plan was finalized in September 1993, identifying specific areas of cooperation namely bio-technology, lasers, electo-optics and information technology. s In November 1994, during the visit of the Israeli minister for communications and science and technology, Shulamit Aloni, the two governments installed an agreement setting up a science and technology fund with a corpus of $ three million. 2 This was made possible by equal share by both the governments to facilitate joint R and D projects in the areas identified for cooperation.

Subsequently, a meeting of the Joint Working group and a Seminar on advanced materials was held in July 1996 in Israel. The next meeting of the Joint Working Group and a seminar on Biotechnology was held in March 1997 in Delhi. In 1999, another one was extended for the research on ‘Human genome’ 3. The project found enthusiasm and interest in both the states and a series of collaborative endeavours on human genome’ have been initiated in 2000. The Joint Committee which met in New Delhi in 1997 agreed that four to six Indian researchers will visit Israel in 1998 for a period of four to six weeks each. So far, four such visits have been approved and undertaken. Thus, there has been an impressive representation of Israeli and Indian scholars in International Scientific Conferences in both the countries and also there is a regular flow of Indian students of advanced studies to Israel.4

The tempo of bilateral cooperation is reflected in the Bi-national Conferences that have already taken place. At first, a bi-national conference on genetics and research on human genome was organized in Israel in 1998. This conference was attended by six Indian scholars. Second bilateral symposium on current issues of condensed matter and material physics took place in Delhi in the beginning of 1999 .

91 Chapter -4

In this conference over twenty Israeli students participated.5 The momentum gained in the scientific sector is reflected in the sharing of technology as well. Tahal Consulting Engineering Ltd, an Israel based multinational company, has entered an agreement with several Indian partners in the field of engineering, ground water management, de-salination, agro-industries and prevention of desertification. Already, this firm has played an active role in the development of Israel’s water resources, agricultural industry and infrastructure. It has signed an MoU with the state governments of Gujarat and Rajasthan for the transfer of technical know-how.6, Likewise, Tadiran, Israel’s leading electronic industry is also cooperating with India in transfer of technology and production on sharing arrangements.

An agreement has also been signed between the Indian Science Academy and Israeli National Academy of Science and Humanities for providing regular cooperation and exchange in the field of science and technology. In this regard, discussions have been held regarding collaboration in the field of commercial application of solar energy, operationalization of Indian solar energy on the lines of those in Israel. Joint R and D with the Weizman Institute in a project for direct conversion of solar energy into steam and petrochemical refining.7

The fourth Indo-Israeli joint committee meeting on science and technology was held in Jerusalem on 3rd of November 1999. The meeting finalized four proposals for joint research projects in the area of human genome research. 8 In short, there was a very healthy bilateral relationship in almost all the areas of common interest between the two countries. On 22 January 2002, Indo-Israeli cooperation attained yet another zenith, this time in the field of electronics and information technology close on the heels of the Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres’s visit to India, communication and information technology minister of India Shri Pramod Mahajan made a three day visit to Israel with an auspicious proposal up his sleeve very earnestly, the two countries signed a MoU to promote bilateral trade in electronics and information technology, thus giving a fillip to research and development activities and technology transfer between the two counties. The memorandum was signed between Shri Mahajan and his Israeli counterpart, Mr. Reuven Rivlin, as a first step towards the establishment of a framework for cooperation between the two countries in information technology and electronics. Earlier, an agreement had been initiated in the area of telecom and posts in 1994 that came into effect from 1998. This new

92 Chapter -4

agreement would enhance industrial and technical competitiveness of both countries through cooperation in industrial research and development. Besides the memorandum would add further bytes to technology transfer potential between the two countries. One of the areas India is keen on enhancing with the applications of this cooperation is the defence sector. During Mr. Mahajan’s visit to Israel in 2002 he also called upon the defence minister of Israel, Binyamin Ben-Elizer, which clearly indicated that India is very much interested to utilize the Israeli information technology techniques in its defense sector.9

India and Israel also have signed various agreements to cooperate in Space Research in an effort to benefit from each other’s experience and form an alliance to reach out to the global market. The agreements were signed during the visit of the Chairman of the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), K. Kasturirangan to Israel in August 2003. The ISRO chief also met the Israel’s Science and Technology Minister, Eliezer Sandberg, and the Director of Israel Space Research, Avi Hareven and exchanged the information regarding the ongoing developments in Space Research.10

At the economic level, relationship between India and Israel has been showing some upward trend almost since 1992. The total bilateral trade showed some increase after the establishment of diplomatic relations. In 1991 the total trade between the two States was 129 US$ million. However, slowly increase year by year pushed the trade to 1099 US $ million in 2000. India’s exports to Israel are mainly precious stones and jewelry, cotton yarn, fabrics, drug , pharmaceuticals, and so on. 11 Whereas the Israeli exports to India apart from pearls, fertilizers are the military arms, which are being sold to India worth million dollars. Defence analysts estimated that Israel sold weapons to India crossed $ 500 millions during the 1977-2000.12 By 2001, India had signed weapons contracts worth $ 2 billion with Israel.13 The Isreali Cabinet headed by Ariel Sharon has approved the sale of Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control Systems worth US $ 1.1 million.14 It is clear from the above estimations that India is providing the market to Israel for selling her arms worth million US dollars to India. From the above estimation, one can easily analyse that India is being treated by Israeli arms exporters as conducive market, which could be exploited by them even if they sold their hardware at exorbitant price. Indo-Israel arms trade is unilateral. Only the

93 Chapter -4

pretext is combating terrorism and fundamentalism. This is high time top echelons in the government realize and save the poor Indian taxpayers from misery.

Bilateral trade in the year 2000 maintained the momentum of growth set earlier. The trade figures for 2000 show a volume of $1084 million, 10 per cent higher than 1999. Israel’s exports to Israel in this period amounted for $535 million, thus registering an increase of 18 per cent. Main export products were diamonds (58 percent), chemicals, textiles, tea and domestic apparels. Israel’s exports to India in this period amounted for $549 million, thus registering an increase of 3 per cent. 15

Bilateral trade stood at $475.6 million (January –April 2003), up by 25.29 per cent compared to $379.6 million in the previous year. The balance hinged in India’s favour by $75.8 million. India’s exports grew by 46 per cent in 2003 and Israel’s by 4.5 per cent. Trade between India and Israel stood at $2.2 billion in 2005-06 of which India’s exports are valued at $1.2 billion and imports at $1 billion. During 2004-05, India’s exports to Israel crossed $1 billion, registering a growth of nearly 39 per cent.16 Major items exported from India include diamonds, pearls, precious stones, electronic goods, fertilizers, inorganic chemicals and computer software, whereas main imports were transport equipment, metals, machinery and equipment.17

Israel is in a unique position of having free trade agreements with the European Union, the US and more recently with Canada and Turkey. This network of agreements would further help the Israeli exports to new markets. During the visit to India by Israel’s Deputy Prime Minister and Industry Minister, Eli Yashai, discussion held with the Indian Commerce and Industry Minister, Kamal Nath, both side agreed on a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) based on the recommendations of a joint study group.18

Agro technology is an important Israeli export industry. The excellent results by the Israeli farmers in agriculture, horticulture and other agro-industries have fascinated the Indian farmers. The Agri tech 1993 in Tel Aviv, which was attended by about 600 Indian farmers, resulted in many agro-commercial associations developing in Maharashtra, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and parts of Haryana. These are the relevant geographical regions for Israeli agro-technologies such as drip irrigation, fertilizers and effective post-harvesting techniques and packaging systems.19

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There is also the beginning of a major Indian garments exporter setting up a manufacturing base in Israel for the export of ready-made garment to the US and the European Economic Community (EEC). The Israeli companies are also contemplating investing in India for diagnostic centres, power generation, telecom and high value agricultural project. All this would act as a catalyst for promoting further investments to mutual advantage. Israel’s total approved Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflow to India is $1347 million. Telecommunications, electrical equipment and chemicals are sectors attracting bulk of the FDI. There will be a bilateral thrust on agriculture; biotechnology and space research. Industry sees growing synergies in telecommunications, manufacturing of high-speed modems, voice-mail systems and fibre-optic products.20

There are several joint ventures mainly in agriculture, telecom, software and medical equipment. Israel’s famous drip irrigation systems are jointly manufactured in three different locations in India. In tele-communications, there is production of high-speed modems, voicemails and fibre optics. In software, a few Israeli companies have set-up their offices and research and development centres in India.21 Israel is interested in investment in R and D. Daniel Sohar Zonshine, Israel’s Consul –General in India, said: Israel had about the highest spending on R and D, with 4.6-4.7 per cent of the GDP goes into this critical area. The government itself committed 20 percent of the roughly $ 6 billion spent on R and D. We provide the right atmosphere and scientists for research, but we cannot manufacture its product of research at competitive rates. We can work with countries such as India to take this forward.22

