______C HAP T E R 6 ______---'__
Political Incorporation and Political Extrusion: Party Politics and Social Forces in Postwar New York
THE MOVEMENT of new social forces into the political system is one of the central themes in the study of American political development on both the national and local levels. For example, Samuel P. Huntington has character ized the realignment of 1800 as marking "the ascendancy of the agrarian Republicans over the mercantile Federalists, 1860 the ascendancy of the industrializing North over the plantation South, and 1932 the ascendancy of the urban working class over the previously dominant business groups."! And the process of ethnic succession-the coming to power of Irish and German immigrants, followed by the Italians and Jews, and then by blacks and Hispanics- is a major focus of most analyses of the development of American urban politics. Most accounts of political incorporation, however, are based on an analy sis of only one face of a two-sided process. The process through which new social forces gain a secure position in American politics is simultaneously a process of political exclusion. This process involves not simply a conflict between the new group and established forces over whether or not the new comers will gain representation, but also a struggle over precisely who will assume leadership of the previously excluded group. Established political forces are not indifferent to the outcome of these leadership struggles, and the defeat of potential leaders who are regarded as unacceptable by estab lished forces is the price that emergent groups must pay to gain access to po\,ver. After discussing the linkages among political incorporation, political re alignments, and political exclusion, the sections below provide evidence for this argument by analyzing the process through which-and the terms upon which-Jews, Italians, and blacks gained a secure position for themselves in New York City politics in the 1940$ and 1950s. To be sure, the incOI]Joration of these groups occurred under conditions-a Cold 'War abroad and rvfcCar thyism at home-that scan'ely were typical in the history ofAmerican urban politics. The extrusion of ideologically unacceptable contenders fur the lead ership of previously excluded groups, however, is a characteristic aspect of the process of political incorporation in American cities.2 It is instructive 198 CHAPTEH 6 POL ITJ CAL J i\' con I' 0 H A TI 0 i\' AND EXT R U S ION 199 , d" the \l1c:Glrthy era this extrusion was that in the nation's larg~st clttY ,UII~hg legl's'lativ~ hearings and blacklists but I, h d' tl m'1II1 no tl1[OU' , f' ities, becausc there are variOlls ways in which the substantive illterests of a accomp IS e ll1 1e, , , ,M, f' "h politics The experience 0 I I h thc non11'11 ll1ShtutIOns 0 pal / ' group can be understood und advanced, Thus at dillcrent times and places, rat ler t Houg " " I thus reve'lls how these institutions are serving the intcrests of blacks in local politics has been understood to mean New York during the poshva~' pel110; , f ,,', social changes and pol,itical able to maintain themselves ll1 t Ie ace 0 maJol the protection of civil rights, the provision of sodal welfare benefits, and turmoil. both less intrusive and more aggressive patrolling by the police in black neighborhoods, Finally, a previously exduded group may-or may not- be able to POLITICAL INCORPORATION, CRITICAL REALIGNMENTS, achieve a secure claim on the political benefits its members receive, Again, AND POLITICAL EXTRUSION blacks provide the clearest example, Although freedmen in the South gained a !lumber of dvil and political rights during Reconstruction, the political ' , ' '~omplex than is com- coalitions ofwhich they were a part fell from power on both the national and The phenomenon of political entirely homoge . " d I the first pilncorpOIc'~atJlo:(lll'cISesma(:'~Cn~ver ace so I II " , state levels in the 1870s, In su.bsequent decades, blacks were driven from monly recogI1lze , n , " I ' t the politic']1 svstem on terms d ' ,be ll1corporatee ll1 0 , " politics and deprived of many of the rights they formerly had been granted, neous, an a gIOUp may , , its members than others, For exam- This suggests that it is useful to distinguish hehveen a group's gaining repre that are of gr~ate: advant,age t~) ~~me ~l~ I the Republican party of the 1790s sentation and its achieVing full incorporation into politics, according to pIe, the agrarIan ll1 terests repl esentee ) I ' , .', I farmers Broadly . , d I' I tl 'ubsistence anc commcl cIa , whether the group's newly won position in the political system is secure or insecure, were compnseI I, 0 I lO'Old 1 S Repu II') Ican . Wll1,' g of th",. p'ut), ! slloke for subsis- speaking, t le rae Ica OJ ',I', t'on of American II ' ~ d the commercIa Iza I Not only is the phenomenon ofpolitical incorporation more complex than tence farmers, who genera y oppose " I " I't'cs The Republican d ' .. III democratIc Il1 t lell po I I , is often recognized, so too is the process through which it occurs, Bringing society and who were ra lca ) d ' k !', , mmercial fanners ,- 'the other han ' , spo e WI co a new group into the political system has the potential of disrupting estab party s moderate Wll1g, on 'I' t ' the United States and lished patterns of political precedence and public policy, Conse(lUently, the 'h c, I ed the building of a commerCIa socle y I~ Id 1 " , , W 0 Ja\or f' , t th 'lt ll1, R'IC 'h' ,II( ,I EllI's ,swords . , wou le le politicians who benefit most from those patterns are not likely to sponsor the creation 0 a governmen , .' d' I ' t lIed b)! the peollle," It I I' tl ' and Imme wte y con ro the incorporation of new groups, Political outsiders, on the other hand sponsible to )lit not e Irec ) , bl" -most iml)Ortantlv, I I, 'h' f the moderate Repu Icans , counterelites, insurgents, ref
