Cátedra UNESCO de Filosofía para la Paz Programa Oficial de Postgrado en Estudios Internacionales en Paz, Conflictos y Desarrollo

The Functioning of Realpolitik in Protracted Conflict and the Transformative Capacity of Self-Determination: A Case Study of Western Sahara, Africa’s Last Colony

Tesis Doctoral

Defendida por:

Jennifer M. Murphy

Dirigida por:

Dr. Vicent Martínez Guzmán Dr. Sidi M. Omar

Castellón, 2010 Table of Contents

Acknowledgments ...... Resumen de la Tesis Doctoral...... 1 Definitions of Important Terms...... 33 Introduction...... 43 Chapter One: Third-Way Politics for Western Sahara: Self-Determination versus Autonomy ...... 65 Introduction: Beginning at the ‘End’ ...... 65 1.1. Decolonization...... 70 1.1.1. Defining Decolonization...... 70 1.1.2. Colonization Over and Done With?: Post-Colonial/ Postcolonial Studies..... 72 1.1.3. Formal Decolonization Today: Open Cases of Non-Self-Governing Territories ...... 77 1.2. Self-Determination...... 79 1.2.1. Preliminary Thoughts on Self-Determination...... 79 1.2.2. Self-Determination: from Principle to Right in International Law...... 82 1.2.2.1. Post World War II...... 84 1.2.3. Key United Nations General Assembly Resolutions: 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV), Delineating Self-Determination...... 85 1.2.3.1. Who Constitutes a People? ...... 90 1.2.3.2. Where Does Western Sahara Fall? ...... 91 1.2.4. Impediments to Decolonization and Self-Determination ...... 94 1.2.4.1. The United States...... 94 1.2.4.2. France...... 98 1.2.4.3. U.S. – French Competition ...... 103 1.3. Peremptory Norms...... 105 1.3.1. The Concept of Jus Cogens ...... 105 1.3.2. Use of Force: Acts of Aggression...... 108 1.3.3. Jus Cogens, the Use of Force and the Specific Case of Western Sahara...... 111 1.4. Autonomy ...... 114 1.4.1. Prelude to Autonomy: A Dangerous Precedent...... 114 1.4.2. The Frente POLISARIO Plan ...... 116 1.4.3. The Third Way: Autonomy...... 117 1.4.4. Introduction to Earned Sovereignty...... 124 1.4.4.1. Outlining Earned Sovereignty...... 125 1.4.5. The 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan...... 129 1.4.5.1. The Plan ...... 131 1.4.5.2. Responses to the Moroccan Autonomy Plan ...... 134 1.4.5.3. Beyond International Law: Practical Concerns for Autonomy...... 136 1.4.5.4. U.S. Voices Hailing ‘Third-Way’ Autonomy...... 141 1.4.5.5. Unlikely ‘Supporters’: For and Against the Referendum...... 144 Conclusions...... 154 Chapter Two: Early History and Conflict Build-Up, Lost Opportunities for Conflict Prevention...... 157 Introduction...... 157 2.1. Conflict Prevention ...... 160 2.1.1. Protracted Conflicts ...... 160 2.1.2. Navigating Conflict Prevention ...... 163 2.2. Western Sahara’s Early History...... 174 2.2.1. Western Sahara ...... 174 2.2.2. The Berlin Conference, 1884-1885...... 177 2.2.3. Spanish Colonization of Western Sahara...... 178 2.2.4. French Intervention...... 180 2.2.5. Phosphate Discovery...... 183 2.3. Decolonization ...... 184 2.3.1. Moroccan, Mauritanian and Algerian Independence...... 184 2.3.2. The United Nations and UN Resolution 1514 (XV)...... 187 2.3.3. Greater Morocco and Mauritanian Claims ...... 189 2.3.4. The Army of Liberation (Conseil National de la Résistance) ...... 192 2.3.5. Call for Spanish Decolonization of Western Sahara, Changes in a Nomadic Society...... 193 2.3.6. Moroccan and Mauritanian Positions ...... 194 2.3.7. Spanish Sahrawi Djemaa ...... 196 2.3.8. Roots of a Nationalist Movement ...... 197 2.3.9. The Frente POLISARIO and Other Competing Movements...... 203 2.3.10. Spain’s Western Sahara Policy in 1974 and Morocco’s Reaction...... 208 2.4. Systemic Failure and Conflict Prevention Sabotage...... 212 2.4.1. Taking the Western Sahara Issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)212 2.4.2. UN Visiting Mission to Western Sahara...... 218 2.4.3. The Announcement of the ICJ Opinion and Morocco’s Green March...... 223 2.4.4. Green March – November 6, 1975 ...... 227 2.4.5. Early November: Conflict Prevention Sabotage...... 231 2.4.6. Madrid Accords – November 14, 1975...... 235 Conclusions: Failure to Prevent Conflict...... 236 Chapter Three: Prefiguring a New Interpretive Horizon for Conflict Analysis: Reconfiguring Conflict Actor-Mapping and Mediation...... 239 Introduction...... 239 3.1. Alternative Analytical Interpretive Horizons for Conflict Analysis and Mapping ...... 242 3.1.1. Clarifying the Approach ...... 242 3.1.1.1. Normalized Approaches to Conflict ...... 248 3.1.1.2. Realpolitik in Conflict Analysis...... 251 3.1.2. Hot Conflict ...... 253 3.1.2.1. Sahrawi Nationalism Set in Stone...... 253 3.1.2.2. Aftermath of the Madrid Accords...... 254 3.1.2.3. 1976 – War, Fighting Fire with Fire ...... 258 3.1.2.4. 1991 Ceasefire and MINURSO ...... 269 3.1.3. Moving from the Hot Conflict Historical Narrative to Conflict Mapping.... 271 3.2. Conflict Mapping...... 271 3.2.1. The Concept of Conflict Mapping ...... 271 3.2.2. Reassessing Primary, Secondary and Other Actors in Conflict...... 275 3.2.2.1. Shadow-Primary Actor ...... 278 3.2.3. Breakdown of Actors in the Western Saharan/Moroccan Conflict ...... 280 3.2.3.1. Primary Actors...... 281 3.2.3.1.1. The Frente POLISARIO – Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el- Hamra and Río de Oro ...... 281 3.2.3.1.2. Morocco ...... 283 3.2.3.1.3. Mauritania...... 284 3.2.3.2. Secondary Actors...... 284 3.2.3.2.1. Spain, Secondary and Shadow-Primary Actor...... 284 3.2.3.2.2. Algeria, Secondary-Primary Actor Overlap ...... 286 3.2.3.2.3. France, Secondary and Shadow-Primary Actor...... 287 3.2.3.2.4. United States of America, Secondary and Shadow-Primary Actor ...... 287 3.2.3.3. Other Actors...... 289 3.2.3.3.1. Libya ...... 289 3.2.3.3.2. Soviet Union/Russian Federation ...... 289 3.2.3.3.3. United Nations and MINURSO...... 290 3.2.3.3.4. Organization of African Unity (OAU)...... 293 3.2.3.3.5. Other Countries and Organizations...... 294 3.2.4. The Practical Application of Actor-Mapping ...... 294 3.3. Extent of Secondary Actor (Shadow-Primary Actor) Involvement...... 295 3.3.1. The Extent of United States Involvement...... 295 3.3.1.1. US Arms to Morocco...... 297 3.3.1.2. Continuity in U.S. Military Policy...... 299 3.3.1.3. Familiar Story ...... 304 3.3.2. The Extent of French Involvement ...... 307 3.3.2.1. Direct Intervention, Arms Supplies and Economic Interests...... 309 3.3.3. Competition: US, France, Spain and the European Union ...... 311 3.3.3.1. Natural Resources ...... 313 3.3.3.2. International Law and Natural Resources, the Hans Corell Opinion...... 315 3.3.3.3. The Corporate Dimension and Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) ...... 320 3.3.3.4. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources...... 322 3.3.4. Interest Proximity and Realpolitik Discourse...... 325 3.4. Third-Party Mediation: Peace Plans for Western Sahara ...... 327 3.4.1. Mediation ...... 327 3.4.2. The Peace Process...... 334 3.4.2.1. Settlement Plan ...... 334 3.4.2.2. Houston Accords...... 338 3.4.2.3. Framework Agreement ...... 342 3.4.2.4. Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara...... 346 3.4.3. Discourse Analysis of the Peace Process...... 350 Conclusions...... 353 Chapter Four: Self-Determination as Conflict Transformation ...... 357 Introduction...... 357 4.1. Autonomy for Western Sahara: Third-way Solution or Zero-Sum State of Exception?...... 361 4.1.1. Reconfiguring Zero-Sum: The State of Exception ...... 361 4.1.2. The State of Exception and Western Sahara: The Zero-Sum Disconnect and Self-Determination...... 368 4.1.3. At the Heart of the Matter: Self-Determination...... 370 4.2. The Multidimensionality of Self-Determination ...... 374 4.2.1. Diverse Conceptions of Self-Determination...... 374 4.2.2. Self-Determination as Colonial Continuity, Reformative Concept and Struggle ...... 377 4.2.2.1. As Colonial Continuity ...... 377 4.2.2.2. As Reformative Concept...... 381 4.2.2.3. As Struggle...... 386 4.2.2.4. As Transformative Conflict Tool...... 390 4.2.3. Arguments against an Independence-Inclusive Self-Determination Process 394 4.2.3.1. Western Liberal Roots ...... 394 4.2.3.2. The People and Identity ...... 398 4.3. Self-Determination and the Neoliberal Project...... 406 4.3.1. Benjamin’s Economic Component ...... 406 4.3.2. The Make-up of the Neoliberal Project ...... 409 4.3.2.1. Globalization...... 410 4.3.2.2. Dissecting the Neoliberal in Globalization...... 412 4.3.3. Self-Determination: A Useful Medium for the Conflict Transformation of Self-Determination Conflicts...... 418 4.3.3.1. Self-Determination Minefields ...... 419 4.4. Thinking Within and Beyond Self-Determination: The Quest of the ‘People’ for Self-Determination in the Nation-State System...... 422 4.4.1. The Nation ...... 422 4.4.2. The Nation-State ...... 425 4.4.3. The People ...... 428 4.4.3.1. The ‘People’: the Liberated-Oppressed ...... 431 4.4.4. Self-Determination and the Nation-State...... 434 4.4.5. Territoriality...... 437 4.4.6. Extraterritoriality...... 441 4.4.7. The Refugee: Challenging the Dominant Narrative of the Nation-State...... 443 Conclusions...... 448 Bibliography...... 456 Annexes...... 499

Acknowledgments (My Many Thanks)

First and foremost, I would like to thank my parents. With their guidance and unconditional love, I have walked (or run, or skipped, or jumped) along life’s less traveled path with my head held high, heart open and mind free. Thank you Mom and Dad for supporting me in every possible way in this doctoral process. Many thanks go out to my diverse and extensive support systems and families (immediate, extended and international), too many to name them all, but particularly, Grandma, Aunt Angela, Aunt Kath, Aunt Trish, Aunt Eileen, Aunt Judy, primos/as, GB, Mel, Coombs, Anya and Liz. Without time-outs for tea, specially prepared meals, soccer, motivational e-mails (that crossed oceans) and financial and emotional support, the thesis that follows would never have been possible. To the Thesis Writing Committee (Larry, Maria, Jimmy, Mary and Barbara), thank you for bringing the light at the end of the tunnel to within reach. If not for your “rewards and consequences,” I might still be in the dark. To my super office family of the International MA in Peace, Conflict and Development Studies, Castellón, Spain – Eloisa, Sophia, Elena, Fatuma, Adela, Sonia and Irene – thank you for your continuous support and encouragement. I would also like to express my gratitude to the many teachers who have guided and inspired me and given me the gift of knowledge(s). They have fanned the flames of learning, critical thinking and questioning within me: to my kindergarten teacher Mrs. Kabota; to my grade school teachers Ms. Blakemore and Mrs. Striby; to my high school teacher Mr. Dean; to my university professors Cunningham, Kgositsile and Yarborough; to my Japanese mother Yamashitasan; to my Ecuadorian mentors Pat McTeague and Sonya Rendón and the Gómez family; to my MA professor Comins Mingol, for introducing me to an ethics of care; and to my Arabic professors Muna and Mona. I would like to extend my sincerest appreciation to the Universitat Jaume I and library support staff; the Spanish and Portuguese department at the University of Leeds, particularly my supervisor Pablo San Martín, who met with me twice a week for three months to map out and test my ideas; to professors Zunes of the University of San Francisco and Epstein of UC Berkeley for graciously and blindly meeting with me and selflessly sharing ideas and information; and to the UC Berkeley Library, for never failing to supply a needed resource. My deepest gratitude to Marti, Silvia and Elena for revising the Spanish portion of my dissertation and to my dearest friend Liz Lee for steering me towards new theoretical horizons and for providing much needed guidance and inspiration. Last, but certainly not least, I extend my utmost thanks to my supervisors Sidi M. Omar and Vicent Martínez Guzmán. Thank you Sidi for your quick responses, insight and sincere commitment to this project. Thank you Vicent for inviting me to be part of your dream of making peace(s). May it continue to grow and provide an intellectual, practical and multicultural environment for the “realists” of the world. Words do not adequately express my gratitude and joy for the dedication and needed direction that you have both whole-heartedly given me.

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my best friend Limam El Jalil Aali Brahim.

Resumen de la Tesis Doctoral

I. Introducción

«One must speak for a struggle for a new culture, that is, for a new moral life that cannot but be intimately connected to a new intuition of life, until it becomes a new way of feeling and seeing reality» (Gramsci, 1985: 98)1.

África del Norte: Una Vista Geopolítica

La edición de invierno de 2007 de la revista trimestral, Middle East Policy, está dedicada en su totalidad a la exploración de temas y tendencias relevantes del África del Norte. La revista se autoproclama como un foro de amplio espectro representativo de diversos puntos de vista sobre recientes desarrollos que afectan a la política entre EE.UU. y Oriente Medio. Su objetivo principal es asegurar que un ámbito completo de intereses y perspectivas estadounidenses sean considerados por los políticos. Para ser claros, el contenido de la revista, como se desprende de la declaración de su misión y de su diseño, supone un sesgo estadounidense, así como occidental, liberal y económico, en su enfoque sobre la región. Sin embargo, nos muestra una forma interesante de cómo la región se sitúa en el mapa geopolítico y de los intereses antiguos de ciertos países en la región, como Francia, España e Italia y de países/regiones con crecientes intereses como Rusia, China, la Unión Europea y los Estados Unidos. Dentro de un marco de análisis regional económico, geopolítico, militarista y predominantemente occidental, África del Norte posee muchas características que hacen de ella una región con interés estratégico tanto para los «viejos» poderes como los «nuevos» respectivamente. Es la extensión más occidental del Mediterráneo (conduciendo al Oriente-Medio); da acceso al Mediterráneo y a los barcos de guerra; es el «patio trasero» de Europa Occidental; es un área de «amistad» política para los Estados Unidos, con por ejemplo Túnez y Marruecos; es el fin occidental del mundo Árabe (de

1 «Se debe hablar de una lucha para una nueva cultura, es decir, para una nueva vida moral que sólo puede estar conectada íntimamente a una nueva intuición de la vida, hasta que se convierte una nueva manera de sentir y ver la realidad» (1985: 98; traducción propia). 1 importancia en el mar y en la tierra); provee acceso al mundo árabe en el cual se alojan los jefes de estado árabes para las conferencias islámicas y para otras propuestas; tiene un fuerte potencial para las asociaciones de libre-comercio, por ejemplo Estados Unidos y Marruecos, y aún más potencial para un unificado «paraguas» del libre-comercio del África del Norte; forma parte de la iniciativa Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism, (especialmente en consideración a partir de las recientes nombradas operativas transnacionales de Al-Qaeda en el Magreb y la guerra global contra el terrorismo dirigida por los Estados Unidos); y, es un punto estratégico entre Europa, Oriente Medio (aunque realmente adjunto al Medio Oeste) y África subsahariana (Zartman et al., 2007: 1-2; Hemmer, 2007: 56-57). En efecto, esta conceptualización, estratégicamente orientada, del África del Norte aporta información sobre los elementos que conforman la formación de etapas, la tipología de castas y la evolución no únicamente de la región, sino también de la agenda de poderes externos en temas políticos, geopolíticos económicos y militares. Los doce artículos que constituyen la publicación de invierno de 2007 utilizan tanto un marco comparativo como un enfoque singular de un país en su análisis de la región norteafricana, teniendo en cuenta transformaciones significativas recientes y constantes que han persistido durante décadas. Entre todos abordan asuntos tales como el cambio político, el desarrollo económico, asuntos fronterizos dentro de la región y relaciones con estados fuera del área, género, corrientes religiosas, interacciones cívico- militares y el conflicto saharaui/marroquí. Mientras que la edición especial aborda una amplitud de temas, en última instancia, se podría concluir que el enfoque regional de la revista hacia África del Norte afecta directamente al deseo de los Estados Unidos y otros actores interesados para la integración política y económica regional. A pesar de esta inclinación y perspectiva político-económica, los autores participantes sacan varias conclusiones en sus análisis en cuanto a la cohesión regional, o la carencia de ésta, en África del Norte. Dicho esto, sobre un punto no hay ninguna disensión. Unánimemente atribuyen la fuente principal de tensión y división que previene la regionalización norteafricana al conflicto saharaui/marroquí. Mientras las relaciones entre países norteafricanos son relativamente estables, el conflicto saharaui/marroquí coloca una profunda y decisiva cuña en la integración regional. Aunque equivocadamente achacado de vez en cuando a

2 un conflicto entre las dos casas de poder de África del Norte, Argelia y Marruecos (Zartman et al., 2007: 3), el conflicto entre Marruecos y el Frente Polisario (Sáhara Occidental) es un conflicto caso-abierto de descolonización complicado por la intervención de terceros actores e intereses geopolíticos, económicos, políticos y militaristas.

Realpolitik y Análisis de Conflictos

Un analista experto de la región norteafricana, Yahia H. Zoubir, escribe extensivamente sobre el conflicto saharaui/marroquí y se enfrenta directamente a las contradicciones emergentes (conflictos de intereses) entre las respuestas de la Realpolitik (motivadas por interés) a los conflictos, que incluyen las dimensiones geopolíticas, económicas, políticas y militaristas ya mencionadas, y aquellas que respetan la ley internacional. Desde una perspectiva de relaciones internacionales del conflicto saharaui/marroquí, Zoubir yuxtapone estos dos conceptos diametralmente opuestos, la Realpolitik y la ley internacional, y deposita la siguiente problemática a la comunidad internacional (en particular a los Estados Unidos y Francia): cómo reconciliar la tensión entre la legalidad internacional y los poderes políticos de la geopolítica, las tendencias de la política real con una solución al conflicto que sea justa y respetuosa con la ley (Zoubir, 2001; y Zoubir, 2007). Su artículo de 2001, «The Third Way in Western Sahara: Realpolitik vs. International Legality», publicado en la revista española Nación Árabe, deconstruye esta problemática a la luz del momento cambiante para una «tercera vía» como solución al conflicto: la autonomía. Este artículo golpea en el corazón del punto muerto diplomático que ha seguido desde el alto el fuego de 1991 entre las partes contrarias, Marruecos y el Frente Polisario. Al mismo tiempo, esto me proporcionó el ímpetu para mi propio interés e investigación de las influencias de la Realpolitik y de cómo éstas se relacionan con las medidas de análisis de conflictos actuales, el mapeo, la mediación y las estrategias y las prácticas de transformación de conflictos para el caso específico del Sáhara Occidental, y más generalmente, para los estudios de los conflictos. Tomando en total consideración la evaluación precisa de Zoubir de la situación del conflicto, hemos procurado ensanchar y profundizar su análisis examinando estrechamente el poder y la función de los discursos y narrativas dominantes de la

3

Realpolitik. Para concretar, este estudio procura explorar cómo las políticas de la Realpolitik han afectado al enfoque del conflicto respecto al conflicto saharaui/marroquí en sus cuatro fases distintas: el fracaso de la prevención del conflicto y descolonización del Sáhara Occidental; el conflicto resultante caliente de 1975-1991; el alto el fuego y el punto muerto diplomático (el fracaso de la misión de las Naciones Unidas conferida por mandato pacificadora de organizar un referéndum de autodeterminación para el pueblo saharaui); y, la proposición de «una tercera vía» para la resolución del conflicto: básicamente la autonomía para el Sáhara Occidental dentro del Reino de Marruecos. Además, dentro de esta conceptualización analítica, es esencial examinar el papel que los actores «terceros» han jugado en cada una de estas fases y en la correlación directa con sus declarados estados neutrales. Aunque esto parezca ser una propuesta de análisis de conflictos directos, el estudio es, de hecho, multidisciplinario en su enfoque de la investigación, multidimensional en su organización estructural y múltiple en sus propósitos.

II. Los Objetivos de la Tesis y la Hipótesis

Uno podría sentirse tentado a preguntar, ¿por qué estudiar el conflicto saharaui/marroquí, un conflicto relativamente de baja intensidad en la agenda de la comunidad internacional y los medios de comunicación? Con los ojos de la comunidad internacional enfocados en conflictos interestatales e intraestatales más apremiantes como los Estados Unidos y partidarios/Irak, Estados Unidos y partidarios/Afganistán, la posibilidad de Estados Unidos/Irán, Israel/Palestina, Myanmar (Birmania), Sudán y, más recientemente, Rusia/Georgia, es verdad que el Sáhara Occidental figura en una posición baja en clasificaciones de interés, perfil y urgencia. Tomando en cuenta esta jerarquía de conflictos, ¿qué puede ofrecer un análisis profundo de este antiguo conflicto colonial a nuestro entendimiento de la teoría, estrategia y práctica sobre la transformación de conflictos? Para dirigir estas preguntas, tomo prestado el enfoque analítico de Siba N’ Zatioula Grovogui (1996) sobre la ley internacional y la descolonización/autodeterminación. De la misma manera en que Namibia es un caso particularmente adecuado para estudiar los aspectos prácticos de los estándares del sistema internacional para la ley internacional y descolonización, el Sáhara Occidental es

4 un caso adecuado para estudiar los aspectos prácticos y estándares del sistema internacional para la resolución de conflictos y las normas que dirigen las estrategias de transformación de conflictos. Primero, cuando los procedimientos del mapeo, la mediación y la transformación de conflictos en general están fundados en suposiciones de la Realpolitik, están sujetos a interpretaciones imperialistas y principios universalistas, que están arraigados en las estructuras institucionales y culturales de dominación y subordinación. Los discursos de la Realpolitik y los mecanismos políticos y jurídicos que aseguran el dominio de las economías políticas occidentales y sistemas hegemónicos de pensamiento, poder y conocimiento, también generan reglas, sistemas de nombramiento y precondiciones que directamente afectan a las estrategias y prácticas de la transformación de conflictos. El derecho internacional mantiene y cuestiona las estructuras coloniales pero dónde se proporcionan los medios políticos y justificaciones legales para la construcción continua de imperios; carece de la disposición legal misma para defender sus principios y hacer cumplir las normas imperativas creadas por el consenso internacional. Al centrarnos en los procesos de la Realpolitik, tenemos la posibilidad de investigar las estructuras, las reglas y los procedimientos y las ideologías, la retórica y los sistemas de pensamiento que influyen en las metodologías de transformación de los conflictos internacionales actuales y los fracasos del sistema jurídico internacional. Además, al escribir sobre las estructuras dominantes y su construcción, también estoy escribiendo sobre «la otredad» – «escribir de otra manera» – para poder explorar las alternativas excluidas por las soluciones al conflicto basadas en el poder de las políticas reales (Mason, 1990: 1-12). Para poder captar la multiplicidad, la multidimensionalidad y la complejidad del concepto y para superar la tendencia a equiparar la Realpolitik con «las políticas de poder» minimalistas y simplistas, pongo en mayúscula el término a lo largo del estudio. Segundo, la situación del Sáhara Occidental pone de relieve las tensiones entre las teorías de las relaciones internacionales por un lado y las teorías de la resolución de conflictos por otro. Un examen próximo del conflicto ilumina las inmensas lagunas entre la teoría y las realidades del terreno. No es una solución decir que las políticas, las teorías y las instituciones establecidas son erróneas y deben ser desmanteladas. De hecho, al tomar esta ruta se corre el riesgo considerable de desestabilizar unas condiciones, algunas

5 frágiles, en África del Norte. Fracasar en reconocer y corregir los fallos, especialmente en el caso del Sáhara Occidental, crea un riesgo igualmente no aceptable; y, dejado sin tratar, la situación puede degenerar en una crisis humanitaria y una respuesta terrorista. El Sáhara Occidental no está solo en el planteamiento de estos dilemas. Este estudio rechaza la afirmación de que los enfoques realistas o la balanza de poderes, que dominan las relaciones internacionales y que tienen relaciones directas con los procesos y reacciones de toma de decisiones internacionales a las evaluaciones y/o la negligencia de situaciones de conflictos, reflejan la naturaleza naturalmente competitiva de la organización de estados. De hecho, se trabaja desde la premisa de que tenemos la capacidad de cambiar el presente sistema internacional y afrontar las situaciones de conflictos prolongados de una manera en que los procesos de transformación de conflictos se muevan hacia la representación y se alejen de los modelos de dominación violentos, se muevan hacia un sistema representativo y se alejen de uno negativamente hegemónico. Las prácticas representativas de la transformación de conflictos podrían traer la justicia al pueblo saharaui en la forma de la autodeterminación por medio de un referéndum libre y justo y podrían acabar con un conflicto prolongado de treinta y cuatro años. Tercero, la naturaleza prolongada (destructiva, arraigada, intransigente) del conflicto del Sáhara Occidental/Marruecos, aunque trágico y deplorable, realmente ofrece una perspectiva interesante al mapeo de conflictos para este conflicto en particular y para reconsiderar nuestras suposiciones con respecto a otros callejones sin salida de conflictos prolongados también. Como el conflicto saharaui/marroquí ha pasado por muchas etapas del ciclo de conflicto, puede analizarse desde varios niveles: los niveles de preconflicto o lo preventivo, conflicto caliente, cese del fuego y fracasos diplomáticos o punto muerto. Adicionalmente, el conflicto cruza dos periodos de tiempos distintos y a la vez similares, en términos de su lógica binaria y orientación ideológica oposicionista, la Guerra Fría y la Guerra contra el Terrorismo. Al examinar las características específicas a este conflicto prolongado, es posible reexaminar decisiones hechas y estrategias seguidas, al mismo tiempo que se trata de localizar áreas inexploradas para la transformación de conflictos. Parte del análisis necesita incluir una mirada retrospectiva de las medidas preventivas que fracasaron, las medidas que no fueron tomadas y que podrían haber sido

6 tomadas o las influencias que deberían haber sido consideradas pero no lo fueron. Dicho esto, una mirada retrospectiva debe evitar la argumentación unidimensional de «si hubiera» o «lo que debería haber pasado» para evitar quedarse atascado en un pensamiento «anticuado», una trampa de los conflictos prolongados. Evitar esta situación es especialmente importante para el conflicto del Sáhara Occidental/Marruecos, que en 34 años ha visto muchos cambios en escalas globales, regionales y nacionales. Esto, sin embargo, no significa que el pasado deba ser ignorado, especialmente cuando consideramos las resoluciones de las Naciones Unidas y la Organización de Unidad Africana. Debe alcanzarse un equilibrio entre las reclamaciones legítimas y «hacia delante» o el pensamiento creativo. Cuarto, el conflicto saharaui/marroquí es un conflicto que resulta beneficioso examinar de cerca debido al hecho mismo de que esto debería haber sido un conflicto fácil de resolver. Mientras no se esté sujeto a los aspectos de los conflictos de lo que «debería haber sido», la clara franqueza del conflicto permite un mejor examen de los actores secundarios hegemónicos y sus papeles en los conflictos, y más específicamente sus papeles en los conflictos prolongados. La descolonización del Sáhara Occidental fracasó. Una pregunta importante que hacerse no es por qué el proceso de descolonización fracasó, sino cómo el proceso de descolonización fracasó. La diferencia sutil en esta formulación es la diferencia entre las aproximaciones analíticas de este estudio frente a una causal. Al proponer esta pregunta, en efecto estoy investigando los aspectos múltiples de la situación del conflicto: cómo la comunidad internacional fracasó en prevenir la invasión de Marruecos y Mauritania, causando un estallido de hostilidades y guerra total con el Frente Polisario, cuando todo estaba dispuesto para un proceso de descolonización exitoso; cómo fracasó la comunidad internacional en hacer cumplir un referéndum después de un alto el fuego alcanzado en 1991; y, cómo la comunidad internacional ha consentido el estatus quo de la situación del conflicto y el fracaso continuado del proceso diplomático y la situación actual de estancamiento. En este sentido, la ubicación del Sáhara Occidental dentro de una visión realista en la organización del planeta no se puede subestimar. Quinto, un análisis del conflicto saharaui/marroquí fuerza las siguientes preguntas: ¿qué significa no poseer un estado o ser apátrida?; y, ¿qué significaría estar en

7 constante cambio y vivir una existencia precaria de ocupación o exilio? Estas preguntas no amplían meramente el discurso del análisis y transformación del conflicto, sino que permiten al analista del conflicto ver «la realidad» ante nosotros en un nivel más filosófico y atisbar el poder de la resistencia frente al discurso hegemónico, teoría, política y práctica. La lucha saharaui ha sido larga y ardua, pero ha desafiado todas las posibilidades. No ha sucumbido a Marruecos, una nación más grande, mejor equipada y más poderosa (militarmente). La cultura saharaui, a nivel colectivo más que individual, y el modelo democrático socialista en que se apoya, provee unas alternativas creativas a los modelos de dominación a pesar de estar contra la hegemonía de los discursos de la Realpolitik.

III. La Metodología

Marco de Análisis: La Genealogía de Foucault

Para llevar a cabo los objetivos anteriormente indicados, utilizaré algunos principios empleados por Michel Foucault en sus exposiciones perspicaces y multifacéticas acerca del poder y el conocimiento, especialmente en lo que se refiere a su concepción de la «genealogía». Lo que es de interés específico para este estudio no es solamente la producción de la verdad y el conocimiento, sino también cómo sus funciones se constituyen para asumir y establecer sistemas de poder. Por lo tanto, los conceptos foucaultianos de poder y conocimiento – sus funciones, sus manifestaciones y su significado – son un buen punto de partida desde el cual es posible abordar y analizar de forma específica el conflicto saharaui/marroquí, y también los conflictos de forma más general. Por consiguiente, para presentar mi propio marco de análisis del conflicto saharaui/marroquí, así como un enfoque genealógico del mismo, repasaré brevemente la construcción teórica foucaultiana que les han influido. Foucault define la genealogía como: «a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or

8 runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history» (Foucault, 1980: 117)2. Es decir que una genealogía de acontecimientos históricos examina las construcciones del conocimiento – las epistemologías del poder – que afirman representar «la verdad». Este mismo ejercicio pone en duda lo que se toma en sentido literal y los discursos dominantes que cobran reconocimiento a través de la repetición y la pretensión de verdad. Por verdad Foucault quiere decir «el régimen/los regímenes de la verdad» de cada sociedad:

«[T]he types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true» (Foucault, 1980: 131)3.

Esto es lo que denomina Foucault «la política general de la verdad» (131). Para «tamizar» las capas de los discursos dominantes, los que llegan a ser teoría, política, práctica y acción y lo que «sabemos», y para llegar a «otras» constituciones del conocimiento, es preciso tener estos «regímenes de la verdad» en el primer plano de la discusión y el análisis. Para comprender una política general de la verdad/regímenes de la verdad, el enfoque analítico no se centra en causa y efecto, sino en función y manifestación. Para hacerlo, es preciso localizar discursos aceptados, los que reclaman ser «la verdad»; funcionan como ciertos; distinguen y sancionan lo verdadero y lo falso; y, lo que recibe aprecio por los valores consagrados sociales. Foucault amplía su explicación diciendo que por regímenes de verdad no quiere significar «the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted», sino «the ensembles of rules according to which the true and false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true» (Foucault, 1980: 132)4. Al escudriñar las «reglas» aceptadas a través de las cuales

2 Foucault define la genealogía como: «una forma de historia que pueda explicar la constitución de conocimientos, discursos, esferas de objetos, etc., sin tener que referirse a un sujeto, o bien trascendental con relación al campo de acontecimientos, o bien una que corra en su igualdad huera a través del curso de la historia» (Foucault, 1980: 117; traducción propia) 3 «Los tipos de discurso, los cuales acepta y hace funcionar como verdaderos; los mecanismos y las instancias que permiten distinguir las afirmaciones verdaderas de las falsas, el medio por el cual cada una se sanciona; las técnicas y los procedimientos concedidos valor para la adquisición de la verdad; el estatus de los que deben decir lo que se considera la verdad» (Foucault, 1980: 131; traducción propia). 4 Foucault amplía su explicación diciendo que por regímenes de verdad no quiere significar «el conjunto de verdades que deben descubrirse y aceptarse», sino «los conjuntos de reglas según las cuales lo verdadero y 9 analizamos el conflicto, las mismas metodologías del análisis del conflicto, abrimos una brecha en la cual exploramos el papel jugado política y económicamente por estas construcciones predominantemente occidentales, no solamente en la edificación y la producción de la verdad, sino también en la conceptualización de casos específicos conflictivos y sus aplicaciones más generales. Por consiguiente, como una suerte de reflexión crítica, el concepto foucaultiano de analizar las reglas que utilizamos para distinguir lo verdadero de lo falso, para legitimar modos concretos de saber, a la vez que se desacredita otros, es el propósito crítico de este estudio. Según Foucault, esta misma «economía política» de la verdad del mundo occidental (lo que entendemos como las relaciones entre las instituciones y procesos político-económicos, y las formas a través de las cuales construimos y legitimamos la verdad/el conocimiento/los discursos) posee cinco rasgos distintos. Se centra en:

«the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it; it is subject to constant economic and political incitement (the demand for truth, as much for economic production as for political power); it is the object, under diverse forms, of immense diffusion and consumption (circulating through apparatuses of education and information whose extent is relatively broad in the social body, not withstanding certain strict limitations); it is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media); lastly, it is the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation («ideological» struggles)» (Foucault, 1980: 131-132)5.

Para decirlo de otra manera, la economía política de la política general de la verdad se enlaza inextricablemente con la manera (reglas) por la(s) cual(es) establecemos la producción, las normas, la distribución, la circulación y la operación de los conocimientos. Las luchas ideológicas por la hegemonía o el dominio, a su vez, se lo falso se separan, y los efectos específicos del poder se sostienen en lo cierto» (Foucault, 1980: 132; traducción propia). 5 Se centra en: «la forma del discurso científico y las instituciones que la producen; se sostiene en una constante incitación económica y política (la exigencia de la verdad, tanto por la producción económica como por el poder político); es objeto, bajo diversas formas, de una difusión y un consumo inmensos (que circulan a través de aparatos educativos e informáticos cuya extensión resulta relativamente amplia en el cuerpo social, a pesar de ciertos límites estrictos); se produce y se trasmite bajo el control, dominante si no exclusivo, y unos grandes aparatos políticos y económicos (la universidad, el ejército, la escritura, los medios de comunicación); por último, es la cuestión de un debate político y un enfrentamiento social (luchas «ideológicas»)» (Foucault, 1980: 131-132; traducción propia). 10 cristalizan y aseguran su producción, las normas, la distribución, la circulación y la operación. La evaluación de Beátrice Han acerca de Foucault se centra en el apoyo institucional de la producción del conocimiento y las formas por las cuales empieza a funcionar, cobrar valor, distribuirse, y de algún modo atribuirse, a una sociedad (o una disciplina) (Han, 1998: 106). Foucault ahonda más en la discusión al agregar el poder a la dialéctica de la producción del conocimiento. Sostiene que nuestros modos de conocimiento, nuestros «conocimientos/verdades» se enlazan de una manera circular con los sistemas de poder que los producen y mantienen, y tocante a los efectos del poder los provocan y los extienden. Por lo tanto, concluye que para efectuar un cambio sostenible, tenemos que localizar el régimen (político, económico e institucional) de la producción de la verdad (Foucault, 1980: 133). Son estas mismas «política general de la verdad/regímenes de la verdad» y su producción las que merecen atención especial en lo que concierne el caso específico del Sáhara Occidental y los medios utilizados por el análisis del conflicto. Pues en el caso del Sáhara Occidental, estos mismos regímenes y políticas de la verdad alrededor de la «Realpolitik»/«política real» y sus funciones y manifestaciones en el discurso/los discursos del análisis conflictivo dominante, son lo que incumben a este estudio. ¿De qué forma los enfoques de la «Realpolitik» sobre los conflictos funcionan e influyen a la teoría, la práctica y la política conflictiva? ¿De qué forma los enfoques de la «Realpolitik» para el análisis de conflictos sirven para proteger segundas intenciones e intereses que están profundamente entrelazados con el neoliberalismo y los modos capitalistas de representación y legitimación? Esta última pregunta nos abre y ahonda el análisis porque dentro de la política general de la verdad de la política real podemos localizar otras políticas de la verdad, por ejemplo – y también de interés para este estudio, los regímenes de las verdades que rodean «la neutralidad» y la implicación de terceras partes en la mediación de conflictos y negociaciones. Respecto a esto, los regímenes de la verdad que rodean la política real no quedan aislados, sino estratificados, multidimensionales, interrelacionados y estrechamente entretejidos. A pesar de que se conciben mayormente como pertinentes a las relaciones internacionales y discusiones del «equilibrio de poderes», los discursos dominantes de la política real influyen en muchas disciplinas (amén de su teoría y práctica) y no se

11 constriñen a la política del poder. En el caso específico del Sáhara Occidental, y retomando el concepto foucaultiano de la genealogía, un enfoque genealógico del conflicto abre un espacio analítico para ubicar con exactitud no sólo las funciones de la política real, sino también los modos en los cuales los enfoques de la Realpolitik sobre el conflicto benefician a agendas e intereses ocultos. Arnold Davidson capta en breve el concepto foucaultiano de la genealogía: «the mutual relations between systems of truth and modalities of power, the way in which there is a «political regime» of the production of truth» (Davidson, 1986: 224)6. Explica que un análisis genealógico foucaultiano presupone la comprensión de que la misma raíz de lo que concebimos como racional es, de hecho, arraigada en el dominio, la subyugación, la relación de fuerzas – en breve, el poder (225). David Howarth también recoge la centralidad del poder para sus análisis genealógicos, pero relacionados con la derivación de un espíritu crítico hacia la constitución de discursos, identidades e instituciones (Howarth, 2000: 73; ver también Owen, 1994: 210-13; Owen, 1999: 30-37; Tully, 1999: 90-103). Además, Howarth expone los propósitos del geneálogo: de divulgar nuevas posibilidades descartadas por interpretaciones existentes (Howarth, 2000: 73). Por lo tanto, el análisis conflictivo genealógico de la contienda saharaui/marroquí no sólo da cuenta de la constitución de conocimientos, discursos, esferas de objetos, etc., que guardan relación con el mapeo del conflicto y los enfoques, estrategias y políticas expuestas por su transformación, sino también para explorar los mecanismos del poder y como, en palabras de Foucault, se invierten, se colonizan, se utilizan, se complican, se transforman, se desplazan y se extienden a través de formas de dominio (Foucault, 1980: 99; citado en Rouse, 2005: 110). Foucault explica que las relaciones del poder son inmanentes, por ejemplo, en los procesos económicos y las construcciones de conocimiento, y que las divisiones, desigualdades y desequilibrios definen su relación, siendo tanto el efecto como las condiciones internas de estas diferenciaciones (Foucault, 1978: 94; citado en Rouse, 2005: 114). Lo que nos interesa es cómo estas mismas relaciones de poder dominante se aceptan, se legitiman, se naturalizan y se diseminan (a través de complejas redes

6 Arnold Davidson capta en breve el concepto foucaultiano de la genealogía: «las mutuas relaciones entre sistemas de verdad y modalidades de poder, la manera por la cual existe un «régimen político» en la producción de la verdad» (Davidson, 1986: 224; traducción propia). 12 sociales), con atención específica a la función de la Realpolitik en el análisis del conflicto del Sáhara Occidental/Marruecos y a las propuestas para la transformación del conflicto. Por eso, utilizamos un enfoque genealógico-analítico del conflicto. Desde luego, como antes hemos mencionado, la genealogía histórica específica del Sáhara Occidental implica diversas disciplinas y temas amplios como la descolonización, el derecho internacional, la autodeterminación, la geopolítica, etc. Además, las modalidades de la funcionalidad de discursos de la Realpolitik pueden aplicarse más en general a los casos específicos genealógicos de otros conflictos y al análisis de conflictos en general. Al utilizar un marco genealógico para analizar el conflicto saharaui/marroquí, nos resulta más eficaz edificar un «saber estratégico» (savoir) (Foucault, 1980: 145) que ilumine las historiografías marginalizadas, y demuestre el poder y la amplitud de los discursos de análisis de conflictos dominantes. Por lo tanto, al localizar la extensión, la operación y el funcionamiento de la política real, la «verdadera tarea política», como plantea Foucault acertadamente, es criticar el funcionamiento de las instituciones (o terceras partes) que parecen ser tanto neutrales como independientes, y de tal manera que la violencia política, que siempre se ha ejercitado de una manera oculta a través de ellas, será desenmascarada para que se pueda combatir, o por lo menos para desacreditar su estatus natural y totalizado (Foucault, 1974: 171; también citado en Fernandes de Oliveira, 2003: 131; y Rabinow, 1984: 6). En su análisis de las genealogías foucaultianas del conocimiento, David Shumway manifiesta que el conocimiento es el nombre general que damos a las interpretaciones que se han impuesto con éxito y que las construimos de tal modo que parezcan naturales y no impuestas (Shumway, 1999: 87-88). Por lo tanto, el ejercicio de criticar los modos de operación naturalizados y legitimados (genealogías de conocimientos) y de las instituciones que facilitan su producción, mientras que parecen ser neutrales e independientes, es, a la vez, un ejercicio que ubica e identifica «conocimientos no- naturales». Estos los denomina Foucault «conocimientos subyugados». Los conocimientos subyugados son «the historical contents that have been buried and disguised by functionalist coherence or formal systemization» y que son también los conocimientos que «have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naïve knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required

13 level of cognition and scientificity» (Foucault, 1980: 81-81; cited in Shumway, 1999: 88)7. La tarea de un enfoque genealógico al análisis de conflictos no consiste solamente en revelar el contenido histórico que ha sido sistemáticamente marginado, ni de sacar a la luz los conocimientos y discursos que han sido desechados por insuficientes, sino que también supone una averiguación en el cómo y por qué razones y propósitos unos modos específicos de la operación de la transformación del conflicto han sido privilegiados sobre otros. En el caso del Sáhara Occidental, el predominio de la política real en las estrategias de la transformación conflictiva nos obliga a fijarnos no solamente en la parte inferior de la jerarquía de conocimientos, sino también a examinar cómo algunas normas establecidas, por ejemplo, normas perentorias de derecho internacional, pueden también desecharse por anticuadas, ingenuas y regresivas (en vez de progresivas). Además, mientras que es imprescindible analizar críticamente la función del poder y los discursos hegemónicos, es también importante señalar que el mismo hecho de la subyugación de conocimientos y discursos promueve la resistencia. El hecho de que los regímenes hegemónicos de la verdad se refuercen ideológicamente, se produzcan discursivamente y subyuguen activamente, bien sea directa o indirectamente, otras epistemologías, crea en efecto las condiciones ideales para que se deslegitime y con lo cual se le niegue la realización de resistencia. Los críticos de Foucault señalan su falta de teorización y conceptualización respecto a la relación entre el poder y la resistencia, y la auténtica existencia de la resistencia a la dominación y la subyugación. Edward Said aclama la perspicacia de Foucault respecto a su comprensión de cómo el discurso opera en función de sistemas de dominación, pero indica el fracaso de Foucault al intentar captar el poder del contra-discurso; de desafiar distorsiones, demostrar las secuelas de la subyugación violenta y, finalmente, formular un discurso de liberación (Said, 1986: 153). David Howarth comparte la opinión de Said y señala la insuficiencia del examen foucaultiano de la resistencia al poder, las estrategias «macro», y los resultados de las luchas contra el poder y la resistencia (Howarth, 2000: 84). Charles Taylor (1984; 1985) y Richard Rorty (1985) casi llegan a descartar las contribuciones de Foucault por lo que

7 Los conocimientos subyugados son «el contenido histórico que ha sido enterrado y disfrazado por la coherencia funcionalista o la sistematización formal» y que son también los conocimientos que «han sido descalificados como insuficientes a su tarea, o insuficientemente elaborados: conocimientos ingenuos, ubicados en la parte inferior de la jerarquía, bajo el nivel necesario de cognición y «cientificidad»» (Foucault, 1980: 81-81; citado en Shumway, 1999: 88; traducción propia). 14 conciben como lo desesperado de su visión y la ausencia de la posibilidad de resistencia en sus conceptualizaciones. Estos críticos rechazan lo que ven como formas de resistencia minadas o abarcadas dentro de las relaciones del poder (Smart, 1986: 170). Mientras que reconocemos indudablemente esta falta crítica en los razonamientos teóricos de Foucault, creemos que con el enfoque de su aproximación al poder y sus medios de análisis se propone recalcar la omnipresencia de poder en toda relación, aún los de los oprimidos, y los modos en los cuales el poder funciona como constante. Como señala Barry Smart, la perspectiva foucaultiana no es «the development from on high of confrontation strategies through which relations of power might finally be undermined, but rather a critical analysis of how power is exercised»; no es «an endorsement nor a neutralization of domination or resistance, but rather an examination of their respectively complex forms and effects and of the ways in which historically constituted distinctions and divisions between «true» and «false» have rationalized or validated the implementation of particular courses of action upon the actions of others» (Smart, 1986: 170-171)8. Foucault proporciona las herramientas y los instrumentos analíticos y la táctica y las estrategias con los cuales uno se puede acercar a los procesos de conocimiento y la producción de la verdad. Se plantea el problema cuando no se diferencia el «peso» del poder, es decir, la función del poder a nivel sistémico. No se puede equiparar la operación del poder y la impresión que causa a nivel estatal con las de una sociedad y comunidad en particular. Foucault no logra tratar teóricamente estas diferencias, ni de incorporar de un modo adecuado los discursos de resistencia y lucha en sus discusiones de poder, conocimiento y regímenes de verdad. Al contrario, la resistencia a las narrativas dominantes y los modos naturalizados de representación tocan el meollo de los estudios poscoloniales: «[Postcolonial studies] has raised provocative, often fundamental questions about the epistemological structures of power and the cultural foundations of resistance, about the porous relationship between metropolitan and colonial societies, about the construction

8 Como señala Barry Smart, la perspectiva foucaultiana no es «el desarrollo desde arriba de las estrategias de polémica a través de las cuales las relaciones de poder podrían, por fin, socavarse, sino un análisis crítico de cómo se ejerce el poder»; no es «una aprobación ni tampoco una neutralización de dominio ni de resistencia, sino un reconocimiento de sus formas y efectos respectivamente complejos, un reconocimiento de los modos históricamente constituidos por los cuales las diferencias entre «verdadero» y «falso» han racionalizado o confirmado la puesta en marcha de los cursos especiales de acción sobre las actuaciones de otros» (Smart, 1986: 170-171; traducción propia). 15 of group identities in the context of state formation, even about the nature and uses of historical evidence itself» (Kennedy, 2003: 18)9. La metodología postcolonial complementa el enfoque foucaultiano genealógico al conflicto saharaui/marroquí. La genealogía debe examinar no sólo los procesos múltiples a través de los cuales los acontecimientos se constituyen en lo que atañe específicamente al estudio de las tecnologías del poder y del dominio (Smart, 1986: 162-163); también debe analizar críticamente el funcionamiento de la resistencia y el contra-discurso. Respecto al Sáhara Occidental, la población saharaui ha sido forzada a responder a la opresión abierta, la ocupación y la subyugación del poder y conocimientos. De hecho, para explorar la resistencia, no se debe observar únicamente la voz saharaui, tanto colectiva como singular, sino también su estatus de refugiados, en el Sáhara Occidental ocupado, los campamentos de refugiados en Argelia y la diáspora. Para concluir, un enfoque genealógico del conflicto del Sáhara Occidental/Marruecos proporciona una narrativa histórica del conflicto que da cuenta de la constitución de conocimientos, discursos y regímenes de la verdad y las reglas que los influyen. Esta explicación histórica debe ser capaz de localizar los discursos aceptados y naturalizados: lo que se proclama como la verdad; lo que funciona como verdad; distingue y aprueba lo verdadero y lo falso; y posee acción legitimada. El objetivo principal de este conflicto genealógico es explorar el funcionamiento de la «Realpolitik» en las estrategias de transformación conflictiva y el análisis conflictivo. Este tipo de análisis de la política real en las cuatro fases distintas del conflicto de saharaui/marroquí (prevención, conflicto caliente, cese del fuego, punto muerto diplomático/paz negativa), también hace pasar a un primer plano otros conocimientos dominantes y discursos relacionados con la política real, así como los conocimientos subyugados y discursos que los enfoques de la Realpolitik sobre los conflictos tienden a marginalizar, deslegitimar o tildar de anticuado. Utilizando una óptica foucaultiana analítica, este estudio proporciona una genealogía del conflicto saharaui/marroquí, un análisis de la situación conflictiva que examina detenidamente las relaciones de poder, conocimiento y verdad, y los discursos y

9 « [Los estudios postcoloniales] han hecho surgir cuestiones provocadoras, muchas veces fundamentales, acerca de las estructuras epistemológicas del poder y el fundamento cultural de la resistencia, acerca de la relación permeable entre la metrópoli y la sociedad colonial, acerca de la construcción de identidades de grupo en el contexto de la formación de estados, incluso acerca de la naturaleza y los usos de la misma evidencia histórica» (Kennedy, 2003: 18; traducción propia). 16 acontecimientos que influyen en estas relaciones, así como el análisis del conflicto en general. Nos dirigimos al ideario de la teoría del discurso para una orientación metodológica.

Enfoque Textual Metodológico: Análisis y teoría del discurso (la «vuelta textual»)

Aunque las teorías del discurso tienen también su sesgo analítico, es en especial la metodología del análisis crítico del discurso y la teoría del discurso respecto al «texto» la que tiene una importancia particular para este estudio. Aunque nuestro enfoque analítico del conflicto saharaui/marroquí se apoya firmemente en una genealogía foucaultiana, para comprender los métodos expuestos por la teoría del discurso, nos referiremos brevemente a su propio esquema y su filosofía para entender mejor sus fundamentos metodológicos y su aplicabilidad. Por lo tanto, utilizaremos la obra de David Howarth, Discourse: Concepts in the Social Sciences (2000), como la referencia principal a la teoría y el análisis del discurso. No pretendemos explorar a fondo los antecedentes teóricos de la teoría del discurso, ni entrar en la extensión vasta y variada de este tema multidisciplinario. Sin embargo, queremos subrayar la funcionalidad metodológica del análisis y la teoría del discurso en lo que concierne a un análisis genealógico del conflicto saharaui/marroquí. En Language and Power (1989, 2001), Norman Fairclough considera el análisis del discurso crítico como el análisis detenido de textos en cuanto a los rasgos lingüísticos, lo que puede contribuir a la comprensión de las relaciones del poder y los procesos ideológicos. Señala como, en el proceso del análisis del discurso, uno se dedica no sólo al análisis de textos ni de procesos de producción e interpretación, sino también al análisis entre textos, procesos y su condición social (Fairclough, 2001: 21). Al llevar a cabo tal análisis, se puede entonces explorar cómo el lenguaje y el sentido son utilizados por los poderosos para marginalizar, dominar y en última instancia oprimir a los demás. David Howarth explica que el parecer de Fairclough acerca del análisis del discurso crítico ensancha el enfoque de la teoría del discurso para incluir prácticas no-discursivas, el análisis de textos y discursos políticos (sociales, políticos, económicos, etc.), y los contextos en los cuales se producen (Howarth, 8: 2000). Howarth procede luego a enlazar el concepto de análisis de discurso crítico de Fairclough con las conceptualizaciones de

17 discurso de Ernesto Laclau y Chantal Mouffe (1985). A éstas las denomina «teoría del discurso». La teoría del discurso a su vez ensancha y agranda el alcance del análisis del discurso hasta incluir toda práctica social, de forma que los discursos y las prácticas discursivas sean análogos con los sistemas de relaciones sociales; por lo tanto comienza suponiendo que todo objeto y toda acción tengan sentido, y que su sentido sea producto de sistemas de reglas históricamente específicos así, investigando los modos por los cuales las prácticas sociales construyan y refuten los discursos que constituyen la realidad social (8; ver también 128). De este modo, la teoría del discurso se hace eco del concepto foucaultiano de «arqueología» (McCarthy, 2005: 508) y su investigación de «formaciones discursivas» (la relación entre el discurso y las prácticas e instituciones no-discursivas), y su enfoque en las reglas y las regularidades, la producción del conocimiento (sistemas específicos de sentido) y el poder. Sin embargo, la teoría del discurso expone un enfoque metodológico del discurso – análisis del discurso – que incorpore las tradiciones post-estructuralistas, hermenéuticas, y post-marxistas anti-positivistas para examinar la construcción y función históricas y políticas del discurso (Howarth, 2000: 5). Howarth une las ideas de Foucault (1972), Dyrberg (1997) y Laclau (1990) para definir el discurso y su formación. En esta unión, los discursos forman sistemas concretos de relaciones sociales y prácticas que son intrínsecamente políticas; sistemas de sentido históricamente específicos; y estructuras contingentes e históricas, vulnerables a fuerzas políticas excluidas en su producción y a los efectos dislocados de acontecimientos fuera de su control (Howarth, 2000: 9). La formación del discurso es un «acto de institución radical» en el que consiste: la construcción de antagonismos y el trazar una frontera política entre los «de dentro» y los «de fuera»; el ejercicio del poder; y la estructura de relaciones sociales o políticas (9). Además, el análisis discusivo se refiere al proceso de considerar como «textos» o «escrituras» los materiales tanto lingüísticos como no-lingüísticos: v.gr., los discursos, los informes, los acontecimientos y los documentos históricos, las biografías, los documentales, los filmes, las entrevistas, las fuentes del internet, los periódicos, las representaciones de los medios de comunicación, los comunicados de prensa, las políticas, las ideas, las organizaciones e instituciones, etcétera.

18

Este enfoque metodológico dota al analista del discurso de los instrumentos adecuados para examinar el discurso político. En el caso de la Realpolitik esto quiere decir examinar la política de temor que refuerza el punto de vista de las políticas reales sobre el conflicto y la propagación de ideas liberales clásicas, geopolíticas, relaciones de poder, militarismo y guerra ideológica, así como la Guerra Fría y la Guerra contra el Terrorismo. También exige, como anteriormente se ha mencionado, una investigación acerca de cómo los discursos de la Realpolitik se formulan, se sostienen, se producen, y cómo compiten e intentan arrinconar otros discursos, incluso aquellos que hayan cobrado legitimidad y reconocimiento internacional. Esta clase de investigación discursiva social y política permite que el analista ahonde en las reglas y convenciones históricamente específicas que construyen la producción del significado de un modo no-esencialista ni reduccionista (11-12). Tal orientación metodológica no reduce los sistemas sociales y las ideas al lenguaje, ni tampoco acaba siendo víctima del idealismo, el «textualismo», el relativismo moral y conceptual, sino que enriquece y ahonda el análisis político por medio de la ampliación de discurso. Esto incluye los múltiples modos por los cuales producimos y comunicamos significados. De hecho, este tipo de análisis de discurso político, que se refiere como ya queda dicho a varios «textos» como discurso, permite que los analistas del discurso elijan acontecimientos específicos y procesos históricos y que examinen bajo qué condiciones y por qué razones los discursos se construyen, se impugnan y cambian (131). Para este estudio, hemos elegido un caso práctico conflictivo en particular: el del Sáhara Occidental. Para reiterar, enfocar las complejidades y pluridimensiones de una situación conflictiva no significa estrechar el alcance analítico al punto del simple relativismo. Al contrario, podemos examinar una situación conflictiva cargada y prolongada, una que refleje ciertas características conflictivas de caso clásico, mientras que, simultáneamente, podemos utilizar la misma particularidad del conflicto para ahondar en los conceptos más amplios que componen la situación conflictiva completa. Al comienzo de esta introducción, exponemos las varias razones por las cuales este conflicto más bien desatendido merece más estudio y atención. El estatus ejemplar del Sáhara Occidental como la última colonia africana, así como su relevancia para explorar el mapeo de

19 conflictos, análisis y estrategias de transformación, califican dicho conflicto como lo que Harry Eckstein denomina un «caso clásico decisivo», que deja «noqueada» del todo una teoría (Eckstein, 1975: 127; también citado en Howarth, 2000: 139 y San Martín, 2006: 18). La naturaleza del conflicto saharaui/marroquí como «caso clásico decisivo» invierte la lógica de investigación y análisis al utilizar un caso específico para explorar conceptos más generales. Por ejemplo, la naturaleza prolongada del conflicto saharaui/marroquí presenta posibilidades únicas para el estudio de ciclos de conflicto, sobre todo tratándose de los contextos y procesos históricos. El conflicto saharaui/marroquí nos permite ahondar en temas amplios y comprensivos (muchos de los cuales podrían constituir una investigación propia), de tal forma que lo específico llega a mediar entre temas que parecen dispares, divergentes y/o no relacionados. A diferencia de aquellos estudios que empiezan con un tema amplio y utilizan ejemplos para recalcar conclusiones basadas en los hechos utilizamos una dirección inversa en la que los detalles específicos del conflicto llevan a temas más amplios. No obstante, en vez de probar hipótesis o preguntar por qué, buscamos narrativas y significados ocultos, y preguntamos cómo: ¿cómo es que el conflicto saharaui/marroquí ha durado tanto tiempo (unos 34 años) y cómo puede transformarse? Además, la elección del enfoque en un caso ejemplar no excluye un análisis comparativo. El análisis comparativo amplía nuestra comprensión de los temas específicos que discutimos y analizamos, y no construye reglas generalmente aplicables de conducta social y política (Howarth, 2000: 139). Por otra parte, cada caso presenta su propia «especificidad única» (Howarth, 2000: 139) que debe explorarse y analizarse en su propio contexto social, cultural, político e histórico, antes de poder «compararse» a otros casos. De este modo, el proceso comparativo es inestimable (Bloomfield et al., 2003b: 61). Por consiguiente, el análisis comparativo (donde pueda aplicarse) se emplea para subrayar los puntos de convergencia de factores particulares y para investigar de qué formas y por qué modos estas convergencias funcionan y cobran forma. Desde luego que estas funciones y formas serán determinadas por las particularidades de la situación conflictiva. Intentamos evitar enfoques positivistas (ecuación-orientados) o universalistas del conflicto y su análisis; en cambio, nos esforzamos por generar una dialéctica del

20 conflicto, no en términos de tesis, antítesis y síntesis pulcras (ver Welsh, 2007: 233), sino en el sentido marxista de involucrarse en los procesos de cambio a través del mismo conflicto de fuerzas y contradicciones opuestas. De esta forma intentamos descubrir y sacar a luz diversas áreas de interpretación y duda a niveles conceptuales específicos y generales, y rechazar enfoques de análisis conflictivos que creen «plantillas» conflictivas y supuestos y preceptos universalmente aplicables. En el capítulo final de Discourse: Concepts in the Social Sciences, «Deploying Discourse Theory» (2000), Howarth señala unos elementos claves de la teoría del discurso y proporciona sugerencias para su empleo metodológico y su aplicación. Nos interesa menos la terminología específicamente técnica que resulta característica de la teoría del discurso: (i.e., «puntos nodales», «dislocaciones», «antagonismos», «equivalencia y diferencia», «imaginarios», etc.) que el nuevo proyecto de investigación que la teoría del discurso propone. El análisis del discurso y su teoría se aplican al presente estudio por su comprensión del discurso como no-discursivo y formas discursivas de representación y producción de significado. Además, su rechazo a aplicaciones mecánicas y teóricas, y verificación de teorías contra la realidad empírica y su enfoque en la articulación y modificación de conceptos y lógica en cada contexto particular de investigación lo convierte en un concepto útil para este estudio (Howarth, 2000: 139). Aunque nuestro enfoque del conflicto saharaui/marroquí es en su mayor parte textual, apoyándose en libros, revistas, documentos internacionales, etc., el concepto de evaluar los discursos (discursivos y no-discursivos) de la Realpolitik y el modo de funcionar, operar, crear significado e influir en las tácticas y estrategias de la transformación del conflicto, así como el modo mismo en que concebimos y trazamos el mapa del conflicto tiene importancia y relevancia particulares a este estudio. Al analizar críticamente los discursos de la política real, esperamos producir interpretaciones nuevas de soluciones a los conflictos tipo Realpolitik, los cuales en efecto refutan representaciones y mitos dominantes acerca del realismo político para, como plantea Howarth, abrir nuevos espacios para la evaluación crítica y el compromiso político (Howarth, 2000: 142). Dentro de la evaluación crítica y el compromiso político del conflicto saharaui/marroquí, no rehuimos la paradoja. Hay muchas, incluso en los instrumentos

21 analíticos con los que nos acercamos al conflicto saharaui/marroquí. Emplearemos el derecho internacional, aún reconociendo su predisposición etnocéntrica occidental. Enfocamos «la autoridad» de las Naciones Unidas, a la vez que criticamos la enorme laguna que separa los principios de la ONU y sus estructuras dominantes. Situaremos el Sáhara Occidental en un contexto de descolonización y subrayaremos su estatus de Territorio No-Autónomo, mientras que a la vez comprendemos la desigualdad del colonialismo y la descolonización, así como la importancia de los estudios postcoloniales en el análisis crítico del colonialismo (lenguaje, discurso, poder, construcción del sujeto, etc.). Consideraremos también su impacto sobre el pasado y el presente colonial, específicamente con respecto a la reproducción y transformación de las relaciones coloniales. Apoyamos el principio de la autodeterminación de los pueblos coloniales, a la vez dándonos perfecta cuenta de las limitaciones del concepto y la conexión en exclusiva estado-nación. Estos no son más que unas pocas de las paradojas que se encuentran a lo largo de este estudio; múltiples niveles y direcciones caracterizan todas y cada una de ellas. Indican las tensiones creadas por el choque entre la igualdad y la lucha por la justicia social, política y económica con el status quo, las normas establecidas y aceptadas, y los discursos y las narrativas dominantes. Las respuestas a estas desigualdades e injusticias serán, inevitablemente, defectuosas, e investigaciones acerca de las mismas, reveladoras. Al investigar los discursos y las narrativas dominantes, es imposible evitar usar el lenguaje, la estructura, y la fuerza dominantes. Asimismo, es imposible no sufrir el poder del dominio. Lo importante no es evitar estos escollos, sino luchar para reconocerlos, investigar el poder y el funcionamiento de las narrativas dominantes – en este caso, los de la Realpolitik.

Estructura de la Tesis

Hemos construido este estudio de un modo no tradicional pues comenzaremos por el final, por decirlo así. Los capítulos primero y último son de hecho los capítulos finales del libro, por lo que «terminaremos» donde «comenzamos». Los dos capítulos intermedios proporcionan la mayor parte de la genealogía del conflicto saharaui/marroquí. El capítulo uno, «Política de la tercera vía para el Sahara Occidental:

22 autodeterminación contra autonomía», presenta el concepto de la autonomía y el Plan marroquí de la autonomía de 2007 para el Sáhara Occidental, explorando primero: la descolonización y los territorios no-autónomos a través de la óptica poscolonial; la historia de la autodeterminación como principio del derecho internacional; los obstáculos a la descolonización para el Sáhara Occidental, sobre todo los roles de los Estados Unidos y Francia; y las normas perentorias en el derecho internacional, particularmente las acciones agresivas y el uso de la fuerza. El capítulo dos, «Historia temprana y aumento del conflicto, prevención de conflictos y oportunidades perdidas», expone una genealogía histórica y de discurso del Sáhara Occidental, su historia temprana y la evolución hacia el proceso fracasado de descolonización formal. Se acerca a esta historia a través de una presentación teórica de los temas generales de conflictos prolongados y prevención de conflictos. El capítulo tres, «Prefiguración de un horizonte interpretativo del análisis de conflictos: reconfiguración del mapeo de los actores en conflictos y mediación», enumera la genealogía histórica de la etapa de conflicto caliente del conflicto saharaui/marroquí; los actores del conflicto; y el Proceso de Paz para el Sáhara Occidental. Esto se logra indagando en los conceptos de análisis conflictivo, trazado de mapas y mediación. También se intenta mover el horizonte interpretativo analítico del análisis del conflicto en general. Por fin volvemos al punto de partida en el capítulo cuatro, «Autodeterminación como transformación del conflicto», y proponemos que, para que ocurra una transformación positiva del conflicto del Sáhara Occidental, habremos de tratar nuestro entendimiento de la autonomía (solución de la tercera vía) y los conflictos prolongados de suma cero. También hemos de retomar el concepto de la autodeterminación. El fundamento teórico del «estado de excepción» de Giorgio Agamben facilita este debate y nos ayuda a explorar la transgresión normalizada y la suspensión del derecho internacional. A lo largo de este estudio, nos acercamos a estos temas a través de un hondo análisis foucaultiano del discurso de la Realpolitik (ideas, teorías, políticas y acciones) y su relación con los estudios conflictivos en general, y más específicamente con las estrategias conflictivas del Sáhara Occidental. El capítulo cuatro termina, no concluyendo pulcramente nuestro examen de autodeterminación como transformación de conflictos, sino desafiándonos a mirar más allá y dentro de la

23 autodeterminación cómo se relacionan la identidad nacional, el estado-nación, el pueblo y los refugiados.

IV. Conclusiones y Aportaciones Originales

Un breve resumen de capítulos

Al inicio de este estudio, nos propusimos explorar cómo las políticas de la Realpolitik han afectado a los enfoques del conflicto respecto del conflicto del Sáhara Occidental en sus cuatro fases distintas: el fracaso de la prevención del conflicto y descolonización; el conflicto caliente (1975-1991); el cese del fuego y estancamiento diplomático y la proposición de «la tercera vía» de autonomía. A la vez, este punto de vista nos permitió examinar el análisis del conflicto y las estrategias de transformación de conflictos de una forma más general. También suponemos que cuando los procedimientos del análisis del conflicto, incluyendo el mapeo de conflictos y la mediación, y la transformación en general están fundados en las suposiciones esencializadas de la Realpolitik, a la vez están arraigados en las estructuras de la dominación y la subordinación institucional y cultural. Determinar la exactitud de esta declaración requirió investigar aquellas estructuras, funciones y procedimientos que influyen en la transformación de conflictos y los fracasos del sistema jurídico internacional, con especial atención a la evaluación de nuestras hipótesis y técnicas de evaluación de los conflictos prolongados. También nos cuestionamos cómo los enfoques de la Realpolitik sobre los conflictos funcionan e influyen a la teoría, la práctica y la política de conflictos y cómo sirven para proteger los motivos e intereses ulteriores que están profundamente entrelazados con los modos de representación y legitimación del neoliberalismo y del capitalismo. Al acercarse a estas preguntas, nos preguntamos sobre los regímenes de la verdad que influyen el análisis de conflicto en general y cómo están creados, producidos y reproducidos. Realizamos esto mediante un enfoque genealógico al conflicto y con la meta de abrir el espacio analítico para explorar las funciones de la política real y las maneras en que los enfoques de la Realpolitik sobre los conflictos intervienen en las agendas e intereses escondidos. Esta estrategia nos facilitó una evaluación de cómo y por

24 qué razones y con qué fines específicos unos modos de operación para la transformación de conflictos han predominado sobre otros. La teoría de discurso nos permitió examinar las maneras en que producimos, comunicamos y aceptamos los significados. Desde luego, podemos concluir específicamente que la comunidad internacional falló en la descolonización del Sáhara Occidental; sin embargo, el «cómo» de este fracaso es intrincado y complejo e hizo necesario un análisis multidimensional y multidisciplinario profundo. En el capítulo uno examinamos específicamente el Plan de Autonomía de 2007 Marroquí del Sáhara Occidental y si esto fue una solución políticamente viable al conflicto o una solución de la Realpolitik al conflicto. Para resolver esta suposición diametralmente opuesta, exploramos los asuntos más generales de la descolonización, la autodeterminación, las normas perentorias y la autonomía por medio de una óptica de estudios postcoloniales. Al hacer esto, concluimos que el plan de Autonomía de 2007 Marroquí es una solución de los políticos reales al conflicto y no el compromiso que pretende ser; además, por medio del discurso de la Realpolitik, esta supuesta solución no- suma-cero ha sido aceptada, normalizada y producida. Al explorar los mecanismos del poder y cómo se están aceptando, utilizando, legitimando, naturalizando, produciendo, y diseminando, ampliamos nuestra lente analítica para incluir los conocimientos subyugados, las soluciones alternativas que están desacreditadas y consumidas en las mitologías de las políticas reales. En efecto, cuando los procedimientos de la transformación de conflictos están fundados en las suposiciones de la Realpolitik, están sometidos a las interpretaciones imperialistas y arraigados en las estructuras de dominación institucional y subordinación característicos de una visión geopolítica, económica y militar a los conflictos. A su vez, esto directamente equivale a una aceptación y propagación del enfoque de autonomía de la tercera vía sin una opción a la independencia del pueblo saharaui como una solución creíble al conflicto a pesar de las normas perentorias internacionales y las especificidades «reales» al conflicto. En el capítulo dos examinamos detenidamente el funcionamiento de los discursos de la Realpolitik en la fase preventiva de los conflictos en general y del Sáhara Occidental en particular. Un análisis genealógico de la historia temprana, la intensificación del conflicto y las ideas, políticas y acciones de la Realpolitik nos

25 revelaron cómo el proceso de descolonización falló para el Sáhara Occidental. También, profundizamos nuestro entendimiento de la teoría y la práctica de la prevención de conflictos. Determinamos que Marruecos ilegalmente invadió y anexionó el territorio del Sáhara Occidental a pesar de las resoluciones repetidas de las Naciones Unidas y de la Organización de Unidad Africana acerca del derecho del pueblo saharaui a la autodeterminación por medio de un referéndum, a pesar de una decisión de la Corte Internacional de Justicia (CIJ) que reafirmó este derecho y a pesar de las protestas del movimiento no-alineado y otras naciones africanas quienes habían dependido de la autodeterminación para sus existencias. Además, contrariamente a las declaraciones de Marruecos y también mauritanas sobre sus vínculos históricos con el territorio (reprendido por la opinión de la CIJ), el Sáhara Occidental nunca constituyó parte de la integridad territorial marroquí. Por eso, el proceso de descolonización del Sáhara Occidental se queda abierto. Esencialmente, este capítulo problematizó las estructuras dominantes que marcan las agendas neoliberales-imperialistas que resultan de la dominación y subordinación cultural y la subyugación del conocimiento. Además, la intervención de unos actores particulares exacerbó la situación preconflictiva y estableció las condiciones preliminares necesarias para la violencia directa/el conflicto caliente. Por lo tanto, reconocemos que el papel de la prevención de conflictos no es sólo identificar las causas del inicio de la guerra, sino también, problematizar sobre las estructuras dominantes que establecen las reglas del juego y que activamente subyugan los conocimientos como resultado de la exitosa normalización y naturalización de las agendas imperialistas e ideológicas. El capítulo tres proporcionó una revisión crítica del análisis del conflicto en sí mismo como referente de un conflicto caliente y de las fases de atasco diplomático (el proceso de paz) del conflicto. Al investigar el concepto de mapeo de actores y la mediación utilizando un enfoque gramsciano (cómo el poder persiste sobre tiempo) y foucaultiano (cómo y por qué medios los regímenes de la verdad reproducen las estructuras dominantes y los resultados específicos), pudimos definir el proceso en términos de un cambio en el horizonte interpretativo. Esto nos permitió ver cómo los discursos de la Realpolitik designan lo que es importante y cómo conducen el análisis del conflicto y las estrategias y políticas de transformación. Crear un horizonte alternativo

26 interpretativo también requirió repensar las estructuras dominantes; quebrar los procesos de confirmar-estructurar; e, investigar maneras de conocer y de ser en términos de cómo funcionan al nivel de sistemas. Esto también requirió analizar las estructuras mismas del mapeo de actores de conflicto, el alcance de la participación y mediación de actores y cómo hablamos de los conflictos. Este proceso analítico nos reveló que la participación de «los actores primarios en la sombra» y «los actores secundarios» en los conflictos incrementa el riesgo del estancamiento del conflicto y/o las condiciones de un punto muerto de paz negativa. Su participación influyó directamente en el proceso de paz del Sáhara Occidental. En última instancia, los objetivos principales del análisis, el mapeo y mediación de conflictos consisten en ayudar en la transformación positiva de conflictos. De este modo, al analizar a fondo interna y externamente el conflicto que nos ocupa, por ejemplo, por medio de una investigación profunda de la historia de las partes, las causas o raíces, los asuntos de relevancia para cada actor, el poder, los recursos y las relaciones, las posibilidades escondidas o latentes para la meta deseada de la transformación de conflictos se nos hacen más aparentes. En el caso del Sáhara Occidental, los discursos de la Realpolitik – las ideas, las políticas y las acciones (la realidad aceptada) – han creado y producido la desigualdad. La autonomía, tal y como la conceptualiza Marruecos, cabe dentro de este molde. Nuestro último capítulo trata de la autonomía como la «respuesta» a un estancamiento de suma-cero (la independencia o la anexión) y proporcionó el concepto de la autodeterminación como nuestro cambio en el horizonte interpretativo para la transformación positiva de la cuestión del Sáhara Occidental. El capítulo cuatro utilizó el concepto del estado de excepción de Agamben para perforar el entendimiento normalizado de suma-cero, particularmente en lo que concierne al Sáhara Occidental. No es solo la autonomía tal y como la percibe Marruecos injusta, sino también pertenece al estado de excepción. Se ha convertido en la suspensión y transgresión normalizada de la ley internacional. Por lo tanto, por medio de un análisis de los discursos de la Realpolitik, desafiamos los coordinantes ideológicos – las coordenadas ideológicas del proyecto neoliberal en la medida en que se relacionan con la suspensión/transgresión naturalizada de la ley internacional (las normas perentorias). Hemos argumentado que, a pesar de sus imperfecciones, la autodeterminación proporciona el cambio necesario en el horizonte interpretativo para el Sáhara Occidental

27 y otros conflictos prolongados. La autodeterminación proporciona un comienzo al proceso de la transformación de conflictos, que desafía la narrativa de conflicto dominante y ofrece la transformación de conflictos tensional-potencial. Como mencionamos en el capítulo cuatro, concluir que un proceso que incluya la independencia como un posible resultado equivale al estancamiento suma-cero supone no incorporar el estado de excepción y el proyecto neoliberal en el análisis. Por otro lado, al desafiar las coordenadas ideológicas naturalizadas y normalizadas de los sistemas dominantes, es posible ver cómo, por un momento histórico, el proceso analítico de la autodeterminación puede quebrar el ciclo de la política real y desinflar el mito neoliberal, creando de ese modo un estado de emergencia real y un cambio en el horizonte interpretativo. Sin embargo, tiene que ser entendido como un proceso continuo y no como un evento puntual porque el hecho mismo de estar inscrito en la condición del estado (el estado-nación, la nación, la gente) supone una fractura biopolítica del pueblo de la gente (la inclusión/la exclusión) y la nación (el nacimiento y el territorio). Como hemos establecido arriba, como resultado de los vínculos mismos al sistema del estado, la autodeterminación nos permite entrar en un discurso complejo acerca de la naturaleza misma del estado-nación. Aunque aparentemente paradójico, al repensar la identidad en términos de su relación con el territorio y el pueblo desde una posición ventajosa del refugiado, es posible criticar la misma organización política que la autodeterminación inclusiva de la independencia facilite, el nacimiento del estado-nación. Por eso, al conceptualizar y acercarnos a la autodeterminación como proceso y como transformación de conflictos nos deja mantener un pie en las realidades internacionales de hoy en día, mientras simultáneamente sale fuera de los confines del estado-nación para prever las estructuras políticas alternativas.

Lo Imaginado

Por un lado, los investigadores de la paz y los conflictos buscan, al crear nuevas realidades que aborden la desigualdad global, las enfermedades y la hambruna, los conflictos interestatales e intraestatales, el tráfico de personas y el calentamiento global, fortalecer «la toma de conciencia del sufrimiento que unos seres humanos podemos generar a otros y a la misma naturaleza, y la búsqueda de formas pacíficas de transformación de las relaciones humanas que sean alternativas a las guerras, la

28 marginación y la exclusión» (Martínez Guzmán, 2005a). Por otro lado, los investigadores de la paz y los conflictos tienen que trabajar en el mundo frente a ellos o contra las visiones dominantes del mundo que gobiernan las economías, el desarrollo, las relaciones internacionales, los asuntos exteriores y las relaciones entre los actores estatales. Estas perspectivas venden los modelos de expansión sin límites y las políticas neoliberales o del libre mercado para el desarrollo; la competición más que la cooperación; el dogma y la ideología de la ley del más fuerte; la dominación; poder y política real en lugar de pluralidad de enfoques sobre el bien común; el uso irresponsable de los recursos del mundo; el materialismo y el gran negocio sin los derechos del trabajador; y el pensamiento bipolar que divide la especie humana en líneas religiosas, económicas, políticas y culturales. Éste último puede ser un argumento convincente con una capacidad extraordinaria de eclipsar las corrientes subyacentes en la sociedad global que están intentado sentir, ver y crear nuevas realidades construidas en la igualdad, el entendimiento y la aceptación del otro, de nosotros mismos (Martínez Guzmán, 2001, 2005a). Gramsci nos dice que «One must speak for a struggle for a new culture, that is, for a new moral life that cannot but be intimately connected to a new intuition of life, until it becomes a new way of feeling and seeing reality» (Gramsci et al., 1985: 98)10. Lederach describe la imaginación moral como la capacidad de imaginar algo arraigado en los desafíos del mundo real aún capaz de dar a luz a lo que todavía no existe (Lederach, 2005: 29). Desde esta perspectiva, es posible cambiar nuestras percepciones del tiempo para que nuestro pasado esté frente a nosotros, aquello que podemos ver y explorar, y que nuestro futuro esté detrás de nosotros, lo cual no podemos ver pero sí enriquecer por medio de las genealogías históricas profundas. Así que, un pasado profundo y el horizonte del futuro están íntimamente unidos en una multiplicidad de posibilidades. Además, son nuestras genealogías, nuestros modos de «contar cuentos» per se, los que influyen en nuestras maneras de resolver problemas y nuestras perspectivas de la mediación (Lederach, 2005: 135-147). El discurso de la Realpolitik no es sino un modo de contar el cuento.

