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EXPLORING U.N.-LED NEGOTIATION PROCESSES

THE CASE OF THE MANHASSET ROUNDS BETWEEN

MOROCCO AND THE POLISARIO

By

Amine Ghoulidi

Submitted to the

Faculty ofthe School oflnternational Service

of American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

In

International Peace and Conflict Resolution

~wek-vh- Dean of the School of International Service 13 !Uov~ ~· ~vcz Date

2009 American University Washington D.C. 20016

AMERICAN UNiVERSITY UBf~Y UMI Number: 1484603

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ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml48106-1346 EXPLORING UN-LED NEGOTIATION PROCESSES THE

CASE OF THE MANHASSET ROUNDS BETWEEN

MOROCCO AND THE POLISARIO

By

Amine Ghoulidi

ABSTRACT

This study explores the stalemate in the U.N.-led Negotiations between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO on the status of the "Western Sahara" territory. It suggests that the

U.N., as a host and mediator of these rounds, has had a significant impact on the process and that it shares responsibility for the current stalemate. It asserts that Bercovitch's contingency framework applies generically to the Manhasset case and provides a modified version of it that better correspond to mediations by Personal Envoys of the U.N. Secretary General.

Finally, this study proposes an alternative mediation approach to the "Western Sahara" conflict that calls for a Moroccan engagement of Algeria through a secret track in parallel to the official U.N.-led Morocco-POLISARIO one.

11 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, I would like to thank Dr. Anthony Wanis-St.John and Dr. Christos Kyrou for their guidance, advice and flexibility throughout the various stages of this research. Also, this study would not have been possible without the support of few individuals that are very dear to me; namely Lauren, Seddik, Mohammed and Houcine. I am also grateful to the intellectual generosity of Anna Theofilopoulou whose insights have shaped the breadth and depth of this research. Finally, to my family members whom through the distance have been as loving and caring as they have always been, thank you.

111 TABLE OF CONTENT

ABSTRACT ...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iii

LIST OF TABLES ...... iiv

LIST OF FIGURES ...... iiiv

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ...... ix

LIST OF ACRONYMS ...... x

Chapter

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Statement ofthe Problem

Purpose of the Study

Significance and Rationale

2. HISTORY & BACKGROUND ...... 4

Western Sahara: Land, People and Conflict

The Moroccan Ambitions and the Surge of the POLISARIO

3. THE UN INVOLVEMENT AND THE ROAD TO MANHASSET ...... 15

The General Assembly Resolutions (1961-1975)

The International Court of Justice (1974-1975)

The Security Council

Negotiated Political Solution

IV 4. LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 28

Success and Failure of International Mediation

International Mediation and Negotiation

Mapping the Mediation Literature

5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ...... 43

Interviews

Research Questions and Analytical Framework

Contingency Model as Analytical Framework

Research Challenges and Limitations

6. ANALYSIS ...... 51

The Context

The Mediator

7. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 80

Context of UN Mediations

UN Mediators

The Contingency Model

The Way Forward

Synthesis

APPENDICIES ...... 89

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 114

v LIST OF TABLES

Tables

1. Categories and Sub-categories for Case Analysis ...... 49

Vl LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures

1. The Contingency Framework ...... 46

2. The Modified Contingency Framework ...... 80

Map

1. Map of Western Sahara and MINURSO Outposts (Source: United Nations) ...... 84

Vll LIST OF ACRONYMS

MINURSO United Nations peacekeeping mission in Western Sahara

UN United Nations

POLISARIO Frente Popular para la la Liberaci6n de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio del Oro

PUNS Partido de la Union Nacional Sahraui

OAU Organization of African Unity

GA General Assembly

ICJ International Court of Justice sc Security Council

SG Secretary General

Vlll CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Statement ofthe Problem

Since the signature ofthe 1991 ceasefire and the deployment ofthe United Nations peacekeeping mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO) little progress has been made towards the resolution of the three-decade long conflict. The U.N., having intervened through its various bodies, has adopted different and sometimes contradictory postures in an attempt to break through the stalemate. Yet, all of its prescriptions, all quasi-zero-sum, have failed in bringing about a closure to what grew to become a conflict of attrition that has aborted individual states' development endeavors as well as efforts for regional economic-cultural and political integration.

The Manhasset Negotiations were an attempt to bring about a new type of interaction mainly between the primary parties, that are the Kingdom of Morocco and the

Frente Popular para la la Liberaci6n de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio del Oro (POLISARIO).

Undertaken under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary General through his Personal Envoy to Western Sahara Peter van Walsum, the negotiations have taken the form of a series of four rounds that brought together not only Morocco and the POLISARIO but also Algeria and Mauritania, the former being the host of the POLISARIO'S government in exile and the major political and military supporter of the front. Nevertheless, after four rounds of negotiation the process came to a halt; the Personal Envoy ofthe UN's Secretary 1 2

General's contract was not renewed and the threat of escalation looms in the background.

What are, then, the conditions that have lead to the current impasse in the Manhasset

Negotiations process?

Purpose of the Study

While Peter van Walsum, the former Personal Envoy and the Manhasset process mediator, blamed the seeming failure of the negotiation rounds primarily on the Security

Council's "unwavering view that there must be a consensual solution to the question of

Western Sahara," others faulted the parties for their unwillingness to move forward with the process. This study explores the causes of failure of the Manhasset Negotiations process. It is anticipated that through a better understanding of the different elements of the U.N. mediated negotiation process as well as at the U.N.'s internal structural components that interfere and affect the conduct of U.N. led mediation endeavors, more informed decisions could be made by both the parties to the conflict and the mediating body in the conduct of future negotiations.

Significance and Rationale

This study derives its significance from the researcher's desire to understand the negotiation dimension of a conflict that has defined the political identity of his home country -Morocco- for over three decades. Little has been written on the "Western

Sahara" conflict and even less on the Manhasset Negotiations. Moreover, the timing of the research is important as the negotiations, while they have reached a deadlock, are still officially expected to continue as sanctioned by Security Council resolutions 1754 and

1783 and by recent Secretary General's statements. Finally, the researcher believes that in 3

a time of escalation and threat of war such a study would provide some understanding of the complexity of the Manhasset negotiations which would hopefully help educate future endeavors of conflict resolution by the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General of the

United Nations. CHAPTER2

HISTORY & BACKGROUND

"Western Sahara": Land, People and Conflict

The Land

The "Western Sahara" is a territory roughly the size of Great Britain bordered by the Atlantic Ocean to the West, Mauritania to the south and the east, Algeria to the northeast and Morocco to the north (See Appendix A for map). Having been formerly called Spanish Sahara under Spanish rule the territory is believed to be one of the last contested territories on the African continent.

Having no oases of consequence the dry plain has always constituted a challenge for explorers and visitors. With early European explorers going missing the Sahara remained un-demystified for centuries (Pazzanita 2006). Historically, the "Western

Sahara" with its contemporary borders has never been an independent entity having always been under the sovereignty of different polities during different periods of history.

This is an important element in the Moroccan argumentation, used to justify its annexation in the early 1970s.

The "Western Sahara" is comprised of two main regions divided along the twenty-six parallel in 1962 by the Spanish administrators (Damis 1983). North is Saguia el-Harnra, a province named after the main river in the region with a third of the overall 4 5

territory. South of the twenty-sixth parallel is Rio de Oro with the largest share of land and one of the most sparsely populated areas in the continent. The temperatures in the territory can ascend to more than 50 degrees Celsius while rainfalls are as scarce as the prospects of a resolution to the three-decade long conflict, usually not exceeding 50 mm per year.

Seen from a larger geographic perspective, the territory of"Western Sahara" (or the Southern Provinces as they are called in Morocco) only constitutes a small portion of the large and equally unwelcoming Sahara that extends from the shores of the Atlantic in the West to the Red Sea in the east representing the largest continuous desert area in the world (Damis 1983). It overcompensates for its lack of water and population with an abundance of other untapped natural resources such as phosphate.

With a deposit estimated to more than 10 billion tons, "Western Sahara" holds the world's second largest reserve of high-grade phosphate which is an easily extracted key component in the production of fertilizers and uranium to a lesser significant extent

(Zoubir 1998). By 1975, about 3 million tons of Sahrawi phosphate were extracted and exported, a figure that dropped dramatically four years later as a direct consequence of the war (Hodges 1984).

Throughout the decades, there have been speculations on the existence of untapped Oil deposits underneath the surface of the "Western Sahara" territory. These speculations were consolidated by the recent agreements signed between the government of Morocco and several international oil companies with the aim of locating potential oil deposits in the territory. However, giving in to pressures from pro-POLISARIO lobbies and NGOs in Europe and the US, companies such as the French Total Group and the 6

American Kerr-McGee Corporation withdrew from the Saharan region (Olsson 2006).

While using the argument of international legality, supported by the recent UN's legal opinion on this matter, to counter such Moroccan endeavors in the territory, the

POLISARIO unorthodoxly engaged in equally controversial ventures by licensing in

2002 British Premier Oil and Fusion Oil & Gas companies for oil exploration in the disputed territory (Olsson 2006). The Front went even further by holding two rounds of oil allocation in 2005 and 2008 the details of which have yet to be revealed (Campos

2008). Surely, the ruckus surrounding these prospection projects, that have yet to yield to any discovery of consequence, added an additional dimension of complexity to the conflict while creating a precedent that may influence any decision of future exploitation of"Western Sahara's" natural resources.

The POLISARIO and its ally-organizations were relatively successful in pushing most companies to discontinue their hydrocarbons exploration commitments. They have, however, been less triumphant when it came to the other major natural resource of the territory: the fisheries. With a coastline that spans more than one thousand-one hundred kilometers, "Western Sahara" is blessed with one of the most fertile fishing grounds of the continent (Damis 1983, 4 ). The quasi -depletion of Morocco's northern fish resources due to over-exploitation has aroused the longing for a further exploitation of the Sahrawi fisheries made primarily of low-value sardines and high-value cephalopods (Olsson 2006,

18). Similarly, European nations, having traditionally fished in Moroccan and Sahrawi waters under the Madrid Agreement, could not be indifferent to this new ecosystemic reality and sought, through a new partnership agreement, to ensure their sustained exploitation of the fisheries in question. The EU/Morocco Fisheries Partnership 7

Agreement saw light in the spring of 2006 following six years of negotiations. In order to circumvent any potential legal controversy surrounding the issue of Western Saharan waters, the agreement explicitly included waters under Moroccan control rather than

Moroccan sovereignty (Olsson 2006, 18).

The People

Prehistorically, it is generally believed that blacks populated the Saharan territory.

(Damis 1983, 5) However, some archeological explorations suggest the Berbers are the first known inhabitants ofthe territory (Hodges 1983). Many ofthese Berbers converted to Islam subsequent to the first Muslim expeditions to the region (Hodges 1983). The

Arabs had little interest in the Sahara with its arid and unwelcoming climate. Its importance in their eyes, however, grew with the construction of wells and the proliferation of trade between the northern and sub-Saharan parts of Africa. Control of these trade routes became a major source of tension between the various sub-tribes of the region. As offshoots of the Berber Zenata and Sanhaja tribes, these sub-tribes united behind some religious leaders forming strong groupings that had the capacity to expand north and westward. One of these groupings became known as the Almoravids ( 1061-

1147).

Led by Ibn Yacin, the Almoravids (or al-murabitin in Arabic) soon started their

Jihad against the superstition still influential among the nomads (Hodges 1983). With

Abu Bakr Ibn Omar as their military leader, they eyed the gold of the Kingdom of Ghana with its widespread animism to the south, succeeding in Islamizing its aristocracy and causing the collapse of its political and military institutions. They also started moving 8

northward reaching the Atlantic plains of Morocco under the leadership ofYusuflbn

Tashfin who would later found the city of Marrakech, capture the city of Fez and some parts of western Algeria, and cross the Straits of Gibraltar to consolidate Muslim control over parts of Spain (Hodges 1983 ). Under his leadership, the Almoravid Empire stretched from Saragossa in Spain to the Senegal River (Hodges 1983 ).

However, this control was only nominal. The empire was in reality divided in two; a northern empire under the control of Yusuf Ibn Tashfin and a southern empire led by Abu Bakr Ibn Omar in the Sahara that had little to no interaction with the northern one

(Hodges 1983). This division reflected, in fact, a personal conflict between the two leaders and a desire of Ibn Tashfin to maintain his control over the part of the empire to the north. It is this particular reading of history that opponents to the Moroccan claim over the territory use to challenge its authority. The empire eventually collapsed due to a combination of internal tribal strife in Morocco and the desert, and a resumption of the

Christian conquest of Spain.

The Conflict

The "Western Sahara" conflict has dominated the North African politics for the last 40 years. It is a conflict that has polarized the region and has been detrimental to most efforts of regional integration the last which was the French-initiated Union for the

Mediterranean; a project that was implicitly rejected by Algiers which conditioned its membership to the resolution of the "Western Sahara" conflict. 1

1 For more information on the Algerian rejection of the French project visit http://www.magharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtmll/fr/features/awi/newsbriefs/general/2008/05/13/newsbrief­ Ql and http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5g130e4jTvmpl72f 3yN riL VOmCg (Accessed: 07-15-2009) 9

It is no exaggeration to claim that the conflict has been the single most predominating issue in the Moroccan politics; a little bit less so for the other parties whose stakes in the conflict are not as existential as the ones of Morocco. The Sherifian

Kingdom considers the restitution of the territory to be the natural sequel to its independence from France. Algeria, however, notwithstanding the significant financial and diplomatic support it lends to the Frente POLISARIO, contends that it is not a party to the conflict and that at the center to the conflict is the failure of Morocco and the international community to provide the conditions for the free expression of the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination. Even though Mauritania was one of the original parties at the offset of the conflict; it no longer plays a significant role in its dynamics. It should be noted, however, that Mauritania shares several hundreds of kilometers of border with the territory making the country particularly sensitive to any development in the status of the Western Sahara dispute.

In 1958, two years after Morocco gained its independence the Moroccan monarch, Mohammed V, formally laid its claim to "Western Sahara" before the United

Nations (Pazzanita 2006). Motivated by a certain interpretation of history and what his opponents called expansionist aspirations for a greater Morocco, the king along with the leadership of the Party of Liberation, attempted in the following years to [re ]gain control over the "Western Sahara" region. This endeavor has shaped the domestic and foreign policies of the kingdom for the last 50 years and has weighed heavily on the Moroccan economy as it is reported that the actual "occupation" costs an average of 1 million

Dollars a day for the Moroccan economy (Zoubir 1998). 10

The Moroccan Ambitions and the Surge of the POLISARIO

The 50s and 60s brought significant changes to the lives ofthe Sahrawi population (Pazzanita 2006). The growing Spanish exploitation of the Bou-craa phosphate mines (See map in Appendix 1) and the persistence of the severe drought that afflicted the Sahara region spurred massive population movement from the marginal areas of the territory to more urban conglomerations with more employment opportunities. This dynamic along a strengthened Spanish colonial resolve created an environment of distrust and tension where "any signs of dissent ... were ruthlessly crushed" (Pazzanita 2006). Among the crushed groups was Mohammed Sidi Ibrahim

Bassiri's Barakat Tahrir Saghia el-Hamra wa Oued ed-Dahab to which can be traced the roots of what later became known as the POLISARIO Front.

With an increased sedentation came education, which in tum gave birth to a wave of well-educated Sahrawi elite who had the knowledge and the legitimacy to advocate for their people's right to self-determination (Acene-Djaballah 1985). This, among other reasons, is believed to have contributed to the emergence of Sahrawi nationalism.

Sahrawi nationalism-as a political and militant manifestation of a Sahrawi identity-is one of the many issues of contention in the "Western Sahara" conflict. Its origins and sometimes mere existence are highly contested by the different parties. Often compared to the Palestinian nationalism it is frequently discredited for being the product of reactive processes to the Spanish colonialism and the Moroccan claims to the land.

The skeptics of its legitimacy argue that the historic tribal organization and inter-tribal rivalries made it difficult, if not impossible, for a unified Sahrawi identity to emerge had not it been for the perception of a common Spanish threat. The argument that the borders 11

of"Western Sahara" did not formally exist prior to the territorial colonization is at oft­ times used as well to support the claim that Sahrawi identity and nationalism are myths and products of pseudo-collective fantasies.

Not so much a fantasy is the birth of the Frente POLISARIO which became, for better or worse, the most outspoken representative entity of the Sahrawi people.

Established by Sahrawi students and few Moroccan sympathizers, the POLISARIO was seen by many as a crystallization of a decade worth of continuous efforts to build a spokes-entity to articulate the Sahrawi claims for statehood. The front was a miniature army whose methods of resistance were inspired from similar organizations in Latin

America, Vietnam and Algeria. Some reports explicitly referred to the close involvement of the Cuban regime in using the movement as a Trojan horse to disseminate revolutionary ideals in the Arab world during the 1970s and 1980s (Acene-Djaballah

1985). Beyond speculations of Communist manipulation, the POLISARIO was able to build a strong support base within the Sahrawi populations and abroad giving a face to the Sahrawi identity.

In 1965, one year after the United Nations adopted its first resolution on "Western

Sahara," Spain was called by the same agency to initiate the de-colonization of the territory. While Spain formally accepted the resolution it delayed its execution citing the underdevelopment ofthe territories as a justification (Pazzanita 2006). Surprisingly,

Morocco and Mauritania supported the resolution but underestimated its implications.

With the increase of anti-colonial ferment within the local populations and the sharpening of international pressure Spain would soon comply but not without ensuring that at least some of its interests in the region are protected. 12

Foreseeing the implications of its withdrawal and the outcome of the eventual conflict, Spain attempted to strike different deals with the soon-to-be parties to this conflict; it ceded Ifni (see map) to Morocco and signed a tentative agreement with the

POLISARIO by which the movement will be awarded control ofthe territory if it concedes some economic benefits to Madrid. Moreover, Spain created the Partido de Ia

Union Nacional Sahraui (PUNS), a moderate party whose original mission was to compete with the POLISARIO for popular support within the Sahrawi population. Rather than consolidating the Spanish colonial hold on "Western Sahara" the PUNS' aim was to lead the transition from a Spanish rule to a full Sahrawi independence while promoting a

Sahrawi leadership favorable to the establishment of close economic and political ties with Spain. The organization, led by Khallihenna Ould Rachid, could not survive the fast­ paced developments and challenges in the territories. It eventually dissolved in May

1975, few months after its establishment. Its leader, however, defected to Morocco and would prove to be a key figure in the Manhasset negotiation process. For Morocco, Ould

Rachid symbolizes the existence of a counter current within the Sahrawi population and leadership that does not necessarily agree with the secessionist stances of the

POLISARIO.

Faced with the imminence of a Spanish withdrawal, the possibility of a handover to the POLISARIO and the organization of a referendum that could eventually lead to the independence of "Western Sahara", King Hassan II requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice about the legal and historical ties between the territory and Morocco. While the Court supported the Moroccan and Mauritanian claims of the existence of legal ties it specified that legal ties do not imply sovereignty over the 13

territory. Weeks later, Morocco, Mauritania and Spain held a round of negotiations in

Madrid by which Spain partitioned the territory between Morocco and Mauritania.