nominating an increasing number of Jews and Italians for public office 100 (4) ,/ a trend that culminated in its first ethnically balanced ticket (including an ,/ '"c 90 Incumbent (18) (13) ,/ Irishman, Italian, and Jew for three top citywide offices) in 1945. In addi o Judicial (~ __ - __(~ __ ./ tion, Democratic machine politicians made peace with the New Deal. In .-=.. 80 19.37 Tammany did back an anti-Roosevelt candidate in the Democratic ~ ~3l // ~ 70 'I ...... (13) / mayoral primary, but in 1941 and 1945 it joined with the other county Dem .~ / ...... / (3) iii 60 ocratic organizations in support ofa New Deal liberal, William O'Dwyer, for / (6) "0 - \ mayor. The Democrats also nominated candidates jointly with the ALP In / *c 50 / , deed, they continued to do so for a period even after the ALP's left-wing 'E \ ~ 40 Nonlncumbent " \ faction (in which Communists and fellow travelers were influential) gained i JUdICI~ ,,' control of the party in 1944, and the ALP's moderates bolted and organized .~ 30 ..., Legislative & , Executive the Liberal party. In particular, during the 1945 municipal elections the "0 20 Democrats and the ALP united behind the slate headed by William (1)', O'Dwyer, while the Republicans united with the Liberals behind a compet ing ticket. The Democratic/ALP slate then scored a solid victmy. o (0) (0) (0) After regaining control of City Hall in 1945, the Democrats sought to put an end to the political uncertainty and upheaval of the 19,30s and early 1940s 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 and to stabilize their rule. There were four interrelated aspects to this en Note: Parentheses indicate raw number of jointly-nominated major party candidates deavor. First, the leaders of the Democratic party entered into a series of FIGURE 6.1 Major Party Collusion in New York City: Elective Positions collusive relationships with their GOP counterparts. Second, as the Cold for Which Democrats and Republicans Nominated a Common Candi 'War intensified and the costs of tolerating Communists and fellow travelers date, 1943-1950 (Source: Ncw York City Board of Elections, Annllal increased, the Democrats and Republicans undertook to isolate politically Report, 1943-50) and destroy the city's Communist party and the ALP. Third, top Democrats in the city undertook to purge from the system machine politicians who publicans developed in the 19405. The major parties jOintly nominated a were closely allied with gangsters and who had gained influence within common candidate in an ever-increasing proportion of elections involving Tammany in the 1930s and 1940s. Fourth, the Democrats during the 1940s incumbent judges in the 19405. In judicial elections involving noninCllm and 1950s sought to work out a relationship with the city's growing black bents, and in elections for legislative and executive positions, joint nomina population that would win the votes of racial minorities without alienating tions increased significantly in the mid-1940s, and then declined. whites in the process. Why did the Republicans and Democrats forgo opportunities to compete, and instead come to tenns with one another in these ways? In answering this ( question it is useful to discuss first the purposes or ends the major parties MAJOR PARTY COLLUSION achieved through collusion, and then to consider why they pursued these goals through collusion more in the period following the Democratic recap During the late 1940s and the early 1950s the leaders of New York's regular ture of City Hall in 1945 than they had during the previous dozen years. Democratic and Republican party organizations established a modus vi The first goal that the Democrats and Repuhlicans sought to achieve { l vendi with one another. This major party detente took a number of forms. through bipartisan collusion was to isolate and destroy the ALP and the d First, the Democrats and Republicans sponsored changes in the rules of city's Communist party. The most important changes in election law they electoral com hat that were beneficial to the leadership of the two major sponsored in the late 1940s were the Wilson-Pakula law, which, as will be parties. Second, the Democrats provided the Republicans with patronage described below, worked to the disadvantage of the ALp, and the repeal of in exchange, essentially, for agreeing not to contest seriously Democratic proportional representation (PR) in elections for the New York city council, ( control of the municipal government. Thinl, and finally, as Figure 6.1 indi which was 'ustifi .Iiminating Communist representation on cates, a remarkable pattern ofjoint nominations by the Democrats and Re the council. (One Communist had been electe 0 he twelity-three-nlember 206 C H A PT E R 6 POL I TIC A LIN COR P 0 RAT ION A N 0 EXT R 1I S ION 207 city council in 1941 and a second was elected in 194.5.) In addition, many of once it was completed Flynn thereafter presented the voters of his bowugh the bipartisan nominations of the Democrats and Republicans were directed with straight Democratic tickets, eschewing alliances even with the pro against candidates of the ALP or the Communist party. Fair Deal Liberal party. In a slightly diflerent vein, the major parties in A second reason why the leaders of New York City's major parties col Bwoklyn united behind a common candidate for borough president in 19.53 luded with one another was to enhance organizational control over the nOIll because the Liberals fielded a candidate that year who appeared to be strong inating process and over the behavior of public officials. Although the elec enough to win a plurality in a divided field. The Democrats and Republicans tion of Communists to the city council was the major argument used by joined forces not so much to preserve internal discipline as to protect major Democratic and Repuhlican leaders in the successhll 1947 campaign against party domimmce of the electoral arena in their borough. C. PR, this was not their only motive in opposing it. They had fought against PR The final incentive for bipartisan collusion was that it enabled the leaders since it had been proposed in 1936, five years before a Communist was first of the regular Republican organization to buttress their position within the elected to the council. Their strongest objection to PR was that it weakened GOp, and it was a means by which the Democrats could ensure that the their ability to dominate the nomination ancl election of councilmen: candi nominal opposition party in the city would be controlled by leaders more dates who established an independent name for themselves had a clear elec in terested in reconciling themselves to the Democratic pa~ty' s hegemony toral advantage over other members of their party; sllch candidates had a than challenging it. Generally speaking, within the Republican party collu great deal ofleverage in seeking a major party nomination, and to the extent sion with the Democrats was supported most strongly by the leaders of the that they were not beholden to the organization f()r their nomination or elec county organization and opposed most vigorously by the rank-and-file (espe tion, they did not have to pay heed to its leaders once they were in office. An cially in districts where the GOP was strongest), who regarded it as collabo indication of the lengths to which the Republican leadership was prepared rating with the enemy. By cooperating with the Democrats, Republican to go to reassert organizational control over city councilmen is that they county leaders could gain control of patronage that coulc! be used to reward supported a return to plurality elections in single-member constituencies