NOTE TO USERS Page(s) missing in number only; text follows. The manuscript was microfilmed as received. 88 This reproduction is the best copy available. EXPLORING U.N.-LED NEGOTIATION PROCESSES THE CASE OF THE MANHASSET ROUNDS BETWEEN MOROCCO AND THE POLISARIO By Amine Ghoulidi Submitted to the Faculty ofthe School oflnternational Service of American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts In International Peace and Conflict Resolution ~wek-vh- Dean of the School of International Service 13 !Uov~ ~· ~vcz Date 2009 American University Washington D.C. 20016 AMERICAN UNiVERSITY UBf~Y UMI Number: 1484603 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. UMI ___.Dissertation Publishing..__ UMI 1484603 Copyright 2010 by ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. Pro uesr ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml48106-1346 EXPLORING UN-LED NEGOTIATION PROCESSES THE CASE OF THE MANHASSET ROUNDS BETWEEN MOROCCO AND THE POLISARIO By Amine Ghoulidi ABSTRACT This study explores the stalemate in the U.N.-led Negotiations between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO on the status of the "Western Sahara" territory. It suggests that the U.N., as a host and mediator of these rounds, has had a significant impact on the process and that it shares responsibility for the current stalemate. It asserts that Bercovitch's contingency framework applies generically to the Manhasset case and provides a modified version of it that better correspond to mediations by Personal Envoys of the U.N. Secretary General. Finally, this study proposes an alternative mediation approach to the "Western Sahara" conflict that calls for a Moroccan engagement of Algeria through a secret track in parallel to the official U.N.-led Morocco-POLISARIO one. 11 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First, I would like to thank Dr. Anthony Wanis-St.John and Dr. Christos Kyrou for their guidance, advice and flexibility throughout the various stages of this research. Also, this study would not have been possible without the support of few individuals that are very dear to me; namely Lauren, Seddik, Mohammed and Houcine. I am also grateful to the intellectual generosity of Anna Theofilopoulou whose insights have shaped the breadth and depth of this research. Finally, to my family members whom through the distance have been as loving and caring as they have always been, thank you. 111 TABLE OF CONTENT ABSTRACT ............................................................................................... ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................... .iii LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................... .iiv LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................... .iiiv LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ........................................................................... .ix LIST OF ACRONYMS .................................................................................. x Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1 Statement ofthe Problem Purpose of the Study Significance and Rationale 2. HISTORY & BACKGROUND ........................................................... .4 Western Sahara: Land, People and Conflict The Moroccan Ambitions and the Surge of the POLISARIO 3. THE UN INVOLVEMENT AND THE ROAD TO MANHASSET ............... 15 The General Assembly Resolutions (1961-1975) The International Court of Justice (1974-1975) The Security Council Negotiated Political Solution IV 4. LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................. 28 Success and Failure of International Mediation International Mediation and Negotiation Mapping the Mediation Literature 5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .........................................................43 Interviews Research Questions and Analytical Framework Contingency Model as Analytical Framework Research Challenges and Limitations 6. ANALYSIS ................................................................................. 51 The Context The Mediator 7. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................... 80 Context of UN Mediations UN Mediators The Contingency Model The Way Forward Synthesis APPENDICIES .......................................................................................... 89 BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................. ........ 114 v LIST OF TABLES Tables 1. Categories and Sub-categories for Case Analysis ...................................... .49 Vl LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figures 1. The Contingency Framework ............................................................... .46 2. The Modified Contingency Framework ........................................................ 80 Map 1. Map of Western Sahara and MINURSO Outposts (Source: United Nations) ......... 84 Vll LIST OF ACRONYMS MINURSO United Nations peacekeeping mission in Western Sahara UN United Nations POLISARIO Frente Popular para la la Liberaci6n de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio del Oro PUNS Partido de la Union Nacional Sahraui OAU Organization of African Unity GA General Assembly ICJ International Court of Justice sc Security Council SG Secretary General Vlll CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Statement ofthe Problem Since the signature ofthe 1991 ceasefire and the deployment ofthe United Nations peacekeeping mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO) little progress has been made towards the resolution of the three-decade long conflict. The U.N., having intervened through its various bodies, has adopted different and sometimes contradictory postures in an attempt to break through the stalemate. Yet, all of its prescriptions, all quasi-zero-sum, have failed in bringing about a closure to what grew to become a conflict of attrition that has aborted individual states' development endeavors as well as efforts for regional economic-cultural and political integration. The Manhasset Negotiations were an attempt to bring about a new type of interaction mainly between the primary parties, that are the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente Popular para la la Liberaci6n de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio del Oro (POLISARIO). Undertaken under the auspices of the U.N. Secretary General through his Personal Envoy to Western Sahara Peter van Walsum, the negotiations have taken the form of a series of four rounds that brought together not only Morocco and the POLISARIO but also Algeria and Mauritania, the former being the host of the POLISARIO'S government in exile and the major political and military supporter of the front. Nevertheless, after four rounds of negotiation the process came to a halt; the Personal Envoy ofthe UN's Secretary 1 2 General's contract was not renewed and the threat of escalation looms in the background. What are, then, the conditions that have lead to the current impasse in the Manhasset Negotiations process? Purpose of the Study While Peter van Walsum, the former Personal Envoy and the Manhasset process mediator, blamed the seeming failure of the negotiation rounds primarily on the Security Council's "unwavering view that there must be a consensual solution to the question of Western Sahara," others faulted the parties for their unwillingness to move forward with the process. This study explores the causes of failure of the Manhasset Negotiations process. It is anticipated that through a better understanding of the different elements of the U.N. mediated negotiation process as well as at the U.N.'s internal structural components that interfere and affect the conduct of U.N. led mediation endeavors, more informed decisions could be made by both the parties to the conflict and the mediating body in the conduct of future negotiations. Significance and Rationale This study derives its significance from the researcher's desire to understand the negotiation dimension of a conflict that has defined the political identity of his home country -Morocco- for over three decades. Little has been written on the "Western Sahara" conflict and even less on the Manhasset Negotiations. Moreover, the timing of the research is important as the negotiations, while they have reached a deadlock, are still officially expected to continue as sanctioned by Security Council resolutions 1754 and 1783 and by recent Secretary General's statements. Finally, the researcher believes that in 3 a time of escalation and threat of war such a study would provide some understanding of the complexity of the Manhasset negotiations which would hopefully help educate future endeavors of conflict resolution by the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. CHAPTER2 HISTORY & BACKGROUND "Western Sahara": Land, People and Conflict The Land The "Western Sahara" is a territory roughly the size of Great Britain bordered by the Atlantic Ocean to the West, Mauritania to the south and the east, Algeria to the northeast and Morocco to the north (See Appendix A for map). Having been formerly called Spanish Sahara under Spanish rule the territory is believed to be one of the last contested territories on the African continent.