The Populist Strategy in Times of Distrust a Comparative Analysis of the Populist Successes in Italy and Sweden

[Bachelor Thesis]

The Populist Strategy in Times of Distrust A Comparative Analysis of the Populist Successes in Italy and Sweden

Author: Matti Welin Supervisor: Heiko Fritz Examiner: Christopher High Semester: Spring 2021 Subject: Peace and Development Studies Level: Bachelor

Course Code: 2FU33E

Abstract

This essay researches the link between populism and political trust by comparing the development of these two phenomena in Sweden and Italy. Populism is defined as a political strategy in which one appeals to the people and uses anti-establishment rhetoric. The purpose of the study is to analyze if voters that are less politically trustful are also more prone to vote for anti- establishment populist candidates. By using a temporal comparative analysis with a historical perspective in mind, the development and linkage of political trust and populism is analyzed in the cases’ most recent four elections.

The Swedish case is distinguished by relatively high levels of political trust but have in the latest decade seen an ever-growing proportion of their electorate turning to the right-wing populist Sweden Democrats. Italy, comparatively, is currently distinguished for low levels of political trust and has seen populist politicians thrive in the electorate ever since the 1990s ‘Mani Pulite’ scandal, and over a majority voted for the two populist parties Lega Nord and Five Star movement. The main research findings suggest that political trust, while not being a crucial determinant for contemporary populist successes, certainly helps populist parties gain attention and attraction. It also shows indications that the relation between populism and political trust can go in two directions. Sweden resembles a case where increased support for the SD have led to decreased political trust. In contrast, Italy’s political scandals, volatile voters and drastic decreases in political trust seems to have sparked increased support for populists.

Keywords: Populism; Political Trust; Anti-Establishment; Voting Behavior; Sweden Democrats; Lega Nord; Five Star Movement.

Table of Contents 1 Introduction ...... 5

1.1 Background ...... 5

1.2 Purpose of Study and Research Questions ...... 6

1.3 Relevance and Justification ...... 6

2 Theory and Literature Review ...... 8

2.1 The Populist Phenomenon ...... 8 2.1.1 Defining Populism ...... 8 2.1.2 The Successes of Right-Wing Populism ...... 11

2.2 Political Trust and Populism ...... 12 2.2.1 Defining Trust and Political Trust ...... 12 2.2.2 Political Trust, Electoral Behavior and Populism ...... 13

2.3 Model of Analysis ...... 17

3 Methodology ...... 19

3.1 Temporal Comparative Analysis and Historical Perspective ...... 19

3.2 Selection of Cases ...... 21

3.3 Material ...... 24

4 Background ...... 25

4.1 Sweden ...... 25

4.2 Italy ...... 26

5 Research Findings ...... 28

5.1 Political Trust in Sweden ...... 28 5.1.1 Voter Turnout...... 28 5.1.2 Voter Choice ...... 29 5.1.3 Winners and Losers...... 31 5.1.4 Trust in Government Over Time...... 33

5.2 Political Trust in Italy ...... 35 3

5.2.1 Voter Turnout...... 35 5.2.2 Voter Choice ...... 36 5.2.3 Winners and Losers...... 38 5.2.4 Trust in Government Over Time...... 40

5.3 Development of Populism ...... 42 5.3.1 Populism in Sweden ...... 42 5.3.2 Populism in Italy ...... 44

6 Analysis and Discussion ...... 48

7 Conclusions and Finishing Remarks ...... 54

8 Bibliography ...... 56

1 Introduction

1.1 Background Around the world, governments, parties and politicians are blamed by populists for being corrupt and working more for themselves than for the people they are supposed to represent. The core of the populist message is that they exclusively represent ‘the people’, while all other political actors have turned away from these people in favor of corrupt and selfish purposes (Müller 2016, 20).

The nations of Europe have witnessed constantly increasing support for populist political parties for several decades, often manifested in anti- establishment messages and drifts towards authoritarian values amongst the electorates. Populists are undoubtedly popular and established parts of contemporary European political systems and are on the rise in many countries. In 2020, there were about three times as many populists in power around the world as compared to the decade shift in 2010 (Kyle & Meyer 2020, 3). There are many theories on the characteristics and causes of populism, but there is a gap in research surrounding its ties political trust, which is what this essay will analyze further. Because anti-elitism and anti-establishment rhetoric are crucial elements of the populist appeal, this essay will delve into the question of whether populist political candidates perform better or worse depending on the development of political trust in the nation in which they reside. Is it reasonable to think that a populist who frequently uses anti- establishment rhetoric also gain more attraction amongst an electorate that is already distrustful towards the established politicians?

To analyze the effect of political trust on populist successes, the cases of Sweden and Italy will be analyzed comparatively due to their variance in international indicators of political trust. Sweden is traditionally known as a high-trust nation while Italy is currently one of Europe’s least politically

trustful nations. The time span that is in focus ranges between 2006-2018, thus including the 2008 financial crisis and 2015 migration crisis, both of which poses as challenges the political trust of a nation. Besides this time span, the analysis will also include a historical perspective with regard to relevant aspects of political trust and populism, in order to provide more depth, validity and reliability to the analysis.

1.2 Purpose of Study and Research Questions The purpose of this essay is to analyze the contemporary populist successes in Europe from the angle of its possible linkage to political trust. The analysis will focus on if populists are more prone to succeed in political systems where political trust is decreasing, or if other factors are more likely to explain those successes. A temporal comparative research design will be adapted between Sweden and Italy that focuses on the time span between 2006 to 2018. By comparing the development of populist parties and political trust in these differing nations over time and combining those findings, this essay hopes to contribute to the understanding of the determinants and causes of the populist phenomenon, as well as why populist parties are still on the rise and what governments and other political actors might be doing wrong, causing them to lose their voters to populists. The research questions are formulated as follows:

1. How has political trust developed in relation to the successes of populist parties in Sweden and Italy? 2. Are there indications of a link between changes in political trust and responses in the support for the populist parties in those nations?

1.3 Relevance and Justification The populist phenomenon is a global phenomenon and can be found in both developed and under-developed parts of the world. While this essay focuses on populism in Europe, understanding its determinants, characteristics and effects on western political systems can still provide useful information and

explanations for developments outside of the western borders. For instance, ever since the 1930’s and during the democratization processes in Latin America, populist leaders like Getulio Vergas, Victor Raúl and Hugo Chavéz have dominated those political systems, having serious effects on these nations’ political cultures and contemporary politics as a result (Torre 2017, 196). Another example are the recent political, social and economic developments in Africa, who have proven to in general provide a breeding ground for populism and populist political strategies resulting in large support from the people for both incumbent and non-incumbent parties. Populism is empirically proven to be most prevalent in Africa’s electoral democracies rather than in the non-democratic settings, and therefore poses as a possible threat to both democratization and democratic consolidation (Resnick 2017, 104).

With this information in mind, the study of populism clearly does not solely belong to political science and is certainly relevant to peace and development studies as well. By studying what political systems and conditions are favorable for populists or what drives populists to power and happens when they actually obtain it, is useful information for policy makers, peacebuilders and diplomats throughout the entire world.

2 Theory and Literature Review The foundation of this essay relies in previously conducted research on the topic of both populism and political trust. What existing definitions exist, how should the terms be conceptualized, and what is known about their roots and causes. This chapter will delve into the existing literature and research on populism and political trust. How should the terms be defined, are there any known links between them and what is currently know about their determinants. Finally, the chapter will be concluded by presenting a model of analysis.

2.1 The Populist Phenomenon

2.1.1 Defining Populism Populism is a widely researched phenomenon, and there are several different theories that surround it. Cas Mudde began his research on populism in the early 2000s, and in The Populist Zeitgeist (2004), he formulated a definition of the term as: “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2004, 543). Within this definition, two distinct elements can be distinguished. First, populism is defined as an ideology, meaning it is conceptualized as a political belief system and systematic set of ideas. However, Mudde emphasizes that it is not as consistent, nor possess the same level of depth and intellectual refinement, as established ideologies such as liberalism or socialism, and concludes that it is a ‘thin centered ideology’ in that sense. This enables it to be combined with other ideologies, which is the reason why there exist both left- and right-wing populism (Ibid. 544). Second, Mudde’s definition includes an antagonistic relationship between the ‘elite’ and ‘the people’. This antagonism is moralistic

in the sense that the elite is seen as immoral in nature, while the people are seen as pure, virtuous and moral.

Developing on Mudde’s definition is Jan-Werner Müller, who emphasized how anti-pluralism is another necessary condition of populism, in the sense that a populist claims that they, and only they, can represent the people. Any other political actor is part of the immoral elite and can therefore not be part of the people. There can be no such thing as legitimate opposition since they, and only they, are the true representatives of the moral people. Müller also states that identity politics is a crucial element of populism, due to its opinion that only some people are really ‘the people’ (Müller 2016, 20).