subordinate politicians who were loyal to them, thereby solidifying their even though this drastically (and predictably) reduced Republican represen leadership positions.16 The Democrats, for their part, had every incentive to tation on the council from four of the twenty-three seats in 194.5 to one of strengthen the position within the GOP of leaders who were prepared to twenty-five in 1949. Evidently, Republican leaders attached limited value to collaborate with them. The Bronx, whose party organization was the strong the election of councilmen who, though nominal members of the party, were est in the city, provides the most striking example. John Kncwitz, who was not beholden to them. elected Bronx Republican leader in 191.3, was appointeel as commissioner of The desire of the leaders of the major party organizations to preserve their records in the Surrogate's Court by the Democrats in 1918 und retained this control of the nominating process was also one of the motives behind many appointment throughout Ed Flynn's tenure (1922-.53) as Bronx Democratic of the joint Democratic-Republican nominations of the post-war era. It is leader. Flynn and his successor, Charles Buckley, also took care of lesser significant that the most comprehensive of these bipartisan cartels-a joint members of the Bronx Repuhlican organization, anti this enabled Knewitz to Democratic-Republican ticket in the 1948 state legislative elections in the hold on to his county leadership until his death in 19.57-a period of f(lI"ty Bronx-was arranged by Ed Flynn, who ran the most tightly centralized four years. In return Knewitz cooperated closely with Flynn and Buckley.17 county party organization in New York City. Flynn wanteel to destroy the In a similar fashion, Manhattan .Republican leader lc)m Curran found ALP not solely-or even primarily-for ideological reasons but because it cooperation with the Democrats useful for maintaining control over his or presented a threat to discipline within his machine. In districts where the ganization. Curran became county leader in 1941, and in that year he agreed ALP held the balance of power, a candidate who might secure that party's to the first ofwhat was to become nine consecutive multiparty endorsements endorsement had a great advantage in obtaining a major party nomination, of Frank Hogan, a nominal Democrat, for district attorney. Two years later and if he could bring Labor party votes to a joint ticket he was in that mea he negotiated the first in a series of bipartisan nominations for I~onincum sure not beholden to the regular party organization for his victory. More bent judges. In 1945 Curran refused to back La Guardia for the Republican over, once in office such a legislator had to pay heed to th~ wishes of the mayorall1omination, and even went so far as to propose that the Republicans ALP's leaders ifhe wanted to obtain the Labor party's nomination again. To and Democrats join behind a common candidate to defeat any bid La Guar Flynn such divided loyalties were intolerable, and therefore he arranged a dia might make for a fourth term or any candidate La Guardia might desig bipartisan cartel with his Republican counterpart in 1948. This purge of all nate as his successor. That year Curran endorsed Jonah Goldstein, a Tam Bronx assemblymen and senators with ALP connections was successful, and many Democrat, as the Republican nominee for mayor in the hope that the 208 CHAPTEH 6 POL I TIC A LIN C 0 H P 0 RAT ION AND EXT R U S ION 209
Democrats might join forces with the Republicans if the joint ticket was Neither party, however, exploited these powers as much as it could have headed by a member of their party. Manhattan Republicans got a reasonable to injure the other; rather, divided control of the institutions of government amount of patronage from the Democrats in return lor this cooperation, and became the basis for mutually beneficial transactions between the Republi this contributed to Curran's being able to retain his position until his death cans and Democrats. For example, in 1954 the legislature reapportioned in 1959, twenty-eight years after becoming county leader. . state senatorial districts on Manhattan's \Nest Side in a way that suited the Although the leaders of the regular Repuhlican and Democratic party Democrats, in return for the city council's redrawing assembly district lines organizations in New York found bipartisan collusion advantageous for these so as to provide the Republicans with two reasonably secure seats on the reasons, they had not pursued this course of action as extensively in the East Side. Two years later the legislature created several new Supreme 1930s and early 1940s as they did in the mid-1940s and early 19.'50s. What Court judgeships in New York City in exchange for a promise of Democratic accounts for this change? endorsement of Republican candidates for some of these positions. There are two conditions under which party leaders are especially likely One other form of bipartisan comity following the Republican accession to collude with one another, and both increasingly came to characterize New to power in Albany is worth mentioning at this point. Although in 1943 a York politics during the postwar years. IS The first obtains when joint action wiretap On the telephone of New York's leading gangster, Frank Costello, will enable the leaders of the major parties to stave off a common threat or indicated that Costello exercised considerahle influence in Tammany, an achieve a common gain. The various steps the Democrats and Republicans investigation of ties between gangsters and politicians in New York was not took to crush the ALP and the Communists fall in this category. These splin initiated until 1951, the year that a committee of the U.S. Senate chaired by ter parties were no stronger when the Democrats and Republicans began a Estes Kefauver conducted televised hearings that gave sensational publicity concerted drive to isolate and destroy them than they had been a few years to this state of affairs. The investigating committee appointed by Governor earliel~ but the onset of the Cold War increased the costs of cooperating with Dewey, the Proskauer Commission, did hold one set of hearings in 1952 to them and provided the major parties with a pretext for taking steps (for look into the matter, but then it turned its attention to other issues, in partic example, the abolition of proportional representation) to tighten their con ular, labor racketeering on the New York watedront. trol over nominations and elections. To account for these various forms of bipartisan collusion and comity it is The second condition under which major parties are likely to collude ob not necessary to suppose that they were all part of some grand