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An Uncertain Italy

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An Uncertain Italy Geographical Overview | EU’s Mediterranean Countries Panorama An Uncertain Italy Marc Lazar has submitted his resignation in the wake of this dis- Professor of History and Political Sociology at aster. In fact, the PD’s defeat is yet another example Sciences Po, Paris of the deep crisis of the entire continental European President, School of Government, Libera Università left. For its part, Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, with Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli (LUISS), 14% of the votes, has obtained its lowest election Rome results since it was founded in 1994. Il Cavaliere, at 81 years of age, no longer mobilizes anyone but his most diehard followers and no longer aggregates an The results of the 4 March 2018 Italian elections are arc of broader forces behind him ranging from the paradoxical. On the one hand, they clearly show extreme right to the centre. He has thus been great- Geographical Overview Mediterranean | EU’s Countries three winners and three losers. On the other hand, ly weakened by the results of this election. The ex- they have made Italy enter a stage of extreme politi- haustion of his party, which exists nearly exclusively cal uncertainty. for and by him, attests to a more generalized phe- The losers are, first and foremost, the two main po- nomenon, that of the difficulties of the European 192 litical parties that had been attempting to impose right, as can be seen, for instance, in France, Ger- their hegemony for years on their respective ends of many, Austria and Spain. In Italy, as elsewhere, the the political spectrum. At centre-left, the Democratic governing parties are penalized. And finally, the third Party (Partito Democratico, PD), with 18.7% of the election loser is the small radical left coalition party, votes for the Chamber of Deputies, suffered a crush- Free and Equal, which aspired to weaken the PD ing defeat. It has almost disappeared in the south and obtain some 6% of the votes, but only garnered and has lost ground in its bastions in central Italy, slightly over 3% in the end. which have always been a left-wing stronghold. In The big winner is the Five Star Movement (Movi- power during the last administration, it has been mento 5 Stelle, M5S) (32.6% of votes for the Cham- sanctioned for its policies, a sanction that the Ital- ber of Deputies), an unclassifiable party within the ians have systematically applied since 1994, ‘remov- panorama of European populism. It proposes a pro- ing the incumbents.’ Indeed, three Prime Ministers gramme that is at once classic left and post-modern who were members of the PD succeeded one an- left (citizens’ basic income, for instance) but also other: Enrico Letta, Matteo Renzi and Paolo Genti- ecological and at the same time, rather right-wing in loni. During this administration, many reforms were matters of security and immigration. During this carried out. But they have divided the left, especially campaign, the M5S carried out significant changes 2018 those regarding the labour market and school, and from 2013, when it became the leading Italian party have not won over the Italians, who have the sensa- with 25.6% of the votes. This time, it is headed by a tion, often grounded, that their situation has deterio- young leader, Luigi Di Maio, aged 31, who, in con- rated despite a real return to growth. The Democrat- trast to Beppe Grillo, comes off as the leader of a ic Party is also paying for the excessive personalization credible party, even insofar as his manner of ex- and media coverage of its leader, Matteo Renzi, who pressing himself and his ‘bodily hexis’1. It has mod- Mediterranean Yearbook 1 Bodily hexis is a concept ultimately developed by the French sociologist Pierre Bordieu, which could be summed up more or less as referring Med. Med. IE to a person’s subconscious use of their body, i.e. body language, posture, bearing, accent when speaking, etc. – Translator’s Note. erated its criticism of the European Union, the euro ropean Union and various migratory shocks. They and what it formerly called “the immigration busi- are in search of an identity, aspiring to re-establish a ness.” And finally, it has accepted the principle of state of “living together”, while being tempted by a Panorama possible alliances with other parties. The M5S, with withdrawal into individualism or the family, with opin- a general presence throughout the territory, has ion polls demonstrating their strong mistrust of for- above all conquered the peninsula’s south, which is eigners, but also of strangers in general. in dire social straits. Its electorate is characterized by an overrepresentation of young people, the work- ing class and people with lower levels of education. The electoral progression of the The League (Lega) is the second big winner (17.3%, as compared to 4% five years ago). Its leader has League, Brothers of Italy