So, how should ‘the people’ be defined? One researcher that discussed who the people are for a populist is Paul Taggard, stating that a key aspect of ‘the people’ is their number, as the way populists use the term ‘the people’ implies that they are numerous and a majority. In turn, this legitimizes the populists who claim to be the only ones who speak for the people, and therefore the majority (Taggard 2000, 92). An example of this is the ‘silent majority’- phenomenon, which has been part of North American populist discourse for a long time and has been brought to the surface again by former U.S. president Donald Trump. The silent majority is claimed to be the virtuous middle-class people, who works hard, pays their taxes and quietly gets on with their lives, whilst having no preference to join the elitist pursuits of the political life. Populists claim that politicians have broken their link with the silent majority, first because the corruption of politics has led to the corruption of essentially all politicians, and second because special interests such as those of bankers, pharmaceutical companies or minority groups wanting special rights, has ascended the entire political system (Ibid. 93-94).

Taggard concludes his discussion on ‘the people’ by asserting a ‘heartland’- definition, stating that the people are for the populist, much like what the nation is for the nationalist; an imagined, constructed part of the population 9

that is virtuous and unified. The heartland gives rise to inclusion, even though it is vague who can actually be included, and perhaps most prominently exclusion. It is usually easier to define who is not part of the people than who is, since certain groups of people such as elites or minorities are demonized. Taggard states that the heartland is made as a justification to exclude the demonized (Taggard 2000, 95-96).

Having a clearer sense of the core elements of populism and who ‘the people’ really are, how should populism be conceptualized? Jan Jagers and Stefaan Walgrave moves beyond Mudde’s and Müller’s conceptualization of populism as a thin-centered ideology. In Populism as a Political Communication Style: An Empirical Study of Political Parties' Discourse in Belgium (2007), the authors identify the same three elements of populism as Mudde and Müller. They refer to the people, are rooted in anti-elitist beliefs and rhetoric and consider the people a monolithic and unified group and excludes anyone else. Jagers and Walgrave states that these three elements make up the ‘thick’ definition of populism and mentions that a ‘thin’ definition is to only include the first element. In that case, populism is defined purely as “a political communication style of political actors that refers to the people” (Jagers & Walgrave 2007, 3). It is no longer an ideology or view on politics as a whole, but rather a strategy any politician regardless of their beliefs can deploy to gain the electorate’s support.

The definition of populism that will be used for this essay will be drawn from a combination of Mudde, Müller, Jagers and Walgrave’s theses. The essential elements of populism are drawn from Mudde and Müller, while the conceptualization is from Jagers’ and Walgrave’s thin definition. Populism, thus, is defined as a political strategy and communication style, in which the actor refers to the people, considers these people a specific, monolithic and exclusive group, and base their political claims using anti-elitist and anti- establishment rhetoric.

2.1.2 The Successes of Right-Wing Populism The old and most traditional theory of the right-wing populists’ successes claims that it is the result of politically mobilized and frustrated losers of globalization. People turn to radical populists only in times of crisis, and it is seen as a form of ‘pathology’ in Western political systems. This ‘normal pathology thesis initially originates in the 1960s, and states that the values of radical right ideologies are alien to those of Western democracies, but that a small potential to gather around 10-15% support still exist in all societies, and that these voters are mobilized only under extreme conditions (Mudde 2010, 1170-1171). This thesis is nowadays mostly overlooked, and Mudde attributes the successes to essentially the opposite. Instead, he argues that radical right- wing populism ought to be called a ‘pathological normalcy’. This thesis is underpinned by data that suggests that the core values of the radical right-wing populist parties correspond with similar but more moderate values held by the mainstream. Radical right values are currently successful because “ideologically and attitudinally, the populist radical right constitutes a radicalisation of mainstream views” (Ibid. 1178). In turn, that suggests that populist radical right have possibilities to go far beyond those 10-15% as the traditional thesis asserted them.

Another factor that is thought to be a determinant of populism is the political convergence of Western party systems. Katz and Mair (1995), for instance, attributes the emergence of the so-called cartel parties a reason for the sudden successes of new populist parties. Western societies’ first party systems usually consisted of Mass parties, linking politics directly to social class and acting as a branch of the values of these groups. A combination of social boundaries breaking down and popularization of mass media, led to the emergence of ‘catch all’-parties targeting entire electorates. These parties successively pulled away from the civil society, no longer being a link between the civil society and the state but rather a ‘broker’ or mediator. Voters became

consumers rather than active participants, and the parties’ withdrawal from civil society resulted in the citizen’s withdrawal from the parties. In turn, also, the main financial resources of a party were no longer the citizens but state- subventions meaning parties were no longer as dependent on their members (Katz & Mair 1995, 6-7, 11-15). These events contributed to the latest development of the Western party systems, the emergence of the cartel parties. These party-systems are distinguished by high levels of inter-party competition as a result of parties becoming more homogenous and less incentivized to compete due to shared goals and values. They could be perceived to have more in common with each other than with the citizens they represent (Ibid. 19-20).

Katz and Mair (2018) attribute the 2010s populist successes to these above- mentioned issues. First, the disengagement and detachment from the parties led to citizens losing a sense of ‘belonging’. Right-wing populists, often anchored in nationalism, manages to provide this which has proven vital for political mobilization. Second, the convergence and increasing cooperation between parties has for many led to a perception of established parties as agents of a larger institutionalized, international inter-party elite rather than for their people or society. Populists manage to use this to their advantage by using rhetoric claiming that “mainstream parties have become part of the problem rather than being part of the solution” (Katz & Mair 2018, 173-174).

2.2 Political Trust and Populism

2.2.1 Defining Trust and Political Trust How the public perceives their governments, political actors and institutions is one of the most important indicators of the health of a nation, and especially the health of democratic systems (Weber et al. 2017, 394). In Democracy and Trust (1999), author Mark E. Warren defines trust as “a judgement, however tacit or habitual, to accept vulnerability to the potential ill will of others by

granting the discretionary power over some good” (Warren 1999, 311). To trust, in this sense, means taking the risk of potential harm for some sort of gain or benefit. Warren investigates whether trust is feasible and even possible in political relationships such as the one between the state and the individual, since these types of social relationships are rooted in conflicts over goods, collective action, as well as means and questions of power. Additionally, political relationships are distinguished by an immense tension between possibilities and risk (Ibid. 311-312). The benefits of trusting the political system or the political actors are huge, since it can provide society with increased longevity with extensive health care, increased knowledge through education, organize defense-forces and a domestic monopoly of power to minimize harm, violence and conflict in everyday life, and much more. However, the risks are equally huge. Politicians and political systems can be corrupt and use the collective resource for selfish purposes, drag one’s society into undesirable wars or conflicts, make severe issues such as climate change even worse and so on. This is partly why trust and democracy go hand in hand.

This essay defines political trust in accordance with Marc J. Hetherington’s definition from his article The Political Relevance of political Trust (1998), where it is referred to as “a basic evaluative orientation towards the government […] founded on how well the government is operation according to the people’s normative expectations” (Hetherington 1998, 1). The essential elements of political trust are thus that the core institution that is to be trusted or distrusted is the government, and that this should be seen as a person’s either positive or negative attitude towards it.

2.2.2 Political Trust, Electoral Behavior and Populism Claus Offe states that the process in which citizens must build their political trust is demanding, since it requires them to trust solely based on what they know about the systems and institutions in which the trusted politicians act. The citizen might actually have very little reason to trust these institutions, 13

because of the precarious conditions that are included in institutionally mediated trust. For instance, there is no sure way to affirm that they work according to the rules and regulations there are proclaimed to follow. The author suggests that populism is a form of response to this doubt that can emerge within citizens, as it risks creating cognitive dissonance. Populist political actors re-personalizes politics in the sense that they base their credibility on charismatic factors such as appearance, media skills and reputation of moral integrity. They do not base their credibility on political track records, programmatic political proposals or their possibilities and constraints they have based on their position in office, as other politicians would (Offe 1999, 76-77).

In defining populism, no mentioned author contributes charismatic leadership as a necessary condition of populism. Mudde states that charismatic leadership facilitates, rather than define, populism. However, it is affirmed that it is a common feature of populist political actors, and that there is a general trend towards strong party leadership communicating directly to party supporters which corresponds to populisms contemporary successes (Mudde 2004, 544- 545). Müller also mention the vital role charisma plays in populist leadership. For instance, even though populists’ leaders are not necessarily ‘one of the people’ of ‘just like us’ as exemplified in Donald Trump who is part of Americas wealthiest and most influential, their leaders are very good at convincing and amplifying a message that they are. Müller states that a populist must be charismatic in order to convince the public that he or she is one of them. It is also stated that populists often want to cut out as many middlemen as possible that mediates between the politicians and the citizens. The media, for instance, is seen as an unnecessary middleman who distorts politics, often in favor of the elite or establishment. In some cases, as with Trump’s twitter account or Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement in Italy that

grew out if his own personal blog, it can be considered a populist strategy to offer and prefer direct communication with the citizen (Müller 2016, 32-35).