Parallel to this the Moroccan King organized a three hundred thousand man strong nonviolent march called the Green March to claim the land, a move viewed by many as a smokescreen for the deployment of several thousands of Moroccan and Mauritanian soldiers to consolidate the two countries foothold on the territory. This was viewed by the

POLISARIO as a breach ofthe UN resolution and an explicit deceleration of war.

On February 26, 1976, the day ofthe departure of the last Spanish soldier from

"Western Sahara", the POLISARIO Front declared the independence of the Saharan Arab

Democratic Republic (SADR). They then decided to move fast against Mauritania which was viewed as the front's weakest foe. The infant organization launched a reckless guerilla war against the Mauritanian troops within "Western Sahara". The attacks paralyzed the Iron Ore industry bringing the Mauritanian economy to its Knees

(Pazzanita 2006). Faced with a growing dissent at home due to the situation in "Western

Sahara" the Mauritanian leadership decided to withdraw from the territories on August 5,

1979 with the signature of the so-called Algiers agreement with the Sahrawi movement.

The POLISARIO then had one last enemy to defeat: Morocco.

Ill prepared for such a war, the Moroccan soldiers could not challenge the

Sahrawi militants advanced knowledge of the geography of the battlefield. They eventually incurred serious losses that spurred them to rethink their military strategy. To respond to POLISARIO's guerrilla warfare strategy and with the support of major foreign powers, Morocco launched an aggressive campaign aimed at pushing the POLISARIO fighters to retrieve back to their border positions (Shelley 2004). The attack did not only 14

succeed in pushing the fighters eastward but also, as the POLISARIO claims, in instigating massive population movement offsetting the refugee issue that still persists today. To consolidate its territorial gain, Morocco built an impressive send wall equipped with movement sensors and land mines. Though simple in its conception the berm was efficient in curbing the attacks against the stationed Moroccan soldiers. It eventually brought the conflict to a halt and imposed a physical status quo that still persists today. CHAPTER3

THE U.N. INVOLVEMENT AND THE ROAD TO MANHASSET

The General Assembly Resolutions (1961-1975)

The U.N. involvement in "Western Sahara" predates the 1991 Settlement Plan and the subsequent ceasefire. It goes back as far as 1961 when Spain, being the administering power, was required to communicate information on its administered territory to the U.N. instances as stipulated in Chapter XI of the U.N. Charter? Four years later, the General Assembly, through resolution 2072 (XX), called upon Spain to take "all necessary measures for the liberation of the Territories oflfni and Spanish Sahara from colonial domination and ... to enter into negotiations on the problems relating to sovereignty" with Morocco and Mauritania. At this stage, the General Assembly deemed negotiation to be the most appropriate method for the resolution of the conflict and the question of self-determination for the people of the Saharan territory was not on the agenda as the same resolution considered the conflict to be primarily a one of sovereignty

(United Nations General Assembly 1965).However, what seemed to be the beginning of a quick and peaceful territorial restitution by Morocco had a dramatic tum when the subsequent General Assemble (GA) resolution, in line with the Organization of African

Unity's (OAU) recommendations of the time, delinked, for better or for worse, the issues

2 The full advisory opinion report is accessible via the International Court of Justice's Website at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/61/6195.pdf

15 16

oflfni and Spanish Sahara, putting a stress on the inalienability ofthe Sahrawi people's right to self-determination through a referendum (United Nations General Assembly

1966).

From this point on, the United Nations will have a different take on the issue of

"Western Sahara" from the one oflfni; the latter being dealt with as a bilateral issue between Morocco and Spain which could be resolved through "dialogue" and

"negotiation" whereas the former as primarily an issue of decolonization with little room for negotiation between the interested parties that are Morocco, Mauritania and Spain.

Resolution 2428 of 1968 noted the "difference in nature of the legal status" oflfni and the Spanish Sahara as well as the difference in the processes of decolonization to be implemented in both cases (United Nations General Assembly 1968) Ifni was, thus, ceded to Morocco on June 30 of the following year and the question of the "Western

Sahara" was set to become the main issue of contention in the North African politics.

Resolution 2591 of 1969 articulated the growing international frustration with the failure of Spain to hold a referendum as it referred to the Saharan territory as the "so­ called Spanish Sahara" implicitly questioning the Spanish rights to it (United Nations

General Assembly 1969). It also reiterated past resolutions' calls for the appointment of a special mission to be sent to the territory for the purpose of "recommending practical steps for the full implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolutions" and particularly for "determining the extent of the United Nations participation in the participation and supervision ofthe referendum" (United Nations General Assembly

1969). 17

The 1970 resolution marked a milestone in the Assembly's management ofthe

Sahara issue; it not only referred to the territory as the Sahara rather than the so-called

Spanish Sahara, but it also put the conflict into a regional perspective claiming that the

territory's ongoing colonization hinders stability and harmony in the region (United

Nations General Assembly 1971). More importantly, it called upon other member states

to desist from investing in the Territory and urged them to provide the necessary

assistance to the Saharan people in what it recognized as their legitimate struggle for self­

determination and freedom (United Nations General Assembly 1971).

Three years and two resolutions later, no change in the status of the territory was

made; the special mission requested in past resolutions was not sent and the referendum

not held. There was a change, however, in the language ofthe 1973 resolution which,

while reiterating the international community's attachment to the principle of self­

determinations, refrained from mentioning the word independence. The reason for this

omission remains unknown. It should be noted, however, that 1973 was the same year of

the establishment of the Frente POLISARIO, which would later become the other major

party to the "Western Sahara" conflict.

The International Court of Justice (1974-1975)

With the intensification of the international community's pressure on Spain to

withdraw from the Sahara and the imminence of the organization of the long awaited referendum, Morocco and Mauritania decided to adopt a different and new approach which, they believed, would back up their legal claim over the phosphate-rich territory.

Accordingly, the GA, having been made aware of their desire for an International Court 18

of Justice (ICJ) opinion on the matter, adopted on December 13t\ 1974 resolution 3292

(XXIX) calling upon this judicial arm of the UN to provide an advisory opinion on the following two questions; First, the Court was asked to examine whether "Western

Sahara" (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius). And if it is not, it was required then to define the pre­ existing legal ties, if any, between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and

Mauritania.

In making its case, Morocco provided the ICJ with extensive documentation that ranged from letters exchanged between the Sultan and various Sahrawi tribal leaders to royal Dahir (or decrees) to different agreements and treaties signed between Morocco and other nations that might infer Moroccan sovereignty over the territory, which up until that day was referred to as the Spanish Sahara. Alongside Morocco was Mauritania, which in arguing its own case, provided evidence of a similar nature that meant to prove its direct or implied sovereignty over the territory prior to the Spanish colonization.

Spain, however, assumed the default defendant position and provided counter-evidence that was primarily directed to debunk the very critical Moroccan argument.

Terra Nullius

On the question of whether the Sahara was terra nullius before the Spanish colonization the Moroccan expose stressed the lack of nuance and decontextualization of the application of such a concept which, it contends, was instrumentalized to justify the expansionist aspirations of the various colonial powers during parts of the 19th and 20th 19

centuries. The anti-colonial resistance, the Moroccans claimed, is also a proof that the

Sahara had never been a terra nullius.

"Le fait que le Sahara Occidental n'ajamais constitue un terre sans maitre explique que l'Espagne n'ait jamais pu, jusqu'a une date recente, assurer le contr6le effectif de ce territoire. L'impossibilite d'une occupation effective au­ dela de trois forts c6tiers est due a la permanence de la resistance des Marocains. Meme a partir de 1912, date de la mise en place du protectorat, et en depit des atteintes subies par la souverainete d'un Maroc occupe par deux puissances etrangeres, la resistance s'est poursuivie au nom de l'unite et de l'integrite de l'Empire cherifien." (International Court of Justice 1975)

The Moroccans contended essentially that the territory referred to as "Western

Sahara" not only was not a no-man's-land at the time of the Spanish colonization but that the tribes which inhabited the territory by then had pledged allegiance to the Moroccan

Sultan. Additionally, Morocco argued that the Kingdom follows a customary constitution which is in harmony with the Islamic law but may not necessarily conform to the constitutional law in force in the European countries at the time; thus, denying its legitimacy is asserting that the totality of Morocco is a terra nullius. (International Court of Justice 1975)

The ICJ's ruling was straight-forward and adamant on whether the territory was a terra nullius:

" ... the information furnished to the court shows that at the time of colonization "Western Sahara" was inhabited by peoples, which, if nomadic, were socially and politically organized in tribes under chiefs competent to represent them ... The Court's answer to Question I is, therefore, in the negative ... "(International Court of Justice 1975) 20

Legal Ties to Morocco

By answering "no" to the first question the Court had then to arbiter on the nature of the ties, if any, between the Sahara and Morocco and Mauritania. Since the "Western

Sahara" was not terra nullius by virtue of the existence of various tribes, any party claiming sovereignty over the territory would have to prove sovereignty over these tribes.

This is particularly what Morocco attempted to demonstrate in the second part of its statement.

The major point in the Moroccan argument pertained to "immemorial possession" of the Saharan plains by the Kingdom based on two factors: that "the history of [Western

Sahara's] inhabitants is intimately linked to the Sherifian Empire" and that until 1886 foreign governments had "recognized the belonging of all territories south of Oued Draa to the Moroccan State" (International Court of Justice 1975). In making its case, Morocco did not attempt to prove its possession of the territory at the time of the Spanish colonization but rather sought to demonstrate its uninterrupted and uncontested possession through a series of events that stretch back to the Arab conquest of North

Africa (Lauterpacht and Greenwood 1997). The Court, however, deemed these events as

"spasmodic" and "transitory" rather than uninterrupted which, in the Court's opinion, renders the historical material equivocal as evidence of immemorial possession

(International Court of Justice 1975).

The Court was also requested by the Kingdom to take into account the special structure of the Sherifian State and which's relationship with the various regions and tribes ofthe country, the disputed territory included, manifested differently being intrinsically different from the structure of the European states. The Court acknowledged 21

the particularity of this structure, which it noted was" ... founded on the common religious bond of Islam existing among the peoples and on the allegiance of various tribes to the Sultan, through their caids and sheikhs, rather than on the notion of territory."

(International Court of Justive 1975)

This structural particularity manifests in the division of the Sherifian state into parts that were subjected to the authority of the Sultan dubbed Bled AI Makhzen (land of

Makhzen), and areas which evaded that authority and which were commonly referred to

Bled Siba (land of anarchy). These expressions, the Moroccans argue, are not an expression of territorial division between the two areas but rather describe sporadic insubordination by different tribes and localities to the Sultan (Makhzen) which by no means imply disunity. The Court, however, contended that this insubordination was apparent in areas north to the disputed territory; a statement that implies the unlikelihood of the existence of a stronger relationship between the central power and the Western

Saharan tribes (International Court of Justice 1975).

In support of their thesis on the Moroccan sovereignty over the disputed territory, the Moroccan delegation invoked the various treaties and agreements that the Kingdom had with foreign governments. This claim was particularly disputed by the Spanish which, in their expose, explicitly challenged the Moroccan claim by providing evidence that directly debunked the Moroccan assertion. Taking notice of all the evidence provided by the various parties the Court deemed the substantiation provided by the Moroccans insufficient to establish the international recognition of a Moroccan sovereignty in the territory. 22

The Ruling and its Aftermath

While it acknowledged the existence of ties of allegiance between the Sultan of

Morocco and some of the Saharan tribes, the Court found that the materials provided to it by the Kingdom "could not establish any ties of territorial sovereignty between the territory of"Western Sahara" and the Kingdom of Morocco." (International Court of

Justice 1975) With fourteen ofthejudges (out of sixteen) voting against the Moroccan claim and a ruling that consolidated resolution1514 (XX), the Moroccan claim was given a severe blow. The Kingdom decided then to move in the territory to establish afait accompli challenging the international legality and creating the conditions that would lead to the offset of the all out war against the POLISARIO movement.

The Security Council

The ramifications of the ruling (the likelihood of a Moroccan march onto the territory) threatened to produce a new structure of the conflict which was soon challenged by the Frente POLISARIO. The move also prompted the Security Council to issue its first resolution on October 22 on the "Western Sahara" conflict calling upon the

Secretary General to issue a report on the recent developments and appealing to the parties to exercise restraint and moderation (United Nations Security Council 1975). With the imminence of the Moroccan move into the Sahara scheduled for November 6, the SC issued another resolution calling upon King Hassan II to put an end to the declared march

(United Nations Security Council 1975). Undeterred by these calls, the Moroccan King gathered a spectacular 350,000 men-strong civilian army, made exclusively of unarmed volunteers, to cross the border into "Western Sahara". The marchers were scheduled to 23

walk down to Layoun (the territory's capital) and back facing real threats of retaliation by the Frente POLISARIO which threatened to mass people on the other side ofthe Saharan border (Damis 1983, 62).

On November 6, the day of the march, the SC issued another resolution deploring its holding and calling upon Morocco "immediately to withdraw from the Territory of

"Western Sahara" all the participants in the march" (United Nations Security Council

1975). The impact ofthe march became immediately apparent as few days later when

Morocco, Spain and Mauritania signed what would later be known as the Madrid

Agreement. The treaty ushered a new era in the history of"Westem Sahara" as it provided for the departure of the Spanish forces from the territory by February 1976 and the partition of this latter by Morocco and Mauritania. It also was an implicit move away from the previously held position of a referendum for the Self-determination of the people of the Sahara. The full text of the agreement was never released to the public, but a "declaration of principles" was published. It was, however, opaque enough to allow the

Spanish to argue that their move was not a transfer of sovereignty to the interested parties but rather of administrative authority in view of allowing the Sahrawis to freely decide on the nature of their relationship to Morocco and Mauritania (Pazzanita 2006, 249).

The Settlement Plan

For the following years, the Council was surprisingly silent on the developments within the territory. In 1988, twelve years after its last resolution, the SC passed resolution 621 calling upon the Secretary General to appoint a special representative for the first time in the history of the conflict (United Nations Security Council 1988). In 24

August of the same year, Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar submitted the so­ called settlement proposal, based on a proposal developed by the Organization of African

Unity, which was to lead to the holding of a referendum for the self-determination of the people of"Westem Sahara" (Theofilopoulou 2006). Among other things, the proposal called for the creation of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in "Western

Sahara" (MINURSO) and suggested that both parties adhere to a ceasefire, repatriate refugees and exchange prisoners. It also stipulated that the referendum electorate be based on a 1974 census undertaken by the Spanish administrative authorities before their withdrawal. The issue of voter identification and registration would prove to be the major challenge for the organization of the agreed upon referendum. While the POLISARIO had a "restricted" view desiring to include only the seventy-four thousand individuals surveyed by the Spanish census, Morocco had an "expansive" view attempting to include thousands of individuals of Sahrawi origin now living in Morocco and which were not included in the 1974 census (Theofilopoulou 2006). The issue really became then about

"who should be the determining self in the act of self-determination" (Jensen 2005, 13).

Embarking in a process that was perceived as inherently flawed could be regarded as intending to create a context for the nonviolent interaction between Morocco and the

POLISARIO leading eventually to some form of direct negotiations between the parties

(Jensen 2005, 15).

After failing to move ahead with the identification process for several years, the

Security Council became polarized about the issue with some of its member states accusing the MINURSO of partiality and lack of transparency while clearly siding with one party over the other (Theofilopoulou 2006). The UN had understood that chances that 25

a referendum be organized were close to none. This stance was explicitly articulated by the UNSG at the time, Boutros Boutros Ghali, who stated his skepticism on the matter in a briefing to the SC, citing the irreconcilability of the parties' positions as the main cause

(Theofilopoulou 2006). On May 1996, a proposal by the SG to suspend the identification process, reduce the military personnel of the MINURSO, and withdraw the police was approved by the SC and threatening the same status-quo it helped create. The interruption of the identification process and the consequent Security-Council threat to withdraw the

MINURSO prompted the parties to explore the track of direct bilateral negotiations resulting in secret talks between the Front and the Morocco in 1996. Whereas the conflict parties had already met secretly on more than one occasion in countries like Mali and

Algeria, these negotiations were the first documented official ones bringing together the

3 second in command in Morocco and some ofthe highest-ranking POLISARIO officials .

Through these negotiations, the international community was hoping that the parties would explore some positive-sum outcomes; something between independence and full integration (Theofilopoulou 2006). Morocco accepted the meeting with the condition that they remain secret and that independence would not be discussed. A pre-negotiation meeting was held in Geneva to prepare for a second meeting that was to be held in Rabat.

The Moroccan delegation for the Rabat talks was made of the Minister of the Interior,

Driss Basri, as well as the then Moroccan crown prince and current king Mohammed IV.

Despite the failure of the parties to reach any agreement, the POLISARIO perceived in the mere holding of these negotiations a success and a legitimating act. Morocco, however, attempted to downplay there importance (Theofilopoulou 2006).

3 Interview with POLISARIO Member, June 2009, Washington D.C. 26

With the process stagnating due to voter eligibility and identification issues, the

UN Secretary General at the time, Kofi Annan, nominated James A. Baker III as a

Personal Envoy hoping that a high-ranking US official would be the best person to help unfreeze the process. Although Mr. Baker was successful in initiating a series of face-to­ face meetings between Morocco and POLISARIO, culminating with the Houston

Agreements, he faced shifting resistance from the difference parties as well as Security

Council members with their diverging interests. The option of the referendum then seemed unfeasible prompting the envoy to lean more toward a mutually acceptable solution and away from a "winner-take-all" approach.

Negotiated Political Solution

No resolution embodied the Security Council's shift away from the Settlement

Plan than Resolution 1359. In addition to supporting Baker's newly initiated Framework of Agreement (FA), the resolution affirmed that "nothing would be agreed until everything has been agreed" (United Nations Security Council 2001). However, the proposal, which was intended to be a framework for the negotiation of an autonomy statute for the territory, was received with little enthusiasm by all parties and was consequently euthanized by the UN.

To break through this impasse, a more detailed and comprehensive plan was drafted by Baker dubbing it the "Peace Plan for the Self-Determination of the Western

Sahara". Inspired from the Framework of Agreement, the plan's main objective was "to give each side a fair chance to win a referendum on self-determination after a [five year long] self-governing period" (Bercovitch 1984; Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille 1991; 27

Theofilopoulou 2006). After much hesitation the POLISARIO and Algeria accepted the proposal to the surprise of Morocco which, fearing an East Timor-like scenario rejected it. Subsequently, the Security Council adopted, in April 2004, Resolution 1451 which was perceived as a regression from its position articulated in the previous resolution. Less than a month later, James Baker resigned from his position of Special Envoy to the delight of the Moroccan government. CHAPTER4

LITERATURE REVIEW

Success and Failure oflnternational Mediation

This literature review will present the different elements of an ongoing debate on the conditions that contribute to the success or failure of international mediations in general and UN-led mediations in particular. Most of the literature produced to date on this subject tends to use the term "UN-led mediations" generically without differentiating between the various bodies of this impressive bureaucracy. It should also be noted that this work is based primarily on one of the most exhaustive reviews by Kleiboer (1996) which, in itself, was largely inspired by the works of Bercovitch who remains one of the most committed scholars to the study of international mediation.