concordat tains when each is in a position to impose costs or confer benefits upon the arranged through explicit negotiations between the two parties. Some of the other. Such a state of affairs exists most clearly when the diflerent levels of agreements described above were arrived at through such negotiations, and government are controlled by different parties, because each party then in these cases Republican control of the state government ancl Democratic commands authority that can be used for bargaining purposes. This situation dominance in the municipal arena provided each party with bargaining prevailed in New York beginning in 1945.19 The Republicans had gained counters. But in other instances the following process appears to have been control of the governorship ancl the state legislature in 1943-a hammerlock at work: as the Democrats consolidated their hold over New York City's on the state government they retained for all but four of the next twenty-two government in the 19405, GOP politicians reconciled themselves to Demo years-and in 1945 the Democrats gained control of the mayoralty and cratic control of City Hall. The Democrats had every incentive to encourage Board of Estimate, and they held on to them for the next twenty years. the Republicans to accept this state of affairs by giving them some patron This set the stage for many of the collusive arrangements discussed above. age, and the Republicans, so as not to upset this modus vivendi, were dis Control over the state government made it possible for the Republicans to inclined to make me of their eontrol of the state government in Albany to pass or kill bills of vital interest to Democratic politicians and public officials threaten the Democratic hegemony in city politics. in New York-in particular, legislation establishing the boundaries of con gressional and state senatorial districts, amending the election law, and cre ating new judgeships. It also enabled the Republicans to conduct investiga MINOR PARTIES tions of the city government. In a similar vein, control of the White House in the 1950s gave Republicans the opportunity to appoint U.S. Attorneys During the late 1940s and the 19.'505 Democratic machine politicians in New who could investigate corruption in New York City. Control over the mayor York undertook to establish a mutually beneficial relationship not only with alty and the other institutions of municipal government gave Democrats, in their Republican counterparts but also with the Liberal party. By establish turn, the power to grant patronage and favors to the Republicans. ing such a relationship they sought to win the support of left-of-center Jew 210 CIIAPTEH 6 POLITICAL INCORI'OHATION AND EXTRUSION 211 ish voters. In appealing fc)r this support, however, Democratic leaders did Sidney Hillman (the one major garment trades union leader who "emained not want to alienate other elements of their party's constituency. Conse in the ALP when Dubinsky and Rose bolted) and the departure of Hillman's quently, as the Cold 'Val' intensified, they undertook to isolate and destroy union, the Amalgamated Clothing "Vorkers, from the party in 194H.21 the American Labor party as well as the city's Communist party (CP). Another important difference be tween the Liberals and the ALP was or This endeavor was remarkably successfilL"° In the 194.5 mayoral election ganizational: the Li berals commanded a less extensive and less highly artic 122,:316 votes had been east on the Liherallinc anel thc party had been allied ulated organization than the Labor party. There were several components of with the Hepublicans. By the 195:3 mayoral election the Liheral vote almost the ALP's organization. First, the party had a network oflocal dubs through quadrupled (to 467,1(4) and the party was on the verge ofa standing alliance which it was able to mobilize thous~;nds of enthusiastic party militants e to with the Democrats in city politics. On the other hand, the ALP went from work on neighborhood issues, as well as in primary and general election 257,929 votes and an alliance with the Demoerats in 194;3 to fewer than campaigns.24 For example, in a congressional by-election in the Bronx in one-fllUrth as many votes (,53,04.5) and political isolation in 19.5:3-and to 1948, two thousand party workers canvassed on elcction day for the ALP extinction befl)re the next lIlunicipal electioll. The Labor party suffered this candidate, Louis Isaacson, enahling him to win without a major party nomi fate, moreover, even though in the 1930s and 1940s it had commanded the nation in a district that normally gave overwhelming margins to the Demo loyalty of thousands of dedicated and hardworking activists, many of whom crats.25 Second, the ALP had dose ties to the unions affiliated with the CIa's engaged in union and community organizing as well as electoral canvassing. Greater New York Industrial Council. By virtue of these ties the party was Despite this extensive support and the dedication of its cadres, the ALP able to involve the shop stewards ofcia unions in its campaigns.26 The third was destroyecl with a combination of the stick and the carrot.2l The major component of the ALP organization was the following that was brought into parties made it increasingly difficult for New Yorkcrs to participate effec the party by Fiorello La Guardia's protege, East Harlcm congressman Vito tively in city politics through the Labor party. At the same time, the mem Marcantonio. 27 rvfarcantonio's organization was bound together by a pecu bers of ethnic groups that had supported tbe ALP were encouraged to par liar blend of machine politics and [lrogrammatic radicalism whose closest ticipate through channels (such as the Liberal party) and in ways (primarily analogue in American history was probably the f()llowing assembled by voting) more acceptable to established f()rces in the city. Huey Long in Louisiana in the HJ20s and 19.30s. In contrast to the ALp, the Liberals did not cornmand a very extensive organization. True, the Liberal party had dose ties with the ILGWU and The Liberal Party and the American Labor Party the millinery union, but these unions supplied the party with money more than manpowe r. It is also true that the Jewish fi'aternal organization the There were three differences between the Liberal party and the ALP that Workmen's Circle was affiliated with the party and that New York's leading made the major parties br more willing to tolerate the former than the latter. Yiddish newspaper, the JeWish Daily Forward, consistently supported it, but The first of these was ideological. The idcoloi-,J'Y of thc Liberal party was what in the final analysis by far the II10St valuahle resource controlled by the its name indicated, and the best way