There is a crucial link between political trust and electoral behavior in that distrusting citizens are less likely to mobilize themselves politically and are associated with both anti-incumbency and populist voting. In Trust and Elections (2018), author Marc Hooghe affirms this link between political trust and electoral behavior, in that the latter affects the former by three distinct factors. The first factor is electoral turnout, in the sense that citizens actually turning out to vote is the first step in any electoral process. Higher voter turnout-levels are more common in countries that also enjoy the highest level of resources, socioeconomic status etc. Low levels usually indicate that those who are most well-of in a society also have an unproportionally large impact on that country’s politics. It is also affirmed that higher levels of trust correlates independently and positively with voters turning out to vote, in advanced industrialized economies. It is also, however less clear, indicated that low levels of voter-turnout amongst those with little trust political might correlate with tendencies towards anti-establishment and elite-challenging political mobilization. What is clear is that it does not correlate with non- institutionalized forms of political behavior, such as demonstrations and protests (Hooghe 2018, 617-618).

The second factor is voter choice, assuming that voters in systems enjoying high levels of political trust are more likely to vote for established, incumbent alternatives. Hooghe states that the logistics and circumstances of elections, specifically concerning the party system and form of government, makes political trust have an effect on the voter’s choices. Voters tend to prefer outsider candidates and lean towards favoring nonincumbent parties in political races. Hooghe states that the hostile, anti-establishment rhetoric of contemporary populist alternatives, therefore, matches perfectly with political systems that are plagued by low levels of political trust. Populist successes in

nations with higher levels of trust ought to be a result of other determinants such as skepticism towards immigration. Another crucial point made by the author, is that a vote for a populist party in itself expresses a low level of political trust. Voters are more likely to accept political messages from already incumbent parties, and especially from parties they themselves have voted for. Therefore, increased support for populist parties who constantly and repeatedly criticize the established incumbent parties, could in turn also lead to further decreasing levels of political trust (Hooghe 2018, 622-625).

The final factor is election results, especially concerning the so-called winner- and loser-effects. The fundamental claim of the loser-effect is that the disappointment of those who voted for a losing party can result in a belief that their preferences will not be taken into account in the parliaments and governments policy-making process until the next election. The winner-effect works the same, but in the opposite manner. In turn, Hooghe claims that, “even if supporters of the losing party would agree that the elections have been completely free and fair, they will still feel inclined to be less trusting toward the political system” (Hooghe 2018, 625-626). These effects are distinctively more prominent in majoritarian or ‘winner takes it all’-party systems, but still has an important role in for instance proportional party systems (Ibid. 627).

To conclude, populism and political trust are interlinked in the sense that populist politics is a short-cut to political trust, that is built outside of a society’s political institutions. The success of populism, rooted in charismatic leadership and anti-establishment rhetoric, proves an example of how difficult it is for citizens to build political trust towards established political actors and the institutions in which they work (Offe 1999, 77).

2.3 Research Gap While there are many theories and mentions of a link between populism and political trust, there is an apparent research gap in empirical studies

surrounding it. Besides the theories presented earlier in this chapter, only a few other studies have studied this link further. One study, for instance, researched a possible linkage between populism, trust and corruption scandals, but was only able to draw preliminary conclusions as no empirical data concerning those specific variables existed (Heywood & Fieschi 2004, 304). There is also research that analyses the relation between political trust and different types of political participation. finding that political trust is negatively linked to non- institutional or elite-challenging political participation (Hooghe & Marien 2012, 145). It is not, however, developed how it differs between countries. The research gap that forms the backbone of this essay, thus, is the lack of empirical data on the link between political trust and populism. While it is well-known the link exists, there is a lack of information regarding the links characteristics, causes and historical developments. This essay will attempt to expand the knowledge in this area, getting us one step closer to unravel the mysterious link between political trust and populism.

2.4 Model of Analysis The purpose of this essay is to investigate how political trust has developed in Sweden and Italy and putting it in relation to the successes and possibilities of populist political actors in those nations. The research will be conducted through a temporal comparative analysis of Sweden and Italy, who perform drastically differently in international indicators of political trust. By adapting a qualitative approach, the essay will be able to provide in-depth analyses that not only displays patterns, but that further seeks to explain why those patterns exist and whether they are valid and reliable or not. The data that is to be gathered through the analysis shall thus be applicable to the research questions.

The analysis consists of three primary sections. The first section will analyze how political trust has developed in Sweden and Italy between 2006-2018.

Besides presenting the raw data, the section will also be delineating the context and development of the cases’ political trust based on Hooghe’s three determining factors (voter turnout, voter choice and winners/losers). While the time span between 2006-2018 is the core of the analysis, analyzing the cases through Hooghe’s factors will also have a historical perspective in mind that ranges back further than 2006 to provide context and depth to the analysis. The second section of the analysis concerns the development of populist parties in the cases. It will present the support for the main populist parties during the indicated time span, as well as outline what role populism has historically played in the nations. Finally, the third section will combine the data from the other sections by displaying political trust and support for leading populist party alongside each other in a scatter point diagram. These three sections outline the design of the analysis. The discussion that follows will analyze the research findings in relation to the research questions and theoretical framework, focusing on discussing the role of political trust in comparison to other possible determinants of populism.

3 Methodology

3.1 Temporal Comparative Analysis and Historical Perspective The analysis of this essay will investigate how political trust has changed and developed over time, and if that has affected the support for the leading populist parties in the cases of Sweden and Italy. This paves way for a temporal comparative analysis, which includes the dimension of time in the research method and design. Without the aspect of time, researching historical processes and development is limited. A methodological argument to include the time-dimension in a comparison is that when looking at time, it is a fundamental criterion that the cause of something precedes the effect or outcome that it resulted in. A theoretical argument is that every contemporary phenomenon, such as the level of trust in politicians or support for a political party, are the result of historical events and processes (Denk 2012, 115). Besides these two aspects, the main reason why this essay relies on a temporal comparison, is because the aspect of time is baked into the purpose of the study and research questions. The purpose is to analyze determinants of populism in Europe, based on why populist political parties are more successful in certain countries than others. The development of populist actors requires the dimension of time to be included in the research design and methodology.

A key aspect of any temporal design is that certain factors or phenomena are studied at different moments of time, like years or decades. Denk presents two different varieties of temporal design. The researcher can conduct a within- case analysis where the task is to compare different aspects or characteristics of cases over time. The second approach is to compare certain developments or historical processes of cases. (Denk 2012, 115). Because this study is interested in the development of trust and populism in the cases, the second approach is more suitable and will be used for this essay’s analysis.

Non-temporal comparative designs study correlations between factors at the same moment of time in two or more cases. While it enables the researcher to study if there is a correlation between the different factors, it does not grant the ability to interpret the direction of the correlation, or which factor is the cause of the other. With temporal design, the dependent factor can be analyzed at a time after the independent one, which enables the analysis to find if the independent factor has some effect on the dependent. This time-lag enables the researcher to find the direction of the correlation.

Denk mentions three tasks, or challenges, that any researcher faces when integrating temporal design into their study. First is what time-interval that is necessary for the independent variable to have an effect on the dependent variable. In this essay, the main question is whether trust in government has an effect on populist political successes. Therefore, there is a necessity to investigate how long it would take for a change in political trust to have an effect. Too short of an interval, and the effect might not have had any effect. Too long, and the effect might begin to erode away. The second task is to identify and define the temporal units that are to be used, such as years, decades, months etc. One strategy is to define what time-unit is relevant for the analysis. Even though years might be a common unit in social sciences, for some analyses sequence of events with a year or over decades might be more relevant. The third task refers to investigating if the variables are independent of earlier times or if there is a temporal autocorrelation. The properties of something can be correlated to its properties at earlier times. Denk mentions, however, that even though temporal autocorrelation is a reoccurring issue, it is seldom that researchers implement it into their analyses (Denk 2012, 119- 122).

In the political landscape, election years are a regular reoccurring pattern where the public support for political candidates are measured directly. To discuss the first and second tasks, declining or increasing trust whether in the

government, political parties or personalities, will have a direct effect on the public support for these actors in the following election year. Elections in the European democracies reoccur regularly, and no EU member-state have a term longer than five years. Using the interval of election years in each of the cases in the analysis, leads to a clear, regular and reoccurring temporal-unit. The trust in political institutions and actors in between elections will have its effect on other factors, such as the support for the leading populist party, in the next election. Even though opinion polls might indicate how the support is changing, only after the election day are the seats in parliament, changes in government and so on actually changed. The length of a term for the Swedish parliament is one year shorter than Italy’s, but parliamentary elections lined up in both 2006 and 2018. Therefore, the election years that will be analyzed in Sweden are 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2018 and in Italy the 2006, 2008, 2013 and 2018 general elections.