International Mediation and Negotiation

Mediation is a form of third-party intervention that is as old as conflict itself. As a conflict management method, it is rooted in both Western and non-Western civilizations taking different forms in different contexts (Bercovitch 1991 ). Mediation is also believed to be the most common ofthe third-party methods (Bercovitch 1993). However, it only became a formal area of inquiry by the late 1960s through seminal pieces by authors like

J. W. Burton.

28 29

Most literature on international mediation can be located either in the large-scale quantitative research (Bercovitch 1984, 1991, 2007), experimental research (Pruitt 1997,

2005), or in the depth case study analysis (Zartman 1989). This disciplinary multiplicity and the related methodological variety have created a diversification in the definition of the concept of international mediation going from the succinct to the detailed. Bercovitch, for instance, who has often used large-n data samples to assess the character of international mediation, broadly defines the concept as "a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law (Bercovitch

1991 ). Broader is Doob' s definition which states that international mediation is "the efforts by one or more persons to affect one or more other persons when ... the former, the latter or both perceive a problem requiring a resolution" (Doob 1993). In contrast,

Zartman and Touval (1989) conceive mediation as a "form of third party intervention in conflict, with the stated purpose of contributing to its abatement or resolution through negotiation. (Deutsch 1973)"

Success and Failure oflnternational Mediation

Functional definitions of international mediation tend to focus on the outcomes of the mediation process. However, assessing these outcomes remains an elusive exercise and often ends up raising more questions than generating answers; what determines the success of an international mediation? Should parties only worry about outcomes? Can we set objective criteria for the systematic evaluation of mediation endeavors? And in the 30

cases of conflicts with little to no communication between the parties, isn't having parties sit at the negotiation table already a success? An important chunk of the literature on the subject attempts to tackle the difficulty of assessing international mediations. Many researchers have avoided defining success and failure of international mediations (Assefa

1987). Others have given up completely on the task of determining factors that contribute to the success of international mediations, arguing that "the variables are so many that it would be an exercise in futility to attempt to describe typical mediator behavior with respect to sequence, timing or the use or non-use of the various functions theoretically available" (Simkin 1971 ). Yet others have set their own personal criteria for the assessment ofthe effectiveness ofthird-party interventions. Bercovitch, Anagnoson and

Wille ( 1991 ), for instance, defined successful outcomes as "producing ... a cease fire, a partial settlement or a full settlement"; a definition that allows for more flexibility but ignores the underlying objectives ofthe various parties and the mediator.

Another category of researchers have paid a close attention to these stated goals and objectives ofthe parties and the mediator (Touval and Zartman 1985). For them, the success and failure of mediation attempts depends on the degree to which the parties and mediator achieve their stated goals and objectives. However, they tend to overlook the unstated objectives which, in a conflict environment with prevailing feelings of distrust, tend to be of more importance and consequence to the parties. Success and failure of international mediations are, thus, "constructed rather than discovered by the analyst: they are a matter of idiosyncratic values, interpretations, and labeling" (Kleiboer 1996).

Surprisingly, the literature on the UN mediation of international conflicts does little to tackle the issue of the assessment ofUN-led mediations. Little has been written 31

about the success and failure of mediations within the UN context and even lesser at the level of the Secretary General. (Fretter 2002, Skjelsbaek and Fermann 1996) I have yet to come across a piece that specifically addresses the topic at the level of the Personal

Envoys and Special Representatives ofthe UNSG. Mediation efforts by PEs and SRs involve an additional level of complexity that remains sparsely understood; it entails managing a complex set of relationships not only with the parties but also with the various UN bodies. Just like the UNSG, PE mediation efforts are subject to the power politics of the Security Council. Additionally, as a mediator, the PE needs to maintain a healthy and transparent relationship with the UNSG as an institution that he/she represents. This also entails managing differences of opinion and approaches, and attempting to achieve objectives that are usually outside his/her sphere of influence.

These objectives are usually spelled out in UNSC resolutions and UNSG reports that many times allow for a limited margin for action, if any, for the PE.

Mapping the Mediation Literature

Most literature on the success and failure of outcomes of international mediations could be categorized into two meta-categories: context and process. Contextual factors include the nature ofthe parties and their relationship, characteristics of the dispute, and characteristics ofthe mediator. The elements of the process tend to revolve around the mediator's behavior and strategies.

Nature ofthe Parties

Research on the parties to international conflicts identifies the following as characteristics that affect the outcome of international mediation endeavors: 12) political 32

context, 2) relative power, 3) history of the relationship, 4) motives to accept mediation,

and 5) the nature of the issues involved (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991,

Kleiboer 1996).

Political Context

One of the recurrent themes in the study of international mediation is exploring the political context of the conflict parties. Not only does political context concern whether the regimes of the contending parties are democratic or not but it also includes cohesiveness and representation within the political systems ofthese parties. Many proponents of the so-called democratic peace theory argue that the democratic states are less likely to go to war with each-other (Small and Singer 1976, Maoz and Abdolali

1989, Russet 1993, Kegley and Hermann 1995). These theories were eventually applied to the study of international mediation, "the idea being that intermediary intervention is more successful in conflicts between democracies" (Kleiboer 1996). This hypothesis was supported by findings of a seminal research undertaken by Bercovitch, Anagnosma and

Wille ( 1991) who, using a dataset of conflicts taking place between 1945 and 1990, found that democratic states were more likely to accept mediation efforts.

Yet, regime type is often considered different from the levels of cohesiveness and representation within the state, which are viewed as another contextual characteristic impacting the outcomes of mediation processes. By cohesiveness it is often meant the number of domestic constituencies that could have a potential say on the acceptance of a mediation effort and the course that it is taking. It is held that the higher the number of these constituencies, the lower the likelihood of success of an international mediation. It 33

could be argued that the US's new strategy of engagement with "foes" like Iran is a manifestation of the difficulty to initiate a negotiation process when various and powerful groups oppose this engagement on both sides - most republicans remain adamant and vocal about the need to isolate, rather than engage, Iran.

This notion is often contradicts the research that argues that the multi-party-ism is more amenable to mediation. However, it is argued that democracy is such a broad term

(which could in turn be divided into several other sub-indicators) that it should not be reduced to the level of cohesiveness alone (Kleiboer 1996).

Power Distribution

Relative power is another contextual condition that influences the outcomes of international mediations. At the image of most research on the success and failure of international mediation, research on the agency of power seems equally controversial. On the one hand, there are those who suggest that the lower the power disparity between the parties the greater the likelihood that the mediation would lead to a successful outcome

(Young 1967, Ott 1972, Zartman 1981, Touval1982). They argue that in the presence of a substantial power disparity, the weaker party, "expecting to lose ... would want to avoid negotiation with a stronger party at all costs." The stronger party, however, "would have no need to negotiate since it could simply take what it wants" (Zartman and Rubin 2000).

On the other hand, many researchers argue that power parity is not only an unnecessary condition but it is one that can be an impediment to the successful undertaking of a mediation process. Apparently, the presence of an unambiguous advantage by one of the parties makes the path of settlement clearer by indicating which 34

party will be expected to make the greater concessions (Deutsch 1973, Bercovitch,

Anagnoson and Wille 1991, Kleiboer 1996). This assertion, however, does not provide a robust explanation to the acceptance (being a conditio sine qua non) of the weaker party to participate in a process that clearly is not in its favor. Power distribution is, thus, a condition that is as elusive as the whole notion of the success of international mediation.

Relationship ofParties

In an increasingly interdependent world, most states have had some type of interaction with one another. The history of these interactions and the nature of the relationship between the parties are believed to influence the course that international mediation takes. Deutsch ( 1973 ), for instance, suggests that a history of cooperation and friendship could prompt parties to approach a conflict more cooperatively. This assertion was supported by Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1996) who found that mediation between friends has twice the chance of success to any other type of relationship (the article divided relationship type into friendly, antagonistic, conflictual, parties with one past dispute and parties with more than one past dispute).

On the other hand, analysts such as Yamamoto (1990) argue that friendship nurtures a sense of self-confidence that could hinder mediation efforts between friends.

Using the US-Canada free trade negotiations as a case, she contends that this overconfidence "encouraged the Canadian side to expect too much and accommodate too soon on some critical issues." 35

Motives of Mediation Acceptance

For a mediation to take place the parties need to accept the intervention of a third­ party first. Acceptance is a sine qua non condition without which there would be no mediation. The motives for the acceptance of mediation are many and are sometimes difficult to pin down. In many cases, one or more parties expect that a mediator will help them achieve a more favorable outcome than would otherwise be possible (Touval and

Zartman 1985). The involvement of a mediator could also be perceived by the parties to guarantee the implementation of the agreement, thus decrease the likelihood of escalation

(Kleiboer 1996). Acceptance of mediation can also be a face-saving device for the parties and a way to avoid pressure by international actors that could jeopardize their relationship with these actors and/or their standing within the international system

(Kleiboer 1996).

Other motives that could lead parties to seek or accept mediation relate to calculations of national interests which one or more parties perceive they could be safeguarded and/or strengthened through the involvement of a third-party. Mediation could also serve a tactical objective such as winning time or remaining in a "gray area" which is half-way between escalation and concession. It could also create new strategic opportunities for the parties that would not otherwise be possible. The engagement of the

US during the Camp David process to provide substantial aid to both Israel and Egypt has certainly played an important role in the initiation of this process (Stein 1985). 36

Nature ofthe Dispute

The literature on international mediation highlights three attributes of the dispute that affect the outcome of mediation endeavors: 1) the timing, 2) the intensity of the conflict, and 3) the nature of the conflict issues (Kleiboer 1996).

Timing

An important number of researchers have highlighted the importance of proper timing in leading to a mediation outcome that could be deemed successful (Touval and

Zartman 1985). Timing, however, seems to mean different things to different people.

Zartman (1989), one of the founding fathers of the field of international negotiations, has often referred to this concept as "ripeness", a theory that puts "great emphasis on the parties' own interactions in ascertaining the ripe moment to initiate mediation"

(Bercovitch and Kadayifci 2002). According to Zartman (2000), a moment is ripe when the following two conditions exist: a) a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) by-which both sides to a conflict realize they cannot achieve their desired objectives unilaterally. b) a mutually enticing opportunity (MEO) that is mutually perceived. In other words, parties need to realize that a solution is possible that is "just and satisfactory to both ... "

(Zartman 1989). Ripeness is primarily a matter of subjective processes. However, a ripe moment can be objectively identified based on some indicators that if they exist, a "well­ informed, dispassionate, and rational decision maker would conclude that negotiation is appropriate" (Pruitt 2005).

Similarly, Hass (1988) argues that for a conflict to be ripe, four conditions need to exist: a mutual desirability of compromise; leaders' ability to reach an agreement and 37

implement it; agreements that are perceived as based on a "rich" compromise; and an agreed upon way to further deal with the conflict (Kleiboer 1994). Haass adds an important dimension to the theory that pertains to the inner political context of the conflict parties, which Zartman seems to have overlooked. Stedman (1991) primarily focuses on the political fabric of conflict parties arguing that actors are far from being unitary. Rather, they tend to consist of different factions that often disagree on core issues and might act upon this disagreement (Kleiboer 1994). Stedman's addition to the theory of ripeness can, thus, be perceived as "an attempt to link the perspectives of

Zartman and Haass" (Kleiboer 1994 ).

Although particular ripe moments can objectively be identified, parties might still fail to perceive them as such. Their entrenchment in the conflict prevents them from taking an objective look at the various conditions that might indicate ripeness. It is then, the role of third-parties to step in and encourage parties to act upon that opportunity.

Mediators can highlight the existence of the mutually-hurting stalemate and assist parties in generating potential solutions to their conflict (Pruitt, 2005). They can draw from their leverage and use different strategies to create a perception of ripeness.

While it has been called parsimonious, elegant, and grounded in case material, ripeness theory has received a great deal of criticism from various scholars (Pruitt, 1997,

2000; Coleman, et al. 2008; Kleiboer, 1994).

Having been metaphorically associated with the state of maturation of a fruit, ripeness theory has been tagged as passive; fruits rely primarily on external conditions and time to reach a state of ripeness. This association attributes little agency for the parties in creating such conditions. Additionally, inherent to the theory is the notion of 38

the mutuality of ripeness, meaning that parties need to experience a reciprocated pain for them to be able to recognize a ripe moment. The theory, argue some scholars, takes little notice of the possibility of an uneven state of ripeness by which a party is hurting more than the other (Pruitt, 1997). However, this criticism seems unfounded as reciprocity is the central underlying assumption of this theory; an emphasis on mutuality implies that the author must have thought about asymmetric perceptions.

Embedded in the theory of ripeness is the notion that parties are rational actors, who will pick the perceived best alternative, based on a cost-benefit analysis (Zartman,

2000). Although this form of rationality might be an accurate depiction of economic forms of decisions in conflict, it does not account for other forms of decisions -such as social and emotional decisions- that are relevant to the study of peace and war (Coleman, et al. 2008).

To redeem some of these conceptual limitations and many others, some scholars have provided their own modified versions of the ripeness theory. For instance, Pruitt

(2005) who is a psychologist by training, attempted to increase the utility of the theory by changing its core structure. Rather than focusing on joint states of mind as the mutually hurting stalemate notion does, Pruitt's theory (2005) looked at the motives and perceptions that create ripeness on each side separately. The theory also treats those psychological conditions as variables rather than states (Pruitt, 2005). Along the same lines, Kleiboer ( 1994) stressed the subjective conditions that build up to the recognition of a ripe moment. In her view, ripeness "appeals to the willingness of the main parties and factions of the main parties" (Kleiboer 1994). According to her, ripeness is, then, a function of the level of willingness of the conflict parties. Willingness is, thus, a minimal 39

requirement for a resolution to come about but is not a sine qua non condition (Kleiboer,

1994).

Intensity of the Conflict

The literature on international mediation seems to highlight the importance of the intensity of a conflict on the likelihood that mediation would lead to a successful outcome. The concept of intensity, however, seems to have been used generically to refer to different things by different authors; the magnitude of violence, the mortality rate and the degree of tension, among other things.

By operationalizing this concept, some scholars have argued that the higher the intensity, the less likely that parties will accept mediation offers (Brockner 1982). This view was supported by research undertaken by Bercovitch and Langley ( 1993) who found a negative correlation between intensity, which he defines as the number of fatalities in a particular conflict, and successful mediation attempts. Others have disputed such hypotheses asserting that the likelihood of mediation efforts increases substantially in the context of a crisis and hostility rather than during periods of lower intensity (Dixon

1996).

Nature ofthe Issues

Mediation outcomes, the literature suggests, c~m also be greatly affected by the nature of the issues at stake. Most analysts who tackled this characteristic agree that parties' perception of the mediated issues is "a key factor in determining whether or not to accept a mediation initiative and in influencing whether it will have much success"

(Bercovitch, Working Paper). 40

By issues, it generally referred to the underlying causes of a dispute. Issues can be numerous and complex. Ott (1972), for instance, contends that questions of territorial divisions and others that pertain to issues of national security are not easily negotiable and that mediating these issues is unlikely to yield to a successful outcome. Similarly,

Lall (1966) argues that the party with the active control over the disputed territory tends to resist the involvement of third parties. Bercovitch, Anagnosom and Wille (1991 ), in their quantitative analysis of 137 mediated conflicts, contend, however, that mediation attempts of conflicts that involve territorial and sovereignty are more amenable to a successful resolution than those with ideological issues.

Conflicts, in their complexity, tend to involve more than one type of issues, which render attempts to separating these categories increasingly difficult (Kleiboer 1994). To overcome this challenge, scholars such as Azar ( 1986) and Fisher ( 1971) argue that interest-based issues tend to be positive-sum while those that involve values are usually zero-sum, rendering them difficult to negotiate. But difficult does not mean impossible; fractionating these issues into subunits is one way to circumvent their non-negotiability; trading off the subunits against one another is another way (Fisher 1971 ).

The Mediator

Another determinant of the success or failure of mediation attempts are the attributes, characteristics, and identity of the mediator. While some analysts agree on the centrality of the mediator in the mediation process, others have relegated him/her to a secondary position (Bercovitch Working Paper). 41

Unlike other forms of third-party intervention, mediation is a voluntary process by which a mediator who is perceived as unfair, partial, and with little influence within its own constituencies (e.i the UN or any other institution and state) will have a difficult time to be ensure entry and carry out its functions (Jackson 1952; 0. Mauni, et al2006).

Surprisingly, the correlation between mediator acceptability and mediation success does not seem to be supported by empirical research (Kleiboer 1994 ). Research, however, highlights two major attributes that may affect the success of a mediator's efforts: 1) his/her legitimacy and 2) strategies he/she uses.

Legitimacy

Mediators' legitimacy is an issue that has drawn much controversy partially because it is an issue that pertains to subjective perceptions of parties, which make it difficult a concept to operationalize. A mediator's legitimacy -or lack thereof- can be affected by his/her status, and/or his/her perception of (im)partiality.

Status

Like most aspects of the study of mediators' success and failure, status is an elusive concept. Kleiboer (1994) identified two types of statuses: institutional and positional. According to her, institutional status stems from the identity of the entity the mediator represents. In most cases, mediators act on behalf of either an institution (i.e. the

UN) or a state, and they seldom act individually. Their status is, thus, borrowed from the one of the entity they represent. A positional status, according to the same author, refers to the mediator's position within that same entity. That position would determine the type and amount of resources the mediator has which would in tum affect his/her leverage. 42

Perception of (im)partiality

Impartiality and bias is another contentious aspect of the study of international mediation. It is argued that the mediator, by virtue of the nature of mediation, ought to be or be perceived as impartial (Burton and Dukes 1990).

Taking into account this discussion, the present study seeks to shed more light on the mediation attempts by UN Secretary-General's Personal Envoy and the conditions that affect the effectiveness of their interventions CHAPTERS

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This thesis is a qualitative research representing a single case-study of four interrelated mediated negotiations rounds that stretched over a period of 10 months, from

18 June 2007 to 19 March 2008, between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO on the final status of the "Western Sahara" territory. The methodology approach I use requires that data be collected primarily through in-depth interviews. Due to the nature of the topic, the professional identity of the target interviewees, and the risks of jeopardizing the negotiation process if sensitive data is released, a small number of elite were interviewed for this research. They provided rich and detailed testimonies that served as the basis for my analysis.

The analysis ofthis thesis was also based on secondary sources such as scripts of speeches, press releases and other forms of media that carry statements by members of the negotiation delegations. Other forms of secondary sources that were analyzed include documents published by the United Nations, such as Security Council resolutions, reports of the UN Secretary-General and related press releases. Finally, I used Jacob Bercovitch contingency framework on the success and failure of international mediation efforts

( 1986) to conduct this analysis.