10 Gramsci nos dice que «Se debe hablar de una lucha para una nueva cultura, es decir, para una nueva vida moral que solo puede pero estar íntimamente conectada a una nueva intuición de la vida, hasta que se convierte en un nuevo modo de sentir y ver la realidad» (Gramsci et al., 1985: 98; traducción propia). 29

Césaire nos advierte que una civilización que utilice sus principios para las artimañas y la decepción es una civilización moribunda (Césaire, 2000: 31). En este escenario, «the bourgeoisie is awakened by a terrific boomerang effect: the gestapos are busy, the prisons fill up, the torturers standing around the racks invent, refine, discuss» (Césaire, 2000: 31)11. Al responder a estos acontecimientos, que por lo tanto desconcertantemente describen muchas de las estrategias de la Guerra contra el Terrorismo, la política de inmigración global así como los regímenes autocráticos (apoyados por los democráticos), Césaire sostiene que el objetivo no es hacer un intento utópico y estéril por repetir el pasado, más bien «ir más allá» y crear una nueva sociedad con todo el poder productivo de los tiempos modernos, cálido con toda la fraternidad de antaño (52). Arendt también reflexiona sobre el sujeto de la verdad y de las mentiras como facultades políticas, a través del cual la veracidad nunca ha sido tenida en cuenta como una virtud política y las mentiras han sido consideradas como herramientas justificables en los manejos políticos (Arendt. 1972: 4-5). Ella problematiza el hecho de que tan poca atención haya sido prestada a las tradiciones del pensamiento filosófico y político al significado de la naturaleza de acción y nuestra habilidad para negar en pensamiento y en palabra lo que venga al caso (Arendt, 1972: 4-5). Como Lederach, Arendt argumenta que sería imposible crear un cambio si no podemos extraernos mentalmente de donde estamos físicamente localizados y imaginar que las cosas pueden ser diferentes de lo que son en la actualidad; sin embargo, también reconoce que la imaginación humana es la fuente de las mentiras, así que la denegación deliberado de la verdad factual – la habilidad de mentir – y la capacidad de cambiar los hechos – la habilidad de actuar – no pueden estar separadas de la habilidad para crear un cambio (Arendt, 1972: 5). Como Arendt nos explica, al deber su existencia a la misma fuente, es absolutamente necesario explorar totalmente las normas naturalizadas y esencializadas del sistema. En nuestro punto de vista, es nuestra habilidad no solo de re-escribir la historia para ajustarse dentro de «las líneas políticas» de los coordinadores ideológicos particulares lo que resulta problemático, sino también nuestra habilidad crear, producir y sostener los discursos totalitarios de Realpolitik (las líneas de la política real) y los

11 En este escenario, «la burguesía está despertado por un efecto terrorífico de bumerán: las gestapos están ocupadas, las prisiones se llenan, los torturadores estando de pie alrededor del potro inventan, refinan y discuten» (Césaire, 2000: 31; traducción propia). 30 regímenes de la verdad, y mientras subyugar y eliminar («defactualización») a los otros (44). Por eso, nuestro ser político es la «facultad de acción» (Arendt, 972: 179) y nuestra imaginación el medio para sostener los modelos de subyugación y dominación o para crear (imaginar) los ordenes alternativos de «ser-en-el-mundo» (de hecho tomando en cuenta las imperfecciones y el desorden de los seres humanos) (Haugaard, 2006b: 63). Aunque hemos resumido algunas conclusiones importantes que este estudio pretende revelar, el proceso analítico que hemos asumido ha tratado menos de localizar las conclusiones definitivas y más de abrir los espacios analíticos y cambiar nuestras perspectivas de conflicto para «ver» los conflictos y nuestro caso específico de conflicto con la óptica analítica que desafíen las mismas estructuras de los discursos de la Realpolitik. Para poder imaginar algo nuevo, algo diferente, es esencial cuestionar la producción, el funcionamiento y la manifestación de la Realpolitik, el análisis, mapeo y mediación de conflictos y en última instancia la transformación pacífica de conflictos. Mundy (2007) ha argumentado que los Estados Unidos deberían tener un planteamiento dual para el conflicto saharaui/marroquí y apoyar simultáneamente la autodeterminación y la estabilidad y las reformas marroquíes; y, la comunidad internacional de ONGs ha concluido que la única manera de salir del punto muerto consiste en permitir votar a los saharauis en un referéndum de autodeterminación libre y transparente (Leenders, 1999: 109). Ambas respuestas apoyan el punto de vista que la autodeterminación ofrece el proceso necesario para la transformación pacífica del conflicto saharaui/marroquí y así como de otros conflictos de autodeterminación.

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Evitando el Conflicto Violento Otra Vez

«A Dream Deferred» «Un Sueño Pospuesto»

What happens to a dream deferred? ¿Qué pasa con un sueño pospuesto? Does it dry up ¿Se seca por encima like a raisin in the sun? como una pasa al sol? Or fester like a sore – ¿O supura como una llaga And then run? y se opera? Does it stink like rotten meat? ¿Apesta como carne podrida? Or crust and sugar over – ¿O logra una costra de azúcar Like a syrupy sweet? como un dulce almibarado? Maybe it just sags like a heavy load? ¿Tal vez sólo cuelga Or does it explode? (Hughes, 1999:426). como una pesada carga? ¿O estalla? (Traducción propia).

Empezamos este estudio con una instantánea geopolítica del Norte de África. Claramente, el conflicto saharaui/marroquí figuró en esta evaluación. Actualmente, el Frente Polisario y los saharauis como un colectivo en sus tres localidades geográficas distintas (los territorios ocupados en el Sáhara Occidental, los campamentos de refugiados en Argelia y la diáspora) han confiado en las Naciones Unidas, la comunidad internacional y el proceso diplomático para la descolonización exitosa del Sáhara Occidental por medio de un referéndum de autodeterminación. Como una muestra de compromiso hacia este proceso, los saharauis de los territorios ocupados iniciaron un movimiento de resistencia no-violento popular, Intifada, en 2005. La resistencia pacífica sigue separada del movimiento de liberación saharaui de muchos otros que han recurrido a la violencia. Sin embargo, el poema citado nos obliga a pensar sobre cuánto tiempo más esta respuesta pacífica puede mantenerse. Como Arundhati Roy (Francis, 2004: 150), creemos que otra solución es posible, que ella está en camino en la forma de la autodeterminación real.

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Definitions of Important Terms

It is important from the outset to establish and clarify my personal social, political and economic orientation as it relates to the terms below. The following definitions12 and perspectives have influenced, informed and facilitated my undertaking of a critical review of conflict analysis itself and the specific case study of Western Sahara. It should, therefore, be assumed that when they are used in this study, they bear the contextual and conceptual meanings of these broader definitions.

Imperialism: Imperialism is the creation and maintenance of unequal economic, cultural and territorial relationships through domination and subordination, usually between states and often in the form of empire (Johnston et al., 2000: 375). Imperialism is both an “ethos of state expansion” and a “civilizing mission” (375). In the past 500 years, it has principally been a western project and mode of dominance that has been shaped and reproduced by a capitalist expansionist system13 (375). The processes of imperialism and colonialism are inextricably linked. They involve a ruler or nation-state’s extension of sovereignty over land and its inhabitants through: military conquest and colonial settlement; imposition of direct rule; and measures of indirect rule, like the creation of informal empires of trade and political organization and supervision (375). The tools of imperialism include the development of weapons, military tactics and technology and self-enforcing ideologies. In effect, complex European-invented imperial imaginaries – “ideologies of superiority, visions of empire, and conceptual devices for ordering the world” – provided the necessary ideological base on which to build an imperial logic and plan of action (Johnston et al., 2000: 376; see also Headrick, 1981; Tracy, 1991; Rabasa, 1993; Crosby, 2004). European imperialism is characterized by “a tension between the universalization and differentiation of European culture and power,” and is sustained by

12 The following definitions are predominantly paraphrased or cited verbatim from The Dictionary of Human Geography, Fourth Edition, edited by R.J. Johnston et al. (2000). These concepts are integral to my study and will be referenced and expanded upon throughout. In this way, they serve as entrance points into the comprehensive and multidimensional topics at hand. I have ordered them in logical sequence, rather than in alphabetical order. 13 It can be argued that the communist expansionist system also fits this imperial mold; however, this study is predominately concerned with the capitalist one. 33

Eurocentrism, the proliferation of a European innate superiority and nationalism (376; emphases in original). In this view, European expansion was an agent of progress beneficial to all as well as an inevitable and logical manifestation of European dominance (376). According to Spurr (1993), Europeans interpreted the world in terms of capital property-ownership and their rightful inheritance. In this way, colonialism was a natural occurrence taking place in response to: nature and the anthropological right to exploit its resources; humanity and the need for universal progress and improvement; and the other, the colonized themselves who needed protection from their own ignorance, violence and inferior nature (Spurr, 1993; cited in Johnston et al., 2000: 376). An intrinsic feature of imperialism, these coercive fictions had penetrating consequences. They helped to configure a social, political and economic space where non-European lands and peoples were conceived of and actively created as uncultivated and backward and therefore in need of not only domestication and rule, but also saving (376). In general terms, imperialism can be interpreted as a logic of power and a system of violence that have historical tendencies and severe cultural implications; its effects are insidious and totalizing (376). Of course, every imperialist system has its agent or agents, but while the protagonists are mutable and the imperial manifestations distinct, the ideological base of domination remains a capitalist constant. From this point of departure, the forms and new directions that imperialism may take are determined by the imperialist power. The term, which has also been denominated neo-imperialism, has been employed to describe “the global economic influence of Japan and the USA; the webs of neo-colonial dependency spun by multinational corporations; the international spheres of intervention cultivated by the USA, the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War; the USA’s recent military campaigns in the Middle East and Central America; and the fashioning and management of the third world as subordinate to the West” (375). In Marxist-Leninist thought ‘imperialism’ and ‘capitalism’ are but two faces of the same coin.

Neocolonialism: Neocolonialism is a means of economic and political control, articulated through powerful states and capitals of developed economies, especially the

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United States, Japan and the member states of the EU as a unit, over the formal economies and the societies of the economically and technologically underdeveloped (impoverished) world (Johnston et al., 2000: 545). To be more specific, various practices of neo-colonialism function in such a way as to keep the dominated/subjugated societies secure/subdued within a wider sphere of “neocolonial influence, definition and assessment” (546). However, it originates and draws breath from imperialism of the nineteenth century – Euro-American expansionism motivated by racism, religious claims, economic promise and geopolitical power (546). According to Peet, theories of imperialism function to relieve the contradictions that are internal to the capitalist system (Peet, 1991: 135; cited in Johnston et al., 2000: 546). The globalization of contemporary economic geographies, which traditionally have been based on trade, the internationalization of production and access to raw materials (now related just as much to flows of finance capital), have increased the gaps in the global distribution of wealth (resource allocation, water, technology, etc.) and have exacerbated capitalism’s ‘contradictions,’ the inability to meet the basic needs (food, shelter, health care, etc.) of human beings globally (546). In spite of these contradictions, the attempts to secure the open and free market flow of ‘goods’ will intensify (546). ‘Capital’ will be defended at all costs (defense and the proliferation of arms being an integral part to the world capital system), and the conflicts and uprisings that ensue as a result of the very system that engenders these deep inequalities will in turn be met with violence and military responses so as to safeguard the capitalist system itself. Within this scenario, neo-colonialism contributes directly and indirectly to “the continued development of underdevelopment” (546).

Capitalism: Typical discussions of capitalism revolve around the singularity and centrality of its economy and the relationship between producer, labor and product. It can be explained as follows: “the direct producer is separated from ownership of the means of production and the product of the labour process…[T]his separation is effected through the transformation of labour power into a commodity to be bought and sold on a labour market regulated by price signals” (Johnston et al., 2000: 56). This two-fold description of capitalism is yet a starting point. Broader capitalist discussions and claims are

35 influenced and at times determined along the lines of discipline, political affiliation and ideological influence. For example, the depth and direction of its discussion depends upon whether one focuses predominantly on the economy and economic theories or a “more comprehensive cultural, social and political ‘architecture’ that is built around (and on) the capitalist economy” (57). For the purposes of this study, the latter focus bears significant relevance. According to Rogers Brubaker’s analysis of Max Weber (1864-1920), Weber contends that rationalization, i.e. the rationalization of the economy, has never unequivocally advanced human well-being; on the contrary, the rationalization of economic production has built the “iron cage” of capitalism – a “tremendous cosmos” that traps individuals and determines their lives with “irresistible force” (Brubaker, 1984; cited in Johnston et al., 2000: 57). Prior to Weber, Karl Marx (1818-1883) highlighted the force of capitalism and its unexpected manifestations. The Marxian view of capitalism recognizes that capitalism is much more than “a system of generalized commodity exchange”; it is also a “generalized system of commodity production” (Johnston et al., 2000: 57). As David Harvey explains, when capitalism is perceived as a historically specific mode of production, the “reproduction of daily lives depends upon the production of commodities produced through a system of circulation that has profit- seeking as its direct and socially accepted goal” (Harvey, 1985; cited in Johnston et al., 2000: 57). Marx focused on the ‘economic base’ in his writings. Marxian writers have built upon Marx’s findings in two significant ways. First, they explore the relationship between economy, society, culture and politics in order to inform: “the empirical analyses of the structure of the capitalist state and the state apparatus, the location and operation of the law and other modes of capitalist regulation and the significance of cultural formations and cultural politics in the legitimation and contestation of the contemporary capitalisms” (Johnston et al., 2000: 58). Second, they have focused their analyses on the complex (inter)connections between capitalism, class and other subject- positions, with particular attention paid to the formation/constitution of gendered, racialized and sexualized subjects as they relate to capitalism and its historical intersections with, for example, colonialism, patriarchy and racism (58).

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Gibson-Graham (two economic geographers with one authorial personality) critically analyze “Capitalism-with-a-capital-C” approaches to assessing the significance and role of capitalism today (1996). They contend that “capitalocentrism,” where capital dominates and is situated at the center of various narratives thereby devaluing or marginalizing other non-capitalist possibilities, is actually a specific economic form that has become synonymous with the very term economy (Gibson-Graham, 1996: 35, 41). They argue that instead of a unified, singular and totalizing understanding of capitalism, it is more effective and radical to frame capitalism in the plural – capitalisms – and to recognize the potential for the coexistence of other noncapitalist economic forms (Gibson-Graham, 1996: 262). Johnston et al. summarize Gibson-Graham’s critique of Capitalism in four points: (1) “Capitalism is situated at the heart of the narrative as the central generating mechanism of historical change”; (2) “Non-capitalist forms and practices are cast as backwards, traditional, inward-looking”; (3) “Non-capitalist sites are thus sites of a ‘lack,’ always and everywhere impending targets of invasion, submission and colonization, eventually to be eliminated by the inexorable penetrations of globalizing capitalism”; (4) “Capitalism is thus constructed as a totality” (Johnston et al., 2000: 58; emphasis in original). Gibson-Graham describe the fatality of the totalizing effect of Capitalism. They suggest that we cannot get outside of Capitalism because of the very fact that it has no outside (Gibson-Graham, 1996: 258). In order to challenge this totalizing and paralyzing effect, they recommend that we create a shift in discursive conditions such that socialist or other noncapitalist constructions become realistic present activities rather than unrealistic or utopic future goals (263). In response to the above four points, I would add that to some extent the importance of a capitalist analysis lies in the very fact that capitalism is situated at the center of multiple narratives, but most particularly the neoliberal narrative. Within the neoliberal narrative, non-capitalist forms and practices are described as backwards, traditional and inward looking. Neoliberal proponents promote global capitalism; work to penetrate untouched sites that ‘lack’ capitalist influence in order to open them up (invade and colonize) to free market trade; and construct Capitalism as a totality and final and desired economic form. Although I agree with Gibson-Graham and would not want to get

37 stuck in a totalized Capitalist paradigm that eclipses all other possibilities, I do think it is important to do two things simultaneously: analyze the dominant neoliberal Capitalist narrative and think, explore and create ‘outside’ of this totality. The power of the Capitalist paradigm should not be underestimated. As Slavoj Žižek warns us, “capitalism can appropriate ideologies that seem to oppose it” (Žižek, 2006: 251).

Neoliberalism: Neoliberalism can be described as ideas and theories associated with the rise of the New Right in the North Atlantic economies during the 1980s, i.e. Thatcherism from Great Britain and Reaganomics (Trickle-down Theory) from the United States. It puts the market at the center of the organization of social, economic and political life (Hayek, 1981; cited in Johnston et al.: 2000, 547). In addition, neoliberal policies call for a minimalist role of the state and are predominantly laissez faire and market driven constructs (Cypher and Dietz, 1997: 298; cited in Johnston et al., 2000: 547). Key to neoliberalism is the underlying logic of free markets, which claims to maximize human welfare economically, socially and politically. Markets efficiently distribute knowledge and resources, and within this most efficient of systems, liberal individualism maximizes moral worth and political freedoms (Johnston et al., 2000: 547). The market is considered to be a ‘neutral’ and self-regulating force that if left to its ‘natural’ workings will maximize human welfare. According to Preston, neoliberalism also signals:

“(a) the elimination of market imperfections, thus the removal of controls on the private sector, the privatization of state assets, the liberalization of foreign investment regulations and so on; (b) the elimination of market- inhibitory social institutions and practices, thus curbing trade unions and professions, abolishing various subsidies, liberalizing employment regulation and so on; (c) the elimination of surplus government intervention, thus the imposition of restrictions on government spending, the reduction in government regulative activity, the reduction of government planning activity, the abolition of tariff regimes and so on; and, (d) it might be noted that such programmes of liberalizations have usually required parallel programmes of political repression” (Preston, 1996: 259-260).

The mythologies surrounding neoliberalism shape present day global policy with frightening force. As will be contested in this study, neoliberalism is not the ‘neutral’ or

38 self-regulating impetus that neoliberals claim it to be. It has direct, involved and calculated effects on approaches to conflict, conflict analysis and ‘neutral’ third-party state participation and action.

Globalization: Anthony G. McGrew defines globalization as:

“the multiplicity of linkages and interconnections between the states and societies which make up the modern world system. It describes the process by which events, decisions, and activities in one part of the world can come to have significant consequences for individuals and communities in quite distant parts of the globe. Globalization has two distinct dimensions: scope (or stretching) and intensity (or deepening). On the one hand it defines a set of processes that embrace most of the globe or that operate worldwide; the concept therefore has a spatial connotation. Politics and other social activities are becoming stretched across the globe. On the other hand it also implies an intensification in the levels of interaction, interconnectedness or interdependence between the states and societies which constitute the world community. Accordingly, alongside the stretching goes a deepening of global processes” (McGrew, 1992: 23; cited in Johnston et al., 2000: 316).

The linkages and interconnections between states and societies are facilitated by Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), which disperse information, continue to grow and advance new ideas and technologies and distinguish the landscape and framework of modern globalization from the past. David Held defines globalization similarly but adds the dimension of power:

“a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interactions and the exercise of power” (Held et al., 1999: 16).

A key element to today’s processes that differentiates them from previous forms of globalization, for example, the “globalized European systems of governance, culture, languages, and presumed racial superiority,” is the interconnectedness of the realms of the political, economic, cultural, educational and technological (Abdi, 2006: 20). In addition, information and military technology, transnational corporations and profit drive

39 all add to the mix, complicating and intensifying the ‘old’ relations of social, political and economic power. The neoliberal globalization model is characterized by the “primacy of financial and speculative capital, highly integrated and flexible systems of production of goods and services, the reorganization of the labor process, and increased mobility of transnational circuits of labor” (Lipman, 2007: 39). In this way capital penetrates the interconnected relations of the political, cultural, technological and educational and adds its own power dynamics to the entire interrelated equation. Proponents of neoliberal globalization approaches and policy promise freedom and democracy through deregulation, privatization and open markets, whereas critics warn against these types of free trade policies and the homogenized, western, imperialistic “accumulation of dispossession” that they engender (Harvey, 2004; cited in Lipman, 2007: 39). Neoliberalists (and to a greater extent neoconservatives) support an unrestrained global ‘democracy of the market’. They point to the decline of the nation-state and negate the need for state intervention and state-run social services. They emphasize, instead, privatization, the notion of a borderless world, a rise of regional economies and their ‘third space,’ region states (Ohmae, 1995). Others, like Hirst, claim that “we still have a world of states,” only we are interacting with “other agencies too” (Hirst, 2000: 185 cited in Olssen, 2006: 262). Globalization discourses are distinct and overlapping and yet highly contested (Waters, 2001; first edition of 1995 cited in Johnston et al., 2000: 315). As Johnston et al. explain pointedly, “the processes of globalization are not geographically uniform” (Johnston et al., 2000: 316). Globalization tendencies can be at work in a multiplicity of ways and need not be construed as an “all-encompassing end-state in which all unevenness and differences are ironed out, market forces are rampant and uncontrollable, and the nation-state merely passive and supine” (316).

Hegemony: Hegemony, as influenced by Antonio Gramsci (1971), means:

“The capacity of a dominant group to exercise control, not through visible regulation or the deployment of force, but rather through the willing acquiescence of citizens to accept subordinate status by their acceptance of

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cultural, social, and political practices and institutions that are unequal and unjust” (Johnston et al., 2000: 333).

When thinking about hegemony in geopolitical terms and dominant representations and practices, it refers to dominant powers and their narratives, which maintain and consolidate power relations, especially between or among states (333). In this way, these power states try to define and enforce the “rules of the game” (Agnew, 2003: 10). Gramsci primarily focused on hegemony within the context of historical materialism and class analysis. It can also be used to interpret other sources of domination, such as racism, colonialism and patriarchy (Johnston et al., 2000: 333).

Ideology: David Brion Davis defines ideology as:

“an integrated system of beliefs, assumptions and values, not necessarily true or false, which reflects the needs and interests of a group or class at a particular time in history. By ‘interest’ I mean anything that benefits or is thought to benefit a specific collective identity. Because ideologies are modes of consciousness, containing the criteria for interpreting social reality, they help to define as well as to legitimate collective needs and interests. Hence, there is a continuous interaction between ideology and the material forces in history…The salient characteristic of an ideology is that whilst it is taken for granted by the people who have internalised it, it is never the external or absolute truth it claims to be” (Davis, 1999: 17; also cited in Bush, 2006: 22-23).

John B. Thompson conceptualizes ideology in terms of a system of signification that facilitates the pursuit of particular interests and sustains specific relations of domination (Thompson, 1981, 1985; cited in Johnston et al., 2000: 369). This study melds the two.

Conflict Transformation: Conflict Transformation can be looked at as the deepest level of the conflict resolution tradition (Ramsbotham et al., 2005) or it can be seen as distinct from conflict resolution (Lederach, 1995; 2003). For the purposes of this study, it is helpful to tease out the positive aspects of each view without necessarily having to declare loyalty to one of the two camps. According to Ramsbotham et al., conflict transformation is “a deep transformation in the institutions and discourses that reproduce violence, as well as in the conflict parties themselves and their relationships. It

41 corresponds to the underlying tasks of structural and cultural peace-building” (Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 29). According to Lederach (1995; 2003), conflict transformation is not just a set of specific techniques, but is also a way of looking and seeing. It provides a set of lenses through which to make sense of social conflict. Each lens draws attention to a certain aspect of conflict and helps focus more sharply the overall meaning of the conflict at hand. Separately, the conflict lenses are not capable of focusing the entire conflict. As such, multiple lenses are needed to see different aspects of complex conflict realities and multidimensionalities. These distinct lenses help address the specificities of conflict (the conflict framework) and allow us to see the conflict as a whole. The first lens permits us to see the immediate situation and the second to look past the immediate problems and capture the deeper relationship patterns that form the context of conflict. This means the focus is not on a quick solution to the problem, but on the human relationships at a deeper level. The third lens helps envision a framework that holds these two viewpoints together and addresses the content, the context and the structure of the relationship (Lederach, 2003). It is from this platform that the parties can begin to find creative responses and solutions. Finally, the notion of ‘constructive change processes’ highlights the capacity of the transformational approach to conflict to build new things: “to build constructive change out of the energy created by conflict”; to focus this energy on “the underlying relationships and social structures”; and “to move conflict away from destructive process and toward constructive ones” (Lederach, 2003). Conflict transformation approaches highlight the importance of process (Idriss, 2005: 195; Wallensteen, 1991: 151) and the changing nature of conflict (Väyrynen, 1991: 3-23). They reject quick fixes and completion-oriented approaches to conflict. The process for transformation is open-ended and unpredictable. Lederach’s focus on multiple and diverse perspectives (lenses) and Ramsbotham’s emphasis on deep transformation of the institutions and discourses that reproduce violence are essential for the historical genealogy and conflict analysis of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict. For this study, I specifically focus on the importance and necessity of adjusting our analytical lenses in order to gain new perspectives and insights into how Realpolitik functions in conflict and how it impedes possibilities for conflict transformation.

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Introduction

“One must speak for a struggle for a new culture, that is, for a new moral life that cannot but be intimately connected to a new intuition of life, until it becomes a new way of feeling and seeing reality” (Gramsci, 1985: 98).

North Africa: A Geopolitical Snapshot

The 2007 winter edition of the Middle East Policy quarterly journal is dedicated in its entirety to the exploration of significant themes and trends of North Africa. The journal is a self-proclaimed wide spectrum forum representing diverse viewpoints on recent developments that affect U.S.-Middle East policy. Its main objective is to ensure that policy makers consider a full range of U.S. interests and views. To be clear, the journal’s content, as is apparent from its mission statement and design, presupposes a U.S. biased and western-liberal-economic-centric approach to the region. Nevertheless, it serves as an interesting introduction into how North Africa fits into the geopolitical mapping and interests of countries of old in the region like France, Spain and Italy and of countries/regions with growing interests like Russia, China, the European Union and the United States. Within a regional economic, geopolitical, militaristic and predominately western framework for analysis, North Africa possesses many characteristics that make it of strategic interest to both the ‘old’ and ‘new’ powers respectively. It is the western-most extension of the Mediterranean (leading to the Middle East); it gives access to the Mediterranean and war ships; it is Western Europe’s ‘back yard’; it is an area of political ‘friendship’ for the United States, i.e. Tunisia and Morocco; it is the western end of the Arab world (of both sea and land importance); it provides access to the Arab world in that it houses Arab heads of state for Islamic conferences and other purposes; it has strong potential for free-trade associations, i.e. U.S. and Morocco, and further potential for one unified North African free-trade ‘umbrella’; it makes up part of the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (especially in consideration of the newly named transnational Al-Qaeda operatives in the Maghreb and the U.S. led Global War on

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Terror); and it is a strategic crossroads between Europe, the Middle East (although ultimately adjunct to the Middle East) and sub-Saharan Africa (Zartman et al., 2007: 1-2; Hemmer, 2007: 56-57). In effect, this strategic-oriented conceptualization of North Africa provides insight into the very elements that steer the stage-setting, type-casting and making of not only the region itself, but also the political, geopolitical, economic and military power-based agenda of outside powers. The twelve articles that make up the 2007 winter issue utilize either a comparative framework or single-country focus in their analysis of the North African region, taking into consideration significant recent transformations and constancies that have persisted for decades there. Together they take on such topics as political change, economic development, cross-border affairs within the region and relations with states outside of the area, gender, religious currents, civil-military interactions and the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict. While the special edition tackles a breadth of topics, ultimately, one could conclude that the journal’s regional approach to North Africa directly relates to U.S. and other interested players’ desire for political and economic regional integration. In spite of this political-economic slant and focus, the participating authors draw somewhat variegated conclusions in their analyses regarding regional cohesion, or lack thereof, in North Africa. That said, on one point there is no dissension. They unanimously attribute the major source of tension and division preventing North African regionalization to the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict. While relations among North African countries are relatively stable, the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict places a deep and decisive wedge in regional integration. Although mistakenly cast at times as a conflict between the two power houses of North Africa, Algeria and Morocco (Zartman et al., 2007: 3), the conflict between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO (Western Sahara) is an open-case decolonization conflict complicated by third-party intervention and geopolitical, economic, political and militaristic interests.

Realpolitik and Conflict Analysis

Yahia H. Zoubir, an expert analyst of the North African region, writes extensively about the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict and confronts head on the emerging

44 contradictions (conflict of interests) between Realpolitik (interest-motivated) responses to the conflict, which include the aforementioned geopolitical, economic, political and militaristic dimensions and those that respect international law. From an international relations perspective on the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict, Zoubir juxtaposes these two diametrically opposed concepts – Realpolitik and international law; and he poses the following problematic to the international community (and in particular the United States and France): how to reconcile the tension between international legality and geopolitical- power politics/real politics trends with a just and law-abiding solution to the conflict (Zoubir, 2001; and Zoubir, 2007). His 2001 article, “The Third Way in Western Sahara: Realpolitik vs. International Legality,” published in the Spanish journal Nación Árabe, deconstructs this problematic in light of the shifting momentum for a ‘third way,’ solution to the conflict – autonomy. This article strikes at the heart of diplomatic stalemate that has ensued since the 1991 ceasefire between the conflicting parties, Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO. At the same time, it provided the impetus for my own interest and inquiry into Realpolitik influences as they relate to current conflict analysis measures, mapping, mediation and conflict transformation strategies and practice for the specific case of Western Sahara and, more generally, for conflict studies. Taking into full consideration Zoubir’s accurate assessment of the conflict situation, I seek to broaden and deepen his analysis by closely examining the power and function of the dominant discourses and narratives of Realpolitik. To concretize, this study seeks to explore how Realpolitik policies have affected conflict approaches to the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict in its four distinct phases: the failure of conflict prevention and decolonization of Western Sahara; the resulting hot conflict from 1975- 1991; the ceasefire and diplomatic stalemate (failure of the United Nation’s mandated peacekeeping mission to organize a self-determination referendum for the Sahrawi people); and the proposition of a “third way” for the resolution of the conflict – basically autonomy for Western Sahara within the Kingdom of Morocco. Furthermore, within this analytical conceptualization, it is essential to examine the role that ‘third-party’ actors have played in each of these phases and in direct correlation with their declared neutral status. Although this seems to be a straightforward conflict analysis proposition, the study

45 is in fact multidisciplinary in its investigative approach, multidimensional in its structural organization and multifold in purpose. One might be tempted to ask, why study the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict, a relatively low intensity conflict on the agenda of the international community and mediums of communication? With the eyes of the international community focused on more pressing inter and intrastate conflicts such as the United States and supporters/Iraq, United States and supporters/Afghanistan, possibility of United States/Iran, Israel/Palestine, Myanmar (Burma), Sudan and, most recently, Russia/Georgia, Western Sahara ranks low on interest, profile and urgency ratings. Taking into consideration this conflict hierarchy, what kind(s) of conflict insight can an in-depth analysis of this ‘outdated’ colonial conflict offer conflict transformation theory, strategy and practice? To address these questions, I borrow from Siba N’ Zatioula Grovogui’s (1996) analytical approach to international law and decolonization/self-determination. In the same way that Namibia is particularly suited for studying the practicality of the standards of the international system for international law and decolonization, Western Sahara is particularly suited for studying the practicality of the standards of the international system for conflict resolution and the norms that steer conflict transformation strategies. First, when procedures of conflict mapping, mediation and transformation in general are founded in Realpolitik assumptions, they are subjected to imperialist interpretations and universalist principles, which are in turn rooted in structures of institutional and cultural domination and subordination. Realpolitik discourses and the political and juridical mechanisms that secure the dominance of western political economies and hegemonic systems of thought, power and knowledge, also generate rules, naming systems and preconditions that directly affect conflict transformation strategies and practice. International law maintains as well as challenges colonial structures; but, where it provides the political means and legal justifications for the continued construction of empires, it lacks the very legal disposition to uphold its principles and enforce peremptory norms created by international consensus. By focusing on Realpolitik processes, I am able to investigate the structures, rules and procedures and the ideologies, rhetoric and systems of thought that influence current international conflict transformation methodologies and the failings of the international legal system.

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Furthermore, in writing about dominant structures and their construction, I am also writing about ‘otherness’ – “writing otherwise” – in order to be able to explore alternatives excluded by power-based real politics solutions to conflict (Mason, 1990: 1- 12). In order to capture the multiplicity, multidimensionality and complexity of the concept and to overcome the tendency to equate realpolitik (real politics) with a bare bones and simplistic ‘power politics,’ I capitalize the term throughout this study. Second, the Western Saharan situation highlights the tensions between theories of international relations on the one hand and theories of conflict resolution on the other. Close examination of the conflict illuminates the tremendous gaps between theory and on the ground realities. It is no solution to say that the established policies, theories and institutions are flawed and should be dismantled. Indeed, to go that route runs a considerable risk of destabilizing somewhat fragile conditions in North Africa. Failing to recognize and correct the flaws, especially in the case of Western Sahara, creates an equally unacceptable risk; and, if left unaddressed, the situation could degenerate into a humanitarian crisis and terrorist response. Western Sahara does not stand alone in posing these dilemmas. This study rejects the claim that realist or balance of power approaches, which dominate international relations and which have direct bearing on international decision- making processes and reactions to and assessments and/or neglect of conflict situations, reflect the naturally competitive nature of the organization of states. Instead, it works from the premise that we have the potential to change the present course of the international system and to address protracted conflict situations in a way that conflict transformation processes move towards representation and away from violent domination models, towards a representative system and away from a negatively hegemonic one. Representative conflict transformation practices could bring justice to the Sahrawi people in the form of self-determination via a free and fair referendum and could put an end to a 34 year protracted conflict. Third, the protracted (destructive, deep-rooted, intransigent) nature of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict, although tragic and deplorable, does offer interesting insight into conflict mapping for this particular conflict and for reevaluating our assumptions with regard to other protracted conflict cul-de-sacs as well. As the Western

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Saharan/Moroccan conflict has passed through many stages of the conflict cycle, it can be analyzed on many levels: pre-conflict or preventative, hot conflict, ceasefire and failed diplomatic or stalemate levels. Additionally, the conflict crosses two distinct and yet similar time periods, in terms of their binary logic and ideological oppositional orientation, the Cold War and the current War on Terror. By examining the characteristics specific to this protracted conflict, it is possible to reassess decisions made and strategies followed, while at the same time trying to locate unexplored areas for conflict transformation. Part of the analysis needs to include a retrospective look at failed preventative measures, measures that were not taken that could have been taken or influences that should have been considered that were not considered. That said, a retrospective look must avoid one-dimensional “if only” or “what should have happened” argumentation so as to avoid getting stuck in entrenched ‘backward’ thinking, a pitfall of protracted conflicts. Avoiding this predicament is especially important for the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict, which in 34 years has seen many changes on global, regional and domestic scales. This, however, does not mean that the past should be ignored, especially when considering United Nations and Organization of African Unity resolutions. A balance between rightful reclamations and ‘forward’ or creative thinking must be struck. Fourth, the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict is a beneficial conflict to closely examine because of the very fact that it should have been an easy conflict to resolve. While not getting stuck in the “should have been” aspects of the conflict, the clear straightforwardness of the conflict does allow for a better examination of hegemon secondary actors and their role in conflict and, more specifically, their role in protracted conflicts. The decolonization process failed for Western Sahara. An important question to ask is not why the decolonization process failed, but how the decolonization process failed? The subtle difference in phrasing is the difference between the analytical approaches of this study versus a causal one. In positing this question, I am in effect inquiring into multiple aspects of the conflict situation: how the international community failed to prevent the Moroccan and Mauritanian invasion, leading to an outbreak of hostilities and all out war with the Frente POLISARIO, when everything was in place for

48 a successful decolonization process; how the international community failed to enforce a referendum after a ceasefire was reached in 1991; and how the international community has acquiesced to the status quo of the conflict situation and continued failure of the diplomatic process and present day stalemate situation. In this regard, the location of Western Sahara within a realist approach to the organization of the globe cannot be underestimated. Fifth, an analysis of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict forces the following questions. What does it mean not to possess a state or to be stateless? What would it mean to be in constant flux and to live a precarious existence of occupation or exile? These questions do not merely widen the discussion of conflict analysis and transformation, but also allow the conflict analyst to look at the ‘reality’ before us on a more philosophical level and to espy the power of resistance in the face of hegemonic discourse, theory, policy and practice. The Sahrawi struggle has been a long and arduous one but, defying all odds, has not succumbed to Morocco, a bigger, better equipped and more powerful (militarily) nation. The Sahrawi culture, collective rather than individual, and the democratic socialist political model it espouses provide creative alternatives to domination models despite being up against the hegemony of Realpolitik discourses.

Framework of Analysis

Foucault’s Genealogy

In order to accomplish the objectives stated above, I will employ specific tenets of Michel Foucault’s insightful and multilayered discussions of power and knowledge, especially as they relate to his conception of ‘genealogy’. What is of specific interest to this study is not only the production of truth and knowledge, but also how their constitution functions in relation to assumed and established systems of power. For this reason, Foucault’s conceptualizations of power and knowledge – their functions, manifestations and significance – provide a useful starting point and spring board from which to approach and analyze the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict specifically and conflict analysis more generally. Therefore, as an introduction to my own framework of analysis for the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict and genealogical approach to the

49 conflict, I will briefly review Foucauldian theoretical constructions that have influenced them. Foucault defines genealogy as such: “a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history” (Foucault, 1980: 117). In other words, a genealogy of historical events examines constructions of knowledge – the epistemologies of power – that claim to represent ‘truth’. This very exercise puts into question that which is taken at face value and dominant discourses which gain acceptance through repetition and claims to truth. By truth Foucault means the “régime[s] of truth” of each society:

“[T]he types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true” (Foucault, 1980: 131).

This is what Foucault terms the “general politics of truth” (131). In order to sift through the thick layers of dominant discourses, which become theory, policy, practice, action and that which we ‘know,’ and in order to arrive at ‘other’ constitutions of knowledge, it is necessary to keep these ‘régimes of truth’ at the forefront of the discussion and analysis. In this understanding of a general politics of truth/régimes of truth, the focus for analysis does not concentrate on cause and effect, but rather on function and manifestation. In order to do so, one must be able to locate accepted discourses, that which claims ‘truth’; functions as true; distinguishes and sanctions true and false; and that which is accorded value by legitimized truth-sayers. Foucault explains further that by régimes of truth, he does not mean the “ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted,” but rather, “the ensembles of rules according to which the true and false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true” (Foucault, 1980: 132; emphasis mine). In examining the accepted ‘rules’ by which we analyze conflict, the very methodologies of conflict analysis, we open up the space in which to explore the economic and political role that these predominantly western constructions

50 play, not only in truth building and production, but also concerning our conceptualizations of specific conflict cases and their more general applications. Therefore, as a form of critical reflection, Foucault’s concept of analyzing the rules we use to distinguish true from false, to legitimize certain ways of knowing while discrediting others, is critical to this study. According to Foucault, this very ‘political economy’ of truth of the western world (which I take to mean the interrelationships between political and economic institutions and processes and the ways in which we construct and legitimize truth/knowledges/discourses) possesses five distinct traits. It centers on:

“the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it; it is subject to constant economic and political incitement (the demand for truth, as much for economic production as for political power); it is the object, under diverse forms, of immense diffusion and consumption (circulating through apparatuses of education and information whose extent is relatively broad in the social body, not withstanding certain strict limitations); it is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media); lastly, it is the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation (‘ideological’ struggles)” (Foucault, 1980: 131-132).

In other words, the political economy of the general politics of truth is inextricably linked to the ways (rules) in which we establish the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of knowledges. Ideological struggles for hegemony or dominance, in turn, solidify and ensure their very production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation. Beátrice Han’s assessment of Foucault looks to the institutional support of knowledge production and the ways in which it is “put to work, valorized, distributed, and in a sense attributed, in a society [or a discipline]” (Han, 1998: 106). Foucault deepens the discussion further by adding power to the knowledge production dialectic. He contends that our ways of knowing, our ‘knowledges/truths,’ are connected in a “circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain” them and “as to the effects of power” induce and extend them; he therefore concludes that in order to affect sustainable change, we must be able to locate the political, economic and institutional “régime of the production of truth” (Foucault, 1980: 133).

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It is this very ‘general politics of truth/régimes of truth’ and its production that deserves special attention regarding the specific case of Western Sahara and the methods used for conflict analysis in its regard. For in the case of Western Sahara, these very régimes and politics of truth surrounding ‘Realpolitik’/‘real politics’ and their functions and manifestations in dominant conflict analysis discourse(s) are what concern this study. How do ‘Realpolitik’ approaches to conflict function and inform conflict theory, practice and policy? And, how do ‘Realpolitik’ approaches to conflict analysis serve to protect ulterior motives and interests that are deeply entwined with neo-liberalism and capitalist modes of representation and legitimization? The latter question opens up and deepens our analysis. Within the general politics of truth of real politics, we can locate other politics of truth, for example, and also of interest to this study, the régimes of truth that surround ‘neutrality’ and third-party involvement in conflict mediation and negotiation. In this regard, the régimes of truth surrounding real politics are not isolated, but rather multilayered, multidimensional, interrelated and closely interwoven. Although predominately conceived of as pertaining to international relations and discussions related to international ‘balance of powers,’ real politics dominant discourses influence multiple disciplines (and their theory and practice) and are not confined to power politics. Returning to Foucault’s concept of genealogy mentioned previously, a genealogical approach to conflict and the specific case of Western Sahara, opens up the analytical space in which to pinpoint not only the functions of real politics, but also the ways in which Realpolitik approaches to conflict aid ‘hidden’ agendas and interests. Arnold Davidson succinctly captures Foucault’s conception of genealogy: “the mutual relations between systems of truth and modalities of power, the way in which there is a ‘political regime’ of the production of truth” (Davidson, 1986: 224). He explains that a Foucauldian genealogical analysis presupposes the understanding that the very origin of what we conceive of as rational is in fact rooted in “domination, subjugation, the relationship of forces – in a word, power” (225). David Howarth also takes up the centrality of power for genealogical analyses, but in relation to the adoption of a critical ethos towards the constitution of discourses, identities and institutions (Howarth, 2000:

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73; see also Owen, 1994: 210-13; Owen, 1999: 30-3714; Tully, 1999: 90-103). In addition, Howarth lays out the genealogist’s objectives, that of disclosing “new possibilities foreclosed by existing interpretations” (Howarth, 2000: 73). Therefore, the genealogical conflict analysis of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict not only serves to account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, etc. that have bearing on the very mapping of the conflict and the approaches, strategies and policies propounded for its transformation, but also to explore the mechanisms of power and how, in the words of Foucault, they are invested, colonized, utilized, involuted, transformed, displaced and extended by forms of domination (Foucault, 1980: 99; cited in Rouse, 2005: 110). Foucault explains that relations of power are immanent in, for example, economic processes and knowledge constructions and that divisions, inequalities and disequilibriums define their relationship, being both the effect and the internal conditions of these differentiations (Foucault, 1978: 94; cited in Rouse, 2005: 114). My interest lies in how these very dominant power relations are accepted, legitimized, naturalized and disseminated (through complex social networks), with specific regard to the functioning of Realpolitik in conflict analysis of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict and proposals for its conflict transformation. Therefore, I utilize a genealogical analytical approach to the conflict. As mentioned above, the specific historical genealogy of Western Sahara implicates diverse disciplines and broad topics such as decolonization, international law, self-determination, geopolitics, etc. Additionally, the modes of functionality of Realpolitik discourses can be applied more generally to case specific genealogies of other conflicts and to conflict analysis more generally. By utilizing a genealogical framework for analysis for the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict, I can more effectively build a ‘strategic knowledge’ (savoir) (Foucault, 1980: 145) that illuminates marginalized historiographies and demonstrates the

14 Owen distinguishes between a critique and a genealogy, defining the former as that which “legislates an orientation in thinking in which thinking is oriented to a transcendent ideal and that it articulates this orientation in terms of the project of striving to reconcile real and the ideal through the lawful use of reason” and the latter as exemplifying “an orientation in thinking in which thinking is oriented to an immanent ideal and that it articulates this orientation in terms of the process of becoming otherwise than we are through the agonic use of reason” (1999: 21; emphases in original). In addition, Nythamar Fernandes de Oliveira contends that Foucault’s conception of history helps us to comprehend the tension between a critical and genealogical account of power relations (2003: 119). 53 power and expanse of dominant conflict analyses discourses. Therefore, while locating the expanse, operation and workings of real politics, the ‘real political task’ is, as Foucault states aptly, “to criticize the working of institutions [or third-parties] which appear to be both neutral and independent” and in such a manner “that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them” or at least debunk their natural and totalized status (Foucault, 1974: 171; and also cited in Fernandes de Oliveira, 2003: 131; and Rabinow, 1984: 6)15. In his analysis of Foucauldian genealogies of knowledges, David Shumway declares that knowledge is the “general name we give to interpretations that have been successfully imposed” and that we construct them in a way that they appear natural rather than imposed (Shumway, 1999: 87-88). Therefore, the exercise of being critical of naturalized and legitimized modes of operation (genealogies of knowledges) and of the institutions that facilitate their production, while appearing to be both neutral and independent, is, concurrently, an exercise of locating and identifying ‘unnatural knowledges’. This is what Foucault denominates ‘subjugated knowledges’. Subjugated knowledges are “the historical contents that have been buried and disguised by functionalist coherence or formal systemization” and they are also those knowledges which “have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naïve knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition and scientificity” (Foucault, 1980: 81-81; cited in Shumway, 1999: 88). The task of a genealogical approach to conflict analysis does not only consist of uncovering the historical contents that have been systematically marginalized or of discovering the knowledges and discourses that have been cast aside as inadequate, but also supposes an inquiry into how and for what reasons and by what purposes specific modes of operation for conflict transformation have taken precedence over others. In the case of Western Sahara, the predominance of real politics in conflict transformation strategies forces us not only to look low down on the hierarchy of knowledges, but also to examine how established norms, for example, peremptory norms of international law, can

15 Thomas Flynn explains that Foucault had a “profound distrust of essences, natures and other kinds of unifying, totalizing, and exclusionary thought that threaten individual freedom and creativity” (Flynn, 2005: 40-41). 54 also be cast aside as outdated, naïve and backwards-thinking (rather than forward- thinking). Furthermore, while it is absolutely necessary to critically analyze the functioning of power and hegemonic discourses, it is also important to point out that the very act of the subjugation of knowledges and discourse provokes resistance. The fact that hegemonic régimes of truth are ideologically reinforced, discursively produced and actively (directly and indirectly) subjugate other epistemologies, in effect, creates the perfect conditions for that which is delegitimized and denied realization to resist. Critics of Foucault point to his lack of theorization and conceptualization regarding the relationship between power and resistance and the very real existence of resistance to domination and subjugation. Edward Said applauds Foucault’s insight into his understanding of how discourse operates in function of systems of domination, but points out Foucault’s failure to capture the power of counter-discourse: to challenge misrepresentations, demonstrate the aftermath of violent subjugation and ultimately formulate a discourse of liberation (Said, 1986: 153). David Howarth also shares Said’s position and points to the inadequacy of Foucault’s examination of resistances to power and the ‘macro’ strategies and outcomes of power/resistance struggles (Howarth, 2000: 84). Charles Taylor (1984; 1985) and Richard Rorty (1985) come near to dismissing Foucault’s contributions because of what they see as the hopelessness of Foucault’s vision and the absence of place for resistance in his conceptualizations. These critics reject what they see as forms of resistance being “eroded or encompassed within relations of power” (Smart, 1986: 170). Whereas I definitely recognize this critical hole in Foucault’s theoretical assumptions, I believe that the focus of his approach to power and methods for analyses intend to emphasize the pervasiveness of power in all relationships, even those of the oppressed, and the ways in which power, as a constant, functions. As Barry Smart explains, Foucault’s approach is “not the development from on high of confrontation strategies through which relations of power might finally be undermined, but rather a critical analysis of how power is exercised”; it is not “an endorsement nor a neutralization of domination or resistance, but rather an examination of their respectively complex forms and effects and of the ways in which historically constituted distinctions and

55 divisions between ‘true’ and ‘false’ have rationalized or validated the implementation of particular courses of action upon the actions of others” (Smart, 1986: 170-171). Foucault provides the tools and instruments for analysis and the tactics and strategies with which to approach the processes of knowledge and truth production. The problem arises when one does not differentiate the ‘weightiness’ of power, meaning the functioning of power at the systems level. One cannot equate the operations of power and its impact at the state level with those of a particular society or community. Foucault fails to theoretically address these distinctions and to adequately incorporate resistance discourses and struggle into his discussions of power, knowledge and régimes of truth. On the contrary, resistance to dominant narratives and naturalized modes of representation strike at the core of postcolonial studies: “[Postcolonial studies] has raised provocative, often fundamental questions about the epistemological structures of power and the cultural foundations of resistance, about the porous relationship between metropolitan and colonial societies, about the construction of group identities in the context of state formation, even about the nature and uses of historical evidence itself” (Kennedy, 2003: 18). Postcolonial methodology complements a Foucauldian genealogical approach to the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict. The genealogy must not only examine the “multiple processes through which events are constituted” with specific regard to the “study of technologies of power” and of domination (Smart, 1986: 162-163); it must also critically analyze the workings of resistance and counter- discourses. With regards to Western Sahara, the Sahrawi people have been forced to respond to overt oppression and occupation and power/knowledges subjugation. In fact, in order to explore resistance, one must look not only to the collective and singular Sahrawi voice, but also to their very status as refugees, in occupied Western Sahara, the refugee camps in Algeria and the diaspora. In sum, a genealogical approach to the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict provides a historical narrative of the conflict that accounts for the constitution of knowledges, discourses and régimes of truth and the rules that inform them. This historical account must be able to locate accepted and naturalized discourses: that which claims truth; functions as true; distinguishes and sanctions true and false; and possesses legitimized agency. The main objective of this conflict genealogy is to explore the

56 functioning of Realpolitik on conflict transformation strategies and conflict analysis. This type of analysis of real politics in the four distinct phases of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict (prevention, hot conflict, ceasefire and diplomatic stalemate/negative peace), also brings to the fore other dominant knowledges and discourses related to real politics, as well as, subjugated knowledges and discourses that Realpolitik approaches to conflict marginalize, delegitimize or name outdated. Using a Foucauldian analytical lens, this study provides a genealogy of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict – an analysis of the conflict situation that closely examines the relations of power, knowledge and truth and the discourses and occurrences that influence these relations as well as conflict analysis more generally. I look to the toolbox of discourse theory for methodological orientation.

Textual Methodological Slant

Discourse Analysis and Theory (the ‘Textual Turn’)

Although discourse theories also have their analytical slants, it is the particular methodology of critical discourse analysis and discourse theory with regards to ‘text' that bears particular importance for this study. Although my analytical approach to the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict rests firmly in that of a Foucauldian genealogy, in order to understand the methods that discourse theory sets forth, I will briefly refer to its own analytical framework and premise so as to better understand its methodological foundations and applicability. As such, I will use the work of David Howarth, Discourse: Concepts in the Social Sciences (2000), as the main reference to discourse analysis and theory16. I do not pretend to thoroughly explore the theoretical antecedents to discourse theory or enter into the vast and diverse expanse of the multidisciplinary subject; however, I do wish to highlight the methodological functionality of discourse analysis

16 In Discourse: Concepts in the Social Sciences, David Howarth provides a genealogy of ‘discourse,’ whereby he traces discourse theories through structuralist, post-structuralist, hermeneutical, Marxist and post-Marxist thought. Two of his other collective works, Discourse Theory and Political Analysis, Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change (2000) and Discourse Theory in European Politics, Identity, Policy and Governance (2005), put to task the theoretical and methodological approach established in Discourse: Concepts in the Social Sciences. 57 and theory with regards to a genealogical analysis of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict. In Language and Power (1989, 2001)17, Norman Fairclough conceives of critical discourse analysis as the close analysis of texts, in terms of the features of language, which can contribute to the understanding of power relations and ideological processes. He details how in the process of discourse analysis one engages in, not just the analysis of texts or the processes of production and interpretation, but also in the analysis of the relationship between texts, processes and their social conditions (Fairclough, 2001: 21)18. By doing so, one can then explore how language and meaning are used by the powerful to marginalize, dominate and ultimately oppress others. David Howarth explains that Fairclough’s take on critical discourse analysis widens the focus of discourse theory to include non-discursive practices, the analysis of political texts and speeches and the contexts (social, political, economic, etc.) in which they are produced (Howarth, 8: 2000). Howarth then links Fairclough’s concept of critical discourse analysis to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s (1985) conceptualizations of discourse, which Howarth denominates ‘discourse theory’. Discourse theory in turn widens and enlarges the scope of discourse analysis to include “all social practices, such that discourses and discursive practices are synonymous with systems of social relations”; it therefore “begins with the assumption that all objects and actions are meaningful, and that their meaning is a product of historically specific systems of rules [thereby inquiring into the ways] in which social practices construct and contest the discourses that constitute social reality” (8; see also 128). In this way, discourse theory echoes Foucault’s concept of archeology (McCarthy, 2005: 508) and its investigation of ‘discursive formations’ (the relationship between discourse and nondiscursive practices and institutions) and his focus on rules and regularities, knowledge production (specific systems of meaning) and power. However, discourse theory expounds a methodological approach to discourse – discourse analysis – that incorporates post-structuralist, hermeneutical and post-Marxist anti-positivist

17 Fairclough published the first version of Language and Power in 1989 and a second edition in 2001. His 1989 work was considered groundbreaking because it portrayed discourse as discourse and social practice. 18 Fairclough’s ‘critical discourse analysis’ has been influenced by a wide range of sociological and philosophical works, including, Antonio Gramsci, Mikhail Bakhtin, Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, Anthony Giddens and Jürgen Habermas (Howarth, 2000: 4). 58 traditions in order to examine the historical and political construction and functioning of discourse (Howarth, 2000: 5). Howarth fuses the ideas of Foucault (1972), Dyrberg (1997) and Laclau (1990) in order to define discourse and discourse formation. In this fusion, discourses form concrete systems of social relations and practices that are: intrinsically political; historically specific systems of meaning; and contingent and historical constructions vulnerable to political forces excluded in their production and to the dislocatory effects of events beyond their control (Howarth, 2000: 9). Discourse formation is “an act of radical institution” that involves: the construction of antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’19; the exercise of power20; and the structuring of social or political relations (9). Furthermore, discourse analysis refers to the process of treating linguistic and non-linguistic materials, including speeches, reports, historical events and documents, biographies, documentaries, movies, interviews, internet sources, newspapers, media representations, press releases, policies, ideas, organizations and institutions, etc., as ‘texts’ or ‘writings’ (Howarth, 2000: 10; 140-141). This methodological approach equips the discourse analyst with the appropriate tools with which to examine political discourse. In the case of Realpolitik this means looking at the politics of fear that reinforce a real politics approach to conflict and the propagation of classical liberal ideas, geopolitics, power relations, militarism and ideological warfare such as the Cold War and the War on Terror. It also requires, as mentioned previously, an inquiry in to how Realpolitik discourses are formulated, sustained and produced and how they compete and try to sideline other discourses, even those that have achieved international legitimacy and acceptance. This type of discursive political and social inquiry allows the analyst to delve into the historically specific rules and conventions that structure the production of meaning in a non-essentialist and non- reductionist way (11-12).

19 Also see Griggs and Howarth (2000: 56-57) for a further discussion on ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. 20 Torben Bech Dyrberg’s work, The Circular Structure of Power: Politics, Identity, Community (1997), provides a thorough analysis of the discursive representation of power. 59

This methodological orientation does not reduce social systems and ideas to language, nor falls victim to idealism, ‘textualism’ or conceptual and moral relativism21 (13), but rather enriches and deepens political analysis by broadening concepts of discourse to include the multiples ways in which we produce and communicate meaning. In fact, this type of political discourse analysis, which as stated above refers to various ‘texts’ as discourse, permits discourse analysts to select specific historical events and processes and to explore “under what conditions and for what reasons” discourses are “constructed, contested and change” (131). For this study, I have chosen one particular conflict case study: Western Sahara. To reiterate, focusing on the complexities and multidimensionalities of one conflict situation does not mean that I am narrowing the scope of analysis to the point of mere relativism. On the contrary, I am able to take a loaded and protracted conflict situation, one that reflects certain ‘textbook’ conflict characteristics, while simultaneously using the very specificity of the conflict to delve into broader concepts that make up the entire conflict situation. At the beginning of this introduction, I laid out the multiple reasons why this rather neglected conflict case deserves further study and attention. The exemplary status of Western Sahara as Africa’s last colony and its pertinence for exploring conflict mapping, analysis and transformation strategies qualify the conflict as what Harry Eckstein denominates a “crucial case study,” one that “scores a clean knockout over a theory” (Eckstein, 1975: 127; also cited in Howarth, 2000: 139 and San Martín, 2006: 18). The ‘crucial case study’ nature of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict inverts the logic of inquiry and analysis by using a specific case to explore more general concepts. For example, the very protracted nature of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict presents unique possibilities for the study of conflict cycles, especially in relation to historical contexts and processes. The Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict has allowed me to delve into broad and comprehensive topics (many of which could constitute an investigation of their own) in such a way that the specific actually mediates between seemingly disparate, divergent and/or unrelated topics. By contrast to those studies that

21 Howarth argues that critics of discourse theory erroneously focus their attacks on the ‘ontical’ (what is there) rather than the ‘ontological’ (nature of being, reality, existence) levels of analysis (Howarth, 2000: 13). 60 begin with a broad topic and utilize examples to drive home fact-based conclusions, I work in an inverse direction where the specific details of the conflict situation lead into the broader topics at hand. However, rather than proving hypotheses or asking why, I look for hidden narratives and meanings and ask how. How has the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict endured for so long (marking 34 years) and how can it be transformed? Additionally, the choice of focus on one exemplary case study does not exclude comparative analysis. Comparative analysis furthers our understanding of the specific topics under discussion and analysis and does not “construct generally applicable laws of social and political behaviour” (Howarth, 2000: 139). Furthermore, every case possesses its own “unique specificity” (Howarth, 2000: 139) that must be explored and analyzed in its own social, cultural, political and historical contexts before it can be ‘compared’ to other cases. In this way, the process of comparison is invaluable (Bloomfield et al., 2003b: 61). Hence, where applicable, comparative analysis is employed in order to emphasize the points of convergence of particular factors and to investigate in which ways and by what means these commonalities function and take form. Of course, these functions and forms will be determined by the particularities of the conflict situation. I try to avoid positivist (equation-oriented) or universalist approaches to conflict and conflict analysis and instead strive to generate conflict dialectics, not in terms of neat theses, antitheses, syntheses (see Welsh, 2007: 233), but in the Marxian sense of engaging in processes of change via the very conflict of opposing forces and contradictions. In this way, I seek to discover and uncover diverse areas for interpretation and query at the specific and general conceptual levels and reject approaches to conflict analysis that create conflict ‘templates’ and universally applicable assumptions and prescriptions. In the final chapter of Discourse: Concepts in the Social Sciences, “Deploying Discourse Theory” (2000), Howarth outlines some key elements of discourse theory and provides suggestions for its methodological employment and application. I am less interested in the specific technical terminology characteristic of discourse theory, i.e. ‘nodal points,’ ‘dislocations,’ ‘antagonisms,’ ‘equivalence and difference,’ ‘imaginaries,’ etc., than I am with the novel research project that discourse theory propounds. Discourse analysis and theory applies to this study because of its understanding of discourse as non-

61 discursive and discursive forms of representation and production of meaning. Furthermore, its rejection of mechanical theoretical applications and testing of theories against empirical reality and its focus on “the articulation and modification of concepts and logics in each particular research contexts” makes it a useful concept for this study (Howarth, 2000: 139; emphases in original). Although my approach to the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict is predominately textual, relying on books, journals, international documents, etc., the concept of evaluating the discourses (discursive and non-discursive) of Realpolitik and the way they function, operate, create meaning and influence conflict transformation strategies and tactics as well as the very way we conceive of and map conflict is of particular importance and pertinence to this study. In critically analyzing real politics discourses, I aim to produce new interpretations of Realpolitik solutions to conflict, which in effect contest dominant representations and myths around political realism in order to, as Howarth states, “open up new spaces for critical evaluation and political engagement” (Howarth, 2000: 142). Within the critical evaluation and political engagement of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict, I do not shy away from paradoxes. There are plenty to be found, even in the analytical tools with which I approach the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict. I will employ international law, while recognizing its inherent western ethnocentric bias. I look to the ‘authority’ of the United Nations, while being critical of the giant lacuna that separates United Nations principles and domination structures. I situate Western Sahara in a decolonization context and stress its Non-Self-Governing Territory status, while at the same time understanding the unevenness of colonialism and decolonization and the importance of postcolonial studies in the critical analysis of colonialism (language, discourse, power, subject construction, etc.) and its impact on the past and colonial present, with specific regard to the reproduction and transformation of colonial relations. I uphold the principle of self-determination of colonial peoples while being fully aware of the concept’s limitations and connection to the exclusive – in-club – nation-state. These are but a few of the many paradoxes that one will encounter throughout this study and multiple layers and circuity characterize each one. They are indicative of the tensions created by the collision of the struggle for social, political and economic justice

62 and equality with the status quo and established and accepted norms and dominant discourses and narratives. Responses to these inequalities and injustices will inevitably be flawed and inquiries into them inevitably telling. In navigating dominant discourses and narratives, it is impossible to avoid dominant language, structure and force or to fall victim to the power of dominance. The importance is not to avoid these pitfalls per se, but to struggle to recognize them, to inquire into the power and function of dominant narratives – in this case, those of Realpolitik.

Structure of the Dissertation

I have structured this study in a non-traditional fashion and begin at the end so to speak. The first and last chapters are in fact bookend chapters and I will ‘end’ where I ‘begin’. The middle two chapters provide the bulk of the genealogy of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict. Chapter One, “Third-way Politics for Western Sahara: Self- Determination versus Autonomy,” introduces the concept of autonomy and the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan for Western Sahara by first exploring: decolonization and Non-Self-Governing Territories through a postcolonial lens; the history of self- determination from principle to right in international law; impediments to decolonization for Western Sahara, particularly the role of the United States and France; and peremptory norms in international law, especially acts of aggression and the use of force. Chapter Two, “Early History and Conflict Build-up, Lost Opportunities for Conflict Prevention,” provides a historical and discourse genealogy of Western Sahara’s early history and build-up to a failed process of formal decolonization. It approaches this history through a theoretical introduction into the general topics of protracted conflicts and conflict prevention. Chapter Three, “Prefiguring a New Interpretive Horizon for Conflict Analysis, Reconfiguring Conflict Actor-Mapping and Mediation,” details the historical genealogy of the hot conflict stage of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict; the actors in the conflict; and the Peace Process for Western Sahara. It achieves this by delving into the concepts of conflict analysis, mapping and mediation and by attempting to shift the analytical interpretive horizon for conflict analysis in general. Finally, we come full circle in Chapter Four, “Self-Determination as Conflict Transformation,” and propose that for positive conflict transformation to occur for Western Sahara we need to address our

63 understandings of autonomy (third-way solution) and zero-sum protracted conflicts, and we need to reengage the concept of self-determination. Giorgio Agamben’s theoretical foundation of the ‘state of exception’ facilitates this discussion and aids us in exploring the normalized transgression and suspension of international law. Throughout this study, I approach these topics through a deep Foucauldian analysis of Realpolitik discourse (ideas, theories, policies and actions) as they relate to conflict studies in general and more specifically to the conflict strategies for Western Sahara. Chapter Four ends, not by neatly wrapping up our discussion of self-determination as conflict transformation, but by challenging us to look beyond and within self-determination as it relates to national identity, the nation-state, the people and the refugee.

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Chapter One: Third-Way Politics for Western Sahara: Self- Determination versus Autonomy

Introduction: Beginning at the ‘End’

Why begin at the ‘end’ or rather the ‘now’ of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict cycle? Although most conflict assessments usually follow the chronological order of events of a particular conflict situation, the present day circumstances of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict warrant immediate attention and provide insight into occurrences that took place 34 years ago. It is nearly impossible to target the ‘beginning’ of any conflict; however, it is possible to locate key historical moments that in effect lead up to the eruption of hostilities and war (hot conflict). We can surmise that, just as there were plenty of signs prior to the 1975 invasion of Western Sahara by Morocco and Mauritania, there are plenty of signs now which suggest that the United Nations and international community will again fail to prevent violent conflict if appropriate measures are not taken regarding the question of Western Saharan. It is generally accepted in international law that liberation movements have the legal entitlement (license) to wage a defensive armed struggle in response to illegal occupation22. Since the 1991 ceasefire,

22 Some authors argue that liberation movements have a right proper to resort to force against an aggressor state, see Cassese, 1998: 152, footnote 13. There is a general understanding that liberation movements have a legal entitlement to self-defense as stipulated in General Assembly Resolutions: 2625 (XXV) and 3314 (XXIX). Concerning the action of states, GA Resolution 2625 (XXV), “Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,” upholds the following: “Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration of the principles of equal rights and self-determination of their right to self-determination and freedom of independence”; and concerning the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations stipulates: “all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter…[in order]…(b) To bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned…bearing in mind that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principles, as well as a denial of fundamental human rights” (United Nations General Assembly, 1970a). Concerning acts of aggression, Article 7 of GA Resolution 3314 (XXIX): Definition of Aggression reads: “Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in any way prejudice the right to self- determination, freedom and independence…of peoples forcibly deprived that right and referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist régimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples to struggle to 65 however, the Frente POLISARIO has committed its struggle to diplomatic paths and measures and has entrusted its cause and fight to the United Nations and international community. However, today, with autonomy without a possibility for a referendum and independence on the diplomatic table, a Moroccan offer strongly supported by the United States and France, the Frente POLISARIO’s choice to pursue diplomatic means for a solution to the conflict may have run its course. Although high stake players to the conflict are applauding the ‘steps forward’ of the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan, Sahrawi civil society in the refugee camps and occupied territories will not accept it without a provision that allows for their legitimate expression of self-determination. With this deadlock in mind, one that is somewhat beyond the Frente POLISARIO’s control, the international community of states is actually in a position reminiscent of the window of opportunity that came and went pre-Green March. It has the potential to prevent hot conflict for the second time in this conflict’s protracted cycle. Currently, while the Frente POLISARIO wages a diplomatic struggle against Moroccan occupation, Sahrawi civil society in the occupied territories wages a non-violent uprising (Intifada) against Moroccan occupation, oppression and systematized violations of human rights. If the Frente POLISARIO and Sahrawi civil society are forced into a diplomatic corner, one that denies their right of self-determination, this low-intensity conflict has the potential to erupt yet again into armed conflict. Armed conflict does not benefit either one of the conflicting parties, and as much as the possibility for renewed violence is downplayed, it does remain a very real possibility. For the very reason that the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict is in the precarious situation of being diplomatically transformed or transformed by ‘other means,’ I have decided to begin the genealogical analysis of the conflict at the end of the chronological order of events. However, in order to adequately assess the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan, I will need to first relate general historical occurrences that have led to the present-day conceptualization of autonomy for Western Sahara, a chronological analytical flash back if you will. As Barbara Bush warns, we must avoid ahistorical

that end and to seek and receive support” (1974; emphasis mine). Both resolutions are further explored in Part Three of this chapter. 66 analyses that “ignore the impact of imperialism and colonialism in shaping global cultures, identities and economic structures” (Bush, 2006: 191). In this light, I also examine how Realpolitik discourses and ideologies function in relation to conflict analysis and transformation strategies. Stuart Hall provides a concise definition of Michel Foucault’s conceptualization of discourses and captures the importance that discourse holds for this study. He states: “discourses are ways of talking, thinking or representing a particular subject or topic” (Hall, 1992: 295). Through their meaningful knowledge production, they influence social practices and have real consequences and effects, while limiting other knowledge constructions (295; 291). By ideology, I adopt David Brion Davis’ definition (see also Definition of Important Terms of this study):

“…an integrated system of beliefs, assumptions and values, not necessarily true or false, which reflects the needs and interests of a group or class at a particular time in history. By ‘interest’ I mean anything that benefits or is thought to benefit a specific collective identity. Because ideologies are modes of consciousness, containing the criteria for interpreting social reality, they help to define as well as to legitimate collective needs and interests. Hence, there is a continuous interaction between ideology and the material forces in history. The salient characteristic of an ideology is that whilst it is taken for granted by the people who have internalised it, it is never the external or absolute truth it claims to be” (Davis, 1999: 17; also cited in Bush, 2006: 23).

Although Foucault prefers the use of discourses over ideologies because of the tendency of ideologies to distinguish between ‘true’ and ‘false,’ this study aims to explore discourses in general as the production of knowledges and how and by what rules their constitution functions in relation to assumed and established systems of powers, while also paying attention to ideologies and ideological positioning that take form and are fortified within these established systems of power. In this chapter, I take on the functioning of Realpolitik processes as they relate to the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan and strategies for conflict transformation. This requires a thorough investigation into the concept of autonomy, what it means, how it has evolved and how it has become the real political solution (third-way solution) for the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict. In order to understand the concept of autonomy as a

67 conflict transformation strategy, its genealogical roots per se, I must also examine three broad and yet key interrelated topics: decolonization, self-determination and peremptory norms. Each of these topics has its place in international law as well as its place in a multidisciplinary assessment of conflict analysis. They provide the necessary lead into a general discussion of autonomy and the specific 2007 Plan. The chapter is separated into four main parts. The first three sections place Western Sahara in its decolonization context, thereby demonstrating not only how Western Sahara qualifies as a decolonization conflict but also how historical events, interests and Realpolitik discourses have prevented the exercise of the unequivocal right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people. Part One, “Decolonization,” briefly surveys the process of decolonization, or the formal transfer of political power. It also recognizes the open-endedness of decolonization and the many points of colonial continuity that mark the formal transition of political power from the colonizer to the colonized. By doing so, I recognize multiple ways of knowing and understanding the complex processes of decolonization. Postcolonial studies facilitate this approach by challenging dominant historical, political, cultural and economic narratives and discursive practices, which implicate identity, culture, hybridity etc. and underscore the incompleteness and continued influence of decolonization. For Western Sahara, this analytical process sheds interesting and important light on the Western Saharan conflict and our ways of conceptualizing representations of time and space, while probing into power relations and ways of knowing (epistemologies of time, space and meaning). Furthermore, by exploring the specificities of the formal processes of decolonization and the remaining sixteen Non-Self-Governing Territories that have yet to exercise this right, I simultaneously address formal decolonization of the past as well as the present call for the eradication of colonialism. As such, I set the temporal positioning of Western Sahara. It is at once colonial and post-colonial. Part Two, “Self-Determination,” specifically traces the political evolution of self- determination, the political process that facilitated and guaranteed decolonization for colonial peoples. I locate the contemporary genesis of self-determination in global dialogue and exchange post-World War II. In order to do so, I present the historical and juridical evolution of the idea of self-determination from principle to international right in

68 international law. Such a historical overview provides a detailed account of the metamorphosis of the right from standard to legal precept (from non-binding to binding); a brief overview of the ‘people’ to whom this right applies; and an orientation of where Western Sahara falls in the entire self-determination equation. I take a close look at impediments to decolonization and self-determination and the political track records of two permanent members of the Security Council with particular interest in North Africa, the United States and France. I do so in order to scrutinize the conflicting stances of both countries on self-determination and decolonization itself. In a post-World War II environment, both powers asserted and continue to either assert interest in maintaining dominance in North Africa (France) or usurp and grow a sphere of influence in the Maghreb (United States). The political, economic and military positioning of both powerhouses has direct bearing on the question of Western Sahara; therefore, I closely analyze the influence of both parties on decolonization and the process of self- determination. Part Three, “Peremptory Norms,” analyzes self-determination through the lens of jus cogens. The concept of jus cogens, international peremptory norms, deepens our discussion of self-determination and the remaining decolonization cases. In this section, I also analyze the use of force and acts of aggression as stipulated in international law. By examining these themes more generally, I am able to specifically apply their significance to the case of Western Sahara and the legal role of the international community in this self-determination conflict case. In effect, the first three sections problematize an autonomy plan that completely omits the option of independence for the Sahrawi people by genealogically breaking down these integral components of autonomy. The fourth and final section of this chapter, “Autonomy,” thoroughly discusses autonomy as a conflict transformation technique and strategy in general and for Western Sahara more specifically. The main goals of Part Four are: to explore the functioning of Realpolitik; to demonstrate how Realpolitik discourses have created the rules of the game; and to illustrate how they have produced a politically realistic ‘third-way’ solution to the conflict as the only politically viable solution to the conflict. In order to accomplish these aims, I examine and juxtapose the 2007 Frente POLISARIO Plan and the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan. Furthermore, I engage in a broad discussion of the concept of

69 autonomy and earned sovereignty. Because the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan has gained international acceptance and support, I look closely at the particulars to the plan and the practical concerns that the plan engenders. I also provide an analytical platform for responses to Morocco’s portrayal of autonomy for Western Sahara, voices both for and against this ‘politically viable’ solution to the conflict. An examination of the multidimensionality and depth of autonomy contributes to a better understanding of the failure of the formal decolonization process for Western Sahara. Does the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan offer a politically viable solution to the conflict or is autonomy the Realpolitik solution to the conflict? This chapter seeks to answer this question by delving into the broad topics of decolonization, self-determination, peremptory norms and autonomy.

1.1. Decolonization

1.1.1. Defining Decolonization

Is it possible to satisfactorily define decolonization23? Does defining the word decolonization inadvertently reduce diverse and place-specific liberation movements and revolutions to historical determinacy, rather than agency? By extension of this interrogative, does decolonization defy definition due to its complexity, depth and multidimensionality? And, taking into consideration the intricacies of decolonization, how does one account for power dynamics inherent in colonial relations and narratives? These types of questions should begin any attempt to provide a definition for decolonization. Despite the shortcomings of definitions – their tendency to totalize and wrap concepts and processes into neat packages – they do provide a good starting point. Diversity of opinion and perspective deepens debate and our understanding of complex processes. Charles O. Chikeka, for example, defines decolonization as “the elimination of alien rule and the attempt by indigenous elite to exercise their rights of self-determination and political independence” (Chikeka, 1998: 2). Decolonization is then marked by the “formal transfer of political authority…within the framework of

23 The post-World War II historical processes surrounding decolonization are explored in depth in Chapter Two. 70 sovereignty” (2). Raymond F. Betts qualifies the term decolonization as a “series of political acts, occasionally peaceful, often confrontational, and frequently militant, by which territories and countries dominated by Europeans gained their independence” (Betts, 1998: 98). He emphasizes three crucial elements of equal significance, which he attributes to the political process of decolonization: national politics, international developments and colonial protest movements (Betts, 1998: 36). In both definitions, independence takes precedence. Prasenjit Duara also views decolonization as the “institutional and legal” transference of power; however, he adds that the transference of power was not purely one of legal sovereignty, but also constituted a “movement for moral justice and political solidarity against imperialism” (Duara, 2004b: 2). He links decolonization to anti-imperialist political movements and to an emancipatory ideology that strove to dismantle the colonial world and “liberate the nation” (2). All three focus on the formal transference of power, the ‘legitimate’ right of passage from colony to statehood. Viewed in this light, decolonization, the formal transfer of political power, has an end, one culminating in the celebrated date of independence from colonial rule. And yet, Duara implies in his mention of revolution against imperialism and the ideology of emancipation that accompanied liberation movements that decolonization represented more than the creation of newly independent states. Barbara Bush directly problematizes the disjuncture between the political and the actual. She charges that decolonization strategies “were designed to retain Western power and influence” and that the term decolonization, the physical disintegration of formal empires, falsely represents the end of imperialism (Bush, 2006: 40). Ngugi wa Thiong ‘O (1986) stresses the incompleteness of decolonization. He contrasts decolonization of a physical space from that of the mind, insisting that the latter persists despite the ‘completion’ of the former. In this way, the analyses of Bush and Ngugi are complementary. Both address the continuity of decolonization, Bush from the perspective of the colonizer and Ngugi from that of the colonized. Gary Wasserman confronts the contradiction of decolonization by differentiating between ‘power’ and ‘authority’ (Wasserman, 1976; cited in Chikeka, 1998: 2). He explains that if the ‘transference of power’ means the transference of ‘formal authority,’ then the newly independent state is left with legitimacy without

71 power. On the contrary, if the ‘transference of power’ means the transference of ‘autonomous’ power, then the state possesses the legitimacy of both exercising and influencing political decisions (2). James D. Le Sueur provides us with both a practical definition of decolonization and a theoretical approach that in some way reconciles the gap between the political and the actual. He defines decolonization as “a process during which hard-won battles were waged between nationalists and metropolitan colonial powers” (Le Sueur, 2003: 2). He stresses the fight involved to arrive at political decolonization – the transference of political power. However, he also points out the importance of thinking about decolonization in a more theoretical light – as dialogical processes and “epistemological ruptures ushered in by the demise of European hegemony” (Le Sueur, 2003: 2). Le Sueur positions decolonization in this theoretical framework for analysis so it can be used as a tool for historians to make history more “responsible and responsive” to the changes that have occurred in direct correlation to decolonization (2). Like Duara, his position is also one of continuity and open-endedness of decolonization. Although inaccurate in believing that dialogue acts as a power equalizer and creates equality of position and voice, he adds the important element of perspective and multiple ways of knowing or understanding processes of decolonization. Furthermore, he reconciles the inaccuracy of the term decolonization and how it falls short of encompassing the complexity of space (geography) and time by adding the theoretical dimension. In this way he links decolonization to postcolonial studies, “the theoretical platform from which to reconsider all dimensions of colonialism [including decolonization]” (Le Sueur, 2003: 3).