Another way in which this essay incorporates the aspect of time, is by including a historical perspective in the analysis. To include a historical perspective in methodological terms, means using the past to study something in the present. Lawrence (1984) distinguishes historical research from historical perspective, in that the former means using artifacts and written documents to analyze the attitudes during a specific time, while the latter implies using historical information to study the differences in attitudes today (Lawrence 1984, 307). This essay will apply a historical perspective to the sections of the analysis with the purpose of providing depth and context to the contemporary developments of populism and political trust. With the historical perspective in mind, the validity and reliability of both the research findings and conclusions are increased.

3.2 Selection of Cases Being a qualitative case study, getting results with as high validity and reliability as possible requires careful case selection with thorough motivation. 21

This essay aims to analyze how changes in political trust might function as a determinant for the opportunities of populists. The cases that have been selected are Italy and Sweden, being representatives of countries that are currently experiencing distinctly different levels of political trust. Italy has been experiencing low levels of political trust for a long time, while Sweden has historically been known as a high-trust country. Figures 1-3 display Italy and Sweden in comparison to the other EU member states, in three different indicators of political trust.

The first indicator is OECD’s survey database that researches Trust in Government. The data is displayed as the percentage of all survey respondents. Figure 1 illustrates a snapshot of political trust from the 2020 survey-responses for all member states of the EU (except Cyprus, Croatia and Malta). Sweden along with the other Nordic member states are within the top five nations where trust in government is the highest, enjoying a majority of their populations’ support. Meanwhile, Italy and some other Mediterranean countries like Spain and Greece are next to each in the bottom with levels below 50%. Italy’s government does not currently enjoy the support of a majority of its citizens.

Figure 1: Trust in Government 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

(OECD 2021)

Another indicator of political trust is displayed in Figure 2, presenting the World Bank’s GovData360 that indicates Public Trust in Politicians, stemming from their Global Competitiveness Index survey. Trust in politicians is a more general indicator of political trust but displays an overall image of whether politicians, populist or not, are well-regarded and honest. The figure displays the average, on a scale from 1 to 7 for all EU member states based on the latest survey responses, which was collected in 2017. Sweden is once again positioned within the top five with a lot of public trust in politicians, while Italy has the worst score of all countries.

Figure 2

Public Trust in Politicians 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

(World Bank 2021)

Figure 3 displays Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). This survey analyses how citizens perceive corruption levels in their countries, which is directly linked to trust in institutions and politicians because corruption lowers both political and social trust (Uslaner 2018, 8). The CPI data is then used to give an index score ranging from the worst 0 to the best 100. In figure two, the member states of the EU are displayed from worst to best. In the CPI, Sweden is the second-best performing nation squeezed in between the two other Nordic member states, while Italy once again performs severely worse closer to the bottom. 23

Figure 3:

Corruption Perceptions Index Score 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

(Transparency International 2020, 1-2)

3.3 Material To measure the state of populism over time, the main resource will be election results, opinion polls and country-specific research on populism. Election data contains information of what the public opinion and popularity of the populist party is, and how it has been developing over time. The data set that will be used to measure political trust is OECD’s Trust in Government Indicator, due to its correspondence with Hetherington’s definition of Political trust. This data derives from a survey where respondents were asked if they had confidence in their national parliament, given the possibility to answer ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘don’t know’. To indicate a country’s trust in government, the share of people responding ‘yes’ is displayed as a percentage. Thus, by inverting this percentage the indicator also displays distrust in government over time counting respondents that either do not have confidence or are uncertain about their confidence in their national government. Combining the data from these two indicators gives rise to investigate the potential correlation between populism and public trust that this essay’s research questions are concerning. For information regarding the political systems of the cases, primary sources in the shape of the countries’ constitutions are the main resources.

4 Background In order to make a good comparison these background sections will present the political systems of the cases in order to lay down a foundation which the analysis and discussion can rely on. Both political systems will be analyzed with the following dimensions for comparative analyses in mind: (1.) Political History; (2.) Form of government; (3.) Polity and distribution of power; (4.) Party System; (5.) Electoral System; and, (6.) Distinctive characteristics and trends (Denk & Anckar 2015, 15).

4.1 Sweden Sweden is a Constitutional Monarchy positioned in the Scandinavian northern region of Europe. Although having been amended and revised, the Swedish Instrument of Government that is still effective in power today was first established in 1809. It consists of four fundamental laws that all other laws in the Swedish judicial system abide under. These are: (1.) The Order of Succession, presiding the heritage and line of succession of the Swedish monarchy; (2.) Freedom of Press Act, which affirms each person’s undisputable right to create and distribute written scripture without censorship; (3.) Fundamental Law of Freedom of Expression, which encompasses other media’s right to freely report without censorship; and (4.) The Instrument of Government which sets out political principles, the shape of the government, parliament and other political institutions as well as fundamental rights and freedoms that all Swedish citizens may enjoy (Government Offices of Sweden 2014).

According to the Instrument of Government, Sweden is a parliamentary state which means that the government is always dependent on the support from the 349 members of the Swedish parliament (Riksdag), and that the Head of State has no political power. If the government has a support from the majority of the parliament, the power is concentrated to the executive power. In

contemporary times, however, Swedish governments have been minority coalition governments which means more power is directed to the Riksdag. Even though citizens can vote for specific political candidates, the Swedish democracy is representative as citizens do not participate directly in decision making, instead relying on the members of parliament to do so. Exceptions have been made though, as referendums has been held for instance concerning joining the EU and Eurozone. The Swedish division of power is also divided vertically, in the sense that most of the public sector is made up of local authorities at a municipal and regional level (Government Offices of Sweden 2013, 4).

Sweden’s party system is proportional, as all parties that manage to get support over the threshold of 4% gain a number of seats in the Riksdag in proportion to their number of votes. 4% is equal to 14 seats in the parliament (Government Offices of Sweden 2013, 6). The party system is fragmented and throughout most of the 20th century it consisted of five parties, tree of which were strongly linked to social class.

4.2 Italy Italy is a Constitutional Republic located around the Mediterranean ocean in southern Europe. Their contemporary constitution was formally put into force after the second world war in 1946 but has been amended several times thereafter. The Italian parliament is bicameral, split into the Chamber of Deputies and Senate of the Republic, both of which are elected through direct and universal suffrage. The election to the senate, however, is conducted regionally, and some seats are appointed by different measures. For instance, all former presidents are automatically elected president for life, and the current president may appoint five citizens whom they motivate has done outstanding work for Italy to lifetime senators. The Chamber of Deputies consists of 630 seats, while the senate consist of 315 (Senato Della Rebubllica n.y, 19-20). 26

Italy’s is a parliamentary republic, since president and government must have support from the parliament in order to execute their power. The President is elected by a large majority (two thirds) of the Parliament and obtains his or her position for seven years. The president possesses a lot of power. For instance, they are commander in chief over the national Armed Forces and presides over the Supreme Council of Defense and the High Council of the Judiciary. They are also able to dissolve either chamber of the Parliament, only in consultation with their presiding officers. The executive power of Italy consists of the President of council along with their board of ministers who together form the Council of Ministers, all of which are appointed by the President of the Republic (Senato Della Republica n.y, 22-23).

Italy’s party system after the creation of the first republic in 1946, can be distinguished by five characteristics: (1.) It had a quite high number of political parties; (2.) There was a considerable ideological distance in-between these parties; (3.) The party system became highly institutionalized quickly after the formation of the republic; (4.) The Christian Democrats (DC) dominated and were part of all majority coalition governments between 1946 and the early 1990s; and (5.) The party competition structure was both closed and limited die to the domination of the DC (Mershon 2015, 145). In the 1990s, electoral reforms combined with corruption scandals in the DC resulting in them splitting apart in 1994, led to an even more fragmented party system. This time-period is characterized by the formation and electoral successes of new parties. The Italian voter’s volatility spiked, and the new dominating party became Forza Italia led by Silvio Berlusconi. The electoral volatility spiked yet again in the 2013 general elections when the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S) who were created just years before, became the most voted- for party with around 25.5%. M5S refused a position in the government, which led to the first grand coalition in the Italian executive power ever since the formation of the republic (Mershon 2015, 149, 152).

5 Research Findings

5.1 Political Trust in Sweden

5.1.1 Voter Turnout Sweden has generally been distinguished by high levels of voter turnout, although it has not historically been amongst the absolute top performing nations. Figure 4 displays the development of Sweden’s voter turnout in relation to all eligible voters in Sweden from 1973 to 2018. The late half of the 20th century illustrates a distinct downward trend in voter turnout in the Swedish electorate, suddenly shifting upwards ever since the election in 2012.

