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AUGUST 2018 Attitudes Towards National Identity, Immigration and Refugees in Italy Attitudes Towards National Identity, Immigration and Refugees in Italy

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AUGUST 2018 Attitudes Towards National Identity, Immigration and Refugees in Italy Attitudes Towards National Identity, Immigration and Refugees in Italy AUGUST 2018 Attitudes towards National Identity, Immigration and Refugees in Italy Attitudes towards National Identity, Immigration and Refugees in Italy MORE IN COMMON AUGUST 2018 Tim Dixon Stephen Hawkins Laurence Heijbroek Míriam Juan-Torres François-Xavier Demoures ABOUT MORE IN COMMON ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS More in Common is a new international Special thanks to Annmarie Benedict, initiative, set up in 2017 to build communities Heather Vernon, Josh Jacobs, Louisa Brown and societies that are stronger, more united and Anibal GómeZ-Contreras. This research and more resilient to the increasing threats of was conducted in partnership with Ipsos in polarisation and social division. The More in Italia. Thanks in particular to Chiara Ferrari, Common initiative took shape from work Mattia Forni, Niccolò Marchion, Cecilia undertaken since 2015 to understand why Pennati and Lucio Formigoni from Ipsos in advanced democracies failed to respond Italia, for their professional dedication to this more effectively to the refugee crisis and its project, and to Antonella Napolitano from impact on domestic politics. More in Common CILD for her invaluable contributions and for was incubated in 2017 by Purpose, a creative coordinating outreach to Italian civil society agency specialising in social change and groups to help shape the research. Thanks to movement building. our partners at Purpose, the incubator of the More in Common initiative. Thanks to More in Common’s objective across its LucreZia De Carolis and Francesco GraZiosi different streams of work is to build closer for their translations. Thanks also to and more inclusive societies, which are Gareth Jenkins for his work on the design of resilient to the appeal of xenophobia and this report. authoritarian populism. We aim to support the efforts of civil society and key infuencers More in Common commissioned this report who share the values of open and inclusive in conjunction with the Social Change societies, and help catalyse other new Initiative and are grateful for its input and initiatives that advance these values. support. We are also grateful for the generous fnancial support provided by the Human More in Common is a non-proft organisation Dignity Foundation. with teams in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. The co-founders of More in Common are DOWNLOAD Tim Dixon, Mathieu Lefevre, and This document is available to download as a Gemma Mortensen. free PDF at: www.moreincommon.com For more information, please visit www.moreincommon.com More in Common ISBN 978-1-9997788-5-9 E-mail: [email protected] © 2018 More in Common Ltd AUTHORS Tim Dixon This work is licensed under the Creative Stephen Hawkins Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- Laurence Heijbroek ShareALike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA Míriam Juan-Torres 4.0). To view a copy of this license visit: François-Xavier Demoures https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by-nc-sa/4.0/ Contents Executive Summary 5 1 Introduction 25 2 Methodology 31 2.1 Limitations of Existing Research 32 2.2 Present research 32 2.3 Moral Foundations Theory 33 3 Attitudinal Segments in Italy 35 3.1 The Media Consumption Habits of the Segments 47 3.2 Moral Foundations of the Segments 51 3.3 Italian Catholics 53 4 Perceptions of The State of Italy and The World 55 4.1 Italians’ Outlook 56 4.2 Italy and Europe 64 5 Italian Identity 67 5.1 Overall Results 68 5.2 Perceptions of Identity Among Lef Behind and Disengaged Moderates 71 6 Attitudes Towards Immigration and Refugees 75 6.1 Refugees and Migrants: Distinct Categories? 76 6.2 The ‘Othering’ of Refugees and Migrants 77 6.2.1 Focus: the Disengaged Moderates and Immigration 80 6.2.2 Focus: The Lef Behind and Immigration 81 6.3 Impact of Immigration 82 6.4 Attitudes towards Refugees 92 6.4.1 Focus: The Disengaged Moderates and Refugees 97 6.4.2 Focus: The Lef Behind and Refugees 98 6.5 NGOs and activities in support of refugees 98 7 Attitudes Towards Muslims 101 8 Threats to Democracy and the Rule of Law 109 9 Communication Strategies 115 10 Conclusions and Recommendations 121 A Media Appendix 127 Executive Summary Attitudes towards National Identity, Immigration and Refugees in Italy Introduction This report provides insight into Italians’ high levels of unemployment amongst young opinions about their country, its place in the people provide fertile ground for divisive world and their relationship to Italy’s recent social narratives and a redefnition of national migrants. It comes at a time of political identity on exclusionary terms, with the disruption and division, with 89 per cent of promise of Lega to “put Italians frst” (“prima Italians in a recent poll describing their gli Italiani”). country as divided1. Italy drew international attention in 2018 when post-election Yet as this report shows, although they believe negotiations led to the formation