1.1.2. Colonization Over and Done With?: Post-Colonial/ Postcolonial Studies24

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully explore the broad topic of postcolonial studies25; however, I will look at some of its more general tenets and will take from its

24 The term postcolonial can be written with or without the hyphen. For this study, the hyphen is used to emphasize time, literally the time period after decolonization. It is removed in reference to postcolonial studies, the cultural legacy of colonial rule, which is not necessarily restricted by time or the order of events. 72 analytical toolbox for my own analysis of Western Sahara. With that objective in mind, it is the above-mentioned and explored tension between decolonization and its ‘aftermath’ that postcolonial studies most effectively address. Postcolonial studies challenge dominant (unquestioned) historical, political, cultural and economic narratives and closely examine discursive practices and the topics of identity, culture, hybridity and representation from a ‘subaltern’ perspective26. Like decolonization, postcolonial is a term that induces debate. However, postcolonial thought calls for the deconstruction of decolonization in order to expose its incompleteness and challenge dominant narratives that inadequately represent the colonial experience, whether of the colonized, the colonizer or both. Ania Loomba echoes the charge of the incompleteness of decolonization of Bush, Ngugi and Le Sueur within the framework of postcolonialism: “It might seem that because the age of colonialism is over, and because the descendants of once-colonised peoples live everywhere, the whole world is postcolonial” (Loomba, 1998: xv). In this way and similar to the term decolonization where the prefix ‘de’ refers to the removal, taking away or undoing of colonization, the term postcolonial is faulty because it infers a temporal and historical result – ‘after’ the colonial. Loomba explains that the term postcolonial is problematic not only because of the temporal misnomer, but also because it implies an ideological supplanting (xv). She attributes the two-fold deficiency to a misrepresentation of process and concludes that if the inequities of colonial rule have not been eliminated, then it is “premature to proclaim the demise of colonialism” (xv). Furthermore, and reminiscent of Wasserman, Loomba explains that a state may be formally independent (post-colonial) and economically and culturally dependent (incomplete emancipation). Thereby, the colonial ideology is merely replaced by a neocolonial one. Loomba’s postcolonial analysis of the inaccuracy of the term lacks

25 For a thorough critical introduction to postcolonial studies see Sidi M. Omar, Los Estudios Post- Coloniales: una Introducción Crítica, 2008a and Bill Ashcroft et al. (eds.), The Post-Colonial Reader, 1995. 26 A term derived from Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci that has been used in postcolonial theory to describe marginalized or oppressed peoples. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak uses ‘subaltern’ as a term to describe “everything that has limited or no access to the cultural imperialism…space of difference” (Spivak, 1992, cited in De Kock, 1992: 35; Spivak, 1988: 271-313). Homi Bhabha emphasizes the interrelation between subaltern groups and a dominant group’s self-definition. Whereas Spivak focuses on the ‘voicelessness’ of subaltern groups, Bhabha emphasizes their ability to subvert the authority of hegemonic power (Bhabha, 1996: 191-207). 73 a second category with respect to formal independence: a state that has yet to gain formal independence. The ideological point still holds water, however, especially in consideration of Western Sahara and the neo-colonial regional reach of France and the United States as well as Spain and the European Union in North Africa. Most importantly, Loomba’s analysis demonstrates the disconnect between the term ‘post- colonial/postcolonial’ (and by extension decolonization) and the aims of postcolonial studies. In other words, the methods of analysis of postcolonial theorists contrast greatly with the term that encompasses their analysis. Anne McClintock’s analysis of the term post-colonialism27 clearly targets this disconnect and the inadequacy of the term post-colonial/postcolonial: “If the theory promises a decentering of history in hybridity, syncreticism, multi-dimensional time, and so forth, the singularity of the term effects a re-centering of global history around the single rubric of European time” (McClintock, 1992: 86; emphasis in original). She critiques the linearity, Eurocentricity and singularity of the term and wonders how multiplicity, so central to postcolonial arguments, gets stuck in the singular and the all- representative, as in ‘the post-colonial situation’. In essence, she problematizes approaches to complex processes that totalize, homogenize and essentialize. Furthermore, and crucial to my own analysis of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict, McClintock highlights the unevenness of post-colonial experiences. In essence, we share the same misgivings:

“My misgivings, therefore, are not about the theoretical substance of ‘post-colonial theory,’ much of which I greatly admire. Rather, I wish to question the orientation of the emerging discipline and its concomitant theories and curricula changes, around a singular, monolithic term, organized around a binary axis of time rather than power, and which, in its premature celebration of the pastness of colonialism, runs the risk of obscuring the continuities and discontinuities of colonial and imperial power” (McClintock, 1992: 88).

The above excerpt separates two disparate elements of the term postcolonial: time and substance. Firstly, let us look at time. As previously established, postcolonial studies

27 McClintock purposefully writes ‘post-colonialism’ with the hyphen in order to emphasize the linear nature of the term. 74 should not be understood in the restrictive linear sense of coming after colonialism or decolonization as the term implies. Much of the analysis of African reality today (successes, failures and challenges), however, uses colonialism and decolonization as points of reference. For example, Albert Memmi (2006) pays particular attention to the Maghreb28. His argument centers on the failure of ‘formerly’ colonized nations to overcome poverty, corruption, stagnation of culture, mass emigration and inept new rule. Although controversial in its sweeping and one-directional assessment of the situation of formerly colonized nations, his focus on the aftermath of decolonization is telling. One of the points of departure for decolonization was the decision by the Organization of African Unity to accept colonial boundaries in order to avoid border disputes and conflict and to create smooth transitions from colonial status to internationally recognized statehood. Memmi blames current border disputes and their irresolution on the ill will of the parties involved to come to a “lasting agreement” (Memmi, 2006: 52). He then points to Morocco and Algeria as his telltale example: “Morocco and Algeria have gone to war and maintained a low-level conflict through the Polisario Front” (Memmi, 2006: 51-52). First, the failure to recognize the Frente POLISARIO as a valid national liberation movement and member of the African Union distorts the conflict situation and erroneously removes Western Sahara from its decolonization context29. Second, Memmi ignores the other actors that lurk in the shadows, mainly the United States and France, which lack the will to secure decolonization for Western Sahara. We have seen how misrepresentations of time – after colonialism – have distorted the colonial legacy and continued forms of imperial influence. For Western Sahara, however, political decolonization itself has been denied. Although the struggle for independence does not end with the transfer of political power, it is a necessary step nonetheless. Secondly, let us examine substance. The methods of analysis of postcolonial studies, the “oppositional consciousness” (Klor de Alva, 1995: 245) and “politics of opposition and struggle” (Mishra and Hodge, 1991: 399; 1993: 276) challenge and

28 The Maghreb is comprised of, from West to East, Mauritania, Western Sahara (disputed territory), Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. 29 In Chapter Four, I will return to how a time-oriented post-colonial evaluation has become problematic for conflict analysis and theory. In this case, linearity penetrates conflict theory and ‘post’-colonial conflicts are renamed ‘ethnic’ conflicts (second-generation conflicts emerging after the revolutionary battle for independence). This logic has wide implications, but for the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict seriously confuses and warps the issues at hand. 75 reexamine many aspects and forms of colonial/imperial domination and discourse in order to evaluate the past and present. Dane Kennedy describes the methodological approach of postcolonial studies – its oppositional consciousness and politics of struggle – as the “deconstruction of Western structures of knowledge” through the “dismantlement of Western modes of domination” (Kennedy, 2003: 12). This has strategic importance for an evaluation of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict because such approaches tackle the “decolonization of representation” (Scott, 1999: 12) and “white mythologies” (Young, 2004; also cited in Bush, 2006: 54). Furthermore, they challenge dominant narratives and epistemological structures of power. For example, putting theory to use in the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict, one might ask the following questions. How has the conflict been represented by key power players (i.e. United States and France)? What are the mythologies that have been propagated through dominant (accepted) narratives? Where does neutrality and representations of neutrality appear in and help frame these mythologies? These questions will be explored throughout this thesis and, in this chapter, in light of new developments on the decolonization process for Western Sahara, namely the new ‘political’ solution of autonomy. In sum, representations of time and analyses of power relations and epistemology hold significant importance for Western Sahara as Africa’s last ‘official’ colony. When decolonization is conceived of as over and done with, problems of both time and representation arise. As we have seen, this is because the colonial legacy did not end with formal independence in the case of many countries in Africa. For Western Sahara this is because it is temporally stuck in the formal process of decolonization, while simultaneously submerged in dominant colonial/imperial narratives. The following statement by Betts reflects the superior air of dominant narratives and their tendency to simplify and demean diverse, multidimensional and painful processes: “It [decolonization] was too hastily done for some, too slowly carried out for others, too incomplete in effect for most. The subject is historically loose-ended; there is no end to discussion of it” (Betts, 1998: 1). Despite the “loose-ended” nature of decolonization he concludes: “One matter is certain: in the political sense of the word, decolonization is over and done with” (1). As a disclaimer he adds that what remains of overseas empire is “insignificant” and “inconsequential,” “like shards of pottery indifferently cast on distant

76 shores” (2). It is difficult to decide what to take offense to first: the misrepresentation of time and space, the misrepresentation of ‘political’ or formal decolonization, or the belittlement of remaining colonial ‘shards’ – insignificant and inconsequential in the dominant narrative. In his analysis, Western Sahara is but a remaining shard on those distant North African shores. Such representations coupled with the passage of time jeopardize the eradication of ‘formal’ colonialism. Time and story are easily manipulated. France, the United States and Spain all stress the political impasse of Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO and yet fail to mention Western Sahara’s legal ties to decolonization. Postcolonial studies have emphasized the tensions between formal decolonization (the eradication of colonialism), dominant colonial narratives representing these historical, economic and cultural processes and continuities and present day post-colonial situations. Therefore, I realize that in stressing ‘formal’ decolonization, I am walking a fine line between formality/legality and present day realities/postcolonialities. However the difference between Western Sahara and other African countries lies in the negation of the former. In effect, both the negation and incompleteness of process characterize and distinguish the ‘conflict’ case of Western Sahara. It belongs to the era of formal decolonization, and yet it is also post-colonial30. One of sixteen remaining Non-Self- Governing Territories, Western Sahara is the only open case listed for Africa.

1.1.3. Formal Decolonization Today: Open Cases of Non-Self-Governing Territories

In the opening of the 2008 session of the Special Committee on Decolonization, Secretary-General to the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon, renewed the call to the United Nations and international community to bring an end to decolonization. In his address, he recalled how “facilitating this process constitutes one of the proudest chapters” in the United Nation’s history (Ki-Moon, 2008a). He also reminded his audience that the “chapter is still being written” (Ki-Moon, 2008a). In fact, it is possible to extract three interrelated deficiencies from this chapter: the act of formal decolonization has yet to be completed; the United Nations has yet to facilitate it fully; and the repercussions and continuity of the ‘old’ colonial system can be felt despite the granting of independence to

30 This disjuncture and dichotomous relationship will be further explored in Chapter Four. 77 eighty former colonies. All three have bearing on Western Sahara; however, the third, imperial reach, presents multiple roadblocks to formal decolonization under the auspices of the United Nations. By virtue of Resolution 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961, the General Assembly (GA) decided to establish a Special Committee of seventeen members with a mandate to make recommendations on the progress and extent of the implementation of the decolonization declaration (1514) and to report to the General Assembly. In 1990, the GA proclaimed 1990-2000 the International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism, a mission which was granted a decade continuance in 2001. The Second International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism prompted Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon to reiterate the sentiments he proclaimed at the beginning of the year again in May of 2008 at the Pacific Regional Seminar.

“Decolonization is one of the great success stories of the United Nations. But as the Second International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism draws to a close, sixteen remaining non-self-governing Territories highlight the fact that this monumental task is as yet incomplete. It falls to the United Nations, and to all of us as members of the international community, to help bring this process to a successful conclusion” (Ki- Moon, 2008b).

He added, as if to fully clarify the intentions of the United Nations for this decade, that “colonialism has no place in today’s world” (Ki-Moon, 2008b). The convening of the special Committee of 24 and the decade for the eradication of colonialism attest to the fact that the formal process of decolonization, as established by international law, has not become obsolete. Nor has it been replaced by a third way or political solution, a fallacy that the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan propagates. In 2008, the United Nations reaffirmed the right of decolonization and promised its eradication– an echo to the United Nations Resolution 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960. In Part Four of this chapter, it will become clear as to how this has become possible and the role that Realpolitik discourses have played in steering conflict transformation strategies. For the closing chapter to see its completion by 2010, the United Nations must become an active agent for the decolonization of Western Sahara. The UN has played a

78 relatively ineffective role since the 1991 ceasefire, and it has veered from the legality of decolonization under international law to ‘political’ solutions to the conflict. Still, many challenges face the process of formal decolonization, including ‘third-party’ behind the scenes maneuvering. Under a veil of neutrality, countries like the United States and France impede possibilities for conflict transformation. However, before exploring their intervention and the UN’s support of a third-way autonomy, the legal steps of formal decolonization must be examined, namely, self-determination.

1.2. Self-Determination

1.2.1. Preliminary Thoughts on Self-Determination

Thus far, the specific case of Western Sahara has allowed us to explore the broad topics of colonialism, decolonization and postcolonialism(s). Michel Foucault’s conceptualization of power and postcolonial studies’ focus on dominant narratives and representations are interesting and telling analytical lenses with which to critically approach these broad topics. At the same time, it must be conceded that it is impossible to step outside of dominant historical, political, economic and cultural narratives and discourses, especially when dealing with topics that are rooted in a European colonial history, neo-colonial present and new-imperialism United States style31. Likewise, the Western Sahara case demonstrates how we can be forced to use the very dominant narratives that oppress or that have provided the continuity of oppression. These dominant narratives, which help to frame and understand the conflict case of Western Sahara better, include the Organization of African Union’s decision to accept colonial boundaries as the starting point for decolonization, the European state system, international law, the United Nations and self-determination itself. Therefore, I intentionally take up the contradictory tensions and paradoxes found within critical analyses of dominant narratives and use them to clarify the conflict situation of Western

31 Chapter Four will integrate neo-liberal globalization into this domination equation. 79

Sahara. Again, I find myself walking a fine line between maintaining and challenging the status quo32. The politics of self-determination represent this paradox quite nicely. Antonio Cassese33 points this out concisely: “The concept of self-determination is both radical, progressive, alluring and, at the same time, subversive and threatening” (Cassese, 1998: 5). For those wishing to maintain the colonial structure, any discussion of self- determination of peoples was like a wrench being thrown into the system. On the flip side, those in favor of self-determination, which took the form of anti-colonial rhetoric and support of independence driven national liberation movements, accepted the state system as their point of departure. Therefore, support of self-determination was an outward affair that did not invite inward reflection. In this framework, self-determination works as a regulator for those inside or outside the club of statehood (5-6). From this perspective, self-determination comes across as a key to legitimacy through statehood instead of one that opens the door to true liberation and determination of self. Hence, the concept is limited. It does not promise a subversion of the system, merely a transformation of that very system. On that note, however, self-determination does represent a radical diversion from the world colonial system. Analyses of dominant narratives and discourses and hegemonic mythologies and ideologies are necessary for penetrating entrenched and ingrained power structures. While recognizing that self-

32 In Chapter Four, I delve deeper into the concept of self-determination as colonial continuity, as reformative potentiality and as struggle. I also explore its multidimensionality more specifically. The purpose of this chapter is to trace the evolution of self-determination (in its colonial context) in international law from principle to internationally accepted peremptory norm. 33 I have used Antonio Cassese’s book, Self-Determination of Peoples, a Legal Reappraisal (1998), as the foundational text for my own analysis of the historical and legal precedence of self-determination. His book is a comprehensive account of self-determination that weaves together history, politics and jurisprudence in order to gain legal clarity on the concept of self-determination. He asserts that law is not politics, but acknowledges that they are obviously intimately connected. I do not share his positivist approach in multiple regards and in my point of view his analysis of the case of Western Sahara lacks accuracy. Nevertheless, his work offers a thorough and illuminating analysis of the progression of self-determination from principle to legal right. For a comprehensive work from multiple perspectives see Donald Clark and Robert Williamson’s (eds.), Self-Determination: International Perspectives, 1996. For a text that examines the dominant narratives that influence international law, a topic that Cassese omits completely, see Karen Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law, 2002. For an overview of self-determination and international law, specifically regarding Western Sahara, see Karin Arts and Pedro Pinto Leite’s compilation book, International Law and the Question of Western Sahara, 2007. Finally, for a comprehensive work on state creation see James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, second edition, 2006. 80 determination also plays a part in these narratives, it is, nonetheless, an important step in formal decolonization34. As such, it is important to trace the genesis of self-determination in global dialogue and at the level of international law. The concept of self-determination is age- old and crosses cultures, languages and social constructions. However, its cooptation into the global language and penetration of colonial epistemologies post World War I sheds light on the dismantling of formal colonization in the aftermath of World War II. Self- determination evolved into a right of colonial peoples, an international standard and operative right in the decolonization35 of Non-Self-Governing Territories, which, opinio juris36, constitutes a norm of customary international law (Crawford, 2006: 647; Omar, 2008b: 42). In 1963, Western Sahara was placed on the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories under Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter. It remains there today. Despite the common acceptance of self-determination as a legal right of colonial peoples, “the question of the ambit of self-determination, the territories to which it applies, has arguably remained as much a matter of politics as law” (Crawford, 2006:115). The politics of the conflict situation of self-determination will be tackled in this chapter regarding plans of autonomy and throughout the historical, economic, geopolitical, social and cultural analysis of this thesis. The legal international law aspects are explored below37.

34 In Chapter Four, I address in depth the relationship between self-determination and the state as social, political and economic form and the international measure of legitimacy and political representation. 35 Establishing self-determination as a legal right of colonial peoples does not rule out by definition the broadening of this topic to other peoples. The analysis should not be taken in the sense of restricting self- determination to colonial peoples. The argument for internal self-determination or secession usually runs counter to representations of self-determination as applicable only to colonial peoples. Proponents of broader interpretations of self-determination reject the colonial argument. In this case, the two positions are not mutually exclusive. It is possible to support the application of self-determination for remaining Non- Self-Governing Territories and support broader interpretations of the concept. Whereas there may be doubt to how to apply self-determination to peoples outside of the colonial setting, there is no doubt and much precedence as to how to implement it for colonial peoples. Chapter Four addresses contemporary discussions on self-determination and its place in a predominately post-colonial era. 36 As put forth by Judge Dillard in his Western Sahara Advisory Opinion for the International Court of Justice, opinio juris refers to “the cumulative impact of many resolutions when similar in content, voted for by overwhelming majorities and frequently repeated over a period of time” (Dillard, 1975: 121). 37 This chapter focuses on the history of the concept of self-determination from principle to international right. As stated in footnotes 29, 30 and 32, Chapter Four broadens the discussion of self-determination by theoretically examining its practical and juridical implications for the peaceful transformation of self- determination conflicts. 81

1.2.2. Self-Determination: from Principle to Right in International Law

“[S]elf-determination is a powerful expression of the underlying tensions and contradictions of international legal theory: it perfectly reflects the cyclical oscillation between positivism and natural law, between an emphasis on consent, that is, voluntarism, and an emphasis on binding ‘objective’ legal principles, between a ‘statist’ and a communitarian vision of world order” (Cassese, 1998: 1).

The historical precedents for the principle of self-determination in international law can be traced to the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the French Revolution of 178938. Both revolutions brought upon a shift in relationship between rulers and ruled so that rather than being mere subjects of Kings, the people became the responsibility of government. However, almost immediately, the concept induced ambiguity. The political fine print read in favor of powerful states. For the United States, self-determination did not extend to the indigenous peoples of the territory. In fact, the idea of Manifest Destiny39, the ‘fated’ expanse from the Atlantic to the Pacific, justified the cultural annihilation, displacement and near eradication of indigenous peoples. The French experience is almost immediately marked by policies of annexation of territories, like Alsace. From its political onset, self-determination invoked discriminatory implementation and excluded colonial peoples.

38 This being said, it should also be noted that the concept of self-determination can also be linked to Enlightenment concepts, the “individual’s right to determine his or her own fate” (Jenne, 2006; 9). According to Erin Jenne, romantic writers of the 19th century provided the intellectual basis for the modern growth of nationalism and German philosophers (like von Herder) began to talk about Volk, or people, as a “natural unit” (Jenne, 2006: 9). European colonial metropoles sought biological support for theories of racial inequality, and they gained momentum in 1859 with the publication of Charles Darwin’s, On the Origin of Species; this “cosmology of race” culminated into fascism of the 20th century (extremist strains of nationalism) (10). As such, Jenne concludes: “National self-determination had thus become a part of the international political discourse well before the end of World War I; indeed, its seeds had been sown more than a century earlier. Lenin and Wilson merely magnified its impact by using it to justify their respective political programs” (Jenne, 2006: 11). 39 John L. O’Sullivan presented the idea of Manifest Destiny in his article, “The Great Nation of Futurity” (O’Sullivan, 1839: 426-430). Manifest Destiny is the belief that God meant for the North American continent to be populated and governed by Anglo-Saxon Americans. O’Sullivan thought that American democracy was so exceptional that there would be no need for war to spread it because it would do so by its own accord and superior nature. 82

With the end of World War I, two key figures took up the call of self- determination, V.I. Lenin and United States President Woodrow Wilson. For Lenin40 self-determination represented a necessary step for the liberation of peoples and ultimately the path for the realization of worldwide socialism. Lenin’s conceptualization of self-determination was both anti-imperial in nature and anti-colonial. In order to ensure a victorious socialism and full democracy, he called for freedom and equality of all nations. Problematic to his approach to self-determination is the fact that self- determination was not sacred in its own right. It was utilized as an ideological stepping- stone to promote political (ideological) objectives and therefore was not guaranteed to diverse peoples as a right per se (Cassese, 1998: 18). However, through the efforts of the Soviet Union, self-determination was included in the United Nations Charter and developed into a general principle of international law (19). Woodrow Wilson41 envisioned self-determination as a political tool that would ensure lasting peace. Western democratic theory heavily influenced how he approached the topic. In this context, governments should be based on the consent of the governed. Logically, the people decide upon the government, its political leaders and state authorities. Self-determination for Wilson meant self-government. This understanding of self-determination has been named internal self-determination. Wilson framed external self-determination in terms of sovereignty, the idea that peoples should be able to choose the sovereign. He expounded upon self-determination in his famous Fourteen Points speech of February 11, 1918. However, he downplayed the enthusiasm with which he had first embraced the concept because of strong opposition to what many thought could set a dangerous precedent, which could not be controlled once unleashed. However, despite the adversity to the principle, Wilson believed that self-determination could reduce global conflict if properly implemented. Regarding self-determination and colonial peoples, he diluted the topic by linking it to the interests of colonial powers. In his vision, self- determination represented a regulatory democratic standard for the break up of the

40 See also “The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination,” in V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, 1969. 41 For more on Wilson’s concept of self-determination see T.S. Woolsey, “Self-Determination,” in American Journal of International Law, 13, 1919, pp. 302-305. 83 empires defeated at the end of World War I (mainly the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires) and a redistribution of power. In sum, Lenin supported armed struggle and revolution as part of an agenda for immediate liberation from imperial and colonial rule. Wilson, on the contrary, promoted the maintenance of international power structures and slow reformation or “orderly liberal reformism” (Levin, 1968: 247). Neither position represented self-determination in its purest form. Cassese explains: “Thus, on the whole, self-determination was deemed irrelevant where the people’s will was certain to run counter to the victor’s geopolitical, economic, and strategic interests” (Cassese, 1998: 25).

1.2.2.1. Post World War II

Near the end of April of 1945, the United Nations Conference on International Organization met in San Francisco in order to draft the Charter of the United Nations. It was at this time and under the heavy urging of the then Soviet Union42 that the political postulate of self-determination entered the domains of international law (Cassese, 1998: 65). Article 1(2) of the United Nations Charter reads as follows:

“To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace” (Charter of the United Nations, 1945).

Article 1(2) jumpstarted the slow process of formal decolonization because it clearly stipulated self-determination as a right of peoples. Furthermore, as an integral part to peace and security and as set forth by the UN Charter, the term took on a moral, political and functional charge. From the onset, self-determination was strongly backed by socialist states. In this way, it also fit into an ideological road map for the liberation of peoples. This included the liberation of peoples from racist regimes like South Africa and colonial domination and its inheritance. The mention of self-determination in the UN Charter provided the legitimacy and moral high ground for legal entitlements to formal

42 For a thorough review of the Soviet Union’s role in the establishment of the right of self-determination see Ruth B. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter, 1958. 84 decolonization. Reminiscent of Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s reflection on the role of the United Nations and decolonization, the world institution functioned as an international platform for self-determination from which legal norms and rules could be formulated and launched. The idea of self-determination – the free and genuine expression of the popular will of peoples – introduced a new element into the Westphalian logic of states. As far back as World War I, self-determination sparked fear of secessionist movements, the breakdown of multinational states and the erosion of state sovereignty. The Charter only mentioned self-determination as a principle of the UN. It did not define the term nor distinguish between external and internal self-determination, the former referring to a colonial peoples’ choice of sovereign and political status (one time event) and the latter to authentic self-government (ongoing right) and control over economic, social and cultural development (Theodoropoulos, 1988: 35; Cassese, 1998: 101)43. The Charter opened up a space for the molding and influencing of the concept; however, it did not exact immediate legal measures to be taken by states or provide the guidelines for the process of self-determination. Nevertheless, despite its vague and ambiguous entrance into international law, the multilateral treaty represented the prescribed legislation for a post- World War II international community. Although the origins of the political postulate of self-determination are found in guiding principles for action, its importance lies in its metamorphosis from standard to legal precept, from a non-binding concept to a binding one44.

1.2.3. Key United Nations General Assembly Resolutions: 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV), Delineating Self-Determination

“[In the area of self-determination, the United Nations] has played a pivotal role: on the basis of its Statute (Article 1(2)), it has first proclaimed new values, then gradually enshrined them in resolutions and subsequently

43 James S. Anaya uses different terminology to convey similar meaning to external and internal self- determination: constitutive self-determination, the fundamental choice of political status, and ongoing self- determination, which need not be full independence (Anaya, 1996: 81; also cited in Buchanan, 2004: 332- 333). 44 In the work, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, Heather A. Wilson (1998) also traces the metamorphosis of self-determination from a principle of political thought to a right in international law. 85

promoted the hammering out of treaty rules and in addition monitored their observance. Furthermore, it has insisted on the general applicability of some concepts relating to self-determination, thus significantly stimulating the emergence of general standards” (Cassese, 1998: 68)45.

As we can see, self-determination46 was immediately marked by ideological and political dissention. Its mention in the UN Charter was also the means to consolidate general standards through General Assembly Resolutions. In addition to Article 1(2) of the Charter, Article 55 of Chapter IX invokes respect for the principle of self- determination and Article 73 of Chapter XI directly addresses the administrative parties to Non-Self-Governing Territories. Picking up from where the Charter leaves off, UN Resolutions 1514(XV), “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial

45 It should be noted that even before the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 the UN wanted to turn the provisions of the UN Charter relating to human rights into a set of legally binding treaty provisions. The Declaration of Human Rights was reinforced by two distinct treaties: the 1966 International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Civil and Political Rights. Common to both covenants, Article 1 asserts that: “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development; all peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence; the States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations” (United Nations, 1966). Treaty provisions, namely Article 1(2) of the Charter and Article 1 of both the 1966 Covenants, contributed to the generation of customary rules. The making of treaty law was vital to the formulation of self-determination and norms of implementation because the process induced debate and opened up forums for discussion and the expression of multiple points of view. These discussions, in turn, helped to formulate general standards, which established norms on self-determination. Most strong proponents of self-determination, including newly independent states and socialist countries, felt that treaty rules, although important, were insufficient in solidifying general norms for state behavior and action. Therefore, they decided to pave the way to the granting of self-determination to colonial peoples through General Assembly Resolutions, the expression of political standards in legal terminology (Cassese, 1998: 68). They believed that this strategy – working their agenda or recommendations through nonbinding resolutions – would ultimately lead to legally binding norms. Additionally, the 1966 covenants set two precedents on self-determination that directly affect Western Sahara. First, they prohibited states from occupying a foreign territory so as to impede the right of those peoples to self-determination. Second, they introduced the right to control natural resources. In this way, self-determination encompassed both political and economic realms. As will be demonstrated in Chapters Two (use of force) and Three (control of natural resources) of this thesis, Morocco directly violated both covenants of which it is a signatory. 46 For more information on self-determination (as a fundamental right), including mandated territories, UN Charter and Non-Self-Governing Territories, see the following texts: Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization, 1964; U.O. Umozurike, Self-Determination in International Law, 1972; Rigo A. Sureda, The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination, A Study of United Nations Practice, 1973; W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe The Principle of Self-Determination in International Law, 1977; Michla Pomerance Self-Determination in Law and Practice, 1982; and Christos Theodoropoulos, Colonialism and General International Law: The Contemporary Theory of National Sovereignty and Self- Determination, 1988. 86

Countries and Peoples”47 and 1541 (XV), “Transmission of Information Under Article 73e of the Charter,” directly address self-determination and colonialism and lay the ground work for formal decolonization and its possible outcomes (See United Nations General Assembly, 1960a; 1960b). Points Two, Four and Five of UN Resolution 1514(XV) speak to the principle of self-determination (emphases mine):

2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected. 5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.

UN Resolution 1514(XV)48 provided the impetus to transform the principle of self- determination, as stipulated in the UN Charter, into a legal right for Non-Self-Governing peoples. In essence, the resolution guarantees colonial peoples their right to self- determination. In this regard, the principle of self-determination contributed to the undoing of the colonial system. The Sahrawi people and the Frente POLISARIO continue to trust in the United Nations to uphold this principle and legal right49.

47 For more information on UN Resolution 1514(XV) see S.K.N Blay, “Self-Determination versus Territorial Integrity in Decolonization,” 1986. 48 An interesting note to add is that the vote results were 89-0 with 9 abstentions. France, Spain the United Kingdom and the United States are among the list of 9, and all but Spain are among the permanent members of the Security Council. It would be abhorrent to reject outright a resolution calling for the end to colonial rule. To save face, these countries could only abstain. Despite the structural inequality of the United Nations, general principles and standards do subject super powers to international scrutiny and make them less likely to act with total impunity (unilateral U.S. policy under the George W. Bush administration and occupation of Iraq in 2003 set very dangerous policies for state action on an international scale). These abstentions are also telling for the decolonization case of Western Sahara, with specific regard to interest proximity and neutrality. There were and are high stakes at risk in the decolonization process. 49 Morocco tries to undermine the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination by emphasizing Point Six of Resolution 1514(XV): “Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 87

Whereas United Nations Resolution 1514(XV) provided the gateway to self- determination of colonial peoples, Resolution 1541(XV) delineated the possible outcomes of the expression of self-determination and the conditions under which to realize the right. It helped to establish the extent and reach of self-determination. Principles VI and VII of the resolution are of significant importance in this regard:

Principle VI: A Non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to have reached a full measure of self-government by: (a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State; (b) Free association with an independent State; or (c) Integration with an independent State.

Principle VII: (a) Free association should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed and democratic processes. It should be one which respects the individuality and the cultural characteristics of the territory and its peoples, and retains for the peoples of the territory which is associated with an independent State the freedom to modify the status of that territory through the expression of their will by democratic means and through constitutional processes. (b) The associated territory should have the right to determine its internal constitution without outside interference, in accordance with due constitutional processes and the freely expressed wishes of the people. This does not preclude consultations as appropriate or necessary under the terms of the free association agreed upon.

Although self-determination is usually associated with independence, the predominant outcome of the expression of self-determination, this assumption overshadows the other two possible outcomes: free association with an independent state and integration with an independent state. If, as Morocco claims, the Sahrawi refugees living in Algeria are held against their will (Buckley, 2008) and if Morocco truly believed

United Nations.” However, as is later discussed in Chapter Two, this point is mute. The International Court of Justice decided the issue in its Advisory Opinion of October 16, 1975: “…the Court’s conclusion is that the materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514(XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory” (International Court of Justice, 1975). The case of Western Sahara is a decolonization case and not one that can be contested by Morocco as a breach of its territorial integrity. However, as Chapter Four explores, the passage of time, the entrance into the ‘post-colonial’ era, and contemporary conceptualizations of self-determination complicate the case of Western Sahara and muddy the waters of a clear-cut decolonization case. The question of Western Sahara is both colonial and post-colonial. To recognize its postcoloniality, however, does not mean we are denying its non-self-governing status. 88 in the ‘Moroccaneity’ of the territory of Western Sahara, there should be no problem of affording the Sahrawi people the possibility to exercise their right of self-determination50, especially in consideration of the third possibility, integration with an independent state. These claims only have an air of credibility if the right to self-determination, as put forth in international law, is ignored or purposefully obfuscated. Morocco cannot guarantee a favorable result and so employs both tactics. However, international law tells a different story. Today, Resolutions 1514(XV) and 1541(XV) remind us of the struggle that continues for the completion of formal decolonization. In 1960, they provided the groundbreaking impetus that helped shift self-determination from a principle and general standard to a legal right recognized and guaranteed in international law. Both are essential documents that forced member states to take a stand on self-determination and determine how to regulate the right. The two ‘recommendations’ directly influenced state practice and put the principles of the UN Charter, especially regarding self-determination of colonial peoples, into effect. The 1971 International Court of Justice opinion on Namibia reiterated and fortified the call of self-determination51 for colonial peoples:

“The subsequent development of international law in regards to non-self- governing territories as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of self-determination applicable to all of them” (International Court of Justice, 1971: 31, para. 52).

According to a study by Héctor Gros Espiell, the Special Rapporteur of the Sub- Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, seventy territories achieved independence between 1945 and 1979 (Gros Espiell, 1980). Now,

50 As will be further explored in Chapter Three, Morocco has consistently used voter eligibility to stall the referendum process. On this issue, the Frente POLISARIO has already conceded to voter eligibility changes twice: first, from the original Spanish census of 1974 of approximately 75,000 to the MINURSO count of 86,386 and second, to include Moroccan settlers in the Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara (Baker Plan), which is counter to international laws and norms (Omar, 2008b: 52; Zoubir, 2001: 73-74). 51 Resolutions 1514(XV) and 1541(XV) and the ICJ opinion on Namibia address the right of external self- determination, but ignore the dimension of internal self-determination. The notion of internal self- determination would guarantee free and democratic political elections whereby the peoples determine the form of government. The problem of internal self-determination only arises with the case of Western Sahara under plans of autonomy, be it Baker’s Plan which provides for external self-determination after five years of autonomy or the 2007 Moroccan Plan which denies external self-determination altogether. Both plans deny the Sahrawi people their right to free and democratic elections and choice of government. 89 sixteen unresolved cases remain. This is proof that uncooperative states capitulated to the international pressure created by the establishment of legal norms regarding colonial territories. Furthermore, the United Nations should be applauded for facilitating many of the expressions of self-determination. However, the United Nations and the international community must also be called to account for the remaining Non-Self-Governing Territories. The case of Western Sahara is the closing chapter for formal decolonization in Africa.

1.2.3.1. Who Constitutes a People?

“It is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people” (Judge Dillard, Separate Opinion, Western Sahara Case, International Court of Justice, 1975: 122).

Who constitutes a people? The right of self-determination applies to colonial peoples. Therefore, a people must be established before it can be implemented. Contrary to Ivor Jennings’ assessment that it is unreasonable and ridiculous to let the ‘people’ decide because “the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people” (Jennings, 1956: 56; cited in Crawford, 2006: 124), the approach here is to look to the people to see who are a people. In this regard, it is beneficial to work off two premises as put forth by Sidi Omar: (1) “national identity is not pre-given, but is socially produced, reproduced and normalized through various institutional and discursive practices,” and (2) within this context, the inhabitants of a territory become “aware of their existence as a people, an awareness whose constitutive elements [consist in] their sociopolitical structures, their common culture and identity and [their] self-identification” (Omar, 2008b: 44-45). As will be further explored in Chapter Two, the evolution of the Sahrawi indigenous population and formation of a nation occurred in response to and in spite of Sahrawi social, political, cultural and historical realities. Nation-building processes52,

52 At this point in the thesis I will not try to ‘prove’ the existence of a Sahrawi people. The analysis in Chapter Two of the early history of the conflict and subsequent build-up, including nation and identity building, provides sufficient evidence of an ‘existing’ people. In essence, it is the Sahrawi people who attest to their own existence. Alfred Cobban affirms this understanding of a people, albeit framed in the idea of the nation: “the best we can say is that any territorial community, the members of which are 90 stimulated by colonial rule and a gradual change from a nomadic life to a sedentary one, created a sense of community and belonging that transgressed “traditional kinship ties” (45). From an alternative perspective, Crawford constructs the notion of a people with statehood as his referent. He explains that it seems more appropriate to describe a people as having a limited status and opting for more permanent status in the future (Crawford, 2006: 124). This assessment applies to the Sahrawi people who struggle to move from a ‘limited’ status (colonized/occupied) to an independent nation by exercising their right to self-determination. Evidently, the United Nations speaks to and invokes the right of self- determination for the Sahrawi ‘people’53.

1.2.3.2. Where Does Western Sahara Fall?

Where does Western Sahara fall in the grand scheme of ‘difficult’ decolonization cases? Antonio Cassese separates these difficult cases into two distinct categories: cases where the principle of self-determination was blatantly set aside and outstanding situations (1998: 79-88). His first classification includes India’s annexation of Portuguese enclaves within its territory of Goa, Damao and Din, Indonesia’s annexation of West Irian and Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor. He targets Western Sahara, Gibraltar and Falkland Islands/Malvinas for the second. His categorizations are surprising because of the placement and description of East Timor and Western Sahara. The two cases are near mirror images of each other. One might even go so far as to call them twin decolonization cases. This is evident in the International Platform of Jurists for East Timor’s (IPJET’s) recent publication on International Law and Western Sahara and dedication of an entire section of the book to comparative analysis, including that of East Timor and Western Sahara (Arts and Pinto Leite, 2007; especially Zunes54, Chapter 8). Cassese asserts that in the case of East Timor there was a complete denial of the very right of peoples to self- determination (Cassese, 1998: 226). By his argument, this is also true of Western Sahara. conscious of themselves as members of a community, and wish to maintain the identity of their community, is a nation” (Cobban, 1970: 107; also cited in Philpott, 1995: 365). 53 In Chapter Four, I further explore the concept of ‘people’ and ‘nation’ in both their political and theoretical constitutions. 54 See also Stephen Zunes, 2001 and Ian Williams and Stephen Zunes, 2003. 91

However, Cassese distinguishes between the two cases. He sees the case of Western Sahara as an ambiguous fight between self-determination (the Frente POLISARIO) and territorial integrity of states (Morocco), where neither one completely eclipses the other. This is a perplexing conclusion. In order to draw it, one must ignore the will of the Sahrawi people, the findings of the 1975 UN Visiting Mission, the 1975 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice and multiple General Assembly and Security Council resolutions calling for the self-determination of the Sahrawi people. In both conflict situations the following occurred: colonial peoples were denied their right to self-determination and were occupied by a foreign power, occurrences abetted by third party power houses; the United Nations refused to name either invasion an act of aggression, which would be a breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter; and the perpetrators and their supporters claimed that the reality of the situation usurped the right of self-determination as guaranteed by resolution 1514(XV). Crawford highlights the gravity of these types of situations, which in light of self-determination are characterized by a double-edged victimization: “Invasion and annexation of territory is unlawful, and the separate status of a territory for the purposes of self-determination, if anything, aggravates the illegality” (Crawford, 2006: 137). Incredibly, Cassese claims that the UN’s failures in the three outstanding cases “are rooted more in the intricacies of each situation than in the principle of self- determination itself…in some cases the composition of the population and the existence of conflicting claims of Sovereign States makes the actual implementation of self- determination impracticable…In other cases, the intractability of the problem is rooted in overriding economic and strategic interests” (Cassesse, 1998: 87). The reader is left to intuit which cases are impracticable for self-determination. How can international law, established norms, be impracticable? Who decides this? What role do Realpolitik discourses play in influencing such a stance? Despite the impracticability of certain cases, Cassesse admits that the legal right of self-determination implicates the people of those territories in the final analysis. Self- determination takes precedence over ‘practicality,’ ‘reality’ and ‘economic and strategic

92 interests’ and has consistently done so in state practice55. However, his assessment demonstrates the power of scholarly representation and the effects such misleading representations have on policy and action. Within the dominant narrative of formal decolonization, that of possible statehood through self-determination, one finds a multiplicity of dominant narratives produced and reproduced through repetition. For Western Sahara, a clear-cut case of decolonization, this has meant the negation of their right to self-determination and the acquiescence of the United Nations and the international community to the illegal use of force and big power interests56. Cassese interprets the matter differently and concludes that the UN has pursued the most logical and realistic course of action in each of the difficult cases (88). Chapter Three of this thesis deals more closely with the mythology that surrounds this statement. In short, it not only neglects the influence of outside parties – especially hegemonic ‘third parties’ – it also omits the complicity of the UN in specific failed formal decolonization contexts, i.e. Western Sahara. Cassese applauds the UN’s agility in affirming the principle of self-determination as a “basic standard of conflict” while simultaneously calling for “direct negotiations” between the implicated parties (88). Let us not confuse legality with reality. Direct negotiations are a positive step in any conflict situation, but they do not supplant self-determination, the free and fair expression of the will of the peoples. I do not deny the important role of the United Nations in facilitating self- determination; however, the success stories should not overshadow the failed and let us hope late in coming ones. Self-determination was blatantly set aside for East Timor and Western Sahara and for a prolonged period of time the United Nations had and has failed to assert the principle and right. In the former case, a regime change, international support and the United Nations helped bring a referendum to the East Timorese people. The latter still waits for Resolution 1514(XV) to be put into effect. In sum, self-determination hit the international scene as a political ideal in a post- WWI environment. By the end of WWII, the concept transformed from idea to a legal and binding principle, one enshrined in the United Nations Charter. As has been

55 In Chapter Four, I explore the disconnect between political reality and international legality using Giorgio Agamben’s conception of the state of exception (2005). 56 To reiterate, I tease out the complicating factors of a decolonization case that has been complicated by interrelated factors such as the passage of time, a settler population, occupation and the evolution of the concept of self-determination in Chapter Four. 93 demonstrated, self-determination gained speed within a decolonization context and therefore was specifically aimed at colonial peoples. By and large, self-determination was understood as the exercising of ‘external’ self-determination, choosing sovereignty via a referendum. Today, nationalist movements have extended the concept to include the right to ‘internal’ self-determination, choosing government democratically. As has been alluded to before, the idea of ‘internal’ self-determination will be further discussed in the following sections on autonomy. Most importantly for this study, however, is how the principle and right of ‘external’ self-determination has been denied to the Sahrawi people. In International Law, the self-determination principle and legal right has contested three violations of basic human rights: colonial rule, foreign military occupation and racist regimes and rule (Crawford, 2006: 120). Considering that the first two breaches of international law apply to Western Sahara, the right most definitely applies to the Sahrawi people. How then has a solution to the conflict that omits this right gained such momentum and international recognition?

1.2.4. Impediments to Decolonization and Self-Determination

1.2.4.1. The United States

Problematic to the implementation of the process of self-determination for the Sahrawi people has been the infusion of said process with Realpolitik (realistic politics) (Omar, 2008b: 50). This means that considerations of ‘practical’ power take precedence over internationally established norms, principles and even law. In the case of Western Sahara, the United States and France have gone as far as direct and indirect military intervention in order to safeguard their desired outcome of the conflict situation: integration with Morocco. They have not shied away from walking the political/geopolitical line between legality and ‘reality’. At times, this includes blatant crossing of the line and complete impunity towards the United Nations Charter and international peremptory norms. Realpolitik discourses facilitate ambiguities of position and serve to safeguard and legitimize political, geopolitical, economic and military interest-oriented theory, policy and practice.

94

For the United States, the term self-determination comes wrought with contradictions, especially in consideration of its own historical legacy and usurpation of land from indigenous peoples and forceful movement westward, including the annexation of Texas in 1845 and the U.S. instigated war with Mexico from 1846-184857. The United States has supported self-determination publicly, but has also consistently undermined its implementation58. In short, the principles of self-determination and decolonization fall to the way side when up against anything that gets in the way of U.S. practices of imperial conquest and global hegemony (La Feber, 2000b; also Ryan, 2000: 6). Edward Said points out that the imperial mindset must be understood in theoretical, practical and attitudinal terms and in relation to “a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory”; in this light, colonialism is a consequence of imperialism (Said, 1993: 9). Attitudes of superiority are utterly entrenched in the discourses and ideologies that drive U.S. foreign policy (Ryan, 2000: 8). The United States has taken imperialism to such new heights that post-colonial imperial relations may even warrant new terminology besides new imperialism/neo-imperialism59. The United States flirted with European-style colonialism; however, in the end it was cheaper and more effective to advance U.S. economic interests indirectly rather than through direct and formal control (Hunt, 2000: 214). When ‘American’ democracy and guarantees of freedom and democracy failed to be convincing, the United States could always resort to unmatchable brute force. Thereby, the U.S. did not have to conquer and colonize in the traditional sense, but could ensure open door policies and safeguard U.S. interests as a global military power (Kelly and Kaplan, 2004: 137). In addition, by strengthening the U.S. military, which former president Dwight D. Eisenhower denominated the military- industrial complex, the U.S. government ensured its ‘super’ power position post-World War II (Eisenhower, 1961: 1035-40; Hartung, 2001: 39-44). Johnson Chalmers (2006) warns that imperialism and militarism (in my view the normalization of the military-industrial complex) can undermine even the best defenses

57 On February 2, 1848 the United States and Mexico signed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Its provisions called for Mexico to cede 55 percent of its territory, including present-day Arizona, California, New Mexico, and parts of Colorado, Nevada and Utah of the United States. Mexico received fifteen million dollars for the ‘exchange’. 58 For further information on U.S. Imperialism see Barbara Bush, Imperialism and Postcolonialism, 2006. 59 Heriberto Cairo, for example, situates “new colonialism” and “new imperialism” into one typology, “new suzerainty” (Cairo, 2006: 300). 95 of a democracy. This warning has thus far fallen upon deaf ears and it appears as if the United States wishes to follow the path of Maecenas from Cassius Dio’s Agrippa- Maecenas Debate60. The development of a global military hyperpower takes precedence over Woodrow Wilson’s ‘commitment’ to self-determination. U.S. interests trump U.S. principles on a regular basis. Furthermore, anyone who dares step out of line to challenge U.S. interests or hegemony can be bullied, if need be by force, back into place. In this light, the concept of self-determination comes messily entwined with relationships of U.S. economic growth, capitalism and imperialism. U.S. Realpolitik discourses clarify these discrepancies so that U.S. interests are protected and propagated in, for example, calls for freedom and democracy. In essence, no clear line can be drawn between U.S. foreign policy and U.S. declared principles on the subject of self-determination: “The right to self-determination as a general principle may have been as often compromised as observed in US policy” (Hunt, 2000: 211). In essence, the U.S. position on self- determination is conflicted, ranging from open support, as in the recent case of Kosovo, to its despotic denial. These contradictions are evident in the United States positioning on colonialism in the early 1940s61. The U.S. State Department issued an official paper entitled the “Declaration of National Independence for Colonies” in 1942 (Louis and Robinson, 1982: 34; cited in Betts, 1998: 24). U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR)

60 Cassius Dio’s Roman History book 52, Chapters 2-40 includes a fictional account of a debate between Agrippa and Maecenas to Augustus, whereby Agrippa argues in favor of a democratic republic and Maecenas in support of monarchical or absolute rule. Maecenas describes the rise of the fall of the Roman Empire as the point in time when it ventured beyond its native soil. The republic could no longer be sustained once the empire undertook imperialist aims. In order to remedy the troubled situation of the Roman Empire, Maecenas advocates for monarchical rule. For more information on Cassius Dio see Fergus Millar, A Study of Cassius Dio, 1966 and Meyer Reinhold, From Republic to Principate: An Historical Commentary on Cassius Dio’s Roman History Books 49-52 (36-29 B.C.), 1988. 61 I realize that in concentrating on the perspective of the United States and France and their approaches to decolonization and self-determination that I do not do justice to the on the ground national liberation movements and their agency (the ability to act and have an effect on ones own environment) regarding decolonization and self-determination; furthermore, this type of analysis leaves out the everyday brutality and calculated violence inflicted upon such liberation movements by their oppressors. However, in focusing on foreign policy decision-making and strategizing of the new world power and metropole, I hope to provide insight into the imperial mindset and manifest destiny/colonial psyche and to challenge decolonization narratives infused with altruistic mythologies of process and intention. Furthermore, although not necessarily comparable because of the uniqueness of experience of independence movements or challengers to U.S. hegemony, I hope that the focus on the Sahrawi struggle presented in the following chapters will shed light on common themes of resistance (of course they themselves imperfect and laden with the messiness of humanity) to dominant modes of international relations and imperial/neocolonial ideologies, policies and practice. 96 opposed colonialism in principle. These principles did not drive U.S. decolonization policy, rather U.S. national interests and positioning for post-war superpower status did (Orders, 2000: 78). FDR calculated that he could use the trusteeship system, eventual ‘earned’ independence, in order to undermine the British and French empires (La Feber, 1975: 1277). Convinced that after the war France would not be a stabilizing force in either Asia or Europe, he believed that he could maneuver things such as to deny France’s return as a colonial power in Indochina. Furthermore, FDR’s strategic planning for global dominance was reflected in his decolonization plans for Indochina (1278). However, this stance began to waver once Charles de Gaulle replaced General Henri Giraud62. Meanwhile, de Gaulle was outraged by FDR’s strategy and by mid-1944 assumed correctly that the Washington wanted to create a four power world policing unit of which France was excluded: China, Great Britain, Soviet Russia and the United States. This belief would have been compounded by the meeting of the group of four in Washington D.C. At the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, from August 21 to October 7, 1944, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the Republic of China met to discuss the organization of the United Nations, particularly the structural make-up of the Security Council. Most importantly, this included the solidification of their right as permanent members with veto power. U.S. policy in Indochina was only part of a greater plan to consolidate U.S. power by getting rid of colonial holdings of the weakened British and French empires and by opening up markets for U.S. access to raw materials and free trade. Of course, Great Britain’s Prime Minister Winston Churchill wanted French colonies restored post-war so as to safeguard Britain’s own interests and block U.S. moves for uncontested world dominance. FDR’s anticolonial idealism was firmly rooted in the determination to protect the United States’ spheres of interests and military force (La Feber, 1975: 1285), rather than self-determination. In the end, FDR’s plans succumbed to forces beyond his control, i.e. the replacement of Giraud by de Gaulle, the failure to control and secure Chiang Kai- shek’s rule in China, the ‘threat’ of communism and economic developments. He

62 Generals Henri Giraud and Charles de Gaulle formed the French Committee of National Liberation (Comité Français de Libération Nationale) on June 3, 1943 in order to liberate France from Nazi Germany during World War II. However, it soon came under the full control of de Gaulle. 97 ultimately capitulated to French and British pressure and reneged on his ‘anti-colonial’ stance. France re-entered Indochina with the ‘promise’ of eventual independence. All along, however, France intended to re-establish its pre-war colonial dominance and maintain its imperial spheres of influence. The European colonial powers saw right through FDR’s manipulation of self-determination, which they thought was no more than a “smoke-screen to facilitate access to the economic resources of the colonies and to spread American influence globally” (Pungong, 2000: 87). The ‘problem children’ (Lucas, 2000: 141) could be brought back into the French bloc.

1.2.4.2. France

“The French have striven hard…to limit discontinuities associated with independence. What mattered was not so much the formal transfer of power as the use to be made of it. However paradoxical it may seem, it was axiomatic and explicitly stated, not only in French official circles but also among francophone nationalists, that the counterpart to independence was interdependence and close cooperation, that decolonization should preserve rather than destroy une présence française” (Panter-Brick, 1988: 73; emphasis in original).

The initial French postwar conviction was to get everything back to the status quo. For conservative French leaders and moderates alike, to walk any other road would be considered unwise and antithetical to French predominance. The U.S. backed trusteeship system posed an unacceptable threat to ‘fundamental’ French national interest and world power standing. Conservatives asserted that independence was unthinkable because it jeopardized francophone solidarity and fractured a needed centralized representative authority. For self-preservation purposes, French settlers outside of the metropole strongly opposed any plan of independence or interdependence. Even propositions of internal self-government were refuted if they did not allot sufficient representation to the settler population that considered itself integral to the economic development of the French colonies, key to the civilizing missions and the uniting element between metropole and colony. Despite widespread discontent and protest, the idea of interdependence prevailed and rested upon “treaties of cooperation signed by independent sovereign states”; in a word, the French decided upon ‘continuity-

98 interdependence’ (Panter-Brick, 1988: 73-74, 80). However, only when autonomy or internal self-government appeared doomed to fail did France even consider independence or interdependence. Like the United States, French foreign policy regarding decolonization and self- determination is disjointed and inconsistent. And, like the United States, the common denominator for decision-making was ‘national’ interest – basically preservation of French hegemony. According to Keith Panter-Brick, French decolonization can be broken into four phases (75):

1. 1946 – 1954: France sought to apply the 1946 constitutional settlement (considerable resistance from North Africa and Madagascar) 2. 1954 – 1956: Independence to Indochina, Tunisia and Morocco 3. Final 2 years of Fourth Republic and first 2 years of the Fifth Republic, marked by status quo despite regime change 4. 1960-1962: Independence of Madagascar, black Africa and Algeria

In a nutshell, French decolonization correlates with a strong will to hold onto power. For this reason and as is evident in the above four ‘stages,’ there is a back and forth motion to the French stance on its different colonies. Rather than a deep conviction or ideological shift away from an imperial and colonial model, decolonization was motivated by a continuity of imperial and colonial approaches. Altruism did not guide French foreign policy, rather practicality and obstinacy regarding self-interest and power did. The post World War II environment provided just enough wind in the sales of independence movements whereby France could not reverse national liberation trends; however, France could try to control their outcomes and guarantee privileged footing after the transference of ‘formal’ power. Sometimes, like in the case of Morocco and Tunisia, this involved skillful diplomatic maneuvering and a commitment to interdependence and in others, like Algeria, the decision to engage in a ‘bloody’ war. The specific case of Morocco is of particular interest to this study. A brief overview of decolonization for Morocco demonstrates its strategic importance for French hegemony

99 in North Africa; furthermore, it sheds light on the divergent strategies regarding Algeria and Morocco63. In 1953, ultraconservatives of the settler community and its allies within the Moroccan administration deposed the Moroccan Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef and exiled him to Madagascar (82-83). The strong settler lobby believed that the Sultan had too closely aligned himself with the major Moroccan independence movement, Istiqlal64. Ben Youssef refused to renounce his right as supreme leader even in light of the fact that the French had quickly replaced him with Moulay Mohammed ben Arafa. To ben Youssef’s advantage, his movement towards the Istiqlal party gained their allegiance and ultimately bargaining power for his return. Even the most moderates of nationalists refused to acknowledge the French-picked successor. The question of Moroccan internal self-government could not even be broached with the issue of the throne unresolved. French Prime Minister Edgar Faure soon realized that if France hoped to hold onto Morocco and the 1912 Treaty of Fez, which consolidated French military and external rights, France would have to neutralize the strong Istiqlal nationalist movement by bringing back ben Youssef. He concluded:

“If France herself brought back the King she would not lose face. The King, for his part, would expunge the offense, in conformity with the mystical aspect of a solemn reconciliation. Because of his strong personality, his experience, the support of his son Hassan, whose exceptional capabilities I had already come to appreciate, and finally precisely because of the enhanced prestige which his ordeal had won for him in nationalist circles, King Mohammed was France’s best card” (Faure, 1982: 249-50; cited in Panter-Brick, 1988: 83).

In essence, France needed to orchestrate the return of the sultan without being thought of as weakened or conceding to Moroccan nationalist pressures. It was believed too much of a political risk to force Arafa out of power, considering he had been placed there to protect French interests (Panter-Brick, 1988: 85). Therefore, careful strategizing took

63 For more information on French-Moroccan relations during the process of formal decolonization of Morocco see Stéphane Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, 1943-1956, 1968 and French Prime Minister Edgar Faure, Mémoires, vol. 2, 1982. 64 Chapter Two gives more attention to the nationalist movement Istiqlal and its leader Allal el-Fassi. 100 place in order to simulate a French-led turn of events, rather than a Moroccan-led nationalist one. Faure openly supported independence/ interdependence and instigated talks with ben Youssef. The terms and conditions of Moroccan interdependence quickly shifted to Moroccan independence with Moroccan sovereignty as the pivotal talking point. Eventually, France moved from internal self-government heavily guided by the Treaty of Fez, to the abrogation of the Treaty of Fez and Moroccan independence. In the end, Morocco was to be first “modern, free and sovereign,” and second, directly connected to France through “permanent ties of interdependence freely consented” (82, 87). The integrity of Moroccan sovereignty would not be overshadowed by an acknowledgment of interdependence; terms which Morocco made known to French authorities in December of 1954 (see Bernard, 1968: 234). Why these turn of events? Why did France concede to Moroccan conditionality? Panter-Brick deduces that a complex of events affected French decisions, ones that were not predetermined, but rather reactionary. The combination of increased Moroccan nationalist strength and influence, an independence movement in Algeria and recent events, international pressure and the analysis of French leadership contributed to the French change in direction. Faure felt that if he acted too late, France could be put in a very precarious position where Moroccan nationalist leaders who supported arms over diplomacy gained control. French leadership feared that the anti-colonial struggle in Algeria, where France’s foothold was stronger, could cross borders and unite with that of Morocco. Therefore, France concentrated diplomatic strategies on Morocco and Tunisia and military ones on Algeria65. However, Faure states in his Mémoires that he would

65 A brief synopsis of the years leading up to Algerian independence demonstrates that the French policy towards Moroccan and Algerian decolonization differ tactically, the former through diplomacy and the latter through the use of force (including psychological warfare and terror tactics). However, ideologically, the approach to Morocco and Algeria are not divergent; the imperial French mindset drove their actions and reactions. French colonial spheres of influence were to be safeguarded and fortified even when faced with international pressure to decolonize and adhere to the self-determination of colonial peoples. French decolonization must be understood from the perspective of the French need to preserve and protect French self-interests. Algeria suffered greatly because of this need. However, under de Gaulle leadership, Algeria finally won its independence. When de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, he was forced to begin forming a strategy for Algeria. In 1959, he conceded the principle of self-determination and provided a three-fold choice referendum: independence, which he called secession; total integration, which he denominated françisation; or, internal self-government, known as “association” (Panter-Brick, 1988: 95). De Gaulle initiated the self-determination process in order to keep international and U.S. decolonization pressure at 101 have been prepared to sacrifice fifty thousand lives to secure France’s position in Morocco (Faure, 1982; cited in Panter-Brick, 1988: 88). The imperial mind-set always maintains the use of force as a first or last resort. By November 6, 1955, France had already recognized ben Youssef as His Majesty Mohammed V. Morocco gained formal independence in 1956. For France, decolonization marked a change in approach rather than ideology. Bilateral agreements and promises of interdependence guaranteed a continuity of French interests. Furthermore, the centralizing metropole force that united the French Union, although technically lost to formal decolonization, maintained its form economically, geopolitically and cultural-linguistically. La Francophonie, the totality of French speaking countries – qualified as those countries which employed French as a mother tongue, official language, medium of instruction and language of international discourse – became an organizing principle and means to recuperate a sense of loss (Panter-Brick, 1988: 103-104). France maintained its imperial reach and strengthened its superpower image. Rooted in the language was a “characteristically French mode of thinking [imperial epistemology], a manner of approach, a set of assumptions, and a cultural heritage [attitudes]” (103). French colonial and imperial attitudes persevered through formal decolonization and, in essence, economically and linguistically tattooed the

bay. At this point, self-determination was, in effect, symbolic rather than representative of true shifts in French policy towards Algeria. The two Saharan départements and their valuable oil and gas deposits were not even on the negotiating table. The option of independence or secession was outwardly vilified and equated with impoverishment, political anarchy and Communist dictatorship (all part of discourse production) (97). By November of 1960, de Gaulle placed less emphasis on secession and reframed self- determination within an adversarial binary: with France or against France. In December of 1961 it was evident to de Gaulle that the FLN (Front de Libération nationale; National Liberation Front) was backed by popular support, meaning supportive of full independence. The self-determination process would have to be opened up anew and the following economic and political issues reevaluated: the exclusion of the two Saharan départements, the future of French settlers and the presence of French armed forces in Algeria (99). By February of 1962, de Gaulle ceded to Algerian demands and renounced French claims to sovereign rights in the Sahara. From 1958 to the spring of 1962, de Gaulle shifted the French position on three key points: offering self-determination in 1959; accepting the FLN as the voice of the Algerian nationalist movement in 1960; and relinquishing French claims to the two départements in the Saharan in 1961. Ultimately, the Algerian liberation movement won independence, but like Faure with Morocco, de Gaulle insisted upon continued French-Algerian interdependence, with an accent on dependence on France. The decolonization process for Algeria demonstrates how decolonization was a matter of French internal dissent and disagreement as well as a battle against nationalist liberation movements. This internal contention was reflected in an inconsistent French foreign policy on decolonization. The common denominator uniting different French colonial territories was the desire to maintain substantial links with them. This was accomplished through bilateral agreements and calculated formal transfers of power or transfert des compétences. 102

Maghreb with a continued French presence. Regarding Western Sahara, France’s alliance to Moroccan imperialism and colonialism is not surprising in light of promised interdependence and language criteria. A Spanish-speaking country in the Maghreb, whether official or not, would eat into French hegemony. Economic and geopolitical competition with the world’s hyperpower, the United States, presents new challenges to and encroaches upon real and imagined French hegemony.

1.2.4.3. U.S. – French Competition

U.S.-French competition has been an ongoing theme since the end of World War II. It started as soon as FDR tried to erase the imperial imprint of France. However, let us not misread U.S. intentions. As La Feber points out, FDR’s Indochina policy from 1943- 44 is a perfect case study of how U.S. idealism, in this case anticolonialism (couched in anticolonial rhetoric and policy), can blend perfectly with American self-interest (La Feber, 1975:1294). In other words the U.S. aligned its self-interests with independence movements. Because these principles were rooted in self-interest rather than in the principles themselves, U.S. policy and action regarding decolonization and self- determination is fragmented and inconsistent. If we superimpose La Feber’s argument that U.S. idealism can blend perfectly with American self-interest onto U.S. Cold War and War on Terror discourses and ideological frameworks, we can see common patterns of displacement in U.S. foreign policy. For example, when the United States emerged onto the scene post-World War II, it had a threefold strategy: transcend Old World powers, contain Soviet-centered power and placate radical nationalism (Ryan, 2000: 14). The United States could not outwardly oppose self-determination; therefore, in order to legitimize its inconsistencies of stated principle and action, the U.S. would often times employ ideological disclaimers, such as labeling legitimate national liberation movements ‘communist’ (14). Today we need just replace ‘communist’ for ‘terrorist’. Western Sahara falls into both usages of ideological warfare, which intend to shadow U.S. self-interests while simultaneously maintaining popular support for U.S. policy. France, on the other hand, did not try to disguise its imperial motivations or initiatives. It clearly sought the French imperial dominance of

103 old. However, the changing times forced France to engage with the idea of interdependence – formal decolonization that maintained and consolidated French interests. At present, both the United States and France have joined forces for the ‘War on Terror’. La Feber also reminds us that overseas markets and naval bases (their strategic placing) are essential to empire (La Feber, 2000: 30). The United States, much more so than France, has striven to become the world’s military powerhouse. By 2003, U.S. military spending reached approximately 40% of the world total, equal to the next 15 largest defense budgets combined (Smith, 2003: 24). However, France comes ranks around number five in the world and is ready militarily to defend its interests in North Africa. The investment of both time and money into military strength is also nothing new to France. De Gaulle decided early on that France would develop a nuclear force, or force de frappe, such that none would dare attack for fear of suffering terrible injuries66. Additionally, post World War II French-United States military cooperation was strained by three main factors: the U.S. foreign policy to extend its global influence and by extension encroach upon pre-war French spheres of influence; U.S. dominance in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and the French perceived U.S.-Great Britain special relations. This culminated in de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw France from the heart of NATO, the integrated defense system67. In their imperial mindset, both countries have a lot to gain and a lot to lose. Therefore, they compete to assert economic, political, geopolitical and cultural dominance and to gain favor with distinct Maghrebi allies. The United States and France share a common ally, Morocco. Whereas France’s alliance to Morocco lies in ‘permanent ties of interdependence freely consented,’ the

66 France tested its first atomic bomb, Gerboise Bleue, on February 13, 1960 in the middle of the Algerian Sahara (amidst the war with Algeria). France became the fourth world power to develop nuclear weapons behind the United States, the USSR and Great Britain. The bomb registered at 70 kilotons, the biggest nuclear blast of its time. By comparison, the nuclear bomb, Fat Man, unleashed by the United States on Nagasaki, yielded 22 kilotons, one-third as powerful. 67 For an account of French-U.S. relations during de Gaulle’s leadership see Julius W. Pratt, “De Gaulle and the United States: How the Rift Began,” 1968. This overtly U.S. biased account of U.S. relations with de Gaulle provides insight into both dominant U.S. narratives and the power relations between two imperial mindsets. Clearly, when the ideological reference point is imperialism/neocolonialism, cookie cutter analysis of ‘history’ dominates the voice and lens of the historian and, in this case, his simplistic and ‘big’ power narrative. 104

United States’ allegiance to Morocco dates back to U.S. independence. In 1777, Morocco sought diplomatic relations with the United States government (one of the first countries to do so), making Morocco one of the United States’ oldest and closest allies in the Maghreb region. Formal U.S.-Moroccan relations date from 1787 with the Treaty of Peace and Friendship; this treaty was renegotiated in 1836 and represents the longest unbroken treaty relationship in U.S. history (U.S. Department of State, 2007a). Considering the close historical ties of France and the United States to Morocco and their track record for decolonization and self-determination (holding self-interest above principle), the United Nation’s determination to eradicate colonialism by 2010 will not prevail unless sufficient pressure is brought to bear on both states. The United States and France have introduced a new ‘idealism’ to the mix, and autonomy, a colonial strategy of old, has replaced anticolonialism as veiled self-interest.

1.3. Peremptory Norms

1.3.1. The Concept of Jus Cogens

“For us not to recognize SADR in this situation is to become an accessory to the denial of the people of Western Sahara of their right to self- determination. This would constitute a grave and unacceptable betrayal of our own struggle, of the solidarity Morocco extended to us, and our commitment to respect the Charter of the United Nations and the constitutive act of the African Union” (Letter from President Thabo M’Beki of South Africa to King Mohammed VI of Morocco, Clark, 2007: 56).

The realization of self-determination, as guaranteed in international law, should be the result of a free and voluntary expression of a people representative of their collective wishes. United Nations Resolution 1542(XV), which immediately followed 1541(XV) (“Transmission of Information under Article 73e of the Charter”), directly addressed Spain and Portugal and their responsibilities regarding decolonization, despite the fact that they had both claimed their colonies to be overseas provinces. The Resolution reiterated the legally binding principle of self-determination for colonial peoples: “[D]enial of the right to self-determination of colonial peoples constitutes a

105 threat to the well-being of humanity and international peace” (United Nations General Assembly, 1960c). Therefore, any attempt to derail the process of self-determination constitutes a breach of international law. This includes plans of autonomy framed in political realism. Self-determination is a “‘sacred trust’ over which the international community has certain responsibilities” (Pungong, 2000: 86). In the 1960s, with much attention being paid to human rights for minorities, women and children, the international community decided to set apart certain fundamental principles of international law. Jus cogens, also known as peremptory or absolute norms of international law, refers to principles of international law so fundamental that no nation may ignore them or attempt to contract out of them through treaties. The concept was formally introduced into international law in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 53 of the Convention stipulates:

“[A] peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character” (Hannikainen, 2007: 59).

Lauri Hannikainen explains that even though the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has not received universal acceptance by the international community, the above definition of international jus cogens has (Hannikainen, 2007: 59). The issue has also been taken up by the International Law Commission and one can safely say belongs to a formal distinct category of international law. Examples of principles recognized under jus cogens include prohibitions (or obligations) against genocide, participation in the slave trade and colonialism68. In correlation with the prohibition and eradication of colonialism, decolonization and self-determination enter the realm of jus cogens69. To reiterate, there are sixteen outstanding cases of decolonization. Although decolonization has regularly been

68 For an exhaustive list of peremptory norms see Lauri Hannikainen, “The Case of Western Sahara from the Perspective of Jus Cogens,” 2007, pp. 63-64. 69 Although I argue, like Ian Brownlie (2008) and Special Rapporteur Hector Gros Espiell (1980) that self- determination for colonial peoples constitutes a peremptory norm (jus cogens), there are those that refute this claim, like Special Rapporteur Aurelieu Critescu (1981) and J.H.W. Verzijil (1968) (see also Hannum, 2002: 247/endnote 34). This discrepancy should be noted. 106 dismissed as “outdated,” “immaterial” (Cassese, 1998: 58, 89), or as mentioned previously, “insignificant,” “inconsequential” and “like shards of pottery indifferently cast on distant shores” (Betts, 1998: 2), it fulfills the criteria of jus cogens. The remaining cases should not be belittled or cast aside so quickly in light of the gravity of colonialism and the international norms that specifically target it. The prohibition of colonialism is not under scrutiny here, rather the manner with which to go about implementing decolonization and self-determination is. Hans Blix notes that if self-determination as a rule of law is to have practical significance, it needs a third party to assess relevant cases and to apply the rule. He concludes that while not necessarily ideal, the UN General Assembly serves this function (Blix, 1970: 13-14). However, under jus cogens and in the case of international breaches of the right to self-determination, third party states are legally responsible for intervening and calling to account the actions of perpetrating states (Cassese, 1998: 324). In essence, the overriding significance and purpose of peremptory norms is to protect the interests and value systems of the international community; the obligatory and universal nature of these norms ensures that they be followed (Hannikainen, 2007: 60). On the whole, international organizations play an important role in the development and safeguarding of peremptory norms. Spanish philosopher Vicent Martínez Guzmán (2001; 2005b) appropriates the term ‘realist’ and redefines it in eco-humanist terms. In his view, realist approaches to international politics and policies imply the use of our competencies and capacities for building peace(s) in harmony with the natural environment. The efforts of third states as well as the United Nations and other organizations to employ their competencies and capacities towards working for a more equal and just world not only fits this descriptive, but also corresponds to their responsibility to uphold internationally established norms (Martínez Guzmán, 2006). Similarly, working to ensure the adherence of the international community to peremptory norms means working towards breaking the negative peace stalemate conflict between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO. Since peremptory norms are meant to protect the general interests and values of the international community, states owe their peremptory obligations to the international community of states as an entirety, rather than to individual states (Hannikainen, 2007:

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61). In this way, the international community upholds peremptory norms above individual state relations, which tend to give and take, and often times overlook or downplay unacceptable state behavior for national gain. Peremptory norms function to maintain international standards regarding, for example, human rights and to deter states from abusing them for fear of international backlash. Furthermore, peremptory norms are not subject to the constraints of time, unless they are revised or declared null and void. Therefore, time does not bestow validity on state action in relation to peremptory norms. Peremptory norms, in fact, trump state action if a state violates them. In addition, ‘political solutions’ for situations where actions of states are in violation of peremptory norms erode international standards and the international security of the community of states, especially if such solutions allow a violating state (or third party states) to act with impunity towards established and accepted international norms. As Hannikainen explains, jus cogens does not permit conflicting norms, instruments or regimes; furthermore, it prohibits third parties from providing assistance to any act that would constitute a breach of peremptory norms, even parties claiming neutrality in a conflict situation (Hannikainen, 2007: 62). Peremptory norms and their relation to decolonization and self-determination should be an integral part of conflict analysis and conflict strategies; however, often times they are overlooked because of big power interest proximity. I have already demonstrated how self-determination has been denied the Sahrawi people, despite it being integral to the decolonization process for Western Sahara. I also highlighted the twofold nature of Morocco’s invasion of Western Sahara: the denial of the right of self-determination through occupation and the illegal use of force. In light of the importance of international peremptory norms, jus cogens, the latter deserves more attention here.

1.3.2. Use of Force: Acts of Aggression

Hannikainen argues that the obligation not to obstruct the right of self- determination of dependent peoples reached peremptory status in the whole scale decolonization process; he further asserts that at the time Morocco and Mauritania invaded Western Sahara in 1975, the norm had already been accepted in international law

108 and practice (Hannikainen, 2007: 62). The protection of the right of self-determination under jus cogens also puts into effect other specific peremptory norms when a state infringes upon that very right: “not to subject colonial…peoples to their domination against the will of those peoples; to refrain from forcible and deceitful action obstructing the right of dependent peoples to self-determination; and not to exploit the natural resources of dependent territories to the detriment of the people of those territories” (62). The peremptory norm of the prohibition of the exploitation of natural resources of dependent territories as well as the application of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949) relating to the illegal transfer of settler populations to occupied territories shall be addressed in Chapter Three. The first two, however, bring us to the topic of the use of force. The use of aggressive armed force by any state breaks a fundamental principle of the United Nations Charter; furthermore, its prohibition constitutes a peremptory norm. UN Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, “Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the UN” (also known as the Declaration on Friendly Relations), can be represented as the legal personality of dependent peoples (United Nations General Assembly, 1970a). The resolution sets out specific principles for the creation of friendly relations between states and directly targets three important subjects: potential aggressor states, other states directly or indirectly involved and dependent peoples (especially with regard to their right to self-determination). According to the resolution every potential aggressor state has the following duty:

“…to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Such a threat or use of force constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations and shall never be employed as a means of settling international issues. A war of aggression constitutes a crime against the peace, for which there is responsibility under international law” (emphasis mine).

Every state party to an international dispute or implicated as a third-party state shall:

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“…refrain from any action which may aggravate the situation so as to engender the maintenance of international peace and security, and shall act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations” (emphasis mine).

Finally, regarding the principle of self-determination of peoples as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations:

“…all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter” (emphasis mine).

Regarding the obligations of the international community to safeguard the principle of self-determination:

“Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate action, realization of the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples…[and to]…bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned; and bearing in mind that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle, as well as a denial of fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the Charter” (emphases mine).

With respect to the obligations of potential aggressor states:

“Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence” (emphasis mine).

Finally, the resolution reiterates that a territory of a colony or Non-Self-Governing Territory has under the Charter:

“…a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it; and such separate and distinct status under the Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or Non-Self-Governing Territory have exercised their right of self-determination in accordance with the Charter, and particularly its purposes and principles” (emphasis mine).

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In accordance with the UN Charter and a corollary to the Declaration on Friendly Relations, General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, “Definition of Aggression,” specifically defines aggression and calls attention to the role of the Security Council in relation to acts of aggression. The resolution also reaffirms the fact that states should refrain from using force to deprive people of their right to self- determination, freedom and independence. The relevant part of the definition of aggression for this study is section (a), Article 3, which qualifies acts of aggression: “The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof.” Ultimately Resolutions 2625 (XXV) and 3314 (XXIX) lay out in no uncertain terms the peremptory norm of the prohibition of force in relation to Non-Self-Governing Territories and their right to self-determination70.

1.3.3. Jus Cogens, the Use of Force and the Specific Case of Western Sahara

“The political nature of the choices in which the Security Council engages in dealing with particular cases is perhaps underscored by the failure of the Security Council to condemn this breach of the Charter and invoke the sanctions of Chapter VII of the Charter. The Council has, rather, consistently sought to characterize the matter as one involving a dispute and thus subject to Chapter VI’s dispute settlement mechanisms” (Clark, 2007: 55).

Article 2 of Resolution 3314 (XXIV) opens the door for political choices to affect the reaction and action of the Security Council. It stipulates that in light of “relevant circumstances” the Security Council may override the use of force constituting prima facie evidence of an act of aggression. This clause has had serious implications for the decolonization process of Western Sahara. In contempt of the UN Charter and peremptory norms, the Security Council has refused to declare Morocco’s invasion and attempt at securing an internationally recognized annexation of the territory of Western

70 Although General Assembly resolutions are non-binding, they represent the majority voice of the 192 member states of the United Nations. Security Council resolutions are binding; however, inherent to them is the structural inequality of the United Nations (permanent members with veto power) and exclusive, rather than, inclusive representation. 111

Sahara an act of aggression. Instead, the Security Council has invoked Chapter VI of the Charter, which addresses pacific settlements of disputes. The reasons for such a discrepancy in principle, law and peremptory norms can be attributed to the infusion of international legality with politicality, the normalization of Realpolitik policies and practice. Political practicality overwhelmingly takes precedence over internationally established norms and values when the interests of key Security Council members, in this case the United States and France, clash with international standards71. The insertion of the ambiguous clause “relevant circumstances” in assessing what constitutes an act of aggression allows the United States and France to bulldoze over what actually constitutes a Moroccan (and Mauritanian) act of aggression against Western Sahara, a Non-Self- Governing Territory with special status. Roger Clark argues correctly that third parties have an added responsibility. As article 5, paragraph three of the General Assembly’s definition of aggression stipulates, “no territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from aggression is or shall be recognized as lawful” (Clark, 2007: 57). Clark contends further that the definition of aggression as well as other international provisions and instruments constitute an international customary law obligation of third states (57). I will argue later that in relation to conflict analysis and transformation, third parties (which will be afforded new and more specified categorizations) actually distort the conflict situation under the guise of neutrality, a necessary accessory to smooth, methodic and normalized realizations of Realpolitik. In essence, the failure of the United Nations to invoke the sanctions guaranteed by Chapter VII of the UN Charter has resulted in the sidelining of internationally established peremptory norms regarding the decolonization process for Western Sahara. If we look specifically at the language of the United Nations and the fact that acts of aggression shall never be employed as a means of settling international issues; that third states should not aggravate the situation; that dependent peoples should freely express their right to self-determination without external interference (including interference from aggressor states and third states); that every State has the duty to

71 The systemic inequality built into the United Nations structure and against United Nations Principles of peace and equality will be examined in Chapters Two and Three. 112 promote self-determination of peoples; and that the Non-Self-Governing Territory shall possess a separate and distinct status under the Charter… until the people of the colony or Non-Self-Governing Territory have exercised their right of self-determination, it is clear that in the case of Western Sahara valuable international standards, principles and jurisprudence, jus cogens, have been set aside by not only the implementation of real politics, but also their normalization. In this instance, third party states figure importantly into the why and how of the normalization of real politics, especially in the utilization of catch phrases like political solutions and/or sweeping ideological disclaimers like the Cold War or the War on Terror. Moreover, third party states collude with Morocco in the maintenance of a conflict situation that denies a people their right to self-determination and provides passive and active acceptance of the use of force and occupation. Morocco weakly argues that its acts of aggression are warranted under the right to protect its territorial integrity. The fact that the International Court of Justice found that nothing should interfere with the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination completely invalidates this claim. Furthermore, self-determination has trumped claims of territorial integrity in most decolonization cases because of the Organization of African Unity’s premise of accepting colonial boundaries for the decolonization context. Additionally, the international community has the responsibility to uphold the principles of the United Nations Charter. Chapter Three, Article 40 of the International Law Commission’s report on State Responsibility establishes international responsibility for serious breaches of state obligations under peremptory norms of general international law. Article 41 specifically lays out what these responsibilities are, including cooperating to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach of international peremptory norms as well as not recognizing as lawful a situation created by a serious breach of such norms (International Law Commission, 2001). The United Nations and the international community as a whole have failed to live up to these responsibilities and obligations. Instead they have created ambiguity where there is none and have entered dangerous territory, upholding ‘practicality’ over ‘legality’72.