Figure 4:

Voter Turnout in Parliamentary Elections, Sweden 94.0 92.0 90.0 88.0 86.0 84.0 82.0 80.0 78.0 76.0 74.0 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018

(Statistics Sweden 2021)

Sweden’s voter turnout in the European parliamentary elections is displayed in Figure 5, illustrating a general upwards trend from the entry to the union in 1995 to the latest 2019 elections. Although it has been above the European average in the three latest EU elections, it is distinctively lower than the turnout in the national elections.

Figure 5:

Sweden's Voter Turnout to the European Parliament 60.0

50.0

40.0

30.0

20.0

10.0

0.0 1995 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019 (Statistics Sweden 2019)

In sum, ever since a peak in 1976 when the parliamentary election reached a voter turnout of 91.8%, voter turnout was declining and reached a bottom in 2002. The 21st century has so far illustrated a shift to regular increases with each election. In the EU elections, Sweden has been performing slightly above average in regard to voter turnout, but the number is distinctively smaller compared to the turnout in domestic elections.

5.1.2 Voter Choice Hooghe describes voter choice as a determining factor on political trust, in the sense that high trust societies are more likely to vote for incumbent parties. It is also stated that the shape of the political system has an effect as well. Proportional electoral systems usually make it easier for non-incumbent parties to enter the parliament, but due to Sweden’s 4% limit, non-incumbent parties have a harder time obtaining political power compared to other nations with proportional systems with lower or no such limit. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, only three new parties arose to levels high enough to enter the Swedish government, one of which was New Democracy that disappeared after serving only one term. One of the parties that came to last

were the Greens, created in 1984 and entering the parliament shortly after in 1988 with 5.5% support. The Greens fell below the 4% limit in 1991 but recovered to last once again in 1994. The other lasting party was the Christian Democrats who got 7.1% in the 1991 election, several decades after its official formation (Aylott 2015, 159). Besides these parties and the recently successful SD, all parties that have governed and gained any substantial support from the Swedish electorate have their roots way back in the 19th century.

Throughout most of Sweden’s modern political history, the same five established and already incumbent parties have been dominating in the domestic elections. For nearly half a decade between 1932 to 1976 the Social Democrats governed the nation almost entirely by themselves, gaining majority twice (Aylott 2015, 153-154). Voter choices in Sweden have thus historically been strongly characterized by voting for incumbent parties, making the recent successes for the SD unique as they have broken this trend. 2010 marks the first election year since 1991 when a large enough proportion of Sweden’s electorate voted for a non-incumbent party, for that party to gain seats in the Riksdag. Sweden’s public statistics agency, in an analysis of the 2010 elections, attributes SD’s success that year to support votes from other parties. Both them and the Christian Democrats would be below the 4% limit if it were not for the record levels of support voting that occurred in the 2010- election (Statistics Sweden 2011). Further, incumbent voting could still be considered a characteristic of Sweden’s voter choices from the 2000s and even after the results of the 2010 elections, as 4/5 voters still voted for one of the old five parties (Aylott 2015, 163).

Other major trends of the party system, and in turn voter choices, of Sweden in the 2000s and early 2010s are block politics and minority governments. In 2004, the center-right opposition-parties created a collective governmental option that, if they were to obtain over 50% in the upcoming 2006 elections, promised to form a coalition government together with. The other block, or

government option were called the ‘red-greens’ and consisted of the Social Democrats and the Greens with outside support from the Left party. Although the party system consisted of seven different parties, the voter now decided between two teams with two distinct and clear prime minister candidates. In a sense, Sweden had become a redesigned two-party system, with the 2010 elections essentially resembling an ideal-typical two-party race (Aylott 2015, 161, 163).

From 2010-2020, the Alliance and Red-Green blocks have been the foundation of the Swedish political system, at least up until the 2018 elections. The major change to voter choice has been the ever-increasing size of SD each election

5.1.3 Winners and Losers Between the time span that this essay is interested in (2006-2020), there has been 4 elections, all with different winners and losers. Figure 6 displays the number of seats in parliament that each party over 4% got in those four elections, plus the size of each block.

The 2006 election resulted in a majority for the Alliance, which led to the first non-social democratic government in twelve years. The victory was marginal with only seven parliamentary seats differing between the blocks. However, the 2010 elections increased this gap between the blocks. No incumbent party wanted anything to do with the newly elected SD who managed to get hold of 20 seats. The Alliance loss of five seats put them just below 50%, which gave the SD their first real political power to decide which block should be able to establish Sweden’s next government, and the Alliance were able to continue their position in government.

The 2014 elections changed the Swedish political landscape, as the SD grew to the third largest party, and the Alliance losing 32 seats in the parliament. The Red Greens were now larger than the Alliance, but because of SD’s size, they once again occupied a pivotal position with the power to enable or disable

any government. Due to their unpopularity amongst the established parties, they were politically isolated through the December Agreement (DA) which was signed by all parties but one elected to the parliament. The purpose was partly to enable minority-rule by the allowing the government-option with most seats in parliament, majority or not, to be allowed the governmental position and get their budget approved. Thus, the Red Greens were the winners of the 2014 election. Although the DA was informal in nature and supposed to last up until the election of 2022, it ceased to exist in the fall of 2015 when the Christian Democrats voted to leave it. Because the opposition decided not to break the minority rule, the contents of the DA worked in practice up until the election of 2018 (Schmidt, Möller n.y).

The 2018 election left Sweden with yet another governmental crisis when the SD increased in size to 17.53%, which resulted in the traditional blocks breaking up in order to yet again exclude them from political power. The January Agreement (JA) was agreed upon between the Social Democrats and Green Party from that previously belonged to one block, and the Liberals and Center Party that belonged to another. The JA came to be due to both traditional government-options being voted down by SD, leaving Sweden without a government during the 2018 fall. The JA includes 73 points, that states different compromises between the four parties that signed it (Möller n.y). International media reported and framed the 2018 Swedish election, stating SD as the winners and the Swedish electorate moving from a previously tolerant population to following the populist right wing trends that is prevalent in the rest of Europe. The liberal-conservative Moderates, the largest party of the Alliance, were deemed the biggest losers of the election (Sinclair 2018).

Figure 6:

(val.digital 2021)

5.1.4 Trust in Government Over Time This section will display how the Swedish population’s trust in their government has developed between the time span of 2006 to 2020. Sweden, similarly to the other Scandinavian countries performs well in the latest data from indicators of political trust. Figure 7 displays how the trust in government has developed over time between the time span of 2006 to 2020.

Figure 7:

(OECD 2021)

Although the world experienced a major economic recession that began in the summer of 2007 and climaxed in September 2008, it has led to any long-term decreases in trust towards the Swedish government, but rather the opposite. This is likely because Sweden went through the crisis relatively unharmed due to the Swedish Central Bank’s more restrictive approach to loans. The European Central Bank (ECB) encouraged banks throughout Europe with more liquidity when the first signs of problems appeared. This had Sweden’s Central Bank become more cautious and precise in its monitoring of the international liquidity market. When the crash occurred, Sweden was perhaps more prepared as compared to other nations and could execute a large amount of, in hindsight, well-functioning measures to stabilize the financial situation in Sweden (Sweden’s Central Bank 2018).

The upward trend peaked in 2011, to decline all the way until 2016. The 2010s in Swedish politics is tumultuous and distinctly affected by the successes of SD increasing in size and obtaining political power. The 2010 election saw SD entering the parliament for the first time, and both the 2014 and 2018 elections led to governmental crises due to SD’s ability to make or break any governmental option. Simultaneously, trust in the Swedish government began to show clear signs of decline after 2011 until a rock bottom in 2016 after having dropped to levels below 50% the previous year. Around the same time as this decline was the international migration crisis, which peaked in 2015. In 2013, the Swedish migration agency allowed permanent residence permits to all refugees from the war-torn Syria (Swedish Migration Agency 2020), and in proportion to Sweden’s population size they had second to most asylum seekers and number of persons granted protection status in Europe 2016 (Eurostat 2017, 2-3). The Swedish government decided to temporarily close Sweden’s borders

2017 is marked by a distinct rise is trust towards the Swedish government. This year was however also plagued by several scandals from within the

government which could explain the loss in trust to 2018. For instance, and IT-scandal in the Department of Transport led to ministers being dismissed, as well as Prime Minister Stefan Löfven along with Minister of Infrastructure Anna Johansson being reported to the Committee on the Constitution (SVT 2017).

5.2 Political Trust in Italy

5.2.1 Voter Turnout Figure 8 displays the parliamentary voter turnout in Italian elections from the election of 1976 to the most recent in 2019. In 1976 the Italian voter turnout had reached 93.4%, and the voter turnout in the 1970s could be considered generally and comparatively high. From the 1970s and up until today, the turnout levels have steadily declined for each election. Besides a distinguishable upturn from the 2001 to 2006 elections, all other elections were followed by a lower turnout.