to understand what it meant to call Liberal party was its line on the ballot. In bargaining with the major parties, oneself "liberal" (as opposed to "progressive") whcn the party was f{mnded the Liberals offered their candidates slots on its ballot line, not campaign in HJ44 is to note that the issue that led it to split ofT fj'OIn the ALP was workers. anti-Communism. David Dubinsky, president of the International Ladies Finally, there were Significant differences hetween the ethnic composi Garment Workers Union (I LGWU), and Alex Rose, president of the Hat, tion of the two parties. The Liberal party was overwhelmingly JeWish. A Cap, and :vlilliners Union, walked out of the ALP when the primary elec number of WASP intellectuals and the prcsident of an Italian local in the tions to select members of its state committee were won by the party's ILGvVU occupied high offices in the Liberal state organizatioll, but other left-wing faction. The f~lction was composed of Communists, fellow trav wise Jews dominated all levels of the party. The party was efkctively con elers, and supporters ofthe New Deal who were not so implacably hostile to trolled by David Dubinsky and Alex Hose, and the weight of Jews among the Communist party that they were ullwilling to cooperate with it I,ll' the those who voted for it is suggested by an extremely high correlation of .88 sake of helping Roosevelt to win a l'lUrth term and hj s supporters to win between the Liberal vote in the 1945 mayoral election and the Jewish popu elections to other offices. 22 Though they comprised but a mil,1ority of the lation of the city's neighborhoods.28 ALP's members, Communists and their dosest sympathizers exercised sub The ALP was more ethnjcally heterogeneous than the Liberals. To be stantial influence over party policy, especially after the death in HJ46 of sure, there were more Jews at all levels of the party than membcrs of any 1 212 CHAPTER 6 POLITICAL INCORPORATION AND EXTRUSION 21:3 other ethnic group, but the ALP (and its close ally, the CP) did esta~l.ish Outside the polls they distributed to the voters a last reminder in the form of some beachheads within the city's Italian-American and ,black ~ommUnI,tles, instruction cards and pencils. Each pencil was inscribed in bold letters: PETER and it even won a modicum of support among the New ):o~k. I.l'Ish. As fOl the v, CACCHIONE. J1 first of these ethnic groups, the two most prominent polItICian: who were b' f the ALP Mayor La Guardia and Congressman Vito Marcan This effort did not quite suffice to overcome the handicap of his name not me~ el s 0 Italian A~ericans and of the four Italians who served on the city tOnIO, were -, I d b t'onal appearing on the ballot, but in the next three elections, when it did, Cac council during the period (1937-49) when it was e ecte y propor I chione won a seat on the city council. In the last of these, the election of representation, one was a member of the ALP and the other, Pet~r V. Cac 1945, he won more votes than any other candidate from Brooklyn. chione was a member of the Communist party (the other two wele Demo The extensive organizations commanded by the ALP and CP also pro crats). Maurice Isserman describes the ethnically heterogeneous .character vided them with links to New York's racial minodties. lVlarcantonio's per of Cacchione's political base as follows: "Jewish neighborho~ds III Br~ok sonal organization linked the ALP to the Puerto Ricans and blacks in his Iyn were the strongest center of Communist popular suppor~ III the Umted district. And just as the two radical parties provided Marcantonio with cam States. Coney Island, Brighton Beach, FI~tbush.' BrownsvIII~, EaT~t ..Ne\~ paign workers from elsewhere in the city to help him mobilize voters in York, Williams burgh, as well as some Itahan neighborhoods III ,,\ Ilhams East Harlem, so too did they provide such assistance to the politicians with burgh, Red Hook, Bay Ridge, and the Brooklyn waterfront, and pockets of whom they were allied in the black community ofCentral Harlem. The most th in black and Irish areas formed a kind of Red belt that turned out, s t reng . "29 prominent of these black politicians was Adam Clayton Powell, who con election after election, to back CacchlOne. d h CP h I structed a personal following for himself that was akin to Marcantonio's, but The extensive organizations commanded by the ALP an teep who also found allying with the ALP and CP helpful in securing election to account for the ability of radical candidates to win the support of such an the city council and then the U nitecl States Congress. The other major figure ethnically heterogeneous coalition. M~rcantonio wa~ able .~o .tu.rn. ~ut ~he in the politics of New York's black community who was supported by the members of his following in DemocratIc and RepublIcan pl\man~s, ~s \\ ell city's radical parties was Benjamin Davis. Davis was a member of the na as in general elections, by relying in part upon the personal. or~~mza.tlOn h.~ tional executive committee of the Communist party, and the support of the constructed in his district and in part on an army of can:assers sent mto hiS CP and ALP enabled him to secure election to the city council in 194,3 d · t " t b ; ALP clubs the CIa Industrial Union CounCIl, and the Commu (succeeding Powell, who left to run for Congress) and to win reelection in IS IIC " . '1 an Peter 1945,32 . t . t' 30 SI'milarIy the campaigns of Communist city counci m ' ms par y., , . h' d d th , t Cacchione were models of electoral organIzatIon-so. muc ~o, m ~e. ' . ~ Finally, labor unions affiliated with the ALP and subject to the influence when the Board of Elections discovered a Raw in hiS electIOn petItions III of the CP provided these radical p,Jrties with some links to Irish voters in the 1939 and denied him a place on the ballot, the Brooklyn branch of ~he Com~ 19:30s and 1940s. The two most important such unions were Mike Quill's munist party organized an extraordinary wri~e-~n camp~ign on .1~ls beh~I.f. Transport Workers Union and Joseph Curran's National Maritime Union. Even discounting the hyperhole in the descnptlOn of thiS campaign by IS To be sure, the ALP and CP by no means threatened to displace the machine official biographer, it was quite impressive: as the dominant political force in New York's Irish neighborhoods, but they were able to elect QUill to the city council from the Bronx three times be 226 countle~s Pete went on a whirlwind drive, speaking at meetings, homes, tween 1937 and 1945.3:3 and on at least a dozen radio stations. Meanwhile, he and his committee con These differences between the ALP and Liberals provided the city's high ducted an educational crusade on two points: where on th e paper ballot to wnt~ est elected officials and