72 Again, the normalization of the suspension of international law will be further explored in Chapter Four, utilizing Giorgio Agamben’s conceptualization of the state of exception (2005) as a theoretical springboard. 113

1.4. Autonomy

1.4.1. Prelude to Autonomy: A Dangerous Precedent

The fact that Western Sahara is a clear case of decolonization in a predominately secessionist era actually hurts the Sahrawi struggle for self-determination (Drew, 2007: 93)73. The previous discussions on postcolonial studies and self-determination loom large here when considering the continuous nature of decolonization. A purely time-line approach to decolonization oversimplifies complex processes rooted in imperialist, racist, supremacist ideologies and practices and the attitudes and dominant discourses and narratives that accompany them. Formal decolonization did not guarantee national liberation and excluded other legitimate calls for self-determination that did not fit into the decolonization mold. However, for Sahrawis to be denied formal decolonization, the right to freely express self-determination, means suffering under an oppressive, militaristic and occupying power and in exile in an inhospitable unrelenting desert. In April of 2006, Secretary-General Kofi Annan documented the recommendations made by his personal envoy Peter van Walsum regarding the status of Western Sahara. Annan recommended that the United Nations step back from trying to establish a plan for Western Sahara and highlighted instead the observations of van Walsum which, if we splice his main ideas, call for: “direct negotiations” in recognition of the present “political reality,” as the “only alternative” to an “indefinite prolongation of the impasse” and in order to provide for a “consensual solution” without “preconditions” (United Nations Security Council, 2006). The Secretary-General makes the assurance that the United Nations cannot endorse a plan that excluded a genuine referendum while simultaneously claiming to provide for the self-determination of the Sahrawi people. However, Morocco refuses any plan providing for the option of independence, which, as we have established, puts into jeopardy a free and fair expression of self-determination by eliminating one of the guaranteed options stipulated in Resolution 1541 (XV). Therefore, in accepting direct negotiations with the knowledge

73 Peter Harris and Ben Reilly (2003), for example, focus their conflict analysis on what they call a trend away from traditional inter-state conflict (a war between sovereign states) and towards intra-state conflict (one that takes place between factions within and existing state). 114 that Morocco has refused to recognize independence as an option, the United Nations passively endorses a plan that excludes a genuine referendum. Is the United Nations using ‘direct negotiations’ in order to avoid its own responsibilities? In short, yes. The United Nations, as Catriona Drew emphasizes, has departed radically from former United Nations policy (Drew, 2007: 88) by endorsing direct negotiations in order to “work out a compromise between international legality and political reality that would produce a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which would provide for the self-determination of Western Sahara” (S/2006/249 of 19 April 2006). Annan admits that “what was unthinkable in a plan endorsed or approved by the Security Council might not be beyond the reach of direct negotiations”; and van Walsum encourages members of the Security Council who support the position of Morocco to also engage in the proposed negotiations (United Nations Security Council, 2006). The normalization of Realpolitik approaches to international relations has the potential for corrupting United Nations established principles, norms and standards. Incredibly, direct negotiations provide the political front and supposed neutral parties to the conflict a Moroccan edge to a political solution. The icing on the cake, however, is van Walsum’s attempt to override the 1975 ICJ decision on Western Sahara ensuring the right of self- determination of the Sahrawi people by insinuating that, as it had been handed down more than 30 years ago, it had virtually become outdated. The timelessness of peremptory norms (unless otherwise overturned) as well as the recent referendum for East Timor in 2002, a process that took from 1975-2002, debunk this claim. In April of 2007, van Walsum encouraged Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to make the exact same recommendations as his predecessor in his own report on Western Sahara (S/2007/202, 13 April 2007). As a result, that same month, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1754 (S/RES/1754, April 30, 2007) requesting the following from Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO:

“…to enter into negotiations without preconditions in good faith, taking into account the developments of the last months, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of Western Sahara” (emphases mine).

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The obvious problem with this entreaty is the fact that a political solution and self- determination are directly at odds with one another. A political solution as proposed by Morocco does not provide for self-determination of Western Sahara and therefore cannot meet the goal of a just, lasting and mutually acceptable solution. Furthermore, the Security Council’s choosing direct negotiations over its commitment to a referendum runs contrary to the right of self-determination as upheld by international law (Drew, 2007: 88). Drew explains that the right of self-determination confers a right to a particular process and not to specific outcomes. The self-determination process entails the freely expressed will of peoples, which in turn establishes a certain outcome (91). Thereby, a political solution, such as autonomy, cannot ‘stand for’ self-determination, the process by which a people decide their fate in the form of independence, free association or integration.

1.4.2. The Frente POLISARIO Plan

On April 10, 2007 the Frente POLISARIO introduced the “Proposal of the Frente POLISARIO for a Mutually Acceptable Political Solution that Provides for the Self- Determination of the People of Western Sahara” (Omar, 2008b: 54; see also Frente POLISARIO, 2007b). Although both negotiating parties put forth proposals, the Security Council took note of Morocco’s “serious and credible…efforts to move the process forward toward resolution,”74 and less emphatically took note of the Frente POLISARIO’s proposal (United Nations Security Council, 2007). There was no mention of a serious and credible engagement on the part of the Frente POLISARIO. This is perplexing in light of the fact that the Frente POLISARIO has consistently met United Nations requests and has made multiple concessions regarding voter eligibility and the time line for the expression of self-determination, even though Morocco has consistently avoided or belligerently denied United Nations stipulations and has persistently thwarted

74 This very wording, “welcoming serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution,” was proposed by the United States (with the backing of the so-called Group of Friends of Western Sahara) in replacement of an earlier wording contained in a draft resolution that was proposed by the United States (with France’s backing) and circulated at the Security Council prior to the adoption of Resolution 1754. The first U.S. draft expressly commended the “Moroccan proposal as a serious and credible initiative” and welcomed Morocco’s efforts “to move the process forward towards resolution” (Interview with Sidi M. Omar, San Francisco, California, January 10, 2010). 116 the process of voter eligibility and self-determination. This is a clear case of knowledge subjugation. As has been reiterated throughout this chapter, the Western Sahara status is a United Nations sanctified Non-Self-Governing Territory. Therefore, it is an open decolonization case. How then has autonomy without an independence option achieved such precedence as a conflict transformation strategy75? In the opening statement on the first day of ‘negotiations’ in June of 2007, the Frente POLISARIO clearly stated its main objection to the Moroccan Autonomy Plan: “the attempt to distort a decolonisation process and to substitute it, regardless of UN resolutions, with a project called ‘autonomy’ whereby Morocco appropriates unilaterally and unduly the sovereignty over a Non-Self-Governing Territory without consulting its people is at the heart of the impasse of which consequences are worsening day by day” (Frente POLISARIO, 2007a). Clearly frustrated by all failed attempts to legitimize its occupation and illegal annexation of Western Sahara and faced with the public reality that no member state of the UN recognizes Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara (Omar, 2008b: 54; paragraph 37 of the 2006 Secretary General’s Report), Morocco has chosen a new route of ‘cooperation,’ what one could denominate an autonomy smokescreen. The functioning of Realpolitik can be seen here in the structuring of the rules by which conflict strategies are created, accepted, legitimized and promoted.

1.4.3. The Third Way: Autonomy

“In short, on the Western Sahara (1975) understanding of the meaning of self-determination, identifying colonialism as the legal basis for self- determination is significant because it places the Western Sahara entitlement at the very top of a normative hierarchy both in terms of the status and content of the right. As with East Timor before 1999, this precludes any argument that the right of self-determination can be satisfied by an offer of autonomy that excludes the option of independent statehood or that the applicable law is so confused or indeterminate that it provides no meaningful guidance as to the content of the Western Sahara self- determination entitlement” (Drew, 2007: 94).

75 Chapter Four also takes up the issue of autonomy, however, from a more theoretical/juridical perspective aimed at querying into the legitimation, suspension and transgression of international law. This chapter specifically analyzes the subject of autonomy and the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan. Chapter Four opens up this assessment even further, utilizing the concept of self-determination, and not autonomy, as a peaceful conflict transformative approach and strategy to self-determination conflicts. 117

Due to the relatively recent phenomena of secessionist movements spanning the globe, it is becoming more and more common for conflict resolution strategists to propound autonomy76 as a middle ground between independence movements and governing states, especially as a means of “state construction” that addresses “the needs of diverse communities” (Weller and Wolf, 2005: 3-4). According to Han-Joachim Heintze, conceptualizations of autonomy fall into three distinct disciplines: philosophy, where it is perceived as the power of human beings to self-determination based on a rational will of the individual; natural sciences, where it relates to organic independence; and law and politics, where multiple meanings characterize the concept (Heintze, 1998: 7). The elastic nature of autonomy in law and politics allows for great depths of interpretation, which can be both positive and negative regarding its application. The term autonomy derives from Greek and literally translated means self (auto) rule of law (nomos). Autonomy can refer to individual or collective self-rule. In this study, we are concerned with the latter as representative of the former. As Hannikainen points out, the three terms, self-determination, autonomy and self-government, are not divergent semantically. In legal terms, autonomy and self-government have been treated synonymously (Hannikainen, 1998: 79). Whereas self-determination provides for the option of full independence, autonomy implies certain limitations. The international community has backed plans of autonomy in order to prevent violent conflicts (especially considering the rise in interethnic conflict) and to appease independence movements and ‘peoples’ that fall outside of decolonization. Target conflicts include those taking place in decolonized countries where ‘accepted’ colonial lines often times did not reflect internal realities. In many of these cases, internal strife followed transitions to statehood. This, in fact, is one of the main critiques of self- determination. In its most positivist usage, it only applies to cases of decolonization. Opening up self-determination, be it internal or external, to situations that go beyond

76 Martin Ostwald traces the origin and development of political autonomy to the period when the Confederacy of Delos began to develop into the Athenian empire. He claims that it was first employed on behalf of allied states that were pulled in the sphere of its empire; in turn, these allied states asserted their rights of independence in political decision-making. Autonomia (autonomy) did not guarantee absolute freedom, but constituted a relationship of payments of tribute and internal interference. Ostwald contends that the concept of autonomy developed after the revolt of Thasos. Towards the end of the Peloponnesian War, when Athenian dominance waned, more freedoms were granted to some remaining allies and to others independence (Ostwald, 1982). 118 decolonization is a positive response to changing complex state realities and is even reflected in international law for groups facing extreme oppression, racist regimes and flagrant human rights violations (see Declaration of Friendly Relations77). However, applying the concept of autonomy inversely to clear decolonization cases, like Western Sahara, runs counter to international law and puts into jeopardy standards of international conduct78. It would be naïve to think that states put international law and standards above ‘national interest’ because they are ‘supposed’ to do so. Nonetheless, if state behavior is allowed to go unchecked when blatantly in violation of these peremptory norms, the international community conspires to undo the very principles and foundation that facilitates peaceful state relations. Although this study has severe reservations regarding autonomy as a tool for conflict transformation for the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict, especially considering that Morocco’s proposal (upheld as positive steps forward by influential third parties) excludes the option of independence, it is nevertheless important to explore key elements of the concept of autonomy in international law and as a tool for real politics. It is possible to peel away the many layers of the apparent compromise of autonomy in order to reveal the various roles that Realpolitik and neocolonial/neoimperial agendas play in its manifestation. Antonio Cassese concludes that “personal and territorial autonomy” constitutes the means of achieving self-determination for ethnic groups and minorities so that they become integral parts in state life (at the national and local levels) and maintain and develop their own identity (Cassese, 1998: 352-354). He defines personal and territorial autonomy as:

“…a broad measure of self-government in political, economic, cultural, and religious matters. Groups and minorities located in specific territorial

77 The safe-guard clause for broadening the concept of self-determination to peoples other than colonial is quoted below. For a summary of different schools of thought, see Karen Knop, Diversity and Self- Determination in International Law, 2002, pp. 75-79. 78 In Chapter Four, I more specifically address contemporary discussion of self-determination and how they bear upon the case of Western Sahara. Using self-determination discourses, I also problematize my own premise that Western Sahara is a clear-cut decolonization case. By doing so, I deepen my own analysis and simultaneously address problematic issues directly related to the passage of time and the blending of eras: the colonial and post-colonial. However, it is also important to clearly recognize the decolonization status of Western Sahara. In this way, I am able to dispel mistruths and engage the complexity of a more than 30- year-old conflict. 119

areas should be granted the power to set up regional or local government structures endowed with legislative and enforcement powers and with the authority to take decisions regarding land and natural resources, social services, police and security matters, culture and education, and more generally the promotion of minority rights and interests…Autonomy would not undermine State sovereignty because, firstly, some matters would be reserved to the central authorities (for example, foreign affairs and defence) and, secondly, there should exist some sort of central power of supervision designed to ensure that the exercise of autonomous powers by minorities and groups does not run counter to the basic principles of the State Constitution” (354-355).

Cassese brings up an important point regarding solutions of autonomy. They are generally connected to situations where state sovereignty overrides a minority group’s desire for self-government or secession. In this way autonomy functions as a middle ground or third way political solution, a compromise that attempts to address the needs of opposing parties. It works towards recognizing ethnic and minority identities, while maintaining the territorial integrity of a state. Ruth Lapidoth claims that the very adaptability of autonomy offers a workable and peaceful compromise to secessionist movements. She asserts that because of the opportunities that autonomy tenders, more and more authors consider it to be a valid means of self-determination and a peaceful solution to potential violent conflicts (Lapidoth, 1997: 23). Natalia Loukacheva (2008) conceptualizes autonomy as equivalent to self-government, but within the context of an internal right to self-determination79. The distinction between internal and external self- determination is critical here. Autonomy, which has been equated with internal self- determination, does not offer independent statehood, whereas external self-determination does. It is commonly accepted by states that colonial peoples have the right to external self-determination without external interference (Hannikainen, 1998: 83). However, the parameters of the concept of autonomy or internal self-determination have not been defined as such.

79 For a conceptual discussion of autonomy and its implications and applications in international and domestic law see Markku Suksi, Autonomy: Applications and Implications, 1998. This work provides a legal understanding of autonomy and an exploration of its conceptual elasticity, including insight into an ethics of minority protection and cultural autonomy. It also explores how different models of autonomy can influence the organization of a state – namely through regionalization. Of particular importance are: the introduction by Suksi and chapters II by Heintze, IV by Wiberg, V by Kjell-Ǻke and VI by Lauri Hannikainen. 120

Heintze problematizes the application of the right of all peoples to self- determination outside of the decolonization context and ultimately poses the question of what would happen if the world’s 3,500 ethnic groups all demanded their own states (Heintze, 1998: 10). Will autonomy eventually lead to an independent status? For some, autonomy poses a problem to the logic of territorial integrity. For this reason, states are reluctant to grant autonomy. On the flip side, secessionist movements do not always see autonomy as the answer to their desires. As Heintze suggests, the differentiation of external and internal self-determination brings an entirely new slant to the relationship between self-determination and autonomy (1998: 9). In this analysis, one can conclude that autonomy broadens the colonial definition of self-determination, albeit within the differentiated context of ‘internal’ self-determination. But, how can autonomy be applied and in which situations? Hannikainen reminds us that the prevailing view in the international community of states in the current United Nations era has been that the right of external self- determination is only undeniably applicable to colonial or other comparable alien domination. Accordingly, support for self-determination will not be easily conceded to secessionist movements within already existing states (Hannikainen, 1998: 83). The exception to the colonial rule may apply in exceptional cases, such as mass extermination, systematic violence and flagrant violations of human rights against a population. The Friendly Relations Declaration provided the necessary opening or ‘safeguard clause’ to the broadening of the understanding of self-determination. Therefore, it is arguable, not necessarily accepted internationally, that in extreme cases of oppression international law concedes the right of secession (Crawford, 2006: 119). It reads:

“Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs [stipulating the principles of self- determination] shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self- determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed, or color” (United Nations General Assembly, 1970a; emphasis mine).

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Cassese points out that to understand the language of the text, one must turn the above italicized clause around and frame that which is stipulated in the negative in positive terms: “if in a sovereign State the government is ‘representative’ of the whole population, in that it grants equal access to the political decision-making process and political institutions to any group and in particular does not deny access to government to groups on the grounds of race, creed or colour, then that government respects the principle of self-determination; consequently, groups are entitled to claim a right to self- determination only where the government of a sovereign State denies access on such grounds” (Cassese, 1998: 112)80. Despite this slight aperture for secessionist movements in international law, it should be noted that thus far this clause has been subject to strict interpretation as the majority of states uphold the principle of territorial integrity and the political unity of sovereign states above calls for self-determination – even in clear-cut situations of state executed oppression of peoples. In this way, internal self-determination is generally subordinate to the territorial integrity of states. Hannikainen highlights two examples of secessionist movements in light of systematic state violence against a people: East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh) and Chechnya (1998: 84). In the first example, he explains that in the early 1970’s the annihilation of the political elite of East Pakistan actually led to the successful secession of the region and it becoming Bangladesh. However, one could argue that Bangladesh succeeded in doing so as a result of military intervention by India (Weller, 2005: 25). As such, the international community of states was slow in recognizing its legitimacy. In the second example, the international community of states turned its back on the secessionist movement of Chechnya, which experienced severe state repression from 1994-1996. Furthermore, after alleged Chechen terrorist attacks in Moscow, the Russian Federation unilaterally annulled the Chechen status of self-determination agreed upon in 2001 and reincorporated Chechnya by force (Weller, 2005: 25). So not only are ‘legitimate’ secessionist movements (fitting into colonial, alien occupation or racist regime categories) strictly interpreted, they can also result in low intensity fighting stalemates with their respective central governments

80 The three areas where it can be argued that international law grants the right to secede are: decolonization in the ‘classic’ sense, unjust military occupation and denial of political participation based on race (Buchanan, 2004: 333). 122 without much international reaction or moves towards intervention. In essence, it is very difficult for the people of a suppressed territory to get the necessary approval and backing of the international community for external self-determination amounting to secession. Although it may be safe to say that secession is acceptable in exceptional circumstances, even then, big power agendas and interests may determine a successful outcome. For this reason, Hurst Hannum declares: “Autonomy is one step below full self- determination but one step above minority rights” (quoted in Hannikainen, 1998: 86). Although autonomy does not have a strong status in international law, it is increasingly used as a tool for conflict transformation and as an alternative to secession. Like the right of self-determination to colonial peoples, the formative process from principle to law of the right of autonomy will take time and depends upon United Nations resolutions and state practice. Even though international conventions do not provide for any general right of autonomy to regions or regional minorities (Hannkainen, 1998: 84), it has recently become the preferred solution for potential conflict situations and exit plan for existing self-determination conflicts (particularly stalemated ones). In this way autonomy is tied to self-determination. However, in cases of secession within state sovereignty, we are talking about internal self-determination – the choice of the people of a system of governance and the administration of the functions of governance. Autonomy does not provide for eventual independence. In complex and stalemated decolonization cases where the United Nations and international community have not enforced peremptory norms relating to decolonization, they have turned to autonomy as a stepping-stone to eventual self-determination with independence as an option. For example, when the leaders of the liberation movement of East Timor realized that their hopes for decolonization via the right of the East Timorese people to external self-determination had been stalemated and sidelined, they propounded a plan that would ultimately provide for self-determination through stages rather than the traditional internationally prescribed process of self-determination (guaranteed to all colonial peoples). This included a phase of autonomy under Indonesia for five years with self- determination and an option of independence at the end of five years (Catholic Institute for International Relations and International Platform of Jurists for East Timor, 1995). This same tactic was used by the Secretary-General’s special envoy, former U.S.

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Secretary of State James Baker, in his Framework Agreement of 2001 and Peace Plan for the Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara of 200381. These proposed plans fall into a relatively new82 conflict resolution approach called earned sovereignty83.

1.4.4. Introduction to Earned Sovereignty

According to Williams and Pecci, earned sovereignty84 entails “the conditional and progressive devolution of sovereign powers and authority from a state to a substate entity under international supervision” (2004: 4). Earned sovereignty is a multi-stage conceptual approach aimed at bridging the gap between ‘sovereignty-first’ and ‘self- determination-first’ conflicts. In other words, earned sovereignty addresses conflicts where sovereignty and self-determination are pegged against each other85. Williams and Pecci denominate such conflicts ‘sovereignty-based conflicts’ and contend that the adaptability of the concept makes earned sovereignty a useful tool for conflict resolution. Williams and Pecci place Western Sahara in this category of sovereignty-based conflicts. They conclude that groups that pursue independence from a state frequently rely on the doctrine of self-determination to support their cause. In support of this argument, they cite the case of Western Sahara (Williams and Pecci, 2004: 3). As we will see below in the discussion of the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan, I contend that it is in fact a misnomer for the decolonization conflict. A sovereignty-based conflict intimates that a separatist movement threatens the territorial integrity of a state, meaning that a substate entity or entity within an already established state desires more autonomy or

81 A review of the multiple Peace Plans for Western Sahara is presented in Chapter 3. 82 Catriona Drew questions the novelty of this approach and cites the work of Rose Parfitt, PhD candidate at the Law Department, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, as a source for a contrary historical analysis (Drew, 2007: 96). 83 For a concise critique of the counter trends in international law regarding self-determination, namely earned sovereignty, see Catriona Drew, “The Meaning of Self-Determination: “The Stealing of the Sahara” Redux?,” 2007, pp. 95-100. 84 James R. Hooper and Paul R. Williams state that the origins of the earned sovereignty approach are uncertain; however, they point to the crisis of the former Yugoslavia as the impetus for developing new approaches to resolving sovereignty-based conflicts (Hooper and Williams: 2003, 358). The concept of earned sovereignty has achieved prominence in U.S. legal literature post Cold War (Drew, 2007: 95). 85 According to the Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements and Democracy, from 1956-2004, 78 conflicts were directly related to self- determination/sovereignty. Incredibly, the average duration of the stalemated conflicts averages thirty years (Khosla, 2005: 21-27). See also, Peace and Conflict 2008 (Quinn, 2008: 33-38). 124 independence. To be sure, the logic of earned sovereignty departs from this very assumption. It seeks to resolve conflicts arising from the clash of independence-oriented entities within sovereign states. As has been stated above, not one state of the international community of states recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara; rather, the territory retains an occupied and to-be-determined status. The sovereignty-based conflict categorization also ignores the special status attributed to Western Sahara as one of the sixteen remaining decolonization cases. The topic of earned sovereignty sheds light on a new trend in conflict resolution strategies reflective of a secessionist era. Unfortunately, despite the inapplicability of the concept for decolonization cases, it has been utilized as a conflict resolution strategy for the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict. In essence, a discussion of earned sovereignty previews the logic behind the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan. The following sections demonstrate how Realpolitik discourses have made what appears illogical possible.

1.4.4.1. Outlining Earned Sovereignty

Williams and Pecci present earned sovereignty as a neutral approach that seeks to “promote peaceful coexistence between a state and a substate entity by establishing an equitable and acceptable power sharing arrangement” (2004: 9). They explain that earned sovereignty is emerging as a conflict resolution approach defined by three core elements: shared sovereignty, institution building and determination of final status. In order to meet the historical diversity of different conflicts and to enhance the applicability of earned sovereignty, three different approaches have been developed: phased sovereignty, conditional sovereignty and constrained sovereignty. The elements of earned sovereignty involve the following: an initial stage of shared sovereignty whereby an international institution monitors how each party exercises their authority and functions; an institution building stage whereby the international community helps to develop the institutional capacity for self-government; and an eventual determination of the final status of the substate entity and its relationship to the parent state (9). Optional elements include phased sovereignty, the accumulation of the substate of increasing sovereign authority; conditional sovereignty, a set of

125 established standards or conditions that need to be met prior to the determination of final status; and constrained sovereignty, the application of limitations to sovereign authority and functions of the new state, including continued international administrative and/or military presence (9-10). Basically, earned sovereignty can be tailored to the specifics of each ‘sovereignty-based’ conflict. However, an important question comes to the fore. What prevents hegemon or neoimperial/neocolonial states86 from tailoring ‘sovereignty- based’ conflicts to their interests? Despite its versatile appeal and suggested promise for conflict resolution of present day secessionist movements, it may also conceal undercurrents of a western free market capitalist agenda. Whether calculated or passively accepted, the homogenized conflict resolution prescription, especially if left unchecked, establishes an unequal and paternalistic relationship between heavyweights in the international community of states and self-determination movements. Catriona Drew provides a critique of the earned sovereignty approach as presented by Williams and Pecci. Rather than focusing on its potential for destabilizing the international order of states and emboldening precarious situations of secession or creating new ones as other skeptics do, Drew problematizes the earned sovereignty approach on the basis that it clumps together and does not differentiate between different self-determination conflicts (Drew, 2007: 96-100). Drew contends that the earned sovereignty approach deviates from established norms of international law in at least three ways, which is problematic not in that it widens the applicability of self- determination, but in that it does so in a manner that disregards and digresses from prior established norms. First, earned sovereignty endorses international supervision before and after sovereignty is achieved. This component signals a “return to the culture of international management that characterized earlier twentieth-century approaches to self- determination projects” like the League of Nations Mandates and Minorities Systems and the United Nations Trusteeship (97). I would also add that besides the condescending language which is reminiscent of the colonial doctrine and prescribed parent-child relationship, the international supervision assumes that certain states, most likely powerful ones, should dictate the development of potential new states or newly

86 The concepts of hegemon states and interest proximity are further developed in Chapter Three of this study. 126 independent states. An economic, political/geopolitical and military analysis of each self- determination conflict could determine the interest proximity of hegemon or neoimperial/neocolonial states and could debunk the underlying assumption that certain states are more qualified to aid in the development of others. Furthermore, an interest proximity analysis may very well undercut the neutrality claim regarding earned sovereignty and the peaceful resolution87 of conflicts. Even though Williams and Pecci stipulate that international supervision refers to the ‘international community,’ it would be fallacious to ignore the dominant narrative of the hierarchy of states and ‘top’ state interest in the final analysis of the implications of ‘international supervision’. Drew’s second critique of the earned sovereignty approach relates to the optional element of conditional sovereignty, which basically renders the exercise of self- determination conditional upon meeting stipulated benchmarks such as “protecting human and minority rights, halting terrorism, developing democratic institutions, instituting the rule of law and promoting regional stability” (Drew, 2007: 98; also cited in Hooper and Williams, 2003: 367). On some level, conditionality may expand the scope of the more traditional international law of self-determination; however, it also weakens traditional laws of self-determination as they relate to the process of decolonization or alien occupation (98-99). It is important to reiterate here that international law declares self-determination as an inalienable and unconditional right of colonial peoples. Additionally, the ideology of conditionality is reminiscent of the trumpeting of structural adjustment programs (privatization, deregulation and liberalization) in the 1980’s88. One must not rule out the real possibility that free market forces and agendas may be lurking in the shadows of such conflict resolution strategies, especially considering the imperial ideology behind conditionality. Thirdly, Drew takes issue with the method of determining the final status of a self-determination ‘entity’ in the earned sovereignty approach because it deviates from the traditional Western Sahara understanding of self-determination (Drew, 2007: 99).

87 As I have stated previously, I prefer the use of the terminology conflict ‘transformation’; however, in cases where conflict ‘resolution’ is employed by other authors, I will not make a terminological change. 88 For more information on structural adjustment programs and ‘development’ see Gilbert Rist, The History of Development, from Western Origins to Global Faith, 2002; Bjorn Hettne, Development Theory and the Three Worlds: Towards an International and Political Economy of Development, 1999; and Shamsul M. Haque, Restructuring Development Theories and Policies: A Critical Study, 1995. 127

Williams and Pecci explain: “The options for final status range from substantial autonomy to full independence. This decision is generally made through either some sort of referendum or in structured negotiations, but invariably involves the consent of the international community” (Williams and Pecci, 2004: 19). This construction of establishing final status ignores the distinctions between various categories of self- determination and ultimately clumps them into the same protracted conflict pot. Furthermore, the determining of final status basically eclipses or erodes legal entitlements to specific situations of self-determination. Whereas some entities with no recognized right to external self-determination have been granted a right to a referendum (including independent statehood as an option), others with an entitlement to the fullest expression of self-determination under international law have been pressured to submit to conditional entitlement (Drew, 2007: 99-100). In the case of Western Sahara, its colonial status normatively provides for a transformation of the conflict. International law guarantees colonial peoples an immediate entitlement to a free choice over territorial destiny, including the option of unconstrained and unconditioned independent statehood. However, and as mentioned previously, this right has been sidelined by earned sovereignty approaches in the form of autonomy plans. In the name of compromise, Western Sahara has conceded to international pressure to accept imposed conditions and changes to this unconditional right to self-determination. In the face of new trends of earned sovereignty and the lack of international will to enforce peremptory norms regarding this decolonization case, the Sahrawi people still hold on to the hope of realizing their right to self-determination, even if through stages (as is evidenced by the provisional acceptance of the Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara in 2003). At least this compromise and good faith attempt to break the political gridlock provides for the self-determination of the Sahrawi people through a referendum with the option of independence, albeit through a controversial ‘conditional’ process. In this case, Realpolitik does outdo peremptory norms, a fact which deserves further scrutiny (see Chapter Four). However, can the ‘political reality’ of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict do away with them altogether? The U.S. and French backed 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan, which offers

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‘real’ and ‘meaningful’ autonomy and no possibility for independence, virtually evading self-determination, suggests so.

1.4.5. The 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan

In the letter addressed to the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and attached to the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan, the Kingdom of Morocco makes two less than subtle assertions about how its proposal provides for self-determination. It declares: “The initiative achieves the principle of self-determination, through a free, modern and democratic expression regarding the autonomy statute” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Kingdom of Morocco, 2007a). First, the declaration that autonomy without the ‘earned’ option of independence functions as an expression of self-determination of colonial peoples runs contrary to Resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV). Second, the word choice ‘modern’ suggests that previous resolutions and peace plans for Western Sahara have become outdated and that autonomy solves this problem as a ‘modern’ tool for conflict resolution. Morocco also throws in the fear factor and threat of terrorism with a suggestive line towards the end of the letter: “Morocco hopes the other parties will be guided by the same political will and earnest commitment to resolve this dispute, once and for all, and to promote peace, security and stability in an endangered geopolitical environment” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Kingdom of Morocco, 2007a; emphasis mine). This word choice fuels the fears of the growth of terrorist cells in North Africa and provides fodder for the U.S. led War on Terror. Morocco’s end goal of manipulating the United Nations and international community comes across clearly in the misrepresentation of the standing of Western Sahara. Morocco disregards with impunity the special status of Western Sahara. Its plan departs from a position of territorial sovereignty so that autonomy appears as an acceptable and innovative compromise within the framework of Morocco’s “sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Kingdom of Morocco, 2007a). Morocco intentionally trumpets regional security, stability, democracy and prosperity – the ideological discourse of Realpolitik – over the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination. As has been stated above, I take issue

129 with earned sovereignty and autonomy approaches for the specific case of Western Sahara. I take further issue with the back step of the United Nations and its role in the conflict in favor of negotiations between the parties. However, I am astounded that the international community headed by the United States and France would even consider such a plan that omits the possibility of independence entirely. Even outside of the many flaws of the 2007 Moroccan autonomy, which is explored below, the negation of the right to self-determination and its active and passive acceptance demonstrates the power and pervasiveness of real politics in strategies of conflict transformation, without prejudice to political affiliation or partisanship89. The “Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Statute for the Sahara Region” is separated into three parts: Morocco’s commitment to a final political solution; basic elements of the Moroccan proposal (divided into two subsections a. powers of the Sahara autonomous region and b. bodies of the region); and approval and implementation procedure for the autonomy statute (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Kingdom of Morocco, 2007b). It is important to single out the main points of contention in each section in order to determine where and why autonomy is an inadequate solution for Western Sahara90. Of particular interest is also how – by what way and by what means – real politics has penetrated conflict resolution strategies, or in the words of Slavoj Žižek, how “the New is here to enable the Old to survive” (2006: 237). Here, it becomes apparent how the specific case of Western Sahara allows us to link together and track the workings of power – the realization of Realpolitik – within conflict transformation strategies, as we have seen as they relate to the interconnected broad topics of decolonization, postcolonial studies, self-determination in international law (and impediments to it, including acts of aggression and occupation) and now lastly, autonomy. Walter Benjamin reminds us “that it is not enough to ask how a certain theory…declares itself with regard to social struggles – one should also ask how it

89 It deserves repeating that I specifically address how self-determination, not autonomy, is a more appropriate conflict transformative strategy and process for self-determination conflicts in general and the Western Sahara case in particular in Chapter Four. 90 Chapter Four analyzes the theoretical implications of ‘how’ autonomy has become the preferred conflict transformative path. The particulars and inadequacies of the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan are considered in this chapter. 130 effectively functions in these very struggles” (cited in Žižek, 2006: 237; emphasis mine). If we replace ‘social struggles’ with ‘conflict transformation strategies’ and ‘in these very struggles’ with ‘in these very conflict strategies,’ it becomes clear that the analysis of a conflict theory or approach must include how this theory or approach functions. I would add that it is necessary to query into how these approaches or tools for conflict transformation function within discourses and ideologies of capitalism – free market systems, militarization, democratization, geo-political strategizing, etc. So as Žižek cites Benjamin in order to put in check the very struggles (third-way approaches) that today attempt to challenge ideologies of capitalism, I incorporate Žižek’s ‘stop and think’ edict for conflict transformation strategies which claim third-way neutrality, effectiveness (resolution) and innovation. In other words, and as presented by Žižek, we must question the hegemonic ideological coordinates and hegemonic ideologies of global capitalism as it relates to conflict ‘resolution’ and more specifically strategies of autonomy (238, 252)91.

1.4.5.1. The Plan

Point Two of Part One of the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan92 for Western Sahara – “Morocco’s Commitments to a Final Political Solution” – clearly lays out Morocco’s point of departure. It states that Morocco offers a “political solution” to the conflict over Western Sahara within the framework of the Kingdom’s sovereignty and national unity. Morocco begins from the perspective of state sovereignty as if to erase the ‘real’ Western Sahara situation, which is one of occupation and obstruction of the right of self-determination. However, by framing autonomy within state sovereignty, Morocco attempts to circumvent international prescriptions for colonial self-determination cases. This logic leads us directly to Point Three of Part One, which explains how territorial autonomy (within the sovereign state of Morocco) affords a better future for the region’s populations, puts an end to separation and exile and promotes reconciliation. The end of

91 As stated previously in this chapter, Chapter Four takes up this theme and broadens our conflict analysis. 92 For the full document of the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Kingdom of Morocco, “Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Statue for the Sahara Region,” 2007b. 131 occupation would also put an end to separation and exile and would provide reconciliation and a better future for the Sahrawi people. However, this is not the Moroccan agenda. Morocco utilizes the “real” and “political” situation of Western Sahara to illegally annex the territory and relies upon the support of the international community of states for the legitimization of this illegitimate act. In order to get the international community of states and other actors on board, Morocco plays to today’s secessionist trends and the third-way compromises that are being hailed as ways to prevent secessionist movements from dissolving into hot conflicts (especially those of a protracted nature). In this way, it appears as if Morocco offers or rather concedes in good faith a generous proposal to the Frente POLISARIO. I. William Zartman, a respected voice for conflict resolution and professor at John Hopkins University, contends that Moroccan autonomy is a “good solution” that should be applauded, and he argues that autonomy should be viewed as a new starting point for the protracted conflict (Zartman, 2007a). He hypothesizes that Morocco is taking an enormous risk by holding out autonomy to the Frente POLISARIO because, like East Timor, the offering could lead to independence. As will be discussed below, I disagree with Zartman’s assessment of the autonomy plan, not because he ultimately sides with Morocco, but because of his point of departure, assessment of the conflict situation and reasoning for supporting Morocco. Points Five and Six of Part One of the Moroccan plan generally delineate Rabat’s position and clearly signal that autonomy provides a legitimization of Moroccan rule in Western Sahara. They read:

Point 5: “[T]he Sahara populations will themselves run their affairs democratically, through legislative, executive and judicial bodies enjoying exclusive powers. They will have the financial resources needed for the region’s development in all fields, and will take an active part in the nation’s economic, social and cultural life.”

Point 6: “The State will keep its powers in the royal domains, especially with respect to defense, external relations and the constitutional and religious prerogatives of his Majesty the King.”

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Despite the fact that Morocco aims to convince the international community that autonomy functions as an exercise of self-determination – Point Eight of Part One insists that the “autonomy statute shall be submitted to the populations concerned for a referendum, in keeping with the principle of self-determination and the provisions of the UN Charter” – self-determination cannot be met without including an option of independence. Morocco claims to have found a middle ground that fulfills the right of self-determination, without actually having done so. This is the true danger of Realpolitik discourses for conflict transformation. Under neutral pretenses, it normalizes problematic ‘solutions’ to the very problems it can in fact engender. Points Twelve and Points Fourteen of Part Two, “Basic Elements of the Moroccan Proposal” (divided into two subsections a. powers of the Sahara autonomous region and b. bodies of the region), lay out the areas of the proposed Sahara autonomous region and the jurisdiction of the state respectively. Point Twelve designates the specific areas as follows: the region’s local administration (the local police force and jurisdictions, etc.); the economic sector (economic development, regional planning, promotion of investment, trade, industry, tourism and agriculture); the region’s budget and taxation; infrastructure (water, hydraulic facilities, electricity, public works and transportation); the social sector (housing, education, health, employment, sports, social welfare and social security); cultural affairs (promotion of the Sahrawi Hassani cultural heritage); and the environment. Point Fourteen underpins the exclusive areas of jurisdiction of the state, specifically the attributes of sovereignty, especially the flag, the national anthem and the currency; the attributes stemming from the constitutional and religious prerogatives of the King, as Commander of the Faithful and Guarantor of freedom of worship and of individual and collective freedoms; national security, external defense of territorial integrity; external relations; and the Kingdom’s juridical order. Finally, points Twenty-Seven and Thirty-Three of Part Three, “Approval and Implementation Procedure for the Autonomy Statute,” highlight the importance of negotiations in the implementation of the autonomy statute. The former reiterates that the autonomy statute will be subject to negotiations and will be submitted to the populations concerned in a free referendum. Despite the fact that Morocco conditions the referendum by negating the right of independence as an option, Morocco assures the international

133 community that the referendum will constitute a free exercise by these populations (the Sahrawi people) of their right to self-determination, “as per the provisions of international legality, the Charter of the United Nations, and the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council” (emphases mine). The latter confirms the Moroccan belief that a solution to the Sahara conflict can only be achieved through negotiations. The two points appear contradictory. Morocco will follow established international legal norms, and yet only through negotiations can a solution to the conflict be found. Despite positive feedback from the United States and France and in spite of Moroccan assurances of sincerity, the plan raises many concerns.

1.4.5.2. Responses to the Moroccan Autonomy Plan

Previous to the official announcement of the Moroccan Autonomy Plan in 2007, King Mohamed VI visited the occupied territories in order to promote the idea of autonomy, the ‘new’ solution to the conflict. This action aroused almost immediate controversy and critics began to mount a response. Firstly, they point to the fact that autonomy is not a new concept and actually has been endorsed by the Security Council in the Baker plan of 2003, propounded by the UN Secretary-General as an optimum political solution to the conflict and accepted by the Frente POLISARIO despite controversial stipulations regarding voter eligibility and Moroccan settlers taking part in the referendum (Lakhal et al., 2006: 335). The inclusion of independence as an option in the 2003 plan and its exclusion in the 2007 Moroccan plan distinguish the two versions of autonomy, an independence discrepancy that should not be downplayed. However, one important question arises with the Moroccan offer of autonomy. What kind of autonomy can Morocco truly offer the Sahrawi people? This question, in turn, sparks a multitude of questions that speak to the complexity of the concept: what kind of autonomy can a monarchic (autocratic) regime with a questionable human rights reputation (especially in occupied Western Sahara) offer the Sahrawi people?; despite boasts of democratization, what kind of autonomy can a “widely considered dictatorship” with “precarious social and political (democratically elected) institutions” offer to the Sahrawi people; what kind of autonomy can Morocco offer to the Sahrawi people when

134 the punishment for questioning the monarchy is jail time (Lakhal et al., 2006: 337)?; and finally, although many more questions arise, what kind of power sharing can Morocco guarantee the Frente POLISARIO considering the fact that Morocco has secured puppet Sahrawi figures with economic monopolies (Bárbulo, 2002) in the occupied territories of Western Sahara? A ‘meaningful’ autonomy should not put limits on political debate and should “guarantee the normal participation in the political life of all kinds of political parties and organisations, including those which peacefully advocate for independence or in favour of a Moroccan Republic” (Lakhal et al., 2006: 337). Plainly stated, autonomy without these types of assurances is meaningless. When we examine one of the main arguments of Morocco, that an independent Western Sahara would cause the downfall of the Moroccan monarchy and stability in the Maghreb (echoes of the domino effect can be intuited here), a problem arises. If this is true, how could the Monarchy survive an open democratic debate? Does autonomy actually threaten the monarchy, as it would introduce “democratic exchange” (Lakhal et al., 2006: 337)? When Morocco compares its autonomy plan to Spanish decentralization and plans of autonomy, is it prepared to accept a Spanish-style autonomy in the Sahara, possibly with republican parties controlling a regional assembly or an openly independentist republican party like the Ezquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) in Catalunya (337-338)? When looking at autonomy from these perspectives, one can only wonder if making these types of adjustments to the foundation of the Moroccan state actually endangers that which Morocco claims to prevent through autonomy – the fall of the monarchy. Morocco will also have a hard time explaining away a contradiction that looms large in the autonomy plan. The reason for Morocco’s rejection of the Spanish census of 1974, an act that complicated the voter eligibility process for MINURSO in the early nineties, related directly to Morocco’s assertion that the census excluded eligible Sahrawi voters in southern Morocco. However, Morocco stipulates that autonomy will be extended to Sahrawis inside and outside of the territory. By territory we can assume Morocco means the occupied territories of Western Sahara, formerly referred to as Spanish Sahara (Sahara Occidental). If Morocco does not include southern Morocco, the Tarfaya Strip, in its offer of autonomy, its reasons for rejecting the Spanish census

135 become null and void and so too its objections to the current list of voters (based on the Spanish census) eligible to participate in a referendum (339). Basically, an offer of autonomy to the occupied territories undermines Morocco’s own objections to voter eligibility. However, if Morocco redraws the map and includes all of the southern ‘Sahrawi tribes,’ this could “open up an extremely explosive situation,” which could potentially involve Algeria, Mauritania and Mali (339). These types of complications will most certainly present themselves in direct negotiations with respect to genuine autonomy. Anything else would amount to “symbolic autonomy” (350), rather than an autonomy that truly provides for the self-determination of the Sahrawi people with independence as an option. Stephen Zunes, an expert voice on Western Sahara who has traveled to the refugee camps, liberated zone and occupied territories, states clearly that autonomy “falls well short of what is necessary to bring about a peaceful resolution to the conflict”; furthermore, it sets a dangerous precedent that “threatens the very foundation of the post- World War II international legal system” (Zunes, 2007). He warns that to accept the plan means that for the first time since the founding of the UN and the ratification of the UN Charter, the international community would be endorsing the expansion of a country’s territory by military force (Zunes, 2007). However, beyond the violations of international law, which have been thoroughly explored above, conflict analysts highlight the practical concerns that the autonomy plan presents.

1.4.5.3. Beyond International Law: Practical Concerns for Autonomy

Ruiz Miguel (2007) asks the international community to look at what he denominates the ‘black holes’ in the Moroccan autonomy plan, the dark areas of the plan that really have not been defined, thereby resembling black holes or empty promises. He lists these ‘black holes’ as follows: (1) distribution of power between Morocco and Western Sahara; (2) an applicable system for conflict resolution; (3) the actual organization of autonomy; (4) a guarantee of autonomy in the Moroccan constitutional system (autonomy as a constitutional right)93; (5) delineated fundamental rights; (6) the

93 According to Markku Suksi, 1998, autonomy as a constitutional right has only been established in Spain. 136 electoral body. Ruiz Miguel insists that the plan is in fact retrogressive, a discontinuity in formal decolonization rather than a constitution of steps forward as the United States, France and others claim. Again, looking beyond autonomy, he drives home the fundamental flaw of the Moroccan plan for Western Sahara. Morocco departs from a position of sovereignty rather than occupation and erroneously equates autonomy (without an independence option) with a valid and free expression of self-determination. While recognizing the flawed starting point of the Moroccan autonomy plan, Zunes (2007) also highlights the impracticability of centralized autocratic states respecting autonomy of regional jurisdictions. He cites Eritrea/Ethiopia and Serbia/Kosovo as examples that actually led to violent conflict. His admonishment resonates with that of Cassese: “…when the central authorities of a multinational State are irremediably oppressive and despotic, persistently violate the basic rights of minorities…it seems difficult to imagine that those central authorities would be willing to grant autonomy, or participatory rights” (Cassese, 1998: 359). John P. Entelis also takes up this concern. He argues against representations of Morocco as moderate, modern and democratic and concludes that U.S. military assistance and foreign aid to Morocco (and to other countries in the region), in fact, embolden the monarchical regime at the expense of civil society (Entelis, 2007: 23). This type of intervention fails to adequately reach Moroccan civil society, and the ‘special’ relationship between the U.S. and Morocco only serves to further alienate a mass public. Whereas other analysts (Zartman et al., 2007; Hochman, 2007) applaud Morocco for its politically liberalizing atmosphere, recent “free and fair” multi-party legislative elections and its role as a steady political supporter for U.S. and western initiatives, Entelis calls Morocco a self-declared constitutional and democratic monarchy (Entelis, 2007: 34). While it is true that King Mohammed VI has invested considerably in such things as state infrastructure, such as highways and ports, modernized the education and tax systems and initiated a long-term National Initiative for Human Development (Hochman, 2007: 70), it is also true that these types of liberalization have not come with much democratization. The power structure of the Moroccan state prevents any fundamental political changes that would allow for real political plurality and democratization, essential conditions for the effectuation of a legitimate autonomous

137 region within the state. The political structure in Morocco denies the possibility for a legitimate autonomous region because of the political realities there. Morocco suffers from a corrupt autocratic system where a relatively small elite monopolizes the key sources of political, economic and military power, which has the effect of disenfranchising the majority of Moroccans (Entelis, 2007: 34). The Moroccan political structure consists of a constitution, bicameral legislature, judiciary and complex multi-party system (with elections taking place at the national and local levels); however, the true head of state, commander of the faithful (Amir al- Mu’minin) and ultimate word and final say on all aspects of Moroccan life, is the king. Therefore, to refer to the Moroccan government type as a constitutional monarchy is a misnomer that misrepresents what in effect is a monarchical constitutionally legitimized system of power and control. In addition, the king utilizes a parallel structure of power, consisting of ex-politicians, businessmen and senior army officers who “constitute the apex of the Moroccan establishment” and solidify this power and control, the Makhzen (Entelis, 2007: 34-35). Given what is in fact a massive centralization of monarchical formal and informal powers, the democratic concept of separation of powers whereby a checks and balance system is struck between legislative, judicial and executive authorities, is rendered nugatory. Moroccan civil society has made some advances on social reforms despite the overriding power systems that challenge real democratic participation and engagement. The changes made to the 2004 family-status code, which renders polygamy difficult and gives women the right to initiate divorce, share custody and inherit family assets, is one such example. Whereas Hochman employs this example to demonstrate the opening up of the monarchy (2007: 70), Entelis uses it as a testament to civil society pressure placed on the king, mostly by women activists (2007: 36). However, civil society advancements are severely constrained or even offset by, on the one hand, overt oppression of the freedom of expression, including censorship and silencing of mediums of communication and, on the other hand, severe corruption, which affects all levels of society. First, according to a 2007 Special Report by the Committee to Protect Journalists, Morocco’s reputation regarding press conditions has considerably deteriorated in the following areas: government censorship, judicial harassment, criminal libel prosecutions,

138 journalist deaths, physical attacks on the press, journalist imprisonments and threats against the press (Mahoney, 2007). Morocco now ranks as one of the leading jailer of journalists in the Arab world. Second, corruption is heralded as the primary deterrent to foreign investment in Morocco. Independent experts, Moroccan civil-society activists and journalists name corruption as the leading obstacle to social change because it is “commonplace” (banalisé), “systematized,” “entrenched,” “institutionalized” and “endemic” in Moroccan society (Denoeux, 2007: 134). Guilain P. Denoeux explains that King Hassan II systematically introduced corruption into the kingdom’s administrative, political and economic systems as a strategy of political control and management (140). In short, systematized corruption in Moroccan society can be conceptualized as:

“…a gigantic patronage machine, a web of patronage networks in which, at each level, a patron seeks to maintain his position of influence through the distribution of favors to clients below him…as well as by retaining the support of a patron above him. At the top of this system sits the king, who, in addition to his intertwined roles as religious leader, final authority on government matters, chief orchestrator of the country’s political life, ultimate referee on contentious issues, and leading entrepreneur and landowner in the country, can also be viewed as Morocco’s ‘Patron-in- chief’” (Denoeux, 2007: 134-135).

Additionally, the monarchy further consolidates its power through economic preeminence in the country. The royal family is a heavy weight player in key sectors of Moroccan economic life, including agriculture, financial services (banking, insurance and real estate), traditional retail distribution, natural resources, new communication and technologies, etc; and it is the primary shareholder in Morocco’s largest private conglomerate and distributor of diverse goods and equipment, ONA-SNI94 (136-137). When one considers the multiple challenges that confront Moroccans regarding their civil liberties and freedoms, one must wonder how real autonomy can be guaranteed for an occupied, militarized and oppressed Sahrawi people. The practical concerns for legitimate autonomy abound95.

94 In July 1999, ONA (Omnium Nord Africain) took over SNI (Sociéte Nationale d’ Investissement) (Denoeux, 2007: 136). 95 Guilain P. Denoeux and Abdeslum Maghraoui support these representations of the monarchy and its structures. They state: “freedom of expression has been severely limited on three issues: the centrality of the monarchy, the policy in the Western Sahara, and the role of Islam in Morocco. The government can be 139

Repetitively prefacing autonomy with the adjective ‘real’ does not will the concept into its legitimate effectuation. This kind of wishful thinking – repeating the unlikely – does not instill confidence in autonomy. On the contrary, when imagining the actual realization of an autonomy plan for Western Sahara, especially as a celebrated conflict resolution strategy, more questions and doubts arise regarding its viability of implementation. As Ruiz Miguel points out (2007), the nitty-gritty details required to execute the plan successfully and as a lasting and final solution warrant close scrutiny. What will the enforcement mechanisms for the Moroccan plan be? Does MINURSO serve as an adequate example of what we can expect regarding international funding, interest, priority and reliability with respect to autonomy? From the onset, MINURSO was charged to accomplish the impossible with the resources it was allotted. It was and is under-funded and poorly staffed and has never achieved strong international support for its enforcement. MINURSO has been mandated to monitor the ceasefire; verify the reduction of Moroccan troops in the territory; monitor the confinement of Moroccan and the Frente POLISARIO troops to designated locations; take steps with the parties to ensure the release of all Western Sahara political prisoners or detainees; oversee the exchange of prisoners of war (International Committee of the Red Cross); implement the repatriation program (United Nations High Commissioner for

criticized, but not the king. No one is allowed to contest the right of the monarchy to rule. Similarly, the Western Sahara’s status as an ‘inalienable’ part of the kingdom cannot be disputed. The same is true for those who dare to challenge the king’s status of Amir al-Mu’minin (commander of the faithful) and his authority to define the ‘proper’ Islamic view on social and political issues. In other words, a boundary is sharply drawn between what is ‘tolerable criticism’ and what is an ‘unacceptable assault’ on ‘sacred institutions’. So, although freedom of expression on the other issues has improved substantially over the past decade, this does not mean that it can be taken for granted, or that the press has become free from governmental interference and intimidation. A press article that trespasses the boundaries of tolerated criticism is likely to result in the government seizing the newspaper or magazine which published it” (1998: 70); furthermore, “Torture, detention without trial, mistreatment of prisoners by the police, forged trials, and arbitrary arrests are still among the methods that the regime uses to repress its opponents” (71). Azzedine Layachi states that the king “has been able to eliminate or keep under control the dangerous opposition by using the military, the security services, and the police. He also made good use of patronage and clientelism. He has been governing with a carefully weighted combination of absolute authoritarianism, repression, and intimidation of the opposition on the one hand and relative parliamentary politics on the other” (1998: 91); in this regard, “the Makhzen controls the people and the territory, adjudicates conflicts, serves as a symbol of national unity and identity, and is an instrument of legitimation and authority…A traditional leadership serves as an institutional and normative power that distributes laws, authorizes economic activities, nominates people to high offices, and mobilizes support” (92). Lise Garon adds that King Hassan II grew to realize that his international image was directly tied “to a minimal observance of international conventions regarding human rights” (2003: 87). In light of this correlation, the monarchy walks a thin line between overt and covert political subjugation. 140

Refugees); identify and register qualified voters; and organize and ensure a free and fair referendum (between independence or integration with Morocco) and proclaim the results96. To date, MINURSO has failed to fulfill a grand part of its mission and has been reduced to denouncing ceasefire violations. If the United Nations could not coerce Morocco to abide by the very rules to the ceasefire it agreed to, what makes us think that the United Nations and the international community will be able to make Morocco abide by its autonomy promises? Finally, who protects the majority of Sahrawis who support independence over an autonomy plan? What guarantees can be made that their voices of discontent, disillusionment and defiance be heard and not oppressed as is now the case in occupied Western Sahara, let alone their safety from persecution, disappearance and imprisonment, also realities in occupied Western Sahara? But rather than placing the blame on MINURSO, as some tend to do (Bolton, 2007), Zunes targets the United Nations Security Council (2007). He drives home the failure of the Security Council, a direct result of French and American intervention and veto threats, “to place the Western Sahara issue under Chapter VII [“Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”] of the UN Charter” (Zunes, 2007). However, U.S. voices tout autonomy as the third-way (compromise) solution (real and political). These voices tell the real politics story.

1.4.5.4. U.S. Voices Hailing ‘Third-Way’ Autonomy

U.S. press releases in response to the Moroccan proposal of autonomy shed light on the U.S. position. On April 10, 2007, Under Secretary Burns of the United States called the Moroccan initiative a “serious and credible proposal to provide real autonomy” for Western Sahara (U.S. Department of State, 2007b). Once again it is important to note the word choice here. What makes the Baker Plan of 2002 (accepted by the Frente POLISARIO), which also provides for an autonomy plan of five years, any less serious, credible or real?

96 See the Western Sahara MINURSO mandate: http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/missions/minurso/mandate.html 141

In July of the same year, Alternative Representative on Western Sahara Jackie Wolcott Sanders backed up Burns’ statement, calling the proposal a “promising realistic way forward” (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2007; emphasis mine). She explained that the Moroccan Autonomy Plan provided a “realistic” framework for “real” and “meaningful” autonomy that allowed the two parties to engage “realistically”; furthermore, she noted that the Moroccan initiative is flexible and “provides for a referendum in keeping with the principle of self-determination for the people of Western Sahara” (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2007). As a retort to the claim that the plan fulfilled self-determination, a reporter asserted: “But it’s quite clear from the statement that the United States supports Morocco, autonomy as the alternative that should be pursued with a referendum that does not mention the word ‘independence’ as an option” (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2007). Wolcott Sanders replied, “We said that we believe a promising and realistic way forward on the Western Sahara is meaningful autonomy,” and then stressed its political relevance as “a realistic framework,” “political negotiation” and “political solution” (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2007). In the short press briefing, Walcott Sanders used six versions of the word ‘realistic,’ ‘political’ twice and adjectives amounting to meaningful eight times. By August of 2007, after the second round of talks between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO, the U.S. position had been firmly established. The idea that “meaningful autonomy” represented a “promising and realistic way forward” and a “realistic framework for negotiations” became the mantra ad nauseum of the U.S. (U.S. Department of the State: 2007b). The message resounds clearly: the United States supports meaningful political-realistic autonomy for Western Sahara. This ‘realism,’ however, excludes independence as an option for the Sahrawi people. The repetitive promotion of a realistic approach to the conflict heavily influences the analysis of the conflict as the following excerpt illustrates: “…to recognise that we are dealing with a matter that is both legal and political and that limiting our vision to one of these two aspects of the issue may not help the situation to anyone’s favor” (Souaré, 2007: 9). Although political realism does not enjoy peremptory norm status, it has made huge inroads in U.S. and French policy and on conflict resolution theory and practice.

142

According to Zunes’ research (2007), the following have publicly backed Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara: Congressman Gary Ackerman of New York, Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, former ambassador to Morocco Frederick Vreeland, former Connecticut Congressman Toby Moffett and Democratic Caucus Chair Rahm Emanuel (currently U.S. President Barack Obama’s Chief of Staff) and Minority Leader John Boehner, House Republican Whip Roy Blunt, former Florida Republican Party chairman Alberto Cardenas and former House Speaker Dennis Hastert97. Their position on Western Sahara has been reinforced by discourses on terrorism and the threats it poses. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Welch warns that the refugee camps are “a potentially attractive safe-haven for terrorist planning or activity” (Zunes, 2007). The Western Sahara issue is not divided upon party lines. U.S. Democrats and Republicans alike join together in support of the Moroccan initiative. This support is best summed up in the words of Madeleine Albright in an open letter to President George W. Bush addressed on June 6, 200798. In essence, the letter, or request of support for Morocco, amalgamates the political (Realpolitik) and fear-mongering (War on Terror) approaches:

“Recent terrorist attacks in Morocco and Algeria show that we cannot afford to continue to ignore the problems of this region. Failure to resolve this conflict jeopardizes international stability, our fight against terrorism, and economic integration efforts in the region…By giving the people of the Western Sahara a true voice in their future through the full benefits of autonomy as presented by Morocco, a credible political solution can be achieved. Morocco’s commitment merits the support of the international community and we must ensure that its neighbors assume their responsibility for contributing to the success of these negotiations” (Albright, 2007; also cited in Zunes, 2007)99.

97 For a list of current U.S. Senators that support the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan, see Stephen Zunes’ article, “U.S. Lawmakers Support Illegal Annexation” (Zunes, 2010). 98 See also, letter to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton of March 16, 2010 (Zunes, 2010). Similar to Albright’s argument, the U.S. Senate letter calls for immediate attention to the question of Western Sahara due to mounting evidence of growing instability and increasing terrorist activities in North Africa (principally authored by Senator Dianne Feinstein of California with 54 signatories). It argues that Western Sahara is a major obstacle to stability in the region and economic regional integration, which will help eliminate terrorist threats and facilitate economic growth and prosperity. 99 A recent New York Times article by Eric Schmitt and Souad Mekhennet addresses U.S. and Western European fears of increased terrorist activity (surge) and organization in North Africa (Maghreb), namely Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger (Morocco is omitted from the list) (2009). Similarly, this heightened fear and political representation of the Maghreb has direct implications on the question of Western Sahara. 143

1.4.5.5. Unlikely ‘Supporters’: For and Against the Referendum

Even an unrelenting conservative as United States permanent representative to the United Nations, John Bolton (2005-2006) – who announced upon entering his position that his ultimate aim was to increase the authority and influence of the United States in the United Nations – defines Moroccan autonomy as a way to effectively keep Western Sahara under its control (Bolton, 2007: 198; 367). In his memoirs, Bolton relates that at his first session in the Security Council, he opened with a declaration of one of his main goals: “to bring the long-running peacekeeping operation [MINURSO] to a close by actually holding a referendum on the future status of Western Sahara” (247). After all, he thought that was what the “R” in MINURSO (the Spanish and French acronyms for Mission of the United Nations for the Referendum in Western Sahara) signified (367). His announcement was met with laughter around the room. In a briefing to the Security Council on April 25, 2006, the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy to Western Sahara Peter van Walsum announced that “international legality” was in conflict with “political reality” (368). Even though van Walsum’s declaration cut against the Sahrawi position, Bolton explains that he was relieved that someone had spoken the unspeakable (368). However, rather than pointing to the Security Council’s failure to make Morocco follow through on its commitment to a referendum with independence as an option (a crucial point in brokering the 1991 ceasefire), Bolton places the blame on the organization of the United Nations and the inherent ineffectiveness of the MINURSO peacekeeping mission. He argues:

“Since it was clear that Morocco had no intention of ever allowing a referendum, there was no point in a UN mission to conduct one. Instead, and typically of the UN, MINURSO seemed well on the way to acquiring a near-perpetual existence because no one could figure out what to do with it. Accordingly, consistent with my fundamental notion that the Security Council should try to find a real solution to the underlying problem, I suggested terminating MINURSO and releasing the Sahrawis from the cease-fire they had agreed to in exchange for the promise of a referendum. If Morocco didn’t like that prospect, then let it get serious about allowing a referendum” (Bolton, 2007: 368).

144

The problem with this argumentation is that Morocco would welcome the termination of MINURSO for multiple reasons. First, such a move by the United Nations would be an open expression of defeat regarding its own principles and norms and the right of self-determination and a referendum for colonial peoples. Second, if the MINURSO mandate is terminated, Morocco will not have to get serious about a referendum. Although MINURSO generally falls short of its purpose, it does present an international barrier to complete Moroccan impunity to international law. Its very existence deters renewed hostilities between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO. Third, Morocco currently propagates the idea that the United Nations proposal of a self- determination referendum is outdated and must be supplanted by a mutually acceptable political solution, i.e. autonomy. Morocco’s negation of the right of self-determination with the independence option more than implicitly demonstrates that MINURSO has lost its raison de être. Finally, Bolton attributes the limitations of the UN peacekeeping mission to UN bureaucratic ineptitude. In fact, the relative failure of MINURSO is but a symptom of the greater workings of a Realpolitik approach to conflict. Bolton recognizes to a certain extent that the United States plays an ambiguous and inconsistent ‘neutral’ role, but never quite makes the clear connection between U.S. policy and the obstruction of the effectuation of the referendum. He goes so far as to say that “State bureaucracy, joined unusually by the NSC’s [National Security Council’s] Elliot Abrams” road- blocked his approach to the conflict, but stops there (368). There is nothing unusual about the NSC’s obstructionist role and refusal to back international peremptory norms. Although Elliott Abram’s portfolio in former President George W. Bush's National Security Council involved democracy promotion abroad, Abrams is widely regarded as being one of the key champions of the neoconservative line on foreign affairs, shunning negotiations in favor of confrontational militaristic U.S. policies. The proliferation of weapons goes hand in hand with a real politics approach to conflict. The book Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy is a collection of essays that challenges the United States to look more closely at its foreign policy (Kagan and Kristol, 2000). The compilation basically functions as a blueprint for U.S foreign policy makers. It argues that for the United States to effectively

145 respond to its ‘enemies,’ it must reinforce the military and missile defense systems and create strategic alliance-based relationships100. In his chapter, Abrams lays out the “peace through strength” credo that became the operating principle of the Bush junior administration: “Our military strength and willingness to use it will remain a key factor in our ability to promote peace” (Abrams, 2000: 239)101. Bolton explains that Elliott and others accepted Morocco’s insistence that independence for Western Sahara (“which nearly everyone thought the Sahrawis would choose in a genuinely free and fair referendum”) would destabilize Morocco and “risk a takeover by extreme Islamicists” (Bolton, 2007: 368). The closest Bolton gets to pinpointing the underlying issue of real politics permeating the conflict ‘resolution’ process comes across in mild perplexity: “I wondered what had happened to the Bush administration’s support for ‘democracy’ in the broader Middle East, but there was no doubt here that stability for King Mohammed VI trumped self-determination” (368-369). He then explains that in practice this meant that the United States could only really be open to “autonomy” for Western Sahara (369). Does autonomy function as another layer in ‘democratization’ and ‘freedom’ mythologies? If we return to the ‘true’ meaning of autonomy, does the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan offer a politically viable solution? Or, is autonomy the Realpolitik response to the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict that ensures the hegemonic position of global neoliberalism102? The capitalist push for unrestrained free market systems and state deregulation through privatization manifests itself in this case in competition between the United States and France for regional hegemony in North Africa. The United States, as the world’s hyperpower and beacon of neoliberalism, has definitely put France on the defensive by trespassing upon ‘old’ imperial/colonial spheres of influence and

100 The United States alone spends nearly 50% of global military spending. The United Nations entire budget is approximately 2 percent of the world’s military expenditure. It is interesting that the United States claims that increasing military expenditures adds to global security when the very institution created for these aims (international cooperation and peace), the United Nations, receives but a fraction of what the world spends on arming itself. See Global Issues: http://www.globalissues.org/article/75/world-military- spending#globalissues-org 101 Abrams also believes that strengthening Israel should be core to the U.S. Middle East policy. He states clearly that the United States “should not permit the establishment of a Palestinian state that does not explicitly uphold U.S. policy in the region” (Abrams, 2000: 239). 102 Chapter Four of this thesis explores the relationship between real politics (Realpolitik) and capitalist neoliberal globalization ideologies. 146 through ideological appropriation – the new (neoliberalism) enabling the old (imperio- colonialism) to survive. Only now we have a relatively new protagonist in the neoliberal imperio-capitalist equation, the United States. Keeping this in mind, let us return to the original question. Does the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan offer a politically viable solution? Hannikainen’s definition of meaningful autonomy suggests that it does not: “the State concerned must be prepared to grant certain rights of autonomy to the region, thus limiting its own jurisdiction, and to act bona fide…the autonomy must be democratic in character…[including] regular and free elections in the region…the self governing organs must respect the principles of democracy in their governance and respect and endeavour to guarantee human rights for everyone in the region” (Hannikainen, 1998: 90). As has been explored above, Morocco falls far short of an ideal political environment for functional autonomy. Putting aside the obvious argument that autonomy without an option of independence violates international norms and laws, the political reality in Morocco arouses doubts as to the applicability of autonomy. Can meaningful autonomy be accomplished? Who will make sure that Morocco will comply with its own stipulations? When we break down autonomy and move from theoretical assessments to practical application the black holes and pitfalls abound. How has the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan gained so much momentum? The alternative question or disjunction takes on specific relevance. Is autonomy the Realpolitik response to the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict that ensures the hegemonic position of particular power players and their agenda of global neoliberalism? I. William Zartman’s recent article, “Time for a Solution in the Western Sahara Conflict,” illustrates how and for what reasons and to what ends real politics functions in steering conflict resolution strategies, i.e. autonomy (2007). Although the emphasis thus far has been on ‘real politics’ and its materialization in conflict resolution strategies, it must be understood that ultimately the discursive and ideological totality of Realpolitik – that we cannot get outside of real politics, that there are no alternatives – functions on a broader ideological scale and in conjunction with capitalism and neoliberalism103.

103 See Chapter Four for a more in depth analysis of capitalism and neoliberalism on conflict transformation/resolution strategies. 147

Zartman utilizes a real politics approach, disguised in conflict analysis, and relates the benefits of such a ‘compromise’ to U.S. interests. Therefore, a close analysis of Zartman’s backing of autonomy, in relation to the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict, bears significant relevance here. How does Zartman defend his stance on autonomy? In order to respond adequately, it is helpful to break down Zartman’s argument. In this regard, Zartman essentially takes an uncompromising position and pushes the functionality of the 2007 Moroccan autonomy plan: “it can be taken as the Single Negotiating Text (SNT), a device long practiced by diplomats to focus negotiations in an organizing direction” (180). He also recognizes an alternate method that works with two texts side by side, but clarifies that this is only possible as long as the two are relatively ‘close’. Zartman disqualifies the two-text approach for two reasons. First, the 2007 Frente POLISARIO Plan (submitted at the same time as Morocco’s plan) differs significantly from the Moroccan autonomy plan. Second, the Frente POLISARIO plan includes the possibility of independence. According to Zartman’s logic, it would be falling victim to zero-sum strategizing to even consider an autonomy plan, or any plan for that matter, that promises an eventual referendum with independence as a possible outcome104. To make the case that the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan should be the ‘Single Negotiating Text,’ Zartman manipulates and at times deviates from the facts at hand. In distorting information, he strengthens his position on Moroccan autonomy. First, Zartman’s historical narrative of the conflict is deeply flawed. For example, he paints Morocco in a benign light and portrays the Frente POLISARIO as the aggressor: “the Polisario launched its war against Morocco in 1974” (178; emphasis mine). In this way, he takes away from the Frente POLISARIO’s legitimacy as an anti-colonial national liberation movement. The following chapter details the events that culminated into all out conflict between the Frente POLISARIO and Morocco and Mauritania; however, it is safe to say here that the occupying powers of Morocco and Mauritania put the Frente POLISARIO immediately on the defensive and shifted the liberation movement’s focus from its colonizer, Spain, to bordering occupiers. Then, in relation to Morocco’s offensive, Zartman explains that the “situation stabilized by 1981 when Morocco

104 Chapter Four presents a theoretical rebuke of traditional conflict resolution understandings of ‘zero- sum’ conflict situations. 148 completed its control of 85% of the territory and built a defense sand stone berm around the territory” (178). Zartman omits the violence and death that surrounded the building of the militarized defensive berm and ‘stabilization of the situation,’ or rather, Morocco’s vicious attacks that targeted civilians as well as freedom fighters. Furthermore, indirect and direct U.S. and French intervention aided the Moroccan offensive. With respect to the conflict narrative, these are but two examples of many that demonstrate how Zartman veers from historical accuracy. Second, Zartman belittles the conflict and the colonial history of domination by asserting that the territories under dispute “are bereft of natural resources” (178)105. Besides the fact that this statement reduces the ‘value’ of a people’s homeland and way of life to material wealth, it is also completely untrue. The territories of Western Sahara are rich in natural resources, including untapped fishing and phosphate (third largest in the world) reserves and the possibility of offshore oil. Considering the renewed value of phosphates in the past year, which have risen from around fifty dollars a ton in April of 2007 to just around four hundred dollars today, it is inaccurate to minimize the ‘material’ wealth of the region (afrol News, 2008). In fact, the annual income from the Moroccan phosphate industry in occupied Western Sahara amounts to about US $1.2 billion (afrol News, 2008). The potential to process phosphates into superphosphate fertilizer, which helps improve crop yields by up to 50 per cent, tempts international businesses to ignore international legality and trade with Morocco for phosphates extracted from Western Sahara (Broadhead, 2008). International law places restrictions on the exploitation of natural resources from occupied territories (see Chapter Three); however, in a time of food shortages, one can only expect international law violations to increase with phosphate demands. All told, phosphate prices have skyrocketed by 700 per cent in the past eighteen months (Broadhead, 2008). Zartman matches his misrepresentation of historical occurrence and economic assessment of the territories with the propagation of fear mythologies. His forewarnings include the regime fall of a strategic ally and an explosion of terrorist activity. He

105 In direct opposition to this stance, which in essence questions the viability of Western Sahara as a state, Beth A. Payne asserts, “The Western Sahara is an example of a small state that would be economically viable and would not have great difficulty supporting its modest population. Exploitation of the territory’s large phosphate resources alone would give the Western Sahara one of the highest levels of per capita income on the African continent” (1993: 134). 149 explains that if Morocco were to abandon Western Sahara, this act would most certainly jeopardize the monarchy’s reign, which in effect presents the greatest danger to regional stability and control of terrorist activity (179). Furthermore, he believes that the conflict of Western Sahara is of particular interest to the United States because of the relationships involved, especially its geopolitical location: “The southwestern shore of the Mediterranean is a strategically important gate to a crucial waterway, and the Maghreb provides an important bridge to a volatile area further east” (183). A smart alliance, Morocco fits into Abrams dominance formula. ‘Peace’ and order should be achieved at all military costs, even if at the expense of international legality. A Western Sahara state does not bode well for this vision. According to Zartman, it is too small and possesses too few resources, making it vulnerable to Arab states and forces from Morocco and Algeria to Saudi Arabia and al-Qaeda, all of which would try to buy its allegiance (183). In addition, he points to “sharp tribal differences” within the Sahrawi population, but ignores the building of a nation that occurred in resistance to colonial domination and now Moroccan occupation (182). The real politics vision becomes clearer and clearer. Control terrorism and make way for free trade agreements, like the one between Morocco and the United States in 2005 (the “template for U.S.-Arab economic relations”) (183). But, why support Moroccan autonomy? Zartman begins his argument by making the blanket statement that the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan is the “first proposal by one of the two contestants to reach middle” (2007b: 178). He explains that Morocco takes the first plausible steps towards compromise in its offer of real autonomy, meaning, where independence is not on the table. On the flip side, he describes the Frente POLISARIO’s position of full independence through a free and fair referendum as a zero-sum beginning (178). Zartman misses the point completely regarding the idea of a referendum. As stated above, the process of self-determination guarantees a process, a set of choices, so that a ‘colonial’ people can decide their own future. Of course the desired outcome is independence for the Frente POLISARIO. However, the Frente POLISARIO has stated repeatedly that the results to a free, fair and democratic referendum will be respected, even if that outcome means integration with Morocco. Zartman insists that the previous Baker plans, which did include midway autonomy proposals and multiple concessions on the part of the

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Frente POLISARIO, do not in fact represent ‘true’ autonomy because they merely “postpone the zero-sum solution by referendum” (179). Basically, he argues that the “far reaching” autonomy plan of Morocco overcomes the ‘zero-sum’ nature of any type of ‘referendum’ solution (179). Shockingly, he reminds us of Hassan’s declaration that all Morocco really needed in the territories of Western Sahara was to retain a flag and postage stamps. It is interesting that Morocco would sacrifice so many lives, resources, time and money for a flag and postage stamps. Aside from this apparent absurdity, Zartman roots his argument in functionality and, to be more precise, in a ‘functional split’ inherent in autonomy. Zartman contends that functional splits are embodied in the Moroccan autonomy proposal by “giving the region its own government (self-determination) but within overall Moroccan sovereignty” (Zartman, 2007b: 180). The functional split would basically give Morocco the “outside of the box” while giving the Frente POLISARIO the “inside of the box”; this split would “avoid the zero-sum, winner-takes-all characteristic found in an independence – or – integration referendum” (180). This logic is problematic on multiple levels. In order to avoid a zero-sum situation do we then need to accept Moroccan aggression and occupation?; do we set aside international norms and standards in order to fit international legality into political reality?; do we strike Western Sahara from the unresolved list of Non-Self-Governing Territories, abrogating the right of the Sahrawi people to a referendum? Can Zartman seriously consider these possibilities in order to secure a zero-sum solution? Furthermore, even if we accept Zartman’s premise, how does an autonomy that Morocco can offer as a monarchy with a questionable democratic reputation constitute a non zero-sum solution, especially when considering that it will most likely ensure that de facto control will shift to de jure control? The historical inaccuracy of Zartman’s article, at times bordering on blatant propagation of mistruth, demonstrates the insidious workings of real politics discourses and the implications for conflict analysis when it is unabashedly infused with and shaped by external interests and the ideology of imperial hegemony. In response to critics of the autonomy plan, Zartman replies, “test it” (180). Regarding the decolonization status of Western Sahara and international law concerns, Zartman states: “In 1974, the colonial power [Spain] transferred administration of the

151 territory to Morocco and Mauritania, divided along a northwest-southeast diagonal that corresponded to no human or physical geographic divisions and had no place for the Polisario” (180). The United Nations considers Spain to be the administering power and did not accept – merely took note of – the Madrid Accords, a secret tripartite agreement between Spain, Morocco and Mauritania106. Zartman insists that the “Polisario outcome,” the future of Western Sahara determined through a referendum, is not a “midpoint solution” because it is a version of independence (181). He misunderstands the meaning of self-determination of colonial peoples. He also misconstrues the protocol for its realization. Zartman cites United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541 as proof of the fact that there are other ways besides independence to achieve self-determination, and he highlights the Friendly Relations Declaration 2625 and its mention of “any other political status” to drive home his point (181-182). He circumvents the process of choice characteristic of self-determination and goes straight to the possible alternative outcomes outside of independence – in this case a political status of autonomy. But as if aware of the holes in his own argument, Zartman explains that UN attempts to arrive at a referendum voter list agreeable to both parties produced only impasses, thereby crippling the realization of a referendum (182). It is common knowledge that on multiple occasions Morocco has complicated the voter registration process by submitting hundreds of thousands of names for review. In spite of these spoiler tactics, MINURSO completed this tedious process in 2000 and concluded that 86,386 Sahrawis were eligible to take part in the referendum (Omar, 2008b: 52; Zoubir, 2001: 73-74). The failure to implement a referendum cannot be blamed on voter identification difficulties; rather, the more likely culprits appear to be brute force, occupation and big power support of these actions. Zartman does not exclude the referendum process altogether. He highlights the fact that “the autonomy plan would be submitted to a referendum for acceptance” (Zartman, 2007b: 182). However, he is quick to undermine this statement by asserting that Ifni and Tarfaya (previous Spanish colonial territories) joined Morocco without a referendum. Considering that Morocco adheres to its promise of a referendum for the plan, will the 2000 UN list be used for voter eligibility? Who will guarantee a free and

106 These events will be discussed in detail in Chapter Two. 152 fair vote? What happens if the Sahrawi people reject autonomy like in the case of East Timor? Would this result signal that the Sahrawi people favor independence? Although Zartman does not explain how the referendum of the Moroccan plan differs from previous referendum plans that have met multiple barriers in implementation, he specifically lays out autonomy projects in larger states that are applicable to the conflict case of Western Sahara. They include Italy and Spain and the islands of Puerto Rico, Greenland, Ǻlands and Zanzibar. Zartman also distinguishes two cases that are not relevant to Western Sahara, the Camp David Agreements of 1978 and East Timor. He insists that in these two cases the “population was ethno-religiously different from the occupying state and had a long history under a separate regime” (182). Spain officially claimed Western Sahara in 1886 and the Sahrawi people are quite distinct from their Moroccan neighbor in dress, language, culture, etc. In consideration of such details, an autonomous solution like that of East Timor appears applicable to the case of Western Sahara. Still, Zartman pushes an autonomy plan that legitimizes occupation and annexation and ignores the colonial status of the territory under the pretenses of creating a non-zero sum possibility for conflict transformation. It is through such conflict assessments that we are able to analyze the functioning of Realpolitik from within and without conflict transformation strategies. In sum, this detailed account of Zartman’s analysis of the applicability of Moroccan autonomy excluding the option of independence for Western Sahara demonstrates the power that real politics approaches can have in shaping modern day solutions to difficult and complex conflict situations and in maintaining dominant power structures. It also serves as an example of how conflict analysis can be distorted, normalized and rendered unquestionable in function of solutions driven by ‘real politics’ agendas. Bolton, a staunch conservative and Republican, supports the referendum process with the option of independence for Western Sahara; however, he concludes that if MINURSO cannot coerce Morocco to abide by the 1991 ceasefire terms and hold the referendum, the mission should be terminated. Unlike Zartman who blatantly supports a realistic political solution to the conflict, Bolton recognizes certain injustices, but never links them to their discursive and ideological roots. Conflict analysis needs to respond to these new political reality trends, rather than propagate them. The question that lingers

153 today is will the international community make up for its failure to prevent the Moroccan/Mauritanian invasion of 1975?