and the turned the North League (Lega Nord), a regionalist Five Star Movement follow a specific party hostile to Rome and the south, into a party in- logic, but likewise attest to the depth spired by the French Front National, deliberately sit- of Italian discontent uated at the extreme right, with its virulent criticism of immigrants, insecurity and the European Union. The League, well established in the north, has made inroads in the centre and gained some ground in the Although an analysis of the election results is sim- south. At its side, the post-Fascist party, Brothers of ple, future scenarios are unclear because no one Italy (Fratelli d’Italia), with over 4% of the votes, dou- party or coalition is in a position to exercise power bled its results from 2013. The centre-right coalition alone, since they do not have the majority of seats in Geographical Overview Mediterranean | EU’s Countries of these two parties plus Forza Italia and a miniscule the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate. The parlia- grouping of centre parties has thus shifted strongly mentary democracy and the President of the Re- further right. public, Sergio Mattarella, are thus being hard test- ed. Already the presidents of the two parliamentary 193 chambers were elected on 24 March after an agree- The big winner is the Five Star ment between the Five Star Movement and the League, which imposed the decision on Forza Italia, Movement (M5S), an unclassifiable thus demonstrating its dynamism: in the Senate, party within the panorama of Maria Elisabetta Alberti Casellati, one of Silvio Ber- European populism lusconi’s people, and in the Chamber of Deputies, Roberto Fico, embodying the leftist tendency of the Five Star Movement and a priori faithful to its found- ing principles. For the Administration, all the combi- The electoral progression of the League, Brothers of nations possible will be explored by Sergio Matta- Italy and the Five Star Movement follow a specific rella: a centre-right, centre-left alliance, an M5S-PD logic, but likewise attest to the depth of Italian dis- coalition, an M5S-centre-right union, an M5S- content. This has various explanations. Social, first League coalition or a ‘minority’ administration led by of all, since unemployment remains high, inequalities a figure who, for a limited time, would have a narrow of all sorts have increased and poverty has spread parliamentary majority, with the possibility of quickly 2018 greatly. Political, in the second place, since Italy has returning to a vote in case of failure. The formation been experiencing a profound political crisis for dec- of the executive is rendered all the more complicat- ades indicated in all surveys: The Italians’ dissatis- ed by the fact that the parties’ interests and pro- faction with their political leaders and more gener- grammes are incompatible, if not completely op- ally, the ensemble of the ruling class, the parties, posed. The Five Star Movement, for instance, parliament and the administration, is extremely high. promised citizens’ basic income during its cam- And finally, cultural, in the sense that Italians are ask- paign and must now meet the expectations of a Mediterranean Yearbook ing themselves who they are, now more than ever; southern electorate that demands social protection Med. Med. what unites them in the face of globalization, the Eu- and aid from the government, which is not at all IE what the electorate of the League –more liberal and And again, beginning in 2007-2008, with the finan- mistrustful of the bureaucratic and administrative cial and economic crisis that severely affected the Panorama machine– expects. peninsula and entailed austerity, rigor, recession, The Italians are thus waiting, as are the Europeans. unemployment, increased inequality and the growth Especially since these elections have marked a fur- of poverty. Finally, in 2013 and over the course of ther stage in the major trend that began a quarter of the following years, over 660,000 migrants arrived a century ago of disenchantment, discouragement, under dramatic conditions on the coasts of Italy and or even scepticism regarding the EU registered in the Italians, with good reason, felt abandoned by all opinion polls, whether Italian or European-wide. the other EU Member States in their attempts to Of all the eurozone, it is Italy that registers the low- manage the situation. Mainly the League and the est level of adherence to the single currency. How Brothers of Italy, but also, to a lesser extent, Forza should we interpret such a change in attitude among Italia and the Five Star Movement, deliberately used Italians vis-à-vis Europe? the migrant question as a political resource, inten- tionally amalgamating three realities: that of immi- grants established on the peninsula and regularized The Italians are thus waiting, as are (over 5 million now, four times their number in 2001, which has overwhelmed Italy, unaccustomed to the Europeans.
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