the top leaders of the Democratic and Republican in Pete's name, and-this was crucial-how to spell it. No method was oveJ~ parties with strong motives to destroy the Labor party. The campaign against looked. Youth supporters wore white jerseys with the boldly stenCilled legend. the ALP was initiated by these city'wide leaders and it often encountered PETEH v. C,\CCIIIO'iE, . , resistance from candidates running for ofJices elected by neighborhood con Two baseball teams toured park diamonds shOWing fims how to wnte 10 stituencies and from subordinate party functionaries. Such resistance arose Peter's name. Shopping hags with Pete's name were distributed near superma~' in districts where the number of votes candidates gained hy receiving the kets and literally hundreds of group sessions were held where spellIng Pete s endorsement of the ALP exceeded the number lost by virtue of their associ name was prac tIce' d ".. [A supporter] wrote a special campaign song, .whICh, ation with a left-Wing party. By contrast, top Democratic and Republican amplified from sound-trucks, helped many a voter get the correct spellmg, , .. leaders and public offiCials elected fi'om citywide constituencies had to 214 CHAPTER 6 POL I TIC A L 1:\' COR I' () nAT I () N A:\II) EXT nus ION 215 worry about the possihle adverse reaction of voters elsewhere in the city tricts where the ALP was strong, consolidated his control over the organiza (and even the state and natioil) to the alliances their subordinates cultivateo tion that a Tammany leader was able to enforce a prohihitioll a.gainst a!li in sllch districts with a party that was so dosely tied to the Communists; they ances with the ALP. Nor was it fC)ltuitous that this ban was established hy also had to be concerneo with the reaction to such alliances on the part the same lead r who attempteci to sever the close ties hetween Tammany of elites "vith wholll their party was allied. For example, in 1947 Mayor and the unden.vorld (see below). O'Dwyer moved to overthrow the leader of Tamnmny because he had often The Liberal party, by contrast, did not raise severe problems for top party collaborated with Vito ~-1arcantonio, and Francis Cardiml,1 Spellman had in leaders and public officials, and hence they were prepared to tolerate it, clicated that this association with someone so dose to the Communists was even though, as will be noted below, it was within their power to destroy it. J4 unacceptable to the Cllllrch.: In addition, William Hanoolph Hearst's tab ~vlost importantly, the vehemently anti-Communist ioeolo:,,'y of the Liherals loid the Daily Mi.ITur, which had the second highest circulation of any news meant that allying with it in neighhorhoods where it was strong was not paper in the city, conducted a scurrilous campaign against ~"'Iarcantonio, likely to cost the major parties votes elsewhere ill the city or the support of and, at tIl(' other end or the scale, the Tim es and the Herald Tribllne as the Catholic Church and the city's newspapers. In addition, the shallow serted in their eoitorials that Marcantonio's representation of a New York organizational structure of the Liberal party, and its concol1litant ethnic ho City district in Congress was a blot on the city's good name. The voters in mogeneity, meallt that it did not pose a threat to the political hegemony of East Harlem may have been indifferent to all of this, but the mayor could machine politicians among the city's Italiall, hlack, and Irish voters. It is true scarcelv l1e. :1.'; that the Liberal party threatened their position in the city's Jewish commu The 'ALP's ethnic heterogeneity, as well as its radicalism, contributed to nity. New York's mayors and the leaders of the Democratic and Republicall the oesire of thc leaders or the D~mocratic and Republican county organi parties in the city and state were prepared to pay this cost, however, because zations to destroy the Labor party. To the extent that the ALP succeeded in there were some compensating benefits. Alliances with the Liberals gave the mobilizing Jewish, Italian, black, and Irish voters under leaders, in the name Republicans their only chance of winning citywide elections and it gave the of doctrines, and through techniques that differed from those of the regular Democrats their only chance of win.ning statewide elections, (or the very party organizations, it presented a threat to the effort of machine politicians reason that such coalitions provided each with the best means of winning :1 to assert their leadership over the groups in question. This is not to say that substantial share of th e volatile Jewisl1 vote in the arena where it needed this the ALP threatened to win majority support among New York's Italian, support to secure a majority. In addition, alliances with the Liberals played black, Irish, or even Jewish voters, but in districts where it simply held the an important role in the campaign to destroy the ALp, hecause the Liberals balance of power it posed a threat to discipline within the major parties. could bring to this effort the support ofJewisb voters who were not prepared Public officials who depended upon ALP votes f()r th eir victory margin had to vote thc Tammany line. to pay heed to the views of the leaders of that party as well as their own if they were to win reelection. The Tammanv Hall of the micl-1940s, howeve l~ was the exception that Destroying the ALP proves the rule, ··The top leaders of the Democratic organization in Manhat tan maintained their alliance with Marcantonio and the ALP even after both ~vlayor O'Dwyel~ Governor Dew(~y, and the leaders of the Democratic and (' elite and public opinion in the city, state, and nation had turned sharply Republican parties in the city and state pursued a number of strategies in against the Soviet Union. That the leaders of Tammany were prepared to their campaign to destroy the Labor party. One of the most important of trade votes with the ALP in its strongholds, even though this alienated im these involved isolating the ALP: Repuhlicans and Democratic leaders portant groups elsewhere in the city and beyond, is a token of the narrow sought to prevent their party's subordinate officials and candidates from 0 ness of their political perspective. (Indeed, for the sake of helping the Tam striking deals with the Labor party and its candidates. The first target of this many ticket in Harlem, the organization in 1945 even endorsed Benjamin campaign was Congressman Vito Marcantonio, who, despite being the most Davis for the city council, despite the severe emharrassment this caused prominent member of the ALP's left-wing bction, had won the Republican the citywide ticket; Tammany's endorsement of Davis was only withdrawn congressional primary in 1938 and 1940 with the support ofiocal GOP com when O'Dwyer and Flynll threatened to deprive the organization of all pa mitteemen. In 1942 and 1944 Tom Curran, the Ylanhattan Republican tronage unless it did so.) Significantly, it was only after Carmine De Sapio, leadel~ told party workers in East Harlem to support the congressman's op whose perspectives extended beyond the Lower East Side and Harlem dis- ponent in the Repuhlican nomination. Few heeded Curran, h()WeVel ~ and