Figure 8:

Voter Turnout in Parliamentary Elections, Italy 100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 1976 1979 1983 1987 1992 1994 1996 2001 2006 2008 2013 2018

(IDEA 2021) Italy’s Voter Turnout to the elections to the European parliament has also seen a constant downwards trend. This is indicated in figure 9, and similarly to the 35

turnout in national elections between 2001-2006, the turnout in the EU elections of 1999 and 2004 saw a short-lived upward trend, then followed by further decreases each election. In the latest election, the lowest score ever in the history was recorded at 54.5%. Italy has, however, always had higher voter turnout than the average turnout in the entirety of the EU (European Parliament 2021).

Figure 9:

Italy's Voter Turnout to European Parliament 100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019 (Kantar, European Parliament 2019)

In conclusion, Italy’s voter turnout has seen steady increases ever since the late half of the 1970s. Between the time span that this essay is centered around, it has plummeted from 83.6% in 2006, to 72.9% in the latest 2018 general elections, thus indicating a total decline of 10.7%. In the EU elections, Italy has a slightly higher voter turnout than the EU average.

5.2.2 Voter Choice Italy has a proportional electoral system, but no percentual limit that a party must reach in order to obtain seats in the parliament. The Chamber of Deputies can thus consist of many different parties, and previously non-incumbent parties can, easier than in systems with a limit, gain access to the political power of that institution. Many parties have therefore come and gone quickly

throughout the history of the parliament, having gotten one or a few seats in an election.

Looking more broadly, Italy’s tradition of voter choice has changed in line with major political reforms. After the formation of the Italian republic in 1946, the Democrazia Cristiana (DC) were essentially unmovable from power up until a corruption crisis in the 1990s. The DC, Socialists and Communists were the three largest and most influential parties during these times. DC led all governments in Italy for 35 consecutive years, 1946-81. In the 1980s, DC gave up their governmental leadership position to their longtime allies, however still having the largest number of seats in those governments. Baldini (2015) attributes DC’s ability to keep the electorate’s support and political power mainly to their mediative nature, being a party formed by different factions resembling the church, state and society. This mediative nature and ability to represent the Italian Catholicism, along with a strong and firm anti- communist barrier, are closely linked to the DC’s long lasting popular support (Baldini 2015, 173, 176).

Although the lack of a percentual limit to enter the parliament helped facilitate non-incumbent voting, voter choice in the 20th century was characterized by a dominating support for three parties, and mainly the DC. An event that changed this tradition of voter choice in Italy was the ‘Mani Pulite’ (clean hands) corruption scandal that exposed the involvement of numerous politicians and bureaucrats in corrupt, fraudulent businesses. In just a couple of months, the scandal led to the immediate exile and resignation of several top politicians as well as disappearance or radical change of the dominating DC and Socialists. In turn, this brought about a complete change of Italy’s party system. For the first time since the formation of the Republic, the Italian government was not dominated by DC and its allies but began altering between new competing coalitions. One of these was the center-right coalition led by Berlusconi, whose party FI had become the new largest succeeding DC. The

other left-center coalition was led by Romano Prodi and was called the L’Ulivo (The Olive Tree), which later merged and rebranded itself as the Democratic Party (PD). It also led new smaller parties becoming dominant forces in Italian politics, as well as the inclusion of previously marginalized or isolated parties such as LN, post-fascists and post-communists (Vannucci 2009, 233-234).

Donovan & Gilbert (2015), states that although the party system was turned completely upside down, research suggests that Italian voting behavior remained quite traditional in left-right terms until the 2013 elections. Those who had previously voted for the socialists turned to L’Ulivo and later PD, while most previous DC-voters turned to Berlusconi’s FI. The authors claim that “What determined election outcomes, given the relative stability of the electorate, or “demand side,” were developments on the “supply side”: the appearance of new political formations, like the Ulivo and Forza Italia, and the alliances made, or unmade” (Donovan & Gilbert 2015, 388-399). As described in previous sections, the 2013 elections were characterized by populist M5S’s remarkable and sudden entry into the Chamber of Deputies, which is the first large-scale non-incumbent voting trend in the Italian electorate since the ‘Mani Pulite’ scandal. The two elections that have been held in the 2010s are distinguished by voters deciding to move beyond the bipolar system that was created in 1994, in favor of pushing new populist parties into the corridors of power. With the shrinkage of the traditional coalitions combined with the success of M5S in 2013, the bipolar system developed into a tripolar system which is a trend that developed even further in the 2018 elections (Chiaramonte et al. 2018, 2).

5.2.3 Winners and Losers The four elections that occurred between 2006 to 2020 led to drastic changes om Italy’s political landscape several times due to new parties emerging, old

parties joining together into new ones etc. Figure 10 depicts how the seats were distributed in the Chamber of Deputies after those four elections.

Figure 10:

(Dipartimento per gli Affari Interni e Territoriali 2021)

The 2006 was a victory for Prodi’s L’Ulivo and coalition, defeating Berlusconi’s center-right coalition who had governed since 2001. This victory was however short-lived, there was a call for a snap election in April of 2008 which resulted in a victory for Berlusconi and his coalition. FI drastically increased from 137 to 272 seats, and elections saw a strong increase for LN as well who went from 26 to 60 seats. The center-left coalition had merged into a unified party (PD), but the elections resulted in fewer parliamentary seats for them than L’Ulivo had gotten by itself in the previous elections, thus leading to their defeat. However, the tables were turned yet again in the 2013 elections, was not just held five years after the previous election but also five years after the financial crisis. The Berlusconi government was voted out of office and the PD-led center-left coalition took office yet again. As stated earlier in the

essay, another winner of the 2013 elections were the M5S who became Italy’s second largest party even though the previously had never been an incumbent party, gaining 11 more seats than Berlusconi’s party. Simultaneously, LN decreased from 60 to 18 seats, also adding to the loss of the center-right coalition. The latest 2018 general elections once again shifted the government, but not between to the traditional center-right versus center-left coalition. This election resulted in the M5S more than doubling their seats in the parliament, FI increasing slightly from 97 to 104 seats, and LN getting 125 seats which is around seven times more than they had in 2013. The winners of this election were without a doubt the populists.

After the 2018 elections, the populists were once again the winners. Accompanied with the successes of both LN and M5S, five million people who had voted for parties from the traditional established coalitions had decided to turn elsewhere. The mobility of voters had thus increased significantly (Chiaramonte et al. 2018, 14).

5.2.4 Trust in Government Over Time The development of political trust in Italy during the time span of 2006-2020 is somewhat of a rollercoaster as indicated in figure 11.

Figure 11

(OECD 2021) 40

The period between 2006 to 2009 is distinguished by increases in trust, beginning at around 23.9% and rising to 40% three years later. The period that followed is instead marked by decreases year after year. While it increased slightly between 2011-2012, in 2013 the level of trust plummeted to 14.6%. In 2014, it recovered to 30.9% which is followed by four consecutive years of decline. The latest developments have been a distinct and sudden rise between 2019-2020, from 22.2% to 37.5%.

Simultaneously as the political trust began decreasing after 2009 , the effects of the 2008 financial crisis, which struck Italy especially hard, began to show. The GDP was dropping and unemployment increasing as production in small businesses and industrialized regions were severely affected. Even though the economy was seemingly recovering in 2010-2011, due to Italy’s high dept and other countries’ lack of confidence in Italy, yet another economic setback plagued the nation. Berlusconi’s government was considered to act slowly to the situation and failed to put out decisive measures. Although managing to adapt an anti-crisis decree in late 2008 and some other measures as time went by, the period between 2008-2011 was distinguished by severely worsening economic and social conditions for the people of Italy (Borghi 2011, 1-2). Moreover, the measures and actions performed by Berlusconi’s government was criticized for not being transparent, especially concerning their support to banks (DiQuirico 2010, 8).

The decreases in trust 2014 happened at the same time as the Migration crisis peaked. Refugees would come over the Mediterranean, which made Italy just due to its geographical position extra affected. Between 2014 and 2015, migrants residing in Italy went from around 55,000 to almost 4 million. Italy is said to have been generally unprepared to manage these refugee-arrivals due to a lack of political determination and efficiency, making them unable to quickly respond to abrupt situations. The tone on immigration has 41

simultaneously hardened with the years for all dominant political forces, although some, like LN, are more extreme. Media coverage of migration linking it to crime and increased public hostility towards migrants, have jointly created a perception of domestic crisis amongst the Italians. Further, a dissonance between Italy’s discourse of immigration and actual policy making, also add to this perception (Hill et al. 2016, 2, 5-6).

5.3 Development of Populism

5.3.1 Populism in Sweden Sweden was often referred to as an exception when it came to populist successes in Europe. Besides a brief short-lived success for anti-migration and populist party New Democracy in the early 1990s, populist parties and values were relatively repressed and unsuccessful in the Swedish electorate. This was the case up until 2010 when SD gained their first parliamentary mandates with 5.7% of the electorate’s support, thus setting them securely past the required 4% barrier. Ever since, they have increased in size with each election that followed, also establishing them as the leading populist alternative amongst the Swedish parliamentary parties (Strömbäck et al. 2017, 68-69).