of governing that immigration has had negative effects on coalition of populist parties. The MoVimento Italy, most Italians also have feelings of 5 Stelle and Lega were elected on a wave of solidarity and empathy towards outsiders. ‘anti-establishment’ feelings. Hospitality and welcome are important to Italians as part of their national character. As this report shows, Italians are profoundly Public attitudes in Italy are more nuanced frustrated with their governing classes, than is ofen assumed. corruption and inequality. They feel that the system is broken, and they worry about a lack This research forms part of a larger initiative of opportunities for the next generation of to address the growing threats to open and Italians. They are disappointed in the inclusive societies. To understand these European Union’s failure to support them, threats, More in Common has been and are especially frustrated by the failure of undertaking detailed research into public other nations to help them manage their sea attitudes in a series of countries (United borders. In an era of deep scepticism about States, France, Germany, the Netherlands, conventional solutions, they are looking Greece and Italy). This work has examined for change. public perceptions of a common set of forces that is contributing to social fracturing and The lead-up to Italy’s March 2018 election divisions in many countries. These forces refected the increased prominence of issues include economic insecurity, growing on immigration and the ‘othering’ of specifc inequality, cultural and demographic change groups. Italians identify immigration among and the weakening of local communities. their highest priority of concerns and the Many people are feeling a loss of identity and prominent media coverage of boat arrivals belonging, and authoritarian populists and across the Mediterranean has led to an extremist forces are exploiting these vulner- increased perception of insecurity. abilities by advancing ‘us’ versus ‘them’ narratives, ofen focusing on migrants and Across Europe, extremist parties see oppor- refugees. Social media is also elevating tunities in the current political and social confict in public debate and bringing environment to improve their standing and extreme narratives into the mainstream. potentially take power. Their copybook More in Common’s work is identifying includes sophisticated use of digital commonalities and differences in public technology, simple narratives of immigration perceptions of these issues, with a view to as an invasion, migrants as economic, identifying ways to strengthen resilience cultural and security threats and governing against the threats to democracy and elites as out of touch and unable to control the inclusive societies. country’s borders. A struggling economy and 1 Italy ranked ffth of 27 countries for perception of division, in response to the question: “Overall, how divided do you think your country is these days?” Bobby Dufy (2018), BBC Global Survey: A World Divided? https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/bbc-global-survey-world-divided 6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Methodology This study employs a population clustering The research was conducted by Ipsos in Italy segmentation analysis method that draws on and consisted of online and phone surveys a range of attitudinal characteristics of the with a representative sample of 2,000 adults. Italian public. This form of segmentation Respondents answered demographic provides a rich composite picture of how a questions as well as questions relating to the population is divided in its views, going issues of greatest concern to them, their beyond basic demographic factors to show political views and affliations, familiarity how networks of attitudes and opinions with refugee and immigration issues, their are connected. understanding of different terminology in the refugee and migration debate, their personal experience with refugees and their responses to different policy approaches and messages. Following an evaluation of the quantitative data and the conclusion of the segmentation analysis, the research was concluded with a qualitative phase involving two focus group discussions with members of two of Italy’s ‘middle’ segments (the Disengaged Moderates and Lef Behind). 7 Attitudes towards National Identity, Immigration and Refugees in Italy General Findings 1. There is widespread dissatisfaction with the status quo in Italy, deep distrust in elites and an overwhelming view that Italy is losing out from globalisation. It is diffcult to fnd any segment in Italian society that believes that globalisation has been good for the country. Only 16 per cent of Italians believe that globalisation has had a positive impact on the Italian economy. Frustration with the status quo is refected in the 73 per cent of the population who say that traditional parties and politicians do not care about people like them. 2. Italians describe their country as weak, angry, and divided. While 53 per cent of Italians describe Italy as weak, only fve per cent describe the country as open, optimistic, and confdent. Italians agree that unemployment is the greatest problem facing their country, but they identify immigration and crime as the next most pressing issues.
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