-=- ..~ 216 CHAPTEH 6 POLITICAL INCORPORATION AND EXTRUSION 217 Marcantonio won the Republican nomination. The tide turned when Gover only) target of Wilson-Pakula was Vito ylarcantonio, and to this extent it was nor Dewey joined the campaign to disassociate the GOP from Marcantonio a bill of political attainder. and to isolate the ALP. Threatened with a loss of patronage, Republican As indicated, YIarcantonio fililed to win the Republican nomination in the committeemen worked for Marcantonio's opponent in the 1946 primary and 1946 primary, ancl his Republican challenger was endorsed in the general deprived him of the GOP nomination. 11m state legislative candidates were election by the Liberal party. :\IIarcantonio won the Democratic primary that jointly nominated by Republicans and the ALP in 1946, roughly the same year, however, and the votes he received on the Democratic line enabled number as in earlier years, but thereafter joint Republican-ALP nominations him to triumph in the general election. The Wilson-Pakula law was designed fell to zero. to prevent a recurrence of this unfortunate outcome, that is, to deprive Mar The leaders of the Democratic party lagged behind their Republican cantonio of the Democratic nomination despite his evident ability to defeat counterparts in their efforts to defeat Marcantonio and to isolate the ALP. challengers in that party's primary. It provided that a candidate belonging to The top leadership of Tammany covertly supported the East Harlem con one party (that is, the ALP) could not enter the primary of another party (that gressman in 1942 and 1944 and openly endorsed him in 1946. The. five is, the Democrats) without receiving the permission of that party's county Democratic county leaders selected a slate of candidates for citywide offices committeemen in the district in question . In other words, to gain the Demo acceptable to the ALP in the 1945 municipal elections, and, with one impor cratic nomination Marcantonio would have to win the Support not only of a tant exception, they raised no objection in 1946 to Democratic legislative majority of the Democratic voters in his congressional distJict, but also of candidates' seeking the endorsement of the ALp, as twenty-nine of them the Democratic party workers. To meet this requirement, Marcantonio en successfully did. The exception was Bronx boss Ed Flynn. In 194.5, despite tered slates of fi'iendly candidates for county committeemen in the 1947 the Democratic-ALP alliance for citywide offices, Flynn had refused to per Democratic primary in his district. Messrs. Wilson and Pakula anticipated mit any of his organization's candidates to seek or accept ALP designations, this maneuvel~ however, and another section in their bill was designed to a ban he continued in 1946 and subsequent years. Mayor O'Dwyer and then counter it. It provided that the county committee as a whole could deprive the other Democratic leaders came around to Flynn's view, so that in the the committeemen in the district of the authority to grant the required per 1949 municipal election the Democrats did not join forces with the ALP and mission; the county committee could transfer that authority to any other in the 1950 state legislative elections not a single Democratic candidate ran duly constituted organ of the party. The Democratic county committee did with ALP support. just this; it transferred this authority to the Tammany executive commit A second strategy the major parties pursued in their effort to destroy the tee-composed of district leaders from all of Manhattan, not just Marcan ALP involved allying with the Liberal party in its stead. During the late tonio's bailiwick-and the executive committee refused to grant the East 1940s the pattern of alliances between the major parties and the Liberals Harlem congressman permission to enter the 1948 Democratic primary. recapitulated the one that had characterized their relations with the ALP Marcantonio was not the only target of \I\1i!son-Pakula, however; it was during the La Guardia years. The Republicans joined with the Liberals and directed against the ALP as a whole, as other provisions of the law indicate. reformers in municipal elections, entering fusion slates in both 1945 and A major source of the ALP's strength was its ability to mobilize thousands 1949. In elections for state offices the characteristic alliance involved the of devoted party workers to perform the dreary tasks of electoral politics. To Liberals and the Democrats, but this alliance did not appear until the late prevent these workers from helping friendly Democratic or Republican can 1940s. In the 1944 state legislative elections the Democrats joined with the didates win their own party's nomination, the law provided that the petitions Liberals (and not the ALP) to run a common candidate against the Republi necessary to enter the primmy election of one party could not be circulated cans in only 8 percent of New York City's state legislative distrids, and in by members of other parties. 1946 they did so in only 14 percent of the districts. But in 1948 the propor The Wilson-Pakula law was designed specifically to weaken the ALP; it tion of joint Democratic-Liberal nominations in state assembly and senate did not prevent the Liberal party from playing balance-or-power politics. races in New York City districts shot up to 40 percent, and it remained at or (This could easily have been done simply by forbidding candidates to appear above this level thereafter. on more than one ballot line, a provision in the election law of everv other Another strategy in the major party campaign to destroy the ALP involved state but Vermont at the time.) The Democrats and Republicans we;'e pre changing the rules under which elections were conducted in New York. The pared to tolerate the Liberal party because it was not tainted bv Commu most important of these changes were brought about by the Wilson-Pakula nism and because each calculated that the Liberals could be a ;seful elec law of 1947, a truly remarkable piece oflegislation. The chief (though not the toral ally. 218 CHAPTER 6 POLITICAL INCORPORATION AND EXTRUSION 219 In the campaign to destruy the ALP-and also the Communist party-the extensive of these hipartisan cartels was arrangeJ by the leaders of the two major parties sponsored one other important change in the laws governing major parties in the Bronx in 1948. That year in everyone of the borough's elections in New York City: the repeal of proportiunal representation in <.:ity thirteen assembly districts, and in all of its five statc senate districts, the council elections. ·Whereas the Wilson-Pakula law made it extremely diffi Democrats and Republiea.ns endorsed a common candiclute; in addition, in cult for the ALP to gain inHuence by allying with elements of the Demo four of the Bronx's five congressional districts the two major parties united cratic and Republican parties, the repeal uf PR eliminated the one mecha with the Liberals behind the same candidate. It re