Conclusions

This chapter has mapped diverse and yet interrelated concepts from decolonization to post-colonial/postcolonial studies; from formal decolonization processes to self-determination; from impediments to decolonization and self- determination to outside (third-party) influences of the United States and France and their relations to Morocco; from peremptory norms to a general conceptualization of autonomy; and from the specific 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan to the functioning of Realpolitik discourses on creating legitimacy and international acceptance of autonomy as the third-way solution to the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict. The genealogy of this latest chapter in the conflict accounts for the constitution of knowledges, discourses and domains of truth that directly influence present-day strategies for the transformation of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict. Firstly, an approach of this sort has facilitated an inquiry into how Realpolitik policies and discourses have affected recent conflict approaches to the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict and to conflict analysis more generally. Secondly, it has provided necessary insight into the role of third-party actors, mainly the United States and France, and their geopolitical, economic and military interest proximity to the conflict. Lastly, by looking at Realpolitik discourses (both discursive and non- discursive), such as specific analytical points of view and voices as well as the War on Terror, conditional sovereignty and autonomy, and the multiple ways these discursive mediums produce and communicate meaning, it becomes more evident how recent real political solutions to the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict have become accepted, normalized and produced. Furthermore, by juxtaposing these discourses against those of international law, peremptory norms and the conflict’s decolonization setting, the power of Realpolitik narratives and discourses (régimes of truth) stands out clearly. The fact that the Non-Self-Governing Territory status of Western Sahara and the internationally established peremptory norm of self-determination (representative of the

154 struggle against colonialism) can be set aside or designated irrelevant and outdated demonstrates the power of Realpolitik discourses and ideological orientations. By exploring the mechanisms of power and how they are invested, utilized, legitimated, naturalized, produced and disseminated, this chapter also widens our analytical lens to include subjugated knowledges, not only that which is marginalized, but also how these knowledges have been denied legitimacy and attention. The Sahrawi right to self- determination has been blatantly sidelined. Even the recent Frente POLISARIO plan has received little if no international attention. In this way, alternatives to a real politics solution are discredited and consumed in real politics mythologies that propagate an ‘alternative’ middle of the road political solution as the solution to the conflict. This chapter shows the incredible significance and efficiency that setting the rules of the game bears upon creating the desired, if not distorted, background to the conflict and eclipsing the key defining components of the conflict situation. In effect, when procedures of conflict transformation are founded in Realpolitik assumptions, they are subjected to imperialist interpretations and rooted in structures of institutional domination and subordination characteristic of a geopolitical, economic and military approach to conflict. There is a link between this Realpolitik conflict transformation orientation and the acceptance and propagation of the third-way autonomy approach (without an option of independence for the Sahrawi people), which, although presented as a credible solution to the conflict, completely disregards international peremptory norms and the ‘real’ specifics to the conflict. However, in the face of the power of hegemonic discourses, where conflict analysts falter and dominance models succeed, pockets of resistance respond: “Where there is hegemonic power there is always protest and resistance against the economic and cultural oppression of dominated peoples” (Bush, 2006: 33). The Sahrawi people in the occupied territories, refugee camps, liberated zone and diaspora know too well the significance of the failure of the international community to respond to their conflict situation. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the similarities between the pre-1975 Moroccan/Mauritanian invasion of Western Sahara and the present day diplomatic stalemate lies in the very fact that once again the international community is faced with responding to its international responsibility or conceding to geopolitical realism.

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If we conceptualize conflict as cyclical rather than linear, we see that understanding the conflict dynamics of today enriches our analytical toolbox in such a way that we are better able to break down the pre-hot conflict phase of the conflict. In this light, the following chapter seeks to examine how Realpolitik discourses affected the policies, strategies and practices for conflict prevention, with specific regard to the failure of the decolonization process for Western Sahara. Parallel to this analysis, I will also dissect the power of counter-discourses, the power of the Sahrawi people to mount a resistance liberation movement, first in response to colonial rule and then to Moroccan and Mauritanian occupation.

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Chapter Two: Early History and Conflict Build-Up, Lost Opportunities for Conflict Prevention

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the functioning of Realpolitik in the preventative stage of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict and the lead up to hot conflict between the parties. This requires a genealogical analysis of the early stages of the conflict and of the discourses – the ideas, policies and actions – that led to both the failed process of decolonization for Western Sahara and hot conflict. The conflict between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO can be classified as a protracted conflict, what other authors deem an intractable conflict (Crocker et al., 2005; Licklider, 2005; Zartman, 2005a; Kriesberg, 2005; Bercovitch, 2005; Coleman, 2000; Deutsch, 1991, etc.). Although ‘intractable’ and ‘protracted’ are practically synonymous, I prefer to use the terminology of the latter because the former carries with it a negative and unsolvable sentiment107. However, in conflict literature, it is probably more common for conflicts such as Western Sahara to be denominated intractable. Accordingly, this chapter provides a historical narrative of Western Saharan, from its early history to the invasion of the territory by Morocco and Mauritania in 1975. A close historical analytical examination of the precursors to direct violent conflict can help to locate points where opportunities for conflict prevention existed and yet failed to be implemented and where and how they were somehow subverted by outside forces and discourses. In the case of Western Sahara, a retrospective analysis of the build up to the conflict sheds light on specific secondary actors, namely the United States, France and

107 According to the Peace Research approach of the UNESCO Chair for Philosophy for Peace, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain, human beings have the capacities to organize our relationships in peaceful ways – from the expression of tenderness and affection in interpersonal relationships to the creation of local, state and global governance institutions that give rise to human relationships founded in justice and based on sustainability (Martínez Guzmán, 2005a: 77-79). Following the logic that human beings possess the capacities (competencies) to ‘transform’ the world we live in, especially in situations of violence, I have chosen to use the terminology ‘protracted conflict,’ rather than ‘intractable conflict’. The term ‘protracted’ better expresses the possibilities at our disposal for the peaceful transformation of conflicts. 157

Spain, and their role in the complete breakdown of the decolonization process and right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people. A critical premise of this thesis is to explore the role ‘third-party’ actors have played in each of the conflict’s phases and in direct correlation with their declared neutral status. Therefore, it is essential to examine the events that led to Morocco’s invasion of Western Sahara, as previously established, an illegal act that bore with it no consequences, international sanctions or effective intervention. In accordance with Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits the “use of force in international relations,” Morocco directly breached international law (Schabas, 2001: 604)108. As a result, the process of decolonization for Western Sahara was compromised. The reasons for the systemic failure of the United Nations, Organization of African Unity and the international community in the decolonization process require deep critical analysis. In essence, the historical circumstances and events surrounding the failure of the process of self-determination for the Sahrawi people are also the precursors to a drawn out protracted conflict. Like the preceding chapter and the chapters to come, Chapter Two is divided into four parts. Part One, “Conflict Prevention,” generally examines the defining characteristics of protracted conflict in order to set the analytical stage for a detailed recounting of the pre-conflict phase of Western Sahara, a protracted external self- determination conflict. Lacking in many assessments and analyses of protracted conflict is an evaluation of the role Realpolitik discourses play in framing the pre-war context and the ideas, policies and actions around the lead up to conflict as they pertain to preventative measures meant to avoid conflict. Specifically, the analysis involves revealing how Realpolitik functions in the preventative stage and failed decolonization process for Western Sahara by locating dominant and normalized discourses of real politics. This analytical process requires shifting conflict prevention in such a way that moves prevention from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention, to move from symptom treating to problem-solving (Annan/UN General Assembly, 2001; Burton, 1990; Mitchell and Banks, 1996). This in turn entails addressing the deep-rooted socio-

108 The Charter “recognizes two exceptions: self-defense and collective action under the aegis of the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII” (Schabas, 2001: 604). 158 economic, cultural, environmental, institutional and other structural causes that often underlie the immediate political symptoms of conflict. Furthermore, this involves a critical assessment of the political economy of violent conflict and the production, manifestation and naturalization of ‘truths’ and an interrogation into the relationships and interrelations among economic, political, social and cultural spheres. By investigating the structural conditions that shape events and ‘the how’ of the structural formation, production and normalization of Realpolitik discourses, we deepen conflict prevention theory. By problematizing dominant structures and the cultural subordination and subjugation of knowledges and experience, we set applicable analytical standards to conceptualize conflict prevention and we strengthen the ways in which we frame conflict prevention strategies and techniques and the ways we approach conflict prevention altogether. By way of this analytical process, we engage the following questions. How did the formal process of decolonization fail for Western Sahara? Did Realpolitik discourses move Western Sahara away from decolonization and toward conflict? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to consider the ideological, colonial and imperialist coordinates that thwart conflict prevention and in fact produce, utilize and reinforce the conditions for conflict. I look backward to the early and immediate historical events that led up to the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict in order to expose the naturalized and unquestioned functioning of Realpolitik discourses in the preventative stage of the conflict pre-1975 and to inform the preventative possibilities of renewed conflict today. This analytical process is an exercise in simultaneously utilizing the specific example of Western Sahara to shed light on more general understandings of conflict prevention and to apply more general understandings of conflict prevention to the failed process of conflict prevention and decolonization of Western Sahara. Part Two, “Western Sahara’s Early History,” and Part Three, “Decolonization,” provide a pre-conflict historical genealogy of Western Sahara. This extensive historical review covers the pre-colonial and colonial periods. Part Two recounts the early history of Western Sahara; the Berlin Conference and the scramble for Africa; the Spanish colonization of Western Sahara; and French intervention of early Sahrawi anticolonial movements. Part Three briefly recalls the process of independence for Morocco,

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Mauritania and Algeria; scrutinizes the dichotomy inherent in the United Nations, the structural inequality built into the constitution of the institution versus the just and equal principles upon which it was established; tracts the shifting Moroccan and Mauritanian positions on self-determination and the territory of Western Sahara; describes and examines the meaning behind both the early and latter formations of a Sahrawi national liberation movement, culminating in the creation of the Frente POLISARIO; and depicts the change in Spain’s policy on Western Sahara and the initiation for a referendum of self-determination in 1974 and Morocco’s reaction to these events. Part Four, “Systemic Failure and Conflict Prevention Sabotage,” investigates the occurrences of the year 1975. It closely examines the events that led up to hot conflict between the Frente POLISARIO, Morocco and Mauritania, with particular focus on the United Nation’s decision to send the colonial case of Western Sahara to the International Court of Justice (ICJ); the United Nations Visiting Mission; the ICJ’s decision and Morocco’s announcement of the Green March; the Green March itself; the behind the scenes dealings of early November; and the Madrid Accords. This final section utilizes recently declassified documents to show the workings of Realpolitik (ideas, policies and actions) and how it erodes and subverts possibilities for effective conflict prevention, with special regard to the active negative participation of the United States and Spain.

2.1. Conflict Prevention

2.1.1. Protracted Conflicts

What distinguishes protracted conflicts from other conflicts? A protracted conflict is one that is destructive, deep-rooted, intransigent and at times seemingly resolution resistant. It is a type of conflict that is “recalcitrant, intense, deadlocked, and extremely difficult to resolve” (Coleman, 2000: 429). To refine this definition further, it is beneficial to identify the salient qualities that characterize protracted conflicts from, put simply, more manageable ones. They tend to be longstanding (years or even decades) and are typified by frequent bursts of violence or failure to leave the contested zone; a ‘frozen’ state (violence has ended, but no permanent settlement has been reached);

160 digging in of heals by political extremists who may dictate the terms for potential resolution; poor leadership or fear of personal safety, such as dethronement from positions of power; and ‘spoiler’ activity where negotiation is viewed as breathing room and where the status quo or ongoing conflict offers greater security than an uncertain peace and/or protects nonnegotiable positions (Crocker et al., 2005: 7-8). Consistently, issue rigidity is characteristic of protracted conflicts. Issue rigidity is the “perceived lack of satisfactory alternatives or substitutes for the methods of achieving the outcomes or for the actual outcomes initially at stake in the conflict” (Deutsch, 1991: 38). Therefore, protracted conflicts tend to resist settlement because the parties to the conflict believe their objectives are irreconcilable and that their interests are better protected in states of hot war or cold stalemate rather than in any other conceivable alternative state of being (Crocker et al., 2005: 5, 11). According to Roy Licklider, ‘intractable’ conflicts are exceptional rather than the norm and for this very reason deserve special attention (Licklider, 2005: 37). Louis Kriesberg and Jacob Bercovitch highlight three of the very same characteristics that define ‘intractable’ conflicts, only in slightly differing ways: a long extended period of time; conflict waged destructively/ ever-present tension and violence; and grounds where partisan and intermediaries attempt, but fail, to transform them/ arenas for futile attempts at management or resolution (Kriesberg, 2005: 66; Bercovitch, 2005: 99-101). Zartman (2005a) divides the features of ‘intractable’ conflicts into two categories, internal and external. The internalities of ‘intractable’ conflicts consist of protracted time, identity denigration (creating the ‘Other’), conflict profitability, absence of ripeness/pressure towards negotiation (S-4: stable, soft, self-serving stalemate) and solution polarization (zero-sum); whereas, the externalities include embeddedness (embedded in multilayered set of relationships, for example, regional), bias (relation of potential conflict managers) and buffering (buffer states between major blocs of powers and/or civilizations) (Zartman, 2005a: 48-58). Common to all, and first on the list of the three assessments of protracted conflict, is time. A telltale characteristic of protracted conflicts is time. ‘Intractable’ conflicts usually have a long past, a tumultuous present and an unsure future (Coleman, 2000: 432). Peter Coleman links the element of time to “a history of colonialism,

161 ethnocentrism, racism, sexism, or human rights abuses in relations between the disputants”; he concludes that ‘intractable’ conflicts materialize in situations where there is a definitive imbalance of power between the parties involved and where the more powerful tries to exploit and control the less powerful party (Coleman, 2000: 432-433). In this way ‘intractable’ conflicts leave an indelible economic, violent and divisive mark, which have the tendency to cross generations, to be intergenerational (435). The Western Saharan conflict certainly fits this mold. Furthermore, it displays nearly all of the other above-mentioned characteristics. It is characterized by: ever-present tension and threat of renewed hostilities; identity denigration (refusal of the expression of self-determination); conflict profitability (natural resources and safeguarding of the monarchy); ripeness (to some extent absence of pressure for negotiation); embeddedness (multilayered at the regional and extra regional levels); bias (U.S., French, Spanish and European Union support of Morocco); and buffering (of strategic geopolitical, military and economic interest). I hold reservations regarding resistance to third-party interventions and solution polarization (zero-sum quality). These two characteristics deserve further clarification for the case of Western Sahara. The former will be thoroughly explored in Chapter Three and the latter in Chapter Four109. For now, it suffices to say that it would be misleading and incorrect to take Western Sahara out of its decolonization conflict. As Chester et al. attest: “when the raised fist of revolution meets an equally powerful force determined to hang on to power, the scene is set for an intractable conflict” (Crocker et al., 2005: 9). In essence, the case of Western Sahara is a protracted external self-determination conflict. Coleman (2000) strikes an important chord when he mentions that a common trait of protracted conflicts is a history of colonialism. What is lacking in these assessments of the nature of protracted conflict is an evaluation of their characteristics in the preventative stage of conflict. To some extent, looking at the ‘causes’ of protracted conflicts infers examining the pre-conflict phase. Kriesberg (2005: 70-76) highlights the different phases of a protracted conflict: eruption, escalation, failed-peace-keeping-efforts, institutionalization,

109 Chapter Four approaches the concept of zero-sum in a way that challenges dominant representations and understandings of zero-sum conflict stalemates. For the purposes of this chapter, zero-sum refers to its more traditional understanding – solution polarization – an unwavering standoff between two parties such that outcomes are formulated in win-lose constructions. 162 de-escalation and transformation and termination and recovery phase (2005: 70-76). He suggests that preventive policies such as democracy building, fostering common identities, addressing political and economic rights and participation of governments and nongovernmental organizations may counter “major contentious actions that move adversaries toward intractability” or a “sharp escalation of relatively low-intensity intractable conflict” (2005: 84-89). His second point is relevant to Western Sahara’s conflict situation of today and his first to the pre-1975 eruption of war. Still, there is no mention of the role that Realpolitik discourses play in framing the pre-war context and the ideas, policies and actions around the lead up to conflict. The component of ‘real politics’ is usually conceived of as inherent to and a given of international relations. However, as John Paul Lederach points out, when considering conflict transformation, the goal is to address the cyclical nature of violent or diplomatic stalemated conflict by recognizing and then addressing the structural issues that do perpetuate armed conflict (cited in El-Bushra, 2006: 235). The undoing of the structural roots of oppression and power relations is a long and arduous process (236), but in asking how Realpolitik functions in the pre-conflict stage, we are addressing these very structural issues and power relations. Evidently, the protracted nature of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict raises the question of how the decolonization process failed for Western Sahara. Locating the dominant and normalized discourses of Realpolitik in every ‘phase’ of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict is essential for conflict analysis and mapping and, concordantly, for understanding conflict transformation strategies and practice. For the preventative phase, this type of analysis sheds light on the failure of decolonization for Western Sahara and the counter-discourses (the raised fists of revolution) that responded to this failure.

2.1.2. Navigating Conflict Prevention

The past two decades, especially the last ten years, have seen a proliferation in literature on conflict prevention, much of which focuses on Africa. Conceptualizations of conflict prevention have developed in response to diverse challenges and common realities around the globe, such as impoverishment (global economy marginalization),

163 oppressive governance, epidemics, drought, competition for energy resources and other natural resources as well as resulting civil, intrastate and interstate violence and wars (failed-state, nascent, hot and protracted conflicts). Conflict prevention literatures address a vast array of these related issues and explore the role that local, regional and international organizations can play so as to prevent further outbreaks of war110. Concurrently, there has been an augmentation in organizations, new as well as old, which have taken up the torch of conflict prevention, what John Burton (1990) denominates, conflict ‘provention’ – the knowledge of environmental sources of conflict and the removal of causal conditions. With its dedication to the Imperative of Preventative Action and Diplomacy, the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) has for some time recognized the importance of conflict prevention in African affairs, especially in consideration of the organization’s role in internal conflict and the growing view that African national sovereignty is not absolute (Organization of African Unity, 1998: 17-18; 19). In June of 2001, Secretary-General Kofi Annan released a report on the prevention of armed conflict at the 55th Session of the General Assembly (United Nations General Assembly, 2001; also cited in Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 123-124). Annan encouraged the international community and the United Nations to move from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention. Annan echoes Burton’s call of a decade earlier that conflict prevention/provention be equivalent to problem solving versus symptom treating111. By culture of prevention, Annan refers to the need to address the deep-rooted socio- economic, cultural, environmental, institutional and other structural causes that often underlie the immediate political symptoms of conflicts. With these principal aims of conflict prevention in mind, preventative action entails creating and implementing comprehensive strategies that encompass both short- term and long-term political, diplomatic, humanitarian, human rights, developmental and institutional measures that can be implemented by the international community and national and regional actors. Annan links conflict prevention to sustainable and equitable

110 See Burton (1990); Van Walraven (1998); Wallensteen (1998); Leatherman et al. (1999); Mekenkamp et al. (1999); Vinyamata (1999); Rotberg (2000); Hampson and Malone (2002); Wallensteen (2003); Kirton and Stefanova (2004); Schnabel and Carment, volumes 1 and 2 (2004a; 2004b); Chabal et al. (2005); Dzurgba (2006); Adekanye (2007); and Mellbourn and Wallensteen (2008). 111 Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks (1996) also utilize the problem-solving approach. 164 development such that an investment in national and international efforts of conflict prevention must be seen as a simultaneous investment in sustainable development, considering that sustainable development best thrives in an environment of sustainable peace112. For Annan and other organizations such as the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, the International Peace Academy and the European Commission (Conflict Prevention Networks) (Schnabel and Carment, 2004c: 5), comprehensive and coherent conflict prevention strategies offer the greatest potential for promoting lasting peace and for creating an enabling environment for sustainable development. Institutionalizing a preventative approach to conflict also moves conflict prevention from rhetoric to concrete action. In general, conflict prevention literature and organizations dedicated to conflict prevention are preoccupied with root causes of war. The logic breaks down as follows. If we are able to trace and uncover the very sources of armed conflict, we can locate potential conflict areas and address ‘root’ causes before they lead to armed conflict. If we locate the core causes of war, we in turn locate areas for conflict prevention, before violence erupts. Furthermore, if we develop early warning signs as well as build capacity through the training of field workers and desk officers in analysis and policy implementation, then conflict prevention moves from rhetoric to application (Schnabel and Carment, 2004c: 7; see also van Walraven, 1998 and Jentleson, 2003). At the 1999 Conflict Prevention Networks Annual Conference, Michael Lund described conflict prevention as:

“Conflict prevention entails any structural or interactive means to keep intrastate and interstate tensions and disputes from escalating into significant violence and to strengthen the capabilities to resolve such disputes peacefully as well as alleviating the underlying problems that produce them, including forestalling the spread of hostilities into new places. It comes into play both in places where conflicts have not occurred recently and where recent largely terminated conflicts could recur…[Conflict prevention can be] carried out by global, regional, national or local levels, by any governmental or non-governmental actor” (Lund, 1999; cited in Schnabel and Carment, 2004c: 5)

112 Along this grain, Edward E. Azar states: “In protracted conflict situations, trying to resolve conflict without dealing with underdevelopment is futile” (Azar, 1986: 39; see also Azar, 1990). 165

Oliver Ramsbotham et al. define conflict prevention as “those factors or actions which prevent armed conflicts or mass violence from breaking out” (2005: 107; emphasis in original). They break conflict prevention down further and separate it into two distinct categories, light (operational) and deep (structural) prevention. On the one hand, light prevention aims to prevent situations with a clear capacity for violence from degenerating into armed conflict. Deep prevention, on the other hand, addresses the root causes of armed conflict, including underlying conflicts of interests and relationships (108). At the international level, this includes addressing structural problems of the international system and at the societal level focusing efforts on development, political-culture and community relations. In sum, light prevention refers to improving international capacity to intervene in conflicts before they become violent and deep prevention means locating the sources of conflict (trigger causes), for example, in poverty, marginalization and injustice, in order to build domestic, regional and international capacity for conflict management (108-110). According to Bruce Jentleson (2003), a cause-based approach to conflict prevention utilizes four basic principles for analysis: the purposive nature of conflict interactions; the availability of early warning; opportunities for meaningful response strategies; and unavoidability of international action. This type of conflict prevention falls, relatively, into the light (operational) conflict prevention described by Ramsbotham et al. Joseph S. Nye, on the contrary, indicates that there are different ways of representing war, which include assessing trigger factors, underlying sources of tension and deeper structural conditions that shape events (Nye, 1993; also cited in Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 112). Nye combines the light and deep approaches to conflict prevention, emphasizing the structural implications of war. This study recognizes the importance of light conflict prevention, especially in consideration of the failure of the international community to prevent the Moroccan and Mauritanian occupation of Western Sahara; however, its main interests and concerns lie in both the structural conditions that shape events and ‘the how’ of the structural formation, production and normalization of Realpolitik discourses. Although it is important to be able to read the early warning signs of conflict, the goal should be to avoid getting stuck in short-term, imminent response-oriented,

166 operational conflict prevention. This is where structural analyses for conflict prevention plays a critical role in addressing the deep-rooted socio-economic, cultural, environmental, institutional, political symptoms and causes that lead to violent behavior. However, I would argue that the goal of conflict prevention is not only to recognize trigger causes of war, but to also problematize dominant structures that set neoliberal- imperialist agendas that result in cultural domination and subordination and subjugation of knowledges113. If we remove poverty, marginalization and injustice from the context of the global capitalist system, ignoring their symbiotic relationship so to speak, we close ourselves off from possibilities for deep analysis of the structural inequalities that form part of violent conflict. Therefore, in claims like, “ [the G8 is the] global nexus for action in preventing conflict,” we can clearly see the tendency to separate global capital and structural inequality from their very outgrowths – poverty, marginalization and war (Stephens and Powell, 2004: 197)114. This disconnect is shocking and counterintuitive and yet has been normalized nonetheless. If conflict prevention is truly to be a lens to “all development policies” (209), the political economy of conflict and development for that matter must be evaluated from within and without the ideological coordinates of empire and dominance- based models. What does this mean? It means problematizing the following statement in full, cited in part above:

“As an organisation with concentrated power and influence that allow it to play a key role in international agenda setting, the G8 is uniquely suited to serve as the global nexus for action in preventing conflict. Sharing and overlapping membership in many of the most influential, multilateral organisations in the areas of development, finance, and security, the G8 members are well placed to provide leadership and an impetus toward a truly holistic approach to conflict prevention – particularly in Africa” (Stephens and Powell, 2004: 197).

With respect to the above excerpt, what is wrong with a holistic treatment of conflict prevention, especially when it involves a “chronological comprehensiveness, a

113 Chapters Three and Four more specifically address the influence of neoliberal policies on conflict transformation strategies and analysis. At its basest form, this requires querying into ‘the how’ of setting the terms and rules of conflict strategizing and analyzing. 114 See the work in its entirety, Kirton and Stefanova, 2004. 167 wide range of policy tools, and a deep understanding of the individual contexts of conflicts” (201)? What is wrong with the position that the restricted membership of the G8, “confined to the most powerful democratic nations of the world,” makes it a more effective and flexible institution that can provide “leadership to those organisations that have more diffuse and slow-moving mechanisms for policy implementation” (200)? What is wrong with the G8’s assessment of efficient conflict prevention that requires a “comprehensive approach encompassing political, security, economic, financial, environmental, social and development policies, based on the principles of the UN Charter, the rule of law, democracy, social justice, the respect for human rights, a free press and good governance” (G8 Foreign Ministers, 1999; also cited in Stephens and Powell, 2004: 201)? What is wrong with such a holistic approach that proactively integrates women, embraces peacebuilding methods and strategies, addresses projected water shortages and water-based conflict, calls for the elimination of weapon flows to Africa and promotes conflict prevention through mediation, facilitation, observation, etc. (Stephens and Powell, 2004: 202-205)? What is wrong with the G8’s aim to set the agenda for the “broader international community”, especially when it recognizes, albeit shallowly, the need for simultaneously setting higher corporate standards and social responsibility (206)? Stephens and Powell concede that norm-setting is voluntary and not mandatory and therefore is ultimately beyond the G8’s control (208-209). In the above quotes, we see all the right jargon. In this regard, the danger is in the rhetoric. Our problematic is reflected in the simplistic statement that “The causes of armed conflict are multiple and complex” (G8 Ministers, 1999; also cited in Stephens and Powell, 2004: 201). They are multiple and complex and very much an integral component of a structurally and culturally violent world in which a Group of Eight can even exist. Not only does it exist, but it is also conceived of as natural and is self- represented as the preferred, practical and powerful expert on conflict prevention. In fact, these statements are reduced to sound bites, political correctness for politics sake and the stuff of opportunistic grant seekers if the normalization and proliferation of structural real politics is not recognized, addressed and thoroughly critically analyzed. The danger lies in the matter-of-factness of the G8’s prescriptions for conflict prevention, as if it exists apart from the very conflicts at hand, rather than as part of (a very active part at that) the

168 causal multiplicities and complexities of conflict. In this vacuum of present time and current ripe conditions for conflict, these preventative prescriptions are the ‘Other Mother’115 face of conflict prevention. They depict and simultaneously create and produce a fantastic and unidimensional world that completely excludes power relations and erases a colonial past and present. They are simplistic to the extreme and frighteningly pristine and perfect. Additionally, tones of racial and cultural superiority are evident in the G8’s own assessment of itself. The G8 portrays itself as more developed, more democratic, and emblematic of better governance and as upholders of the rule of law and the respecter, guardian and advocate of human rights. What is lacking in this assessment, besides a critical analysis of race and culture, is a geography of connectedness. Any acknowledgment of the freedoms, economic prosperity and creative political, economic, cultural and artistic space of the G8 (and the west more generally) must always already include and recognize the associated synchronicity of a history of oppression, rape, pillage (of materials and natural resources and political will), death (torture, murder and genocide), destruction (of social and cultural fabrics and ancestral, traditional and indigenous knowledge and world views) and the creation and naturalized establishment of race and gender dominance models and structural inequality. Democratic societies are not static. They are deeply connected to a shameful past and present of colonialism and empiricism. In this light, democracy must be worked and reworked. Democratic societies must be self-critical because undemocratic systemic behavior is always characteristic of democracies and degrees of authoritarianism are always at democracy’s door. Stated G8 principles and supposedly superior codes of conduct do not exempt G8 members from,

115 The reference, ‘Other Mother,’ is taken from the book Coraline (Gaiman and McKean, 2009). In this fictional dark haunting tale, the protagonist, Coraline, moves between two worlds. The world of the Other Mother, a character distinguished from Coraline’s real mother by black button eyes and an eerie façade of perfection, is at first the world of Coraline’s dreams. Slowly, however, the constructedness of the ‘other’ world reveals itself and Coraline must escape from the grips of the Other Mother and the world of ‘perfection’. I use the term ‘Other Mother’ as a direct reference to that which is constructed, deceptive, contrived and devoid of human messiness. Despite the Other Mother’s attempts to create the perfect world through words and material means, the other world cannot override Coraline’s need to return to her ‘real’ world, its multiplicities, complexities and imperfections. Simultaneously, the constructedness and dangerously deceptive reality of the Other Mother’s world slowly begins to peel away and reveal its darker closely guarded falsities. 169 for example, human rights abuses. We need only look at the increase in assassinations of human rights workers like Natalia Estemirova116 (Schwirtz and Barry, 2009) in Russia or the technological normalization of body politics (Agamben, 1998) and racial profiling in the name of security and anti-terrorist policies in the United States. This critical analysis is not advocating that the G8 cannot play a positive role in conflict prevention, especially considering its political, economic and militaristic clout. Nor is it suggesting that impoverished countries and their leaders bear no responsibility in present dire situations and possible conflict zones117. However, it does demand that it be acknowledged that whatever forms the G8’s role take will necessarily be conditioned, influenced and even programmed by a neoliberal, even neoconservative, economic interest-laden agenda rooted in “the political economy of colonialism, postcolonialism [post-colonialism], and neo-liberal globalization” (Zeleza, 2008: 15). The relationship of servant to master and the normalized and reproduced discourses that establish a hierarchy of races and nationalities118 has not been erased by the formal process of decolonization or the passage of time. These structural inequalities must form part and parcel of conflict prevention assessments and strategies. In this analytical framework, it is possible to locate such disconnects, like the European Union’s recent policy on conflict prevention and the EU’s economic and political relationship with Morocco, which cannot be separated from the question of Western Sahara. The following quote captures the EU’s position on conflict prevention:

“Conflict prevention calls for a cooperative approach to facilitate peaceful solutions to disputes, and implies addressing the root causes of conflicts. The EU underlines its political commitment to pursue conflict prevention as one of the main objectives of the EU’s external relations. It

116 Chechen President, Ramzan A. Kadyrov, stated publicly that he believed that Natalia Estemirova’s murder “aimed to divert law enforcement from counterterrorism operations” and was carried out by “forces that are incapable of coming to terms with the fact that in the Chechen Republic, military actions have ended and peace has arrived” (Scwirtz and Barry, 2009). We are reminded of the ‘Other Mother’ analogy, considering the fact that the conflict in Chechnya, albeit a silent and hidden one, still persists. It appears only on the surface to have subsided, a falsity promulgated by local and state authorities and the violent eradication of dissenting voices and media, the harbingers of the voiceless. 117 Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (2008) states poignantly that conflict in Africa can be “provoked and sustained by ethnic rivalries and polarizations, economic underdevelopment and inequalities, poor governance and elite political instability and manipulations,” but that these factors are also rooted in a history of colonialism (15). The symbiotic relationship of responsibility between colonizer and colonized is represented in this quotation. 118 Chapter Four further explores the concept of nation and notions of inclusion-exclusion. 170

resolves to continue to improve its capacity to prevent violent conflicts and to contribute to a global culture of prevention” (Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 124).

And yet, the EU simultaneously granted an “advanced status” to Morocco and “approved a package of measures geared to reinforcing its partnership with this country in the political and security domains” without the slightest reference to either Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara or continued human rights violations in the occupied territories (Abdelaziz, 2008). It is absolutely critical to examine the social networks and the general politics (régimes) of truth, the discourses that establish, produce and normalize the rules of conflict analyses and prevention (the production of some truths and knowledges at the subjugation of others). In this way, words and promises are just that, words and promises and not naturalized and pretentious givens. Furthermore, it becomes possible to ‘see’ the functions, manifestations and significance of these discourses (ideas, policies and actions) and to open up new spaces for critical evaluation and political engagement. Therefore, deep structural analyses frame integral components of modern conflict such as water, land, natural resources, drugs, small arms, population flows and human trafficking in terms of their relation to the global economy, the political economy of violent conflict (Mehler, 2005: 102-103) as well as the political economy of the production, manifestation and naturalization of truths, of discourses. Analyses of the political economy of violent conflict, keeping in mind the political economy of truths, interrogate the relationships and interrelations among economic, political, social and cultural spheres. For example, local, regional and international resource flows and the private sector, management and access to natural resources can be directly linked to political power, to political agendas and to conflict in general. In this regard, “roots of conflict appraisals do not comprise single item, causal linkages” (Alley, 2004: 17). In fact, a “political economy and cultural ecology of war” approach asks how political, economic, social and cultural factors cause and sustain conflict (Zeleza, 2008: 16). By approaching the causes of conflict in this way, we also set an applicable analytical standard from which to conceptualize conflict prevention. As suggested by Charles S. Maier, the political economy approach allows us to interrogate “economic doctrines” in

171 order to bring to light their “sociological and political premises” (Maier, 1987: 4). From this perspective, economic ideas and behavior are not just frameworks for analysis, but “beliefs and actions that must themselves be explained” (Maier, 1987: 6). Furthermore, as demonstrated in Chapter One, Realpolitik discourses have the power to steer conflict transformation strategies and analyses and, logically, conflict prevention epistemologies, methodologies, theory and practice. Using these analytical ‘guidelines’ for conflict prevention, it is possible to examine the functioning of Realpolitik discourses and their effects on the real possibilities for conflict prevention and yet ultimate failure of the decolonization process for Western Sahara. Did Realpolitik discourses move Western Sahara away from decolonization and towards conflict? How did the formal decolonization process fail? In asking these questions, in meeting Realpolitik discourses head on and in deepening the structural analyses of conflict prevention, I hope that the past can offer insight for the present conflict situation of Western Sahara. Contrary to Zartman (2005b), I do not conceptualize time in neat forward-looking and backward-looking frameworks. An evaluation of the past has bearing on the present and it informs conflict analyses and conflict prevention. Zartman rejects the notion of ‘backward-looking’ solutions to conflict and suggests that when a party to a conflict bases its position on repetition of past grievances and past legalities, then negotiation “is, in fact, war” (Zartman, 2005b: 291). The following chapter engages the notions of negotiation and third-party intervention and so will not be treated here. However, if we truly want to move conflict prevention from rhetoric to action, it must be ‘backward-looking’ and must take into consideration the ideological, colonial and imperialist roots that fertilize, produce and reinforce the conditions for conflict. If conflict prevention is merely prescriptive without critically analyzing how myths function within conflict analyses and prevention and without linking prevention to the political economy of violent conflict and discourses of the past and present (and their inter-linkages), then we have superficial conflict prevention templates that do not dig deeply into direct, structural and cultural violence. A template for a template’s sake fails to challenge structural domination, but shows the power of real politics on theory, policy and practice. Instead we should be looking at how cookie cutter

172 prescriptions for conflict prevention do not take into account the political economy of these very prescriptions. Therefore, like Nye, I combine light and deep(er) analyses for conflict prevention as they relate to the failure of conflict prevention for Western Sahara. This accomplishes two intentions: to analyze the failed prevention in 1975 (and the events leading up to Moroccan and Mauritanian occupation and subsequent decolonization breakdown) and to learn from the past to open up possibilities for deep conflict prevention today. Additionally, as Chandra Lekha Sriram and Zoe Nielson point out (2004), it is important to look at conflict prevention from regional and subregional perspectives. In this way, one takes into account the issue of regional variance and diversity. A conflict’s specific historical, economic, geopolitical and military coordinates determine the applicability of conflict prevention measures and the ways in which to explore the functioning of Realpolitik discourses. Furthermore, conflict analyses and prevention must take into consideration the unique socio-cultural aspects of the conflict at the local, regional and international levels. I look backward to the early and immediate historical events that led up to the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict in order to profoundly dive into the functioning of Realpolitik discourses in the preventive stage of the conflict and so as to inform the preventative possibilities of renewed conflict today. As conflict is cyclical, rather than linear, progressive and retrogressive, the exact beginning of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict is impossible to locate; however, the decolonization process of North Africa sheds light on the events that would ultimately lead to the Moroccan invasion of Western Sahara in 1975119. Although the immediate events culminating in direct violence between the Frente POLISARIO and Rabat are of utmost interest and concern, a brief early historical overview provides an understanding of place and its cultural, political, societal and economic implications. In order to present a complete and multidimensional appraisal of the conflict, a thorough analysis that takes into consideration the many factors at play is absolutely necessary. The case of Western Sahara demonstrates the fact that failed conflict prevention does not necessarily foreclose

119 Similarly, Sandole defines conflict as “a process characterized by origins, escalation, controlled maintenance, de-escalation, and some kind of termination. During its ‘lifetime,’ any particular conflict may or may not go through all of these stages and, indeed, may move in both directions at different points in time (e.g., a conflict may escalate after having de-escalated for a while)” (2006: 23). 173 future opportunities of conflict prevention, especially for protracted conflicts. Additionally, this conflict case facilitates an analysis that moves multi-directionally such that the specific multifaceted and layered factors and social, political and historical contexts that led to failed conflict prevention inform a more general understanding of conflict prevention. Conversely, a general approach that considers a historical political economy complex of social, cultural, colonial and neoliberal factors can be applied to specific conflict scenarios. It is a reciprocal analytical relationship. The following pre- conflict analysis seeks to broaden our understanding of this relationship, the historical political economy of the specific case of Western Sahara and conflict prevention more generally.

2.2. Western Sahara’s Early History

2.2.1. Western Sahara

Western Sahara120 is located in Northwest Africa and is bordered by Morocco to the north, Algeria to the northeast, Mauritania to the east and south and by the Atlantic Ocean to the west121. It encompasses approximately 266,000 square kilometers. The terrain is almost completely made up of hammada122 desert, while the coastline stretches for 1,110 kilometers and alternates between rocky cliffs and sandy beaches. Sand dunes accompany much of the coastline and move inland for 15 to 30 kilometers (Munilla Gomez, 1974: 13-74)123. The nomadic life of the inhabitants of the Sahara desert makes it difficult to know the exact origins of the Sahrawi people as nomadism involves the moving and mixing of peoples through intermarriage, the conquering and reconquering of tribal lands and movements based on motivations for material gain or climate change and droughts.

120 Although there is considerable information available on the history of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict, two texts in particular deserve special mention: see Tony Hodges, Western Sahara, the Roots of a Desert War (1983) and Francisco Villar, El Proceso de Autodeterminación del Sahara (1982). Both sources provide accurate and detailed early historical accounts and build-up to the conflict. 121 See Annex I. 122 Rocky desert of the interior plateau of the Sahara desert. 123 A descriptive and accurate account of the general characteristics of the desert, both geographical and geological, is given in the book, Estudio General del Sahara, by Eduardo Munilla Gomez, 1974. 174

Furthermore, for many of its inhabitants, the desert’s vast and ruthless terrain provided refugee and sanctuary from tribal enemies or repressive rule (Hodges, 5: 1983). The very harsh and precarious conditions of the desert in the land area, the fear of attack from different tribes and the relative disinterest in the barren desert land discouraged and even prevented historians from giving a detailed account of what today is known as Western Sahara. However, pieces from different historians, oral history and some scientific guesswork do provide a general idea of the desert’s past. Despite the harsh conditions of the Sahara desert, migration into the western part of the Sahara began in the first Millennium BC. The people were known as Berber nomads (Hodges, 1983: 3). As the final stages of the desertification of the Sahara desert took form, it was the arrival of the camel in the first century BC that allowed the peoples of the desert to withstand the relentless environment. During the eighth and ninth centuries and in the wake of the Arab expeditions to the far Maghreb, some of these Berber nomads in the northwest of Africa, known as the Zenata and Sanhaja, converted to Islam (4). This early history is marked by strategic moves for better more fertile land and control of important trade routes between caravan and trading towns. In the middle of the eleventh century, led by a religious zealot Abdallah Ibn Yacin, the Saharan Sanhaja formed the Almoravids and successfully conquered the kingdom of Ghana, Morocco, Muslim Spain and a good portion of western Algeria (5). Power continually shifted between tribes and leaders during this time period. Within the Almoravid Empire, there were deep fractions and separations of power. Also, in the eleventh century, the Arab Bedouin tribes by the name of the Beni Hilal and the Beni Sulaim began to invade the Maghreb area and transformed the cultural backdrop by replacing the Berber languages with Arabic, a lingual shift that reached not only the cities, but also the rural areas (8). By the 1150s the Beni Hilal reached Morocco; however, neither the Beni Hilal nor the Beni Sulaim made it as far as Western Sahara. On the other hand, in 1218, the Maqil, a Bedouin Arab people, who reportedly originated from Yemen, crossed North Africa as far as the Draa Valley and Atlantic Coast. It was not until the end of the thirteenth century that a tribal offshoot of the Maqil, the Beni Hassan, migrated southward from the Draa Valley and into Western Sahara. Their migration was a slow process taking as long as two to three centuries (8). The Beni

175

Hassan spoke the Hassaniya language, an Arabic dialect, and mixed with the Sanhaja people, who already populated the area. They thereby established their domain by the early sixteenth century (Mercer, 1979: 5124; Norris, 1986: 44). Eventually the area was populated by various Western Saharan tribes that despite intertribal warfare and raiding shared a common religion, language and dress. They practiced Islam without mosques and many times used sand for their ablutions due to the lack of water. They communicated in Hassaniya and in the sixteenth century, according to historical documentation, became known for their skilled verse and amazing ability to recite and improvise poems on various subjects, many times accompanied by music (Norris, 1986: 48-49). Both poetry and music provided an important cultural base for these nomadic people. Typically, the men of Western Sahara dressed and continue to dress in an indigo blue daraa and turban and the women in a melhafah, a light cloth wrapped deftly around the body and over the head. The customs surrounding the importance of music, poetry and traditional dress are evident in Sahrawi practices to date. Each Sahrawi tribe organized a djemaa or an assembly of the heads of its most respected and notable families. The people of the tribes selected these men on the basis of their wisdom, goodness, courage and overall concern for the wellbeing of all the people of the tribe. The djemaas held the responsibility of selecting the sheikh, establishing and overseeing the agreed upon body of laws and of choosing the community qadi, judge, in times of infighting or strife. It was known at the tribal level as the ait arbain (council of forty). In times of war, it organized the tribal defense and offensive raids (Hodges, 1983: 14). Despite the political organization of the djemaa and due to the inhospitable nature of the desert and relatively sparse and dispersed population, which discouraged growth and alternative forms of human organization, there was, consequently, “no effective supratribal state authority” that controlled Western Sahara (Hodges, 1983: 12). In fact, as one historian wrote: “Europeans, catching slaves and fish along the Sahara coast, sometimes appealed to Morocco for protection from the fierce nomads – but were told the

124 The first of John Mercer’s works, Spanish Sahara, touches on many of the same issues presented in this shorter Minority Rights Group report (Mercer, 1976). 176 region did not fall within the sultan’s jurisdiction. Indeed, Morocco’s own southern region was known as the bilad as-siba, ‘the unsubmitted land’” (Mercer, 1979: 5)125.

2.2.2. The Berlin Conference, 1884-1885

“All your interest in old cave drawings, the manners and customs of remote tribes and the slow mapping out of a desert about which nobody has cared up to this moment is all very well – for those who have time for such things. But it is all different now. We [Europeans] are men who deal with reality, who have ‘made’ the Sahara. We are the people who count!” (Bodington, 1961: 148).

The Berlin Conference of November of 1884 to February of 1885 led to the ‘scramble’ for Africa, where European powers divided the continent amongst themselves with absolute disregard for the diverse social, political, cultural and religious composition of the African peoples. The 1950s and 1960s marked the undoing of the colonial system through the process of decolonization. The push for independence by the colonized nations combined with the undermined economic state of the European nations in the aftermath of World War II provided the necessary conditions for decolonization. This process received full attention in Chapter One and so I will only re-emphasize a few key concepts here. The physical withdrawal from the colonized lands was ultimately backed by the United Nations after a hard and ideological fight between member states within the United Nations. However, the political and economic pull out did not occur. Although the 1960s can be designated as the move to get out of Africa, it was solely a physical departure. The colonial influence remained. The European colonizers were eager to maintain their political and economic positions of authority. They primed the local western-educated elites within their former territories for leadership positions and on their way out signed independence agreements that specified decolonization conditions that supported and promoted these interests. As can be seen in Chapter One, the policies

125 The phrasing of this historical account oozes racism. The equation of “catching fish and slaves,” the same verb used for both ‘pastimes,’ is unbelievably offensive but demonstrates the naturalized understanding of European racial superiority. This assumed superiority is also evident in the citation quoted at the start of the next section. 177 of the United States and France regarding self-determination and formal decolonization were inconsistent and contradictory (and continue to be so). The necessary components for post-colonial hegemonic relations between former colonial powers and their colonies, along with the new world power, the United States of America, were set firmly in place. Premeditated and economically calculated strategic alliances and puppet democratic governments of the new African states solidified the results. The old European powers and the United States, in competition with Russia and growing socialist movements, strategically planted the post-colonial economic and geopolitical seeds that reflect the globalized economy of today and the struggles for maintaining or usurping regional spheres of influence between western powers. In North Africa, the safeguarding of interests by France and Spain and the growing interest of the United States has deeply affected the stability of the Maghreb region.

2.2.3. Spanish Colonization of Western Sahara

The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 provided the necessary backdrop for the cutting up of Africa and the imposition of forced borders based on economic resources and political power, regardless of diverse cultural, political, economic and social identities in Africa. Spain found itself in a vulnerable position in comparison to other colonial nations and moved quickly so as not to be pushed out of the European-African ‘Gold Rush’. To get a piece of the pie, the Spanish government was forced head to head with the French and their manifest destiny practices for economic and political dominance in North Africa. This division began the process of cultural domination and impaired the freedom of movement characteristic of nomadic society in North Africa. In fact, racist discourses constructed the nomad as someone who could be driven away or molded into colonial constructions (Barsamian and Said, 2003: 16). It was a matter of asserting your place in the international context of international prestige and racial and cultural hierarchies. Colonial hegemony, directly linked to status and power construction, took the form of direct invasion and physical dominance. The colonizers rationalized their violent imposition of culture, language and religion on the basis of cultural, religious and racial

178 superiority. The calculated invention and naturalization of this cultural and racial superiority, fortified by a divine call to provide salvation to the savage, had vast and lasting implications for the local populations in all areas of life, including the creation of linguistic imperialism with the replacement of local languages by colonial tongues. The connection between language and power and the importance of international status is still evident today in competitive French – U.S. relations in North Africa. Colonial powers sustained the naturalness of colonial relationships through the normalized production and sustainment of “ingrained imperial presuppositions” (Tucker, 1999: 19). In Aimé Césaire’s simple and yet loaded equation, “colonization = ‘thingification’” (2000: 42). Colonized societies were beaten into becoming “instruments of production” (42), in both the material sense and in the framework of the thought and of the idea, such that the justifying myth of divine racial superiority itself became embedded in ‘nature’ and ‘truth’. Although Spain joined European expansionism on December 26, 1884 by declaring a protectorate over Río de Oro, the Cape Blanc peninsula and Angra de Cintra, it was not until two years later in 1886 that Spanish and French negotiations more clearly delineated respective territorial claims, without regard for ethnic, geographical or historical boundaries of the time (Villar, 1982: 37). In a successful and definitive power play by France for dominance in North Africa and, more specifically, the Maghreb region – Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia – Spain conceded the better piece of the African pie in terms of economic promise and strategic regional placement. Nevertheless, Spain was determined to safeguard its occupation of the Canary Islands and did not want a competing nation, mainly France or Britain, so close to its stronghold (Hodges, 1983: 40). In 1912, France and Spain concretely established the borders of Western Sahara, or Sáhara Español (Spanish Sahara). While other colonial powers immediately began the physical process of colonization, the Spanish government did not immediately penetrate the area. Sahrawi resistance took the form of costal raiding of trading posts like Villa Cisneros in reaction and in defiance of European hegemony. Spain did, however, form two groups for the exploration and ultimate extraction of natural resources from the area, the Sociedad de Geografía de Madrid and Sociedad Española de Africanistas y

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Colonistas, the former established in 1876 and the latter in 1884. Supported by Spanish businessmen and political heavy weights in Spain, both organizations were interested in the appraisal of the territory for economic gain with special consideration for the rich fishing reserves of the Río de Oro and other possible natural resources like phosphates and oil (41). In support of the fishing endeavors and in order to capitalize on these reserves, the Sociedad de Pesquerías Canario-Africanas was established. Spanish intent and expectations of its newly acquired territory was clear from the onset: economic gain, political prestige in the international community and strategic regional placement with regards to the proximity of Western Sahara to the Canary Islands. In response to these obvious moves for physical penetration of the area, respective Sahrawi tribes defended their terrain and way of life. They were one of the last peoples of Africa to truly break under the weight of colonial military muscle (55). Ironically, the Spanish were not the actual temporary pacifiers of the Sahrawi resistance movement. It took the French to finally reduce the resistance fire to burning embers, embers that only needed an opportune moment to reignite.

2.2.4. French Intervention

Even though North Africa was accustomed to tribal warfare, invasion from faraway lands and cultural, political and economic change incurred by such warfare, the forceful advent of the French and more passive entrance of the Spanish in North Africa sowed the seeds of resistance of a different kind in reaction to organized international hegemony. The actions of both France and Spain, although drastically different, were comprised of the same hegemonic fabric for the domination of the peoples of Northwest Africa and beyond. The direct action of colonial state actors under a naturalized colonial pretext bore heavily on the local population of the Sahara desert. In the name of cultural, social and political superiority, the colonizers began to erode the very cultural, social and political fabric of the people they claimed to civilize. Due to the harshness of the land they traversed, the tribes that traveled the Western Sahara territory maintained tribal autonomy more so than any other peoples in the region, even though the movement and mixture of Berber and Arab peoples had

180 directly influenced them. For the Sahrawi people, the arrival of the French and Spanish also presented a new kind of foreign interference and physical presence. With the colonial regime, the beginning of organized and unified resistance began to take form between competing and warring tribes. Unity, although strained at times, found refuge in a common religion (Islam), a shared language (Hassaniya) and in the unique dress and way of life of the desert. A distinguishing factor for anti-colonial liberation movements was the imposition of imaginary lines, colonial paperwork and bureaucracy, which threatened and slowly decreased the freedom of movement essential to desert and nomadic life. Like no other time in Sahrawi oral history, foreign influence threatened to cut off the umbilical cord of nomadic life. Rainfall did not recognize colonial enforced boundaries. The French proactively organized the complete suppression of the vast colonial territories and its people, which it managed to concretize at the Berlin Conference. In an attempt to fully control by physical domination the present day areas of Mauritania, Morocco and Algeria126, France relied upon invasive military might and immediate occupation. French colonial policy contrasted greatly with the slow, practically non- existent Spanish process of colonization of the Spanish Sahara. This proved frustrating for the French. The Sahrawi tribes paid little attention to colonial boundaries and made hit and run attacks upon French settlements in southern Morocco and then quickly retreated into the Spanish Sahara, without fear of rapprochement from Spanish forces. It was in reaction to these attacks and to an organizer and infamous leader, Mohammed Mustafa Ould Sheikh Mohammed Fadel, most commonly known as Ma el-Ainin, that France decided, regardless of Spanish domain, to put into motion a counter-attack against Sahrawi insolence and a direct threat to French national security. It would not be the last time that France directly intervened. Ma el-Ainin, meaning water of the eyes, led a tribal population of anti-colonial resistance from Smara in the Spanish Sahara. He was not native to the Saguia el-Hamra and reportedly was born at the banks of Niger around 1830 (Hodges, 1983: 55-56). However, his leadership in the area provided a temporary unifying element against French advancement and escalated the clashes between the French and respective

126 France also controlled Tunisia and what was then denominated French West Africa. 181

Sahrawi tribes in Northwest Africa. Ma el-Ainin threatened French dominance and challenged France’s colonial authority, which in the diverse setting of nomadic tribes proved dangerous and problematic to colonial expansion and, subsequently, to the reaping of economic rewards in the region. On the flip side, Ma el-Ainin immediately recognized the significance of French occupation in the early 1900s and the threat it presented to the way of life of the people in the region. By allying himself with the Sultan of Morocco, he tried to counter French forces and colonial Christian repression and to unite the autonomous nomadic populations in organized resistance in the name of Islam, freedom and dignity. Ma el-Ainin capitalized upon the influence of the Sultan of Morocco as a military power, but not in recognition of the sultan’s suzerainty over Western Sahara. He needed an effective way to challenge French dominance in the region, which was quickly closing in on the Spanish Sahara. His forces were comprised of a “disparate and inherently unstable tribal coalition that came together to confront a grave external threat” (Hodges, 1983: 58). Although Ma el-Ainin died in 1910 and did not live to see the eventual ‘success’ of French colonization, his memory and cause remained at the heart of nomadic resistance. The French decided to strike hard in order to wipe out the remnants of these rebel forces. In 1913, in reaction to effective tribal resistance against French occupation, French forces entered Smara in the Spanish Sahara without Spanish authorization, destroyed the dome of Ma el-Ainin and desecrated much of his historically rich library (Hodges, 1983: 58, 61). This act infuriated the tribes of the area and for a short time period they rallied once again against the French forces using guerrilla tactics and hit and run attacks. Knowledge of the terrain strongly worked in their favor against superior military muscle. However, by 1934 French military superiority crushed (for the time being) the last remnants of nomadic resistance, which were weakened by the demoralizing effects of no real coordination, long term plan or strategy. The French had closed in on all sides – Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania – and had paved the way for Spanish movement into the interior of Western Sahara. The local population had finally submitted to colonial rule and the Spanish met no real resistance as they moved inland. This was a direct result of the native population’s assessment of the Spanish who, in

182 comparison to the French, were a much less invasive presence. By 1943, the French had succeeded in the conquest of southern Morocco and opened the doors for total pacification of the Spanish Sahara (63). As one Sahrawi put it succinctly, “we all now have to adjust to laws which are not ours, put up with the control of arms, property and so on, imposed by more powerful people. The only ‘man of the gun’ now is the soldier of the government” (Caro Baroja, 1955: 33).

2.2.5. Phosphate Discovery

In 1943, Spanish geologist, Manuel Alía Medina, began a series of expeditions, resulting in the discovery of phosphate reserves127. Between 1948 through 1955, after four survey campaigns, phosphate extraction was deemed too costly for its potential outcomes. Therefore, by 1956 the search was suspended. However, in 1961 and 1962, the Spanish government reconsidered its venture and increased the search for phosphates on a much larger and more intensive scale. The results of the intensification of the search uncovered huge phosphate deposits at Bu-Craa, a very promising find (Villar, 1982: 20- 21). As a result of the discovery of this natural resource jackpot, Spain finally understood the potential economic value and importance of the territory. Therefore, as the process of decolonization was taking root, Spain began to strengthen its hold on the Spanish Sahara (32). Also in 1962, Spain divided the territory into two parts: the Saquia El-Hamra in the northernmost sector and the Río del Oro (River of Gold) in the south. The strengthening of the Spanish position in Western Sahara began in the late 1950s due to the prospect for big phosphate finds. At the same time, however, Spain decided to relinquish certain colonial claims to Morocco. In 1959, Spain abdicated the region of Tarfaya to Morocco, an area that extended from the Wadi Draa in southern Morocco to the northern border of the Spanish Sahara. Consequently, in 1969, Morocco recovered the small coastal enclave of Ifni (Damis, 1983: 11). However, despite these concessions, Spain refused to report its colonial territories to the reporting system of Chapter XI of the United Nations, and its admission to the UN was not conditioned by such recognitions (Crawford, 2006: 608).

127 Chapter Three further explores the integral relationship between real politics discourse and the untapped natural resource economic incentive that fuels conflict, not only regarding the failure to prevent conflict, but also the failure to enforce established international norms. 183

The Spanish push for prominence in Western Sahara in the late 1950s and early 1960s began to take effect on Sahrawi life and culture. The combination of relentless droughts that began in the late 1960s, the interruption of Sahrawi commercial caravans by pervasive Spanish growth, improved infrastructure creating more job opportunities for the native population and changes in colonial policy toward the Sahrawi people all resulted in the drastic decline of nomadism (Damis, 1983: 13).

2.3. Decolonization

2.3.1. Moroccan, Mauritanian and Algerian Independence

The 1950s and 1960s marked the undoing of the colonial system. The colonial breakup was instigated by multiple simultaneous factors. World War II severely weakened European nations. The emergence of the United States of America as the leading world power exacerbated this vulnerable position. At the same time, the push for independence from the colonized nations themselves could no longer be ignored. Liberation movements for independence combined with the undermined economic state of the European nations provided the necessary conditions for systemic change with regards to African colonial territories128. The post World War II environment and the creation of the United Nations in 1945 forced the decolonization of colonized peoples and, of specific interest to this study, the decolonization of Spanish and French territories in North Africa. As explained in Chapter One, the ideals behind decolonization and the right to self-determination of colonized peoples were voiced in the anti-colonial rhetoric of the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations; however, the beauty of the language of the Charter and charge for global solidarity masked the underlying causes for decolonization. For colonial peoples, decolonization was rooted in liberty and freedom for the colonized. For the colonial powers, it was prompted by economic collapse, overextension and the overall unsustainability of the colonial system as it stood. On the international scheme, the tectonic political, economic, social and power shifts that the decolonization process

128 See Chapter One for a broader discussion of decolonization, one that utilizes a postcolonial analytical lens. 184 promised ignited the fire under liberation movements in Africa. However, while colonial powers publicly applauded decolonization, privately they sought to safeguard their economic, political, social and power interests. This is true of French colonial relations in Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria and of Spanish relations in Western Sahara. Therefore, even though the 1960s can be designated as the move to get out of Africa, it was solely a physical departure. The colonial influence remained. While the Charter of the United Nations sustained the right of men and women to be free from foreign domination, behind closed doors, colonial powers were setting the stage for post- colonial dominance. The European colonizers wanted to maintain their political and economic influence. Once they realized that this influence was too expensive and at times too bloody to maintain through physical domination, they developed alternative ways to safeguard their interests. In order to ensure their ‘new’ position of influence on their way ‘out,’ European nations specified decolonization conditions in independence agreements that supported their interests. One of many tactics used was to support puppet governments through the promotion of the local elite within the colonized territory, those who had studied abroad in the advanced industrialized nations and who would more likely respect and promote the interests of their ex-colonizers. Although these processes have been explored in depth in Chapter One, a brief review here is beneficial to our conflict prevention inquiry. In North Africa, the French learned a hard lesson with the Algerian revolutionary war from 1954 to 1962. The French thought they could maintain Algeria as a French protectorate through a quick and decisive military intervention; however, it turned into an ugly and brutal war with heavy casualties on both sides, but considerably more so for the Algerians129. The French underestimated the seeds of resistance that had been slowly growing in the minds of the people in an atmosphere of colonial repression and domination. While the French chose military engagement with Algeria, they avoided prolonged direct confrontation with Morocco and Mauritania by approaching the liberation fury that was taking hold in both places through diplomatic and neocolonial strategies.

129 See footnote 65 in Chapter One for a brief synopsis of the years leading up to Algerian Independence. 185

In Morocco, France began talks with Sultan Sidi Mohamed Ben Youssef (Mohammed V) who had been exiled to Madagascar by the French in 1953 (Oliver, 1987: 61). By 1956, Morocco was granted its independence as a democratic, constitutional monarchy. The French had in essence avoided a bloody transition, like that of Algeria, safeguarded their interests and sealed a special relationship with freshly reinstated King Mohammed V (Pennell, 2000, 290; Menéndez del Valle, 1975: 9)130. As a result, Franco was forced to withdraw from the International Zone of Tangier, which put him on the defensive over the Spanish colonial possessions of Ifni and Western Sahara. In Mauritania, the French supported political leader and Francophile Mokhtar Ould Daddah. He was also married to a French woman. They joined forces to assure Daddah’s presidential position as the French ceremoniously renounced its claims to Mauritania in 1960 (Mercer, 1979: 7-8). Through the new Mauritanian puppet establishment, the French preserved their colonial economic and industrial pull and protected major assets such as prime iron-ore reserves, which were also of particular interest to the British, Italians and Germans. Understanding the false pretenses that surrounded decolonization is essential to understanding the decolonization process of the French and Spanish in North Africa and the repercussions in the region resulting from the maintenance of foreign hegemony there. In many newly independent nations, authoritarian governments replaced colonial rule. Newly independent nations across the African continent sought to be self-reliant; however, the dependency relationship was very well established and proved to be difficult to overcome despite the victory of independence. As established in Chapter One, postcolonial studies facilitate investigations into these post-colonial relationships. Furthermore, they inform a historical political economy analysis of conflict prevention. The same analytical techniques and interrelations are valued and utilized in both frameworks for analysis.

130 For a more detailed description of the reinstatement of King Mohammed V, see Chapter One, Part Two, section 4.2. 186

2.3.2. The United Nations and UN Resolution 1514 (XV)

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, AND FOR THESE ENDS to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples, HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS (Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, 1945).

At the time that colonized nations were engaged in liberation struggles, the United Nations became the international institutional force behind decolonization, although not initially intended for this purpose. The United Nations (UN) was established in 1945 in the aftermath of the death and destruction wrought by World War II in order to maintain peace by preventing conflict and by ensuring global security (Hoy, 1998: 81). In essence, the victors of World War II (with the United States at the helm) created an institution predicated on equality, international solidarity and a peaceful world order. It condemned the use of armed force or aggression and sought to facilitate cooperation in international law, international security, economic development and social equity. The hierarchical and hegemonic organization of the institution, in contrast, directly contradicts the essential principles of the United Nations doctrine towards a just and equitable world order131. The General Assembly of the United Nations today is composed of 192 member states. The Security Council is made up of 15 members, five of which are permanent and possess veto power: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. The General Assembly and the Security Council elect the International

131 See Annex II. These structural deficiencies were also examined in Chapter One. They are also explained in Chapter Three in relation to conflict actors and mediation. 187

Court of Justice for a 9-year term. As is evident in the structural organization of the international body, the ‘winners’ of World War II built economic, political and power inequality into its institutional core. However, at the same time, it provided hope and the means for aiding and instituting the process of decolonization in a lawful, legitimate and internationally accepted context. This dichotomy between the hegemonic structure of the United Nations and the just and equal principles on which it stands must be understood in the context of a calculated reconstruction and division of power in a post-World War II environment. The worthy realism, rather than idealism, of the Charter is the creative vision of possibility. The hegemonic structure, on the other hand, can impede and obstruct the UN from effectuating change in conflict situations. This duality of the United Nations is essential to understanding the breakdown of the decolonization process for Western Sahara. In the opening speech of the 2003 United Nations General Assembly, Kofi Annan encouraged governments to work towards restructuring the UN Security Council in order to make up for the growth and changes that the United Nations has undergone since its inception in 1945 (Annan, 2003; Smith, 2004 and 2006). Annan addressed the post- World War II hegemonic structure of the international organ and called for its restructuring so that the current influence the Security Council has on its member states better reflect the decision making power of its member states132. The fact that certain members have permanent status and veto power allows them to effectively control all major decisions about how the world is governed (Smith, 2004: 2 and 2006: 399) and, consequently, undermine the founding principles of the body that promises to create a more peaceful, secure and equitable world. Annan warned that the dominant power patterns that the structure of the Security Council produced would eventually render itself ineffective unless it began to address the interests of all members. As such, it is essential to take the power dynamics of the United Nations into account when taking strategies for conflict change into account; “understanding how power relations perpetuate war can help to identify points in the vicious circle where the downwards spiral can be reversed” (El-Bushra, 2006: 233).

132 The Security Council has been coined the “Hegemony Council” in reference to its institutionalized and structural inequality (Lâm, 2002: 190). 188

In 1960, the United Nations forged an internationally legitimate path for the decolonization of nations in Resolution 1514 (XV), “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.” Colonized nations found an international voice in this infamous resolution, but also found themselves depending on an institution that promised short-term liberty from direct colonial rule, but maintained neocolonial hegemony in the long run. It had the potential to create a certain international stability and to eliminate formal colonization, while simultaneously reinforcing an international hierarchical status quo that maintained the very inequality it sought to destroy. The ultimate failure of the implementation of this resolution for Western Sahara clearly demonstrates where the sphere of hegemonic influence clashes with the rhetoric of the charter for international solidarity, human rights, equality and justice. This plays out not in the clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1996), but rather in the clash between organized institutional hegemony and just international policy and equal representation. In this regard, an interrogation into the functioning of real politics, the ideas, policies and actions around the processes of decolonization, must also incorporate an assessment of the sociological, (geo)political, militaristic, ideological and historical premises that influence conflict prevention processes. Echoes of Maier (1987) can be heard here. Undertaking the political economy of conflict prevention means engaging the economic ideas and behavior and the related beliefs and actions that relate to such behavior (Maier, 1987: 6). It also means uncovering naturalized and normalized beliefs and discourses, which are taken at face value without critical thought, and occult behaviors, which mask real interests and reasons for acting or for not acting.

2.3.3. Greater Morocco and Mauritanian Claims

“If Morocco is independent, it is not completely unified. The Moroccans will continue the struggle until Tangier, the Sahara from Tindouf to Colomb-Bechar, Touat, Kenadza, Mauritania are liberated and unified. Our independence will only be complete with the Sahara! The frontiers of Morocco end in the south at Saint-Louis-du-Sénégal!” (Allal el-Fassi, June 19, 1956; cited in Fessard de Foucault, 1975: 78; also cited in Hodges, 1983: 85).

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“I cannot help evoking the innumerable ties which unite us: we bear the same names, we speak the same language, we conserve the same noble traditions, we honor the same religious leaders, graze our herds on the same pastures, give water to them at the same wells. In a word we are referring to that same desert civilization of which we are so justly proud. So I invite our brothers of Spanish Sahara to dream of this great economic and spiritual Mauritania” (Mokhtar Ould Daddah, Atar, July 1, 1957; cited in Ould Daddah, 1966: 10; also cited in Hodges, 1983: 100).

In 1956, the same year that Morocco gained its independence, Istiqlal party leader Allal el-Fassi, who had been exiled in Cairo, began a public campaign for the recovery of what he designated pre-colonial Moroccan territory. His idea of Greater Morocco extended the Moroccan border to the Senegal River in the south and included vast parts of the Algerian Sahara, all of Spanish Sahara and Mauritania and a small corner of northwestern Mali (Villar, 1982: 61). Motivated more by political prestige, influence and power, at first el-Fassi stood alone in these grandiose territorial claims. He admitted the following when recounting those times of political isolation and daring; “I was the only person to call for the liberation of the Sahara and I was greeted with laughter” (Hodges, 1983: 86)133. Both King Mohammed V and el-Fassi were extremely popular in Morocco at the time, and both were trying to carve out their dominant role in a fresh post-colonial society. So as not to be outmatched by el-Fassi’s nationalist movement, Mohammed V officially endorsed the idea of greater Morocco in 1958. The claims to Mali and Senegal were quietly dropped in the late 1950s. However, Moroccan claims to Western Sahara, Mauritania and the Algerian Sahara intensified in the 1960s. When Mauritania gained independence in 1960, Morocco tried to stop its admission into the United Nations and, in 1963, engaged in a short war with Algeria over the Tindouf area. What began as a laughable ambitious goal became the political norm worthy of military intervention, border wars and aggressive behavior (that would go unchecked and would even be sanctified by third-parties). Although both the Istiqlal party and the monarchy backed the idea of Greater Morocco, one exiled political figure and Secretary-General of the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires, Mehdi Ben Barka, condemned the move as Moroccan expansionism. He viewed these aggressive politics as constituting a “veritable betrayal not only of the

133 Speech to Beni Mestara, October 16, 1957. 190 dynamic Algerian Revolution, but, in a general sense, of the whole Arab Revolution for liberty, socialism and union, of the entire world movement of national liberation”; he concluded that war with Arab brothers should be looked upon as treason to the Arab community “whatever the pretexts prefabricated by governments for their particular and unavowable schemes” (Ben Barka, 1966: 157-159; also cited in Hodges, 1983: 96). When King Mohammed V died in 1961, his son King Hassan II took power and did not inherit the popularity of his father. He felt threatened by Ben Barka’s public defiance of the monarchy and leadership role in the Third World movement, which also raised the hairs of both the French and U.S. governments. In a repressive crackdown on dissidents to the monarchy, Hassan sentenced Ben Barka and others to death. All were charged with attempting to overthrow the new king. Although Ben Barka fled Morocco, he continued from a distance to plant resistance on two levels, local and global. In October of 1965, he was abducted and never found. Mystery and foul play surround his disappearance and presumed murder. After a French public uproar to the kidnapping and murder of the leader, where French officers were implicated, an inquiry by the French president traced the disappearance to Moroccan interior minister, General Mohammed Oufkir. The monarchy was proving itself capable of anything to safeguard its survival. Moroccan expansionist measures also sparked a defensive response from still French Mauritania. In 1957, it made a public claim to Western Sahara, a nice buffer between it and Moroccan ambition. By the time of its independence and throughout the 1960s, Mauritania vacillated between three positions on Western Sahara: an official claim to the territory, a status quo acceptance in an attempt to keep Morocco at arm’s length and support for self-determination. At the same time that Morocco and Mauritania were making their respective claims on the Spanish Sahara, the political atmosphere in Western Sahara was beginning to shift. At the time and despite moves by the Moroccan elite and French-groomed Mauritanian leadership to curb the diverse liberation movements in their interests, a wave of change could be felt in the Spanish Sahara. A people’s independence movement took hold in a tribal setting that had just begun to understand the unifying power of a common cause, self determination, and of a common enemy, colonial and post-colonial hegemony.

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2.3.4. The Army of Liberation (Conseil National de la Résistance)

The Army of Liberation formed in response to the forced exile of the Moroccan Sultan in 1953. Officially established in 1955, the Army of Liberation organized a guerrilla army and anticolonial resistance movement, comprised of Sahrawi and Moroccan forces determined to rid Northwest Africa of the colonial presence of France and Spain. The movement incorporated the ideals of Ben Barka. In the name of Arab brotherhood, religion and dignity, it challenged French and Spanish colonial control in Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco and Western Sahara. This political organization constituted the first step towards an organized anticolonial movement for an independent Western Sahara, involving a collaborative effort with Morocco and other neighboring liberation movement players in Northwest Africa. Although it could be argued that Moroccan voices and leadership led the charge, the Army of Liberation was conceived in a regional context in an atmosphere of colonial repression that provided the catalyst for cooperation and guerrilla coordination against a common enemy. In 1957 and 1958, the Army of Liberation reached the height of its campaign against colonial domination. It celebrated and supported both Algeria’s Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) as a partner movement and other rebellious forces in the region. The Army of Liberation staged offensive attacks in French outposts on the Algerian border, in Spanish Sidi Ifni and in Western Sahara and Mauritania, its main focus. Its rapid growth infuriated and scared Paris, Madrid, the Istiqlal party and King Mohammed V of Morocco and French friendly Mauritanian leader Ould Daddah (Pazzanita, 2006: 33). In reaction to the growing strength of the opposition liberation movement, King Mohammed V organized his own royal forces, the Forces Armées Royales (FAR), in an effort to exert total and unchallenged control and legitimacy in Morocco. The fervor of the Army of Liberation movement threatened French post-colonial influence in both Morocco and Mauritania. The momentum of the guerrilla forces convinced France to organize a joint French-Spanish preventative intervention to regain control in Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro in the Spanish Sahara and to target their home base in southern Morocco in order to squash the organized rebellion as they had done in

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1934. The Spanish quickly agreed to the joint venture, referred to by both parties as Operation Ouragon. The planned strike was also backed by Ould Daddah and received no interference from King Mohammed V, who wanted a scapegoat to the autonomous anticolonial ‘problem’ in the south of Morocco. Foreign military intervention provided an easy solution. Operation Ouragon proved successful on many fronts in February of 1958. The French and Spanish capitalized on the waning morale and unity of the Liberation Army caused by internal strife between the more traditional Sahrawi tribes and the radicalized Moroccan leaders (Pazzanita, 2006: 36). The military strike also regained Spanish control of the Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro. Finally, the base of the Army of Liberation in southern Morocco was crushed and more or less dismantled. Although the French accomplished the goal of maintaining dominance in its former colonies, the operation also caused a humanitarian disaster for the guerrilla fighters of the Liberation Army. In the end, the loss left the majority of the fighters without livestock or a way to provide for themselves or their families. As a result, many of the guerrilla fighters decided to join the King’s army (FAR). Others took refuge in Western Sahara or Mauritania in an attempt to recuperate their previous desert life. The ultimate destruction of the Army of Liberation was a huge success for King Mohammed V. Not only did the French extinguish the only real threat to his absolute power, but their decision to intervene in the region also blazed the path for the Moroccan seizure of the Tekna Zone (Tarfaya) from the Spanish in the same year. As the French intervention smothered the resistance fire in 1934, so too did Operation Ourang in 1958. The embers of resistance of the Sahrawi people would have to wait another decade and a half until the influence of the Frente POLISARIO would ignite them once again.

2.3.5. Call for Spanish Decolonization of Western Sahara, Changes in a Nomadic Society

The Sahrawi population gradually began to leave behind the nomadic way of life. The combination of relentless droughts between 1959 and 1963, which wiped out approximately 60% of livestock herds, and increased Spanish presence and attention to the economic development of industry, education and infrastructure, roads, factories,

193 housing, government buildings, etc., offered alternatives to nomadic life (Instituto de Estudios Africanos, 1971; Munilla Gomez, 1974; Vilar, 1977). Job opportunities opened up to the native population as the need for labor increased. As a result, the Spanish set forth to train its new working force. In an ironic twist, Spain began to industrialize its Spanish Saharan province at the same time that the colonial tides were turning. On December 16, 1965, the United Nations released its first specific resolution on Western Sahara and Ifni, urgently requesting Spain to “take immediately all necessary measures for the liberation of the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara from colonial domination and, to this end, to enter into negotiations on the problems relating to sovereignty presented by these two Territories” (United Nations General Assembly, 1965). In response to this international pressure to decolonize, Spain called for a delay of colonization citing underdevelopment and a nomadic population as obstacles to the decolonization process. In 1966, despite previous Moroccan and Mauritanian claims to Western Sahara, both expressed their support for and right of Western Sahara to self- determination. In addition, the Organization of African Unity (AOU) called for its freedom and independence and the United Nations requested a referendum in Western Sahara for the first time. In December 1966, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution that requested Spain to concede Ifni to Morocco and proposed a UN supervised referendum of self-determination for Western Sahara134 (Hodges, 1987: 44). Between 1967 and 1973, the United Nations issued 6 resolutions that affirmed the right of self-determination for the Sahrawi people. By 1972 and 1973, the resolutions more explicitly specified the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination and even independence (44). The apparent international support for self-determination and independence from colonial rule by both the United Nations and OAU strengthened the Sahrawi position on an international and regional scale.135

2.3.6. Moroccan and Mauritanian Positions

Throughout the 1960s, despite territorial claims to Western Sahara, both Morocco and Mauritania publicly backed Spanish decolonization of Western Sahara and the right

134 Spain and Portugal were the only two dissenting voices of 107. 135 For a more detailed review, revisit Chapter One. 194 to self-determination of the Sahrawi people. In 1966, Moroccan foreign minister Mohammed Cherkaoui backed decolonization of the territory and Sahrawi independence. He defined independence as “a true independence which would put the future of these territories in the hands of their own nationals who, with their discretion and fully recovered freedom, would know how to decide their destiny” (Hodges, 1987: 46)136. In addition, Morocco voted in favor of General Assembly Resolution 2229 (XXI) of 1966, which clearly summarized the supporting documents for the self-determination of Western Sahara, UN Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960, Special Committee on Western Sahara of 1964 and UN Resolution 2072 (XX) of 1965, which called for a fair and free referendum for the Sahrawi people with regards to the decolonization process. Morocco’s support did not stop there. It voted in favor of every one of the pro-referendum and pro- independence resolutions that the United Nations General Assembly adopted from 1967 through 1974, with the unexplainable exception of that of 1972 (47). King Hassan declared in a press conference on July 30, 1970 that the Sahrawi people should determine their own fate: “instead of going purely and simply to claim the territory of the Sahara, I want to request specifically that a popular consultation take place there, assured as I was that the first result would be the departure of the non-Africans and that then one would leave it up to the people of the Sahara to choose whether to live under the Moroccan aegis or their own aegis or any other aegis” (47). Mauritania followed Morocco’s lead and supported self-determination for the Sahrawi people. It voted for all seven of the pro-referendum resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly in the 60s and early 70s. As early as 1966, the Mauritanian government concluded that self-determination was elemental to the decolonization process: “the right of its [Western Sahara] inhabitants to choose their future, without their being converted into tools of the internal problems of other countries, must be recognized” (47). Adding legitimacy to the United Nations resolutions and the Sahrawi cause for self-determination and a Sahrawi referendum to determine the status of its independence, the leaders of the region publicly applauded the principle of self- determination. King Hassan of Morocco, President Mokhtar Ould Daddah of Mauritania

136 Taken from: Discours pronounce par SE Monsieur Mohammed Cherkaoui, minister des affairs etrangères du Maroc, à la XXI session de l’Assemblée Générale, October 13, 1966, Moroccan government. 195 and Houari Boumedienne of Algeria scheduled two tripartite summit meetings, one at Nouadhibou on September 14, 1970 and the other in Agadir on July 24, 1973. The three leaders recognized that the destiny of Western Sahara resided in the Sahrawi people (47)137.