Minister of State for Science and Technology, Shri Kapil Sibal visited Israel from 28-31 May 2005. He called on Israeli Vice-Prime Minister Mr. Ehud Olmert and signed an MoU for setting up a joint Research & Development Fund (India-Israel Industrial Research & Development Cooperation Initiative) under which the two sides would contribute US$ 1 million each to provide financial support for joint R&D by companies of both countries. It was also agreed by the two sides to set up joint groups for furthering cooperation in the areas of nanotechnology, biotechnology, space and aeronautics, non-conventional energy and water. 23

The 9th round of India-Isrel Foreign Office consultations at Senior Officials level was held on August 28,2005 in Jerusalem. Secretary (East) who led the Indian

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delegation also called on Deputy Prime Minister & Foreign Minister of Israel Mr. Silvan Shalom.24 Commerce and Industry Minister Shri Kamal Nath visited Israel from 9-11 November 2005 to attend the Prime Ministers Economic Conference. Shri Kamal Nath met his Israeli counterpart, Mr. Ehud Olmert, Minister of Industry, Trade and Labour, and the Finance Minister of the State of Israel. They adopted and released the Joint Study Group report identifying areas of future cooperation and outlining the mechanism to further boost the bilateral trade. India participated in the Israel Gateway 2005 Exhibition held on 9 November 2005.

Between January –October 2005, bilateral trade reached US$ 2135.4 million, a growth of 18.21% compared to the same period in 2004.25 Several Israeli companies established manufacturing and R&D facilities in India. Indian companies also set up operations in Israel. The State Bank of India was granted permission to open a branch in Israel and is in the process of starting its operations. Shir Sharad Pawar Minister of Agriculture, Food and Civil Supplies, Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution visited Israel from 13-16, November, 2005 to participate in the State ceremonies organized to commemorate the 10th death anniversary of former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. He called on Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and had a bilateral meeting with the Agriculture Minister of Israel, Mr. Israel Katz.

A bilateral agreement on Cooperation in the field of health and medicine that was signed in September 2003 entered into force on 20 June 2006. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel, the bilateral trade figures that stood at US$ 2500.50 million at the end of year 2005, reached US$ 1956.20 million during the period January –September 2006, an overall increase of 0.86% as compared to the corresponding period last year.26 As part of the Joint Working Group established at the recommendation of the Joint Study Group for enhancing bilateral trade and economic relations between the two countries. Grisha Deitch, Commissioner of Standardisation, Ministry of Idustry, Trade, and Labour of the State of Israel visited India from 31 October -1 November 2006 to discuss standardisation and related issues. The year witnessed an increasing number of visits by business delegations from India and Israel, including agriculture, and industrial delegations from the States of Rajasthan and Gujarat to Israel. The State Bank of India that was granted the License by the Government of Israel to open its branch in Tel Aviv has initiated the

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process of setting up its offices, and is expected to be operational by the beginning of year 2007.27

The year 2007 marked the 15th Anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Israel. The multifaceted relations between the two countries were consolidated through exchange of visits and delegations in various fields. Ashwani Kumar, Minister of State for Industry led a delegation to Israel from 4-7 August 2007. During the visit he met with Israeli President Shimon Peres, Minister of Trade, Industry and Labour, Eliyahu Yishai and Minister of Transport and Road Safety, Shaul Mofaz.

Special Envoy of the Government of India for West Asia and Middle East Peace Process, Chinmaya R. Gharekhan, visited Israel in February and September 2007. He met with Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and other senior officials. From Israel, Minister of Transport Shaul Mofaz visited India in March 2007; National Security Adviser of Israel Ilan Mizrahi visited India in October 2007. Minister of Interior of Israel, Meir Sheetrit, visited India to attend the 2nd Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in New Delhi on 7-8 November 2007.28

According to the Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel, the bilateral trade figures amounted to US $ 2440.3 million during the period January –September 2007 , an overall increase of 22.87% as compared to the corresponding period last year.29 Business delegations from the States of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Meghalaya, Misoram and others visited Israel during 2007.

Other significant commercial developments during the year included the inauguration of a branch of the State Bank of India in Tel Aviv in June 2007 making it the first Indian Bank to operate in Israel, investments and acquisitions in the areas of pharmaceuticals, tires, and irrigation equipment manufacturing by the Indian companies in Israel, and large scale investments by Israeli companies in infrastructure and realestate sector in India.

Secretary, Department of Science and Technology Dr. T. Rmasami along with Secretary, Department of Bio-Technology Shri M.K Bhan visited Israel from 8-10 November , 2008 to discuss cooperation in science and technology. Defence

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Secretary, Shri Vijay Singh visited Israel in November 2008 for the seventh India Israel Joint Working Group meeting on Defence Cooperation.30 The Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, Mr. Aaron Abrahamovich visited India from 7- 8 July, 2008 during which he called on External Affairs Minister and held delegation level talks with Shri N.Ravi, Secretary (East).

The second Meeting of the India Israel Forum was held in Tel Aviv from 8-10 September, 2009. A 19 member CII delegation and 34 Israeli businessmen, academics and officials participated in the Forum. The Governor of Bank of Israel and the Israeli Ministers of Infrastructure and Finance also addressed the participants. The Forum deliberated on ways to increase cooperation between India and Israel in infrastructure, real estate, investment and financial resources, technology, industry and agriculture, renewable energy and water technology.

Gen Deepak Kapoor, Chairman Chief of Staffs Committee and Chief of Army Staff visited Israel from 8-11 November, 2009. The Chief Ministers of Himachal Pradesh and Punjab were among Indian participants in the Second International Conference and Exhibition on Water Technologies, WATEC 2009, in Tel Aviv from 17-19 November, 2009.31 Israeli Chief of Defence Staff Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi visited India from 8-10 December, 2009. Head of the Israeli National Security Council. Dr. Uzi Arad visited India on 4 January, 2010. Israeli Minister of Industry, Trade & Labour Mr. Benjamin Ben Eliezer visited India from 8-14 January, 2010 and called on External Affairs Minister Shri S.M. Krishna, Commerce & Industry Minister Shri Anand Sharma, Agriculture, Food Distribution and Consumer Affairs Minister Shri Sharad Pawar and Deputy Chairman Planning Commission Dr. Montek Singh Ahluwalia. The Israeli Chief of Naval Staff Vice-Admiral Eliezer Maroom visited India from 18-22 January, 2010.

On the other hand, India’s relation with the Arabs dates back to many centuries. The intensive interaction among the people of Arabia and the Indian subcontinent since centuries was primarily promoted by trade , which saw the flowering of the two-way exchanges that have left, their imprint also on literature, lifestyles and the languages of the two regions. 32

India’s trade relations with the Arabs are growing fast since decades. The oil, which is in abundance in the Arab World, has built these trade relations very much

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strong and almost still overwhelming India is heavily dependent on this oil of Arabia. Almost the GCC countries including Iran presently account for almost all of the India’s oil imports.33 Ever since OPEC became an effective cartel in 1973-74, oil has become the biggest single Indian import. Now in this age (1990’s), India’s security hinges critically on the oil exporting countries of the region (Arab/Gulf). Analysts point out that India can easily lose a war for its poor petroleum policies.34 It was thought that India’s stakes were much higher in the region, as according to one analyst, “the Gulf is our lifeline as much as that of the West. We could be thwarted much more easily by development in this region.”35 Even though at the time of the invasion of Iraq, India had major economic stakes in both Iraq and Kuwait . India was importing crude oil from Iraq to the tune of 2.2 million tons and 1.5 million from Kuwait. Further, there were around 170000, Indian workers in both Iraq and Kuwait when the crisis broke out.36

The total indo-Arab trade reached $4463 million in 1990 and in 1991, it stood at $4232 million. In the following year, the total bilateral trade between Arab and India reached $6415 million . In this year, India established the diplomatic relations with Israel but this step could not reach the trade figures of India and Arab in the same year or after that, India’s trade relations with the Arabs were overwhelming not only prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel but are still increasing and overwhelming and are still higher than Israel. The Indo-Arab trade which was $4232 million in 1991, reached $ 6727 million in 1993 and the trade stood at $10448 million in 1996, whereas it touched $9941 million in 2000. On the other hand the Indo-Israel trade was $129 million in 1991 and in 1993 it reached 5370 million but in 2000 it reached $1099 million.37

From the trade figures mentioned above, it is clear that Indo-Arab trade is overwhelming than its trade with Israel. The oil, which is mainly imported from the Arabs, has increased the trade levels. This oil is playing a very much significant role in the industrial development in India. On the other hand, the arms and ammunitions that are being imported worth of million dollars from Israel can strangle the industrial development since huge amount is being wasted on the purchase of Israeli arms and ammunitions.