POLITICAL INCORPORATION AND EXTRUSION 221 220 CHAPTER 6 predominantly Jewish districts would lead the Liberals to field a candidate, resources provided by La Guardia, was able to distribute patronage to his closest supporters and to perform favors for individual constituents. As for either on their own or in conjunction with the Republicans, who would draw Jewish votes away form the Democratic line. In other worus, the Liberal Peter Cacchione, it is likely that many Italian-Americans voted for him be party was the shotgun behind the door that made the process of ethnic suc cause he was a member of their ethnic group, not because he was a member cession work for the Jews. To make these gains, it should be noted, Jews had of the Communist party; he took every available occasion to call attention to to reject the efTorts of the ALP to assume their political leadership, for, as his being an avid fan of the Brooklyn Dodgers, and one suspects that he did this in an effort to show his constituents that despite his Communist affilia inuicated ahove, a balance-of-power strategy such as the Liberals pursued can only succeed if the major parties are willing to tolerate the minor party tion, he really was one of them. Finally, however much La Guardia was prepared to tolerate or even cooperate with the Communists, he publicly that engages in it. The collapse of the ALP and the institutionalization of the Liberal party disavowed their endorsement, and his alliances with the New Deal and the also had Significant implications for the politics of New York's black, Irish municipal reform movement were infinitely more important sources of his American, and Italian-American communities. The case of the blacks will be political success. However, even if Italian-American voters supported La Guardia, Marcan discussed in a separate section below, and of the Irish-Americans it need onlv be said that the withdrawal of labor leaders such as lvl ike Quill and tonio, and Cacchione chiefly for ethnic reasons, it remains significant that Jos~ph Curran from the ALP removed a thorn from the side of the regular they were willing to vote for public officials who were radicals or who co operated with radicals. After the ALP and the Communist party collapsed, Democratic party organization, because it ended a small but not insignifi there no longer was any organized support for radicalism in the Italian cant challenge to the political hegemony of machine politicians among the American community. Indeed, because the Liberal party was far less ethni New York Irish. The implications of the ALP's collapse for the politics of the city's Italian- cally heterogeneous than the ALp, there was limited institutional support American community warrants fuller discussion here. As mentioned above, among New York's Italian-Americans during the postwar decades for liber New York's two most prominent Italian-American politicians of the 1930s alism-for candidates such as Charles Poletti and Ferdinand Pecora, who and 1940s-Fiorello La Guardia and Vito Marcantonio-joined the ALP had been among the most prominent Italian-American politicians during the 1930s and 1940s. Rather, political leadership in the Italian-American com when it was organized in 1936 or shortly thereafter, and in the wake of the munity was assumed by machine politicians, be they Republicans or Demo factional struggles of 1944 that led the right wing to secede and form the crats, whose ties were not to the radical or liberal political activists and trade Liberal party, both remained with the ALP, now dominated by the left. Be yond this, Marcantonio's voting record in Congress on questions of both unionists among their fellow ethnics, but rather to lower middle class home domestic and foreign policy adhered quite closely to the Communist party owners and small businessmen, on the one hand, or to unions in the building line, and despite pressure from various quarters to do so, La Guardia never trades as well as to contractors, realtors, insurance brokers, and lawyers seeking to use their political connections to advance their fortunes, on the disowned his protege, nor did he undertake to purge Communists from other hand. the municipal bureaucracy. A striking example of the working relationship To be sure, machine politicians had played a prominent role in the Italian between La Guardia, Marcantonio, and the Communists occurred in 1944 when the mayor needed the support of the party's two city councilmen to American community prior to the postwar period, but after La Guardia's enact a municipal sales tax. The two--Peter Cacchione and Benjamin involuntary retirement in 1945, the repeal of PR in 1947, and the three Davis-insisted that they would never vote for the measure on the grounds party gang-up on Marcantonio in 1950, their claims to the leadership of New that it was regressive. During a council recess La Guardia got them to switch York's Italian population no longer were subject to challenge. The tradition of Italian-American liberalism and radicalism institutionalized in the ALP their votes, however, by calling :"Iarcantonio and having him intercede with Earl Browder, the party's national leader, who in turn directed the council lay largely dormant after the Labor party's destruction, until Mario Cuomo revived it in campaigning for governor of New York more than thirty vears men to support the mayor."!; later. ~ Of course, the support that Marcantonio, La Guardia, and even Cacchi one received from their constituents should not necessarily be attributed to In sum, the collapse of the ALP and the incorporation of the Liberal party their radicalism. Marcantonio and La Guardia relied upon appeals to ethnic into New York's postwar regime involved the defeat of would-be leaders of pride to rally their fellow Italians, and the East Harlem congressman, with the city's Jewish and Italian communities who were radical in ideology and
I 222 C HAP T E R 6 POL I TIC A LIN COR P 0 HAT ION AND EXT R U S ION 22:3 who relied upon the support of an extensive party organiz