2.3.7. Spanish Sahrawi Djemaa

As the international community was setting the stage for Sahrawi self- determination, Spain was trying to retain its colonial territory, if not through direct rule, then via the future referendum process. Madrid still held onto the hope that the Sahrawi people might vote to integrate with Spain. In order to set up a more positive relationship with the Sahrawi people, the Spanish government decided in 1967 to establish the Sahrawi Djemaa, Asamblea General del Sáhara (Thompson and Adloff, 1980: 137). Traditional Sahrawi society used the Djemaa as the arbiter of disputes and crimes against the tribe. It acted as the tribe’s executive, legislative and judicial authority. The Djemaa was comprised of tribal elders who were entrusted with enforcing the orf, customary laws of the tribe. Threat of expulsion from the tribe or tribal faction if a member of the tribe did not adhere to the Djemaa’s rulings or penalties preserved its authority. Only older free males could participate in the governing body. Because the Djemaa depended upon popular participation and encouraged collective decision-making, it has been regarded as democratic in nature (Pazzanita, 2006: 96-97). The Spanish version of the traditional Djemaa involved the participation of 84 members, 82 of which were Sahrawi. The two Spanish positions on the Djemaa, the Secretary and Secretary-General, had no voting power and according to Spanish authorities served an advisory purpose. The Djemaa was implemented to serve a double function: to provide a superior body of representation of administration of the local population by the local population and to promote the participation of the Djemaa in matters considered of general interest to Madrid and to the people of the territory (Oliver, 1987: 52-53). In essence, the Djemaa conceded limited power to respected tribal leaders

137 The Joint Communiqué was issued by the governments of Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco, July 24, 1973, at Agadir; cited in UN Document A/10023/Rev. 1, pp. 126-127 (United Nations General Assembly, 1975). 196 without undermining or posing a threat to Spanish political or economic interests. Furthermore, the ‘capitulation’ of colonial power created the impression that Madrid supported moves towards autonomy for the Sahrawi people. With growing regional discontent about Spain’s colonial presence and growing pressure from the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity for the organization of a self-determination referendum for the Sahrawi people, Spain resorted to stall tactics. Astute diplomatic decision-making involved placating both the demands of the international community and of the Sahrawi people.

2.3.8. Roots of a Nationalist Movement

“[A]s the sole remaining European colony in the region – after the achievement of independence by Morocco in 1956, Mauritania in 1960 and finally Algeria in 1962…[the Sahrawi people] were now living a distinct and unique colonial experience. Despite the territorial claims of both Morocco and Mauritania, neither country played any significant role in assisting the birth of a new anti-colonial movement within the Spanish colony” (Hodges, 1987: 40).

Despite strategic Spanish colonial power moves for the inclusion of the Sahrawi people in public affairs, the political climate began to change in the Western Sahara and the contagion of successful and widespread independence movements reignited a latent Sahrawi liberation struggle. Like many colonial products in Northwest Africa, the area of Western Sahara had never truly experienced a lasting centralized government or organization other than that of tribal fractions previous to colonial rule. The area was renowned for territorial tribes whose warrior reputation preceded them. Many who sought to control the area and its inhabitants discovered that it was nearly impossible to subdue or control the diverse Sahrawi tribes. Intertribal raiding also characterized the modus vivendi of the area. Survival depended upon skilled movement across vast expanses of desert and the search for water and favorable conditions that would support the livestock and an economic system built on trade; therefore, nomadic life in no way resembled the organization of the modern nation-state. A centralized governing power could not be achieved in an environment that celebrated allegiance to tribe, faction and family

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(Hodges, 1987: 32). Blood loyalty, asabiya, trumped all other ties. In addition, identity was very much linked to tribal distinction. In the 1950s, Sahrawi identity was still strongly bound to traditional tribal divisions; furthermore, nothing resembling a supratribal organization or national identity existed. For the Sahrawi people, a national identity was slow in the making. Despite the transfrontier anticolonial struggle that united Sahrawi tribes and Moroccan forces from 1956 to 1958, the Sahrawi tribes never relinquished their independent and self-governing status. Although post independence both Morocco and Mauritania advanced notions of pre-colonial territorial ties to the Western Sahara, their claims did not reflect historical reality. The Sahrawi people possessed “a certain distinctiveness, as the Ahel-es-Sahel, the people of the Atlantic littoral, an especially arid zone whose qabael had never been subservient to either the sultans of Morocco or the Mauritanian emirs to the south” (Hodges, 1983: 150). The Sahrawi and Moroccan liberation movement and solidarity was a direct product of a global liberation phenomena made legitimate by the United Nations and its General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), the Organization of African Unity’s call for the emancipation of African peoples from colonial rule and the voices of the oppressed across the globe demanding an end to colonial hegemony, domination and discrimination. Colonized people across the globe rejected the hegemonic colonial model and held up in its stead political and economic models based on global equity and democratic representation138. The solidarity created by an implicit foreign oppression and the desire to be free created the necessary conditions for a natural union of Moroccans and Sahrawis. By joining the Army of Liberation, the Sahrawis did not take on a Moroccan national consciousness. Instead, both groups forged an alliance so as to take on their oppressors. Although some Sahrawi fighters may ultimately have seen their destiny lying with Morocco, it is generally understood that most viewed their collaboration as an anticolonial struggle intended to safeguard their nomadic and traditional way of life (Hodges 1987: 34-35).

138 Chapter Four takes up the issue of the utopian promises of resistance and how calls for liberation can quickly be co-opted by institutionalized and systematized constructs of inequality. 198

The development of a national consciousness, which eclipsed tribal allegiances, did not happen overnight. After a slow start, however, it did kick into gear somewhat quickly for the Sahrawi people. Important changes in Sahrawi society lay the foundation for a well-organized and united liberation movement. Spanish involvement and economic interest and investment in Western Sahara materialized at about the same time that the decolonization process gained speed and momentum. Economic, political and social investment in the territory changed nomadic life in Western Sahara. The increased Spanish presence drastically altered the previously existing colonial/colonized coexistence. The planned building and new growth required administrators, bureaucrats, soldiers, policeman and the creation of laws and their enforcement, schools, hospitals, government buildings and housing. The Spanish built new urban areas that provided the infrastructure and space for the abandonment of a nomadic life for a sedentary one. The process of sedentarization of the nomadic Sahrawi population encouraged Sahrawi participation in this new urban environment. At the same time, the movement from the desert pasture to an urban setting encouraged the mixing of tribes. No longer did vast distances preserve long held tribal distinctions or prohibit contact with other tribes. Closer quarters brought different factions together in both the private and public spheres and in the workplace (38). With the Spanish creation of the Djemaa or Asamblea General del Sáhara, a political arena was forged that brought tribal leaders together in a formal setting to discuss issues that affected all Sahrawis. Even though representation was based on tribal size, all voices were invited to the table139. The contact of highly respected members of the community at the level of the Djemaa and the integration of different tribal members in the work force began to chip away at long held notions of divisive tribal identity. From 1959 to 1963, drought annihilated nearly 50 percent of the country’s camels (Damis, 1983). By the end of the 1960s, scarcity of water wiped out more livestock and made desert life dangerous and unsustainable, thereby intensifying the sedentarization process. Spain was trying to hold on to its mineral wealthy province through economic

139 Representation on the Djemaa was divided as such: the Reguibat received 45 seats (Reguibat ech-Charg with 22 and Reguibat es-Sahel with 23); the Izarguien with 9; the Oulad Delim, 12; the Arosien, 5; the Oulad Tidrarin, 4; the Ahel Cheikh Ma el-Ainin, 2; the Ait Lahsen, 2; the Ait Moussa Ou Ali, 1; and the Filala, 1 (Pazzanita, 2006: 97-98). 199 and infrastructural investments and by publicly supporting the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination through a referendum. In doing so, the colonial population gained more independence via the integration of Sahrawis into the political system, formal education and work force. This in turn produced earning power, tribal integration and hope for and viability of an independent Sahrawi state. As the Sahrawi urban population increased, so too did opportunities for higher education. Access to higher education gave some Sahrawis the possibility to study abroad, which in turn exposed them to popular independent movements in Latin America, Asia and Africa (Hodges, 1987; Naylor, 1993). By 1966, Spain publicly announced its support of the United Nations backed self- determination process for the Sahrawi people, stressing the importance of its realization without external interference. Although Madrid did not intend to follow through on its promise, its supportive declaration recognized the important right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination; reinforced the possibility for a free and fair referendum; and ultimately fueled growing nationalist sentiments. In order to stave off Moroccan motives to appropriate the territory, Spain consistently warned the Sahrawi people of Moroccan expansionist tendencies (Hodges, 1983: 152). In doing so, Spain accomplished two things, neither of which helped its colonial cause: the Sahrawi people realized that both Spain and Morocco coveted sovereignty of Western Sahara for its mineral wealth, including phosphates (potential to be the second biggest producer after Morocco), fish and prospective oil and that an independent Sahrawi state was economically viable. When taking into consideration the importance of outside influence on the Sahrawi nationalist movement, Moroccan and Mauritanian claims to Western Sahara must be considered. On the one hand, Morocco and Mauritania supported the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination via a referendum at various times. On the other hand, Morocco and Mauritania did not rescind their territorial claims to Western Sahara. The fact that both Morocco and Mauritania supported two opposing positions, self- determination and historical rights to the territory, suggests that neither one understood the changing dynamic within Western Sahara itself, nor could they predict the strength and potency of the Sahrawi national liberation movement. Complicating things even further, as indicated above, Morocco recognized Mauritanian independence in 1969 after

200 having refused to do so in 1958 and after having strongly rejected its admission into the United Nations. This act sent mixed messages to Sahrawis in the thick of the anticolonial movement. Could Morocco be prepared to do the same for Western Sahara? Concurrently, the Sahrawi people were very well informed considering that the majority of the urban population was in possession of a radio. This medium of communication allowed them to follow the occurrences in the region and the activities and progress of other liberation movements across the globe. Both formal and informal education influenced the Sahrawi nationalist movement. Neither Morocco nor Mauritania could foresee the power of these undercurrents with regards to a united Sahrawi front for independence. Unbeknownst to the interested actors, the Sahrawi anticolonial movement once again began to stir; however, this time it was rooted in a growing national Sahrawi identity. Mohammed Sidi Ibrahim Bassiri led the first anticolonial movement that formed after the definitive defeat of the Army of Liberation in 1958 by the French and Spanish forces. Bassiri was born in Tan-Tan, Spanish Southern Morocco. During the Army of Liberation struggle, he lived farther south in Saguia el-Hamra and like many other displaced Sahrawi people was evacuated in 1957 from Lemsid (near El-Ayoun) to Morocco (Hodges, 1983: 153). With the aid of a Moroccan government scholarship, he studied at the University of Cairo and Damascus (Villar, 1982: 171). In 1966, he returned to Morocco and founded a radical Sahrawi journal called Al-Chiab, The Torch. His work almost immediately made him a target for Moroccan authorities and repression. He fled Morocco in late 1967 for fear of detainment and relocated in Spanish occupied Western Sahara (171). He immediately continued the work he had accomplished in Morocco by establishing the Organization for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Oued ed-Dahab (Harakat Tahrir Saguia el-Hamra wa Oued ed-Dahab). The Moroccan government was not the only regime that felt threatened by Bassiri’s natural leadership and adept organizing skills. In Western Sahara, Bassiri joined the growing yet relatively underground liberation movement. Spanish forces knew the risks that an enticing global movement presented to its hold on Western Sahara; therefore, through its secret police and by controlling information going in and out of the territory, Madrid monitored the Sahrawi population and prepared itself to smother any

201 sign of rebellion. Even though the Harakat Tahrir was a relatively small, secret and word of mouth organization that functioned in an informal way, it permeated all walks of life and represented the first political party in Western Sahara. When, in the spring of 1970, the secret police detected and confirmed widespread support and participation at all levels of society, even from people in positions considered to be pro-Spanish, the fate was sealed for the organization (Thompson and Adloff, 1980: 139; Hodges, 1987: 49). The Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra wanted to publicize its demands to the Spanish colonial government despite warnings from a minority of the group, including Bassiri, who thought such a premature move to be unwise. Bassiri felt that the organization was too young and had not yet consolidated its forces to be able to withstand the heavy hand of the colonial power, which he was sure was poised to strike and strike hard against the resistance movement. In the end, Bassiri supported the majority. The goals of the group were three-fold: to come out of hiding; to present its demands to the colonial power; and to counter a pro-Spanish demonstration in El-Ayoun by gathering its own demonstrators in the suburb of Zemla. The group’s original requests were met with silence. On the eve of the demonstration, with still no word from Spanish authorities regarding the group’s demands, Bassiri expressed his deep concern in a letter: “The situation is dangerous, very dangerous” (Hodges, 1983: 154)140. On June 17, 1970 the group’s bold coming out of hiding led to the Zemla Massacre. In one fell swoop, Franco’s regime dealt a heavy blow to the liberation group. On the day of the marches, differing sources reported that there were 200-300 pro-Spanish supporters in El-Ayoun and from 1,500 to 3,000 participants in Zemla. Spanish forces arrested hundreds of Sahrawi supporters of the Harakat Tahrir, jailed many for months and killed as many as twelve people. The night after the crack down, Bassiri was seized and disappeared. Although denied by Rabat, Spanish security forces alleged that he was sent to Morocco. That same year, King Hassan, President Mokhtar Ould Daddah and President Houari Boumedienne all pushed for the decolonization of Western Sahara. The Zemla Massacre, a violent Spanish colonial strike against the freedom of self- determination, was reminiscent of the 1934 and 1958 French-Spanish ‘interventions’ and

140 Original source: “La dernière letter de Bassiri,” Sahara Libre, Polisario Front, Algiers, No. 38, July 7, 1977, p.2. 202 of Ben Barka’s disappearance and presumed murder. Although the goal of hegemonic violence and repression was to wipe out the heart of resistance, the hearts, minds and memory of the people prevailed and preserved the resistance movement. The Harakat Tahrir, the organization of liberation, may have officially died that day, but it was to be reborn in the form of the Frente POLISARIO in 1973.

2.3.9. The Frente POLISARIO and Other Competing Movements

“[Polisario] is born as a unique expression of the masses, opting for revolutionary violence and the armed struggle as a means by which the Saharawi Arab African people can recover total liberty and foil the manoeuvres of Spanish colonialism” (Polisario Manifesto; cited in Pazzanita, 2006: 150).

Three years after the Spanish toppled the Harakat Tahrir, the Frente POLISARIO emerged as the leading Sahrawi movement for independence. Like Bassiri, its leaders spent time in the Sahrawi diaspora, mostly outside of the Spanish Sahara in southern Morocco and northern Mauritania (Hodges, 1987: 50). Young university students played a vital role in the genesis of this second organized political group and governing body. It should be reiterated here that over the years Sahrawi tribes had been displaced outside of the Spanish Sahara as a result of the failed liberation attempt of the Army of Liberation from 1956 to 1958 and due to relentless droughts. Therefore, even though many of the original Frente POLISARIO leaders may have been born and even educated outside of the Spanish Sahara, their identity adhered to no colonial borders. Furthermore, the potential for growth for the Frente POLISARIO from within the Spanish Sahara was positive and nearly inevitable, as the number of Sahrawis living in three main Spanish cities, El-Ayoun, Smara and Villa Cisneros, tripled between the years 1967 and 1974 (Mercer, 1979: 8). The stage was set for a reawakening of the Zemla resistance spirit, not only in the Western Sahara diaspora, but also within Western Sahara, the mouth of the colonial beast itself. After the Zemla Massacre, Madrid could no longer convincingly play the part of the benevolent master. Although many Sahrawis were outraged by the brutality and precision of the Spanish response at Zemla, the blow left the movement demoralized.

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Within the Spanish Sahara, it was difficult to regain the necessary momentum for a renewed liberation movement. The stagnant political organization in the Spanish Sahara, however, did not reflect the political arena in Mauritania or Morocco. One future Frente POLISARIO Sahrawi leader, El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed, received his formation in a Moroccan setting and was able to continue his secondary education with the aid of government scholarships. El-Ouali immediately became involved in the political seen in Morocco and met many Moroccan politicians that claimed to support the Sahrawi cause. It was in May of 1972 that El-Ouali realized that his dreams of a united Sahrawi resistance movement could not continue on Moroccan grounds. Approximately 45 students were arrested when they took to the streets of Tan-Tan to declare the right of the Sahrawi people to independence from colonial rule (Hodges, 1983: 160). Even though King Hassan II publicly defended the right of Sahrawis to self-determination, he did not support a Sahrawi led liberation movement within Morocco itself, one early warning that self-determination meant integration with Morocco. The Frente POLISARIO originated as a political party that sustained the struggle of the people against colonialism, racism and imperialism and identified itself as an integrated party in the Arab revolution (Oliver, 1987: 70). Although the movement did not exactly define the outcomes of what was meant by the struggle against colonialism, it did know its main goal from the onset, the downfall of colonial rule in Western Sahara. It emerged after a clandestine congress was held in the Western Saharan-Mauritanian border on May 10, 1973. The Frente POLISARIO can be defined as a classical liberation movement characterized by its political and social nature. Its founders were diverse individuals, a combination of old Army of Liberation survivors and newly radicalized educated university students. Ten days after its founding, the Frente POLISARIO staged its first military attacks against Madrid at El-Khanga. Despite being ill equipped, their first hit came at quite a surprise to the Spanish forces that they relinquished their position without firing a shot. New materials were gained and a war on colonialism officially inaugurated. On May 20, the group began publishing a monthly magazine to distribute among the Sahrawi people. During 1973 and 1974, the Frente POLISARIO was a relatively small group known for its guerrilla hit and run attacks on colonial strongholds. They slowly made

204 connections with Sahrawis working for two Spanish security forces, Tropas Nómadas (Nomad Troops) and the Polícia Territorial (Territorial Police). Their relationship with these groups did not bear fruit immediately, but in the long run it was a very smart alliance to have established (Pazzanita, 2006: 149-150). In addition, during these early years, El-Ouali sought help from outside supporters, such as Algerian President Houari Boumedienne and Mauritanian President Mokhtar Ould Daddah. Boumedienne decided to give Algeria’s support to another resistance movement of the time, MOREHOB141 and Daddah allowed some Frente POLISARIO leaders to live in Mauritania by facilitating paper work and visas. Algeria did not trust or back the Frente POLISARIO until much later as a result of its disappointing relationship with MOREHOB, which Boumedienne, the veteran liberation fighter, ultimately deemed lacking in seriousness and popular backing. As a result of MOREHOB’s failure, Algiers steered clear of the Frente POLISARIO and other subsequent national liberation movements of the time until one could prove its popular acceptance and relative permanency. Growing discontent of colonial rule amongst Sahrawis and increased Spanish controls and repression placed the Frente POLISARIO in a strategic position for a positive reception in Sahrawi society. At first, the Frente POLISARIO functioned on one premise, the removal of a colonial presence in the Western Sahara; however, in its Second Congress in August of 1974, it declared its support for an independent Sahrawi state. The Frente POLISARIO liberation movement was revolutionary in more than one way. It challenged the colonial hegemon while it celebrated equality and the end of discrimination in its own society. The Frente POLISARIO integrated women into its fight and incorporated their political and social rights into the struggle. It felt a connection of solidarity with the liberation movements in Portugal, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea- Bissau and with the Palestinian resistance movement. At the same time that the Frente POLISARIO was formed, King Hassan, President Mokhtar Ould Daddah and President Houari Boumedienne called for the self-determination of Western Sahara in the Agadir Summit Conference. However suspect these proclamations may have appeared, the Frente POLISARIO still capitalized on the changing times and outward regional support.

141 MOREHOB is an acronym for Mouvemont de Résistance “Les Hommes Bleus,” Resistance Movement “The Blue Men”. 205

The Frente POLISARIO was not the only new liberation movement to take hold in the early 1970s. At about the same time, MOREHOB arrived on the political scene. In retrospect, MOREHOB received generous international attention in the press and in discussions by diplomatic observers relative to its poor popular base in Western Sahara. Its leader known by the name of Edouard Moha was somewhat of a phantom figure not only because he went by a Christian and French pseudonym, but also because skepticism surrounded the political motives for the creation of the group itself. The name of the group, Blue Men Resistance Movement (after the color of the daraa, the official Sahrawi dress for men) was meant to pull at the folkloric and romantic strings of the international community. Moha was born in 1943 near Smara in a Reguibat fraction, was educated in Morocco and France and began forming MOREHOB in Rabat in 1971 (Mercer, 1976: 228). He was a former Moroccan policeman, Bashir Figuigui, a fact that in and of itself was cause for alarm. The mystery surrounding MOREHOB’s leader calls into question the sincerity of the resistance movement. Was it a true Sahrawi independence movement with ties to Morocco or was it merely a Moroccan concoction that would aid in the Moroccan annexation of Western Sahara? In July of 1972 the group contacted France Presse in Rabat and communicated its objectives clearly: to secure the liberation of Moroccan territories pillaged by Spanish colonialism (Villar, 1982: 217). This same month, it contacted foreign embassies, the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the Pope in Rome, broadcasting its objectives to the international community (217-218). By 1973, the changing creed of MOREHOB for a full independence for the Sahrawi people quickly became unacceptable to Morocco and Moha was stripped of his passport by Moroccan authorities (Mercer, 1976: 228). On March 6, 1973, Moha moved his headquarters from Rabat to Algiers and declared that this sharp change in climate between Rabat and MOREHOB lay in his refusal to be the “fifth column” on behalf of the Moroccan authorities (Villar, 1982: 217; Hodges, 1983: 113)142. The MOREHOB movement practically disappeared in Algiers. It never organized a true-armed insurrection against the colonial power and failed to win the popular support of the Sahrawi people. In 1975, MOREHOB’s leader would surface again, only to be in support of the Moroccan position on Western Sahara.

142 Reuters, dispatch from Rabat, March 3, 1973. 206

While Morocco closely monitored liberation movements in its own frontiers, Spain followed the typical colonial hegemon model (and French example) towards safeguarding its interests. Probably in reaction to the growing popularity of the Frente POLISARIO and general liberation fervor gripping the territory, Spain organized its own political creation, the Partido de la Unión Nacional Saharaui (PUNS) in 1974. The inauguration of the PUNS party in February of 1975 provoked an immediate and heated response from the Frente POLISARIO who viewed it as a colonial extension. The PUNS delineated their objectives in a fourteen-point program, which included the right of Saharan independence without interference from foreign powers and in rejection of any foreign claims to the territory. It also carefully maintained a special relationship with Spain in order to “preserve mutual friendship and cooperation with [the colonial power] in every field” (Hodges, 1983: 171). The PUNS benefited from the strong support of Madrid, which legally recognized the pro-Spanish party. The selection of twenty-seven year old Khalihenna Ould Rashid as Secretary- General to the party mirrored that of the French-approved and groomed Mauritanian President Ould Daddah. Khalihenna had been schooled in Las Palmas and Madrid and was married to a Spanish woman. In the spirit of colonial hegemony, he could easily have been a presidential candidate in an independent Sahrawi state that adhered to the principles of the special Spanish-Sahrawi relationship outlined in the PUNS charter. Despite the Spanish attempt to steer Sahrawi liberation fervor in its favor, the PUNS quickly disintegrated after its inception due to the overwhelming popular support for the Frente POLISARIO and the latter’s unwillingness to allow the group to be an independent party alongside the movement. The Frente POLISARIO aimed to present a united front and not one prone to internal strife. When three leading members of the group, including Secretary-General Khalihenna, fled to Morocco during the United Nations visiting mission in 1975, the desires of a Spanish-Sahrawi unified front died (Oliver, 1987: 73). The PUNS lost all credit with their submission to the Moroccan King and annexionist policy. According to the Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara in 1975, much of the PUNS support came from “the traditional element of Saharan society, including the majority of sheikhs and notables, and from the older generation,” but did not penetrate Sahrawi society as did the full independence

207 movement of the Frente POLISARIO (United Nations General Assembly, 1975a). Despite attempts to portray the Frente POLISARIO as a group formed through “money, indoctrination, and intimidation” (Price, 1979: 34-35), the national liberation movement reflected the popular will of the Sahrawi people within the parameters of a cultural resistance identity. The idea of a cultural resistance identity is further examined in the final section of this chapter.

2.3.10. Spain’s Western Sahara Policy in 1974 and Morocco’s Reaction

The first real signs of Madrid’s changing policy towards the Western Sahara began in 1973. On September 21, Franco wrote to the Spanish organized Djemaa that the Spanish government would be taking steps towards preparing Western Sahara for internal self-rule. Although conciliatory in nature, Madrid was conceding its hard line position and refusal to cooperate with consecutive United Nations resolutions that called for the end of Spanish colonial rule and the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination via a referendum. Then, on December 14, Spain admitted a vote of abstention, instead of voting no to UN Resolution 3162 (XXVIII) as it had done as recent as 1972 to other UN resolutions regarding the fate of Western Sahara. The frequency of the Frente POLISARIO guerilla attacks may have encouraged Madrid to finally begin the exit strategy. However, it was generally believed that the process would be much more drawn out than subsequently occurred. In addition, the revolution in Portugal put an end to its colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. Madrid could foresee only a negative outcome to the occurrences in Portugal, especially if Spain became the only colonial presence in all of Africa. This was an international stigma and embarrassment that Madrid wanted to avoid at all costs. At the same time, quadrupling phosphate prices from 1973-1975, fishing prospects and other natural resource prospects corroborated the economic viability of the territory. An independent Sahrawi government would most certainly be dependent on Spanish know-how, technology and influence (Joffé, 1987: 19). Franco also guessed that if Morocco were to successfully annex the territory, Spain’s important role in the territory would be eliminated. As the world’s leading

208 producer and supplier of phosphates, Morocco already possessed the necessary technology and know-how for its extraction. Furthermore, if Morocco were to control Western Sahara’s untapped fishing reserves, Madrid would be up against further fishing rights wars with Morocco. In 1974, Franco reacted to the Moroccan threat by creating a new team of experienced players in Western Sahara. He named Colonel Eduardo Blanco Rodríguez Director General de Promoción del Sahara (director of general security), General Federico Gómez de Salazar Governor General and Colonel Luis Rodríguez de Viguri y Gil, an experienced engineer, Secretary-General. Finally on August 20, 1974, fourteen years after the call for the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples and nine years after the first of the United Nations resolutions on Western Sahara, Madrid informed Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim that it planned to hold a United Nations observed referendum within the first six months of 1975. When Madrid lifted the censorship order of the Spanish press that had been enforced in 1972, Spain finally opened up its closed-door policies on Western Sahara and threw aside the veil of secrecy surrounding its colony. The Frente POLISARIO attack on Fusbucraa conveyor belt in October only increased the pressure. By December, Spain was beginning to organize identification documents that would be used for voter identity in the future referendum. Morocco’s approach to Western Sahara was emboldened by Spain’s new policy towards the territory. As Spain opened itself to the ending of direct colonial rule, Morocco became more forthright with its own plans for the recovery of the ‘Moroccan Sahara’. The economic gains projected by the addition of Western Sahara to Morocco were very promising; however, the political significance of Western Sahara and the realization of part of the Greater Morocco thesis were critical to the monarchy’s survival. Economically, Morocco could gain immensely from the Bu-Craa phosphate mines because Morocco would dominate the market and could set world phosphate prices.143 The addition of the rich and untapped fishing reserves to Morocco’s fishing enterprise would considerably fortify one of its most important industries. The potential for economic gains resulting from its mineral and natural resource wealth undoubtedly made

143 The drop in prices of phosphates in 1975-76 could not be foreseen when Morocco invaded Western Sahara. 209 the Western Sahara an attractive addition to the Moroccan kingdom (IEPALA, 1978: 16). However, the political instability and unpopularity that surrounded King Hassan in the early 1970s made the future of Western Sahara integrally linked to the King’s survival. In a politically astute maneuver, King Hassan II promised his people that he would stand up against Spanish colonial domination as his father did to the French in 1956 when Morocco gained their independence. Furthermore, he proclaimed that he would unite the people of Western Sahara and Morocco after over a hundred years of colonial separation. In 1961, King Hassan II inherited the throne but not the popularity of his father Mohammed V. King Mohammed V led his people in an independent struggle against the French, the colonial enemy and repressive hegemon. When he returned from exile, he was revered in the streets wherever he went. He enjoyed this popularity throughout his reign. When King Hassan II succeeded his father as the new commander of the faithful, Amir al-Mu’minin, he had impossible shoes to fill. His father ruled in the euphoric and romantic glory of a successful independence movement and deposition of the colonial power. King Hassan II gained power in a time of urbanization and modernization, a transfer characterized by poverty, destitution and widespread corruption amongst his loyal followers. His religious standing as a supposed descendent of the Prophet Mohammed could not stave off serious criticism for long. The combination of a deteriorating quality of life, new problems caused by waves of people from rural to urban areas and a stagnant economy alongside the ostentatious and lavish lifestyle of the King and his followers placed him in a precarious situation (IEPALA, 1978: 24). His claim to divine rule did not go unquestioned The opposition parties complained of the stronghold of foreign interests over much of the economy, while the Moroccan people slipped further and further into extreme poverty. Unsanitary shantytowns began to sprout up in the outskirts of urban centers. One in particular, on the edges of Casablanca, exploded into angry rioting in 1965 (Hodges, 1983: 176). It was suppressed by Moroccan security forces, but only after several hundreds lost their lives. It seemed as if the growing frustration and discontent among the people and opposition leaders might escape the repressive grasps of the monarchy. Despite King Hassan’s attempts to create an atmosphere of freedom where dissent was acceptable, he allowed the opposition parties artificial freedoms only. When real

210 opposition posed a threat, he would use his constitutional powers to “dissolve the Chamber of Representatives and rule by decree” (Hodges, 1983: 176). By 1970, Hassan II had drafted a new constitution, which further reduced the powers of the diverse political parties by decreasing the number of parliamentary seats open for election. His ability to keep tabs on opposition leaders and their parties proved relatively successful. On the contrary, his controlling reach did not extend to the Moroccan people or his most trusted military. Phosphate mines went on strike in 1968 and then again in 1971. University students expressed their unrest through continuous manifestations from 1969- 1973. Furthermore, the military, first the army and then the air force, staged two separate failed coups, both of which threatened the King’s life. On July 10, 1971 the army staged the first failed coup. Then on August 16, 1972, the air force failed to bring down King Hassan’s plane as he flew home from a vacation in France. In response to the first coup, King Hassan II expeditiously executed the surviving generals. At the end of the slaughter, seven generals of sixteen remained standing. The 1972 coup saw the suicide or murder of Mohammed Oufkir, King Hassan’s trusted interior minister. It is speculated that he was killed for participating in the coup or for failing to prevent it. Eleven officers were sentenced to death. Finally, King Hassan took control of the Royal Armed Forces (FAR)144. The severe reaction of the monarchy in both instances underscored the seriousness of such treachery in the King’s eyes and revealed that he clearly understood the very precarious and dangerous balance of his regime (IEPALA, 1978: 24). In the summer of 1974, King Hassan launched an amazing comeback when considering the depths to which his popularity had plummeted. His saving grace, however, came at the expense of Africa’s last colony, Western Sahara. King Hassan aggressively began to broadcast el-Fassi’s idea of the ‘Moroccan Sahara’ at the same time that Spain was beginning to prepare for its colonial exit. King Hassan capitalized on this opportunity. Under the Moroccan banner of patriotism and jihad (holy war), he united the disgruntled opposition parties and the disillusioned Moroccan society. He blew breath back into the dying independence fervor of the 50s and began to rebuild the monarchy as the backbone of Moroccan society, the patron against foreign conquest and oppression and the heart of Moroccan unity. At the same time, the noble and just cause

144 Acronym for Forces Armées Royales. 211 kept the FAR at a safe distance, while neutralizing the King’s opposition parties, all of which had been invited to join the cause. The popular support for the ‘reunification’ of Western Sahara sealed the backing of nearly all of the governmental parties. King Hassan placed all his chips in one pot. His longevity depended on the successful integration of Western Sahara into the regime. Because the future of the monarchy lay in the future of the territory of Western Sahara, he organized all of his resources to make sure Spain would not be able to realize the referendum it had planned in the upcoming year. He dispatched his diplomats to lobby his cause internationally and began to strengthen military forces in southern Morocco under the leadership of Colonel Ahmed Dlimi. Spain’s call for a referendum in the first six months of 1975 was countered by King Hassan’s announcement that he would not accept a vote in Western Sahara if independence for the Sahrawi people were a possible outcome. He raised the stakes against the colonial Franco regime. As the leaders of both Spain and Morocco vied for power at the state level, on the grass roots level, a Frente POLISARIO-led resistance began to permeate all walks of Sahrawi life, changing the demographics of its society.

2.4. Systemic Failure and Conflict Prevention Sabotage

2.4.1. Taking the Western Sahara Issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)

“The route leading to the final decolonization of the Sahara is quite clear. The support that my government, together with Morocco and Mauritania, has always given to General Assembly resolutions on this question does not permit it to envisage any other way of putting an end to Spanish domination over the Sahara than through the holding of a referendum on self-determination, to be both supervised and guaranteed by the United Nations. Such a solution, incidentally, would not be in conflict with the Moroccan and Mauritanian claims, but if those claims are to be met it would appear that there is no better course to follow than that of the express choice of the population itself. Thus the opinion of the population directly concerned will always remain the primary decisive element in any settlement” (Abdelazziz Bouteflika, Algerian minister of foreign affairs

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speaking at the UN General Assembly, October, 9 1975; cited in Hodges, 1983: 189)145.

Rabat needed to stall the referendum process planned for the beginning of 1975 in order to buy time to stage a brilliant diplomatic offensive, to thwart the process of self- determination for the Sahrawi people and to prepare for a military invasion of Western Sahara. On August 24, 1974, Spain declared that it would hold the referendum in the first half of the following year. Morocco gathered enough support, and on December 13 of the same year, the UN General Assembly Resolution 3292 (XXIX) requested an advisory opinion of the status of Western Sahara from the International Court of Justice146. In order to secure the involvement of the ICJ, Rabat organized an incredible diplomatic attack on many fronts. On the international level, the monarchy contacted all possible supporters and soon had the public backing of the Arab League. Hassan’s supporters in the Arab world even included the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a movement led by Yasser Arafat that the Frente POLISARIO had included on its list of solidarity liberation movements. On the western flank, both President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing of France and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of the United States had vested interests in Morocco as a pro-Western, friendly, anticommunist state in North Africa. If King Hassan II were to lose his quest for Western Sahara, they realized that the monarchical regime would be in grave danger and so too would their economic, political and military interests. He organized important power players in both the Arab and Western world behind his mission to stall the referendum. The Moroccan government’s offensive against Spain was wrapped in independence and anticolonial rhetoric and was diplomatic (as demonstrated above) and militaristic in nature. He targeted Spain’s weaknesses, including Franco’s failing health and the uncertainty of the Franco regime in a changing region marked by the fall of the Portuguese government. The monarchy supported or even created a liberation army

145 Provisional Verbatim Record of the 2382nd Meeting, UN General Assembly, UN Document A/PV.2382, October, 9 1975, p.66. 146 Previous resolutions relevant to Western Sahara’s decolonization process: 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; resolutions 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 2229 (XXI) of 20 December 1966, 2354 (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2428 (XXIII) of 18 December 1968, 2591 (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2711 (XXV) of 14 December 1970, 2983 (XXVII) of 14 December 1972 and 3162 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973. 213 called the Front for Liberation and Liberty (FLU)147 that staged guerilla attacks against Spanish posts from the Moroccan southern border (Thompson and Adloff, 1980: 138). Spain could no longer ignore the growing popularity of the Frente POLISARIO and so decided to make conciliatory steps towards the group. Rabat, in contrast, decried the group as a communist and terrorist movement. These very same accusations can be heard in portrayals of the Frente POLISARIO today. Morocco also stepped up its claims on the Spanish presidios on the Moroccan Coast, Ceuta and Melilla, and caused calculated mayhem for Madrid by harassing Spanish fishing boats off its coast and by staging terrorist bomb attacks on the ground in the two territories. In 1974 and the first half of 1975, King Hassan II persistently pushed Spain and the international community on the Western Sahara issue in hopes of annexing the territory through diplomatic means. Simultaneously, he reinforced the southern frontier and prepared for military intervention in case his diplomatic endeavors failed to produce the desired results. The most astute move Hassan made, besides using the Western Saharan issue as his saving grace, was to stall the planned Spanish referendum by convincing enough United Nations members to support his request for a non-binding Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The UN General Assembly accepted the request even though it aroused concern for many newly independent states, all of which had depended on the process of self-determination for their current status. They feared a new precedent would be set that held historical rights above self- determination. The right to self-determination had consistently been the common denominator for the process of decolonization. The United Nations, Organization for African Unity and the newly independent states all understood demands for self- determination as self-justifying. Basically, a call for self-determination by a colonized territory revealed the existence of a nation and, therefore, the right of that nation to become a state. Furthermore, this practice was fortified by the principle of uti possidetis148 (Joffé, 1987: 18).

147 Front de Libération et de l’Unité. 148 In order to reduce the probability for border wars, the principle of uti possidetis in the decolonization process was applied, emphasizing the notion that the frontiers established in the colonial process should be maintained for a peaceful and clear transfer of power; the Organization of African Unity also called for African nations to respect colonial boundaries (IEPALA, 1978: 46; Bhatia, 2001: 291). 214

In theory, this meant that newly independent African states inherited the lines drawn by their colonizers, ones that did not respect the pre-colonial African reality. At the same time, it recognized the forever changed face of Africa in the aftermath of hegemonic destruction and cultural assassination and the colonial induced cohesion of African nations, which were born in struggle, took root in resistance movements that defied and rejected colonial domination and which reflected a new African reality. While these new nations carried the tradition and memory of pre-colonial life, they emerged as a direct result of colonial domination and influence. The international endorsement of colonially established frontiers by the United Nations and Organization of African Unity reflected an understanding of this new reality149. They intended to use systemic guidelines for the decolonization of Africa that would create stability and security and would reduce destabilizing forces that inconsistency and irregularity of process would engender, like border wars, power struggles and resource allocation. By bringing the question of Western Sahara to the International Court of Justice, Morocco changed the nature of the decolonization process from a political problem whose solution lay in the principle right of self determination for colonized peoples to a juridical question that put two members of the United Nations in direct opposition. In the spirit of the UN, these parties were obligated to resolve their differences within the framework of negotiation, mediation, arbitration, investigation or, in this case, by submitting their differences in a formal yet nonbinding judicial solution (IEPALA, 1978: 27). Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs Pedro Cortina Mauri pointed out this international inconsistency (to say the least) to U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on November 9, 1974. They exchanged the following:

“Cortina: …but, we don’t know what the International Court can say about it. It is not a juridical problem but a political problem. Morocco had certain rights in Spain; that’s what history has taken away. But the claims in the Sahara are similar.

Kissinger: By historical claims, Morocco can take half of Spain.

Cortina: By the Caliphs in Cordoba, we could take all of Morocco.

149 In an in-depth discussion of self-determination, Chapter Four re-engages issues surrounding this international premise for decolonization – accepting colonial boundaries. 215

Kissinger: If the General Assembly votes to take it to the International Court, would Spain oppose?

Cortina: We have accepted the UN to implement the resolutions. These resolutions all said we have to give the people the right of self- determination. How is it possible that that right, now accepted, is taken away by taking it to the International Court at The Hague?” 150 (Memorandum of Conversation, 1974b: 2).

Even more critical to the process of decolonization for Western Sahara was the fact that by forcing the question to the ICJ, Morocco obliged the Spanish government to suspend the organization of the referendum until the tribunal passed judgment. Before submitting its case to the International Court of Justice, Morocco amassed strong support in the Arab and African world and even took a surprising step towards stalling the Spanish planned referendum. In spite of previous unsuccessful talks with Mauritania on the Western Saharan issue and in spite of violent diatribes against Mauritania’s ‘false’ claims to Western Sahara on the part of Morocco, which intensified in the summer of 1974, Morocco buried its sole claim to Western Sahara (Villar, 1982: 268). In order for Rabat to strengthen its position and historical claim, it proposed a partition of the territory that would be beneficial to both parties. Western Sahara would create a nice buffer between Mauritania and expansionist Morocco, and Morocco’s concession would take care of the problem of conflicting claims, which reduced the legitimacy of the historical claims of both parties. From one day to the next, Morocco set aside long held resentments against Mauritania, including opposition to its independence and admission into the United Nations, and forged a new brotherhood based on a shared ‘right’. Nearly four months after Spain announced its planned referendum, Morocco succeeded in bringing the question of Western Sahara to the International Court of Justice. The United Nations General Assembly obligated the Court to decide on the following questions:

“I. Was Western Sahara (Río de Oro and Sakiet El-Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?

150 At this point in the conversation, Kissinger responded to Cortina: “We’ll stay out of it” (Memorandum of Conversation, 1974b: 2). As will be discussed below, the United States was fully ‘in it’ only one year later. 216

If the answer to the first question is in the negative, II. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?” (International Court of Justice, 1975).

Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria and Spain were allowed to submit arguments to the ICJ, but the Frente POLISARIO, as it was not a member of the United Nations, did not participate in the decision making process of its own future. Morocco and Mauritania had to convince the Court of “disrupted territorial integrity and national unity, demonstrable territorial sovereignty” as a result of colonization (Joffé, 1987: 24). As can be recalled from Chapter One, UN General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) of 1960 outlined three possibilities for colonized territories in the process of decolonization: sovereign independence, free association with an independent state or integration with an independent state (Joffé, 1987: 20). Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 1970 reaffirmed this choice, but added that it was only valid when “freely determined by a people.” Even though Spain’s pro-referendum argument, excluding integration with Morocco, was by and large weak, the process of self-determination still lay in the hands of the Sahrawi people (20). Again, these resolutions stressed the primacy of self-determination over historical claims. However, Morocco’s argument lies in a qualifying clause of Resolution 1514 (XV), which states that a “disruption of national unity or territorial integrity is incompatible with the UN Charter”; in these circumstances, “the territory should be reintegrated” (21). For this reason Morocco clung tightly to its claims of legal ties to the territory. Algeria and Spain, on the other hand, needed to demonstrate that Morocco and Mauritania did not have territorial rights to Western Sahara pre colonial rule and that self- determination via a United Nations sponsored referendum for the Sahrawi people was absolutely necessary and in line with the United Nations decolonization process and commitment to the right to self-determination of colonized peoples. Algeria underscored the existence of a separate and cohesive Sahrawi people and nation and, therefore, the inherent right to self-determination of those distinct peoples. This argument appealed to the present day Sahrawi reality and implicitly weighted the importance of national identity over outdated and illusive territorial claims. Morocco focused on the nature of

217 the Moroccan state in the pre-colonial era and pointed to the reign of the Moroccan Sultan and his ability to appoint local officials, collect taxes and attain vows of loyalty from local leaders and quid pro quo from the communities under their reign. Algeria and Spain continuously stressed the right of self-determination (Article Two of UN Resolution 1514) for the Sahrawi people. They even alluded to the fact that the basis of Morocco’s argument not only failed to reflect pre-colonial reality, but also did not take into consideration the new Western Saharan reality that existed at the time of calls for decolonization. Morocco countered the Spanish and Algerian approach to the issue by invoking Article Six of UN Resolution 1514 (XV), which safeguarded ‘national unity’ and ‘territorial integrity’. Furthermore, Morocco argued that the authority of the Sultan extended into the physical domain as well as the spiritual, which in Islamic law corroborated his political authority (Joffé, 1987: 24; Vincineau, 1980: 50). Morocco and Mauritania’s argument referenced Islamic law as a legitimate link to territorial sovereignty pre-colonial rule. By framing the argument in religious terms, they were able to denounce the colonial repartition of their territories, including Western Sahara, as a direct affront to their territorial integrity.

2.4.2. UN Visiting Mission to Western Sahara

“[T]he mission was able, despite the shortness of its stay in the territory, to visit virtually all the main population centres and to ascertain the views of the overwhelming majority of their inhabitants. At every place visited, the Mission was met by mass political demonstrations and had numerous private meetings with representatives of every section of the Saharan community. From all of these, it became evident to the mission that there was an overwhelming consensus among Saharans within the territory in favour of independence and opposing integration with any neighbouring country” (United Nations General Assembly, 1975a: 59; also cited in Hodges, 1983: 198-199).

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, sent three members, Simeon Aké of the Ivory Coast, Marta Jiménez Martínez of Cuba and Manoucheur of Iran from May 8 to June 9, 1975 to visit Western Sahara and to hold consultations with the governments of Spain, Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria (Pazzanita, 2006: 443; Thompson and Adloff, 1980: 169). The results of the United

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Nations Visiting Mission were a shock to all parties involved. By the time of the mission, the Frente POLISARIO had fortified its position in Sahrawi society. The popular support for the Frente POLISARIO was evident at every stopping point, in the Sahrawi mass exodus to the streets, the abundance of waving Frente POLISARIO flags and the loud chants calling for self-determination and Frente POLISARIO leadership. Marta Jiménez of Cuba stated in reference to the visit: “Desde que salimos del aeropuerto del Aaiún la marea humana nos recibió con banderas del Polisario y pancartas. Independencia Total, Fuera España, Ni Marruecos ni Mauritania, Somos Saharauis…lo que veíamos en las calles era un verdadero plebiscito por la independencia y una adhesión total al Frente Polisario”151 (Garcia, 2001: 144). The visiting mission revealed the falsities of Moroccan propaganda, which had long denied a cohesive Sahrawi nationalism. At the same time, Spain could no longer ignore the existence of the Frente POLISARIO. It had become a unified, well-organized and popular Sahrawi political party. The Spanish backed PUNS were completely blown away by their very quickly deteriorating hopes and obvious lack of popular backing. The outburst of support for the Frente POLISARIO in the presence and eyes of the international community revealed the precarious situation of the PUNS. The sudden change of loyalties and flight of its leader, Khalihenna Ould Rashid, to Morocco sealed its fate. The PUNS did not foresee the Frente POLISARIO’s rise to power and popularity. Spain’s continued stall tactics and the postponement of the referendum in January of 1975 had in fact fortified the nationalist independence movement. The Frente POLISARIO succinctly elucidated its plans for a Western Sahara state to the UN Visiting Mission. The group envisioned a democratic republic based on socialist ideals and mass participation; planned to nationalize natural resources; wished to reduce feudal elements of traditional Sahrawi society; denounced the PUNS and Djemaa as puppet organizations of their Spanish colonizers; and announced its commitment to “combating regionalism, nepotism and corruption” (Shelley, 2004: 174-175).

151 Translation: “From the moment we left the airport at El Ayoun, a wave of people met us with Polisario flags and signs. Total Independence, Get out of Spain, Not Morocco or Mauritania, We are Sahrawis…what we saw in the streets was a true plebiscite for independence and a complete loyalty to the Frente Polisario” (Garcia, 2001: 144). 219

In Mauritania, President Mokhtar Ould Daddah staged integration demonstrations. Other groups came out in support of the Frente POLISARIO and its aims for an independent Sahrawi state. Despite these conflicting manifestations, Daddah argued for his case and the integration of the southern portion of Western Sahara into Mauritania. Morocco substantiated claims for the integration of the northern two-thirds of the territory. Moroccan staged support proved more convincing than Mauritania’s show and the mission left Morocco “noting” the deep support for the “reunification” of Morocco and Western Sahara (United Nations General Assembly, 1975a). However, the overwhelming lack of popular support for integration with Morocco within the territory of Western Sahara undermined Moroccan claims and endangered its position. The visiting mission determined that an overwhelming majority of Sahrawis backed the Frente POLISARIO and favored independence. As the Sahrawis were excluded from the ICJ debate, the importance of the UN visiting mission was two-fold: to give the Sahrawi people a voice in their own future and to have outsiders bear witness to a very real Sahrawi national identity led by the Frente POLISARIO (Joffé, 1987: 17). The visiting mission bore witness to the consolidated expression of a Sahrawi national identity. At its core, this national identity, better characterized as a cultural resistance identity152, rejected Spanish colonial rule and Moroccan and Mauritanian claims of

152 The idea of a cultural resistance identity should not be confused with modern understandings of ‘identity politics,’ which Mary Kaldor defines as movements that “mobilize around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power” (Kaldor, 2006: 80). Identity should be conceived of as a continuous set of processes that have no end or finality. The concept of cultural resistance identity takes culture as meaning the substance of everyday life. For Sahrawis this includes language, dress, religion, geography, food, tea (and the social processes in which tea drinking is framed) history (both oral and written), music, poetry and prose, social interactions, etc. Such cultural attributes equip members of society, as Abdi aptly observes, to respond to their physical and social (2006: 13) and, I would add, political and historical environments. In this framework, culture is not static. It is simultaneously subject and responsive to the outside-inside forces of colonization (now globalization) and other externalities and to communal dynamics or internalities. Rather than being innate or given, it is cultivated intersubjectively and dialogically by human beings (Omar, 2008a: 143, 183; Martínez Guzmán, 2001). The ultimate paradox or contradiction of identity is that strong identities are needed for healthy societies and yet identity essentialism creates fissions and conflicts based on difference (Davies, 2006: 1029). Identity politics has been accused of forcing people through an inclusion-exclusion binary to ‘belong’. Yet, in the Sahrawi case, the politics of identity are based not on ‘belonging,’ but on choice. Rather than invoking identity politics to achieve social and political cohesion, the Frente POLISARIO has chosen what Youval Davis calls a “transversal politics” or politics that are constantly “rooting and shifting,” (Davies, 2006: 1034). The Frente POLISARIO recognizes that potentially divisive forces, like traditional male-female roles or tribal affiliations, are points of constant analysis that should be open to adjustment, reframing and redefinition (Schröttner, 2007: 210-211). The struggle for self-determination of the Sahrawi people is rooted in their specific colonial and conflict experience; however, they have been able to adjust not only to their mutable 220 historical ties. However, ultimately Sahrawi identity rested on one primordial need – the right of self-determination, the right to choose one’s own social, political, cultural and economic destiny. In fact, potential protracted conflicts often times revolve around “identity, security and other deep-rooted needs that are unmet or severely threatened” (Kelman, 1993: xi). It is in fact shocking that this unified expression of national identity and call for self-determination fell under the radar of Spain, Morocco, Mauritania and the international community and that it took a late in the game UN visiting mission to bring its full impact and meaning to light. Or, did it? On October 14 of 1974, President of the Revolutionary Council Houari Boumediène asked Kissinger his view on Western Sahara and self-determination (Memorandum of Conversation 1974a: 30). Regarding Western Sahara Kissinger responded: “I want it to go away! I can’t get excited about 40,000 people who probably don’t know they’re living in Spanish Sahara” (Memorandum of Conversation, 1974a: 30, 31). Regarding self-determination, he acknowledged: “I’m for it, but I don’t think it’s natural for an entity so accidentally formed. So the only question is what country exerts a dominating influence. We will not be active in the area153…Would they [Sahrawis] know what they were being consulted about?” (30, 31). One month later, Kissinger received a

conflict situation but also to the changing world around them. For example, today a combination of fortitude and adaptability is at the core of their nationalist and non-violent drive for self-determination (see San Martín, 2005 and Stephan and Mundy, 2006). Grossberg highlights the limited nature of binary models of oppression, such as the “colonial model” (oppressor and oppressed) and the “transgression model” (oppression and resistance), particularly their inability to capture contemporary relations of power and their tendency to foreclose the possibility for creating alliances (Grossberg, 1996: 88). Despite his objection to these two modes of framing, they do reflect partially accurate representations and configurations of domination when applied to the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict. Of course, “notions of resistance that assume a subject standing entirely outside of and against a well established structure of power” (88) fail to capture the degrees, nuances, undercurrents and pervasiveness of power. Instead, I would argue that all frameworks for analysis of national identity and resistance should reflect the “overlap and displacement of domains of difference” (Bhabha, 1994: 2) and the messiness of human relationships. The pitfalls, simplifications and limitations of these very frameworks for analysis should also be acknowledged. As Welsh points out, there are no neat constructions of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, particularly regarding identity and conflict (2007: 233). In order to embark on alternative modalities of the logics of identity, simplified domination models must be rejected in both theory and practice. The discussion of a Sahrawi cultural resistance identity encounters another potential pitfall in what Stuart Hall has denominated ‘naturalism’ or identification based on common attributes (1996:2). Does a Sahrawi cultural resistance identity generate ‘us-them,’ ‘ours-other,’ ‘inside-outside,’ ‘inclusion-exclusion,’ ‘Sahrawi-Moroccan’ binary oppositions? I address this charge of naturalism and this particular question in Chapter Four. The above explanation of a ‘cultural resistance identity’ has been adapted from a previous article of mine (Murphy, 2009). 153 Kissinger misrepresents the position of the United States. The U.S. was poised to be very active, not in the decolonization process for Western Sahara, but in the Moroccan annexation of the territory. 221 clear response to his question in a statement made by Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs Pedro Cortina Mauri. In no uncertain terms, Cortina Mauri described the careful process of assessing the ‘wishes of the people’ of the Spanish Sahara: “What happened – and I tell you in the best good faith – is that we studied deeply the wishes of the population, and we concluded they don’t want to be Moroccans. We can’t treat them as a group of camels, just because King Hassan has the ambition of grasping territory. We want to reach a solution that is peaceful, friendly and cordial, but of course not based on the mistreatment of the population, or saying like Hassan, with his fertile imagination, that they are ‘Moroccan separatists’” (Memorandum of Conversation, 1974b: 2). Even though earlier evaluations of the territory were systematically set aside and ignored, the UN visiting mission reinitiated this process. Its findings demonstrate the importance of on the ground fieldwork and assessments of the social, political and identity environments of potential conflict areas. In this case, both a lack of information about and underestimation of the critical creation and awakening of a Sahrawi national consciousness and collective rejection of colonial reign undermined and even impeded the necessary groundwork for comprehensive and effective conflict prevention. Many factors influenced the failure to read the tectonic shift in Sahrawi national identity, including ideological constructs, constraints and influence of big power players, like the United States, and broad-sweeping geopolitical representations of interested parties, like Morocco and Mauritania. In effect, Kissinger steered U.S. foreign policy down a simplistic, one-dimensional and binary real politics path. The case of Western Sahara was reduced to the following preventative actions: prohibit the spread of Communism/Socialism; thwart the reach and sphere of influence of Russia; obviate the creation of a Muslim state; protect the U.S.-Moroccan alliance; and strengthen U.S. regional interest and influence in North Africa. Morocco’s brilliant and successful message to the international community of its unbreakable commitment to the ‘recuperation’ of Western Sahara (through diplomatic or military means) overshadowed the making of an organized and strong national movement for self-determination within Western Sahara. These miscalculations of the Sahrawi national liberation movement, whether purposefully misleading or genuinely careless, set the scene for inadequate international responses to both ‘peaceful’ and active aggression.

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2.4.3. The Announcement of the ICJ Opinion and Morocco’s Green March

“The materials and information presented to the Court show the existence, at the time of Spanish colonization, of legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara. They equally show the existence of rights, including some rights relating to the land, which constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity, as understood by the Court, and the territory of Western Sahara. On the other hand, the Court's conclusion is that the materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory” (International Court of Justice, 1975: Advisory Opinion Paragraph 162, 68).

“When King Hassan introduced his show on October 16 – a highly publicized ‘Green March’ escorted by 35,000 troops and as many secret service agents – his immediate objective was to provide a smoke screen to bury the embarrassing International Court of Justice verdict, which…ruled unequivocally against Moroccan claims over the territory” (Kamil, 1987: 13).

On October 16, 1975, the International Court of Justice announced its decision in favor of the right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people. In defiance of the ruling, Morocco announced the plans for a peaceful Green March,154 a mass exodus of Moroccan citizens into Western Sahara on the very day of the ruling. As the findings did not corroborate long held Moroccan sovereignty claims over Western Sahara, King Hassan II reverted to blatant mistruths and widespread propaganda to convince the Moroccan public that the ICJ, the legal advisory of the United Nations, had ruled in their favor: “The opinion of the Court can only mean one thing: the so-called Western Sahara was part of Moroccan territory over which the sovereignty was exercised by the Kings of Morocco and that the population of this territory considered themselves and were considered to be Moroccans…Today Moroccan demands have been recognized by the legal advisory organ of the United Nations” (Saxena, 1981: 43). By asking for 350,000 Moroccan volunteers to greet their Sahrawi brothers across the border, Rabat successfully

154 Green was considered the holy color of Islam. 223 created a wave of nationalist fervor and support behind the monarchy. It may have appeared from Hassan’s public assurances that the Green March solely constituted a symbolic and peaceful demonstration; however, the announcement openly challenged the authority of the ICJ, Spain (the administrative power) and the Frente POLISARIO. Furthermore, by mid-1974, Hassan began to fortify the borders of Western Sahara by stationing “over a quarter of his previously mutinous military forces in the south, with an estimated 20,000 troops near the Spanish Sahara by October 1975” (Mundy, 2006: 284)155. In an incredible show of mass approval, over 500,000 Moroccans volunteered for the holy and peaceful mission across the border. King Hassan tapped into the Moroccan people’s hardship by creating an “unreal conflict” (scapegoating) and induced a “process of redirecting hostility and energy away from the real source of fear and goal-frustration,” poverty, corruption and repression (Mitchell, 1981: 27; Menéndez del Valle, 1975: 9). The decision to announce the Green March also took the United Nations General Assembly off guard by precipitating its own analysis of the Court’s findings. Furthermore, the thought of 350,000 Moroccan citizens suddenly rushing the northern frontier of Western Sahara placed Madrid where Rabat wanted, in a pressure cooker with little room to move and less and less apparent options for an easy retreat (Hodges, 1983: 211). By using the first and incomplete portion of the decision, King Hassan II justified the peaceful invasion and was able to orchestrate the subsequent political and militaristic moves without much outside interference, besides slap on the hand written condemnations. Rabat successfully made a very straightforward and clear decision appear cloudy and indecisive in the Western world and in the media’s eye (Mercer, 1979: 9). In a conversation between United States President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger in the oval office on October 17, 1975, a day after the publication of the ICJ Opinion on the status of Western Sahara, Kissinger stated: “Morocco is threatening a massive march on Spanish Sahara. The ICJ gave an opinion that said sovereignty had been decided between Morocco and Mauritania. That basically is what Hassan wanted” (Memorandum of Conversation, 1975a: 3). Two conflicting conclusions can be drawn

155 Redacted and released by the CIA under the Freedom of Information Act to Jacob Mundy: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The National Intelligence Daily 2(236), 8 October, 1975. 224 from this statement. Morocco’s propaganda and outright manipulation of the decision of the ICJ convinced not only the Moroccan public, but also powerful and influential leaders like Kissinger that the Court had ruled in its favor; or, Kissinger purposefully misled President Ford in order to legitimate a planned Moroccan invasion and safeguard the close Washington-Rabat relationship156. Recently declassified documents157 – top-secret correspondence from the first half of October of 1975 – suggest that Kissinger had been kept well informed on Western Sahara. On October 3, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) briefed Kissinger the following: “If Morocco loses this gamble [invasion of Western Sahara], it could ultimately lead to the downfall of the present government in Rabat” (Central Intelligence Agency, 1975). That same day, an intelligence memorandum detailed the psychology behind Rabat’s planned invasion and King Hassan’s assumption of victory. King Hassan predicted that Spain would not launch a defensive counter-attack; however, he also assumed that “armed intervention [would] provoke favorable international mediation” (Intelligence Alert Memorandum, 1975). Rabat gambled that the international powerhouses, the United States and France, would circumvent the ICJ decision; ignore the illegal use of citizens prior to its military attack and invasion; and uphold the Madrid Accords. Because Hassan knew that Spain might “resist a forcible eviction,” he organized a “peaceful” march instead (Intelligence Alert Memorandum, 1975). The march had two purposes. It prevented Madrid from using force against citizens armed only with the Koran and allowed Moroccan military forces to ride in on its tail The memorandum also explained that Morocco would deter Algerian intervention by planting a “token preserve in Rabat…from Syria, Egypt, the PLO, and possibly Saudi Arabia” (Intelligence Alert Memorandum, 1975). Finally on October 15, a cable to the Secretary of State outlined the

156 In a conversation with Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdelaziz Bouteflika on December 17, 1975, Kissinger changed his stance on the ICJ opinion, declaring that the decision was “ambiguous” (Memorandum of Conversation, 1975c: 5). Bouteflika responded: “No, it considered each side’s brief in detail and came out for the one peaceful solution” (5). 157 It is important to note here that I found certain declassified information before having read Jacob Mundy’s 2006 breakthrough paper based on archival records and documents that he obtained through the U.S. Freedom of Information Act. Mundy merits credit for the first comprehensive article of this kind. Some of the declassified information that we cover corresponds. Where I found it on my own, I cite directly from the source. However, where I use Mundy’s findings and analysis, I cite both Mundy and the source. The official record of the 1975 invasion of Western Sahara is still incomplete because key documents and parts of declassified documents remain classified. 225 peaceful, yet illegal, invasion. The note in the margin reads: “We don’t want to comment at all” (Department of State, 1975). The United States turned a blind eye to Morocco’s clear rebuke of the United Nations ICJ opinion and planned illegal invasion. To adjudge that there was ambiguity to the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, like the conclusions of Rabat and Kissinger, one has to ignore the contents of the ruling itself. It is perplexing that even well versed academics, like B.O. Okere, also portray the opinion as confusing (Okere, 1979). Furthermore, in accordance with Article 49 of the Geneva Convention adopted on August 12 by the Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer part of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies” (Geneva Convention, 1949). Although the opinion recognized certain territorial ties between Western Sahara and Morocco and Mauritania, it expressly stated that those ties did not amount to territorial sovereignty. Furthermore, and of utmost importance, the opinion reaffirmed the principle of self-determination for the Sahrawi people158, “the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory.” Only manipulation of the opinion or purposeful exclusion of fundamental portions of the text could distort its findings and conclusions. The Court did not rule in favor of Morocco’s argument that the Sultan’s power and religious ties were commensurate to territorial sovereignty. Even though the Court concluded that some links did exist between Morocco and certain Western Saharan tribes, it expressed concern over the fact that these tribes were nomadic, dispersed and not constricted by territorial limits. In addition, the Court had set precedence in earlier decisions where similar claims were refuted as insufficient for territorial sovereignty (Joffé, 1987: 24). Considering the weakness of the Moroccan and Mauritanian arguments and the fact that the colonial experience creates changes in “economy, society and political attitudes,” it is very difficult to explain the UN rationale and decision to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice in the first place (19). From the onset of Morocco’s illegal offensive on Western Sahara, the U.S. appeared to play some part. What was the extent of the role of the U.S.? Jacob Mundy’s

158 Chapter Four delves into the issue of self-determination, its scope and application in international law and self-determination theory and practice more generally. 226

2006 article, “Neutrality or Complicity? The United States and the 1975 Moroccan Takeover of the Spanish Sahara,” sheds light on the degree of U.S. involvement in the lead up to the conflict. It tells quite a different story from Washington’s official narrative of neutrality and nonintervention. In fact, U.S. silent complicity and behind the scenes maneuvering served to undermine the United Nations and Organization of African Unity and their plans of self-determination for the Sahrawi people. Once again, recently declassified documents help us fill in the conceptual gap and perplexing sequence of events and explain the lack of strong and effective responses to Moroccan aggression.

2.4.4. Green March – November 6, 1975

On October 21, 1975, José Solís Ruíz, minister of labor and loyalist to Franco, met with King Hassan II and hinted at a compromise in order to delay the Green March. The Spanish atmosphere was changing and the high moral ground on which Madrid stood was crumbling with Franco’s demise. As a result of Franco’s deteriorating health, Prince Juan Carlos became the Spanish head of state on October 30. Prior to this change, Spain had decided to take King Hassan’s planned invasion to the UN Security Council in order to force the Council to act. The United Nations held emergency meetings on October 20 and 22 and requested that UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim go to the region to consult with Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria. He did so from October 25 through the 28. After careful deliberation of the facts at hand, he suggested what became known as the Waldheim Plan. Its main goal was to alleviate tensions in the region through UN intervention. This would require sending peacekeeping troops and a temporary and transitional UN administration to Western Sahara in anticipation of a referendum of self- determination. Meanwhile, Governor-General Salazar was working diligently for a transfer of power to the Frente POLISARIO. All Sahrawi leaders including the Frente POLISARIO, PUNS and the Djemaa reacted to the Green March. As a united front for the first time, they requested Madrid to stop the indirect invasion and threatened to respond with force if necessary. Eventually the PUNS and the Djemaa integrated with the Frente POLISARIO. Despite Morocco’s plans, Salazar agreed to transfer the territory to the

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Frente POLISARIO within six months and to grant the Sahrawi people their independence from colonial rule. King Hassan responded by giving Sahrawi leadership a final warning to rejoin the motherland. On November 1, the president of the Djemaa, Khatri Ould Said Ould Joumani159, previously slandered by Morocco as a puppet leader of Madrid, made the traditional bayaa160 to the King and the Kingdom of Morocco and announced his loyalty and the loyalty of the Sahrawi people. His defection was a blow to the Frente POLISARIO and a gift for Rabat. On November 2, with the visit of Prince Juan Carlos to El-Ayoun, the capital of Western Sahara, Madrid reaffirmed its intention to grant independence to the Sahrawis (Kamil, 1987: 13). Despite Madrid’s continued support of the Frente POLISARIO and protests against the march, there was no turning back for King Hassan II. He had created a nationalistic and religious fervor that snowballed out of his control. This support oozed from every aspect of Moroccan life, from surcharges on football games to Jil Jilala’s popular music hit, El-Ayoun, My Eyes (Hodges, 1983: 214). In order to abate domestic unrest and increased political opposition, King Hassan II promoted historical myths that glorified his people’s past and demonized the last foreign presence in Northwest Africa. He rallied domestic support and asked for volunteers to peacefully march into Western Sahara in order to be reunited with their Sahrawi brothers who had been amputated from the great kingdom of Morocco by colonial rule (Levy, 2001: 15). King Hassan II owed his renewed popularity and stability to the Green March, and it could therefore not be avoided. The international community did not raise a finger to stop it. Another opportunity for conflict prevention fell to the way side and the Frente POLISARIO’s protests fell on deaf ears.

159 Khatri declared two very conflicting statements within two weeks time of each other: (1) “The Sahrawi people will oppose the march, by force if necessary. The Sahrawis will not rest with arms folded in the face of our only enemy, Morocco. We will fight to the death for our objective – independence”; (2) “I have come on behalf of all the inhabitants and tribes of the Sahara to render to Your Majesty the allegiance of our ancestors…I have come out of patriotism because the Sahara is an integral part of Morocco. We have never ceased to be Moroccans” (Pazzanita, 2006: 234). 160 “In traditional Moroccan society, an act of allegiance to a sultan or king, one usually made by tribal chiefs on behalf of their people. Although the bayaa has largely fallen into disuse, it has been retained in Morocco as a way of strengthening the legitimacy of the monarchy. In particular, Saharawis aligning themselves with Morocco or - more recently – defectors from the Polisario Front have sometimes been given an audience with the monarch in order to personally express their fealty to the throne” (Pazzanita, 2006: 52). 228

The inevitability of the Green March did begin to change the Spanish colonial tune and Franco’s illness only exacerbated differences that, until then, had been kept at bay with regards to the decolonization of Western Sahara. Spanish government officials within Western Sahara, including Salazar and Colonel Rodríguez Viguri161, were convinced of their mission and promise to hand over power to the Frente POLISARIO, a stand they upheld against opposition in Madrid. The Instituto Nacional de Industria warned that phosphate and fishing interests would be in grave danger if Morocco were to gain control of the territory. In contrast, the president of Council of Ministers Arias Navarro, minister of Presidential Affairs Antonio Carro Martínez and Secretary-General of the Francoist Movimiento Nacional José Solís Ruíz (also former guardian of the Moroccan Royal Family assets in Spain) began to argue that a confrontation with Morocco was the last thing Spain needed as a fragile country in the final hours of the Franco regime and in a time of potential democratization (Hodges, 1983: 215). They claimed that a direct conflict with Morocco could endanger a peaceful transition period within Spain and they pointed to the tumult in Portugal with its own regime change as an example not to follow. In addition, they highlighted King Hassan’s threats against Ceuta and Melilla, which was home to a good number of Spanish citizens. Hassan wavered between threatening to put Ceuta and Melilla on the decolonization list (de Piniés, 1990: 51) and promising to ignore the Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco until the UK settled Gibraltar with Spain if Western Sahara transitioned smoothly into Moroccan hands (Mundy, 2006: 296). Spain knew that it was stronger militarily than Morocco, but that a costly and most likely unpopular external war could be disastrous for a raw post- Franco Spanish society162. By late October, under pressure from Paris and Washington, rumors spread that Spain had completely switched gears and was now leaning towards partition of the territory between Morocco and Mauritania. Kissinger sent Lieutenant-General Vernon Walters, confidante and second ranking official of the CIA, on a special mission that was

161 Viguri was relieved of his post due to his outspoken nature on the subject (Mercer, 1979:9). 162 According to the CIA, “there were some 5,000 elite legionnaires and 16,000 regular troops at Spain’s disposal. Nearby, on the Canary Islands, Spain had 20,000 extra soldiers, two squadrons of F-5 tactical fighters and sixty subsonic fighter-bombers. Should a full-scale war break out, Madrid could also quickly scramble four squadrons of Mirage III and F-4C jets from Spain” (Mundy, 2006: 284; CIA, “The National Intelligence Daily” 2(236), 8 October, 1975, redacted and released by the CIA under the Freedom of Information Act to Jacob Mundy. 229 designated ‘Leila,’ code name for the Green March. Walter’s presence in Madrid at such a crucial time in the decolonization process of Western Sahara suggests that the United States had a strong interest in the next moves played by Spain. In fact, the purpose of Walter’s visit was to pressure Spain to capitulate to Moroccan demands for control of Western Sahara (Kamil, 1987: 11). Despite its claims of neutrality throughout the conflict cycle, the United States desired a certain outcome. The U.S. had important bases in Spain, but a treaty that expired in September of 1975. In light of these changing circumstances, Spain was “eager to assure the continuation of important military and economic aid from Washington in exchange for the renewal of the contract on the bases” (Kamil, 1987: 13). The critical role of the U.S. and France as secondary actors in the conflict will be fully explored and detailed in Chapter Three. However, in a nutshell, U.S. and French interest proximity to the conflict put a wedge in the process of self- determination for the Sahrawi people, decreased the possibilities for conflict prevention between Morocco, Mauritania and Western Sahara and, in fact, increased the probability of outright direct conflict between the three primary actors. Spain continued to refute its change in position to the United Nations. However, on October 28, a curfew was imposed in El-Ayoun. Suddenly Spanish forces appeared positioned strategically in the city, and they began to enclose Sahrawi neighborhoods in barbed wire. Sahrawis found themselves expelled from the Tropas Nómadas. Gasoline stations were ordered not to serve Sahrawis. All Spanish settlers were ordered to leave the country. Spanish troops began to withdraw, leaving all territory east of Smara completely vulnerable (Hodges, 1983: 217-219). These actions and measures contrasted sharply with Madrid’s promise of a peaceful transfer of power to the Frente POLISARIO. Then, King Hassan announced that the Waldheim plan was no longer relevant. He claimed that a trilateral agreement with Spain and Mauritania had already been decided upon, making it obsolete. The events that followed would clarify Madrid’s inconsistent behavior – its willingness to cooperate with the United Nations and its simultaneous cooperation with Morocco, Mauritania and the United States and France. At this point in the build up to the conflict, the only significant actors in the conflict working towards conflict prevention were the UN, the OAU and Algeria. On November 6, 1975, the Green March volunteers crossed into Western Sahara.

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Most marchers were poor and received free food, cigarettes and a Koran. Many lived better in the following days as warriors of God than they did in their everyday lives. Some even had their belongings strapped to their backs in hopes of possibly settling in the area and of making a better life. The 350,000 Moroccans who crossed the borders while the Moroccan army organized behind them along the frontier, provided the king with “a personal triumph necessary to the stability of his throne” and gave his “restless army” a purpose (Shelley, 2004: 55)163. The marchers were only allowed to penetrate a few kilometers. On November 8, Arias Navarro called a meeting of the cabinet. Was the Western Sahara fate sealed with Morocco and Mauritania in this meeting? The fact that King Hassan prematurely called off the Green March on November 9 suggests so. The infamous Green March (Marcha Verde) provided the perfect conditions for a peaceful invasion (IEPALA, 1978: 33). Despite the ‘peacefulness’ of the march, Security Council Resolution 380, adopted on November 6, 1975, deplored the tactical entrance plan (United Nations Security Council, 1975b). U.S. and French involvement, however, rendered the institution and its resolutions impotent.

2.4.5. Early November: Conflict Prevention Sabotage

CIA briefs and memoranda of conversation dated November 3, 5, 6, 10 and 11 lay out in no uncertain terms U.S. foreign policy on Western Sahara. Kissinger’s ability to implement a real politics agenda and approach to potential conflict demonstrates the considerable impact that individual players can have on conflict. His orchestration of events, particularly behind the scenes dealings, adversely affected appropriate and effective methods for conflict prevention, like third-party involvement of the UN and the OAU164. In fact, a CIA brief of November 3 portrays the UN as a front organization for

163 Author cited: Mercer, John (1977): “The Saharauis of Western Sahara,” in Ashworth, Georgina (ed.): World Minorities, vol. 1, Quartermaine House, London, 133. 164 In 1975, the press carried the following dispatch from Washington: “Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has formally initiated a policy of selecting for cutbacks in American aid to those nations that have sided against the U.S. in votes in the United Nations. In some cases the cutbacks involve food and humanitarian relief” (Zinn, 1996: 557). Kissinger took real politics ruthlessness and dishonesty to an entirely new level. In fact, the statement, “access to information is the cornerstone of democracy, so secrecy is essential for dictatorship” (Garon, 2003: 87-88), reveals not only the fine line between democracy and authoritarianism, but also the dangers presented by the effectuation of a systematized and naturalized real politics agenda. 231

U.S. political expediency. The briefing reveals the political constructedness of the Waldheim Plan meant to mediate the dispute and provide for the self-determination of the Sahrawi people. It states: “The Secretary-General reportedly had earlier thought that Morocco would acquiesce to his proposal provided the UN trusteeship were ‘manipulated’ so that the territory would soon be turned over to Rabat and Noukachott” (Mundy, 2006: 296)165. That same day, Kissinger briefed President Ford on the situation pre-Green March. The exchange went as follows:

“Kissinger: On the Spanish Sahara, Algerian pressure has caused the Spanish to renege. Algeria wants a port and there are rich phosphate deposits. The Algerians have threatened us on their Middle East position. We sent messages to the Moroccans yesterday. I think we should get out of it. It is another Greek-Turkey problem where we lose either way. We could tell Hassan we would entirely oppose him; that might stop it but it would make us the fall guy. Or we could force Waldheim forward.

President: I think the UN should take on more of these problems. God damn, we shouldn’t have to do it all and get a bloody nose.

Kissinger: The UN could do it like West Irian166, where they fuzz the ‘consulting the wishes of the people,’ and get out of it.

President: Let’s use the UN route” (Mundy, 2006: 297)167.