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Moreover above three million Indian workers are working in the Gulf States. They constitute the largest proportion of the total foreign population living in the Gulf region as whole, as well as in each of the gulf countries, ranging from 21.5% in Kuwait to 54% in Oman, from 25.4% in Saudi Arabia to 41.1% in UAE. It means that the Gulf is playing a significant role in minimizing the job crisis in India by providing jobs to millions of Indian workers is the region. The Indian expatriates remit some four billion dollar per annum to India.38 It should be noted that Israel’s recent step of recruiting Indian workers in their hotels39 is minimal compound to millions of India workers already working in the Gulf and sending remittances strengthening Indian economy.

As far as India’s trade relations with Israel one can deduce that through this relationship Israel have gained immensely and India meagrely. While Israel exports to India are of larger volume, the Indian exports are negligible. The trade relations between the two countries at this stage are titled heavily to Israel’s advantage at a heavy cost of Indian taxpayers’ money and without dividends in real terms. Moreover, the tables depict that trade volume with the Arab world is very substantial and India cannot afford to annoy the Arabs at the cost of its new found trade relations with Israel.

The cooperation between India and Israel in areas such as the economic and technology started off with the simple exchange of commodities which is now growing rapidly, covering trade, technology transfer as well as investments into industry. Considering the fact that the two economies are complementary to each other, coupled with an investor friendly environment, the future of trade relations look bright. India’s liberalization policies and globalization strategies make Israel well positioned to fulfil the economic and technical demands of India’s rapidly developing economy. Israel’s achievement in agricultural technologies as well as better industrial known-how, combined with India’s large pool of scientific and technical personnel, create a bigger scope for cooperation.

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Table 2: India’s Trade with Arab States (Mentioned in Table No.3&4) From 1990-2000, US $ Million.

Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total

Imports 3391 2700 4648 4655 5379 6537 7624 8036 5002 4921 6655 59548

Exports 1072 1532 1767 2072 2190 2355 2834 2834 3062 2922 3286 25916

Total 4463 4232 6415 6727 7569 8892 10870 10870 8064 7843 9941 85464

Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Year book (Washington, DC : IMF) 1998 and 2001

Table 3: India’s Trade with Arab States (1990-2000) US $ million (Exports)

Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total

Bahrain 39 49 47 49 60 62 65 55 57 81 93 677

Egypt 120 81 446 476 116 138 165 208 270 245 281 2546

Jordon 23 102 62 65 60 68 79 67 64 54 58 702

Kuwait 69 52 120 97 125 131 149 163 263 259 - 1428

Lebanon 2 9 9 7 9 15 19 23 35 37 56 221

Oman 56 74 84 78 80 99 122 105 147 147 182 1174

Qatar 22 19 27 29 26 29 38 39 56 60 84 429

Saudi 249 352 431 478 442 425 521 625 750 672 834 5779

Arabia

Syria 9 18 24 29 25 30 45 46 51 51 59 387

UAE 455 738 480 726 1210 1306 1491 1451 1303 1268 1585 12013

Yemen 28 38 37 38 37 52 130 52 46 48 54 560

Total 1072 1532 1767 2072 2190 2355 1824 2834 3062 2922 3286 25916

Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Year book (Washington, DC : IMF) 1998 and 2001

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Table 4: India’s Trade with Arab States (1990-2000) US $ million (Imports)

Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total

Bahrain 200 49 371 520 632 794 931 640 612 647 744 6140

Egypt 45 67 576 446 230 92 63 190 46 148 170 2073

Jordon 190 145 157 106 140 172 129 153 181 280 267 1920

Kuwait 421 215 965 1066 1386 1884 2208 2493 326 0 0 10964

Lebanon 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 16 15 36

Oman 40 43 18 20 23 15 15 30 53 79 99 435

Qatar 24 36 102 118 106 98 147 84 77 76 141 1009

Saudi 1475 1109 1649 1601 1513 1860 2428 2733 1887 1872 2321 20445 Arabia Syria 0 0 1 10 22 5 21 12 5 7 8 94

UAE 964 994 727 650 1307 1594 1657 1686 1801 1782 2216 15391

Yemen 32 42 82 10 20 23 24 14 8 9 674 1838

Total 3391 2700 4648 4655 5379 6537 7624 8036 5002 4921 6655 59548

Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Year book (Washington, DC : IMF) 1998 and 2001

Table 5- Total Import and Export Trade with some Arab Countries (Mentioned in Table No.3 &4) (1990-2000), US $ million.

Country Barhrain Egypt Jordon Kuwait Labanon Oman Qatar Saudi Syria UAE Yemen Total Arabia

Exports 677 2546 202 1428 221 1174 429 5779 387 12013 560 25916

Imports 6140 2073 1920 10964 36 465 1009 20448 94 15391 1038 56548

Total 6817 4619 2622 12392 257 1609 1438 26227 481 27404 1598 85464 Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Year book (Washington, DC : IMF) 1998 and 2001

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Table 6: India’s Trade with Arab States (1990-2000) US $ million (Imports)

Country 1995-1996 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 Total Saudi Arabia 1539.76 2140.93 1769.73 1191.81 1691.45 8333.68 UAE 1050.52 1382.73 978.69 909.90 1633.20 5955.04 Kuwait 1872.38 2276.44 2109.66 1334.54 1381.70 8974.72 Iran 433.69 677.14 429.32 256.25 781.77 2578.17 Bahrain 807.11 778.19 500.83 361.81 258.54 2706.48 Iraq - 24.82 185.60 150.90 200.37 561.69 Yemen 17.15 12.20 10.04 1.78 6.37 47.54 Qatar 0.87 26.77 7.84 7.80 2.41 45.69 Total 5721.48 7319.22 5991.71 4214.79 5955.81 29203.01 Source: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, Cited in Girijesh Pant,”India’s Energy Security :The Gulf Factor” , GSP Occasional Paper Series, GSP 2002/03)

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References

1. A.K. Raju, “Shamir for Better Ties With India”, The Statesman, New Delhi March 22, 1992.

2. UNI, Backgrounder, No.14, p.8.

3. “Indo-Israel Cooperation in Science”, Embassy of Israel, New Delhi-1999, p.3. Also Embassy of Israel, New Delhi Report, 2001.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Economic Times , May 18, 1993.

7. UNI, Backgrounder, No.14, pp.8 . Also India’s Foreign Relations- Israel, www.meadev.gov.in.

8. India’s Foreign Relations- Israel, www,meadev.gov.in.

9. Bombay Chamber International Trade News, Vol. IV, No.6, June 2002, pp.33- 34. Also Annual Report of MEA, 2001-02.

10. The Hindu, 12 August 2003.

11. MEA, Report 2001-2002.

12. The Hindu, July 01,2000.

13. The Hindu, 16, August 2001.

14. The Hindustan Times, 1 March 2004.

15. Financial Express, New Delhi, 4 September 2001

16. The Hindu, New Delhi, 6 December 2006.

17. The Pioneer, New Delhi, 14 September 2003.

18. The Hindu, New Delhi, 6 December 2006.

19. Israel Today,Vol. 3, No. 4, July-August 1997, p. 5

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20. The Pioneer, New Delhi, 14 September 2003.

21. Financial Express, New Delhi, 4 September 2001

22. The Hindu, New Delhi, 6 December 2006.

23. Ministary of External Affairs Report 2005-06

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ministary of External Affairs Report 2006-07

27. Ibid.

28. Ministary of External Affairs Report 2007-08

29. Ibid.

30. Ministary of External Affairs Report 2008-09

31. Ministary of External Affairs Report 2009-10

32. Wink Adre, Al-Hind , “the making of Indo-Islamic world”, Vol.1, OUP, 1990. Also Javed Ahmad Khan, “India and West Asia: Emerging Markets in Liberalization Era”, New Delhi, 1999, p.82.

33. Javed Ahmad Khan, No.32, p. 78.

34. “India’a Security Hinges on Oil Supplies”, The Hindustan Times, June 30, 1998.

35. Khargamwalla, J., “India’s Commercial Diplomacy in West Asia”, The Hindu, November 7,1991.

36. P.S. Jayaramu, “India and The Gulf Crisis: Pro-Iraq or Pro-India”, in A.K.Pasha (ed), The Gulf in Turmoil: A Global Response, New Delhi, 1992, p. 149.

37. See Tables (1,2).

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38. Muchkund Dubey, “West Asia: India’s Neighbouring Region”, Journal of West Asian Studies, AMU, Aligarh -202001, pp. 3-4.

39. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, March 9, 2004.