SD is an authoritarian rightist party as they hold anti-immigration, anti- multiculturalist, anti-feminist and anti-Islam values (Strömbäck et al. 2017, 70-71). The party describes themselves as a social-conservative party with a nationalist foundational view (SD 2019, 1). According to their websites section ‘What We Want’, the party have four political issues especially close to heart. First are strict and reserved migration policies, focusing on stopping asylum seeking migrants from entering Sweden as well as enabling more to return to their home countries. Second is strengthening the Swedish national unity and identity, emphasizing that Islamism and other extremist ideologies are a threat to democracy, equality and the Swedish culture, customs and 42

habits. Third is the politics of the welfare state, which they underline should prioritize Swedish citizens. Finally, their fourth most important issue is judicial policy, especially concerning harsher punishments for crimes, more resources for the Swedish police force and supporting victims of crimes (SD 2021).

A common strategy amongst established parties in party systems where a new populist party is gaining momentum, is to perform a so-called Cordon Sanitaire. A Cordon Sanitaire is a form of political isolation where established parties form a grand coalition, surpassing traditional antagonistic boundaries and ideologies, with the sole purpose of exclude a ‘common enemy’ party (Downs 2002, 38). In the Swedish case, there have been two major Cordon Sanitaires against the SD, each one as a result of election results where they increased size. These Cordon Sanitaires were DA and JA, which both had SD obtaining a position in which they were framed as outsider candidates as well as enabling them to use anti-establishment populist political communication to their advantage. Although these disadvantages, the support for the SD have reached new record levels each election. A main contributor, especially for the latest 2018 elections, is thought to be their prevalence and dominance in social media, where they outclass the established parties in terms of interaction and investment. This is linked to the SD’s anti-establishment strategy in that they openly disprove and criticize both the other parties and the mass media as a collective elitist identity. An example of this is SD’s 2018 communication manager, who in an article in Swedish newspaper Aftonbladet was asked about their successes on social media and answered: “We push for questions that people care about. You yourself work for a newspaper that does not let us advertise and that is partly owned by a party. We do not have those channels, we invest in social media.” (Aftonbladet 2018).

Figure 11 tables out how the support of the SD have developed in the four Swedish elections that have been held within the time span of this essay.

Figure 11:

Election Year Sweden Democrats (SD)

2006 2.93%

2010 5.70%

2014 12.86%

2018 17.53%

(val.digital 2021)

5.3.2 Populism in Italy Due to the differing political systems, cultures and events that have been addressed in previous sections, Populism in Italy has developed distinctively different compared to Sweden. Passarelli (2015) even states that Italy’s democratic history is generally strongly linked to movements and parties that can be associated with populism. It would, however, be first after the ‘Mani Pulite’-scandal and formation of the Second Republic that populist actors that go incline with the definition as presented in this essay, got any real influential political power in Italy (Passarelli 2015, 226-227). While there, in contemporary politics, is only one major populist party that does this in Sweden, there are currently three major parties that are studied as examples of populism in Italy: Lega Nord (LN), Forza Italia (FI), and the 5 Star Movement (M5S) (Boppa & Legnante 2017, 225). As indicated in previous sections, these three parties have all been Italy’s most influential and powerful populist party at different periods of time.

In 2000s, ever since his surge into power in the 1990s, the most influential Italian populist party was FI, founded and lead by Silvio Berlusconi. Between the brief period of 2008-2013, they changed name to The People of Freedom (PdL), only to change back to FI again in 2013. FI was created by Berlusconi in 1994 and became Italy’s Prime Minister after the following general elections. Berlusconi, in spite of the fact that he had no prior experience in 44

party politics, has served longer than any Italian Prime Minister since the post war period. Since 1994 he has led coalition governments after three general election victories (McDonnell 2013, 218). FI’s political strategy was centered around legitimizing themselves and their policies was characterized by appealing to the people (Passarello 2015, 227). FI cannot be compared to the radical right-wing populists of Europe, but that they are nonetheless populists as their political commination revolves around appeals to the people and the direct link between the people and leader, hence relying on two elements of populism (Bobba & Legnante 2017, 226-227). Figure 12 indicates a slow decline in support for FI, despite a remarkable increase between 2006-2008. The 2018 elections resulted in them having lost a staggering 23.38% of the support that they had amounted in 2008.

LN emerged in the late 1980s and was formally established in 1991 when six different ‘leagues’ in northern Italy joined together under the leadership of Umberto Bossi. Characterized by anti-establishment rhetoric in its criticism of the traditional Italian parties, LN collaborated in Silvio Berlusconi’s ‘Second Republic’-government that was established in 1994. They continued to be part of coalition governments led by Berlusconi between 2001 to 2011. Figure 12 shows that the support for LN has been quite irregular over the past four elections. In the 2006 elections, the coalition government that both LN and FI were part of lost to the opposition and LN only amounted 4.58%. The 2008 election was far greater for LN, almost doubling their previous election results to 8.30%. LN’s fortunes briefly shifted in 2011, partly due to losing political power when their alliance with FI deteriorated as Berlusconi decided to support Mario Monti’s government instead. In turn, this positioned LN as the main opposition party to that government (McDonnell 2012, 20-21). LN saw very little success from that period until after a rock bottom election in 2013 with only 4.09%, after which Matteo Salvini became the party leader of LN. Ever since and up until today has been a time of steady increases for the party.

In the 2018 election they increased to 17.4%. While previously being a party in favor of secession of Northern Italy, they rebranded themselves as simply ‘Lega’ (the league) for the entire Italy in the run up for the 2018 elections. With Salvini as party leader, using his social media platforms to communicate directly to the voters, in combination with this rebranding the party suddenly tied itself with, anti-immigration, anti-establishment and anti-Islam values (Mcginnis 2021).

Being formally founded in 2009 as an alternative in Italian politics for the 2013 general elections, the M5S under leadership of Beppe Grillo emerged to immediately see a steep rise in support from the Italian electorate. Since they were not part of the Italian incumbency until 2013, they have no data for those years in Figure 12. However, the support they have amounted in the 2013 and 2018 elections currently make them the single largest populist force in Italy. M5S was shaped and formed through the personal political blog of Italian comedian Beppe Grillo. While commenting most political issues, domestic to Italy as well as global, an anti-establishment rhetoric and agenda surges through the blog. For instance, Grillo was critical towards what he called the political class, who he believed acted corruptly and selfishly and enjoyed way to large and numerous benefits for their profession (Lanzone & Woods 2015, 57). M5S’s populism does not solely rely on being critical of the establishment, but also in their appeals to the people. For instance, they do not describe themselves as a party but rather a people’s movement, and try to promote themselves as outside of the ideological spectrum belonging to neither the left or the right. Further, they operate almost solely online and promotes an online based form of direct democracy for Italy’s citizens. M5S not only use the web as a medium for communication, but also for voting and active participation. Their political candidates and strategies were voted for and elected directly via Grillo’s blog, who switched to the official blog of the M5S some months before the 2018 elections. The core issues brought up by

contemporary M5S, besides these advocacies for more direct-democratic measures, is to completely limit immigration to Italy as well as hold an official referendum concerning Italy’s membership in the eurozone area (Musso & Maccaferri 2018, 3, 13-15).

Figure 12 displays how the support for the three leading populist parties in Italy has developed during the time span of this essay.

Figure 12:

Election Year Forza Italia (FI) / Lega Nord Five Star Move- People of Freedom (LN) ment (M5S) (PdL) 2006 23.72% 4.58% - 2008 37.38% 8.30% - 2013 21.56% 4.09% 25.56% 2018 14.00% 17.35% 32.68% (Dipartimento per gli Affari Interni e Territoriali 2021)

6 Analysis and Discussion Populism is in this essay defined as a political strategy in which the actor appeals to the people and uses anti-establishment rhetoric. From what has been found in this essay’s analysis, the successes and entries into power of populist political parties can be linked to different developments in political trust. Figure 13 combines the different research findings in both Sweden and Italy to get a clearer view of the developments next to each other.

Figure 13:

Beginning with the Swedish case, SD’s entry into the parliament in 2010 can seem contradictory, as both voter turnout and especially political trust had simultaneously risen from the previous election year. The research findings suggest that SD’s 2010 success is mainly contributed to support voting from other parties and that they would most likely not have reached the 4% limit otherwise. The distinct increases in support that followed in the elections of 2014 and 2018 were however joined by similar levels of decreasing political trust. Between 2010 and 2018, the SD had increased with 11.83%, and political trust had between the same years decreased with 10,90%. There are thus indications towards a link between decreased political trust and increased support for populists in Sweden.