Kissinger’s portrayal of Algeria, one that reeks of pure geopolititicizing, completely erases the Frente POLISARIO and the existence of a people’s movement in the territory of Western Sahara. Furthermore, he simplifies Algeria’s support of the Sahrawis and their right to a legitimate expression of self-determination to geopolitical and economic gain, ignoring (or ignorant to) a colonial history and Algeria’s general commitment to liberation movements. Lastly, he promotes a ‘solution’ to the conflict that reduces the UN

165 Citation originally from: Central Intelligence Agency, 1975, “Middle East Africa Brief, Spanish Sahara,” 3 November, electronic document, CIA archive database National Archives. 166 Indonesia invaded Western New Guinea (Irian Jaya) in 1961, in an attempt to thwart the process of self- determination of the Dutch colony. The UN assumed an administrative role in the territory in 1962; however, it was quickly ceded to Indonesia in 1963. In 1969, a suspect self-determination referendum formalized Indonesian sovereignty over the territory (Mundy, 2006: 296). 167 Original citation from: White House, 1975, “Memorandum of Conversation,” 3 November, Folder ‘November 3, 1975, Ford – Kissinger – Scowcroft,’ Box 16, collection ‘NSA Memoranda of Conversation, 1973-1977,’ Ford Library. 232 to a puppet organization that not only breaks international law by fraudulently consulting the wishes of the people, but also functions in the interests of the United States. In a staff meeting on November 5, the day before the Moroccan scheduled Green March, Assistant Secretary of State Alfred Atherton began to brief Kissinger on the diplomatic situation between Rabat and Madrid. Kissinger interrupted in anticipation of what he thought was going to be Spain’s stance: “Just to turn it over to the UN with a guarantee it will go to Morocco” (Staff Meeting, 1975: 28)168. In fact, Atherton was referring to Spanish suggestions as to how the Green March should proceed in such a way that would allow the Green March to be executed for the Moroccans and averted by the Spanish: “Let the marchers go into it ten kilometers, and let a token go all the way to [El-Ayoun], and having done this, turn around and go back. And to do all they can to see that the UN self-determination procedure comes out in favor of Morocco. This has been carried back to Hassan” (28). Kissinger then asked Atherton, “But he is going to get the territory, isn’t he?” (29). Atherton assured Kissinger that, considering the impossibility of a hundred percent guarantee, Hassan was getting the most he could hope for regarding the acquisition of Western Sahara. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Arthur Hartman, explained that if the future of Western Sahara rested on a referendum, the Spanish government had been “very explicit” regarding “what they would do in influencing” a referendum in Morocco’s favor (29). Kissinger’s final comment on the subject of the Sahara was in the form of two unbelievable questions: “Do any of the people know they live in the Spanish Sahara? It is 80,000 Bedouins, right?” (29). As stated above, it is problematic when member states of the UN, especially permanent members with veto power, view the organization as a means to a desired end rather than as an impartial facilitator and mediator of potential conflict situations. Incredibly, Atherton’s statement here basically describes the unfolding of the Green March, which took place the following day and which is detailed above. Kissinger’s obliviousness,

168 Also cited in Mundy, 2006: 298; however, Jacob Mundy misquotes Kissinger’s reply, “Just turn it over to the UN with a guarantee it will go to Morocco.” He omits the article ‘a’ from Kissinger’s comment, making it appear to be a demand when in fact it refers to Spain’s position on Western Sahara. The entire exchange can be found in: Secretary of State, 1975, “Staff Meeting Minutes,” 5 November, 8:00AM, Series ‘Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973-1977,’ Record Group 59, National Archives. 233 whether feigned or otherwise, to the UN visiting mission’s public report on the very real existence of a Sahrawi national liberation movement is both scandalous and telling. On November 6, the day of the initiation of the Green March, the United Nations Security Council deplored the holding of the march (United Nations Security Council, 1975b). Previous to this Security Council Resolution, Resolution 379 urged “all the parties concerned and interested to avoid any unilateral or other action which might further escalate the tension in the area” (United Nations Security Council, 1975a). How can one deplore an act that one simultaneously orchestrates? These declassified documents expose the emptiness of these demands and the manipulation of the conflict prevention process. Resolution 380 was the “last substantive action the Security Council would take on the Western Sahara issue until 1988” (Mundy, 2006: 288). On November 10, Kissinger announced to Scowcroft and Ford in the Oval Office: “Hassan has pulled back in the Sahara. But if he doesn’t get it, he is finished. We should now work to ensure he gets it. We would work it through the U.N. [to] ensure a favorable vote” (Mundy, 2006: 300)169. With the possibility of conflict between Spain and Morocco averted, Kissinger immediately began to prepare for how to secure the territory of Western Sahara for Morocco. He used the threat of the dethronement of Hassan as justification for this stance and purported to use the UN to attain these goals. At no time did the livelihoods or the suffering of the Sahrawi people in this territory affect his assessment of the situation. Furthermore, at no time did conflict prevention strategies and methods guide his decision-making. It was based purely on a real politics strategy, agenda and ends, couched in the power politics of the Cold War and binary shortsightedness of East/West competition. The structural deficiencies of the United Nations and the abuse of power of the United States rendered the institution completely impotent in the realm of conflict prevention. On November 11, Kissinger plainly stated that the UN would be the medium for a “rigged” self-determination vote (300)170. What he could not necessarily have predicted was the workings of the transfer of the territory through ulterior means, through a secret pact between Morocco, Mauritania and Spain.

169 Citation originally from: White House, “Memorandum of Conversation,” 10 November, 1975, Folder November 11, 1975, Box 16, Collection ‘NSA Memoranda of Conversations,’ Ford Library. 170 Citation originally from: White House, “Memorandum of Conversation,” November 11, 1975, Folder November 11, 1975, Box 16, collection ‘NSA Memoranda of Conversations,’ Ford Library. 234

2.4.6. Madrid Accords – November 14, 1975

“U.S. and French governments put it forcefully to the Spanish government that radical political change across the Straits of Gibraltar would not serve Western interests, especially in a period of political uncertainty in the Iberian Peninsula” (Hodges, 1983: 215).

A cloud of secrecy surrounds the events that followed the Green March. Spain, Morocco and Mauritania met in Madrid on November 12 to discuss the details of the partition and how to organize a Tripartite Administration. On November 14, all three parties signed a treaty that guaranteed Spain’s exit from the territory by the end of February 1976. The treaty specified that the partition of Western Sahara was not a transfer of formal sovereignty of Western Sahara to Rabat and Nouakchott, but rather one of administrative authority over the territory until the Djemaa expressed an act of self- determination in representation of the Sahrawi people (Pazzanita, 2006: 249; Vilar, 1977: 148-49). Spain would be expected to exit the territory by the end of February 1976. The inclusion of the Djemaa in the agreement was a considerable misstep for Morocco and Mauritania and another underestimation on their part of the power of the Frente POLISARIO-led nationalist movement. The majority of the Djemaa backed independence rather than integration with Morocco and Mauritania. On November 28, 67 members (of the 102 total members) of the Djemaa, an absolute majority of those represented, approved the Proclamation of Guelta Zemmour, which rebuffed the Madrid Accords. Following this vote, the Djemaa pledged its allegiance to the Frente POLISARIO and effectively disbanded itself. On February 26, 1976, Morocco responded by organizing its own rump Djemaa, presided over by Khatri Ould Said Ould Joumani. Fifty-seven members voted for integration with Morocco and Mauritania (Seddon, 1987).171 The economic concessions made to Madrid were not made available to the public at first, but later inquiries revealed agreements on minerals and fisheries, a stake of 35 percent of the Bou Craa operation and an understanding that hundreds of Spanish vessels would be granted rights to fishing in the rich waters (IEPALA, 1978: 67-69; Shelley, 2004: 70, 74). Once the deal was brokered, Moroccan and Mauritanian troops did not

171 The Moroccan-organized Djemaa is discussed in further detail in Chapter Three. 235 hesitate to invade militarily. Although Morocco had already sent FAR troops into Western Sahara in late October to take positions in outposts abandoned by the Spanish, the signing of the Madrid Accords provided the necessary ‘legitimacy’ for a full military invasion of the territory. On November 9, the Green Marchers were finally ordered home; on November 20, Franco died; and on November 27, Moroccan troops entered Smara. The decolonization process had failed, but the creation of a nation could not be undone. The Frente POLISARIO declared the creation of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), a state in exile, on February 27, 1976. Although the SADR did not possess all of the requirements of statehood, its very establishment and the potential for state recognition by other states, which confers legitimacy on the objectives and actions of liberation movements, served to discredit the colonial system and pressure the occupying powers to withdraw (Wilson, 1988: 116)172.

Conclusions: Failure to Prevent Conflict

In this chapter, we looked at the breakdown of the international system regarding the prevention of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict within the context of colonial and postcolonial hegemony, political inequality and power relations that undermined the effectiveness of the United Nations. The contradiction between the mission of the United Nations and its hegemonic institutional structure keeps the international body in a constant balancing act between right (following its principles) and the status quo (inherent in its structure). The historical narrative of the pre-conflict environment focused on the historical events and the many failed opportunities for the successful decolonization of Western Sahara and, ultimately, for conflict prevention. The inability, or lack of will, of the United Nations to organize and implement the decolonization process for the Sahrawi people is particularly alarming when we consider

172 Heather Wilson states that, in the case of Western Sahara, the effectiveness of these tactics remains to be seen (1988: 116). She also points out that the UN does not recognize the Frente POLISARIO as the ‘legitimate’ representative of the Sahrawis (141). Additionally, the Frente POLISARIO does not enjoy observer status even thought the UN recognizes the right of self-determination for the people of Western Sahara. She concludes that the PLO is the only liberation movement that has been recognized by the United Nations as a “legitimate representative” (141). Contrary to these claims, the United Nations has in fact explicitly recognized the Frente POLISARIO as the representative body of the Sahrawi People in, among others, GA Resolutions 34/37 of November 21, 1979 and 35/19 of November 11, 1980. 236 the institutional supports and structures in place to carry it out, including: Resolution 1514 (XV), which established the right to self-determination of colonial peoples; subsequent UN resolutions, which specifically affirmed the right of the Sahrawis to self- determination; the Report of the UN Visiting Mission, which upheld that the Sahrawis categorically supported independence; and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, which called for the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the territory through a self-determination referendum. These institutional safeguards were successfully broken down by a Moroccan-led and French and U.S.- backed affront to the right of self-determination for the Sahrawi people. In simple terms, Realpolitik ideas, policies and actions moved Western Sahara away from decolonization and toward conflict. Declassified documents, including those of November 3 and 5, clearly lay out the partisan U.S. policy towards the crisis and the participative practice of an international legitimization of the Moroccan (and Mauritanian) invasion, occupation and takeover of the territory (Mundy, 2006: 301). Kissinger purposefully steered President Ford towards a transfer of power from Spain to Morocco by providing a distorted, or even falsified, picture of the actual situation. In Kissinger’s estimation, which became U.S. foreign policy on Western Sahara, Hassan represented the “best guarantor of domestic and regional stability” and a “steadfast firewall against Soviet influence, socialism and radical Arab nationalism in the Middle East and Africa” (278). Kissinger’s Realpolitik assessment of the conflict situation became U.S. foreign policy on Western Sahara. In his memoirs, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, U.S. Representative to the United Nations in 1975, details the extent to which the United States would go to thwart Communist expansion:

“China altogether backed Fretilin in Timor, and lost. In Spanish Sahara, Russia just as completely backed Algeria, and its front, known as Polisario, and lost. In both instances the United States wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success” (Moynihan and Weaver, 1978; cited in Mundy, 2006: 277; emphasis in originals).

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It is clear from this statement (ideological coordinate) that U.S. (and French) actions, which have been portrayed as partial and neutral, constitute active negative participation. I would in fact argue that a U.S. calculated abuse of power and a coordinated assault on international preventative measures for conflict not only set the stage for the Green March, but also for the illegal annexation of the territory of Western Sahara through an unlikely medium, the United Nations. In order to effectively address such misrepresentations, we explored the role that Realpolitik discourses played in framing the pre-war context and the ideas, policies and actions around not only the lead up to the conflict, but also the active making of conflict rather than prevention of conflict. As we established, the role of conflict prevention is to recognize trigger causes of war and to problematize dominant structures that set the rules of the game and actively (albeit seemingly passively) subjugate and subordinate knowledges as a result of the successful normalization and naturalization of imperialist and ideological agendas. In this regard, it has been absolutely beneficial and necessary to examine the social networks and the general politics (régimes) of truth – the very discourses that establish, produce and normalize the rules of conflict analyses and prevention (truths and knowledges), while subjugating others – that surround and penetrate the conflict of Western Sahara. These analytical processes are also applicable to other conflict situations. By engaging the workings of power and discourse, it is possible to locate their functions, manifestations and significance (ideas, policies and actions) and the beliefs and behavior that sustain them in order to open up new spaces for critical evaluation and political engagement and to probe the very functioning of real politics in the preventative stage of conflict. Even with the signing of the Madrid Accords, Morocco failed to accomplish an internationally legitimized annexation of Western Sahara. The will and desire of a colonized people for self-determination proved to defy all odds as well as the skillful and dishonest maneuverings of Morocco, Spain, the United States and France. Chapter Three continues our analysis of the functioning of Realpolitik, and it further probes the conception of neutrality and third parties in the hot conflict and diplomatic (ceasefire) stages of our conflict.

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Chapter Three: Prefiguring a New Interpretive Horizon for Conflict Analysis: Reconfiguring Conflict Actor-Mapping and Mediation

Introduction

The previous chapter focused on theoretical and practical conceptions of conflict. Through a genealogical historical review of the build-up to the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict, it also queried into the ‘how’ of failed opportunities for conflict prevention. This chapter moves from the concept of prevention to the concept of conflict stalemate through a critical review of conflict analysis itself. Although conflict prevention makes up part of what we call conflict analysis and mapping, our focus here is on hot conflict and diplomatic gridlock. This requires probing the concepts of actor- mapping and mediation. Part One, “Alternative Analytical Interpretive Horizons for Conflict Analysis and Mapping,” takes Gramsci’s idea of hegemony – the ability of the bourgeoisie in capitalist societies to maintain a dominant position through diffuse series of relationships, institutions, ideas and values, rather than coercive state apparatuses (Newman, 2006: 169) – as a theoretical jumping off point for evaluating the analytical structures, tools and meanings at our disposal for conflict mapping. In this regard, we need to probe the overt natures of power and normalized approaches to conflict analysis. Critical to this evaluation are the ideas (and claims) of universality, essentiality and naturalization. These are our conflict analysis interpretive horizons that influence the ways we approach, analyze and map conflict and hence transform it. In effect, they create the rules of the game (accepted even by the disenfranchised and unrepresented) and influence our ways of knowing and ontological interconnections. They are hegemonic. In this sense, relations of domination (related to hegemony) and hegemonic discourse, the functioning of Realpolitik, penetrate conflict studies and conceptualizations of conflict analysis and mapping; designate what is important; and steer conflict analysis and conflict transformation strategies and policies. Creating an

239 alternative interpretive horizon, therefore, requires rethinking dominant structures, breaking the process of ‘confirm-structuring’ and inquiring into ways of knowing and being. I aim to link the ways that power persists and endures over time (Gramsci) to the Foucauldian idea of how and by what means the régimes of truth of conflict analysis confirm-structure and reproduce dominant structures and specific outcomes at the service of personal, state and regional gain and in function of the dominant financial capitalist system. As such, the very structures of conflict analysis and mapping (the rules of the game by which we analyze conflict) and the relations of power and dominance deserve our attention. We cannot underestimate the impact of how we talk about conflict and as such what steers and conditions approaches to conflict. In this section, therefore, I analyze normalized approaches to conflict that Realpolitik discourses systematically create and reproduce. I take the specific hot conflict situation of the Western Saharan- Moroccan conflict to provide a genealogy of this part of the conflict cycle and in order to provide the necessary background (specifics of the conflict) for better conceptualizing conflict mapping, particularly actor-mapping and mediation. Part Two, “Conflict Mapping,” suggests the need to approach conflict analysis and mapping from a critical perspective that accounts for the disconnect between UN resolutions calling for the self-determination of the Sahrawi people and UN inability to both carry out the process of self-determination and effectively respond to Moroccan aggression and non-cooperation. Of course, this analytical perspective can be applied to other conflicts and conflict in general as well. I first present a brief review of ‘traditional’ conflict mapping and then introduce an analytical shift in approach. This process allows me to work from, add to and shift our framework for analysis, while bringing the theoretical to the practical domain. I address a specific part of conflict mapping, mapping parties/actors in conflict, with three goals in mind: to broaden our understanding of the categories of conflict actors – primary, secondary and other; to take into analytical consideration the very ‘truths’ from which we approach conflict mapping; and to create a shift in analytical interpretive horizons. In order to accomplish this, I define what we mean by primary, secondary and other actors and create my own model for assessing appropriate categorization. I add the

240 category of shadow-primary actor in order to facilitate a more accurate assessment of actor involvement, one that takes into consideration the interest proximity (motivating economic, cultural, (geo)political and military factors) of actors. The interest proximity of actors has bearing on direct or indirect actor involvement in conflict. In my model, the closer to the core (primary actors) that third-party actors (secondary, other, uninterested) fall, especially when considering interest-proximity, the more likely it is that a commitment to the peaceful transformation of conflicts is compromised. The qualification shadow-primary actor amplifies, specifies and adds to our conceptualizations of actors. By questioning the analytical coordinates (categorizations) that have guided how we designate and understand who’s who in conflict, we better understand their ability to influence a conflict situation. I specifically apply this theoretical script to the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict and breakdown the specific actors in accordance with the new categorical guidelines. By creating such divisions of actor involvement, we open up the analytical and practical space for a deeper evaluation of actor-impact on the conflict and on the obstructions to its peaceful transformation. Part Three, “Extent of Secondary Actor (Shadow-Primary Actor) Involvement,” and Part Four, “Third-Party Mediation: Peace Plans for Western Sahara,” are closely related. Part Three explores the extent of U.S. and French involvement, particularly military, in the conflict in order to assess how it has had negative effects on conflict transformation processes for Western Sahara and its protracted conflict nature. I also analyze U.S.-French-Spanish-EU competition over the natural resources in the region. Along this vein, I look at the relationship between resource exploration/exploitation of a Non-Self-Governing Territory and international law (peremptory norms/jus cogens). Part Four connects actor-mapping and conflict-actor-involvement to mediation and the Peace Process for Western Sahara. It explores the role of mediation more generally as it relates to the peaceful transformation of conflicts. Specifically, it evaluates each peace plan for Western Sahara as well as the challenges that have plagued the process from 1991 until the present.

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3.1. Alternative Analytical Interpretive Horizons for Conflict Analysis and Mapping

3.1.1. Clarifying the Approach

“Contemporary history has shown that, in the vast area stretching from Berlin to Vladivostok, the so-called ‘realities,’ which more often than not consisted of crime and lawlessness on a massive scale, proved to be less real and less permanent than many assumed. In matters pertaining to military invasion, decolonisation and self-determination, that peculiar brand of realism should be kept at a distance” (Lauterpacht and Greenwood, 1997: 406; Judge Skubiszewski, Separate Opinion, International Court of Justice, East Timor).

When analyzing the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict, it is important to evaluate the very analytical structures, tools and meanings at our disposal for conflict analysis and mapping. Using Gramsci’s idea of hegemony as a point of departure – the ability of the bourgeoisie in capitalist societies to maintain a dominant position through a diffuse series of relationships, institutions, ideas and values, rather than coercive state apparatuses (Newman, 2006: 169) – we can probe into not only the overt use of power/domination, for example, by the actors in conflict, but also the normalized (consensual) approaches to conflict analysis that become themselves an integral component of power relations and dominance. As Mark Haugaard explains, Gramsci argues that, “the bourgeoisie occupied the position of a hegemon because they managed to present their particular interests as universal for society as a whole” (Haugaard, 2006b: 45)173. It is precisely the idea of universality, essentiality and naturalization that deserves further study regarding conflict studies and the peaceful transformation of conflicts.

173 According to Mark Haugaard, a sophisticated theoretical examination demonstrates that hegemony is not merely a term that can be used interchangeably with empire and dominance as, for example, in Noam Chomsky’s book Hegemony or Survival (2004) (Haugaard, 2006a: 3-4). In fact, hegemony is a “substantially subtler concept than mere rationalization” and should not be conceived of in terms of coercion, either through the threat of violence or material depravation (4-5). According to Gramsci, bourgeois domination is based largely on consent and a series of consensual alliances with other classes and groups. Gramsci was trying to understand the strength and resilience of modern bourgeois society and how socialism failed (Fontana, 2006: 27). He struggled to identify “social groups within bourgeois modern society capable of challenging morally and intellectually the supremacy of the dominant groups” (Fontana, 2006: 40). In this way, Gramsci conceived of proletarian hegemony as a worthy hegemonic system because, as opposed to bourgeois capitalism, it is both sociologically and normatively desirable (Haugaard, 242

In this regard, our conflict analysis-interpretive horizons determine the ways in which we approach, analyze and map conflict. I propose that we must construct alternative interpretive horizons in order to compensate for the naturalized workings of Realpolitik in conflict and its analysis. The ‘peculiar brand of realism’ mentioned in the opening citation is not at all peculiar and has not been ‘kept at a distance’. In fact, its very normalization threatens to institutionalize models of inequality and consensual domination, while claiming to approach conflict equitably with the goal of maintaining international security and peace. In general, how we view mediation, neutrality and third- parties in conflict directly relates to specific conflict mapping and our ways of understanding and interpreting conflict situations and responses to them. Furthermore, the neoliberal capitalist hegemonic system of today – remembering hegemonic means both dominant and consented to, rather than coerced through material or violent means – reinforces ideas, policies and actions that in turn reinforce this system by reproducing naturalized and consented to rules of the game and by securing an ontological and particular order of things, meaning and social knowledge. We are talking about what Cerny (taking from Lukes: 1974) designates relational power (power over); structural power (embedding of asymmetric power positions in certain ‘rules of the game’ and selecting of certain decision outcomes, while reinforcing the existing distribution of power); and infrastructural power (internalization of power in the understandings, world views, habits, attitudes and behaviors, thereby systematically reinforcing the influence of the norms of the powerful on the powerless) (Cerny, 2006: 81-82). From this theoretical springboard and in our paradigm of conflict analysis and mapping, we are concerned with both the rules of the game (and those in positions of power establishing and reproducing them) and about those who “lack relative power” and internalize, adopt and help create “a common sense” knowledge (82). For Gramsci, this is known as a “common will” (ideas and morals) (Gramsci, 1971: 125-33; also cited in Haugaard, 2006b: 47) between the hegemonic and other classes, “whereby the power of the hegemon is built upon the consent of the supporting classes” (Haugaard, 2006b: 47).

2006a: 5). Although Haugaard makes an interesting point, I use both meanings of hegemony as I clarify in the “Definitions of Important Terms” section of this study. 243

It is this Gramscian idea, “the ability of the dominant class to exercise power by winning the consent of those it subjugates, as an alternative to the use of coercion” (Goverde, 2006: 110; from Heywood, 2002: 201), that informs our approach to conflict analysis and mapping and that offers a potential opportunity for a shift in interpretive horizon. However, I would also add that we need to query into how the power of the hegemon infiltrates and influences both theoreticians and practitioners working towards more equitable models of conflict analysis and mapping. Our ways of understanding and knowing – our internalized and naturalized and ontological interconnections – are very powerful forces of multiple forms of domination, regardless of their normative desirability or undesirability. The hegemonic, then, is a conceptualization with which we can theorize “how power has a consensual aspect that facilitates relations of domination” (Haugaard, 2006b: 50). Hegemonic discourse, the functioning of Realpolitik in a neoliberal and transnational global order, penetrates even conflict studies and conceptualizations of conflict analysis and mapping; designates what is important; and steers conflict analysis and conflict transformation strategies and policies. Thus, of major interest to this study are the implications of hegemonic discourses (in the vein of Gramsci) on the mapping and analyzing of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict and the role of the United States, France and other parties. To accomplish this, we need to shift our analytical interpretive horizon. With this in mind, what do I mean by constructing alternative interpretive horizons? I mean consciously altering, impeding, rethinking and constructing “alternatives to dominant structures, processes, practices and identities” and, more specifically, destructive and oppressive dominant structures (Day, 2005: 4). Haugaard argues that an alternative interpretive horizon presupposes an alternative meaning, a complete break from the structure of the hegemonic system and from the socialization from within and without this system (2006b: 55-62). He argues that social actors can either make change from within an already existing structure and systems of meaning or they can propose alternative interpretive horizons (58). Therefore, creating an alternative interpretive horizon necessitates a “fundamental attack upon the existing order of things” and not just a reproduction of the existing social structure, what he designates ‘confirming-structuration’ (62). This means changing the world itself and not only the

244 agents of specific relations of domination (57). A break from the hegemonic system in the form of a counter-hegemonic move is in order. I propose to apply the logic behind Haugaard’s argument to conflict analysis and mapping. Tweaking his understanding of an alternative interpretive horizon, I intend to query into the ways of knowing (epistemological points of reference) and being (ontological grounding) of conflict analysis theory and by extension practice. Furthermore, I intend to break with the norm and norm setting in conflict analysis where the hegemonic system totalizes and excludes alternative interpretive horizons, alternative methods for analysis. Our ways of knowing (conflict theory) and being (conflict practice) are contingent upon institutional structuration, education and production of knowledges. Although I am not creating a new world per se or breaking completely from the system (which may happen in a revolutionary moment, but which is difficult to sustain), I am advocating for an analytical shift and an exploration of alternative modes of knowing and being, while challenging dominant structures that enforce relations of domination and/or legitimate certain social, political and economic norms over others. As Haugaard points out, “meaning is mere convention” (Haugaard, 2006b: 59); therefore, it is necessary to investigate systems of meaning that claim origin, naturalness and universality. Of course in a dominant system of meaning, it is beneficial to portray something as if it is innate or natural, not only because it is difficult to argue against, but also because it is a safe and clear-cut (relatively devoid of ‘gray’ areas) way of being in and knowing the world around us, i.e. realism. As Fontana explains, “With hegemony Gramsci tries to capture the power dynamics and power differences within society, and to show the ways and means by which power persists and endures over time” (Fontana, 2006: 27). I want to link the ways that power persists and endures over time to the Foucauldian idea of how and by what means the régimes of truth of conflict analysis confirm-structure and reproduce dominant structures and specific outcomes at the service of the dominant finance-capitalist system. We not only perceive our surroundings and material reality through “ideological [discursive] and cultural prisms” (Fontana, 2006: 42). These prisms are contingent upon and condition the ways in which we know and reproduce knowledge.

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Of course, conflict analysis is made up of complex processes with deep historical roots (Solomon, 1999). This is not what is being contested here. What require attention are the very structures of conflict analysis and mapping and the relations of power and dominance in this very exercise. In fact, the new analytical interpretive horizon can be conceived of as a two-fold process of destructuration. Edward Said’s statement on asymmetric conflicts and the Palestinian/Israeli conflict helps clarify this point: “There is still a military occupation, people are still being killed, imprisoned and denied their rights on a daily basis [so only when there has been an] end to occupation [and] we are on a reasonably equal footing with the Israelis [can we] begin to talk seriously about cooperation. In the meantime cooperation can all too easily shade into collaboration with Israeli policy” (cited in Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 295). Cooperation and collaboration with dominant U.S./Israeli policy fuse together and become muddled in conflict terminology. We could also easily substitute Morocco for Israel in this representation. How we talk about conflict in general is the first layer of our assessment. This immediately brings us to our second layer of critical conflict analysis, the meaning attributed to our discursive cultural prisms, the descriptive framework that not only names conflict phenomena, but also steers and conditions approaches to conflict. As such, we engage asymmetric conflict with the aim of locating imbalances of power on the level of actors and the very asymmetric approaches to conflict and conflict analysis. For example, an integrative approach to conflict “proposes that there be movement away from the entrenched attitudes and positions of the parties towards a situation where the real needs and interests of the parties are focused on” (Bloomfield et al., 2003a: 40). In this theoretical composition, what criterion determines an entrenched attitude versus, for example, a breach of international law and an appropriate response to such a breach? How do we compensate for asymmetry in conflict, on the theoretical, discursive and explanatory levels? If we return to Said’s concept of asymmetric conflict, we see the significance of words and framing. Let us consider a cooperative (contingent) approach to conflict versus a realist one. A realist approach to conflict envisions negotiating behavior as “a series of moves toward or away from one another” (Hopmann, 1995: 41). Practitioners of this theoretical grain take a competitive approach to conflict resolution (in this case we are

246 not talking about transformation because the end goal is definitive rather than open- ended). On the contrary, a cooperative approach to conflict replaces a competitive approach (winning the peace): “it is a process in which people, their attitudes and their positions move and change. Negotiation is not merely a matter of convincing the opposition that your position is right: it demands a degree of co-operation with that opposition to move creatively from stalemate towards a new position” (Bloomfield et al., 2003a: 39). Cooperative conflict transformation requires a “collective effort” to transform the conflict at hand and towards a position that is beneficial to all parties (Hopmann, 1995: 41). These two divergent approaches converge when cooperation shades into dominant policy, a policy conditioned by neoliberal and transnational social, (geo)political and economic structures174. In an asymmetric conflict, which tends to be the case for many protracted conflicts, cooperation can all too often mean to confirm- structure, to reinforce domination. To take another example, it has been argued that issue rigidity (Luard, 1988; Väyrynen, 1991; Deutsch, 1991; Hopmann, 1995), “retractions of previous offers and concessions, commitments to fixed positions, utilization of frequent threats” (Hopmann, 1995: 40), is directly related to conflict resolvability. If rigidity can be overcome, alternative outcomes become possible. On the flip side, the stronger the issue rigidity between two or more primary actors, the more likely the conflict will be prolonged or protracted. In the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict case, issue rigidity has been cast as the Frente POLISARIO’s refusal to accept anything less than self-determination via a referendum and Morocco’s rejection of any referendum or any solution for that matter that includes independence as an option for the Sahrawi people175. It is true that when hegemon states (an idea that will be taken up in Part Two of this chapter) take part as secondary actors in a conflict that is prone to issue rigidity, there is a strong tendency for that conflict to degenerate into a protracted conflict. It is also true that the relationship between the Frente POLISARIO and Morocco, defined solely by their opposed and obstinate positions, is characterized by issue rigidity. However, issue rigidity, like cooperation between parties, has been constructed within a ‘symmetric’ understanding of

174 Chapter Four more fully explores the relationship between the global economy and conflict. 175 This characterization of a ‘zero-sum’ stalemate will be revisited and deconstructed in Chapter Four. 247 conflict and does not account for the confirm-structuring of the current dominant system. Therefore, we must not only analyze the specific defining details to conflict, but also how we then take that information and make sense of it. In making sense of the conflict information in areas such as mapping and mediation, we must also consider the very analytical structures, terminology, categorizations and strategies and techniques with which we approach and represent a conflict situation. We recognize that when we analyze something, we simplify; however, the perspectives that we gain, the ways in which we can organize information and general and specific understandings of conflict outweigh these limitations (Bloomfield et al., 2003a: 44). Along this grain, we must also recognize that we are not just simplifying complex and deep processes, but that we are also reproducing dominant perspectives, systems and structures. This is problematic when these very structures appear naturalized, essentialized and of a neutral character. Effective conflict analysis works towards crafting positive methods for conflict transformation. For this particular study, this means being open to unknown possibilities and creative approaches to the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict. There are diverse ways and philosophies for approaching conflict situations, and each conflict is unique and characterized by a given set of circumstances. In this way, effective theory must be tractable in order for it to be applicable to different conflict settings. However, it must also take into consideration the very methods that establish the characterization of the conflict and the ways of understanding and prescribing meaning to the conflict situation. This shift in analytical interpretive horizon and analytical process will become clearer as we address conflict mapping and mediation later on in this chapter. Regarding conflict in general and our particular conflict setting, the period from late 1975 through the 1991 UN and OAU brokered ceasefire between the Frente POLISARIO and Morocco, it is important to evaluate how our understanding of conflict is constructed in the first place and by extension how we assess conflict.

3.1.1.1. Normalized Approaches to Conflict

Conflict has been approached and defined in many ways. When considering conflict from an International Relations perspective, for example, “situations that provoke

248 violence appear to be always to some extent the effect of a clash of expectations” or others would say interests (Luard, 1988: 10). In this schema, conflict is understood within the power dynamics of the insecurity created by the anarchical structure176 of the international system and the ‘natural’ competitive forces that drive state decision making and engender state-centered behavior, rather than cooperative state behavior. A competitive approach creates multiple areas for conflict of interests and can provoke direct or indirect conflict. Furthermore, in the ideological structure of the system, where state sovereignty is held supreme, and in mainstream international relations studies, where the dominant focus is on the balance of power and realpolitik, the perceived ‘inevitability’ of conflict is self-sustaining and reinforcing. As argued above, this narrow approach to conflict eliminates other essential and multilayered elements of conflict analysis and reinforces the status quo, domination based approaches to conflict and hierarchical institutional constructions at the international level. Far from being natural, they have been humanly constructed. On the flip side, understanding an international relations approach to conflict gives insight into state rationale and action and the self- perpetuating effects of analyzing foreign affairs through the very dominant myths that feed the perceived and proliferated idea of the intrinsic nature of the system itself. Within conflict studies, approaches to conflict involve an interdisciplinary strategy that is influenced by political science, sociology, international relations, psychology, history, anthropology, religious studies, women’s studies, etc. The vast expanse of overlap and integration of many disciplines adds to the richness and applicability of conflict studies to real world situations and can be applied to more focused areas. Such diversity of thought also allows for the critical analysis of long held belief systems at the international level. This is where a change in interpretive horizon comes into play. Within conflict studies, wider approaches to conflict are less concerned with the causal elements of conflict and focus instead on the “dimensions of a social structure and the conditions which give rise to parties with incompatible goals” (Bercovitch, 1984: 4).

176 According to Cynthia Weber, anarchy denotes a lack of order: “We usually describe states experiencing civil wars as anarchical, for example. But in international theory ‘anarchy’ denotes a lack of an orderer – someone or something who/which self-consciously imposes order in a top-down way on to sovereign nation-states. So in international theory anarchy prevails even if there is order (like power-balancing among sovereign nation-states or one hegemonic state being able to call most of the shots like the US does). These sorts of ‘order’ are still considered to be anarchical because there is no world government” (Weber, 2001: 14). 249

However, as I have argued, they do not necessarily guarantee a break from the very system that reinforces and produces relationships of domination and subjugation. Subjective approaches, as conceived by Jacob Bercovitch (1984), look at the root level of conflicts. They contend that conflicts are directly linked to values and that these values are influenced by perceptions. Therefore, by linking the subjective element and perception to conflict, the perception of values (subjective) becomes the guiding force and hence essential to conflict discussion and end analysis. Along this vein, Dennis Sandole defines a “manifest conflict process” as a “situation in which at least two actors, or their representatives, try to pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by undermining, directly or indirectly, the goal-seeking capability of one another” (Sandole, 1993: 6; see also Sandole, 2006). And as Bercovitch explains, in opposition to this view, objective approaches concentrate on the direct correlation between contrary interests and conflict, regardless of actor awareness to the tensions caused by competing interests (Bercovitch, 1984: 5). Because these approaches seem to be at odds with one another due to the fact that the former emphasizes “motivational and attitudinal factors” and the latter proffers “structural and predispositional factors” and because they have been presented as antithetical in academic discussions on approaches to conflict analysis, the positive points of convergence tend to be overlooked (Bercovitch, 1984: 5). There is of course room for subjective and objective (although due to the contingency of agency, no position can truly be objective) into and understanding of conflict. However, neither approach adequately represents or acknowledges relations of power or the ways in which we confirm-structure hegemonic relationships. For example, if a conflict mapper or analyzer were to apply the subjective approach to conflict, he/she must acknowledge that subjectivity does not exist in a void and that our values and perceptions, the root level of conflict, do not exist in a void. Our subjectivity is also influenced by how we have been educated to perceive events, our epistemological and ontological frames of reference (interpretive horizons). This is also true for the objective approach. A combination of the two approaches does capture the more dynamic and multilayered nature of conflict so that conflict transformation requires changes of perception and structural changes at the base level of social situations. That said, the creative capacity for a break from conflict stagnation,

250 especially regarding the protracted nature of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict, must include a change in perceptions of the very measures for conflict analysis. In this way, we can better locate structural and institutional embedding of domination. As such, a thorough analysis investigates conflict attitudes and perceptions (actor- oriented analysis) as well as the institutional and systemic (system-oriented) factors that influence how we construct our representations of actual conflict. Conflict analysis involves the “exploration, differentiation, and clarification of the sources of conflict and the processes of interaction that characterize both its history and current expression” (Fisher, 1994: 50). It searches for potential and past sources and sensitivities that cause escalation. In order to do this effectively, it is necessary to establish the needs, values, interests, positions (focusing on perceptions), cognitions, fears and end goals of each party. By locating these points of slight or serious provocations, a space can be developed for open communication that “allow for the exchange of clarifications, acknowledgments, assurances and potential contributions between parties” (Fisher, 1994: 51-52). However, in order to challenge these normalized approaches to conflict, it is important to locate our frameworks of reference.

3.1.1.2. Realpolitik in Conflict Analysis

Our critique of conflict analysis and mapping is not so much nestled in realism per se, but rather in the systematic reproductions that Realpolitik discourses create and manufacture. Sandole explains that three component parts constitute the dominant system of political realism (Realpolitik): descriptive realism, the idea that the world is either a potential or actual battleground; explanatory realism, the belief that the reason for our violent behavior relates to a basic and inherent negative human nature and an inability to prevent the inevitable clash between humans; and prescriptive realism, the position that decision-makers must do anything and everything to defend the basic interests of the in- group (the “only morality” being the successful defense of those interests) due to this negative biological determinism and lack of ability to respond effectively to it (Sandole, 1993: 4). As I have suggested, Realpolitik processes of conflict resolution portray conflict itself in competitive terms, power-based, adversarial, confrontational, zero-sum, etc.;

251 furthermore, alternative approaches that critique this viewpoint equate competitive processes with destructive outcomes (4). As I have also pointed out, these alternatives call for cooperative processes (constructive outcomes) in order to achieve positive conflict transformation and in order to create the possibilities for “fair, long-lasting, durable solutions to problems underlying manifest conflict” (6). However, and as I have established and Said stated pointedly, proposing cooperative responses to conflict does not necessarily get us out from under the confirm-structure predicament. By introducing ‘cooperation’ into the mix of conflict transformation techniques, we do not overcome the realist framework. It is the dominant framework for states and state actors, be it multilateral (European) or unilateral (United States under the Bush II administration) in manifestation. Realism is part and parcel of a global capitalist system. Therefore, it is the structure of hegemonic structure that has bearing on creating an alternative interpretive horizon. Before we dive into the specifics of the hot conflict between the Frente POLISARIO, Morocco and Mauritania and before we undertake the task of conflict mapping (a performative task in creating an interpretive horizon shift), it is important to note that it is a realist’s perspective to concede that protracted conflicts resist resolution because they refuse to “yield to efforts – through either direct negotiations by the parties or mediation with third-party assistance – to arrive at a political settlement” (Crocker et al., 2005: 5). On the surface, there does not appear to be anything wrong with this statement because it reflects part of the reality of protracted conflicts. However, regarding the case of Western Sahara, the placement of agency is incorrect. As the following genealogy of the hot conflict stage of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict and the following sections of this chapter will reveal, this statement falls wide of the mark because it fails to capture the far from impartial role of third-parties, especially when considering their specific agendas and interests in every conflict situation (Bloomfield and Reilly, 2003: 13). It is easy to detect the misleading nature of such a statement. It is more difficult when the origin of analysis does not work directly from a Realpolitik agenda, but rather confirm-structures this existing order. In order to shift our analytical interpretive horizon regarding the question of Western Sahara, we must first explore the hot conflict stage of the conflict. Equipped with the theoretical tools for conflict analysis,

252 telling the conflict story is more than an exercise of narration. It is a creative exercise aimed at locating negotiable points and untapped areas for successful dialogue and at broadening our conflict knowledge, a necessary step for reconceptualizing conflict mapping and mediation.

3.1.2. Hot Conflict

3.1.2.1. Sahrawi Nationalism Set in Stone

“By nationalism we mean the political ideology that locates the right of self-government in a people who share a common culture” (Buzan and Little, 2000: 252)

The physical Moroccan-Mauritanian invasion of Western Sahara caused a population fissure in Sahrawi demographics. Half of the Sahrawi population fled the territory because they feared the repercussions of a violent and aggressive military takeover. Those who left and escaped Moroccan air bombardments settled in southwestern Algeria, near the Moroccan and Mauritanian borders. They arrived in Algeria and eventually created an infrastructure for refugee camps. From desert nothingness, Sahrawi women basically built what today consists of five refugee camps. In spite of this military aggression and forced separation, Sahrawi nationalism continued to feed the resistance movement. King Hassan hugely miscalculated what was the consolidation of a people’s movement. Sahrawis shared language, dress, religion and customs, in sum, a common culture. Culture177 can be defined as “any interpersonally shared system of meanings, perceptions and values” (Jacquin-Berdal et al., 1998: 2). The collective experience of cultural assault by Morocco and Mauritania only intensified the feelings and perceptions that united the Sahrawi people behind the Frente POLISARIO

177 Although outside the scope of this work, it is important to note that cultural approaches to conflict provide a deeper understanding and consideration of its many layers. Such approaches could potentially unearth untapped resources for conflict transformation: “[C]ultural approaches not only try to demonstrate how group perceptions of interests and power shape the international system, but also seek to clarify to which groups individuals feel they belong, as well as how shared perceptions of interests and power themselves are shaped. These perspectives attempt to show that the perceptions of interests, power and group identities that international actors have are tied to their preferred way of organizing social relations, their conceptions of time and space, their systems of allocating honour and blame, their favoured way of dealing with conflicts, and so on” (Jacquin-Berdal et al., 1998: 6-7). 253 and that congealed a resistance and nationalist movement (cultural resistance identity178) for a Sahrawi independent state. By trying to usurp the right of self-determination from the Sahrawi people, Rabat and Nouakchott fortified the Frente POLISARIO led resistance movement. The interconnect between converging colonial, economic and political integration along with the rise in sedentarization of Sahrawi nomads and participation of the population in its own affairs created the necessary conditions for a popular consciousness and increased nationalist sentiment (Joffé, 1987: 18). It also provided the unfortunate circumstances for direct violence. In the face of occupation and in order to safeguard the right of self-determination, the Frente POLISARIO resorted to armed resistance.

3.1.2.2. Aftermath of the Madrid Accords

In the months following the International Court of Justice decision, the Green March and Madrid Accords, Morocco tried to bury the thorn in its side, the right of self- determination for the Sahrawi people. Rabat immediately went on the offensive both militarily and diplomatically in order to ensure its hold on the territory. Despite aggressive Moroccan attacks, including bombings with napalm, and a full military occupation and repression of the Sahrawi population, the Frente POLISARIO did not hesitate to organize itself against the bigger and better equipped enemy. While Morocco was organizing on the ground, it was also strongly selling its cause to the international community. Two anomalous UN General Assembly resolutions were passed on December 10, 1975. The first, Resolution 3458A179, emphatically calls for self- determination and makes no mention of the tripartite agreement of the governments of Mauritania, Morocco and Spain:

“[T]he government of Spain, as the administrative power, in accordance with the observations and conclusions of the Visiting Mission and in accordance with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, to take immediately all necessary measures, in consultation with all the parties concerned and interested, so that all Saharans originating in the

178 Revisit Chapter Two, footnote 152, for an in-depth explanation of a cultural resistance identity. 179 Eighty-eight states, including Algeria, voted for the resolution. There were zero negative votes and forty-one abstentions. 254

territory may exercise fully and freely, under United Nations supervision, their inalienable right to self determination” (United Nations General Assembly, 1975b).

In what seems to be an attempt to neutralize Resolution 3458A, Resolution 3458B180 “takes note of” the tripartite agreement. The UN recognition of the Madrid Accords was a setback for the Frente POLISARIO; however, the parties behind the addendum could not nullify the United Nations guaranteed right of self-determination. Resolution 3458B echoed its predecessor by requesting:

“the interim administration to take all necessary steps to ensure that all the Saharan populations originating in the territory will be able to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination through free consultations organized with the assistance of a representative of the United Nations appointed by the Secretary-General” (United Nations General Assembly, 1975c).

Both resolutions clearly call for the self-determination of the Sahrawi people. As a result, Waldheim sent Sweden’s UN ambassador Olof Rydbeck to Western Sahara to report on the situation there. At the end of his trip to Western Sahara, he concluded that it was impossible at the time for an authentic process of self-determination because of the Moroccan military occupation and repression of the Sahrawi people. Yet again, the Frente POLISARIO found itself supported by the international organization in its quest for the right to self-determination; however, the ability to enforce this right was stifled by strong Moroccan lobbying, which was aided by U.S. and French support181. During the early stages of the war with Morocco and Mauritania, the Frente POLISARIO’s number one priority was the safe accompaniment and settlement of fleeing Sahrawi refugees. Tens of thousands of refugees reached the Algerian desert ill prepared and ill equipped to withstand the harsh desert conditions, very cold nights and sweltering days and little access to water. Very few were able to bring supplies, food, tents or livestock. The rapid invasion by Morocco and Mauritania forced Sahrawi refugees to leave their homes without being able to organize their possessions. Those that

180 Fifty-six states voted for the resolution. There were forty-two negative votes and thirty-four abstentions. 181 The details and extent of U.S. and French support of Morocco is discussed in Part Two and Three of this chapter. 255 did not move towards Algeria sought sanctuary in places where Moroccan and Mauritanian troops had not yet penetrated. Spanish journalists located in El-Ayoun reported that as few as five thousand Sahrawis remained in the capital, a fifth of the twenty-nine thousand who had been registered there during the 1974 census (Hodges, 1983: 232). Algeria, which had thus far been hesitant about aiding the Frente POLISARIO, began to give the revolutionary group the economic, technical and military aid that was essential to the Frente POLISARIO’s counter attack and survival. At the same time, Algeria helped with the growing refugee problem, finding aid for food, water and shelter. In order to bring Algeria under the microscope of the international media, Morocco accused Algiers of the Frente POLISARIO led and executed attacks. By confusing the two different actors, the Frente POLISARIO (primary actor) and Algeria (secondary actor), Morocco successfully pulled the Cold War and ideological battle into the arena of the conflict. With these accusations, Rabat undermined the Frente POLISARIO’s independence movement and turned all eyes on Algeria, a socialist and communist friendly country, France’s nemesis and the United States’ concern. Algeria never picked up arms against Morocco, but its involvement as a secondary actor can be seen in terms of secondary-primary actor overlap, a designation that reflects its interest proximity to the conflict, integral role and substantial influence. For Morocco, a real full-blown independence movement led by the Sahrawi people was much more dangerous than a staged war with Algeria. King Hassan II could not afford to lose and so employed lies, brutality and excessive force to ensure the takeover of Western Sahara. When Moroccan air forces spotted two large concentrations of refugees near Guelta Zemmour, he authorized his units to bomb the unarmed civilians with napalm. This act of aggression lasted for over two months. The evacuation of these refugees caused more casualties, including senior Frente POLISARIO leader, Bouela Ahmed Zine (233). As a result, a second round of refugees fled towards Algeria. Despite being exhausted and beaten down, they battled the harsh and unrelenting conditions of vast desert terrain. Those that were not killed in the Moroccan ambush or that did not succumb to the desert arrived in Algeria undernourished and with severe health problems. It was a humanitarian disaster that the international community did not jump to aid. The

256 overflow of refugees created multiple challenges for the Frente POLISARIO and Algeria and threatened the stability of the surrounding region (Rugumamu, 2001: 3-4). Algeria had to front much of the costs: “The main responsibility of feeding, clothing and sheltering the refugees therefore fell on the Algerian government and the Algerian Red Crescent which channeled their aid through the Frente POLISARIO’s own Saharawi Red Crescent” (Hodges, 1983: 234). At the time of the mass retreat of Sahrawi refugees to neighboring Algeria (after the establishment of the tripartite transitional administration), Morocco tried to organize the Djemaa and stage a vote of self-determination. A vote in favor of integration with Morocco from the Djemaa would give Rabat legitimacy and could then be used as proof that the voice of the people had been represented, thereby undercutting the need for a referendum. Rabat sent two Sahrawi defectors, Khatri Ould Said Ould el-Joumani and Khalihenna Ould Rashid, to el-Ayoun to try and persuade their former colleagues to pledge loyalty to Morocco. Spain, Morocco and Mauritania incorrectly assumed that the Djemaa, made up of conservative members, would in fact back the proposed partition of the territory. For this reason, the Madrid Accords included a clause that stipulated that the views of the Sahrawi population as expressed through the Djemaa would be respected. In anticipation of the abuse of the colonial made group, the Frente POLISARIO organized its own meeting of the Djemaa. On November 28, 1975, the 67 attending members of the 102 members of the Djemaa unanimously and effectively dissolved itself in Guelta Zemmour. The disbanded group announced full support and allegiance to the Frente POLISARIO and asserted that the only true act of self-determination for the Sahrawi people would be through the very voices of the Sahrawi people. The Proclamation of Guelta Zemmour sealed the fate for the Djemaa. Morocco attempted to revive it on February 26, 1976. On this date, where fifty-seven members of the Djemaa voted for annexation, but both the Spanish government and the United Nations rejected the results and reiterated the right of the Sahrawi people to self- determination. Spain announced that the Djemaa no longer represented the Sahrawi people and United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim informed the Moroccan government that the Djemaa vote did not constitute the fulfillment of UN resolutions 3458A and 3458B. On February 27, 1976, the day after Spain departed from the territory,

257 the Frente POLISARIO declared the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), a state-in-exile. All attempts to prevent all out war between the Frente POLISARIO, Morocco and Mauritania sailed with the Spanish ships.

3.1.2.3. 1976 – War, Fighting Fire with Fire

“A freedom fighter learns the hard way that it is the oppressor who defines the nature of the struggle, and the oppressed is often left no recourse but to use methods that mirror those of the oppressor. At a certain point, one can only fight fire with fire” (Mandela, 1994: 166).

On April 14, 1976 Morocco and Mauritania signed a treaty ratifying the partition of Western Sahara. Because the Frente POLISARIO considered this partition an illegal annexation of the territory, it conceived of the war zone and target points for a defensive counter-attack against the invading powers as including all of Western Sahara and its bordering frontiers, southern Morocco and northern Mauritania. Although relatively small and knew to the modern system of warfare, the Frente POLISARIO force learned quickly. They soon became very effective fighters, combining the guerrilla warfare in the tradition of the ghazzi182with modern weapons, training and technique. The Frente POLISARIO leadership designated Mauritania the main priority because it was the weaker of the two enemy invaders. While the Frente POLISARIO had independence fervor and a just cause working in its favor, Mauritanian and Moroccan forces did not. Consequently, they were not only confronted by the Frente POLISARIO guerrilla warriors, but also by low morale and a general unwillingness to put one’s life on the line for la patria. The Frente POLISARIO’s goal was to penetrate the Mauritanian defensive line and stage a show of strength at the Mauritanian capital, Nouakchott. On June 2, 1976, the Frente POLISARIO succeeded in doing just that. They repeated the occasion in July of 1977. Led by El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed, the Frente POLISARIO forces set out in Land Rovers with the intent of reaching the capital without detection. On June 8, the group

182 According to the Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara, ghazzi comes from traditional Sahrawi society and is defined as “a raid to acquire booty from a rival tribe or subdivision thereof, conducted according to strict rules regarding participation and division of spoils” (Pazzanita, 2006: 165). 258 fired shells in the morning and by evening was able to target the presidential palace with great accuracy. Mauritanian President Ould Daddah never thought the Frente POLISARIO forces could break through to the capital. While the unimaginable was taking place, he was vacationing in Cape Verde islands. It was not until June 9, however, that there was a turn of events for the Frente POLISARIO. El-Ouali was shot through the head and killed. Mauritanian officers found his body after an incursion with the liberation army. The shocking blow of loosing the Frente POLISARIO’s founder and leader did not leave the group paralyzed for long. In order to elect its new leader, the Frente POLISARIO held the General Popular Congress from the 26 to the 30 of August. The Congress voted Mohammed Abdelaziz into the position of Secretary-General of the Frente POLISARIO and president of the SADR. As if El-Ouali’s spirit had returned, the Frente POLISARIO succeeded in breaching Mauritanian defenses and entered the capital for a second time on July 3, 1977. The Frente POLISARIO shot mortar rounds into the grounds of the presidential palace. The liberation army outmatched the poorly trained and poorly motivated Mauritanian troops despite their numbers. In a moment of desperation, Ould Daddah was forced to ask for French assistance against the guerrilla forces. It did not take long for French forces to intervene because the Frente POLISARIO was also getting more successful at hitting economic hot spots in Mauritania. A principal target for the Frente POLISARIO was the Zouérate-Nouadhibou Railway. Because the 657km long railway was impossible to patrol, the Frente POLISARIO could splinter the trade route at many different locations without much detection or deterrent. On May 1, 1977, the Frente POLISARIO attacked Zouérate, a northern Mauritanian mining town of utmost economic significance to the Mauritanian economy, without any resistance from troops stationed there. The Frente POLISARIO targeted this specific town because of its economic importance. The mine produced 90 percent of Mauritania’s export earnings. Therefore, any slow or standstill in production meant big economic losses for the already fragile country and its foreign investors. In the raid, two French employees were killed and six others were captured. The Frente POLISARIO claimed that the French were fair game since they were employed as engineers and technicians for the Mauritanian army. In reality, if the Frente POLISARIO’s affront resulted in France’s evacuation of its citizens from the area, the

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Mauritanian entity would be economically weaker still. If the Frente POLISARIO could cause a Mauritanian economic crisis, Mauritania was more likely to pull out from the costly war. Economic warfare became a useful strategy for the guerilla fighters. The Frente POLISARIO forces targeted the airport, power stations and facilities of the railway in order to impede their functioning and production levels. The French, however, did not react the way that the Frente POLISARIO had hoped. French Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringaud used a ploy similar to that of the Moroccan government and accused Algeria of the killings and kidnappings. Algeria refused to bite and only offered to mediate between the French and the Frente POLISARIO forces. Paris, however, expertly manipulated the situation. In order to avoid public scorn for any future military intervention in Western Sahara, Paris fingered Algeria as a primary actor, tapping into fresh Algerian-French sentiments, while painting the Frente POLISARIO as a terrorist group. By early December of 1977, French forces, which included six Jaguar planes, prepared to advance on the Frente POLISARIO troops. Self-proclaimed French ‘neutrality’ was about to be put to a test. The French directly intervened on December 2, 1977. Secrecy surrounded their intervention. At this point in the conflict, the French government’s interest proximity increased as its own economic interests and the stability of Mauritania and surrounding countries (all francophone) were threatened. On December 12, the French attacked retreating Frente POLISARIO forces in what was designated Operation Lamantin. For two days, French forces slammed the Frente POLISARIO fighters on the ground with napalm and phosphorous bombs and killed many guerrillas and most of the sixty Mauritanian prisoners. This was not an expression of defense for the Mauritanian people. This was a deliberate show of force. On December 14, Waldheim and SADR’s Foreign Minister Ibrahim Hakim agreed upon a release date for the six French prisoners of war. They were to be submitted into the hands of Secretary-General Waldheim on December 23. Despite the concessions made by the Frente POLISARIO, France continued its offensive. This time they claimed the lives of seventy-four Mauritanian prisoners. Considering the Frente POLISARIO’s capitulation to French demands, the sustained bombardment is difficult to understand if France is viewed as a neutral actor (other actor) in the conflict. France’s complicit and active

260 behavior in the conflict demonstrates its closeness to the core of the conflict. French participation no longer corresponded to the kidnappings of six French citizens. France had interests to protect. Lies, deception and silence disguised Paris’s role. Along with Nouakchott, Morocco claimed responsibility for the staged strikes. The Frente POLISARIO reprimanded the extended use of force in light of its concessions. France replied: “the Mauritanian government requested French forces’ aid and, on two occasions, units of the French air force came to their assistance” (Hodges, 1983: 255)183. The French air strikes did not reduce the frequency of the Frente POLISARIO attacks. Additionally, Mauritania’s failure to prevent the damaging Frente POLISARIO hit and run attacks compelled Morocco to send troops to Mauritania and Tiris el-Gharbia in an attempt to strengthen the Mauritanian front. France justified more air strikes on May 3 through 5 of 1978. Supposedly, these interventions were outside of the contested area and inside of Mauritania. The Frente POLISARIO asserted otherwise. As outside help continued to try and bolster Mauritanian force and morale, the public external debt of the country reached $711 million by the end of April of 1978 (Hodges, 1983: 260). To make matters worse, foreign economists predicted that there would be no recovery of the Mauritanian economy from its near bankruptcy status without putting an end to the war. In July of that same year, Mauritania had to borrow $35 million emergency aid from France, Libya and Morocco in order to pay civil servant salaries (260). Compounding the situation even further, social problems in the cities were on the rise due to increased sedentarization and drought. By 1978, Ould Daddah was in a precarious situation. An array of problems reared their angry heads at once. French and Moroccan forces could not deter the Frente POLISARIO guerrilla offensives. Guerrilla fire caused expensive damage to the infrastructure of the railway and inflicted economic losses with every transit delay; exports began to fall at considerable rates; drought plagued the country; war debt drained the government of needed money for social programs; and the people of Mauritania wanted a government change, one that would reestablish peace. On July 9 and 10, 1978, the armed forces took power and Lieutenant Colonel Mustapha Mohammed Salek replaced Ould Daddah. The Frente POLISARIO immediately called off military operations as a gesture of good will (265). On August 5,

183 Taken from Le Monde, December 25, 1977. 261

1979, Mauritania and the Frente POLISARIO signed the Treaty of Algiers. Mauritania withdrew from the war and renounced any claims to the territory of Western Sahara. As a secret addendum to the treaty, Mauritania agreed to transfer power to the Frente POLISARIO within seven months of the peace treaty. However, on August 12, 1979, with thousands of troops already stationed in Mauritania and Tiris el-Gharbia, Morocco annexed the territory, renamed it Oued ed-Dahab and designated it the 37th Province of Morocco (Kamil, 1987: 56). Then, on December 27, 1979, President Houari Boumedienne of Algeria died and Chadli Benjedid replaced him. At this point in time, the conflict entered another phase. Mauritania, no longer a primary actor in the conflict, took a secondary actor seat. By early spring of 1976, the Sahrawis who did not flee the Moroccan invasion began to feel the weight of occupation. The monarchy denied the freedom of movement and of expression in Western Sahara. Morocco organized rump elections and tried to manufacture political legitimacy by placing Sahrawi loyalists to the monarchy in positions of power, like former PUNS leader Khalihenna Ould Rashid and ex-president of the Djemaa Khatri Ould Said Ould El-Joumani. Rabat upheld that the transition had taken place without the use of force and could point to Sahrawi representation in local government positions as proof. Despite the repressive control measures taken by Rabat, support for the Frente POLISARIO remained strong amidst the minority of Sahrawis living in El-Ayoun, Smara, etc. In fact, sympathizers resisted quietly and carefully through secret correspondence with exiled Frente POLISARIO leadership by way of Sahrawi traders who were allowed to travel to Las Palmas (Hodges, 1983: 281). As a result, the Sahrawi population in the occupied zone was under constant surveillance. Any act deemed to be in opposition to the new occupiers resulted in the immediate arrest, imprisonment (without due process) and disappearance of the dissenter. At this time, outward organizing came to a near halt for fear of serious reprisals. On the military end, the FAR faced an uphill battle. Although, the Moroccan army was better equipped militarily and had superiority in numbers, most came from the mountains and cities and were therefore not accustomed to the extreme conditions of the desert. Low morale and resentment against the harsh climate and environment coupled with the army’s inability to act without the monarchy’s command further weakened the

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Moroccan army. The Frente POLISARIO, although smaller in number, easily maneuvered the terrain and was driven by the noble cause of independence. The group was very active the entire year of 1979. It successfully negotiated a peace treaty with Mauritania and scored big military hits against Morocco in the summer and fall. However, the Frente POLISARIO accomplished this in some of the war’s bloodiest battles. On August 24, the Frente POLISARIO took control of the southern Moroccan town of Lebouirate, an embarrassing blow to the king; on October 6, the Frente POLISARIO forces briefly captured the city of Smara; and on October 14, the liberation army successfully captured Mahbes. As the violence escalated, the United Nations General Assembly called for direct negotiations between the parties. On November 21, the international organ reiterated the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination and independence (United Nations General Assembly, 1979). The resolution emphasized the “profound concern” of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the nonaligned countries over the decolonization of Western Sahara. While applauding the peace agreement between Western Sahara and Mauritania, the UN “deeply” deplored the “aggravation of the situation resulting from the continued occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and the extension of that occupation to the territory recently evacuated by Mauritania” (United Nations General Assembly, 1979). While the UN urged Morocco to “join the peace process” and “terminate the occupation of the Territory of Western Sahara,” it acknowledged for the first time the “legitimacy” of the Sahrawi “struggle” and its right “to secure the enjoyment” of self-determination (United Nations General Assembly, 1979). In a final blow to Morocco, the UN and OAU recommended that the Frente POLISARIO, the officially recognized representative of the Sahrawi people, participate in a “just, lasting and definitive political solution of the question of Western Sahara” (United Nations General Assembly, 1979). The United Nations and OAU failed to make a dent in Morocco’s refusal to negotiate with the Frente POLISARIO. In fact, King Hassan announced in March of 1980 that the situation of Western Sahara was now an irreversible historical reality, suggesting that there were no talking points, that the chapter was closed and that the war reality penetrating its frontiers was nobody else’s business but its own. Morocco had no

263 intentions of terminating the occupation or of joining the peace process. The Frente POLISARIO responded by striking the Bou- Craa mine in June, hard enough to shut it down. At the July OAU summit in Freetown, Sierra Leone, the SADR received twenty- six out of fifty votes in favor of its admission as a full member state. Morocco threatened to walk out along with its supporters. The stall tactic worked. By 1981, however, King Hassan’s Western allies pressured him to show some sort of compromise on the OAU referendum proposal. They knew that if Morocco refused to do so, the OAU would surely grant admission to the Frente POLISARIO. In acquiescence, King Hassan approved of an OAU sponsored referendum at the Nairobi summit, but only under the pretenses that it was to confirm Moroccan sovereignty over the territory. In essence, this condition defeated the purpose of the referendum itself. That said, in accepting the referendum, international focus shifted from how to get the parties ‘cooperating’ to how to conduct the referendum (Hodges, 1983: 312). In addition, African states would expect the king to honor his word. The Nairobi summit adopted an eight-point resolution that provided the details for an internationally supervised cease-fire and a truly democratic referendum. It called for an immediate ceasefire; requested the UN to join the OAU in providing a peacekeeping force in order to safeguard the referendum process; and further established an Implementation Committee made up of Kenya, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Tanzania in order to further regulate the free and fair expression of self-determination of the Sahrawi people. As a result, King Hassan, Mohammed Abdelaziz and Presidents Chadli Bendjedid of Algeria and Mohammed Khouna Ould Heydella of Mauritania met again in Nairobi from August 24- 26. No date was set for a ceasefire or a referendum. The diplomatic fight was at a standstill yet again. On the battlefield, the Frente POLISARIO continued to make big strides. Under heavy bombardment from the Frente POLISARIO guerrillas, Morocco abandoned Guelta Zemmour and Bir Enzaren in November. Morocco’s successful stalling tactics finally ran out of steam in February of 1982. The Secretary-General Edem Kodjo admitted the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) into the Organization of African Unity the same year that Felipe González of PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) was elected president of Spain. In another bold step in June of 1983 in Addis Ababa, the OAU officially designated the two parties

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(primary actors) to the conflict as Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO and called for direct negotiations between them. The following is an excerpt of the OAU Resolution 104 quoted in United Nations Resolution 38/40 urging:

“[T]he parties to the conflict, the Kingdom of Morocco and the POLISARIO Front, to undertake direct negotiations with a view to bringing about a cease-fire to create the necessary conditions for a peaceful and fair referendum for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, a referendum without any administrative or military constraints, under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, and calls on the Implementation Committee to ensure the observance of the cease-fire” (United Nations General Assembly, 1983).

With this resolution, considerable international pressure was brought to bear on Morocco. The Frente POLISARIO, on the contrary, was focused on maintaining its good standing in the international arena. In order to keep the possibility of negotiations open with Morocco and to avoid bringing the members of the OAU to a critical conflict point, the newly admitted SADR absented itself from the OAU summits of 1982 and 1983. Meanwhile, in Morocco, the domestic ease that came with the nationalistic fervor created by the Green March and subsequent occupation of Western Sahara began to wane. The economic cost of the war was taking its toll on Morocco as it had on Mauritania. Political, social and economic problems were once again on the rise. Reportedly, Moroccan General Ahmed Dlimi was killed in a car accident at the beginning of 1983, but many speculate that King Hassan assassinated him for plotting a coup against the monarchy. Amidst this controversy, Algerian president Benjedid and King Hassan broke their diplomatic impasse and met in February that same year. After two years of absenting itself from the OAU summits, the SADR finally took its seat at the twentieth annual OAU summit in 1984. In response, Morocco immediately and permanently withdrew from the OAU. In an address to the participants of the pan- African summit, the Kingdom of Morocco declared to the organization: “historical, natural, juridical and human realities testify to the Moroccaneity of the Sahara through the ancestral and traditional ties existing between the southern and northern provinces” (Kingdom of Morocco, 1985: 13). Morocco’s reaction to the admittance of the SADR to

265 the OAU was one of disbelief and disapprobation. In its letter to the summit, the Kingdom of Morocco presented the following argument to support its protestation:

“The Nairobi summit was held in June 1981. It heard and examined the report of the Secretary General on the Western Sahara. The report reviewed all what [sic] happened from the Freetown Summit to the Nairobi one. After it examined the Sahara problem in its entirety, the summit expressed satisfaction firstly at the solemn commitment of H.M. Hassan II, King of Morocco, to accept the organization of a referendum, and decided to set up an implementation committee and to endow it with full power. This implementation committee met from August 24 to 25, 1981 in Nairobi. It decided to organize and hold a referendum and restore a cease-fire. With respect to the referendum, it specified that the people of the Sahara will have the following choices: A) Independence, B) Join Morocco. Thus this implementation committee, which was entitled with full power by the previous summit, unambiguously answers the ‘SADR’ request for admission and supremely decided that the fate of the Sahara [sic] people is still to be determined: either it opts for independence or it opts for joining Morocco. These decisions were vested with a definite and irreversible feature. Ignoring and violating these pertinent previsions consciously taken by honorable head of state, you are now asked to admit the ‘SADR’ among you as an African, independent and sovereign state. In other words, your summit is asked to act as a substitute for the Sahrawi people, which alone has the right to opt for self-rule through a referendum so as to vote for the ‘SADR’ and endow it with the capacities that can be acknowledged or refused to the ‘SADR’ by the referendum only” (Kingdom of Morocco, 1985: 19-20).

Basically, the Kingdom of Morocco founded its rather strange and contradictory argument against the admittance of the SADR into the OAU on the basis that the Sahrawi people had not yet determined their own destiny. Therefore, by admitting the SADR into the OAU before this time, the organization was stripping the Sahrawi people of their right of self-determination. Morocco basically accused the OAU of failing to do that which Morocco consistently sabotaged, the implementation of the OAU-UN proposed ceasefire and referendum. Furthermore, the letter recognized the referendum and ceasefire proposed by the OAU and even reiterated its own acceptance of independence as an option. The letter referred to the SADR in quotes as if to say that the SADR did not exist and, for that matter, could not exist as an independent and sovereign state until the Sahrawi people had opted for “self-rule through a referendum.” Its reference to self- rule

266 via a referendum echoed the Frente POLISARIO’s request for self-determination, but was in direct opposition to its own hard line refusal to cooperate on these issues. As to confuse the issue even further, the Text of the Royal Message decreed the following: “Our Children must learn from early childhood that this question [Western Sahara] cannot be the object neither of negotiations nor of concessions” (Kingdom of Morocco, 1985: 24). The only way that the SADR could be an independent and sovereign state and therefore eligible for admittance into the OAU, was through the process of self- determination, the very process that Morocco could not and would not concede upon. The message from the Kingdom of Morocco then went on to suggest that the OAU’s admittance of the SADR into the African Union basically disqualified it as an intermediary in the conflict because it had “become itself a party in the affair” (47). Morocco was unwilling to cooperate and neither the OAU nor the UN could put enough pressure on Rabat to change the static situation. On January 27, 1985, just as things seemed deadlocked yet again, the Frente POLISARIO’s second in command Bachir Mustapha Sayed met secretly with Moroccan Interior Minister Driss Basri in Lisbon. Unfortunately, the meeting failed and the war raged on. Morocco, which had first built a defensive berm under U.S. instruction around the useful triangle, El-Ayoun, Smara and the Bou Craa mines, continued to extend its reach to Guelta Zemmour and pursued an aggressive construction agenda from May to December (Ruf, 1987: 74). Morocco constructed the berm in order to protect key economic interest areas in Western Sahara from the Frente POLISARIO guerrilla attacks. The Frente POLISARIO figured out how to penetrate the wall even though it was heavily protected by mines and electronic devices supplied by Western companies (Zoubir, 1993: 3). The wall was a classic defensive strategy and was reinforced by French and U.S. built radar detection sensors and barbed wire, minefields and artillery positions – an “imitation of France’s Maginot Line and Germany’s Siegfried Line of World War II” (Kamil, 1987: 70-71)184. Inwardly, Morocco increased its defensive measures. Outwardly, it tried to

184 The wall was built in six stages and was expanded from a small area near Morocco in the north to most of the western and central part of Western Sahara. The construction of the wall began in 1980 and was completed by 1987. The wall is approximately three meters high and is fortified by bunkers, fences and landmines along its entire length. Military bases, airfields and artillery posts are located at different intervals to the interior of the wall and radar masts and heavy duty electronic surveillance equipment survey the terrain in front of the wall in order to detect Frente POLISARIO incursions. 267 better its diplomatic record. By April, Morocco and Mauritania renewed diplomatic relations. The United Nations continued to pressure both parties. On December 2, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 40/50, fully backing the OAU’s settlement efforts. The OAU set the process for a ceasefire and referendum in motion and the UN picked up where it left off. In 1986, United Nations Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar unsuccessfully tried to establish indirect relations between the two direct actors, Morocco and Polisario. On October 31, in an attempt to break the stalemate and put pressure on the parties, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 41/16. It endorsed Cuéllar’s mediation efforts and called yet again for a referendum for Western Sahara. In an attempt to show a commitment to some kind of resolution to the conflict, the United Nations sent the first Technical Mission to Western Sahara in 1987. In 1988, Algeria and Morocco resumed real diplomatic relations after a twelve-year split. Cuéllar, still intent upon stopping the violence in Western Sahara, admitted a proposal for a ceasefire on August 30. In an amazing turn of events, both Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO accepted the United Nations plan (in principle) on August 30. Security Council Resolution 621 accepted the Secretary-General’s plan and authorized him to appoint a special representative to Western Sahara on September 20 (United Nations Security Council, 1988). On October 17, Hector Gros Espiell became the first UN special representative for Western Sahara. Frente POLISARIO leaders Bachir Mustapha Sayed, Mahfoud Ali Beiba and Ibrahim Ghali Ould Mustapha met with King Hassan in his palace in Marrakesh for the first and last time (to date) in the beginning of January of 1989. The steps did not produce any results, besides the fact that the occasion finally brought the two primary actors together. That same year, Morocco and Algeria resolved their longstanding border dispute. Morocco formally ratified the border agreement. Obviously frustrated by consecutive failed diplomatic moves, the Frente POLISARIO stepped up its attacks against Moroccan forces at Guelta Zemmour and other locations. By June of 1990, Cuéllar submitted a detailed plan for the referendum, which would be carried out under the auspices of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). As had been accepted by the primary actors, the referendum would give

268 the Sahrawi people a choice between full independence and integration. Security Council Resolution 658 was approved on June 18 (United Nations Security Council, 1990). Between July and November, the Frente POLISARIO and Rabat ironed out the specifics to the referendum plan. At last, negotiations were taking place. It appeared that the Sahrawi people would finally have their vote of self-determination.

3.1.2.4. 1991 Ceasefire and MINURSO

On April 19, 1991, Pérez de Cuéllar issued a report that further detailed the self- determination process. Thirty-six weeks after the planned ceasefire, a referendum was to be held. Ten days later, Security Council Resolution 690 officially authorized the MINURSO mission (United Nations Security Council, 1991a). MINURSO was charged with enforcing the following: a ceasefire between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO; establishing and preserving peace and security in the territory; effectuating a detailed survey of the Sahrawi population in order to obtain an accurate voter eligibility count and identification; executing the referendum, whereby the voters would be given the choice between independence and integration with Morocco as stipulated by OAU and UN resolutions and as agreed upon by the primary actors; confirming and administering the withdrawal of or confinement to military bases of Moroccan and Frente POLISARIO military units in the territory; and, finally, overseeing the safe return of the Sahrawi refugees, the majority of which were located in the Tindouf region of Algeria (Pazzanita, 2006: 436). In reality, it was a huge job for the poorly funded and manned peacekeeping mission. MINURSO’s troubles began immediately upon arrival when Morocco refused to let the MINURSO team and its equipment unload185. Although Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO agreed to a ceasefire date and authorization of the MINURSO mission for September 6, 1991, the month of August saw inflammatory and heavy military strikes by Morocco and immediate retaliation by the Frente POLISARIO. The war was not easing despite the agreed upon ceasefire date. If anything, it seemed as if the conflict situation was getting worse. Then, on August 21, Morocco slammed the ceasefire and referendum process by demanding a delay in the

185 See Part Four of this chapter. 269 entire process due to a voter eligibility disagreement. Morocco realized its vulnerability. With the likely outcome of independence for the planned referendum, Morocco resorted to familiar stall and spoiler tactics. It claimed that an additional 120,000 Sahrawi votes needed to be considered before proceeding with the referendum. Overnight, Morocco had created a logistics nightmare. The Frente POLISARIO immediately protested the change, believing that it could only tip the vote in Morocco’s favor. However, even if the United Nations decided to consider the 120,000 votes and even if they were thrown out in the end, determining the authenticity would take months and would prolong the already overdue self-determination process. At this time, Morocco refused to cooperate with MINURSO and instead actively impeded the agreed upon mission. On September 6, 1991, the ceasefire went into effect. As planned, MINURSO placed 240 UN peacekeepers in ten different locations. MINURSO faced major difficulties caused by Morocco’s failure to cooperate in the months following the ceasefire. On November 15, in an about face to the entire referendum process, Peréz de Cuéllar publicly supported Morocco’s request for voter eligibility expansion. This new criteria would unfairly tip the vote in Morocco’s favor. On December 19, in his final report to the United Nations Security Council, Cuéllar submitted a formal proposal that capitulated to Morocco’s persistent demands for changes in the criteria of voter eligibility. He recommended that voter eligibility be extended to people who could prove they had lived in Western Sahara continuously for a period of six years or intermittently over a period of twelve years prior to December 1974 (Zoubir and Volman, 1993: 233- 34). Inconsistency, confusion and a cloud of secrecy surrounded the referendum process and Cuéllar’s mind-boggling decision to derail it. In an effort to protect Cuéllar’s reputation, the Security Council (Resolution 725) reserved judgment on his proposal (United Nations Security Council, 1991b). However, his unexplainable change in direction with regards to the referendum process threw another wedge into the process of decolonization for the Sahrawi people. The tools had finally been set in place for the actualization of self-determination; however, Morocco successfully thwarted the entire diplomatic process and UN peacekeeping mission.

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3.1.3. Moving from the Hot Conflict Historical Narrative to Conflict Mapping

In order to effectively and accurately analyze a conflict and in this case a prolonged, intricate and multilayered one, a clear visual of who’s who in the conflict, with specific regard to the different conflict actors, their interest proximity and influence potential, is essential. A critical conflict analysis or road-mapping of the actors in conflict decreases the possibility for their roles to be blurred by manipulation, secrecy and by the actors themselves for the purpose of setting up smokescreens or stall tactics, anything to tilt the situation in one of the primary actors favor. Mapping the actors in conflict is a preliminary exercise for conflict mapping and analysis in general. However, the particular framework for analysis that I lay out below, including the addition of new actor categories, helps facilitate an analytical process that informs not only a deeper understanding of a conflict situation, but also the integral role that powerful players have on steering conflict analysis in its practical application and in reproducing the analytical coordinates of a real politics hegemonic discourse. With the dissection of the conflict fresh in mind, the conflict analyst can use the historical assessment as an analytical tool for better understanding the facts and details surrounding the period of hot conflict between Western Sahara and Morocco, especially considering the build up to the conflict and the failure to prevent it presented in Chapter Two.

3.2. Conflict Mapping

3.2.1. The Concept of Conflict Mapping

If we look at the time period between the outbreak of direct violence between the Frente POLISARIO and Morocco and Mauritania and the United Nations brokered ceasefire of September 6, 1991, between the ‘escalation’ of the conflict and the point of ‘termination’ of the hot conflict (Sandole, 2006: 23), we can clearly see the implications and consequences of the breakdown of effective conflict prevention (explored fully in Chapter Two). Because the United Nations and international community did not thwart the Moroccan-Mauritanian invasion of Western Sahara, it took sixteen years of careful deliberation and diplomatic artwork to finally negotiate a shaky ceasefire. It was a poor

271 remedy to a near complete systemic failure in the decolonization process for Western Sahara. Sixteen years of direct violence between Morocco and Western Sahara wrought the horrors of war – large-scale suffering, loss of life and economic and political instability in the region186 – for all parties to the conflict. The United Nations’ failure to prevent violent conflict in this instance compels one to question the viability of Connie Peck’s argument that the UN represents the ideal body for conflict prevention (Peck, 1999: 39-40). I would not necessarily argue the contrary; however, I would argue that an alternative approach to conflict analysis and mapping is necessary in order to account for the disconnect between UN resolutions calling for the self-determination of the Sahrawi people and UN inability to both carry out the process of self-determination and effectively respond to Moroccan aggression and non-cooperation. Before introducing and putting to use our analytical shift in approach, it is first necessary to present a brief review of traditional conflict mapping. By doing so, I am able to work from, add to and shift our framework for analysis, while simultaneously bringing the theoretical to the practical domain. Mapping a conflict is an important step that should precede the act of putting forth ideas or suggestions for transition or change in the current standing of a conflict situation, be it a hot or direct conflict or a diplomatic standstill. Bartos and Wher (2002) contend that in order to understand conflict you need both general analysis (as presented in their own work) and a more detailed “microanalytical approach” (as explained by Deutsch, 1973) (Bartos and Wehr, 2002: 67). The concept of conflict mapping helps to clarify “conflict-generated confusion” (Wehr, 1979; cited in Bartos and Wehr, 2002: 67). Conflict mapping provides a “clearer understanding of the root causes, nature, dynamics and possibilities for resolving dispute” (Omar, 2009: 1; see also Wehr, 1979: 18). Furthermore, every conflict possesses certain characteristics and “basic elements” that permit the analyzer to “produce a road map” that, like any type of map, serves to orient “a conflict opponent, a third-party intervenor, or simply a student of conflict” to the

186 See Sriram and Nielson’s work, Exploring Subregional Conflict: Opportunities for Conflict Prevention (2004), for an interesting perspective on the interconnection between regional variances and conflict prevention. Their work highlights the importance of looking at regions and subregions for understanding conflict. I would argue that understanding regional dynamics not only has bearing on conflict prevention, but also on conflict mapping. 272 conflict ‘environment’ (Bartos and Wher, 2002: 67). There are multiple ways of creating a conflict road map. For example, Bartos and Wher suggest that in order to produce a useful map, the mapper must specify the context, identify the parties and understand the dynamics (2002: 67-69). What does this require? Specifying the context means gathering information about the history of the conflict (its physical and organizational settings). Accurately identifying the parties entails figuring out how directly involved each party is and the importance of outcome for each. Bartos and Wher separate the possible parties to conflict into three categories: primary parties, actors in direct opposition; secondary parties, actors that have an indirect stake in the conflict; and third parties, actors such as mediators and peace-keeping forces that potentially intervene to facilitate resolution (67; see also Rugumamu, 2001: 5). I will break these categorizations down further; however, this is a good starting point for now. Understanding the dynamics means understanding that the nature of conflict is constantly moving and changing and that the conflict perceptions of the parties directly influence conflict behavior (69). Wher’s conflict mapping guide clarifies conflict mapping further by emphasizing the importance of the conflict’s background (geography and history); the specific analysis of the conflict parties and their issues (not just who the parties are, but also their relationships, perceptions, current behavior and leaders); and the conflict context (global, regional and state-level factors) (1979: 18-22; cited in Bartos and Wher, 2002: 74). The purpose of conflict mapping is to provide clarity to the convoluted nature of every conflict situation. However, conflict mapping can be contextualized in multiple ways. As such, the subjectivity of the mapper matters. For example, when establishing the actors involved in conflict, one can focus on the identity groups involved, the leaders of these groups, how these groups mobilize, what alliances have been formed (and what interests such alliances serve), what factions exist in parties, who are the spoilers, who are the single-issue groups and what are the external factors and actors that affect conflict (Bloomfield et al., 2003a: 41-42). When targeting the issues and underlying factors that influence the conflict, one can asses the distribution of economic, social and political resources or the conflict in political terms; analyze the driving factors behind conflict; and locate the fears that bear upon actor behavior in conflict (42). Geography can be understood in terms of scope and the extent to which a conflict affects a certain area.