106

CONCLUSION

Conclusion

CONCLUSION

West Asia continues to occupy an important position in international relations due to its geo-political location. The entire region acts as a link between the Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea, Red Sea, Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean. The vast reserves of oil have perpetually attracted special interest from the Western powers. The West Asia policy of India had primarily been shaped by its friendly relations with the Arab countries and with a view to promote its national interest. Several factors were responsible for the formation of India’s policy towards the Arab world. First, India and the Arab countries have got historical and cultural affinities. Second, India’s relations with Arabs had also been influenced by the nature of its relations with Pakistan. Pakistan regarded itself as closer to West Asia and always tried to project India as anti- Islamic. Third, India had extensive commercial interests with these countries. With the industrial, technological, economic and commercial developments, the importance of the area grew for India. Fourth, politically, India stood with the Arabs with regards to fighting for the liberation against Western imperialism, colonialism, exploitation and racialism.

There was gradual realisation on India’s part that normal diplomatic relations with Israel need to be established anew. Various factors played their part in the dawning of this reality on the foreign policy planners of India. The manner in which the international geopolitical scene had taken its shape , made it necessary for India to review its West Asia policy in favour of Israel. Consequent upon the waning clout of Russia in the international political chessboard, India also felt the need for establishing better relations with the United States. Getting closer with the United States also had its effect in the conduct of India’s relation with other countries. The national interest of India which in the opinion of the foreign policy planners of the country during that time, consisted in aligning more closely with the United States also required that India’s relation with one of the closest ally of the US i.e., Israel should also be based on firm footing. This was also needed, more so, because India’s consistent pro-Arab policy was not yielding the required result. Not only in the popular national imagination but also in the serious academic discourses, it was increasingly being discussed that India’s pro-Arab policy was not being reciprocated in the likewise manner. Under these circumstances, which have been amply discussed

107 Conclusion in the preceding chapters, it became very important for India to revise its west Asia policy, which meant having relation with Israel on a new footing

With the change in the international geopolitical scene and with the changing geopolitical dynamics in West Asia, India changed its policy towards Israel which was evidently marked by the normalisation of its relations with Israel. The normalisation of relations between India and Israel marked a radical shift in India’s foreign policy with multifaceted consequences. Under the new post-Cold War climate and growing pre-eminence of the US, India and its leaders abandoned their blinkers and discarded the zero-sum approach towards Israel. Normalization of relations was no longer seen as an anti-Arab or anti-Palestinian measure but a sign of Indian support for the Middle East Peace Process. In the post –Madrid situation, particularly, support for the Palestinian would demand support for the peace process and normal ties with the principal player, Israel.

The establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel was not accompanied by any shift in its overall attitude towards the rights of the Palestinians. India continued to support the right of self-determination of the Palestinians would mean the establishment of a sovereign independent Palestinian state living in peace with Israel. It reiterated its support for the PLO and treated Arafat and later on, his successor, Mahmud Abbas, as a head of state. Indeed on a host of issues pertaining to the Arab- Israeli conflict such as Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, borders, refugees and the Jerusalem issue there was no difference in India’s pre-1992 and post-1992 positions.

Since 1992 the bilateral relations have expanded and covered a host of political, diplomatic, economic and security issues. In the initial years, it has been cautious in its approach but towards the end of 1990s relations took a significant upward turn. The formation of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government headed by Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), known for its traditional support for Israel, in 1998 significantly enhanced the bilateral relations.

Apart from the political aspect of the relations between the two countries which saw an upward surge, in the bilateral economic relation as well, there took place significant improvement since 1992. From less than US$100 million in the late 1980s, the two-way trade has crossed the three billion mark and is gradually moving

108 Conclusion upwards each passing year. Israel, thus, has become one of India’s major trading partners in the West Asia. This growth was in contrast to India economic ties with countries such as Egypt which traditionally had closer political ties especially during the Nehru-Nasser era. In the following years, Israeli companies found India to be a good place for investment and started investing heavily in various infrastructure programs in India. There has been widespread cooperation in other traditional areas such as agriculture, water management and horticulture.

The most significant growth in the bilateral ties could be noticed in one of the most critical issues i.e., military-security ties. Israel has been identified as India’s second largest arms supplier after Russia and New Delhi has emerged as the principal export destination for Israeli weapons. Upgrading of aging Soviet inventories, border management, small arms, avionics and missile are some of the major areas of cooperation. Israel has also agreed to supply India with Phalcon advanced airborne early warning systems. The US which blocked a similar deal with China was more than happy to endorse the same spy planes being supplied to India. In this regards, in July 2007 both countries entered into a US$ 2.5 billion program to jointly develop missile defence. This marked a new phase in the security relations between the two countries. Moreover, in a major shift in January 2008 India launched Israeli spy satellite, believed to be aimed at monitoring Iran and its suspected nuclear programs. This came against the background of periodic statements of ‘civilizational links’ with Tehran.

Though never articulated adequately, normalization of relations was part of India’s new found aspiration for great power status. Ability to pursue a foreign policy independent of the diktats of others is a prime criterion for a major power. The issue is not about a great power doing the right thing but doing what that country considers right for its interest. In this sense, normalization of relations gave an unmistakable signal to the outside world that India was prepared to pursue a policy that would serve its own national interests. While still seeing Arab and Islamic countries in friendlier terms, India was not prepared to accept their diktats over Israel. This approach is more visible in the manner in which India has been handling its relations with Iran and Israel. Both these countries have unique advantages that are vital for India. Military support from Israel and energy supplies from Iran are critical for India’s economic growth and aspirations for greater influence beyond South Asia. In short, Iran could

109 Conclusion not offer the kind of military –technological expertise it needs and Israel could not help in its search for energy security. Hence, India has been trying to de-link Iran in its Israel policy and Israel in its Iran policy.

India’s realigned relation with the strategically important player of West Asia actually brought benefits to India within a very short span. During the Kargil crises, Israel’s overall support had been very comforting for the Indian establishment. The Israeli aid during the Kargil war in 1999 was considered by India as a cementing factor in the Indo-Israeli relationship. This relationship was further boosted by Shimon Peres visit to India. It was during his visit to India in January 2002 that India and Israel made major agreements to fight ‘terrorism’. This actually brought with it a fundamental question, which didn’t go unnoticed by the serious onlookers of India’s foreign policy. That question relates to the basic tenets of India’s foreign policy .The word ‘terrorism’ used by Israel, ironically, was about the national liberation struggle of the Palestinians, which had been strongly supported by India until the late 1980s.After the visit, even an official of the Indian Foreign ministry said: “India finds it increasingly beneficial to learn from Israel’s experience in dealing with terrorism”. This line of Indian policy was rightly observed by many as a contradiction with the fundamental principle of Indian foreign policy i.e., supporting all national liberation movements.

Another important event in the Indo-Israeli relationship was the visit of Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon to India in September 2003. In fact, the visit engineered much controversy in the wake of the assassination of Palestinian leaders by Israeli military forces during the period. There were series of protests in different parts of India against the Israeli Prime Minister. However, the Indian government adopted a cautious step of either displeasing Sharon or giving much honour against the public sentiments. At the same time, there were many agreements during his visit as Sharon was accompanied by a large delegation of about 30 influential businessmen, eager to forge new contracts and open new markets in India.

With the change in regime, as it is usually expected in the conduct of India’s foreign policy, not much change was brought in the existing relations between the two countries. The same line of foreign policy was continued. It is worth pointing out that during the NDA rule the Congress party had criticized some of the close cooperation

110 Conclusion

between India and Israel. But UPA government followed its relations with Israel without changing any policies. This shows the political maturity of the foreign policy establishment of the country. India’s Naval Chief Admiral Suresh Mehta visited Israel in January 2008 to finalise several key defence projects. It was reported that Mehta had reviewed efforts to enhance the Israeli-origin Barak missiles defence system.

This study, apart from highlighting the geopolitical and economic factors which led to the boost in the Indo-Israel relations also adequately brings forth the role of different interest groups in the realignment of India’s relation with Israel. The trader and business lobby in India and Israel, particularly, played a crucial role in fostering the ties between the two countries for promoting their interests although Palestinians had very little to offer to the Indian business group. Thus, Israel proved far more beneficial to India but it was imperative for India to align more closely with the “valuable” Israel. This is clearly reflected in terms of balance of trade between the two countries. The official Israel figures show that Israel exports to India valued US$ 1,270 billion in 2006 and imports US$ 1.433 billion to Israel. Agricultural, water and IT technologies in addition to fertilizers and diamonds had been the major mutual trade concerns. The State Bank of India became the first foreign bank to open a branch in Israel’s diamond exchange.

The India-Israeli alliance also strengthens the US strategic designs for India and the region. India holds significant place in the September 20, 2002 National Security Strategy of the US, a policy document to support the actions of the then US President, George Bush. Like Israel in West Asia, the US needed a close ally in South Asia to confront terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as to overcome the challenges posed by China. The Indo-US nuclear deal is the most significant outcome of this kind of policy initiatives of the United States.