43 44

Interviews

In this thesis, I used semi-structured (or semi-standardized) interviews as primary data collection instruments. Such interviews permit room for maneuver, allowing the questions to be reordered, the level of language to be adjusted and follow up questions to be added for clarification (Berg 2003). The interviews were framed to elicit the participants' own understanding of what success and failure ofUN-led mediation means, and their views on the UN-mediated Manhasset process and the conditions that led to the current stalemate. The main questions that made up the interviews were framed as to elucidate this study's main research question.

Elite interviewing was also the tool of choice because little has been written on the events in question and it was thus imperative to gather case information from individuals with a direct knowledge of the topic. While most of the participants had no objections to associating themselves with their testimonies, others, because of their political and diplomatic standing, preferred that their names be undisclosed.

Primary data was collected in the Spring and Fall of2009. Initially, I intended to interview representatives of the following six entities: Morocco, the Frente POLISARIO,

Algeria, Mauritania, the UN and academics who either studied the subject or advised one of the parties. Algeria and Mauritania were, however, ruled out after several failed attempts to approach their respective diplomatic representations. All interviews but one were face to face and took place in Washington D.C. and New York. E-mail was used in that one instance when the participant was out-of the country on diplomatic assignment.

I was able to interview two representatives of Morocco among which is a high­ ranking diplomat who participated in the negotiation rounds as well as an adviser of his; 45

two high-ranking representative ofthe Frente POLISARIO one of which was a member of the official delegation that negotiated on behalf of the Front; one adviser to the former

Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary General to "Western Sahara"; and one prominent academic with an advanced knowledge of the conflict and the negotiations in question.

All interviews were conducted in English (For a sample interview questionnaire, please see Appendix B).

Research Questions and Analytical Framework

Considered comparatively to the former negotiation attempts between the parties to the "Western Sahara" conflict, the Manhasset negotiation rounds offer a unique opportunity for the study ofUN-mediated efforts for the resolution of the 34 year long conflict. This exceptionality stems from the fact that these rounds were extensively documented by the UN and covered by the international media. As a case study, it should help answer the following main research question:

• What are the conditions that have led to the current impasse in the Manhasset

process?

In answering this question, I used Jacob Bercovitch's contingency model to investigate whether or not the framework explains the observed stalemate in the negotiations. Interview questions were framed as to explore the boundaries of this contingency model. Illustrative research questions include:

Questions that pertain to the dispute:

• What are the conditions that led to the initiation of the Manhasset process?

• Was the time "right" for the initiation of the negotiations? 46

Questions that pertain to the parties and their relationship

• What were the motives that pushed the parties to accept the U.N. mediation of the

process?

Questions that pertain to the mediator

• What type of leverage did the mediator have?

• Under which institutional, functional and procedural constraints did the mediator

operate?

Questions that pertain to the process

• What procedural choices did the mediator use during the Manhasset process and

why?

• How did the U.N. structure interact with the Manhasset process?

Contingency Model as Analytical Framework

Bercovitch's contingency model is a framework that was first developed in 1986 and which stipulates that "any conflict management is ... contingent upon a number of contextual variables" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2007). The framework provides a systematic approach to the study of third-party interventions and "can equally focus on one particular mediation attempt, a specific group of mediation attempts, one variable or multiple variables" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2007). In analyzing the collected data on the

Manhasset mediation process, I projected this data on the contingency model to test its capacity in explaining the conditions that may have led to the failure of the Manhasset process. 47

The framework divides the mediation process into three clusters of data: 1) antecedent attributes or context; 2) current mediation characteristics or process; and 3) mediation outcomes (Figure 1). Each of these clusters encloses overarching and cluster­ specific variables that help identify patterns and determine relationships that "explain the structure, and at times, the process, of mediation in international relations" (Bercovitch and Fretter 2007).

Under the context cluster are variable such as 1) the nature of the issues, 2) the nature of the dispute, 3) the nature of the parties, 4) the nature of the disputants' relationship, 5) and the nature of the mediator. The latter is, however, considered as a transversal indicator that spans both the context and process phases. Each of these variables is broken down into several indicators that allow for the application of the model to specific cases. The nature of the parties, for instance, is a variable that is the function of several indicators such as the nature of the previous relationship between these disputants and their power balance. Similarly, indicators such as the timing of the intervention, the duration ofthe conflict and its number of fatalities make up what the framework refers to as the nature of the dispute.

The process cluster revolves primarily around mediator strategies and behavior which are assumed to be central to the success or failure of mediation endeavors. The framework assumes that mediators are rational actors who entertain a reciprocal relation with the disputant parties. They are motivated by altruistic and nonaltruistic factors and have a variety of strategies that they choose depending on personal and contextual factors

(Bercovitch 2001 ). A mediator's strategy is thus "a broad plan of action designed to indicate which measure may be taken to achieve some objectives in particular conflict 48

situations" (Bercovitch 2001 ). This strategy is translated into a set of tactics or instruments that help him/her in the pursuit ofthese objectives (Bercovitch 2001). As noted earlier, characteristics of the mediator are considered as both antecedent and current conditions. Some of these characteristics include the mediator's rank, identity and experience that indicate the level and type of leverage he/she has, which in tum impact the process and outcome of the mediation intervention.

CONTEXT PROCESS OUTCOJ1E {Antecedent Condition.~) (Current Conditions) (CoiiSNfllellt Conditions)

:HRdilltimu OutN.HJlt's J'.Jufiariou Strtltt·gy And 1) Subjatit•t' Belu/lJior lj 0/Jjatit•t•

Other Extrmal!ujluem·C!

Nttture of Tbe Mediator

ltznk, lJc~Jtity. F.xpuienu, (/ndi~JJting Ln>twtge~ Stltlus 6 Rrputntion)

Figure 1 Contingency Framework for Analyzing International Mediation rBercovitch and Fretter 2007) 49

Use ofthe Framework

The contingency framework is central to this research in the way that the collected data was analyzed based on the various indicators that make up some of the main variables of the modeL This allowed for the exploration of the applicability of the gist of this model to the Manhasset negotiations and for the identification of its limitations, and potentially for the development of an alternative mediation approach that better reflects the intricacies of the negotiations in question.

Research Challenges and Limitations

In the conduct of this study, I faced several challenges. The first challenge pertained to the identification of and communication with the potential resource people.

Negotiations at the interstate level often involve a limited number of high-profile individuals whose names and identities are often kept secret. While the names of the official delegations to the Manhasset negotiations were released to the public, it was extremely difficult to get in touch with these participants due to their standing within their constituencies; the Moroccan delegation, for instance, was made ofTaied Fassi­

Fihri, the Minister ofForeign Affairs; Chakib Benmoussa, the Minister of Interior; and the head of the DGED (Direction Generale des Etudes et de la Documentation),

Mohamed-Yassine El Mansouri. With a lot of effort and some luck, I was able to reach out to some of these individuals through referrals as well as other non-official channels.

Nevertheless, my effort to interview representatives of Algeria and Mauritania did not yield to any result. In this particular case, I relied solely on secondary data such as transcripts of speeches and articles in French, Arabic and English. 50

Another challenge I faced in the conduct of this study is the perceptions I conveyed as a young Moroccan male asking questions about a conflict that is supposed to make the unanimity in Morocco. It should be noted that very little contact has taken place between representatives of the Frente POLISARIO and lay Moroccan citizens and researchers.

While there is no law that outlaws such contact, a high degree of stigma accompanies individuals seeking direct communication with the Front. These individuals run the risk ofbeing branded as traitors and may attract the scrutiny of the Moroccan security apparatus. CHAPTER6

ANALYSIS

After transcription of the interviews and a careful selection of the relevant reports and articles, I analyzed the parts that feed directly into my main research question: What are the conditions that have led to the current impasse in the Manhasset Negotiation?

The analysis process was based primarily on key elements that are tributary to

Bercovitch's contingency framework. The elements of the framework, which I used to analyze the negotiations in questions, are as follows:

Table 1: Categories and Sub-Categories for Case Analysis

Category Sub-Category

Context Nature ofParties

Nature oflssues Nature ofthe

Timing of Intervention Mediator

Process Mediator's Behavior (transversal to

both context

and process)

Outcome Subjective and Objective Outcomes

51 52

The Context

To understand the current stalemate in the Manhasset Negotiations, it is important to look at the contextual conditions that may have influenced this process. By context, it is meant elements antecedent to the Manhasset process but which carry the potential to interfere with it. The contextual conditions that will be analyzed are the timing of the mediation, the conflict issues, the parties' political context, the mediator's identity and rank, the mediators' history with the parties, and the mediator's behavior.

Timing of the Mediation

After the resignation of Baker from the position as PE in 2004, the "Western

Sahara" conflict was again put on the back burner. For two years, the conflict was treated as it has always been; "a cold conflict that is best served through the status-quo"

(Interview 1). Many within the UN believed that Baker had left big shoes to fill and that it could be very difficult to find a replacement with similar credentials. After all, they thought ifBaker failed, who could really succeed? (Interview!) It took the UN two years to start to think about potential replacements.

At that time, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was leading the informal vetting process with the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) momentarily pulling back from the conflict after Baker's resignation. DPKO first suggested the name of van Walsum to the SG as potential evaluator of an upcoming mission to "Western

Sahara" and the region. This decision, however, was not welcomed by Algeria, which

"did not want anybody in the region other than an officially appointed Personal Envoy"

(Interview!). To circumvent this Algerian inflexibility, DPKO then suggested that van 53

Walsum be appointed as PE rather than as a mere evaluator. The SG accepted and the retired Dutch diplomat became then the long awaited replacement to Baker, to the surprise of the DPA which had little agency on the selection process. Apparently, even the UN's Western Sahara Desk Officer was not informed about the SG's decision.

Van Walsum's first trip to the region was between October 11 and 17 during which he visited Rabat, Tindouf, Algiers and Mauritania before he headed to Paris,

Madrid, London and Washington D.C. In his January 2006 briefing to the SC van

Walsum concluded that "there could only be a consensual solution to the question of

Western Sahara" in the absence of any pressure from the Council on Morocco to reconsider Baker's Peace Plan (SG Report S/2006/249, 19 April 2006). He noted that a new plan would be doomed to fail but deemed that "once the Council recognized the political reality, it would realize that there were only two options left: indefinite prolongation of the [current] deadlock in anticipation of a different political reality; or direct negotiation between the parties" (SG Report S/2006/249, 19 April 2006). Despite the tone of van Walsum's statement and the urgency it exhibited, the SC failed to act upon the his recommendations by passing a resolution that was entirely dedicated to issues of sexual exploitation within the Peacekeeping Mission and making no mention of any negotiations (SC Res.1675, 28 April 2006). The Council was fully aware that

Morocco was in the process of developing a proposal that advances a "third-way"­ something between independence and full integration- that may have the potential of being taken as a single negotiation text (Interview1). On November 6 of the same year,

1 which commemorated the 30 h anniversary of the Green March, King Mohammed VI made the first explicit hint on his country's intentions to develop a proposal by which the 54

"Western Sahara" territory would be granted an autonomous statute putting an end to all speculations.

The Moroccan authorities used the next five months to build momentum for their proposal through intensive lobbying in Paris, London, Madrid and Washington D.C. The

POLISARIO, on the other hand, watched Morocco attentively. On AprillO, 2007, coup de theater; the Front presented its own proposal one day before Morocco was scheduled to officially present its long-awaited plan to the Secretary-General. By doing so, the

POLISARIO "hijacked" the year-long Moroccan process and brought back the option of a referendum to the negotiation table.

Titled "Proposal of the Frente POLISARIO for a Mutually Acceptable Political

Solution that Provides for the Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara", it was based on two pillars: first, the need for the referendum on self-determination that would include the options (independence, integration, autonomy) already agreed by the two parties and endorsed by the Security Council; second, if the referendum would lead to the Independence of"Western Sahara", the Frente POLISARIO will be ready to negotiate with Morocco the establishment of strategic relations between the two countries in all domains, particularly those that are or could be a cause of real or perceived concern to Morocco (See Appendix C for a copy of the POLISARIO proposal) (Interview4).

As expected, a day later, the "Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy

Statute for the Sahara Region" was presented to Secretary-General (See Appendix D for a copy of the Moroccan proposal). Acknowledging both parties desire to come out of the impasse, the SG recommended in his a report dated 13 April 2007 that 55

"The Security Council calls upon the parties, Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO, to enter into negotiations without preconditions, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution that will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara."

Ban Ki-Moon also recommended that Algeria and Mauritania be invited to the negotiation table being the parties with direct stakes in the resolution or escalation of the conflict. Expectedly, the Security Council adopted the same month Resolution 1754

(2007) supporting the Secretary General's calls and requesting that the negotiations should be set up under his auspices.

The proposal implies a level of commitment to negotiating a mutually acceptable solution to the conflict and is a move away from the win-lose approach that has been the trademark of most past attempts to resolve the conflict. Most importantly, it is a clear statement of the Moroccan position that fleshes out the main axes of what Morocco views as a final solution to the conflict. The proposal is comprehensive touching upon the political as well as the social and cultural aspects ofthe future relationship between the territory and the central government. It certainly carries the spirit of "everything is negotiable but the flag and stamps" as King Hassan II was reported to have stated.

The Moroccan proposal could be seen as an expression of a subjective readiness for engagement; a statement of dissatisfaction with the status-quo. Morocco, being in control of more than two thirds of the territory, is the party incurring the highest political/diplomatic and economic costs. At the military level, for instance, Morocco

1 maintains the world's 28 h largest army with more than 250,000 personnel, 130,000 of which are stationed in the "Western Sahara" territory (International Crisis Group 2007).

In the period leading to the presentation of its proposal, the army was said to absorb more 56

than 5% ofthe annual GDP ofthe country or an equivalent of$10 million per day

1 ranking it as the world's top 16 h (Telquel Magazine 2009, Nation Master). While it might be argued that these figures could not be attributed solely to the "Western Sahara" conflict, the fact that 60% of the army is stationed in the territory is a revealing indicator.

This dynamic cannot be understood without factoring the Moroccan-Algerian tumultuous relationship mainly because ofthe sustained Algerian support for the

POLISARIO project. Algeria has been for the last 40 years a major regional player with natural and economic attributes that Moroccan does not have; primarily the abundance of hydrocarbons such as natural gas and oil. With an army of more than 300,000 and exploding foreign currency reserves thanks to the soaring price of oil in the early 2000s,

Algeria engaged in an aggressive buildup of its military that engulfed a region into what many analysts deemed an arms race (Afrik 2006).In this regard, Algeria struck a spectacular deal with the Russian Federation by which the Algerians acquired military equipment of a worth exceeding $7 billion (BBC NEWS 2006). Through this deal,

Algeria acquired 40 MiG jets and 20 Sukhoi fighters as well as 60 Yekjet trainers and 40

T -90 tanks (BBC NEWS 2006). Morocco in the period preceding the presentation of its proposal negotiated the acquisition of a fleet of 48 US-made combat aircrafts 24 of which are F -16 at the colossal cost of $2.4 billion (Norwegian Support Committee for Western

Sahara 2007). Simultaneously, the Kingdom was negotiating with France -another permanent member of the Security Council- the procurement of several Rafale aircrafts; a deal that fell apart but which Morocco had to make up through the acquisition of their

Frenn frigate for which the Kingdom unblocked about $500 million as well as $2.6 billion for the realization of a TGV train between the cities of Tangier and Casablanca by 57

the French heavyweight Alstrom. The French's continued support at the Council was said to be conditional to the signature of these contracts (TF1 2007, RFI 2007, Telquel

Magazine 2009).

The Moroccan government has also had to deal with a growing number of protests by Sahrawi students both within the territory and in other major cities in the country for the two years preceding the negotiations. These protests took the organizational structure of a miniature insurgency that challenges the security establishment of the Kingdom on a daily basis and is drawing unprecedented international attention and support.

The Moroccan proposal was perceived, by the POLISARIO, to depart from the assumption that "Western Sahara" is already an integral part of Morocco's territory, which the movement deemed "unfounded" (Interview4) While the Kingdom has an effective control over the territory, "no Member State of the UN recognizes Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara" (SG Report S/2006/249, 19 April 2006). The

POLISARIO argued against the proposal saying that "by declaring that autonomy is the only solution, Morocco is prejudging the will of the Sahrawi people by limiting their choice, from the start, to autonomy" (Interview4)

On 30 April 2007, in its resolution 1754 (2007), the Security Council took note of the Moroccan and POLISARIO proposals but only welcomed "serious and credible

Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution." It also "call[ ed] upon the parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions in good faith, taking into account the developments of the last months, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of 58

the people of Western Sahara." (SC Res. 1754, 30 April2007). It is worth noting that the

US and France tried to push for a draft resolution calling, in an operative paragraph, for negotiations on the basis of the Moroccan proposal, but the draft was not endorsed by the other members of the Council (lnterview4 ). Had the Moroccan proposal been the only proposal, it would certainly have been the basis of these negotiations.

The POLISARIO was said to be "dragged" into a process that was initiated and lead by Morocco and its allies at the Security Council. It clearly was not ready for these negotiations and only attempted to accommodate the dynamics within the Council that were favorable to Morocco and its proposal at the time. They perceived that "Morocco's insistence on accepting its proposal as a precondition to the negotiation -contrary to

Security Council's call for negotiations without precondition- was a nonstarter"

(Interview4). Their participation was a tactical one; understanding the implications of a noncompliance with an eventual Security Council resolution favorable to the Moroccan plan, they presented their own proposal, before the Moroccan one was presented, altering the narrative of the whole process. By doing so, they secured that their proposal be taken seriously if not equally to the Moroccan proposal at the negotiation table. And since the

"Western Sahara" conflict is under Chapter VI of the UN charter, any outcome would have to be mutually acceptable. Thus, all the POLISARIO -or Morocco for that matter­ has to do is to participate in the process under the framework of Security Council resolutions that define the overall framework and mandate of the mediator of these negotiations and which safeguards their right to say no if they deem the process unsatisfactory. 59

How ready was the mediator for such a process? There seems to be a general agreement among the analysts and many participants that van Walsum was unprepared to lead these negotiations. The POLISARIO argued that the Personal Envoy did not have a plan that would at least ensure the continuation of the process but rather exhibited a level of passivity by waiting for the parties to come up with a solution (Interview4). A former

UN employee and "Western Sahara" insider claimed that van Walsum underestimated the complexity of the conflict and that only after his appointment and subsequent consultation with internal experts that he realized "it was more complicated than what he was made to believe" (Interview!). The Moroccans, on the other hand, were glad to move beyond the Baker era and did not express any notable objection to van Walsum's appointment as Personal Envoy.