Regarding Italy’s populist parties, all three parties have developed differently over the four past elections. FI’s developments in the 2006, 2008 and 2013 elections seemingly follow the development of political trust, which is likely attributed to them and Berlusconi governing the nation between 2008-2013. Since political trust is measured as trust in government, it is not surprising that it developed to around the same level as the support for the governing party. The loss of FI’s government coalition in 2013 is linked to their failures to cope with the 2008 financial crisis, and so the trust in them, and thus in the government, decreased as a result. Although FI and Berlusconi certainly possess many populist characteristics, LN/Lega and M5S go more along with the definition as presented in this essay’s theoretical framework and literature review. LN in particular is very similar to SD and the other right-wing populist parties in Europe, at least after Salvini became party leader in 2013 changing the party’s name to Lega and deprioritizing the question of secession in favor of anti-immigration and anti-feminism issues. After 2013, the support for Lega increased with election. Interestingly, political trust actually went up between 2013-2018 as well, however still 15.50% lower than in 2008. Lega, M5S entered the Chamber of Deputies in 2013 with a staggering 25.56%, and that

same year marks a sudden large downshift in the political trust as compared to the years before. M5S, thus, entered the Italian parliament in a year that was distinguished by especially low levels of political trust.

So, knowing how support for all four populist parties developed in relation to political trust, is it decreases in trust that made them successful or their successes that in turn affected the political trust? To approach this question, I will turn to the theoretical framework. Concerning the Swedish case, Hooghe argues that voters tend to prefer outsider-candidates, and ever since SD entered the parliament in 2010 they have been an outsider candidate not belonging to either of the two established blocks. Instead, up until recent years they have been demonized and isolated from political power which furthers their portrayal as an outsider candidate. The Swedish 2014 and 2018 elections resulted in governmental crises as no traditional coalition obtained majority support. As a consequence, they could not form a government without the support from SD. DA in 2014 was an agreement between almost all established parties that allowed the largest coalition option, even with a minority of support, to form a government. JA in 2018 was an agreement that deteriorated the traditional coalitions, as the Liberals and Center Party switched sides from the Alliance to the Red Greens. Both agreements are examples of Cordon Sanitaires, with the underlying purpose to exclude and isolate SD from political power. As a result, they were also framed as outsider candidates and essentially the only true opposition party besides the Left party who were not part of any Cordon Sanitaire nor government. In that sense, according to Hooghe’s theory SD already got better preconditions to grow after each election that occurred. Further, Hooghe also states that voters are more prone to vote for parties that are already incumbent and which they have already voted for. Entering the parliament gives a party more credibility, trustworthiness and experiences. Although SD’s 2010 success is attributed to support votes, it granted them the ability seem more legitimate and credible as

a result. In turn that could have led to the consolidation of their voter base as well as improvement of their possibilities to reach out to new voters which also adds up to their preconditions to grow after the 2010 elections.

The Italian case does not provide a history of political isolation and exclusion towards populists, as in the Swedish one. It is certainly not the case for FI, who have led the center-right coalition since 1994. LN/Lega have also been part of this coalition and in several governments since their entry into power in the 1990s, but when Berlusconi decided to support the center-left government in 2011 they became the only incumbent opposition party. Even though this frames them as an outsider candidate, they had a rock bottom election in 2013. However, in the most recent elections one can detect a trend of outsider candidates gaining large voter support. Besides LN/Lega gaining 17.35% after rebranding themselves completely, it was certainly also the case with the M5S. Through their anti-establishment rhetoric they managed to frame themselves as an outsider candidate. After the 2013 elections, although becoming Italy’s second largest party, M5S did not want to govern with either mainstream party due to of their distrust towards the establishment. Up until the 2018 elections, thus, they were still able to be framed as an outsider party even if they had gotten the support of a quarter of the Italian electorate in the 2013 elections.

Another vital factor that needs to be addressed when discussing Hooghe’s theory is his thesis that, because voters are more likely to accept messages from incumbent parties and parties they have voted for, increasing support for the populists can express lower levels of political trust in general. In Sweden, for instance, as SD have grown more people will listen to and accept their political messages. Because SD frequently uses anti-establishment rhetoric, more people will become distrustful towards the establishment as a result. With respect to the research findings of this essay, I would argue that this explanation goes incline with the development of both the support for SD’s and the citizen’s political trust. After gaining enough support votes in 2010 to

become an incumbent party, Hooghe’s thesis would claim that more voters would begin to perceive SD as a legitimate and credible party. This attracted even more voters which meant more and more people listening to and accepting their anti-establishment messages after each election, hence making more and more people distrustful towards the government as a result. In Italy, populist appeals have been prevalent in politics far longer compared to Sweden, and their democratic history is said to be generally associated with populist movements and parties. Because the existence of this populist political culture goes far back in Italy, Hooghe’s thesis would claim that populist messages are also more likely to be accepted today as a result. However, his claim that people are more likely to accept claims from incumbent parties that they already voted for seems to not be as accurate in the Italian case since all four elections that are included in this essay’s analysis have resulted in losses for the sitting government. Voter volatility is very high in Italy. This essay’s research findings would suggest that this volatility is a result of Italy’s history of political scandals as well as large established parties disappearing, joining together into new ones and changing political lines. Voters have a hard time developing strong bonds to a party because they are constantly evolving or changing their shape and ideology. As a result, voters are also more prone to switch between elections, and perhaps most importantly, vote for non-incumbent parties.

Warren’s theory of political trust as a natural hardship in combination with Offe’s, Mudde’s and Müller’s theory on populism’s dependency on charismatic leadership and as a re-personalization of politics, can further explain the increased support for populists in both cases. While traditional parties usually have a long and thorough track record to rely their legitimacy on, Offe states that populist parties, usually being relatively new, base their credibility on factors such as moral integrity and media skills. This has certainly to some extent been the case for all populist parties that have been

researched in this essay. The SD are openly critical and towards established mass media and was the Swedish party that pre-eminently dominated and invested the most in social media for the 2018 elections. All three Italian populist parties have also used personalistic factors, direct communication strategies and media skills and to gain support. FI’s leader Silvio Berlusconi is thought of as a media tycoon and has used his personal charisma to dismiss several scandals in the past. Perhaps more typically populist however are LN and M5S who amassed great support and a large follow basis by using direct communication without the amplification and process of any middlemen such as mass media. A large part of LN’s electoral strategies for the 2018 elections revolved around Salvini addressing LN’s issues, policies and concerns directly with people on Facebook live and similar platforms. Of course, Beppe Grillo’s personal blog which is now M5S’s official blog is their main source of not only information, but political participation and mobilization as well. One could theorize that FI’s downfall and LN’s and M5S’s recent successes is partly a result of their ability to re-personalize an otherwise depersonalized party system.

7 Conclusions and Finishing Remarks This essay’s research questions ask how political trust has developed in relation to the successes of Sweden’s and Italy’s populist parties, and whether changes in trust have an effect on the outcome of those populist parties in elections. From what has been found, the relationship between populism and political trust has developed similarly but have adapted different characteristics in the cases. Regarding the first question, in Sweden after the SD entered the parliament with the dependency of support votes, political trust between elections declined with almost the same rate as SD gained more votes. In the Italian case, political trust has also decreased over the latest year in combination with more and more support for populist parties. With care to the second question, there are indications of populists being more successful due to decreases in political trust in Italy. The largest party in Italy’s parliament is the populist M5S who just years after their formation gained 25.56% in the 2013 elections, which happened in combination with a distinct decrease in political trust. The analysis suggests that the M5S’s and LN’s increases in the 2010s is thus linked to further decreases in political trust in a system where it was low to begin with. There does not, however, seem to be such an obvious link in the Swedish case, where the research findings suggest that it is rather the increased support for SD that have led to decreases in political trust. With a tradition of incumbent-voting and low voter volatility, the sudden push into power that support votes granted them in 2010 seems to have made more people with each year that passes listen to and accept their anti-establishment messages which in turn would decrease the political trust of Sweden.

The main conclusion that is derived from this essay’s research findings and analysis, is thus that political trust can be linked to populism in two ways. Either it can act as a determinant for populist successes, or it could be an effect of populists gaining more political power and thus attention from a nation’s electorate.

Looking towards the future, it is clear the link between populism and political trust is an area that needs a lot of further research to be completely understood. Based on what is found in this essay, it would defiantly be interesting to investigate other cases, as well as with a more broad, quantitative approach in order to gain more generable empirical data. It would also be interesting to investigate in comparison with other variables. While this essay has focused on governmental trust, looking at other forms of trust such as trust in institutions, inter-personal or social trust or trust in politicians in general, could bring new and other perspectives on the link between trust and populism. That being said, I really hope that this essay and the topic which it studies will spark the interest of other researchers to being their thoughts, ideas and perspectives to the table. Each new finding brings us one step closer to fully understand the concept of populism, its determinants, successes and failures.

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