“Pakistan factor” was another aspect which cemented the relation between India and Israel. For India, the growing nuclear arsenal of Pakistan and its support to terrorism in Kashmir and different parts of India had been one of the most important challenges. In the case of Israel, the nuclear capability of Pakistan and its support to Palestinian extremists posed a threat to its security. In this context Pakistan was a common threat to India and Israel and any alliance in this direction was considered as most valuable.

111 Conclusion

India’s relationship with the West Asian countries, specially Iran, has been a point of contention in the Indo-Israeli partnership. Israel’s relationship with Iran is extremely antagonistic and unstable. Israel viewed Iran as the most important threat to its security in the region due to the kind of support it extended to Hezbollah and Palestinian extremists. In the case of India, Iran is considered as the most important ally in the region. India paid a lot of respect to Iran on account of its support to Kashmir issue against Pakistan. So India treated Iran as an ideal power in the region to counter Pakistan influence in West Asia. But with the inception of Indo-Israeli ties, India’s traditional relationship with Iran got badly damaged. Israel’s spy satellite, Tecsar (Polaris), was launched by India in January 2008 to enhance Israel’s intelligence gathering capability. In fact, the real objective behind the launching of the satellite was to undermine the Iranian nuclear programme. Moreover, India voted twice on the IAEA governing body against Iran under the compulsion from the United States. All these created rifts between India and Iran.

India, however, tried to manage its relation with both these countries by very tactfully balancing the tightrope of international politics. India couldn’t let go of the Arab countries for obvious reasons. It is estimated that more than five million Indian expatriate work in the Arab countries. Moreover, nearly US$ 25 billion worth of Indo-

112 Conclusion

Arab trade, including 60 percent of Indian oil and gas imports worth US$ 20 billion, is the basic support of India economy. In this respect, India had to follow a soft policy towards the question of Palestine because it has all through been a very emotive issue for the Arabs. In order to overcome this dilemma India’s foreign policy makers attempted to separate its Israeli policy from the Arab-Israeli conflict. To realize this objective, India took a more tactical neutral position on the Palestinian question, publicly stating its continued support for the Palestinian cause and making a deliberative effort to further strengthen ties with Arab neighbours. This is more evident from India’s attitude during the Israeli invasion of Gaza Strip in January 2009 in which more than 1000 Palestinians were killed. India was ready to condemn the attack only in a mild manner without affecting the normal relations. This was questioned by some Indian political parties, especially the left wing groups.

As a result of India’s new foreign policy decisions, its traditional line of supporting national liberation movements and anti-colonial and anti-imperial stands seems to have fizzled out. The Palestinians have been waging a struggle for their nationhood for the last six decades against Israeli illegal occupation of lands. India was one of the leading countries which extended all support to the Palestinian cause. India has always opposed the continued illegal occupation of West Bank and Gaza. However, India’s changed policy since 1992 is a blatant contradiction to its avowed policy of supporting the Palestinian cause due to the transformation in the international politics resulted in the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Moreover, India had enough justifications in establishing ties with Israel by taking into account of the factors like the recognition of Israel by the P.L.O. and some Arab countries. However, the current phase of India’s relation with Israel goes beyond the level of normalcy and reached a stage of much clandestine cooperation for defence and strategic purposes. As has been discussed in details in the earlier chapter, India wants to borrow the ideas of Israeli tactics of eliminating the Palestinian leaders in its efforts to combat terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. For a long period India had been condemning these Israeli policies against the Palestinians. Now the cooperation in the same field with Israel is against its foreign policy principle and the support to the Palestinian struggle.

Moreover, India never used its relations with Israel to resolve the issue of Palestinians. At present India is in a commanding position of using its good offices to

113 Conclusion influence Israel. However, no attempt was made to pressurize Israel to withdraw its forces from the occupied territories. Since 1992 India was not ready to condemn Israeli atrocities against the Palestinians by sticking to a passive stand of supporting a ‘peaceful solution’ to the crisis. The new diplomatic initiatives of India target only its interest against the traditional principle of solidarity with the third world countries. The current trends indicate India’s keen interest to develop close ties with imperialist global powers like the United States for economic and defence benefits which may undermine its democratic values and principles.

The growing ties between these two nations has even been termed as ‘natural alliance’, though, doesn’t come without the cautionary note pointed out by some serious observers of international politics who rightly view power in international relations in broader sense. According to this view, in the immediate context of growing Indo- Israel ties, what came at stake was India’s philosophical base of its foreign policy. Enlightened self -interest must obviously be the guiding principle of the foreign policy of any country, but that enlightened national interest must be formulated with broader mind and visionary outlook. The immediate compulsions of the international geopolitics should pragmatically not blur the long term vision of the philosophical base of any nation’s foreign policy. In the history of nations, it is sometimes very important to stand for something which may not be so fruitful in the immediate context.

114

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX – I

List of Agreements / Memoranda Signed between India and Israel: 1992-99

Agreement/ MOU Date Signatories

Agreement on Scientific 17.05.1993 Not known and Technological Co- operation between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the State of Israel.

MOU between the 17.05.1993 Mr. Shimon Peres, Deputy Prime Government of the Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of India and the and Mr. Kamaluddin Ahmed, Union Government of the State of Minister of State for Commerce and Civil Supplies. Israel on Economic Co- operation.

MOU between the 18.05.1993 Mr. S.V. Gin, Secretary, Department of University Grants Education and Dr. M. Zadok, Director Commission and The Israel General. Academy of Science and Humanities

Agreement between India 18.05.1993 Mr. Shimon Peres, Minister of Foreign and Israel on Co-operation Affairs. Signatory of Indian side not in the Field of Tourism. known.

Cultural Agreement 18.05.1993 Mr. Arjun Singh, Minister for Human between the Government of Resource Development and Mr. Shimon the Republic of India and Peres, Minister of Foreign Affairs. the Government of the State of Israel

MOU between the 09.07.1993 Mr. B. S. Ojha, Chairman and Mr. Shoul Government of Haryana/ N. Eisenberg, President. Haryana State Electricity Board and The Eisenberg Group of Companies.

MOU between Gujarat 08.09.1993 Mr. K.S. Verma, Industries Corporations and the Commissioner, Gujarat and Mr. Shoul N. Eisenberg Group of Eisenberg, President. Companies, Israel.

(Gujarat Corporations 09.09.1993 Mr. K. S. Verma, Industries Collectively represented a Commissioner, Gujarat and Mr. Amram number of Gujarat Olmert, Managing Director, AGRJDEV companies). in the presence of Hon. Chief Minister of Gujarat, Mr. Chimanbhai Patel.

MOU between Gujarat 09.09.1993 Mr. K.S. Verma, Industries Commissioner, Gujarat and Mr. Corporations Ltd. and Mordechai Yaskil, Managing Director, Agricultural Export Co. Netafim Yiftah Irrigation Equipment and Drip Systems in the presence of the Chief Ltd., Israel. Minister of Gujarat, Mr. Chimanbhai Patel.

MOU between Gujarat 09.09.1993 Mr. K.S. Verma, Industries State Fertilizer Company Commissioner, Gujarat and Mr.Yair Ltd. and Netafim Yiftah Zarmi, Deputy Director, Jacob Blaustein Irrigation Equipment and Institute of Desert Research. Drip Systems.

MOU between Gujarat 09.09.1993 Mr. K. S. Verma, Industries Ecology Commission and Commissioner, Gujarat and Mr. Joseph the Jacob Blaustein Institute Ravkure, Vice President, Business of Desert Research. Development.

MOU between the 27.09.1993 Mr. S.K. Mahapatra, Secretary, Culture Industries (Commiserate, Signatory on Israeli side not known. Gujarat Corporations) and the ELUL Group

Programme for Cultural and 24.12.1993 Not known Educational Cooperation between The Governments of the Republic of India and The State of Israel for the years

1994-1996.

Agreement between the 04.04.1994 Mr. R. L. Bhatia, Minister of State for Government of the State of External Affairs and Dr. Yossi Beilin, Israel and Government of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. the Republic of India for Co-operation in the Field of Agriculture.

Air Transport Agreement 05.04.1994 Mr. M. K. Miglani, Commissioner and between the Government of Secretary, Agricultural Department, the State of Israel and the Haryana state and Mr. A. Ben-Gal, Government of the President. Republic of India.

MOU between Government 05.04.1994 Mr. M. K. Miglani, Commissioner and of Haryana and Tahal Secretary, Agriculture Department of Consulting Engineers Haryana and Mr. Amram A. Olmert, Limited. Managing Director, AGRIDEV.