Unlike the past negotiations, which were the outcome of internal UN gestation processes, the Manhasset rounds were mainly brought up at the initiative of one of the parties with the other feeling "coerced" into a process it did not encourage. It could be said, thus, that the timing was not appropriate for the initiation of such process. While both parties hurt because of the actual and fragile status quo, their "suffering" is different and asymmetrical. In the words of a former Baker collaborator, "the UN has never managed to get both parties equally uneasy" (Interview!) Morocco clearly incurs the biggest loss as a result of the stalemate, which explains its desire to find a final -and favorable- solution to the conflict, though at a time when the other parties of the conflict may not feel the urgency to. 60

Conflict Issues

Conflict issues refer to the underlying causes of the dispute. They are what the conflict is all about and the object of the negotiations if they were to happen. Most conflicts involve more than one issue and issue-identification tends be a consuming and elusive endeavor. The different parties perceive the "Western Sahara" conflict's underlying issues differently. While the POLISARIO claims that at the gist of the conflict is the question of decolonization, Morocco generally contends that the conflict is rather a proxy one engineered and executed by neighboring Algeria. These antipodal views have been held throughout the life of this conflict and continue to be held today, at least as an official discourse.

The Manhasset negotiations were to be held at the recommendation of the

Secretary-General and the request ofthe Security Council as stipulated in resolution 1754

(2007). These negotiations were to achieve a "just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution" that respects the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination (SG Res.

1754, 30 April 2007). Before they even started, both parties presented proposals that could not be further distant from each other; the Moroccan plan offered autonomy to the territory; the POLISARIO proposal, which was submitted by the Permanent

Representative of South Africa, put the organization of a referendum back to the negotiation table. Consequently, the issues to be negotiated were no longer pertaining to the final status of the territory but rather related to what proposal was to be taken more seriously and whether or not the submission of proposals beat the purpose of the negotiations which were meant to be held without preconditions. 61

Certainly, the Moroccan proposal received a substantial amount of support from allies such as France and the US trickling down to the language of the Security Council resolutions that deemed the Moroccan initiative serious and credible (SO Res. 1754, 30

April 2007). The Moroccans perceived this support as a victory in itself and were to start the negotiations from a position of power. But it also made them more inflexible; autonomy was their starting as well as their ending positions. It was the most they could offer and if they participated in the negotiations it was only to make the POLISARIO

"walk the other halfmile." In the words of a member ofthe POLISARIO delegation to the negotiations, the Moroccan approach was a "nonstarter" (lnterview4). Similarly, the

Moroccans could not accept that independence be an option on the table; a position they have maintained throughout the various talks and negotiations they have taken part to.

Additionally, the parties seemed to have a different conception of what self­ determination meant (SO Report S/2008/45, 25 January 2008). In his report subsequent to the second round of talks, the Secretary General noted that the parties "positions remained far apart on the definition of self-determination" (SO Report S/2008/45, 25

January 2008). While they both expressed their commitment to safeguarding that right, they differed on the "how" ofthe question. The POLISARIO contended that only a free referendum could achieve the full-expression of that right while Morocco argued that self-determination is not synonymous with referendum and that autonomy offers the context for the expression of that right. In an attempt to move beyond this initial but fundamental difference, the Personal Envoy -and mediator- attempted to encourage the parties to problem-solve by focusing on an eventual expansion of the confidence-building measures (SC Report S/2008/45, 25 January 2008). The POLISARIO welcomed the 62

initiative and expressed their openness to the mediator's suggestions. Morocco, on the other hand, saw in van Walsum' s scheme a deviation from the aim of the rounds, which were to generate an agreement on the final status of the territory (SC Report S/2008/45,

25 January 2008).

The rounds of negotiations seemed to have neither a structure nor a plan, noted two interviewees (Interview4). The issues were broadly defined and theoretical, and the mediation failed to move beyond the positional differences of the parties who clung to their mutual proposals. Despite the UN's precedent knowledge of these fundamental differences between the parties, there were no attempts to address them in pre-negotiation sessions. Consequently, most energy and time was spent on definitions of concepts such as self-determination and preconditions to the extent that it contributed to the stalling of the whole process.

The Political Context

The death of King Hassan II of Morocco marked a milestone in the political history of the Kingdom. Having led the country with an iron fist for thirty-eight years, he was instrumental in defining the Moroccan policy towards "Western Sahara". It was under his reign that the territory was annexed and that the war was undertaken. He symbolized the reunification of Morocco with what the Moroccans believed was their historical southern provinces; he also symbolized years of protracted and failing negotiations with the POLISARIO on the status of this mineral-rich territory. His successor, Mohammed VI, understood this symbolism and attempted from day one to advance progressive policies on different fronts, the "Western Sahara" conflict included. 63

It was during his first year that he signaled to the UN that his country was willing to consider a negotiated political solution that may imply some form of recognition of the legitimacy of the Frente POLISARIO, which his father refrained from engaging at an official level.

Along these lines, the Kingdom presented a first proposal to Baker advancing officially for the first time in the history of the conflict the thesis of creating an

"Autonomous Region of Sahara" (Ruiz Miguel 2006). Presented to the Security Council in December 2003, the text of the plan was only made public by late 2006 (Ruiz Miguel

2006). Analysts suggest that an autonomous Sahara would lead Morocco towards more decentralization of authority in other regions, which could in tum contribute, to the overall democratization of the country (Ruiz Miguel 2006). The proposal was not taken seriously by the UN but succeeded in intensifying Baker's frustration at the realization that he may not have anymore the level of support he needed from the US administration

(this episode is discussed in more details in the Mediator's section). As noted earlier, the two years that followed were marked by heightened tensions within the territory of

"Western Sahara". Many members of the local population started organizing against the heavy-handedness of the Moroccan security apparatus in the territory that was accused of the imprisonment and torture of several Sahrawi activists. Morocco was clearly uncomfortable about the situation as the events started to receive an increased level of media coverage, especially from some Scandinavian and Spanish media outlets and human rights activists who, for better or worse, dubbed the riots "the Sahrawi Intifada."

After van Walsum's nomination for the position of Personal Envoy, Morocco attempted to revive the idea of autonomy. This time the approach was slightly different. 64

Through intensive lobbying in the world's most influential capitals, the Moroccans attempted to win the support of the key members of the Security Council before the proposal be presented to the Secretary-General. Through this new proposal, the Sahara would gain an advanced level of autonomy allowing the local population to exercise power over sectors, such as the local administration, the police, the economic development, health and education policy, and the budget and taxation. The proposal stipulates, on the other hand, that the State would keep exclusive jurisdiction over the attributes of sovereignty such as the flag, the national anthem and the currency; the attributes stemming from the constitutional and religious prerogatives of the King; national security and external relations; and the judicial order of the Kingdom.

The Moroccans had a conception of what a final solution should look like and were hoping that the negotiations would take that conception as a starting point. They made it clear that they could not consider any proposal that does not take the Moroccan sovereignty over the territory as a starting point. It should be noted that the Sahara conflict has always been a legitimizing agent for the Moroccan monarchy and the military elite and any changes in the status quo that challenges the Moroccan sovereignty would constitute a direct threat to the interests of these elites and thus threaten the stability of this traditional US ally. While the King undertook serious efforts to settle the conflict, he missed the opportunity to completely dissociate himself from it. As a respondent noted, "his father embodied the conflict but he had a golden opportunity to embody the way forward" (Interview 1). 65

The Mediator

Most attempts to settle the "Western Sahara" conflict have been undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations. From Security Council resolutions to the International

Court of Justice rulings to mediation attempts under the auspices of the Secretary­

General, various bodies of the organization have attempted different approaches of intervention all of which have failed to bring about a resolution to this Saharan conflict.

Thus, any serious endeavor to deconstruct the stalemate of the Manhasset process would have to go through an understanding of the role played by this institution and its mediators in bringing about and leading the negotiations in question as well as the past ones.

History with Parties

The Manhasset rounds are the last in a series of negotiations that have taken place under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations over the course of the last twenty years. The most notable of these negotiations had been led by the former

Personal Envoy James Baker who, as a former US Secretary of State and renowned deal­ maker, was able to bring the parties to the negotiation table on several occasions during his eight-year mandate. Baker was brought into the conflict at the request of the

Secretary-General himself"who was familiar with [his] negotiating skills, toughness, and integrity" (Theofilopoulou 2006). Baker initially attempted to bring life back to the

Settlement Plan that primarily revolved around the organization of a referendum. The first direct talks he led between the parties were in London, followed by ones in Lisbon 66

before ending in Houston -Baker's hometown- all aiming primarily at getting the parties to agree on the resumption of the stalling identification process.

"The Baker approach"-as a former collaborator ofhis likes to call it- was a very focused one; he would break down the problem into workable issues and attempt to get the parties to agree on one issue at the time (Interview 1). In London for instance, he pushed the parties to agree "that they will not. .. sponsor or present for identification anyone from [the contested] tribal groupings ... " (See Appendix E) In Lisbon, the agenda dealt primarily with the issue of troop confinement by which the parties agreed that their troops be reduced and confined in accordance with the provisions of the Settlement Plan

(See Appendix F) It was only at the end of the four rounds of talks in Houston that the parties adopted what would become known as the Houston Agreements that included a joint declaration by Morocco and the POLISARIO to comply with their initial commitments as stipulated in the Settlement Plan (See Appendix G).

Though the Houston Agreement was an explicit commitment of the parties to implement the clauses of the Settlement Plan, the identification process continued to stall for the three years following the agreement. By then, Baker was convinced that a political solution that does not prejudice the parties' positions was the most realistic alternative

(Theofilopoulou 2006). Morocco with a new king who inherited this complex conflict and who seemed genuinely interested in bringing about a resolution to it, accepted to explore alternatives to the Settlement Plan. The POLISARIO, on the other hand, feeling confident about the prospects of a referendum rejected the proposal. Morocco was then requested to provide a proposal that would showcase devolution of governmental authority in the "Western Sahara". When Morocco, several months later, failed to come 67

up with such a proposal Baker, in April 2001, prepared the draft Framework Agreement

(FA) on the Status ofWestern Sahara (Appendix H). The document granted the territory five years of autonomy after which the people of "Western Sahara" would have to decide on the nature of their relationship to the Kingdom through a referendum, which's options the framework did not flesh out. Algeria and the POLISARIO were very critical of

Baker's proposal but subsequently accepted to review it after the Security Council called upon them to do so. The POLISARIO then informed Baker that the proposal was not something they deemed acceptable.

In a bizarre twist of events the Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika proposed to Baker, whom he met personally in a visit to the Baker Institute in November 2001, a division of the territory with Morocco. Though surprised by the proposal Baker took it seriously and met the Moroccan king twice to discuss the matter who saw in the Algerian suggestion a clear indication of their heavy-handedness on the conflict and the Frente

POLISARIO. He predictably rejected the proposal.

In July 2002, at the request of Baker the Security Council adopted a resolution that expressed the Council's readiness to consider any approach that would provide for

Self-Determination (Theofilopoulou 2006). Subsequently, Baker drafted the "Peace Plan for Self-Determination for the People of Western Sahara" which was a revised

Framework Agreement but which provided the options of a referendum. After the submission of the plan the parties engaged in extensive lobbying in many of the world's most influential capitals in an attempt to influence the language of the Council's resolution, which was to express itself in July 2003 on the plan. Though the Council unanimously adopted the resolution, it nevertheless seemed divided on the plan with 68

France standing behind Morocco; the US, the UK and Spain strongly supporting Baker's

Plan; and China and Russia maintaining an ambivalent position (Theofilopoulou 2006).

The period following this resolution marked a surprising shift in the US support to Baker despite the apparent closeness between him and President Bush. Many attributed this shift to the Moroccan lobbying in Washington D.C. and the unequivocal support of

National Security Advisor Abrams Elliott to Morocco (Interview!). By that time, the

Moroccans informed Baker of their intention to submit their response proposal in Paris.

To his surprise, they cancelled and they dispatched a delegation to present the proposal to the US Department of State and Congress "behind his back" in a clear attempt to influence US policy, which they hoped, would influence the Council's actions. The

Moroccan efforts were apparently fruitful as the Council's resolution 1541 (2004) that was introduced by the US and sponsored by Spain, while supportive of the Baker Plan, adopted a tone favorable to exploring other options other than the plan. Additionally, the new socialist government in Spain seemed to have also changed its position that became more in sync with the Moroccan one. It should be noted that as a Personal Envoy, Baker received a draft of the resolution 1541, which he thought was a first draft, and was still subject to further discussions (Interview!). He was surprised that he never was informed that the text was the final draft and that Algeria, a member of the Council at the time, was satisfied by the text unbeknownst to him that the Algerians fought a French-introduced text that was deemed "even more pro-Moroccan" (Interview4).

On June 1, 2004, Baker sent a letter to the Secretary-General informing him about his resignation and agreeing that the letter be available to the Security Council. The letter, however, was never made public and the Secretary-General had apparently asked the 69

Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to prepare a letter for the Council which's content seemed to be completely different than the Baker's letter. Though Baker entertained an excellent relationship with the Secretary-General, a shift in the positions of some of the key Council members seems to have exerted a lot of strain on their relationship. This episode, notes a UN insider, was an "indicator that something was happening in the thirty-eight floor" in reference to the tumultuous inner politics of the office ofthe Secretary-General.

Peter van Walsum

Peter Van Walsum, Baker's replacement as Personal Envoy, inherited a legacy of complex relationships between the Personal Envoy and the parties, the Security Council and the parties, the Security Council and the Secretary-General, and the Personal Envoy and the Secretary-General. As a former Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the UN and Chairman of the Iraq Sanctions Committee he certainly was a UN insider.

Thus, his appointment as Personal Envoy should have seemed logical. However, as noted earlier, the vetting process by which he became envoy and mediator of the Manhasset

Rounds was an opaque one, to say the least.

Unlike Baker who was tapped into to be the Personal Envoy from the beginning, van Walsum was never intended to be one. His name was first associated with the

"Western Sahara" conflict two years into that vacuum that Baker's resignation had created. At the initiative of the DPKO, suggests a "Western Sahara" insider, van Walsum was initially suggested to lead an evaluation mission to the region to gauge the parties' commitment to the possibility of engagement (Interview I). When the parties were 70

approached about the matter Algeria made it explicit that they would only welcome the visit of an officially appointed Personal Envoy. Understanding the implications of the

Algerian refusal, DPKO then proposed to the Secretary-General that van Walsum be that

Personal Envoy. Kofi Annan accepted and van Walsum became the new Personal Envoy.

It is worth noting that unlike Baker's, his appointment received little resistance from the parties.

Identity and Rank

At the time ofhis nomination for the position of Personal Envoy, van Walsum had already retired from the Dutch Ministry of Affairs in 2001. He had led a discreet career as a diplomat and public servant and only as a chair of the controversial Iraq

Sanction Committee that he got under the limelight. It remains unknown what particular credentials he had that the DPKO deemed necessary for the effective conduct of a mandate of a Personal Envoy. It is also unknown whether he was the only short-listed candidate or that there were other names on the list. What is known is that he, as noted earlier, was not intended to become the new Personal Envoy.

Other than the Op-Ed he published in the Spanish newspaper El Pais and an interview he gave to a Dutch newspaper, van Walsum maintained a low profile after his mandate ended. When approached for this research, his former assistant noted that he had

"already declined several other requests and prefers to continue to do so" and that he does not feel the need to express himself further on the issue since "his views were sufficiently on the record" (Communication!). It is thus difficult to make any fully valid judgment of his character as a person and mediator of the Manhasset Rounds. 71

It could be contended that in the hierarchy of the UN mediators' pyramid, he could be placed in the middle; not quite the UN career mediators and not quite the star mediator that Baker was. He never held any position of the same nature as Personal

Envoy and prior to his nomination he never expressed any particular interest in the

"Western Sahara" conflict. It should be noted that the position of Personal Envoy for the

"Western Sahara" conflict was created at the request of James Baker who argued that the word Personal conveys the message that "he speaks and acts in the name of the

Secretary-General and that he is only accountable to him" (Interview! ). Van Walsum was said to have "inherited the name but not the package" that Baker received

(Interview 1 ). Baker brought his own team to the UN when he accepted the position of

Personal Envoy. He brought Chester Crocker who served as Assistant US Secretary of

State for African Affairs, and John Bolton who was a former Assistant US Secretary of

State for International Organizations. He also brought the support of two US administrations, which ensured a high level of cooperation from the Security Council.

Van Walsum clearly lacked the leverage Baker had. One of the respondents noted that "he had big shoes to fill" and his nomination was received with a lot of skepticism within the organization (Interview 1). Another respondent contended that though he was an experienced diplomat van Walsum "did not have any source of leverage as a mediator" (lnterview4 ). He added that he had no explicit backing from the Security

Council and that most of the time "he was left alone to conduct the negotiation process"

(Interview4). Despite the fact that he was Personal Envoy ofthe Secretary General, van

W alsum seemed to have reported more to the head of the UN departments than to the

Secretary-General (Interview!). He also had to deal with several people at the Office of 72

the Secretary-General. All of this, a respondent notes, complicated the quality ofhis work and consequently impacted the negotiation process he lead (Interview}).

Behavior

Van Walsum started his mandate with a seemingly accurate assessment ofthe situation. In his briefing of 18 January 2006 to the Security Council, he noted that

"Once the Security Council recognized the political reality that no one was going to force Morocco to give up its claim of sovereignty over "Western Sahara", it would realize that there were only two options left: indefinite prolongation of the current deadlock in anticipation of a different political reality; or direct negotiations between the parties" (SG Report S/2006/249, 19 April 2006).

He dismissed the first option as a recipe for violence and called for direct negotiations without preconditions (SG Report S/2006/249, 19 April 2006). The

Secretary-General endorsed his recommendations and the Security Council only supported his call when Morocco and the POLISARIO presented their mutual proposals.

Prior to the holding of the first round of negotiation in Manhasset in the suburbs ofNew

York City, van Walsum held what the Secretary-General called "preliminary discussions" during which the Envoy "listened to the concerns and positions of the parties and neighboring countries with regard to the conduct of the negotiations" (SG Report

S/2007/385, 29 June 2007). He also consulted with representatives of many ofthe

Member States of the Security Council in an attempt to ensure their "commitment to maintaining the momentum towards a negotiating process" and their "willingness to provide political support and lend assistance in order to make the negotiations" (SG

Report S/2006/249, 19 April 2006). He was also reminded that the Council would not 73

impose a solution on the parties and could only endorse a mutually acceptable solution.

(SG Report S/2006/249, 19 April 2006).

The first meeting was held on 18 and 19 June with Algeria and Mauritania only attending the opening meetings at the request of one of the parties. The meeting had a broad objective but no specific agenda the framework of which was defined by Security­

Council resolution 1754 (2007). The meeting, notes one respondent, was "no more than an ice-breaking one, everyone was polite and no one would dare not to go" (Interview!).

At the end of the meeting, van Walsum expressed his satisfaction with "the positive atmosphere that had prevailed during the negotiations" but added that "a negotiation process could not be sustained by atmosphere alone" (SG Report S/2006/249, 19 April

2006).

Traditionally, the communication pattern between the Personal Envoy and the

Secretary General is as follows: he/she would write a report, sends it to the Secretary­

General who would make the necessary adjustments, appropriates it and issues it as his own calling upon the Security Council to take the actions that they both deem necessary.