MOU between Haryana 19.04.1994 Mr. Tejendra Khanna, Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Mr. Yossi Snir, Agro Industries Corporation Director General, Ministry of Industry Ltd. and Agricultural and Trade.

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Development

Company (AGRIDEV).

Agreement between the 28.04.1994 Mr. M. K. Miglani, Commissioner and Government of the Secretary, Agriculture Department, Republic of India and the Haryana and Mr.A.l3en-Gal, President of Government of the State of Tahal Consulting Engineers Ltd. in the presence of the Hon. Bhairon Singh Israel on Trade and Shekhawat, Chief Minister of Rajasthan. Economic Co-operation.

Memorandum of 28.04.1994 Mr. N. S. Sisodia, Secretary, Agriculture Understanding between and Co-operation, Government of Government of Rajasthan Rajasthan and Mr. Amram Olmert, and Tahal Consulting Managing Director in the presence of the Engineers Limited, Israel. Chief Minister of Rajastan, Shri Bhairon Singh Shekhawat.

Memorandum of Under- 22.06.1994 Mr. P. K. Singh, Ambassador on behalf of standing between The the Vice Chancellor of BHU and Mr. Dan Government of Rajasthan Amir, Rector, Tel Aviv University. and AGRIDEV, Agricultural Development Company.

MOU between Banaras 22.06.1994 Mr. S. V. Giri, Secretary, Department of Hindu University and Tel Education, on behalf of the Vice Aviv University Chancesllor, University of Hyderabad and Prof. Moshe Kaveh, Rector, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Can.

MOU between University 04.02.1995 Mr. S. V. Giri, Secretary, Department of of Hyderabad and Bar Ilan Education on behalf of the Vice University. Chancellor, University of Hyderabad and Prof. Moshe Kaveb, Rector, Bar Ilan

University, Ramat Can.

Co-operation between The 05.02.1995 Not known.

University Grants Commission and The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities.

MOU between Karnataka 05.02.1995 Mr. B. S. Patil, Chairman and Managing Director and Mr. A. Ben Gal, President State Industrial and Development Corporation and Ozcot Agro Development Consultancy

MOU between Karnataka 05.02.1995 Mr. B. S. Patil, Chairman and Managing Director and Mr. Rachel Sayag, State Industrial Investment Managing Director and Development Corporation Ltd. and Agricultural Development Company (International) Ltd.

MOU between Karnataka 05.02.1995 Mr. A. Ben-Gal, President and Mr. B. S. Patil, Chairman and Managing Director in State Industrial Investment the of presence Mr. H. D. Deve Gowda, and Development Corporation Ltd. and Sayag Chief Minister of Karnataka. Nurseries.

MOU between Karnataka 30.07.1995 Mr. M. P. Rajan and Mr. Manish Kalani, State Industrial Investment Managing Directors and Ms. Michal and Development Pascal, Manging Director. Corporation Ltd. and Tahal Consulting Engineers

Limited, Israel.

Memorandum of 08.08.1995 Not known Understanding between Madhya Pradesh Audyogik Vikas Nigam Ltd. and Kalani Industries Ltd. for Fresh Water Aquaculture Project in Madhya Pradesh.

MOU between Haigud 30.12.1996 Mr. Manohar Joshi, Chief Minister of Society for Transfer of Maharashtra and Mr. Rafael Eitan, Technology, State of Israel Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of and the Association of Agriculture and Environment, Israel. Rajasthan Jajoba Plantation and Research Project, Jaipur.

MOU between the 30.12.1996 Mr. Amar Nath Ram, Secretary, Ministry Government of Maharashtra of External Affairs and Mr. Yehoyada and the Ministry of Haim, Ambassador of Israel to India. Agriculture, State of Israel.

Agreement on Technical 04.03.1997 Director, Truman Institute, Hebrew Co-operation between the University of Jerusalem and DG, ICCR. Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the State of

Israel.

Agreement between ICCR 24.02.1999 Mr. H.S. Khola, DG, Directorate General and the Harry S. Truman of Civil Aviation and Mr. Arik Ben-An, Institute for the Deputy Director General for International Advancement of Peace to Relations, CAAI. institute an “India Israel

Colloquium”.

MOU on Air Services 03.09.1999 Mr. Dewang Mehta, President of between India and Israel Nasscom and Amiran Shore, Chairman of the Israeli Association of Software Houses.

MOU between NASSCOM and the Israeli Association of Software Houses

35 Agreements/ MOUs have been signed between India and Israel from 1992-1999.

Source: Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi

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APPENDIX-2(a)

Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the State of Israel on Co-operation in the Field of Tourism

The Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the State of Israel, (Hereinafter referred to as “The Contracting Parties”) desirous of widening the existing links of friendship between the Contracting Parties and fostering a deep understanding in the establishment of a wide co-operation in tourism between the two countries on a basis of equality and mutual benefits; have agreed on the following:

Article I

The Contracting Parties shall encourage measures for promoting and increasing exchange in tourism between the two countries. With this aim, each Contracting Party shall encourage the development of co-operation between the official tourism organisations in both the countries, as well as develop the tourism potential of each of the Contracting Parties.

Article II

Within the limits established by their internal legislation, the Contracting Parties shall fovour

(A) Tourism promotion and publicity. (B) Measures meant of simplifying as far as possible, the formalities required for trips.

Article III

The Contracting Parties shall facilitate the import and export of material and documents for publicity on tourism, free from customs duties, in accordance with the additional protocol to the convention concerning customs facilities for touring, relating to the importation of tourist publicity documents and material, done at New York on 4 June 1954.

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Article IV

The Contracting Parties, subject to their respective legislation, shall facilitate and encourage the activities of tourism-related services that may generate reciprocal tourism among both the countries, such as Travel Agencies, Commercial Tour Operators, Hotel Chains, Airlines and Shipping Companies, without prejudice to any other authorised agency competent to facilitate tourism between both the countries.

Article V

The Contracting Parties will encourage tourism investments in the field of tourism in private enterprises, in the form of joint ventures on the basis of guidelines indicated by each country’s internal legislation.

Article VI

The Contracting Parties shall exchange information on their tourism resources, their experience in the field of management of hotels or other types of tourist accommodation: The regulation and legislation that each Contracting Party may have on tourism activities, as well as for the protection and preservation of natural and cultural resources as tourism attractions; and on the curriculum for tourism teaching, studies and research with the aim of perfecting the training of its technical and specialised staff. The Contracting Parties shall endeavour to promote among tourism organisations respect for the historical and cultural reality of both countries in their touristic promotion and information.

Article VII

The Contracting Parties agree to co-operate within international tourism organisations.

Article VIII

The Contracting Parties will support the co-operation of travel companies with the markets of third countries, and will co-operate in promoting visits from third countries to the countries of the Contracting Parties.

In witness whereof, the undersigned being duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have hereunto signed this agreement and affixed thereto their seals.

Signed at New Delhi on this 18th day of May 1993 in two originals each in Hindi, Hebrew and English languages. All the texts being equally authentic. In case of doubt the English text shall prevail.

Sd/- Sd/-

For the Government of the Republic of For the Government of the State of Israel India

APPENDIX-2(b)

CULTURAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

The Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the State of Israel, herinafter referred to as the contracting Parties;

Inspired by a common desire to establish and develop closer cultural relation; and

Desirous of promoting and developing in every possible manner the relations and understanding between India and Israel in the realms of art, culture, education including academic activity and in the fields of sports, journalism, radio, television and cinema,

Have Agreed to conclude the following Agreement:

Article 1

The Contracting Parties shall facilitate and promote cooperation in the fields of art, culture and education, including academic activity, and in the fields of sports and youth activities, journalism, radio, television and cinema.

Article 2

The Contracting Parties shall encourage the development of contracts in the field of education, in particular through the exchange visits of academics, scholars and teachers of specialised institutions as well as through the provision of scholarships and specialist training and participation in congresses, conferences, symposia and seminars.

Article 3

The Contracting Parties shall encourage the conclusion of specific programmes of cooperation between institutions, universities and other schools of higher education of both countries providing for joint research projects, exchanges of teachers, post graduates and pupils as well as their financing thereof.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF

REPUBLIC OF INDIA THE STATE OF ISRAEL

Sd/ Sd/

(ARJLJN SINGH) (SHIMON PERES)

MINISTER FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEVELOPMENT

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APPENDIX.2(C)

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL FOR COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF AGRICULTURE

The Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the State of Israel hereafter referred to as the “Contracting Parties”:

Considering the development in the field of agriculture shall be of mutual benefit to both countries.

Desirous of strengthening co-operation in the field of agriculture between the two countries.

Recognizing that such cooperation will promote further their already existing friendly relations. Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Contracting Parties shall promote cooperation in agricultural science and technology, including research, education, extension and training, developmei.it projects and joint ventures between companies on institutions of the two countries, through collaborative activities and exchangs, which they will determine and implement in conformity with the laws; regulations and policies of the Contracting Parties in both countries.

More specifically, the cooperation will include activities in the following fields:

(a) Water and Soil Management, including optimal use of water, drip/sprinkler irrigation systems, development of ground - water resources salinity and erosion control. (b) Arid and semi-and crop production and other land based activities including sustainable agricultural methods, increasing of bio-mass availability and afforestation with special emphasis on commercial species.

Article II

In order to set priorities and bring Articles-I and II to fruition, a three-four member Joint Committee comprised of representatives of both Contracting Parties shall be set up. The Joint Committee will provide guidance, review the progress of activities,

xiii facilitate bilateral cooperation and determine the financial aspects of the cooperation. It will meet once every two years, alternately in Israel and India, the date of the meetings to be arranged, through the diplomatic channels.

The Joint Committee may appoint Working Groups in different areas/ subjects and will have overall responsibility in supervising the activities of these groups.

Article III

Each Contracting Party shall designate and Executive Secretary who shall be responsible for coordinating and monitoring all activities carried out under the aegis of this Agreement. The Executive Secretaries will be permanent members of the Joint Committee of Agricultural Experts. They will maintain an ongoing correspondence to develop a Work Programme and coordinate administrative details.

Article iV

To generate broad interest, the Contracting Parties will encourage and facilitate the involvement of interested government ministries and agencies as well as the scientific and agri-business communities in both countries, with the long-term goal being cooperation in the areas of research, extension, training and identification of potential joint ventures.

Article V

The present Agreement shall-enter into force on completion of the internal legal procedures of the Contracting Parties and their notification to each other through diplomatic channel and shall remain valid for a period of five years.

It shall automatically be extended for a subsequent period of 1ive years at a time unless either of the contracting Parties gives to the other, a written notice six months in advance, of its intension to terminate the Agreement from the date of its expiry. The termination of Agreement shall not affect the activities and the projects already in progress until completed.

Article VI

The Agreement may be modified or amended by mutual consent. Any amendment or modification of the Agreement shall follow the same procedure as its entering into force.

xiv

IN WITNESS THEREOF, the undersigned being duly authorized thereto by the government of their respective countries have hereto signed this Agreement.

Done at New Delhi on this the 24th day of December, 1993

Sd/ - Sd/

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF

THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA THE STATE OF ISRAEL

(Dr. Bal Ram Jàkhar) (Yaakov Tour)

Minister of Agriculture Minister of Agriculture

APPENDIX-2(d)

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL FOR A PROGRAMME OF CO-OPERATION IN THE FIELD OF AGRICULTURE

The Government of the Republic of India, represented by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Indian Agricultural Research Institute (TART) and the government of the State of Israel, represented by the Centre for International Co-operation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MASHAV) hereinafter referred to as “The Parties”.

RECOGNIZING the benefits to be derived through agricultural co-operation between the two countries and,

BEING BASED on the Agreement of Technical Co-operation signed at New Delhi on 30 December, 1996, between the two Governments,

Have agreed as follows:

Article – 1

1. To implement a programme of co-operation based on A Feasibility Study of the R & D and Demonstration Farm that was jointly undertaken by the two countries in December, 1996. The Programme parameters of the Feasibility study and the general plan of action is described in the Annexe to this Agreement which’ forms an integral part of it. 2. The programme, intended for the development of a Farm Unit, shall demonstrate periurban, commercial management methods, including field experiments, variety testing and high-level technological agricultural production methods. The Programme shall also envisage technology generation, active demonstration and agricultural extension delivery systems, with the aim of improving the economic efficiency of various vegetable, flower, fruit and selected field crops, that shall serve both as economic management and cultivation models for medium- and small scale farmers who wish to implement high-level agricultural technology to develop their farms.

xvi

3. The Farm Unit shall be developed in two stages, over a three- year period, at the IARI (as described in the Objectives and Recommendations for implementation of the Feasibility Study) included in the Annex to this Agreement. 4. The Programme shall place special emphasis on the development of efficient water management systems and the use of marginal quality water. It shall take special note of the problems of water quality at the IARI site. Part of the programme shall also be directed towards the use to low- cost technology using local materials and plastic for designing protected agricultural systems.

Article 2

The Government of the State of the Israel, through MASHAV, shall provide and finance the establishment of the green houses, net houses, open field facilities and infrastructure and technical assistance, training and management for a three-year period, as detailed in the Feasibility Study Report.

The on-farm investment shall also include imported equipment for climate control, spraying equipment, foggers and imported seeds and seedlings. The decision to purchase equipment and other material shall be made by a Steering Committee.

The Government of the State of Israel shall participate with upto 50 per cent and not more than 70,000 US Dollars over the 3 years period for recurring production costs to purchase critical inputs; including seeds, seedlings, hand implements, plastic cover sheets, etc., but excluding labour and management outlays.

Article 3

The Programme shall be financially accountable to and monitored by Steering Committee comprising experts of the Parties and representatives of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), and under the Chairmanship of the Director General of the ICAR. The Steering Committee shalls meet twice a year to approve budgets and programmes.

The Steering Committee hiay take the decisions regarding any re-appropriation of resources and funds in the interest of the project.

The Programme shall be managed by a joint technical management team headed by the Director of JARI and it shall appoint a competent local Farm Manager, who will

xvii

direct the operational aspects of the project in co-operation with the Israeli experts in situ.

Article 4

1. The Government of the State of Israel shall provide one long- term vegetable/Irrigation exper.t (36 man/months), and on ad hoc basis a Floriculture expert (12 man/months) and a fruit production expert (6 man/months) over the three year period of the project. After 18 months of the project, the Parties shall review the technical expertise required. The main activities of the experts shall include the establishment of the research and demonstration Farm unit at IARI. The experts shall also engage in helping to develop a training and delivery system for small holders of family farms. In addition the Israeli Party shall also provide six short-term expert assignments over a three-year period for specific consultancies and training for the purpose of supporting the activities. 2. The Government of the State of Israel shall support the long term expert and short-term assignments, including salary, international travel, local accommodation, health insurance and other costs related to the experts and their families.

Article 5

The Government of the State of Israel shall offer up to 25 training scholarships during the three-year period of the project, for participants from India in the International Training Programmes held in Israel by MASHAV, particularly in subjects related to irrigation, protected agriculture and horticulture production (fruits, vegetables and flowers).

The Government of the State of Israel shall organize, during the three-year period of the project, together with the experts in situ four in-country (on the spot) training courses of 3 to 4 weeks duration each, by sending two subject matter specialists for each activity, who shall conduct the course together with local national professionals.

The Government of the Republic of India shall provide a training facility including accommodation for the participants.

xviii

Article 6

This Executive Agreement shall enter into force of the date of signature and shall remain in force for the period of three (3) years, with a renewable period of two (2) years by mutual consent. After the expiry of the duration of the project, IARI will take necessary decision for using the facility.

Notwithstanding the foregoing paragraphs, this Executive Agreement may be terminated by any of the Parties by giving a three (3) months prior written notice to the other party.

Signed at New Delhi on the 17th day of October, 1997, in two original copies in the English language.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA STATE OF ISRAEL

Sd/- Sd/-

REPRESENTED BY THE REPRESENTED BY THE CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL CO- MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE & OPERATION OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INDIAN AGRICULTURAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MASHAV) RESEARCH INSTITUTE (IARI)

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APPENDX-2(e)

AGREEMENT ON SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CO- OPERATION

BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

The Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the State of Israel (hereinafter referred to as “the Contracting Parties”);

Noting with satisfaction the favourable development in the relations between the two countries;

Desiring to strengthen the mutual confidence and the friendly relations between the two countries;

Considering the importance of achieving further progress in scientific and technological co-operation between the two countries;

Recognizing that co-operation in science and technology will strengthen the understanding between their two people and will advance the state of science and technology to the benefit of both countries;

Have greed as follows:

Article 1

The Department of Science and Technology of the Government of India and the Ministry of Science and Technology of the State of Israel shall be the modal agencies for implementation of the Agreement.

Article 2

The Contracting Parties shall promote co-operation in the fields of science and technology on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

Article 3

The Contracting Parties shall encourage direct scientific and technological co-operation between governmental agencies, Academies of Sciences, research institutes, enterprises, institutions of higher education and scientific societies of the two countries.

Article 4

The Co-operative activities contemplated under the present Agreement may include the following forms:

a) Exchange of scientists, researchers, technical personnel and experts; b) Implementation of joint research and development projects, on subjects of mutual interest; c) Organization of joint scientific workshops, semin.rs and symposia; d) Invitation by the organising country to participate in conferences, seminars and other scientific meetings to scientists of the other country; e) Exchange of research results, publications and information of scientific and technological nature between co-operating institutions; f) Any other forms as may be mutually agreed upon between the Contracting Parties.