While this is what had apparently happened at the conclusion of the first round of negotiations, the issued four-page report was later withdrawn and replaced by a scrapped version of it by the Office of the Secretary General. The initial one included an

"Observations and Recommendations" section in which van Walsum outlined what he believed are the necessary actions to be taken by the Security Council (Appendix 1). In the same section he noted, "If the negotiations are to lead to a positive outcome, both parties must recognize that the question of sovereignty is, and always has been, the main stumbling block in this dispute, and that it is in this highly sensitive area that a solution 74

will need to be found" (See Appendix I for a copy of the original report). Whether this language is too strong for a report on a first round of negotiations or that van Walsum may have released more information than what a mediator should is difficult to ascertain.

It could, however, be established that this episode put a lot of strain on the relationship between the Personal Envoy and the Office of the Secretary-General. A respondent contended that "this would have never happened during Baker's time" and that "if anybody dared to change anything on his reports they would certainly regret it"

(Inerview 1 2009).

The second round of negotiations was held on 10 and 11 August 2007. This time, the mediator brought a plethora of UN experts to present on various issues such as natural resources management and local administration. Realizing that the parties expectedly maintained the same positions, van Walsum attempted to push them towards a problem­ solving approach by suggesting that they expand the confidence-building measures. The move proved counter-productive as much time was spent on the issue only to be rejected

-again expectedly- by Morocco that believed that the measures be "discussed within the framework of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR), and that "for the consideration of possible proposals for confidence-building measures that would be beyond the scope of that forum, another appropriate forum should be found" (SO Report S/2007619, 19 October 2007). In the same report, the

Secretary-General's set the tone for what was going to follow and expressed his disagreement with the assessment of his Personal Envoy, which he deemed "somewhat rosy" Along this line, he concluded that "the first two meetings, taken together, have not 75

resulted in the implementation of paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 1754

(2007), thus "it cannot. .. be maintained that the parties have entered into negotiations."

1 The Secretary-General October 19 h' report was also explicit on what the

Secretary General perceives as successful negotiation and not. Based on his assessment, a successful negotiation is one that complies with the Security Council resolution that called for its organization; in this case it was resolution 1754. Any rounds of talks that do not satisfy the clauses of this resolution are not considered negotiations, even if the parties believe they were actual negotiations. When asked whether he considered the

Manhasset rounds actual negotiations, a member of the POLISARIO delegation said:

"I believe that the meetings were significant in view of the following reasons: first, the two parties met face-to-face, in the presence of the UN, and interacted with each other and exchanged views on issues of major concern to them. This was a necessary step; second, initial agreement was achieved on at least one issue bearing on the whole negotiation process, i.e., Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), and the possibility to explore family exchange visits by land" (Interview4 ).

By the time the third round oftalks was held from 7 to 9 January 2008, the general spirit seemed to digress from where it was in the first two. The parties were again stuck in the interpretation ofthe paragraphs of resolution 1754 -and resoltuion1783 that confirmed resolution 1754- and their stated positions remained "far apart on ways to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution" (SG Report S/2008/45,

25 January 2008). Again, the Secretary-General considered that there was "hardly any exchange that could be characterized as negotiations" (SG Report S/2008/45, 25 January

2008). The parties seemed to be there only to comply with the Security Council 76

resolutions and the mediator, again, fixated on the issue preconditions and positions. On this matter, a participant in the Manhasset rounds noted,

"van Walsum seemed to have a peculiar way of reasoning when it comes to reflecting on the perceptions or positions of the parties. In any negotiations, the parties involved will come with already established positions, because it is actually positions that give rise to any situation of conflict. These positions are the first to come to the surface in any conversation and they tend easily to be framed in terms of preconditions ... Hence, the difficulty to distinguish between subjectively held positions and objectively articulated preconditions. However, it is through the negotiation process that the parties, by themselves or aided by a mediator/facilitator, are expected to gradually move beyond their positions (preconditions) and explore other possible common grounds of understanding" (Interview4 ).

He added, "I think that instead of trying to mull over the positions of the parties, van Walsum should have invested more time in assisting the parties to move forward in the process" (Interview4)

Between round three and four many developments took place in the region that suggested that the negotiations were far from bringing the parties perspective closer. The

POLISARIO held in the February 2008 its elections in the refugee camps in the Tindouf, selecting the new "Saharan parliament" (SG Report S/2008/251, 14 April 2008). In the same month, the Front celebrated in the Tifariti area (also known as the UN buffer zone) the thirty-second anniversary of the proclamation ofthe "Saharan Arab Democratic

Republic" (SADR) to which Morocco vehemently objected. The Kingdom threatened to take military action against the movement, which started new constructions in the disputed area. As a response, a Moroccan group named "Association Sahara Marocain"

(ASM) announced they were planning to organize a "peaceful march" to reclaim the rest of the territory east to the "berm." The situation was further escalated by the holding of 77

Morocco of "pre-scheduled" military training exercises in the territory; an action the

POLISARIO deemed "provocative" being on the eve of the fourth round (SG Report

S/2008/251, 14 April 2008). It was then clear that the parties were not in the mood for negotiations at the time. The fourth round was held, nevertheless, with the parties unable to move beyond the initial questions -preconditions versus positions- that were raised in the first round.

In his communication with the Security Council at the conclusion of the fourth round, the seventy-three year old Dutch diplomat noted that in the absence of any sort of pressure by the Council on Morocco to abandon its claim to the territory, the option of

"an independent "Western Sahara" was not a realistic one."4 This assessment put him at odds not only with the POLISARIO which is at the heart an independence movement, but also with the Secretary-General who may not have been consulted about the matter before it was made public. The fifteen members of the Security Council received the comment via fax on the eve on a scheduled meeting to consult on the Sahara question.

The President of the Council at the time, Dumisani Kumalo, noted that the comment caused confusion at the Council and that it "seemed to contradict a report on "Western

Sahara" by Secretary General Ban Ki Moon" (Reuters 2008). He added that the Council

"decided [to] focus on the report ofthe Secretary-General" rather than on the personal opinion of the Personal Envoy (Reuters 2008).

In a communique they released after the van Walsum declaration, the Front deemed the approach of the Personal Envoy and mediator of the Manhasset process

4 A copy of the fuii statement was not located but the statement was picked by many media outlets among which is this one: http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N21382839.htm (Accessed 10/ I 0/2009) 78

"illegal, unjust, and completely aligned to the thesis of the Moroccan colonial occupation", adding that Mr. van Walsum "lost the confidence of the Sahrawi people and thus can no longer play a role in the ongoing [mediation] process ... " (See Appendix J for a copy ofthe communique) When I asked one of the POLISARIO representatives whether van Walsum's comment was not what mediators normally do, he answered by saying that "van Walsum should have stuck to his mandate, and his mandate is to find a mutually acceptable political solution, and not give opinions on proposals" (lnterview3)

In August 2008, van Walsum's contract as Personal Envoy expired and was not renewed by the Secretary-General putting an end to a two-year long negotiation process that many believed was ill-thought.

On August 28, van Walsum wrote an Op-Ed to the Spanish newspaper El Pais in which he reiterated his position. He later gave an interview to the Dutch newspaper NRC

Handelsblad in which he let it all out. Answering the journalist's question he said that "he had a feeling he was appointed as Personal Envoy to maintain the status-quo rather than change it", that "the negotiations were a farce, a mockery and a false game", that he has always told the parties that "if they had enough of [him], all they need to do is send a letter to the Secretary-General", and that if he continues to sit there as a "good boy" and do what is expected of him, then he will mediate not four rounds, but eight, twelve or sixteen rounds. 5 When at the end of the interview he was asked whether he consulted with his predecessor, James Baker, he answered that he did, and that Baker found it incredible that someone took the job. "After all", noted a respondent, "if van Walsum or

5 For language constraints I relied solely on an unofficial translation by one of the most active bloggers on the Western Sahara question: http:/lsahara-watch.blogspot.com/2008/05/van-walsum-nobodys­ fool.html and http:/lw-sahara.blogspot.com/2008/05/flying-dutchman.html 79

anybody in his shoes claims to know the UN and the conflict, why then would they accept the job of Personal Envoy?" (Interview 1) CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

In this chapter, I will discuss the limitations of the Bercovitch's model and provide a new model that could be more applicable to cases ofUN-led mediations. I will also lay out conclusions from the case and recommendation for future negotiations on the status of the "western Sahara" territory.

Context of UN Mediations

For the past century, the United Nations has been one of the most active institutions in the field of conflict management and resolution. Similarly, it has sustained a strong presence throughout the different stages of the Western Sahara conflict and is the overseer of the ongoing Manhasset Negotiations. Often perceived as the "bastion of international morality", the UN is the default institution that states (and sometimes non­ state actors) look upon for intervention (Fretter 2002). The UN, however, is far from being a unified body of institutions and is rather made of non-homogeneous organs that sometimes push for different, if not contradictory, norms and values. This heterogeneity allows the institution to intervene in conflicts using tools that range from violence and coercion, direct and indirect negotiation, to binding or non-binding intervention as a third party (Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille 1991). While generally mediation is a strategic choice that is selected based on its "appropriateness and its ability to achieve certain

80 81

objectives in the conflict environment", UN-led mediations are not always as such

(Fretter 2002). As the Manhasset case illustrates, mediation as a method of conflict resolution -in contrast to direct negotiation- was not the result of some cost-benefit analysis that both parties undertook but rather was an inescapable course of action dictated by Security Council resolutions that may not have had the consent of one of the parties. One could go even further and assert that one of the parties was dragged into a process it did not deem necessary but which it nevertheless engaged into in compliance with the Council's resolutions. In any other context, such an undertaking would have raised many questions on the parties' agency on the process and the timing of the mediation.

UN Mediators

The UN mediators certainly operate under several constraints in the conduct of their mediation endeavors that independent mediators do not have to deal with. Most of these constraints are of institutional and operational nature that pertain to the fluctuating commitment of the member states and their level of cooperation, the constitutional boundaries stipulated in the UN charter, and the contextual conditions that relate to the nature of the international system (Fretter 2002).

These mediators have to operate within a certain number of conditions that could either promote or hinder their endeavors, and work under constraints that pertain to rank and leverage. The rank of the UN mediators depends on their experience, expertise and the parties' perception of them (Kolb 1985). This perception adds to the credibility of the mediator and his/her ability to bridge between the positions of the parties. Fretter (2002), 82

in her study, was able to categorize the rank of UN mediators into nine different categories among which are the ranks ofthe Secretary General, Special Envoy or Special

Representative of the Secretary General, appointed high-ranking mediator, and appointed low-ranking mediator (Fretter 2002). While all of these mediators operate under many similar constraints, the Personal Envoy is subject to additional elements that others are not subject to. For instance, one such condition is his relationship to the Secretary­

General; an element the Manhasset case has proven central to the ineffective conduct of his mediation endeavors.

The mediator's leverage is an important element in the analysis of international mediations and has been a recurrent theme in the Manhasset Negotiations. The UN mediators draw much of their leverage from their rank, the level of support of the

Security Council to their efforts, and the perceived quality of their relationship with the

Secretary General at the time of the mediation. Peter van Walsum as a retired Dutch diplomat had little leverage on the parties and the UN as an insitution he represented. His predecessor James Baker, however, by virtue of his status as a former US Secretary of

State, enjoyed the explicit backing of the US president at the time and the quasi-complete cooperation of the various bodies ofthe United Nations; this until the Bush administration changed its position on the Baker Plan.

The Contingency Model

Bercovitch's contingency model (2007) could be said to be applicable to general

UN led mediations, but the peculiarities of mediations that are led by the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General are lost in the general picture. One element that I think the 83

model falls short off is "the institutional variables" that have been instrumental in creating the conditions for the current stalemate in the Manhasset process. The UN institutional conditions do affect the rank, the identity, the status and the reputation of the mediator, but they also affect his/her behavior, the timing of the mediation and the relative power of the parties. For example, the perceived mediator's relationship with the

Secretary-General influences the way the parties perceive him/her, which in tum impacts, his/her leverage. Similarly, the perceived support of the Security Council of the mediator's efforts would influence his/her perceived leverage (Figure 2).

CONTEXT PROCESS OUTCOME (Antecedent Conditions) (Litrnmt Conditions) (Consequent Conditions) i ... N"""' •fT/,. Di'P"" ~ I i\1editttimu t Outcomes ,''0uure of The I .. .Ueditlfion .Issues Strttregy A11d .. I I .. 1) Subjective Beh,wior i 12) Objectiuel Nmure of The I Disputt11Jfs y: UN Institutional Conditions i (Security Council Resolutions and Ntttm··· of The Support, Relationship with I R<•f,uiomhip... Secretary-General)

Nttture of Tile JvJ,·dimor ~,.

R.ank. ldnJtity. Fxpe-ri~Jue-, ( lntliuning Levc-ragt>, St.atus 0 R~put"JIJ'on)

Figure 2: Modified Contingency Model for the Analysis of the Manhasset Process 84

The UN Institutional Conditions also influence the definition of success and failure ofUN-led mediations (hence the arrow that links Institutional Conditions box with

Mediation Outcome box in Figure 2). The Manhasset Negotiations were technically called upon by the Security-Council resolutions that stipulated that these negotiations ought to be held in view of achieving a mutually acceptable solution. Thus, a successful mediation is the one that achieves such a solution. Anything short of it could not be perceived as success and this was particularly apparent in the Manhasset process.

The Way Forward

After the sacking of van Walsum in August 2008, the Secretary-General named

Ambassador Christopher Ross as his replacement. Ross, a fluent Arabic speaker, is no outsider to the conflict. As a US Foreign Service officer, he served as Ambassador to

Algeria and Senior Advisor on Middle Eastern and North African affairs to the US

Mission in the UN. One of the respondents noted that he was among the team of experts that van Walsum brought into the Manhasset negotiations for consultation (Interview 1).

She added that the UN had contemplated his nomination prior to van Walsum's departure whose firing may just have been a context for replacing him with Ross (Interview!).

Ross' approach is different than the one of his predecessor. He has been an advocate for what he calls "informal" negotiations and seems to enjoy the complete backing of the Obama administration. His name was brought up as a potential replacement of van Walsum weeks only after the latter's departure, but he only was named Personal Envoy on January 2009, simultaneous to Obama's inauguration as

President. On August 2009, he held the first round of informal talks between the parties 85

in Vienna, Austria, in view of bridging some of the fundamental differences between the parties before they sit for a fifth round of formal direct negotiations.

Ross' approach resolves one of the central flaws of the four rounds of the

Manhasset process that is attempting to address questions of interpretation before engaging in substantive matters. By calling it informal, he lowers the expectations of the

Security-Council and eases the pressure on the parties. Unlike van Walsum, he is not misguidedly pushing for a fifth round of negotiations which he said will only call for once the parties agree on a clearly defined agenda.

While I think this approach will eventually lead to some form of agreement between the parties on the resumption of formal negotiations, it does not resolve the single most important structural issue of the past and current negotiations on the status of

Western Sahara; the Algerian question.

Algeria is the sponsor and host of the government in exile ofthe Frente

POLISARIO. It has several outstanding issues with Morocco and seems to be the least hurt by the current status quo. The Moroccans have always contended that Algeria uses the conflict as a proxy to maintain its strategic advantage over Morocco while the

Algerians argue that they will support any solution that the POLISARIO deems acceptable (Interview2 2009). The POLISARIO is certainly far from being an Algerian puppet, but as Zartman and Theofilopoulou (2008) note in an unpublished article, the

POLISARIO could be seen as "the tail that wags the dog." Algeria may not want to be considered a party to the Sahara conflict, but as a "supplier, funder and supporter of the

POLISARIO, it bears a relationship quite akin to that of a party" (Zartman and

Theofilopoulou 2008). It is thus important to factor Algerian positions, motives and 86

interests in any serious attempts to resolve the Western Sahara conflict. One way could be the establishment of a secret Moroccan-Algerian negotiation track that aims at addressing the underlying causes of the animosity between these two "enemy brothers", simultaneous to the official UN-led Morocco-POLISARIO track. The secret track, at an initial stage only, will create the context for the identification of these underlying issues that neither one has been willing to explicitly disclose. The secrecy component will also prevent the antagonization of the POLISARIO which is very susceptible to any rapprochement between the two neighboring countries; a rapprochement which it fears will happen at the expense of its own interests. In this context, secrecy could be used as a face-saving approach for the Algerians who have entranched themselves into an inflexible position of non-cooperation. The parties should de link their collaboration from their positions on the Western Sahara conflict. Once this is achieved and some pattern of normalized collaboration is established, problem-solving on the Western Sahara issue would be a much less complicated endeavor.

Synthesis

All in all, the Manhasset Process could be said to be an illustration of what could go wrong with the UN mediation of international conflicts. This research attempted to shed more light on the Manhasset case and through it on the complex inner workings of the UN mediation processes and the interaction of the UN as an institution with the effective conduct ofthose same processes. The international mediation literature says little about the mediation of Personal Envoys of the Secretary-General-and other UN mediators- notwithstanding the fact that they are usually at the forefront of most conflict 87

management and resolution endeavors. The UN may not be the ultimate forum for the resolution of some of the world's most intractable conflicts, but it still has the capacity and legitimacy to intervene in them. It is thus imperative that future research explores

U.N.-led mediation processes which are at the gist of its conflict resolution attempts but that remain ill-understood. APPENDIX A

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89 APPENDIXB

1. It's never been really clear whether the negotiations were spurred by the Moroccan King's announcement that his country was working on an Autonomy Proposal or by the Van Walsum' s assessment of the situation which he articulated in his report. In your opinion, how did the process come about?

2. The UN has called what happened during the Manhasset rounds talks, negotiations, and discussions in its various documents, and the UNSG concluded that there weren't any negotiations. How would you qualify what took place between June 2007 and March 2008? Do you agree with the UNSG's assessment?

3. Do you think the parties were ready for the process? Was the Polisario ready for the process? Were the Personal Representative and mediator ready for the process?

4. In the SG report preceding resolution 1754 he talked about how the Polisario saw that they'd rather stay the course which might have lead to the resumption of violence whereas Morocco seemed to have warmly welcomed these negotiations. Do you think without resolution 1754 there wouldn't have been any negotiations?

5. Mr. Van Walsum also talked about the parties misunderstanding of the difference between preconditions and positions. What the report doesn't say is whether the parties' conception of these 2 terms differed from the one of the Personal Envoy or whether they themselves didn't agree with each other. Do you think the parties had the same conception?

6. At the end ofthe fourth round of negotiations Van Walsum who was also the process mediator was "fired" after calling the option of independence "not realistic". What do you think of his assessment?

a. Do you think he disqualified himself as mediator for deeming one option less realistic than the other, or do you think that's what mediators should do (give their opinions)? b. How do you think his "sacking" impacted the process?

7. Did Van Walsum have any source of leverage as a mediator?

a. If so, how different was his leverage from the one of Baker?

8. What advice would you give to the new Personal Envoy Christopher Ross? 90 APPENDIX C

DESRCIPTION OF INTERVIEWEES

Interviewl: Ms. Anna Theofilopoulou is a former United Nations employee. She has followed the conflict and UN-led attempts to resolve. Ms. Theofilopoulou worked closely with former Personal Envoy James Baker and has attended past negotiations between the parties. I interviewed her on 24 April 2009 in New York City.