Article 5

1. The Contracting Parties shall do their best to ensure the implementation of this Agreement and to this end they shad establish a Joint Committee on Scientific and Technological. Co- operation (hereinafter, referred to as “the Joint Committee”).

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2. The Department of Science and Technology of the Government of India and the Ministry of Science and Technology of the State of Israel will inform each other of their respective members for the Joint Committee. 3. The Joint Committee shall meet every two years, or at the request of either Contracting Party, alternately in India and in Israel. 4. The function of the Joint Committee shall be to draw up and endorse the biennial working programmes in which a list of cooperative activities to be exec’ ted for every two years and detailed terms and conditions thereof shall be provided and to review and discuss any matter related to the implementation of the present Agreement. 5. Expenses for the visits shall be made through their international travel costs being borne by the sending country and the local hospitality costs including board, lodging, medical expenses in case of sudden illness and internal transportation, being taken care of by the receiving country.

Article 6

Each Contracting Party shall provide necessary assistance to the nationals of the other Contracting Party staying in its territory for the fulfilment of the co-operative activities under the present Agreement or the biennial working programmes, thereunder.

Article 7

All activities covered by this Agreement shall comply with the Jaws and regulations in force in the territory of the Contracting Party where the activities take, place.

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Article 8

Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the present, Agreement shall be settled by mutual consultation between the Contracting Parties and it may be modified and amended by mutual consent and due ratification.

Article 9

1. The present Agreement is subject to ratification. It shall enter into force on the date of exchange of Instruments of Ratification. 2. The present Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years and shall be renewed for successive periods of five years, unless either of the Contracting Party notifies six months in advance in writing to the other party of its intention to terminate it. 3. The projects/ programmes already executed or in progress shall not be affected by the termination/expiry of the Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have hereunto signed the Agreement and affixed thereto their Seals.

Done at New Delhi on this 27th day of Vaisakha Saka 1915, which corresponds to the 26th day of Iyyar 5753, and the 17th day of May 1993, in original, in the Hindi, Hebrew and English languages, all the texts being equally authentic. In case of divergence of interpretation the English text shall prevail and shall be an operational one.

Sd/- Sd/-

FORTHEGOVERNMENTOF THE FOR THE GOVERNMENTOF REPUBLIC OF INDIA THE STATE OF ISRAEL

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Appendix II

Important Bilateral Visits

March,1993 India’s Foreign Secretary visited Israel.

May, 1993 Shimon Peres, Israel’s Foreign Minister, visited India.

May, 1993 Sharad Pawar , Chief Minister of Maharashtra, visited Israel.

June, 1993 Ms. Sukhbans Kaur , India’s Minister of State for Tourism visited Israel.

July , 1993 Balram Jakhar , India’s Agriculture Minister, visited Israel.

December , 1993 Israel’s Agriculture Minister, visited India.

June, 1994 Arjun Singh , India’s Human Resource Development Minister visited Israel.

November 1994 Shivraj Patil, Lok Sabha Speaker, Heading Indian Parliamentary Delegation, visited Israel, which included Parliamentary Affairs Minister,V.C.Shukla.

April,1995 R.L. Bhatia, India’s Minister of State for External Affairs visited Israel.

Chief Ministers of Several Indian States visited Israel for Cooperation in Agriculture, Dry Land Farming, Horticulture and Conservation of Water Resources.

January, 1996 Prof. Amon Ruhenstien, Israel’s Minister of Education, visited India.

January, 1996 Aurahanm B.Shohat, Israel’s Finance Minister, visited India.

January , 1996 P. Chidambaran, India’s Minister of States for Commerce, visited Israel.

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May , 1996 Ministers and officials from several Indian State Governments visited Israel to visit AGRITECH exhibition.

October, 1996 Chief Ministers of Maharashtra visited Israel to participate in the Global Marathi Conference organized by Israeles of Indian origin having migrated from Marathi speaking areas.

December,1996 Ezer Weizmen, President of Israel, visited India.

January 1997

October 1997 N. Dayal, Secretary and India’s Minister of External Affairs, visited Israel.

January –February, 1998 Daniel Krichman, Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development of Israel, visited India.

March, 1998 V.P. Malik , India’s Chief of Army Staff, visited Israel.

September, 1998 Ram Jethamalani, India’s Minister of Urban Affairs and Employment, visited Israel.

October- November , 1998 Balagouda Patil, India’s Minister of State for Rural Areas and Employment, visited Israel.

November , 1998 Dalit Ezhilmali, India’s Minister of State for Health and family Welfare, visited Israel.

January , 1999 Yitzhak Shelev, The Deputy Director General in Israel’s Foreign office, visited India.

January, 1999 Dov Mishor, Director General, Israel’s Minister of Industry, visited India.

September, 1999 Brajesh Mishra, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister of India, visited Israel.

November, 1999 Ms. Naomi Chazan, Deputy Speaker of the Knesset of Israel, visited India.

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May, 2000 Raman Singh, India’s Minister of State for Commerce

and Industry, visited Israel. L.K. Advani, India’s Home Minister, visited Israel. June 2000

June- July, 2000 Jaswant Singh, India’s Minister of External Affairs, visited Israel.

July, 2000 Jyoti Basu, Chief Minister of West Bengal, accompanied by a 20 member West Bengal Trade Mission, visited Israel.

August, 2000 Shimon Peres, Israel’s Minister for Regional Cooperation , visited India.

December ,2000 K.V. Rajan, Secretary (East), Ministry of External Affairs of India , visited Israel.

January, 2001 Shimon Peres, Israel’s Minister for Regional- Cooperation , visited India.

April –May, 2001 Admiral Sushil Kumar, India’s Chief of Naval Staff, visited Israel.

May 2001 India’s Defence Secretary visited Israel.

July , 2001 India’s Secretary (Defence Production Supplies) visited Israel.

August, 2001 Yoav Biran, Senior Deputy Director General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, visited India,as a Special Emissary of Deputy Prime Minister & Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.

September, 2001 Major General Uzi Dyan, Israel’s National Security Advisor, visited India.

November, 2001 Major General (Retd. ) Amos Yaron, Defence Secretary of Israel, visited India.

November-December, 2001 Parliamentary delegation of Members of Knesset of Israel & Chairman of Israel-India Parliamentary

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Friendship League Amnon Rubeinstein visited India.

January, 2002 Pramod Mahajan, India’s Minister of Information Technology, Communication & Parliamentary Affairs, visited Israel.

January, 2002 Shimon Peres, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Israel, visited India.

January ,2002 Zui Galay, Deputy Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Israel, visited India.

February, 2002 Tzachi Hanegli, Israel’s Minister of Environment , visited India to attend the “Delhi Sustainable Development Summit 2002.”

September, 2003 Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister of Israel visited India.

January- December 2004 Secretary (Defence ) Govt. of India, Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Chief of the Air Staff of India, Chairman of Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), were the visitors from Indian side to Israel.

December, 2004 Ehud Olmert, Israel’s Vice Prime Minister and Minister for Industry, Trade and Labour, visited India.

February, 2005 India’s Commerce Secretary, visited Israel.

May, 2005 Kapil Sibal, India’s Minister of State for Science and Technology, visited Israel.

August, 2005 Secretary (East), Minister of External Affairs, Govt. of India led the Indian delegation, Israel.

September, 2005 Kumari Selja, India’s Minister of State for Urban Employment and Poverty Alleviation , visited Israel.

November, 2005 Kamal Nath, India’s Commerce and Industry Minister, visited Israel.

November, 2005 Sharad Pawar, India’s Minister of Agriculture, Food

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and Civil Supplies, Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution, visited Israel.

November, 2005 Ehud Barak, Former Prime Miniser of Israel, visited India to address the Hindustan Times Leadership Initiative Conference.

November, 2005 C.R. Gharekhan, Special Envoy of Govt. of India, visited Israel.

October, 2006 Vasundhara Raje, Chief Minister of Rajasthan and Prabhula Saini, Agriculture Minister of Rajasthan, visited Israel.

December, 2006 Eli Yishai, Israel’s Deputy Prime Minister and Industry Minister, visited India.

October, 2007 Ilan Mizrahi, Israel’s National Security Adviser,

visited India.

July, 2008 Aaron Abrahamovich, Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, visited India.

November 2009 Gen. Deepak Kapoor, Chairman Chief of Staffs Committee and Chief of Army Staff, visited Israel.

December, 2009 Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, Israeli Chief of Defence Staff, visited India.

January, 2010 Dr. Uzi Arad, Head of The Israeli National Security Council, visited India.

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