Interview2: This individual is a high-ranking Moroccan diplomat who has participated, in the negotiations in question, though not as member of the official Moroccan delegation. The interview took place in May 2009 in Washington D.C.

Interview3: Mr. Mouloud Said has been the POLISARIO's "Representative" to the

United States for over 22 years. He has participated in past negotiations between

Morocco and his movement. The interview took place on 20 July 2009 in Washington

D.C.

Interview4: Dr. Sidi M. Omar is the current Representative of the Polisario with the

African Union and Ethiopia. He was a member ofPOLISARIO's official delegation to the Manhasset Negotiations. The interview was done via email in October 2009.

Communicationl: This individual is a former assistant to Personal Envoy Peter van

Walsum. I communicated with this person via email in an attempt to secure an interview with Mr. van Walsum. 91 APPENDIX D

Annex to the letter dated 16 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Proposal of the Frente Polisario for a mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara

I. The Conflict of Western Sahara is a decolonization question:

1. Included since 1965 on the list of the Non-Self-Governing territories of the UN Decolonization Committee, Western Sahara is a territory of which the decolonization process has been interrupted by the Moroccan invasion and occupation of 1975 and which is based on the implementation of the General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) regarding the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

2. The UN General Assembly and the Security Council have identified this conflict as a decolonization conflict between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO whose settlement passes by the exercise by the Saharawi people of their right to self­ determination.

3. Likewise, the International Court of Justice, at the request of the General Assembly has clearly ruled, in a legal opinion dated 16 October 1975, that "the materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression ofthe will ofthe peoples of the Territory".

4. Furthermore, on 29 January 2002, at the request by the Security Council, the UN Legal Counsel clearly established that Morocco was not the administering power of the territory, that the Madrid Agreement of 1975 dividing the territory between Morocco and Mauritania did not transfer any sovereignty to its signatories and, finally, that the status of Western Sahara, as Non-Self-Governing Territory, had not been affected by this agreement.

92 93

II. The solution of the conflict passes by the holding of a referendum on self­ determination:

5. The question of Western Sahara having been identified by the International Community as a decolonization question, the efforts aiming to settle it have consequently and naturally been guided by the objective of offering the people of this territory the opportunity to decide their future through a free and fair referendum on self­ determination.

6. The Settlement Plan approved by the two parties to the conflict, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO, and by the Security Council in its resolutions 658 (1990) and 690 (1991 ), complemented by the Houston Agreements negotiated and signed in September 1997 by the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO, under the auspices of James Baker III, Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General, and endorsed by the Security Council as well as the Peace Plan for Self-determination for the People of Western Sahara or Baker Plan approved by the Security Council in its resolution 1495 (2003), all provide for the holding of a referendum on self-determination in Western Sahara. All these efforts failed because of the reneging of the Kingdom of Morocco on its international commitments.

III. Readiness of the Frente POLISARIO to negotiate with a view to holding the referendum on self-determination and the granting of post-referendum guarantees to Morocco and to Moroccan residents in Western Sahara:

7. The Frente POLISARIO that unilaterally declared a cease-fire which it has ever since respected scrupulously, and that accepted and implemented in good faith the Settlement Plan by virtue of which the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was deployed as well as the Houston Agreements, and that has honoured all the commitments it has undertaken by making concessions sometimes painful in order to offer to the Saharawi people the opportunity to freely decide their destiny, reiterates solemnly its acceptance of Baker Plan and declares its readiness to negotiate directly with the Kingdom of Morocco, under the auspices of the United Nations, the modalities for implementing it as well as those relating to the holding of a genuine referendum on self-determination in Western Sahara in strict conformity with the spirit and letter of the UN General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and within the format envisaged in the framework of Baker Plan, namely the choice between independence, integration into the Kingdom of Morocco and self-governance.

8. The Frente POLISARIO is also committed to accepting the results of the referendum whatever they are and to already negotiate with the Kingdom of Morocco, under the auspices of the United Nations, the guarantees that it is prepared to grant to the Moroccan population residing in Western Sahara for 10 years as well as to the Kingdom of Morocco in the political, economic and security domains in the event that the referendum on self­ determination would lead to independence.

9. The guarantees to be negotiated by the two parties would consist in: 94

9.1: the mutual recogmtwn of and respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the two countries in accordance with the principle of the intangibility of the borders inherited from the independence period;

9.2: the granting of guarantees concerning the status and the rights and obligations of the Moroccan population in Western Sahara, including its participation in the political, economic and social life of the territory of Western Sahara. In this respect, the Saharawi State could grant the Saharawi nationality to any Moroccan citizen legally established in the territory that would apply for it;

9.3: the agreement on equitable and mutually advantageous arrangements permitting the development and the joint exploitation of the existing natural resources or those that could be discovered during a determined period of time;

9.4: the setting up of formulas of partnership and economic cooperation m different economic, commercial and financial sectors;

9.5: the renunciation by the two parties, on a reciprocal basis, of any compensation for the material destructions that have taken place since the beginning of the conflict in Western Sahara;

9.6: the conclusion of security arrangements with the Kingdom of Morocco as well as with the countries of the region that may be interested;

9.7: the commitment ofthe Saharawi State to work closely with the Kingdom of Morocco as well as with the other countries of the region with a view to bringing to conclusion the integration process of the Maghreb;

9.8: the readiness of the Saharawi State to participate with Morocco and the countries of the region in the maintenance of peace, stability and security of the whole region in the face of the different threats that could target it. Likewise, the Saharawi State would positively consider any request from the United Nations and the African Union to participate in peace-keeping operations.

10. The Frente POLISARIO is ready, under the auspices of the United Nations and with the approval and the support of the Security Council, to enter in direct negotiations with the Kingdom of Morocco on the basis of the aforementioned parameters with a view to reaching a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in conformity with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations mainly the General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), thus bringing about peace, stability and prosperity for the whole region of the Maghreb. APPENDIXE

Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Statute for the Sahara Region

I. Morocco's commitment to a final political solution

1. Since 2004, the Security Council has been regularly calling upon "the parties and States of the region to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations to end the current impasse and to achieve progress towards a political solution".

2. Responding to this call by the international community, the Kingdom of Morocco set a positive, constructive and dynamic process in motion, and pledged to submit an autonomy proposal for the Sahara, within the framework of the Kingdom's sovereignty and national unity.

3. This initiative is part of the endeavours made to build a modem, democratic society, based on the rule of law, collective and individual freedoms, and economic and social development. As such, it brings hope for a better future for the region's populations, puts an end to separation and exile, and promotes reconciliation.

4. Through this initiative, the Kingdom of Morocco guarantees to all Sahrawis, inside as well as outside the territory, that they will hold a privileged position and play a leading role in the bodies and institutions of the region, without discrimination or exclusion.

5. Thus, the Sahara populations will themselves run their affairs democratically, through legislative, executive and judicial bodies enjoying exclusive powers. They will have the financial resources needed for the region's development in all fields, and will take an active part in the nation's economic, social and cultural life.

6. The State will keep its powers in the royal domains, especially with respect to defense, external relations and the constitutional and religious prerogatives of His Majesty the King.

7. The Moroccan initiative, which is made in an open spirit, aims to set the stage for dialogue and a\negotiation process that would lead to a mutually acceptable political solution.

95 96

8. As the outcome of negotiations, the autonomy statute shall be submitted to the populations concerned for a referendum, in keeping with the principle of self­ determination and with the provisions of the UN Charter.

9. To this end, Morocco calls on the other parties to avail the opportunity to write a new chapter in the region's history. Morocco is ready to take part in serious, constructive negotiations in the spirit of this initiative, and to contribute to promoting a climate of trust.

10. To achieve this objective, the Kingdom of Morocco remains willing to cooperate fully with the UN Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy.

II. Basic elements of the Moroccan proposal

11. The Moroccan autonomy project draws inspiration from the relevant proposals of the United Nations Organization, and from the constitutional provisions in force in countries that are geographically and culturally close to Morocco. It is based on internationally recognized norms and standards.

A. Powers of the Sahara autonomous Region

12. In keeping with democratic principles and procedures, and acting through legislative, executive and judicial bodies, the populations of the Sahara autonomous Region shall exercise powers, within the Region's territorial boundaries, mainly over the following:

· Region's local administration, local police force and jurisdictions; · in the economic sector: economic development, regional planning, promotion of investment, trade, industry, tourism and agriculture; ·Region's budget and taxation; · infrastructure: water, hydraulic facilities, electricity, public works and transportation; · in the social sector: housing, education, health, employment, sports, social welfare and social security; ·cultural affairs, including promotion of the Saharan Hassani cultural heritage; · environment.

13. The Sahara autonomous Region will have the financial resources required for its development in all areas. Resources will come, in particular, from:

· taxes, duties and regional levies enacted by the Region's competent authorities; · proceeds from the exploitation of natural resources allocated to the Region; · the share of proceeds collected by the State from the exploitation of natural resources located in the Region; · the necessary funds allocated in keeping with the principle of national solidarity; ·proceeds from the Region's assets. 97

14. The State shall keep exclusive jurisdiction over the following in particular:

·the attributes of sovereignty, especially the flag, the national anthem and the currency; · the attributes stemming from the constitutional and religious prerogatives of the King, as Commander of the Faithful and Guarantor of freedom ofworship and of individual and collective freedoms; ·national security, external defense and defense of territorial integrity; · external relations; ·the Kingdom's juridical order.

15. State responsibilities with respect to external relations shall be exercised in consultation with the Sahara autonomous Region for those matters which have a direct bearing on the prerogatives of the Region. The Sahara autonomous Region may, in consultation with the Government, establish cooperation relations with foreign Regions to foster inter-regional dialogue and cooperation.

16. The powers of the State in the Sahara autonomous Region, as stipulated in paragraph 13 above, shall be exercised by a Representative of the Government.

17. Moreover, powers which are not specifically entrusted to a given party shall be exercised by common agreement, on the basis of the principle of subsidiary.

18. The populations of the Sahara Autonomous Region shall be represented in Parliament and in the other national institutions. They shall take part in all national elections.

B. Bodies of the Region

19. The Parliament of the Sahara autonomous Region shall be made up of members elected by the various Sahrawi tribes, and of members elected by direct universal suffrage, by the Region's population. There shall be adequate representation of women in the Parliament of the Sahara autonomous Region.

20. Executive authority in the Sahara autonomous Region shall lie with a Head of Government, to be elected by the regional Parliament. He shall be invested by the King.

The Head of Government shall be the Representative ofthe State in the Region.

21. The Head of Government ofthe Sahara autonomous Region shall form the Region's Cabinet and appoint the administrators needed to exercise the powers devolving upon him, under the present autonomy Statute. He shall be answerable to the Region's Parliament. 98

22. Courts may be set up by the regional Parliament to give rulings on disputes arising from enforcement of norms enacted by the competent bodies of the Sahara autonomous Region. These courts shall give their rulings with complete independence, in the name of the King.

23. As the highest jurisdiction of the Sahara autonomous Region, the high regional court shall give final decisions regarding the interpretation of the Region's legislation, without prejudice to the powers of the Kingdom's Supreme Court or Constitutional Council.

24. Laws, regulations and court rulings issued by the bodies of the Sahara autonomous Region shall be consistent with the Region's autonomy Statute and with the Kingdom's Constitution.

25. The Region's populations shall enjoy all the guarantees afforded by the Moroccan Constitution in the area of human rights as they are universally recognized.

26. An Economic and Social Council shall be set up in the Sahara autonomous Region. It shall comprise representatives from economic, social, professional and community groups, as well as highly qualified figures.

III. Approval and implementation procedure for the autonomy statute

27. The Region's autonomy statute shall be the subject of negotiations and shall be submitted to the populations concerned in a free referendum. This referendum will constitute a free exercise, by these populations, of their right to self-determination, as per the provisions of international legality, the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions ofthe General Assembly and the Security Council.

28. To this end, the parties pledge to work jointly and in good faith to foster this political solution and secure its approval by the Sahara populations.

29. Moreover, the Moroccan Constitution shall be amended and the autonomy Statute incorporated into it, in order to guarantee its sustainability and reflect its special place in the country's national juridical architecture.

30. The Kingdom of Morocco shall take all the necessary steps to ensure full integration, into the nation's fabric, of persons to be repatriated. This will be done in a manner which preserves their dignity and guarantees their security and the protection of their property.

31. To this end, the Kingdom of Morocco shall, in particular, declare a blanket amnesty, precluding any legal proceedings, arrest, detention, imprisonment or intimidation of any kind, based on facts covered by this amnesty.

32. Once the parties have agreed on the proposed autonomy, a Transitional Council composed of their representatives shall assist with repatriation, disarmament, 99

demobilization and reintegration of armed elements who are outside the territory, as well as with any other action aimed at securing the approval and implementation of the present Statute, including elections.

33. Just like the international community, the Kingdom of Morocco firmly believes today that the solution to the Sahara dispute can only come from negotiations. Accordingly, the proposal it is submitting to the United Nations constitutes a real opportunity for initiating negotiations with a view to reaching a final solution to this dispute, in keeping with international legality, and on the basis of arrangements which are consistent with the goals and principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter.

34. In this respect, Morocco pledges to negotiate in good faith and in a constructive, open spirit to reach a final, mutually acceptable political solution to the dispute plaguing region. To this end, the Kingdom of Morocco is prepared to make a positive contribution to creating an environment of trust which would contribute to the successful outcome of this initiative.

35. The Kingdom of Morocco hopes the other parties will appreciate the significance and scope of this proposal, realize its merit, and make a positive and constructive contribution to it. The Kingdom of Morocco is ofthe view that the momentum created by this initiative offers a historic chance to resolve this issue once and for all. APPENDIXF S/19971742 English­ Page 9 Annex II Results of the third round of direct talks Lisbon, 2 9 August 1997

I. COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ON TROOP CONFINEMENT

1. The parties agree that Moroccan armed forces will be reduced and confined or contained in all respects strictly in accordance with the provisions of the settlement plan.

2. The parties and the observer nations of Algeria and Mauritania also agree that Frente POLISARIO armed forces will be confined or contained in locations and numbers as designated by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (as called for in the settlement plan) provided, however, that no more than 2,000 individuals may be confined or contained on the territory of Western Sahara east of the sand berm and no more than 300 individuals on the territory of Mauritania. Frente POLISARIO armed forces over and above the number designated by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for confinement or containment in Western Sahara east of the sand berm and in Mauritania shall be confined or contained on the territory of Algeria. As far as the locations of the troops to be confined and contained in Algeria and Mauritania are concerned, these locations will be identified in coordination with the Algerian and Mauritanian authorities.

3. This compromise agreement is for the sole purpose of further defining the rights and responsibilities of the parties and the observer nations regarding confinement or containment of troops for the purpose of carrying out the settlement plan and the referendum called for in such plan. This compromise shall in no way change, alter or otherwise affect the internationally recognized boundaries of Western Sahara, and shall not serve as precedent for any argument that such boundaries have changed or been altered.

II. PRISONERS OF WAR

1. The parties agree that all prisoners of war will be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of the settlement plan.

2. The parties further agree that they will continue their full cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross until the completion of the repatriation process.

III. POLITICAL PRISONERS OR DETAINEES

The parties agree that any and all Saharan political prisoners or detainees will be released, pursuant to the amnesty envisioned in the settlement plan, before the beginning of the referendum campaign. The parties further agree that they will fully cooperate with the Independent Jurist in carrying out his duties.

100 APPENDIX G

S/1997/742 English Page 8 Annex I

Results of the second round of direct talks London, 19 and 20 July 1997

I. COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ON OUTSTANDING IDENTIFICATION ISSUES

1. The parties agree that they will not directly or indirectly sponsor or present for identification anyone from tribal groupings H41, H61 and 151152 other than persons included in the Spanish census of 1974 and their immediate family members, but the parties shall not be obligated to actively prevent individuals from such tribal groupings from presenting themselves. The parties agree that identification of any such individuals who may present themselves shall proceed as soon as possible.

2. The parties agree that persons from all other tribal groups from census categories H, I and 1 may come forward to be identified.

3. The parties agree that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General shall notify the parties of the results by number, but not name, of the identification process to date.

4. The parties acknowledge that, from the time of the original settlement plan, they have understood that credible oral testimony to the Identification Commission would be required, and the parties agree that in the identification process oral testimony will be received and considered by the Identification Commission, as provided for in the settlement plan.

II. COMPROMISE ON OUTSTANDING REFUGEE ISSUES

The parties concur that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) should begin the steps preparatory to the process of repatriation of refugees in accordance with the settlement plan. In addition, they have agreed to cooperate with UNHCR in implementation of the repatriation program in accordance with UNHCR's normal practice and established principles of repatriation.

101 APPENDIXH

1997 Houston Declaration

1. The Parties agree to comply with their commitments as regards the identification process, repatriation of refugees, prisoners, detainees, confinement of their respective troops as well as the code of conduct for the referendum campaign.

2. The Parties understand and agree that the United Nations is required by the settlement plan to organize and conduct a referendum that is free, fair and transparent and free from all constraints, both for participants and accredited observers. They also understand and agree that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General will set the start of the referendum campaign when he is satisfied that all such conditions are met.

3. Accordingly, the Parties agree that the powers and authorities of the United Nations during the transitional period, as described in the settlement plan, and during the referendum campaign, as described in the code of conduct, shall apply to ensure, among other things, that there shall be complete freedom of speech and assembly, and of the press, as well as freedom of movement of personnel and property into, out of and within the Territory, thus creating a climate of public tranquility within which a referendum free of all constraints, intimidation and harassment can be organized and conducted by the United Nations.

4. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General shall be authorized to issue regulations prohibiting graft, fraud, intimidation or harassment which could interfere with the organization and conduct of a free, fair and transparent referendum, and shall likewise be authorized to require that all Parties shall have equal access to all television and radio facilities for the purpose of broadcasting their respective views on the referendum. Television and radio facilities shall be made available at United Nations expense to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the extent he deems appropriate, in order to disseminate publicly information about the referendum in order to inform all eligible voters about their rights and obligations.

Code of Conduct for the Referendum Campaign in Western Sahara

Having regard to resolution 658 (1990), by which the Security Council approved the report ofthe Secretary-General of the United Nations on the situation concerning Western Sahara (S/21360),

102 103

Having regard to resolution 690 (1991 ), by which the Security Council approved the report of the Secretary-General (S/22464) and decided to establish, under its authority, a United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO),

Having regard to the aforementioned reports of the Secretary-General collectively referred to as the "Settlement Plan",

Having regard to regulations 5 and 8 to 10 of the General Regulations for the Organization and Conduct of the Referendum in Western Sahara issued by the Secretary­ General on 8 November 1991 (S/26185, annex III), and

In order to ensure that the referendum on self-determination for the people of Western Sahara is free and fair, without military or administrative constraints and without any intimidation or interference, the Code of Conduct set out below shall govern the referendum campaign.

This Code of Conduct formulated and issued by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General after consultation with the two Parties shall govern the conduct and behavior, during the referendum campaign, of the Parties and persons or groups of persons approved by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, supporting one or the other Party participants in the referendum.

1. Sole and exclusive authority over all matters relating to the referendum, including its organization and conduct, shall be vested in the United Nations. This authority shall be exercised, within the framework established by the Settlement Plan, by the Special Representative ofthe Secretary-General.

2. The Special Representative shall, in accordance with the Settlement Plan, set the date for the commencement of the referendum campaign, which shall be at such time as he is satisfied that all conditions are met for a free and fair campaign and which date shall be three weeks prior to the date set for the referendum. No referendum campaign activities shall commence prior to that date.

3. The two Parties shall be entitled, in accordance with the provisions of this Code, to campaign freely for the support of those entitled to vote, during the period specified for this purpose in paragraph 2 above. Each Party shall respect the corresponding right of the other Party in this regard.

4. The two Parties shall respect the right of all persons or groups of persons wishing to participate in campaign events and activities, expressly prohibiting any form of intimidation, including intimidation of persons seeking access to polling centers. The two Parties shall see to it that no person or group of persons disrupts meetings, demonstrations and rallies organized by others having a different political view. The two 104

Parties shall do what is needed to ensure that no person or group of persons seeks to prevent anyone from participating in meetings, demonstrations or political rallies organized by others to put forward a political position that is different from their own. It is understood that, apart from those returning under the auspices of UNHCR in accordance with the Settlement Plan, no party shall encourage, support or facilitate the transfer or movement of people in substantial number into the Territory without the express authority ofthe Special Representative.

5. Possession of weapons of any kind, including traditional weapons, shall be strictly prohibited during any meeting, march, demonstration or political rally related to the referendum campaign.

6. No meeting, demonstration or political rally involving 30 or more persons may be held or organized without the prior authorization, in writing, of the MINURSO civilian police who will consult with the existing security forces. In all cases where such consultation is required or permitted by this Code, the adequacy of such consultations shall be determined solely by the Special Representative. The Parties shall notify the MINURSO civilian police of their intention to hold a demonstration and shall apply for the required authorization at least two days prior to the proposed demonstration.

7. In accordance with its functions, which include monitoring the existing security forces, the MINURSO civilian police shall ensure that meetings, marches, demonstrations and rallies of opposing parties are not held close to one another, at the same time or in such a manner as to threaten public order and security. The two Parties undertake to cooperate with MINURSO in good faith so that this principle may be applied faithfully and reasonably should the dates or venues coincide.

8. Each Party shall establish direct lines of communication and maintain regular contact with the field offices of the Special Representative in the Territory, and shall keep the Special Representative apprised of any information he may request or need in order to ensure a free and fair campaign.

9. The two Parties shall respect the right to participate in authorized political meetings, demonstrations, marches and rallies conducted as part of the referendum campaign on the part of all voters entitled to participate in the referendum. Where necessary, the Special Representative shall take appropriate measures to ensure the security and freedom of access of the persons concerned, including consultations with the existing security forces.

10. The two Parties shall permit representatives of the international and local press and independent observers duly accredited by the Special Representative unrestricted access to all public political activities conducted during the referendum campaign and referendum. Such observers, to be accredited, must be recognized and experienced in election observation, shall perform only observation and reporting functions, and shall not engage in any partisan activities. The two Parties shall likewise respect the rights of official observers as are provided for under the Settlement Plan to observe and attest all 105

political activities conducted during the referendum campaign and referendum.

11. Campaign material normally used, such as posters, video equipment, tapes, loudspeakers and, within reasonable limits, vehicles, shall be permitted at campaign activities. No national colors or flags, other than the United Nations flag, shall be displayed in any campaign activities or locations. Nor shall any national colors or flags be displayed except those that were on government buildings as at 14 September 1997.

12. The two Parties shall ensure that speakers at campaign events avoid at all times using language which is offensive or inflammatory or which threatens or incites violence in any form.

13. The two Parties shall refrain from issuing pamphlets, newsletters or posters, either officially or anonymously, having an offensive, abusive or inflammatory content.

14. The two Parties shall make every effort to ensure that persons or groups of persons do not plagiarize symbols of opposing groups or steal, remove or destroy their property or campaign materials.

15. Any complaint or allegation of intimidation or of any other form of unlawful conduct during the referendum campaign shall be brought immediately to the attention of the MINURSO civilian police office and the field office of the Special Representative. The head of the office in question shall immediately take steps to resolve the matter, including informing the existing security forces if, in his opinion, the occasion requires it. If this is not possible, the matter shall be referred to the Special Representative for a decision, which shall be final.

16. The two Parties shall issue directives to all persons or groups of persons requiring their strict compliance with this Code of Conduct and shall take all other steps necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the Code.

17. The two Parties shall cooperate with the Special Representative in publicizing the Code of Conduct throughout the Territory and in giving it the widest possible dissemination.

18. The Special Representative ofthe Secretary-General shall have the responsibility of guaranteeing the freedom of movement and the security of the population. The two Parties undertake to do their utmost to ensure respect for these rights.

Practical Measures to be Taken for the Resumption of Identification

1. The responsibility for implementing the identification process lies with the Identification Commission.

2. The Commission will confirm the timetable and the locations for identification, as well 106

as the operational procedures for identification. The Chairman of the Identification Commission will inform and provide the parties with relevant convocation lists in due time after the list of sheikhs and alternates for each tribal group to be identified has been established by the Chairman following consultations with the parties. All remaining applicants, as defined and agreed in London on 19 July 1997, will be convoked once.

3. The working week and hours of work, as well as other necessary practical measures to be taken in order to achieve the weekly program, will be at the discretion of the centre leader.

4. In the interest of efficiency and economy, the necessary rotations will take place once a week from Laayoune and Tindouf. The parties will ensure that all participants concerned, sheikhs as well as observers, will be available to complete a full week's work, and accommodated according! y.

5. The Organization of African Unity will be invited to observe in accordance with the settlement plan.

6. The parties undertake to cooperate fully with the Identification Commission in the discharge of its function.

Houston, Texas, 14-16 September 1997 APPENDIX I

S/200l/613

Annex I Framework agreement on the Status of Western Sahara

The authority in Western Sahara shall be as follows: 1. The population of Western Sahara, through their executive, legislative and judicial bodies shall have exclusive competence over local governmental administration, territorial budget and taxation, law enforcement, internal security, social welfare, culture, education, commerce, transportation, agriculture, mining, fisheries and industry, environmental policy, housing and urban development, water and electricity, roads and other basic infrastructure. 2. The Kingdom of Morocco will have exclusive competence over foreign relations (including international agreements and conventions) national security and external defence (including determination of borders, maritime, aerial or terrestrial and their protection by all appropriate means) all matters relating to the production, sale, ownership or use of weapons or explosives and the preservation of the territorial integrity against secessionist attempts whether from within or without the territory. In addition, the flag, currency, customs, postal and telecommunication systems of the Kingdom shall be the same for Western Sahara. With respect to all functions described in this paragraph (2) the Kingdom may appoint representatives to serve it in Western Sahara. 3. In Western Sahara the executive authority shall be vested in an Executive, who shall be elected by a vote of those individuals who have been identified as qualified to vote by the Identification Commission of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, and whose names are on the United Nations provisional voter lists (completed as of 30 December 1999) without giving effect to any appeals or other objections. To qualify as a candidate for Executive, one must be an individual who has been identified as qualified to vote as aforesaid and whose name is on said provisional voter lists. The Executive shall be elected for a term of four years. Thereafter, the Executive shall be elected by majority vote of the Assembly. The Executive shall appoint administrators in charge of executive departments for terms of four years. The legislative authority shall be vested in an Assembly, the members of which shall be directly elected by voters for terms of four years. The judicial authority shall be vested in such courts as may be necessary, the judges of which shall be selected from the National Institute for Judicial Studies but shall be from Western Sahara. Such courts shall be the authority on territorial law. To be qualified to vote for members of the Assembly, a person must be 18 years or older and either (i) a continuous resident of the territory since 31 October 1998, or (ii) a person listed on the repatriation list as of 3 I October 2000. 4. All laws passed by the Assembly and all decisions of the courts referred to in paragraph 3 above must respect and comply with the constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco, particularly with respect to the protection of public liberties. A !I elections or referenda referred to in this agreement shall be conducted with aU appropriate guarantees and in keeping with the Code of Conduct agreed to by the parties in !997, except where to do so would be inconsistent with the terms hereof. 5. Neither the Kingdom nor the executive, legislative, or judicial bodies of the Authority of Western Sahara referred to above may unilaterally change or abolish the status of Western Sahara. Any changes or modifications of this agreement has to

107 108

Sf2001/613

be approved by the Executive and the As$embly of Western Sahara. The status of Western Sahara will be submitted to a referendum of qualified voters on such date as the parties hereto shall agree, within the five year period following the initial actions to tmplement this agreement. To be qualified to vote in such a referendum a voter must have been a full time resident of Western Sahara for the preceding one year. 6. The Secretary-General of the United Nations will offer .his mediation and good offices to assist the two parties hereto in the implementation or interpretation of this agreement. 7. The parties agree to implement this agreement promptly and request the assistance of the United Nations to this end.

Executed this ___ day of ·---~2001.

Kingdom of Morocco Frente POLISARIO

WITNESSED:

Government of Algeria Government of Mauritania

Secretary-General of the United Nations In order to promote an agreed resolution of the dispute over Western Sahara, the Governments of France and the United States of America hereby guarantee performance of this agreement by the parties hereto. •

Government of France Govemment of the United States of America

("'neither country has committed to do this, but both have agreed to consider it, if it were necessary to achieve an agreement) APPENDIXJ

United Nations

D.istr.: General 2' Jun~ :007

Original: English

Report of the Seuetat·y-General on the status and progress of tbe negotiations on 'Vestern Sahara I. Introduction

l. The present repott is subtnitted pursuant to Sc(:nriry Council rc~o1ution 1 '754 (2007) of 30 April 2007, by which the Council called upon the parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions in good f of the last months. wifl1 a view to achieYing a just. lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, \Yhich would pro\·ide for the self­ determination of the people of ·western Sahara In that r~solmion. the Council also requested th~ Secretary-General to provide a report by 30 Jun~ ~00' on the stan" and progres~ of those nl!goti(ltions under his an~pjces. m1d expre~sed irs. intention to 1neet to receiYe and discnss that report. The pre~ent repon coYers de,·eloptnent"::­ since the issuance of my report dated 13 April 2007 (S.::o07i102) and describes both the preliminary consultations and the status and progre&> of the negotiation>.

II. Activities of my Personal Envoy

2. Pursuant to Security Council resolution !754 (2007). my Personal Em·oy. Peter van \Valsum. held preliminmy discussions in Ne\\- York separately with rept·esentati\·es of the two parties. lVIorocco and the Freme Polisario. and with those of the two neighbouring States. Algeria and 1\'lnuritania. in preparation for a tneding of the partie:,. During. tho';e consultations. tny Personal EnYoy li'Stened to the concerns and positions of the parties and neighbouring countries. with regard to th~ conduct of the negotiations, and the parties reiteroted their will to enter into negotiation& in good faith under n1y auspices. 3. In May and June 2007, my Personal Em·oy also cousulted the representati\·es of interested Member States. including France. the Russian Federation. Spain. the L'nited Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the L'nited States of Amet·ica. in New York. and br-iefly visited Loudon. Madrid. Paris and \VashingtorL D.C .. for additional consultations. During those me~tings. he sensed a commitment to tnaintaining the n101nentun1 towards a negotiating proce~s and a willing:ne5.s to provide political support and lend assistance in order to make the ne~!Otiations possible. It was also reiterated to him that the Security Council had consistently made it clear that it would not impose a solution to the gue<;tion of \Vestem Sahara. but that it was. conunitted to al)sisting the parties in achieYing: a tnutnally acceptable

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political solution that would proYide for the self-detenuination of the people of ·western Sahara.

4. In a letter dated 25 May 2007, I invited the panies to send delegations to meet with my Personal Envoy. Mr. .-an Walsum. at the Greentree Estate in IVlanhasset. New York. on 18 and !9 June 2007. In my letter. it ·was specified that the discussions would be priYate. In similar letters. I invited Algeria and Mauritania to attend the ?>'lanhasset meeting as neighbouring countries. 5. The meeting took plnce at the Greentree Estate on 18 and 19 June. as planned. The parties held separate meeiings with my Personal Etwoy. as '.vel! as l\vo sessions of face-to-face discussiom. for the first time since direct talks hnd been held in London and Berlin in 2000. RepresentatiYes of the neighbouring countries, Algeria and Mauritania. '"ere present at the opening and closing sessions and were consulted separately during the t\\·o-day meeting. In principle. they were also welcome to attend the joint meetings of the pm1ies. but all delegations had accepted the understanding thm when either of the parties prefened to meet without neighbouring cotmlries. ut>ither ut>ighbouring country would pcretary-Geueral for Political Affairs. Mr. B. Lynn Pascoe. who underlined that in the preparation of a process of negotiations. it was important to establish au atmosphere of good faith and mutual trust. He also appealed to the parties to exercise discretion and respect confidentiality: and urged all delegations to employ good judgement and refrain from using langn<~ge that could inflame rather than support an enYironment conducive to fruitful negotiation:s. He reminded the meeting that the succt>ss or failure of the negotiations would ultimately be determined by the political will of the partie> to resolve their differences through dialogue and compromise. The United Natiom. tluough the good offices of the Secretary-General. was there to t';1cilitate the discussions in every w<~y possible: but it was the responsibility of the parties to forge a nmtually acceptable solution. 7. In facilitating the negotiations. my Personal Em·oy asked for an open and frank but nonethelt>ss t·espectful discn>siotL During the discussions. the parties reiterated their commitment to the proce% and appeared determined not to be the cause of a breakdown of the negotiations. Although they both confirmed their respect for the principle of self-detennination and accepted Security Council resolution 17 54 (2007) as the mandate for the negotiations. their positions remained far apart on the definition of ;,elf-detennination. 8. The parties agreed to the commnniquti of my Personal EnYoy, contained in the annex to this report. In his closing remarks. my Personal Envoy expressed his satisfaction at the positiYe atmosphere that had prevailed during the negotiations. He added. howeYer. that a negotiation process could not be sustained by atmosphere alone. 9. I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Greentree Foundation for haYing made aYailable the Greentree Estate m. the Yenue for the meeting held on 18 and 19 June 1007.

2 07-39983 111

S/2007!385

III. Observations and recommendations

1 0. In parag1·aph> 1 and 3 of its resolution 17 54 (2007). the Security Council called upon the parties to enter into negotiations and requested me to set up those negotiations under my auspices. In addition to what I haYe reported on the status and progress of the negotiatiom in the preceding paragraphs. I am also pleased to inform the Council that a second round will begin on 10 August 2007. II. In paragraph 3 of that resolution, the Security Council also invited I'vlember States to lend appropriate assistance to the negotiations. GiYen the context. I a:;sumed that the Council was thinking, in particular, of assistance in the setting up of the negotiations. In thai respect, I can report that seYeral I\-1ember States have offered t:1cilities and expertise for that purpose. for which I wish to express my gratitude. All oft~rs are currently being evaluated. 12. In a different context. howeYer. there i;; ar least one other area where appropriate a;;sistance could be lent to the negotiations. I would like to recommend that the Security Council call on all Member States to lend assistance to the process by urging both paTties to make eYery effort to maintain the momentum and to impress upon them that a final resolution of the conflict will require flexibility and ;,acrifice from both of them. In that context. the Frente Polisario could be asked to 1\!st i\:lorocco ·s readiness to take part in serious. constrnctiYe negotiations by making concrete propo;,als to define. clarify or amend proYisions in the proposal of Morocco. lea\·ing the final status out of consideration at this stage. Morocco. on its side. could be asked to show a greater awareness of the complexity of the issue by not imisting that its acceptance of autonomy instead of integration is equi\·alent - in terms of sacrifice. for example- to a possible acceptance by the Frente Polisario of autonomy instead of independence. 13. If the negotiations are to lead to a positiYe outcome. both partie;, must recognize that the question of soYereignty is. and always has been. the main stumbling block in this dispute. and that it is in this highly sensitiYe area that a solution wi II need to be found.

07-39983 3 112

Sil007'385

Annex Communique of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary­ General for \Vestem Sahara, agreed with the parties meeting at the Greentree Estate, ·Manhasset, New York, 19 June 2007

In accordance with Security Council resolution 1754 (2007) of 30 April 2007 on \Vestern Sahara. the Secretary-General arranged for :'viorocco and the Frente Polisario to enter into negotiation>. without preconditions, in good faith. taking into account the deYelopments of the Ia>! months. with a Yiew to achieYing a just. lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which would pro-o;;ide for the self-determination of the people of\Vestern Sahara. l.'nder the Secretary-General's auspices. the meeting was held at the Greentree E;,tate in l'vlanhasset. New York. on 18 and 19 June 2007. with the participation of the parties. Morocco and the Frente Polisario. Representatives of the neighbouring countries. Algeria and lviauritania. \Yere also present at the opening and closing se>sions and were consulted separately. During the meeting, negotiations started as requested by Security Council resolution 1754 (2007). The parties have agreed that the process of negotiations \\·ill continue in l'vfanhasset in the second week of August 2007.

4 07-39983 APPENDIXK

COMMUNIQUE OF THE FRENTE POLISARIO ON VAN W ALSUM

NATIONAL SECRETARIAT/UN

COMMUNIQUE

The bureau of the National Secretariat held a meeting on May 04 2008 under the chairmanship of Mohamed Abdelaziz, the Secretary General ofPOLISARIO Front, the meeting was devoted to the latest developments of the Saharawi question in the United Nations following the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 1813 on 30 April 2008.

In this respect, the bureau is delighted that the Security Council has decided through this resolution to upheld international legality and to reaffirm the pertinence of resolutions 1754 and 1783 that call on the two parties to the conflict to engage into negotiations with a view to reaching a solution that guarantee the Saharawi people's inalienable rights, rejecting thus the attempt that aim to alter the Morocco-Saharawi conflict from its nature as a decolonization question.

The bureau of the National Secretariat deemed the personal approach preached by Mr. Peter van Walsum, illegal, unjust and completely aligned to the thesis of the Moroccan colonial occupation whose objective is to hijack the Saharawi people's inalienable rights to self-determination and independence. The bureau vigorously condemns, on behalf of POLISARIO Front, this approach and considers that Mr. Walsum has lost the confidence of the Saharawi people and thus can no longer play a role in the ongoing process Western Sahara decolonization.

Recalling that the cease-fire, in force since September 6, 1991, between the Saharawi Army of Liberation and the Moroccan forces of occupation is an integral part of the process of holding the referendum on self-determination, which was accepted by the two parties and unanimously endorsed by the Security Council, the Bureau reiterates that any attempt to alter the conflict from its nature as a problem of decolonization will eventually be doomed to fail. In this respect, the Bureau reaffirms that the POLISARIO Front will not accept today or tomorrow to enter into a process that aims at negating the Saharawi people's inalienable rights to self-determination and independence.

Bir Lahlou, May 04, 2008". (SPS) 060/0901100 041035 MAl 08 SPS 113 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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