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When considering the history of conflict, one can focus on the history of previous attempts at settlement in order to identify patterns among failed attempts (42). One can query into the phases and intensity of conflict. Is it possible to identify the phases? What are the patterns of violence or the patterns of a negative peace stalemate? Important issues to the conflict can be understood in terms of the capacity and resources of the parties to the conflict. Who is stronger? Who has more support? Is the conflict situation sustainable (42-43)? In order to establish whether or not a degree of trust exists, a conflict mapper can examine the relationship between the primary actors and the ways in which the actors perceive each other and gather information about each other (43). Finally, one could focus on the “balance of power” in the conflict relationship (42-43). Who is stronger? Who has more support? The very perceptions of the parties with respect to this balance of power bear upon the conflict situation. However, in this realm, the realist idea of a balance of power is too simplistic. This is where the subjectivity of the mapper and the surface assessment of conflict actors come into play again. What do I mean by this? The following statement by Thomas S. Kuhn helps facilitate the discussion:

“[T]he ‘realities’ perceived by the ‘high priests of truth,’ scientists, are a function of their collective, internalized ‘maps’ (or paradigms). Different paradigms, different mappings of the ‘same thing,’ mean different ‘realities’ – different descriptions and explanations of the ‘same thing,’ plus a different sense of problems appropriate to that ‘thing’ and of methods relevant to solving them – whether for members of different communities at one point in time or for members of the same community undergoing radical change over time” (Kuhn, 1970; cited in Sandole, 1993: 3).

The subjectivity of the conflict mapper cannot be underestimated. However, our subjectivity is contingent upon and directly influenced by the hegemonic frameworks for analysis of conflict analysis itself and conflict mapping more specifically. According to Bartos and Wehr’s analytical framework, I have ‘specified the context’ of the conflict by providing a detailed history of the conflict. I will now focus on a very specific part of conflict mapping, the parties to the conflict and the underlying interests to the dispute. I will do so with three goals in mind: to broaden our understanding of the three categories

274 of conflict actors (primary, secondary and other); to take into analytical consideration the very ‘truths’ from which we approach conflict mapping, especially considering the influence of hegemonic systems of thought; and to create a shift in analytical interpretive horizon in order to capture a much more complex understanding of power than is afforded by hegemonic realist ‘balance of power’ methods.

3.2.2. Reassessing Primary, Secondary and Other Actors in Conflict

Actors in a conflict may include governments, international organizations (non- governmental as well as governmental), identity groups, external parties, potential peacemakers and spoilers. These actors can then be organized into three general groups: top leadership, middle of the way leadership and grassroots leadership (Lederach, 1997; also cited in Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 24). Middle and grassroots leadership are immediately implicated by a discussion of top leadership. In this actual exercise in conflict mapping, I mainly concentrate on top leadership like state actors and international organizations such as the OAU and UN; however, I do not ignore the influence of, for example, middle of the way leadership of NGOs or grassroots leadership of non-violent resistors. An actor-based conflict mapping recognizes the impact potential of top leadership on a conflict situation. Because the impacts of top leadership can sometimes be elusive, it is important to trace their various manifestations in different conflict settings. Once they have been localized, they deserve close examination. By focusing on the very categorization of top leadership, we are acknowledging that the workings of Realpolitik are also at play. Thus, we set the analytical stage for providing a deeper conceptualization of all international conflict. In addition, by establishing a general understanding of who can be involved in a conflict, what that involvement entails and how it can affect a conflict situation, we open up the analytical space to examine points of ‘non-recognition’ – information we generally consider conflict common sense and conflict givens, but which may in fact represent areas of analysis that can shift our analytical interpretive horizons. As stated above, Bartos and Wehr (2002) place actors into three categories: primary parties, secondary parties and third parties. I prefer the use of the term actor

275 because it carries with it the important weight of agency; however, I also use the two interchangeably. As it stands in contemporary conflict mapping, a primary actor is one that is directly involved in the conflict. Secondary actors are not considered actual parties to the conflict, but do have significant or high level interest in the conflict and influence over its status. Many times geographical location determines secondary actor involvement. Other actors with influence over the events of a conflict include both regional and global players. In multiple situations of conflict in Africa, the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity have been placed in this category. In a manipulative strategic move to confuse the on-the-ground reality of our conflict situation and in order to avoid negotiations, Morocco refused to recognize the Frente POLISARIO and instead fingered Algeria, a secondary actor in the conflict, as the other primary actor. The dynamic nature of a conflict situation and the changing relationships amongst its players can at times cause confusion or can be used by the players themselves to obstruct an accurate conflict assessment. These groupings are multidimensional and are marked by dynamics of interchangeability and interplay. For example, in the Western Saharan/ Moroccan conflict, Mauritania was at one time a primary actor and would now be considered a secondary actor. These three categories can be visualized as concentric circles, with the primary actors in the core circle, followed by secondary actors and then other parties. As you move outward from the core, the actors tend to be more removed from the conflict, not necessarily with regards to the influence that they can have on it, but in relation to their interest proximity to the primary actors. Interest proximity can simply be defined as motivating factors – economic, cultural, (geo)political or military – for direct or indirect involvement in a conflict by secondary actors or other actors. This representation of concentric circles has also been introduced by Encarnacion et al., but in regards to third party intervention (1990: 45; cited in Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 24-25). They have distinguished a spectrum of agents in third-party intervention in order to overcome the implication of third-party externality and detachment and in order to acknowledge not just outsiders to the conflict, but also internal third parties and peacemakers (24). Their inner circle consists of core parties. Extending outward from the core are the concerned parties: actively influential parties, marginal parties and uninvolved parties. The further

276 away one moves from the core, the lower a party’s interest and commitment. Third parties can move inwardly from the outside or vice versa from the core. Here, they introduce the idea of embedded core parties, core parties who want to move to the position of an interested party (24-25). This gradient of third-party involvement can be adapted to my own approach for conflict mapping. I borrow the categorical designation of ‘uninvolved parties’ and the idea of actor mobility. There is no fixed position on the chart because the conflict dynamics and, concordantly, the actor-positions are mutable. However, I place more emphasis on the relationship between interest proximity and secondary-actor proximity to the primary actors (the core). As such, I am not so much concerned about declared secondary-actor interest in and commitment to a solution to a conflict as I am about their interest proximity (economic, cultural, (geo)political and military interests) to the desired outcomes of the primary actors. Secondary actors and even other actors to the conflict, which are located on the outer circles, can have a very strong interest and commitment to conflict transformation; however, their commitment is less likely to be compromised by interest proximity factors. In our model, primary actors make up the core of our gradient of actor involvement in conflict. Extending outward from the core, we have shadow- primary actors, secondary actors, other actors and uninvolved actors. In this regard, Bartos and Wehr’s actor classifications are not sufficient. In the vein of the diagram of Encarnacion et al., the following figure clarifies actor-based mapping by amplifying, specifying and adding to our conceptualizations of actors and by questioning the very analytical coordinates (categorizations) that have thus far guided how we designate and understand the actors in conflict.

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Figure 3.1. Diagram of Conflict Actor Involvement

3.2.2.1. Shadow-Primary Actor

In order to more accurately reflect and assess the complexities, dynamics and, at times, the mysteries that surround specific event outcomes in conflict, I further distinguish the category of secondary actors to that of ‘shadow-primary actors’. In many cases, the position of the secondary actor overlaps with that of the primary actors. In order to reflect this tendency in my conflict mapping of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict, I refer to a secondary actor as a ‘shadow-primary actor’ when the secondary actor has crossed into the realm of the primary actors. Generally, this passage to primary actor status results from an increase in the secondary actor’s interest proximity to the conflict. In essence, the distinction of ‘shadow-primary actor’ is secondary actor action oriented. It reflects the conflict moment when secondary actors take direct measures to fortify the position and desired outcome of a primary actor (or actors) via secret agreements, lies, economic (development) aid and military support in the form of aid, technology, expertise, equipment and strategy. The word ‘shadow’ refers to the clandestine and behind the scenes (or behind the primary actor) nature of the relationship between primary and secondary actors. ‘Primary’ indicates the direct involvement of the secondary actor in a conflict situation. Such involvement, considerably impacts the status

278 of the conflict and the standing of one or more of the primary actors in the conflict. In all likelihood, the secondary actor’s public declarations, like claims of neutrality, plainly contradict the actual direct involvement of the secondary actor. These above demonstrative breakdowns (Figure 3.1.) function as analytical tools that help us more effectively analyze a conflict situation. For example, some conflict analysts might designate the United States and France as other actors in the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict, rather than secondary actors. Such an analysis is one- dimensional and does not take into consideration the powerful interest proximity of the United States and France to the conflict and their potential for serious influence on the status of the conflict. Claimed neutrality, paternalistic rhetoric, like ‘freedom,’ ‘democracy’ and ‘equality,’ and ideological positioning, whether in terms of the Cold War or War on Terror, interfere with accurate conflict analysis. This study will refer to the United States and France as secondary parties due to their interest proximity to the conflict and their power to influence its outcome as major powers and hegemons of the United Nations187. In addition, the United States feigned neutrality with regards to the initial Moroccan invasion of Western Sahara. As has been discussed in Chapter Two and as will be later examined in Parts Three and Four of this chapter, recently declassified documents reveal the sharp discrepancy between the actual role of the United States in the conflict and U.S. official public record. In the build up to direct conflict between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO, the U.S. secretly aided Morocco, its longstanding ally. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was briefed about Moroccan Green March188 plans. As the Frente POLISARIO and Spain protested its execution, the U.S. actively and secretly pursued Morocco’s desired conflict outcome, the annexation of

187 The terminology ‘hegemons of the United Nations’ refers to the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council: China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States of America. If we recall from footnote 132 of Chapter Two, Lâm uses a similar term, hegemony council, to describe the structural imbalance of power of the UN (2002: 190). 188 As discussed in Chapter Two, Morocco manipulated the decision of the International Court of Justice. After its publication, the monarchy immediately announced and organized the civilian based Green March into Western Sahara. In addition to the illegal occupation and use of force, Article 49 of the Geneva Convention adopted on August 12 by the Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War declares, “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer part of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies” (www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/92.htm). Therefore, the United States was obliged by international law to stop the illegal use of civilians in accordance with Article 49 of the Geneva Convention. 279

Western Sahara. Kissinger sent his confidant and second ranking official of the CIA, Lieutenant General Vernon Walters to persuade Spain to cave into Moroccan pressure. Spain needed important military and economic aid from Washington in exchange for the renewal of a contract for U.S. bases on Spanish soil (Kamil, 1987: 13). Lies, secrecy and clandestine agreements surrounded the events that led up to the Green March, Madrid Accords and denial of the right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people. To date, this obscure set of circumstances does not allow an accurate assessment of the extent of U.S. involvement. At the same time, the U.S. Cold War reality, Realpolitik politics and strategizing – taking into consideration the revolution in Portugal, U.S. failures in Angola and the believed old friendship and Northwest African alliance with Morocco – considerably heightened the United States’ interest proximity to the ensuing conflict in favor of Rabat. In this way, the term ‘shadow-primary actor’ better and more accurately captivates the role and actions of the U.S. than does the less specific denomination of secondary actor. This might seem to be a game of semantics; however, in an international community where certain countries enjoy more formal power, a power that is systemically organized, reinforced and self-proliferated, failure to make these distinctions is equivalent to accepting the status quo, in other words, to allowing behind the scene actions to go unchecked and be justified by naturalized power politics. The actions of countries which seem to be above the law and international norms should be considered of utmost importance to a comprehensive conflict analysis and not merely, as has been suggested in International Relations Studies (Luard, 1988), as the natural workings of balance of power politics in an anarchic international setting.

3.2.3. Breakdown of Actors in the Western Saharan/Moroccan Conflict

The following is an exercise in actor mapping of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict. I utilize the categories described above: primary actors, secondary actors (taking into consideration that secondary actors can assume positions that the terminology shadow-primary actors more accurately describes) and other actors with influence. To be sure, an actor-based assessment not only locates the players in the conflict, but also highlights their attitudes, perceptions and needs. However, such an evaluation also

280 examines the very analytical approaches to conflict mapping. For example, as Roger Fisher and William Ury (1991) point out, interests, not positions, define conflict. Conflict can be understood in terms of needs, desires, concerns and fears (Fisher and Ury, 1991: 40), intangible components that are difficult to measure, trade and bargain (Omar, 2009: 8). By accepting this dynamic as an integral part of conflict, we are also accepting that this view should influence our mapping of actors in conflict. However, and as we discussed in Part One of this chapter, if we are to keep our analytical approach in ‘hegemonic check,’ we have to question any analytical coordinate that does not take conflict asymmetry into account, especially when assessing the conflict needs, desires, concerns and fears of the actors. The new representation of actor involvement aims to fill in some theoretical gaps of conflict mapping. With the historical context of the hot conflict fresh in mind, I practically apply these new guidelines and reevaluate actor interest proximity and involvement. In this light, I place the specific actors in the appropriate category and provide a brief description of each entity. When a particular actor falls into more than one category, this interchangeability is noted.

3.2.3.1. Primary Actors

3.2.3.1.1. The Frente POLISARIO – Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el- Hamra and Río de Oro

On May 10, 1973, the Frente POLISARIO was “born as a unique expression of the masses, opting for revolutionary violence and the armed struggle as the means by which the Saharawi people can recover its total liberty and foil the maneuvers of Spanish colonialism” (Hodges, 1987: 53)189. From the local to the national level, the Frente POLISARIO grows from eleven member cells to a council for each refugee camp to a twenty-one Political Bureau to a nine member Executive Committee (Damis, 1983: 43). A five hundred member National Congress holds supreme authority, meets every two years and elects the Frente POLISARIO’s Executive Committee (43). This democratic political structure, conceptualized within the ideology of revolutionary struggle,

189 Excerpt from the Manifesto of 10 May 1973, in Sahara Libre, Polisario Front, Algiers, no. 13, May 20, 1976. 281 discourages the development of privileges and corruption (43). Since 1976, Mohamed Abdelaziz has held the post of Secretary-General of the Frente POLISARIO. The General Popular Congress, which consists of the Popular Congresses of each refugee camp and delegates from the Unión Nacional de las Mujeres Saharauis (UNMS), the Unión de Juventudes de Saguia al Hamra y Río de Oro (UJSARIO), the Unión General de Trabajadores de Saguia al Hamra y Río de Oro (UGTSARIO) and the Sahrawi Popular Army of Liberation (SPLA), continues to elect Abdelaziz because of his adept leadership and for purposes of political consistency in the international community. Not to be confused with the Frente POLISARIO, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)190 is the governmental state-in-exile structure of the Sahrawi people that has been based in Tindouf since 1976. Currently, Mohamed Abdelaziz is the president of the SADR and leader of the Frente POLISARIO. As such, he is both head of state and commander of the national liberation movement. Today, the Frente POLISARIO has not renounced armed struggle against Moroccan occupation; however, the political body has chosen to exhaust political and diplomatic avenues before a return to arms. The Sahrawi people have accepted the Frente POLISARIO as the only political body to represent and serve them until the referendum for self-determination determines their political fate. By that responsibility and in accordance with article 31 of its Constitution, the Frente POLISARIO has promised to defend the legitimate right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination and independence; to safeguard their national unity; and to achieve the building of a sovereign Sahrawi state (Shelley, 2004: 181). Considering the process of decolonization incomplete by its Spanish colonizers, the Frente POLISARIO frames its arguments in the right of the Sahrawi people to self- determination through a free and fair referendum with independence as the ultimate goal. The Frente POLISARIO rejects Morocco’s territorial claims to Western Sahara and illegal occupation of its land. The Frente POLISARIO bases its claims to the territory on multiple UN Resolutions, among others, 1514 XV, 2072 XX and 2229 XXI, and on the Organization of African Unity’s principles and call to respect colonial boundaries.

190 As indicated earlier, the Organization of African Unity admitted the SADR as a member of the body in 1984. 282

3.2.3.1.2. Morocco

Although Morocco claims to be a constitutional monarchy, it can more accurately be described as an authoritarian regime. Despite some recent progress in democratic processes, the monarchy possesses ultimate control over all areas of society and maintains and reproduces the systems and societal-cultural structures necessary for this control through the Makhzen (see Chapter One191). The king of Morocco is the “supreme representative” who “draws his legitimacy from his religious authority stemming from his alleged descent from the prophet” (Ruf, 1987: 67). In this regard, the Moroccan constitution upholds three subjects as absolute: the king and the royal family (the king is the descendant of the profit), religion (Islam) and Territorial Unity (Western Sahara, the ‘southern provinces’). Morocco bases its claim to Western Sahara on historical ties of a political and religious nature. Morocco argues that these ties, involving “varying degrees of political, legal, and especially religious authority,” constituted effective sovereignty over the territory in question prior to the twentieth century (Damis, 1983: 15; 19). Although Rabat admits that the sultan’s control rarely extended into Western Sahara, its argument lies in the fact that the sultan represented both church and state. Within this historical context, consecutive Moroccan sultans effectively sought and established ties of personal allegiance from certain tribes, effectively establishing territorial sovereignty of the Western Sahara prior to its colonization (Damis, 1983: 19-21). In addition, Morocco points to specific agreements and treaties that it established with major foreign powers during colonization. For Morocco, they serve as proof of its control and dominion over Western Sahara during the colonial period192 (22). Morocco refuses to publicly recognize the Frente POLISARIO and denounces the national liberation movement as a separatist/communist/terrorist group. While Rabat refuses to negotiate with the Frente POLISARIO, it names Algeria, its nemesis for regional dominance, as the other primary actor in the conflict. Today, although this has

191 Chapter One (section 1.4.5.3.) details the political organization of the Moroccan state. 192 John Damis cites three examples: Spanish-Moroccan Treaty of November 20, 1861, the Anglo- Moroccan Treaty of March 13, 1985, Franco-German agreement of November 4, 1911. 283 not always been Morocco’s public stance, the monarchy has declared that it will not accept a referendum if independence is an option for the Sahrawi people.

3.2.3.1.3. Mauritania

Mauritania asserted territorial rights over Western Sahara in order to create a buffer zone between it and Morocco, which at one time claimed all of Mauritania and Western Sahara. In order to secure its own economic, political and military position in Northern Africa and safeguard itself from Moroccan expansionism, Mauritania agreed to partition Western Sahara with Morocco. At the time of partition and initial invasion of the territory, Mauritania underestimated the impact that the war would have on its population and fragile political system. The Frente POLISARIO targeted Mauritania as the weaker of the two invaders and concentrated its energy and military efforts in southern Western Sahara. Through strategically planned guerrilla attacks, the revolutionary force successfully penetrated Mauritanian frontiers and caused a political collapse there. The Algiers Agreement of August 5, 1979 stipulated the conditions for Mauritania’s withdrawal from Western Sahara and renunciation of its claim to the territory, more specifically, to the Tiris el- Gharbia193. From late 1975 until early August of 1979, Mauritania was a primary actor in the conflict. Post Algiers Agreement, however, Mauritania became a secondary actor with strong interests in the final resolution of the conflict.

3.2.3.2. Secondary Actors

3.2.3.2.1. Spain, Secondary and Shadow-Primary Actor

As the colonial invader, Spain is the official administrative power of Western Sahara (Trillo de Martín-Pinillos, 2007)194. It has a historical responsibility to the conflict

193 On April 14, 1976 the southern one-third of the former Spanish colony was given over to Mauritania in the Moroccan-Mauritanian Conventions. 194 Eduardo Trillo de Martín-Pinillos (2007) argues that Spain is still bound by Article 73e of the United Nations Charter to transmit information of the territory to the Fourth Committee. The fact that Spain does not do so because it claims to have terminated its presence in Western Sahara and officially relinquished 284 due to: the role it played in the partition of Western Sahara; the illegal transfer of administrative authority (detailed in the Madrid Accords) to Morocco and Mauritania; and its ultimate failure to abide by the decolonization process outlined by the United Nations and backed by the Organization of African Unity. As the former colonial power, the undetermined status of Western Sahara reflects poorly on the Spanish international record. Madrid also has strong geopolitical, historical and economic ties to the region. The territory of Western Sahara was a strategic area for safeguarding its political and economic control of the Canary Islands, especially regarding the commercial assets produced by the Canary fishing industry and the abundance of seafood in the waters off the coast of Western Sahara (Damis, 1983: 9). As a result of the illegal transfer of administrative control of Western Sahara to Morocco, Madrid had to shift positions. The animosity it expressed towards Rabat during the early 1970s transformed into a cordial and economic relationship, one which would protect its economic interests, fishing and phosphates and the geopolitical importance of the Canaries, Ceuta and Melilla (Price, 1979: 60). The Canary Islands offer a geographically strategic position for controlling shipping routes around the Cape, and with respect to military strategy, they are well situated for patrolling naval activity in and off the coast of Northwest Africa (60). Spain is open to a United Nations referendum and has publicly supported the right of self-determination for the Sahrawi people. However, in recent years, Spain has strengthened its economic relationship with Morocco via fishing rights and trade agreements. The colonial secondary actor’s role and actions in the conflict can at times be more accurately understood in the context of a shadow-primary actor designation. This categorization more accurately captures its close interest proximity to the conflict.

administrative control on February 26, 1976 bears no legal value (82). It is only logical that the administering power of Western Sahara, a Non-Self-Governing Territory, is the former colonial power. To argue otherwise, the United Nations General Assembly would have to change the official status of Western Sahara. 285

3.2.3.2.2. Algeria, Secondary-Primary Actor Overlap

As a result of its bloody independence revolution with France, Algeria supports not only the Frente POLISARIO, but also all independence movements and the liberation framework that sustains them. In terms of a geopolitical strategy, however, Algeria would benefit from the Frente POLISARIO’s ideological orientation, which is more allied with its own, socialist and nonaligned movement (Damis, 1983: 34-35). The Frente POLISARIO has received most of its equipment, training and financial resources from Algeria (Volman, 1993: 157). The Sahrawi refugee camps near Tindouf195 are home to over 250,000 people who rely on Algeria and the international community for food and other necessities (Shelley, 2004: 27). If Western Sahara were to gain independence, a pro-Algerian SADR orientation is very likely. Such a positive and somewhat indebted relationship would strengthen Algeria’s economic and political influence in the Maghreb region. Like Mauritania, Morocco’s expansionist claims affect Algeria’s stance in the conflict, especially when considering the dangers to national security that a Moroccan Western Sahara could present. Algeria’s interest proximity, in terms of its support for national independence movements, strategic positioning for dominance in the region and fear of Moroccan expansionism, is equivalent to that of Spain’s interest proximity. It could therefore be argued that there is secondary-primary actor overlap. However, due to Algeria’s transparency with respect to its role in the conflict, it would be incorrect to label Algeria as a shadow-primary actor. In fact, Algeria has openly and publicly defended the right of the Sahrawi people to a free and fair self-determination referendum and has pledged to accept the results of the referendum, either independence or integration (Memorandum of Conversation, 1975c).

195 In 1963, Morocco and Algeria fought a border war over the Tindouf region, an area of considerable historical and economic significance for the two parties. Although Morocco recognized the borders with Algeria in 1972, the Moroccan parliament has yet to ratify the agreement. 286

3.2.3.2.3. France, Secondary and Shadow-Primary Actor

As a dominant former colonial power in North Africa and as one of the five permanent members in the United Nations, France enjoys considerable influence and historical and lingual prestige in the region. Even though France made a physical departure from Morocco in 1956, Mauritania in 1960 and Algeria in 1962, its interests, with the exception of Algeria, were not adversely affected by decolonization. France skillfully protected and held on to its economic, political, militaristic and francophone interests and influence in Morocco and Mauritania. Even though a brutal war severely strained its relationship with Algeria, its colonial and linguistic influence cannot be underestimated there either. The geopolitical location of Western Sahara (between Morocco and Mauritania) directly relates to France’s preferred outcome for the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict. France concluded that an Algerian backed Western Sahara would not be as economically lucrative or secure its stronghold in terms of foreign regional influence as would a Moroccan governed Western Sahara. Morocco’s important shipping routes, large population and standing army and French private interests there and in Mauritania all had bearing on France’s approach towards and position in the conflict. France maintains neutrality in the conflict. This neutrality, however, does not stop it from being an arms supplier to Morocco or from cultivating a pro-monarchy relationship with Rabat. France’s unclear role in direct attacks against the Frente POLISARIO, its close interest proximity and behind the scenes maneuvering qualify France as a shadow-primary actor.

3.2.3.2.4. United States of America, Secondary and Shadow-Primary Actor

The U.S.’s role must be understood in a post World War II and Cold War setting (today the Cold War can be replaced with the War on Terror). Morocco’s geopolitical location is essential for the U.S. in terms of access to the Mediterranean and in terms of strategic positioning for U.S. bases. In short, the North African location of Morocco plays “Scylla to Gibraltar’s Charybdis, guarding the route into and out of the Mediterranean” (Shelley, 2004: 7). During the Cold War, Morocco succeeded in keeping the Soviet

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Union at bay while incorporating the United States and France into its close circle of friends (7). Playing off of the fears of the United States in the mid-1970s over the rapid spread of Communism, Morocco also portrayed the Frente POLISARIO as Leninist, Guevarist and Maoist. Today Morocco characterizes the Frente POLISARIO as a radical terrorist group. Both approaches have successfully tapped into U.S. fears. Morocco’s support of Israel and other U.S. allies (support of Mobutu in Zaire, Angola, Mozambique, etc.) also strengthened the U.S. Moroccan relationship. Morocco is considered by the United States as a Western friendly Muslim country open to the ‘free’ market and neoliberal globalization in the form of privatization, deregulation and the relaxing of tariff barriers (10). U.S. interest proximity is intensified by its longtime friendship with Morocco and by Morocco’s geopolitical importance, which one could extend to Western Sahara. However, economic interests also play a key role. The United States has assessed Moroccan production capabilities and has identified the best prospects for U.S. companies in “telecommunications, electrical power systems, environmental equipment and services, water resources equipment, tourism and oil and gas exploration” (12). The United States refutes oil interests in Western Sahara; however, with its dependency on foreign oil, it seems unlikely that the U.S. would not capitalize on offshore oil finds. Like France, the U.S. claims neutrality in the conflict. Publicly, the U.S. does not recognize Moroccan (or at one time Mauritanian) sovereignty in Western Sahara. While proclaiming impartiality, the United States has been the number one supplier of arms, technology and technological know-how, including military strategies like building the Moroccan berm (fortified wall). Although Morocco has also received major support from parts of the Arab world, like Saudi Arabia, the United States has much more influence and bearing on the status of the conflict as the world super power. The more specific roles of both the United States and France as shadow-primary actors are analyzed in greater detail in Part Three of this chapter.

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3.2.3.3. Other Actors

Due to the drawn out nature of this now 34-year conflict, the other parties may appear at one point in the conflict cycle but not necessarily be an active player at another point in time. It is expected that a conflict that lasts decades will transform with the changing international world and domestic worlds of the actors themselves and with regards to their interests in and the influence they can have on the conflict. This dynamic is reflective of the cyclical nature of conflict itself.

3.2.3.3.1. Libya

At the outbreak of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict, the leader of Libya Muammar al-Qadhafi was strongly advocating pan-Arabism (unity of all Arab states). Libya, like Algeria, was known to support independence movements. From 1973-1975, it was the largest financial and material supporter to the Frente POLISARIO. In April of 1980, Libya recognized the SADR. In response, Morocco broke diplomatic relations with Libya. At present, its interest proximity to the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict is relatively low, especially in comparison to other actors. Although Libya provides some support to the Frente POLISARIO’s cause, like accepting Sahrawi students at the secondary and university levels, it is a peripheral figure in the conflict.

3.2.3.3.2. Soviet Union/Russian Federation196

There is an incorrect tendency to assume that due to the Soviet Union’s close ties to Algeria that it would immediately have given its full support to the Frente POLISARIO. The Soviet Union supported the right of the Sahrawi people to self- determination, but stopped short of much more than lip service to the conflict. Although most of the Frente POLISARIO’s weaponry was of Soviet-bloc origin, besides the arms it captured from Morocco, none of the Eastern European countries directly supplied

196 The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and its subsequent renaming to that of the Russian Federation is the reason for the duo referencing in the title. 289 military equipment to the Frente POLISARIO (Hodges, 1983: 354). Instead, the Frente POLISARIO received most of its military equipment from Algeria and Libya, both of which relied on the Soviet block for 90% of their arms (354). The Soviet Union had important economic ties to Morocco, including phosphate and phosphoric acid needs197. At the beginning of the war, however, Morocco played on the United States’ fear of Communist expansion and used the ideological warfare between the Western and Eastern Blocs in its favor. Rabat successfully sold the idea that the Soviet Union’s interest proximity to Western Sahara was far greater than it was in actuality. Today, the Russian Federation still supports the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination.

3.2.3.3.3. United Nations and MINURSO

According to Chapter VI, Article 34 of the United Nations Charter, “The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security’”(Charter of the United Nations, 1945; see also Karns and Mingst, 1994: 189). However, the legal and normative basis of the United Nation’s role in conflict lies in Article 1 of the Charter (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2009: 60): “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measure for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace” (Charter of the United Nations, 1945). As discussed in Chapter One, the United Nations played an essential role in the decolonization of Africa in general and more specifically regarding the status of Western Sahara.

197 On March 10, 1978, the Soviet Union signed a contract with Morocco. Over a period of thirty years, the Soviet Union agreed to export oil, chemicals, timber and ore-carrier ships to Morocco in return for phosphates and phosphoric acid and to finance an estimated $2-billion investment in the development of a new phosphate mine at Meskala (Hodges, 1983: 354). 290

In spite of the fact that multiple UN resolutions on Western Sahara failed to both execute the UN sponsored self-determination referendum and prevent the Moroccan- Mauritanian invasion of the territory, the United Nations worked to end the armed conflict and to settle the parties’ differences through peaceful means, collective action and cooperation and with the desired goal of a UN brokered ceasefire and eventual resolution to the conflict. MINURSO198 is the UN interim peacekeeping group and administrative presence in Western Sahara. It was conceptualized in 1990, but did not materialize as a mission to coordinate the ceasefire and eventual referendum for the Sahrawi people until 1991. The inherent contradiction between the United Nations’ principles and its structural composition consistently places the international organ in an unrelenting predicament, one where it must perform a balancing act between its distinctive role of promoting peace and security and the structural barricades that prevent the carrying out of these main functions (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2009: 68-74). On the one hand, the United Nations functions (or should function) as a neutral organ in the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict with the principled goal of trying to finalize the open status of Africa’s last colony and to effectuate the referendum process for self-determination of the Sahrawi people. On the other hand, the United States and France, permanent members of the Security Council with veto power and considerable lobbying capacity and secondary actors/shadow-primary actors in the conflict, compromise the neutral status of the United Nations and the effectiveness with which it can accomplish its role of promoting peace and security. It is to a certain extent true that as an international organ (IO) the UN cannot be evaluated on the same terms as governments because of the very fact that it lacks “the boundaries that define and distinguish a territorial entity” and suffers from “circumscribed decision-making processes, limited resources, and few autonomous implementation powers” (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2009: 61). In addition, it should be recognized that the UN is plagued by “fundamental internal weaknesses” like: the simultaneous relevance of contradictory norms; its inability to enforce the norms it

198 MINURSO is the French acronym for Mission des Nations Unies pour l’organisation d’ un referendum au Sahara Occidental. 291 establishes as well as its promotion of double standards (71); its general lack of technical, human or financial resources for gathering and analyzing information (72); its inability to respond to the pace and scale of events, at times due to the simultaneous eruption of conflicts; and its slow reactive capacities and insufficient preventive resources (73). Furthermore, the UN operates in tandem with other actors over which it has no control (61). As such, Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson argue that it is difficult to ‘disentangle’ where and what role the UN has played in conflict (61). In this study, the United Nations and MINURSO together are considered to be an ‘other party’. The interest proximity of the United Nations is assessed in direct correlation to its founding principles as negotiator and peacemaker in conflict situations. I argue that we should not overlook the duality of the United Nations regarding its founding principles and hegemonic structure, especially when trying to comprehend the apparent ineffectuality of the international organ to create change in the status of Western Sahara and its impotency in the face of big power players like the United States. However, this critical commentary, the lacuna between principle and practice, should not be confused with what Bercovitch and Jackson have called a misunderstanding of the workings of international organizations in international relations (61). The UN may by its nature be limited in what it can realistically hope to achieve, especially when considering the aforementioned institutional inadequacies (74). However, there is a difference between erring on the side of “overoptimism or undue pessimism” (61) and critically analyzing the workings of the UN and its involvement in the peaceful transformation of conflicts within the greater context of Realpolitik hegemonic discourse. In this analytical context, agency (point of reference) and involvement cannot be taken for granted. Within the framework of discourse analysis, we can challenge such statements as: “Many of these conflicts [orphan conflicts] occur in other regions of the world, such as Africa, where the great powers in particular are unwilling to risk involvement” (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2009: 69-70). In one form or other, the ‘great’ powers are almost always involved in those ‘other’ areas of the world. In Part Four of this chapter, we will further explore the idea of how the United Nations paradoxically works as a mediator and peacemaker and in function of dominant discourses at the expense of the maintenance of international peace and security.

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3.2.3.3.4. Organization of African Unity (OAU)

The Organization of African Unity199 (OAU) was founded in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on May 24, 1963 for the specific purpose of acting as Africa’s international organization (Pazzanita, 2006: 307). The OAU Charter called upon all African nations to respect colonial borders (the inviolability of existing African borders) in order to prevent conflict and in order to promote unity and solidarity. The organization internationally recognized the right of all people to self-determination. In 1966, the OAU initiated support for the decolonization process of Western Sahara through its own resolutions. In cooperation with and support of the United Nations, the African international body also requested that the interested parties adhere to the UN resolutions on Western Sahara. The OAU applauded the peace agreement struck between the Frente POLISARIO and Mauritania in 1979. In addition, it pushed for the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force in the territory to create a stable environment, one that could support a UN-supervised referendum and the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination. The OAU fully supported the position of the UN on the conflict, but it also laid the groundwork for the Settlement Plan. In order to prevent OAU meddling in Moroccan ‘internal affairs,’ Rabat consistently used Western Sahara as a wedge issue to create disunity in the OAU and, more specifically, to create divisiveness between member states regarding the organization’s stance on the conflict and the admittance of the SADR into the organization. On June 10, 1983, the OAU adopted Resolution 104, which named Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO as the only two parties to the conflict. It was not until the withdrawal of Morocco from the OAU in 1984 – in response to the SADR’s admittance into the organization in February of 1982 – that the OAU took a backstage role to the United Nations.

199 On July 9, 2002, the African Union (AU) succeeded the Organization of African Unity. This new international organization did not include Morocco, but did accord membership and administrative responsibilities to the SADR (Pazzanita, 2006: 315). 293

3.2.3.3.5. Other Countries and Organizations

Other actors that deserve mentioning are states in support of Morocco like Cameroon, Egypt, Gabon, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Palestine Liberation Organization, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, etc.; state actors in support of the Frente POLISARIO, like Cuba and the over 80 countries that have recognized the SADR; nongovernmental organizations, including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Landmine Action, etc.; the media’s role in the conflict; other UN agencies like the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); other permanent members of the Security Council, China and the United Kingdom; and Africa200 as a continent. It is also important to note that a country stance on the recognition of the Frente POLISARIO and the SADR may shift depending on the political party in power, geopolitical outside influence or even foreign aid. For example, Guinea-Bissau recognized the SADR on March 15, 1976, canceled its recognition on April 4, 1997 and then re-opened an embassy for the SADR on September 29, 2000. Kenya opened an embassy on June 25, 2005 and froze its status on October 22, 2006. As these examples demonstrate, other actor involvement is not static.

3.2.4. The Practical Application of Actor-Mapping

The above excerpts provide a brief glimpse of each actor and the reason for their placement in the respective categories: primary actor, shadow-primary actor, secondary actor and other actors. By creating such divisions of actor involvement, we open the analytical and practical space for a deeper evaluation of actor-impact on the conflict and on the obstructions to its peaceful transformation. The following section of this chapter (Part Three) evaluates the more specific roles of our shadow-primary actors, the United States, France and Spain. It also connects the dots between this involvement and underlying interests to the dispute, like natural resources, economic and regional prospects and settler populations.

200 “[I]t is on Africa that Polisario has relied for diplomatic support and recognition” (Shelley, 2004: 45).

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3.3. Extent of Secondary Actor (Shadow-Primary Actor) Involvement

3.3.1. The Extent of United States Involvement

Actions do not necessarily have to be violent to be considered conflict behavior (Mitchell, 1981: 30). United States involvement in the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict can be considered conflict behavior that has helped to stalemate the conflict. They have also been the creators, producers and enforcers of a greater agenda of Realpolitik discourse. As was discussed in Part Two of this chapter, the United States is a secondary actor and a shadow-primary actor. Even though the United States has not necessarily involved itself directly in the conflict per se, its indirect involvement has had serious negative effects on the conflict transformation processes for Western Sahara and its current protracted status. However, protestations that deny an active, albeit backseat, role are blatantly false. When Kissinger stated in late 1975 that the United States did not play “a very active role” and that it was not doing a “great deal for either side,” neither helping Morocco or Algeria, he was lying (Memorandum of Conversation, 1975c: 8, 10). The United States fully supported the Moroccan annexation of Western Sahara. The reaction of the United States as Morocco planned the Green March and subsequent invasion of Western Sahara was one of fear. This fear was of a practical and theoretical origin. On the ground, the United States government was afraid that the Portuguese fervor, which had brought the Communist Party to power in Lisbon, would by extension move into Spain, an already unstable country due to the death of Franco and downfall of his regime (Kamil, 1997: 9-10). The United States did not want to lose its military base access to southern Europe and the Mediterranean, which a regime change in Spain might have effectively endangered. In military terms, French North Africa was of particular interest to the United States because of its “strategic significance” as a site for military bases (National Security Council, 1954: 1). Moreover, Morocco borders important bodies of water: the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, including the Strait of Gibraltar (Seddon, 1987: 106; Zunes, 1993: 53). The geographical location of Spain, Western Sahara and Morocco played a big part in solidifying the U.S. pro- Moroccan position.

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Theoretically, the United States feared the growing sphere of communism and the real alternative it presented to the Western free market, capitalist and democratic hegemonic discourse (words, policies, actions). The effect of Cold War ideology cannot be underestimated regarding the United States and its role in the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict. At the time of Morocco’s invasion, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger announced that the United States would not “allow another Angola on the East flank of the Atlantic Ocean,” referring to Western Sahara (Kamil, 1987: 10). Today, the War on Terror has replaced the Cold War and plays heavily into continued U.S. support for Morocco. In exchange for support of Western capitalist ideology, the United States has tolerated and militarily and economically financed a despotic regime. At the time of the Moroccan invasion of Western Sahara, the United States took what Richard B. Parker has denominated a globalist view, one which held the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union (between capitalism and communism) above international law and the process of decolonization (Parker, 1993: 95). Unfortunately, the Sahrawi people have suffered the consequences of such an approach. When Moroccan Foreign Minister Benhima approached Kissinger in 1973, he stressed both the geographical and ideological importance of Western Sahara:

“We have friendly relations with Spain, and cooperation. Morocco and Spain have some problems now. We have hoped that relations would develop in the interests of global and regional security. But there are certain problems. We are preoccupied with the [Spanish] Sahara. Spain seems to be thinking now of independence for it. We ask, why should it be independent? It is a country of 45,000 people, two-thirds uneducated. It controls the sea routes. I don’t want you to think that Morocco wants it for itself. We asked Spain what its intentions were. They were not clear…We are against all liberation movements; we fear infiltration. We would prefer the status quo, but Spain wants to act quickly. We won’t participate in this liberation movement. We have told Spain that the security of the Western Mediterranean is indivisible. Spain has said to us that security in the northwest Mediterranean is separate from security in the Atlantic. I think it’s in the middle of the question of the security of the region…If this goes, it will be the first place between Oslo and the Cape on the Atlantic that is not pro-West. Algeria wants access to the Atlantic. Morocco doesn’t want to be isolated or encircled, as the French did against Algeria” (Memorandum of Conversation, 1973: 4-5).

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To this skillful representation of Western Sahara, Kissinger replied: “That is an interesting point” (5). As early as 1954, the United States was well aware of the balancing act it would have to play between French interests and North African nationalism, especially regarding Western intentions and the right of self-determination of dependent peoples (National Security Council, 1954: 1). In the end, Morocco depicted the war over Western Sahara as a proxy war between itself and Algeria. Rabat successfully convinced Kissinger of the dangers of Algeria’s “revolutionary heritage, anti-imperialist credentials, and advocacy of socialism” (Zunes, 1995: 27). Consequently, the U.S. placed strategic alliances above the decolonization process and the right to self-determination for the Sahrawi people, which had severe consequences regarding the role and effectiveness of the United Nations and Organization of African Unity in the decolonization process. Realpolitik Cold War discourse, including blanket anti-communism and regular practice of military support to friendly nations (Betts, 1998: 34), steered U.S. foreign policy and U.S. interpretations of self-determination. In this globalist worldview, the United States was obliged by any means necessary to prevent the constitution of another independent state with a progressive government of a type that the Frente POLISARIO would have surely formed (Menéndez del Valle, 1975: 38).

3.3.1.1. US Arms to Morocco

“When I began the visit to the region, I leaned toward the view that there might well be a convincing strategic and political case for changing our arms sales policy toward Morocco. But I came away from the trip persuaded that the proposed sale of offensive arms to Morocco for use in the Western Sahara would have significantly negative consequences for U.S. foreign policy and that the advantages cited in behalf of such a course of action are either minimal or nonexistent” (United States Congressional Representative; cited in Solarz, 1980: 6).

Despite warnings like the above, the means necessary for preventing the spread of communism translated into U.S. military involvement with Morocco and Spain. By giving military aid to both, the United States was able to secure bases in both countries. It also hoped to extend NATO into the West Mediterranean. By October of 1978, the

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United States had acquired a base in the Canary Islands (Mercer, 1979: 8). In Washington’s geopolitical analysis, the addition of Western Sahara to the community of states would tip the scale in favor of Algeria and would open another avenue for communism. However, if Morocco controlled Western Sahara, the United States could then establish a “control network down the African coast” (Mercer, 1979: 8). In this regard, U.S. foreign policy and military aid are inextricably linked. During the Cold War, the United States allotted Morocco $40 million a year, a number that eventually fell to $4 million (Shelley, 2004: 13). Today, Israel and Egypt receive most U.S. military aid, followed by Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. These figures are telling. In the year 2000, the Africa Demilitarization Program of the Center for International Policy put the figure of direct commercial sales licenses of U.S. companies for arms sales to Morocco at $51.3 million (14). This military policy towards Morocco began with the Green March. Weeks after the illegal invasion, Hassan II immediately contacted the United States to organize further arms sales. In the form of F5E aircraft, the U.S. assured him of their support201 (15). By early 1976, Kissinger had approved the rushed shipment of more military equipment like tanks, armored personnel carriers and howitzers (Staff Meeting, 1976: 36-37). In order to avoid the grilling eyes of the international community, Kissinger decided to airlift the supplies over a period of months rather than weeks (37)202. With the fall of the Shah in Iran, the United States allocated more money and arms to Morocco in consideration of Morocco’s role in the Arab and Western worlds and in an attempt to secure the monarchy. The United States and Saudi Arabia feared that after the fall of the Iranian, Nicaraguan and Afghani regimes, King Hassan could be next. In addition to U.S. support, Morocco received arms shipments from Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel and South Africa, most likely under U.S. urging (Ruf, 1987: 81). Besides direct arms sales to Morocco, the United States has trained Moroccan officers in

201 The U.S. provided military arms to Morocco despite Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, the “fundamental norm prohibiting the use of force in international relations” (Schabas, 2001: 604). 202 At this point in time, Kissinger vocalized his perception of the Western Sahara issue in the following light: “If the Algerians take the Sahara with Algerian troops without Cubans and Russians, it still will be another example of the Soviets supplying the supported groups – running the American-supported groups out of the world…[B]ut the fact is it’s a Soviet-supported insurgent movement moving with impunity everywhere. Then gradually you’re going to see adjustments to any place where the Soviets come out in an insurgent movement. That’s one of the penalties of Angola, even if it isn’t the same” (Staff Meeting, 1976: 40, 41). 298 guerrilla warfare tactics; provided sophisticated weaponry and strategic and technological know-how; and helped to devise and execute the building of the 2,700 km-long berm that is reinforced by landmines and advanced surveillance equipment203. More recently, Morocco has received financial and military equipment from the United States, including F-5, M1A1, artillery and recent UAV supply (the Skyeye), and from France, Great Britain, Israel, South Africa and Saudi Arabia (Bhatia, 2001: 292). There are also allegations that the Central Intelligence Agency’s main base in North Africa is located in Morocco and that Morocco has cooperated in the War on Terror by building a secret prison for the purposes of a U.S. rendition program for potential terrorists204.

3.3.1.2. Continuity in U.S. Military Policy

“Some modern diplomatic historians have attempted to contrast Jimmy Carter’s idealism in the international arena with both Kissinger’s Realpolitik of the Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford Department and the right-wing ideologues of the Ronald Reagan administration. Yet despite some differences in emphasis, there appears to be a high degree of continuity in the U.S. policy since the signing of the Madrid Accords” (Zunes, 1993: 55).

U.S. policy regarding the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict has maintained a high degree of continuity. The ebbs and flows in U.S. policy towards the conflict do not come from a change in position on the conflict, but rather from the differences in the amount of aid given to Morocco during different U.S. presidential cycles. During Ford’s

203 The following is an accurate and detailed depiction of the Moroccan berm today: “Physically, the berm is a two meter high wall (with a backing trench), which rides along a topographical high point/ridge/hill throughout the territory. Spaced out over every five kilometers are a big, small and medium base, with approximately 35-40 troops at each observation post and groups of 10 soldiers spaced out over the distance as well. About four km behind each major post there is a rapid reaction post, which includes backing mobile forces (tanks etc.). A series of overlapping fixed and mobile radars are also positioned throughout the berm. The radars are estimated to have a range between 60 and 80 km into Polisario controlled territory and are generally utilized to locate artillery fire onto detected Polisario forces. Information from the radar is processed by a forward-based commander, who contacts a rear-based artillery unit. The Skyeye recently acquired by Moroccan forces, and the anticipated Israeli Hunter craft, will play a similar role in the detection of targets for artillery fire” (Bhatia, 2001: 295). 204 Due to the secrecy surrounding much of the U.S. foreign policy on terrorism, these allegations have not been confirmed by a reliable source. However, the connection between Moroccan and U.S. relations on the War on Terror cannot be refuted. 299 presidency, a definitive military relationship was established with Morocco, one that was at times public and at times clandestine. As discussed in Chapter Two, Henry Kissinger and Vernon Walters played a shady role in the signing of the Madrid Accords. Although not fully understood, the relationship between Rabat and these two U.S. figures was firmly sealed at this point in time. As mentioned in Chapter Two and which deserves repeating here, the memoirs of U.S. Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan clearly demonstrate that the United States purposefully and decisively blocked the United Nations referendum and self-determination process for Western Sahara: “the United States wished things to turn out as they did, and I worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success” (Moynihan, 1978: 247). The United States interest proximity to the conflict pegged the hegemonic structure of the United Nations against its principles. In the end, the United Nations did prove ‘utterly’ ineffective. By 1978, during Carter’s Presidency (although not under his order), Kissinger and Walters helped find new military connections for Morocco and successfully organized and supervised the illegal transfer of guns, ammunition and planes from Jordan, Iran, Taiwan, South Korea and South Africa (Kamil, 1987: 31). The United States was building the military network that Morocco needed to try and crush the Frente POLISARIO with better, bigger and more advanced equipment. This may not be direct violence against the Frente POLISARIO, but it was definitely indirect involvement and supports the view that the United States is a shadow-primary actor. The U.S. secretly equipped Morocco militarily so as to put an end to the conflict and the Frente POLISARIO independence movement. While the United Nations was trying to broker a ceasefire and referendum, the United States, a permanent member in the United Nations with veto power, was fueling the Moroccan invasion and stalemating the diplomatic arena. In May of 1979, “the State Department approved a proposal from Northrop Page Communications to construct a $200 million electronic detection system to help the Moroccans locate elusive Polisario fighters in the desert” (Zunes, 1993: 56). With the transfer of power from the Republicans to the Democrats, Morocco realized it needed to

300 secure support in Washington. By the end of 1978, Morocco had firmly established a strong lobby in the U.S. (Ruf, 1987). Today, this lobby includes the Livingston Group, Tew Cardenas and Edelman Public Relations, Gabriel and Company, Robert Holley and the Whiton Case (Inhofe, 2005: 9). In order to offset changes in party lines and political parties, Rabat has hired at great cost different U.S. public relations firms to advance its cause. Furthermore, Rabat wined and dined potential supporters with extravagant parties, dinners and luncheons with exotic Middle Eastern cuisine, at times accompanied by belly dancers (Zunes, 1993: 57). In 1977, the Carter administration refused a Moroccan request for military equipment, and general support for Morocco dipped from that of the Ford-Kissinger days (Kamil, 1987: 18). Carter finally addressed the 20 year-old bilateral military agreement205 with Morocco, which prohibited the use of U.S. military supplies for any purpose other than the defense of the Kingdom of Morocco (29). Under pressure from Congress, he also banned the delivery of ammunition and weapons to Morocco. However, by the second half of his presidency, the military aid to Morocco increased considerably (Zunes, 1993: 55). King Hassan’s diplomatic fancy footwork produced the desired results. By the end of Carter’s administration, the U.S. sent significant shipments of weapons for the specific purpose of assisting Morocco in the war against the Frente POLISARIO, including a contract to King Hassan for an air defense system that the Westinghouse Electric Corporation mounted for $200 million (Kamil, 1987: 36). Washington continued to prove that they valued an individual-regime relationship over the suffering of the Moroccan and Sahrawi people. The Reagan administration only increased the U.S. interest proximity to the conflict. Reagan appointed Joseph Reed, a good friend of King Hassan, to the position of ambassador to Morocco. Along with Hassan’s own private companies like Neal and Company lobbying for him, Reed also openly advocated for the Moroccan position: “Morocco is at the strategic straits of the Mediterranean. It is clear how Morocco is important to the survivability of Europe. My mandate is to illustrate to our friends around the globe that the Reagan Administration wanted to single out Morocco as the primary

205 The American-Moroccan Agreement of 1960 banned the use of U.S. weapons outside of the Kingdom of Morocco’s internationally recognized borders. 301 example of how America supported a proven ally and friend” (Zunes, 1993: 58; see also Kamil, 1987: 66). The Reagan administration surpassed previous administrations regarding its military and economic funding to Morocco. Reagan not only increased weapon allotment and economic aid, but also immediately lifted all restrictions on weapons use (in direct violation of the U.S. Moroccan treaty) in the war against the Frente POLISARIO (an expansionist and regionally destabilizing war). The U.S. was setting a dangerous precedent. Back U.S. policy and interests and be rewarded regardless of the circumstances, international opinion and UN and OAU resolutions. The Reagan administration also resorted to lies and secrecy to maintain the relationship it wanted with Rabat. In testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary of State Alexander Haig blatantly lied to receive more military aid for Morocco, attesting that the Frente POLISARIO was using SAM-6 missiles within Moroccan territory (Kamil, 1987: 63). The new administration both misled the international community regarding the U.S. role in the conflict and fed mistruths to people in leadership positions and decision-making power in the United States. Haig visited King Hassan in February of 1981 in order to make a promise of a $100 million U.S. war package for the purchase of weapons. In return, the U.S. expected to create a Joint American-Moroccan Military Commission and to secure U.S. landing rights at Moroccan bases. These military aid packages did not come without strings attached. To secure them, Morocco had to concede to American hegemonic military strategizing and commit to loan repayment for the new equipment. The war was definitely taking its toll on the economic state of Morocco, but the U.S. ignored telltale signs of economic demise. Beginning in 1982, the Reagan administration began to provide Moroccan forces stationed in Western Sahara with Cluster Bomb Units (CBUs) and cluster shells that could be fired from an artillery gun or dropped from a plane (Kamil, 1987: 73). These actions not only began to erode an international standard on military intervention, but also disregarded all calls for a ceasefire from the international community. U.S. aid to Morocco supported the war effort and legitimated the Moroccan invasion and annexation. It also undermined the work of the United Nations towards a ceasefire to the conflict and eventual referendum. In addition, the United States tried to sabotage Frente POLISARIO

302 advances at the international level. When the SADR came dangerously close to being inducted into the Organization of African Unity, the United States convinced pro- Western African leaders to block its admittance, using needed aid as leverage (Zunes, 1987: 437). It was also in the U.S.’s overall interest to create divisiveness in the OAU and thwart its ability to produce or threaten U.S. interests. The participation of the United States as a shadow-primary actor in the conflict, due to its power position, hegemon status and close proximity to the conflict directly affected international efforts to change the course of the conflict. In 1995, the Clinton administration worked to create “open access” and “deregulated environment” free-trade agreements with Morocco, which previously only Israel and Jordan had enjoyed (Shelley, 2004: 12). According to the US Trade Information Center and, as stated above, the non-agricultural sectors that offered positive gains were telecommunications, electrical power systems, environmental equipment and services, water resources equipment, tourism and oil and gas exploration (12). U.S. interests had now moved into the private sector. By 1998, seven years after the ceasefire, the Clinton administration began to implement a regional business approach to compete with European nations in North Africa. The Eizenstat Initiative was drafted in order to harmonize the customs systems of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia and open up bilateral trade with the United States (11). Mauritania at the time had no economic pull and Libya was under US sanctions. The initiative further sought to break down intra-regional trade barriers in a push to maximize private sector led development (11). The United States tried to strengthen the economic ties between Morocco and Algeria even though the deadlocked Western Sahara issue was a formidable wedge discouraging such cooperation. The U.S. probably considered that the possibility for high economic gains could provide the necessary incentive to change Algeria’s position on the conflict. At the same time, the United States only strengthened its trading interest in the region. The current position of the United States is detrimental to the referendum process. Under George W. Bush, the United States improved its relationship with Rabat. This improved relationship was evident in the signing of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Morocco and the “inclusion of Morocco in the exclusive list of major non-NATO allies” (San Martín, 2004: 658). It remains to be seen how U.S. President Obama will

303 respond to the conflict. However, a recent trip to Morocco by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton suggests that there has been no change in policy. In fact, Clinton praised Morocco’s human rights record and appeared to endorse the Bush administration’s policy to support Morocco’s plan for Western Sahara (Ross, 2009)206. In sum, by unambiguously supporting Morocco economically, politically and militarily, consecutive U.S. administrations have obstructed possibilities for conflict transformation of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict and have directly delayed a ceasefire and end to direct conflict between the parties.

3.3.1.3. Familiar Story

Morocco is a familiar story for the United States – support the regime regardless of its treatment of its people. U.S. support of dictatorships and absolutist regimes on the basis of loyalty or interest proximity while turning a blind eye to human rights abuses, torture, domestic policies, corruption, etc., raises important implications about U.S. involvement in conflict situations. Morocco fits this mold, and yet the U.S. continues to support the regime. As explored in Chapter One, an overwhelming number of Moroccans live in severe poverty and suffer from overwhelming inequalities with regards to the distribution of resources. Widespread corruption at top and low-level government branches also adds to the country’s economic ills (Denoeux, 2007). Communities struggle with rapid urbanization without the infrastructure to keep up with the growth of urban centers. The situation for the Moroccan people is exacerbated by the oppressive monarchy and very little genuine political freedom. In spite of all this, the United States and Morocco have a longstanding relationship. Since 1787, they have enjoyed a treaty of friendship, “the longest unbroken peace agreement the United States has maintained with any country in the world” (Zunes, 1993: 53). This special friendship compounded by U.S. geopolitical and military interests in

206 After Secretary Clinton’s interview, Morocco has gone on the offensive against Sahrawis in the occupied territories. Moroccan authorities arrested and expelled Aminatou Haidar, winner of the Civil Courage Award (Train Foundation) and the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award for her non-violent fight for self-determination. Morocco has also decided to try seven Sahrawi human rights activists for treason, meaning they face the death penalty for visiting their compatriots in the refugee camps and for demanding their legal right to self-determination (Ross, 2009). 304

Morocco has been a recipe for disaster for the undetermined status of Western Sahara. Morocco has also proven its loyalties over the years. Rabat initiated the contacts between Israel and Egypt that eventually led to the Camp David Accords in 1978; supported UNITA guerrillas in Angola, a U.S. ally; sent troops to Zaire in 1977 and 1978 in support of General Mobutu against insurgents; reached out to Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres in 1986; and, a deal maker, provided access to Moroccan bases for use by American forces in event of deployment to the Middle East in 1982 (Parker, 1993: 94). As detailed above, the most significant part of the U.S. Moroccan relationship has been their military cooperation. The United States has provided counterinsurgency arms, planes and expertise to the Moroccan army, and Morocco has opened its arms to American military bases (Kamil, 1987: 5). Morocco has a population of over twenty- three million (the second largest Arab country) and the Sahrawi people do not even reach one million (Zunes, 1993: 53). Realpolitik discourses have guided and driven the decisions by the United States with respects to the question of Western Sahara. Kissinger firmly believed in the balance of power model, and he was the mastermind behind U.S. foreign policy at the time. It can be argued that the extreme bipolar position of the United States became as considerable a problem as the Green March and Madrid Accords for affecting the decolonization process for Western Sahara. The events of 9/11 in 2001 irrevocably changed the Maghreb’s geopolitical importance for the United States. As argued by Zoubir, this geopolitical rupture in U.S infallibility and invulnerability not only encouraged the bringing together of Maghrebi states (geopolitically, militarily and economically) with the U.S., but also increased U.S. interest in the area, extending it to the Sahel region (Zoubir, 2005: 13). The U.S. Pentagon’s long-term aims in the Maghreb include obtaining access to bases in Mali and Algeria; concluding agreements to refuel its planes in Senegal and Uganda; and initiating programs of assistance and training in terrorism and general war tactics (12). By establishing its presence in the Maghreb and Sahel region, the U.S. would be ideally situated for quick military intervention all over the African continent and could “secure control over the ‘arc of instability,’” stretching from Afghanistan to the Gulf of Guinea and passing through the main oil fields around the globe (12).

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The recent strategy of the U.S. government to ‘propagate democracy’ in the Arab world through the BMENA initiative has been received by Arab and Muslim people as a plan to impose a ‘ready-made democracy’ that subjugates them to American and Israeli hegemony (14). U.S. support of undemocratic governments, especially those that suffer from a lack of justice, social development and education, delegitimizes the freedom and democracy agenda and adds insult to injury in the eyes of Maghrebi populations (Zoubir, 2006: 14; see also the Arab Human Development Report 2004, 2005). When the United States portrays countries like Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Libya as ‘moderate’ and ‘democratic’ in order to justify security arrangements, military assistance and foreign aid, it encourages elite-dominated authoritarian orders at the expense of civil society, “a condition that angers an already deeply alienated mass public whose daily frustrations are often directed at the ‘far enemy’ (the United States) as much as the ‘near enemy’ (local authorities)” (Entelis, 2007: 23). Ironically, by allowing a small elite to monopolize key sources of political, economic and military power, further disaffecting and alienating the mass public (Entelis, 2007: 34), the United States creates the perfect conditions for the creation and proliferation of ‘terrorism’ that it claims to be combating and preempting. This approach to the region directly impairs the peace process, referendum and ultimate goal of self-determination for the Sahrawi people. By abetting in the suppression of an internationally recognized right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people, the United States compromises the very principles on which it claims the country was founded. Even though the U.S. enjoys a stronger economic relationship with Algeria than Morocco, it does not trump the U.S.-Moroccan ‘friendship’. Bouteflika challenged the supposed neutral status of the U.S. as early as 1975 and declared that it “could never be marginal or devoid of interest” because of U.S. military cooperation with Morocco (Memorandum of Conversation, 1975c: 8). The United States has concluded that a Moroccan withdrawal from the war would ignite a popular reaction that could lead to the deposition of the king, despite other analysts who have suggested that Morocco’s prolonged engagement with the Frente POLISARIO and the heavy costs of the war and now diplomatic stalemate present a greater threat to the king’s survival (Zunes, 1993: 69). From 1975 until today, U.S. involvement in the conflict, predicated on greater Realpolitk discourses, has instrumentally impacted its stalemated status.

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3.3.2. The Extent of French Involvement

“El Consejo de Seguridad, reunido en varias ocasiones adopta unas tibias resoluciones en donde el lenguaje no alcanza el rigor mínimo requerido para ‘detener esta invasión que amenaza a la paz y a la seguridad internacionales’. El lenguaje de las tres resoluciones 377, 379 y 380 no pasa de manifestar que el Consejo de Seguridad ‘deplora que la marcha verde haya tenido lugar’. El mecanismo de urgencia del Consejo de Seguridad no funcionó plenamente, debido fundamentalmente a las maniobras dilatorias del delegado francés, el cual obstaculizó los debates y la redacción de los textos en repetidas ocasiones” 207 (IEPALA, 1978: 33; on the Green March).

French involvement in the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict began before direct conflict broke out between the Frente POLISARIO and Morocco. France was concerned with perpetuating its past and fluctuating control of Northwest Africa, which secured its high demand for raw materials and other economic gains. Considering its strained relationship with Algeria208, France could definitely reap the benefits of the Moroccan/Mauritanian invasion and annexation of the territory. As the above quote demonstrates, the French used their powerful status in the United Nations to undermine the Security Council’s response mechanisms for handling the illegal Green March invasion. France’s neocolonial involvement in Western Sahara was propelled by several factors. First, France desired to establish and maintain hegemonic power in North Africa. In fact, France has always opposed the emergence of an independent non-French speaking entity that would break the continuity of its political and cultural dominance in North Africa. Second, France was in direct competition with other European nations, namely Spain and Germany, the former with regards to Morocco and Western Sahara and

207 Translation: “The Security Council, gathered on various occasions adopts some tepid resolutions where the language does not meet the minimum severity required for ‘halting this invasion that threatens international peace and security’. The language of the three resolutions 377, 379 and 380 does succeed in demonstrating that the Security Council ‘deplores that the Green March has taken place’. The mechanism of urgency of the Security Council plainly did not function, due fundamentally to the delay tactics of the French delegate, who prevented debates and drafts of the texts on repeated occasions” (IEPALA, 1978: 33; translation mine). 208 The Revolutionary war with Algeria from 1954-1962 placed a strain on French-Algerian social, political and economic relations.

307 the latter with the Maghreb region in general. Third, France still maintained a patriarchal and ‘colonial master’ relationship with its former colonies in the surrounding areas so that an anticolonial resistance had to be contained by a French military response (Naylor, 1993: 19). France retains a post-imperial vision of its place in North Africa and is therefore inclined to intervene in regional crises (Clapham, 2000: 41). This “nostalgia” for colonial influence in the Maghreb (Amin and El Kenz, 2005: 58) directly corresponds to French policy on Western Sahara. Like the U.S., France claimed neutrality regarding the outcome of the conflict and yet the facts on the ground tell a different story. France actively supported Morocco and Mauritania from the beginning. Like the U.S., its interventionist tactics were closely entwined with its fear of the spread of communism; however, France also actively fought against its decline in international power and position (Flood and Frey, 2003: 400). More recently, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism has threatened the French sphere of influence, “radiating out from those states to sections of the immigrant population within France itself” (400). Without the support of the French, even more powerful when considering French- U.S. cooperation, Morocco could not have accomplished what it did prior to the conflict and in the years following. Paris was also involved in the negotiation of the Madrid Accords and assisted in their implementation (Naylor, 1993: 32). Added together, the monarchy’s pro-Western stance; internal threats to the King’s thrown; strong probability for French economic opportunities; the underestimated cohesion organization and driven Sahrawi nationalist resistance movement; the personal friendship between Paris and Rabat; and “France’s wish to protect Spain’s fledgling democratic movement from the perilous possibility of colonial war” considerably enhanced France’s interest proximity to the outcome of the conflict (32). France has important economic and cultural interests in Morocco and, as such, provides Morocco with generous political support in the UN Security Council. Furthermore, France has provided constant economic and military assistance that Morocco has needed to assert dominance in Western Sahara (Zoubir, 1998: 159). For example, France has reduced Moroccan debt and has signed important economic agreements with the kingdom in order to protect the monarchy and circumvent the issue

308 of succession in Morocco (159). It is evident that there are multiple parallels between French and U.S. interventionist policy on Western Sahara. Neither ever warmed to the idea of an independent Sahrawi state. Above all, the unifying characteristics between the two hegemon-states were/are ideas, policies and actions tied to imperial ideology, domination and ego, the stuff of Realpolitik discourse.

3.3.2.1. Direct Intervention, Arms Supplies and Economic Interests

As discussed in Part One, the French participated in the conflict from behind the scenes and via direct air attacks against the Frente POLISARIO. The French justified its direct military intervention, Opération Lamantin, as a defensive act within Mauritanian boundaries. In reality, overlapping economic, linguistic, (geo)political and colonial- rooted interests provided the motivating factors for France. The French wanted to send a strong blow and message to the relatively small forces of the Frente POLISARIO. In 1977 and 1978, French aircraft launched heavy air attacks (sorties) against the guerrillas (Shelley, 2004: 19). This military intervention sought to preserve the postcolonial French establishment in North Africa; solidify more power and influence in the region; and extend the terrain of “Franco-phone politics,” an important pillar of French policy in Africa (Jackson, 2002: 33). France was Morocco’s number one arms supplier, even surpassing U.S. levels. Under Giscard, France secretly equipped Morocco with a major part of its advisers and weaponry (Kamil, 1987: 33). Potential challengers to France’s military position in Francophone Africa are fully aware of the French 11th Division in southern France, a force with the capability to intervene quickly and effectively at any time (Chikeka, 1998: 252). Today Morocco continues to use business to forward its foreign policy goals with France, including French military advisers, aid in the construction, maintenance and modernization of the berm and costly software for war simulation (Fisera, 2004: 62). Furthermore, the two leading media groups in France, Dassault and Lagardere, lead the country as suppliers of armament (62). One year prior to the onset of direct conflict between Morocco, Mauritania and the Frente POLISARIO, half of Moroccan trade was with France (Damis, 1983: 114).

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Under Jacques Chirac, France also enjoyed strong economic ties with Algeria. In an attempt to balance these relationships, Paris has tried to convince Algiers to integrate its economy and to help create regional stability by distancing itself from the Frente POLISARIO. As will be explored below, regional stability depends in large part on the resolution of the question of Western Sahara. Despite these economic incentives and French pressure, Algeria has continued to support the Frente POLISARIO. When looking at North Africa from a regional perspective, there is potential for a unified Maghreb region, one which has been visualized more intimately as that of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia or more expansively as Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The latter regional composition, the Arab Maghreb Union, was in fact established in 1989 in order to guarantee cooperation, advance regional integration, facilitate trade, ease border restrictions and help tourists and migrant workers (Zunes, 1995: 25). The history of these nations and their will to create a regional unification in line with the European Union dates back to the 1960s when anticolonial movements and sentiments were at their height. Although the region shared a colonial experience and each launched their own independent movement, this commonality did not lead to a successful coordination of composite interests or unity at a regional level. To move beyond a conceptual stage and the current deadlocked situation of the Arab Maghreb Union, the status of Western Sahara must be determined, preferably through productive strategies of conflict transformation. In the U.S. and French view, Algeria’s support of the Frente POLISARIO’s independence movement and calls for self-determination has pigeonholed the possibility for the regional alliance. Other issues add to the instability of the alliance, but they are not unique to regional unification. That said, as long as Western Sahara remains a nonnegotiable point for Morocco, a regional cohesion of any sort seems unlikely. French interest proximity (economic, political, military and social), secrecy surrounding its actions and direct involvement in the conflict are all factors that qualify France as a shadow-primary actor. Each individual factor pulls France closer to the core of the conflict. Both the United States and France have maintained neutrality and would claim third-party or other status in relation to the conflict, but both have been integrally and intimately involved in various ways, especially militarily. In conclusion, like the

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United States, the involvement of France in the conflict as a shadow-primary actor has helped to submarine conflict prevention, impede the decolonization process and create the stalemated diplomatic situation of today.

3.3.3. Competition: US, France, Spain and the European Union

“The increasing Spanish involvement in the Western Sahara conflict during the last years of José María Aznar’s government has to be understood within the context of the growing struggle between France and the United States for hegemony in North Africa” (San Martín, 2004: 657).

Against the advice of generals directly involved in Spanish Sahara, including acting Governor of Western Sahara Gomez de Salazar, and under extreme pressure from the United States and France, Madrid decided to back a monarchist regime. An unthinkable turn of events, Spain reneged on its promises to the Frente POLISARIO and the Sahrawi people to hold a referendum and secure a transfer of power (Kamil, 1987: 14). On January 24, 1976, Spain reaped economic advantages from this decision. The U.S. promised Spain $1.3 million in military and economic aid in exchange for the rights to extend U.S. military bases there (14). Part of this aid would be used to create new missions for Spanish troops. The new Spanish government feared the “ferment” that might arise if sixty thousand men, unhappy to have tiptoed out of Western Sahara, were sent to small garrisons around the country (Memorandum of Conversation, 1975b: 3). In effect, Spain argued that a U.S. funded new military agenda would help these disgruntled troops “forget about Africa” and “think about Europe” and a “positive future” (Memorandum of Conversation, 1975b: 3). Competition almost immediately ensued between the United States and France for domination in Africa and has continued to date. When Washington instigated free-trade agreement talks with Morocco in the early 2000s, Paris responded by warning Morocco that bilateral agreements with the United States would have a negative effect on its economic relations with itself and the European Union (Shelley, 2004: 17). While chastising the U.S.-British led Iraqi bombing and invasion, President Jacques Chirac stepped up France’s own counterattack by trying to solidify its dominance in North Africa (17). The competitive quest for global dominance by the United States and France

311 has had a direct negative impact on the status of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict. French multinationals such as, Renault, Citroen, TotalFinaElf, Aerospatiale, etc., employ over 70,000 workers in Morocco (18). Although France still has the biggest foot in the Moroccan door in terms of an economic and political relationship, the United States has worked to play a greater role in the region. Spain, in contrast, has been playing economic catch up to the two superpowers. In the early 80s and 90s, it focused mainly on integration into the European Union and on economic development (21). Spanish duplicity towards the Frente POLISARIO has continued even after the Madrid Accords and subsequent illegal handover of its formal colony to Morocco and Mauritania. When Felipe Gonzalez of PSOE (Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party) came to power in 1982, he expelled the Frente POLISARIO representatives. Before his election, PSOE had openly recognized the Frente POLISARIO, backed its cause and announced that the Madrid Tripartite Agreement was “null and void from the perspective of international law” (Damis, 1983: 105). Gonzalez even visited the Tindouf refugee camps in 1976 and reiterated this stance calling “for an official repudiation of the Tripartite Accords” (Naylor, 1993: 25). However, Morocco’s willingness to cooperate with Spain on an economic level overshadowed its ex-colony’s right to self-determination. Morocco gave investment opportunities to Spanish businessmen, secured Spanish access to Moroccan fisheries and even offered “compromises over agricultural exports” (21). Upon election, Gonzalez immediately strengthened Madrid’s relationship with Rabat, but did not stop there. He also encouraged Latin American countries to refuse to recognize the SADR. Ironically, the following conservative government of Jose Maria Aznar changed the Spanish course in support of the UN referendum for Western Sahara and even demonstrated uneasiness over Morocco’s push for a transition autonomy arrangement in Western Sahara. In the summer of 2002, in an act of defiance and as a warning to the new political direction in Madrid, Morocco staged a military exercise on the island known as Leila or Perejil. The message was clear. Morocco’s action let Spain know that Rabat still held claims to Spanish territories and that they were treading on shaky ground regarding the Western Sahara issue.

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The present Spanish government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero of PSOE once again shifted the foreign policy course of Western Sahara. Upon entering office, he announced his intentions to improve the badly damaged relations with Morocco and to return to the sphere of Europe (the orbit of French foreign policy) (San Martín, 2004: 657). An echo of the post-Franco government’s push for a return to Europe can be heard in Zapatero’s message. The new government has publicly condemned the referendum process as a threat to the security of the Maghreb region (657-58). Spain’s lack of support for Personal Envoy James Baker’s attempts to break the stalemate between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO had serious repercussions for the referendum process and may be one more factor that brought about his resignation. Spain’s failure to take historical responsibility as the ex-colonizer to Western Sahara continues to taint its international record (Naylor, 1993: 31). On February 26, 1996, Morocco “signed an agreement of association with the European Union in the context of a free-trade zone for industrial products” (Zoubir, 1998: 158). Although the European Union Parliament has passed several resolutions regarding Morocco’s role in Western Sahara and has criticized its policy on the disputed territory, the European Union may ease up on the Western Sahara issue with the development of stronger economic ties between the two entities, especially considering the strict rules regulating European Union members and the relatively unregulated wealth of natural resources in the territory of Western Sahara.

3.3.3.1. Natural Resources

Edward Azar’s theory of protracted social conflict (PSC) is particularly suited for an analysis of the natural resources that can be found in Western Sahara. His theory evaluates ‘international linkages,’ particularly “political-economic relations of economic dependency with the international economic system as well as the network of political- military linkages constituting regional and global patterns of clientage and cross-border interest” (Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 87). In this view, weak states are especially vulnerable to the international forces that operate in the wider global community and are impacted by the patterns of linkage within the international system (Azar, 1990: 11; also

313 cited in Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 87). The international interest-proximity linkages to Western Sahara of secondary actors and shadow-primary actors have played an integral role in not only confirming-structure the dominant order, but also in protracting the conflict. Additionally, different factors of the political economy of Western Sahara, such as Morocco’s relationships with Europe and the United States regarding foreign commercial interests and regional and global security, are closely intertwined (Zoubir, 1998: 158) and part and parcel of Realpolitik discourses. Western Sahara contains the world’s largest fishing grounds and rich unexploited phosphate reserves. There have also been discoveries of petroleum and hydrocarbons in the region, which have yet to be fully explored and uncovered. Iron (estimated at 70 million tons), uranium, titanium, vanadium, iron ore and precious stones are among other natural resources that could be extracted for considerable profit from the territory. These riches provide some insight into underlying factors of the conflict. The phosphate deposits are desired because of their high-grade quality and location. Phosphates have been discovered less than twenty feet below the surface, of which 80% is bone phosphate lime (Damis, 1983: 4). They are used to make fertilizer (phosphatic fertilizer), which are then distributed widely to the agricultural industry, and are important for the production of certain crops, particularly high-yield hybrids. In areas where the growing seasons are shorter, they speed the ripening of the grain (26). In general, phosphatic fertilizers stimulate and increase the production of many crops. The untapped fishing grounds off the Atlantic coast, which stretches 2,000 miles from the coastal zone of northern Morocco to southern Mauritania, are another valuable natural resource. Due to the fact that the nomadic tribes of the region did not incorporate fish into their diet, the fishing population was left practically untouched. At the time of the Moroccan/Mauritanian invasion, the area contained as much as 2 billion tons of fish (4). During Spain’s colonial reign in the territory, U.S., Soviet, Japanese and South Korean boats were allowed to fish the waters. Today, in order to meet the high demands for fish of the Spanish population and in order to boost production in the fishing industry, Spain has made deals with Morocco to fish the controversial areas.

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In August of 1978, U.S. Occidental Petroleum signed “a preliminary agreement with Morocco for the exploitation of shale oil from two fields in the south” (Price, 1979: 40). Other oil companies like British Petroleum (BP) and Phillips Petroleum of the United States have been granted “off-shore oil-prospecting licenses,” which cover “35,000 square kilometers off the Western Sahara coast between Laayoun and Boujdour” (40). Prospects for oil in Western Sahara complicate matters further for the referendum process. If oil is discovered in the disputed territory, the interest proximity for the United States will increase dramatically, putting the referendum process in further danger, if not eliminating it altogether. In the autumn of 2001, Rabat signed deals with Kerr-McGee of Texas and TotalfinaElf, the major oil company in France. The agreements “parceled out the entirety of the Western Sahara’s waters, 90,000 square miles. The Kerr-McGee license area is the size of 4,750 Gulf of Mexico blocks” (Shelley, 2004: 66). The Frente POLISARIO has successfully stalled any premature offshore drilling or exploration in the territory or off its coasts. However, the real question is whether the Frente POLISARIO will be able to hold off the oil sharks in today’s current oil crisis, particularly in light of the U.S. goal for domination and control of the oil market. These geopolitical and economic priorities and interests and the desire to protect them tend to collide with an aspect of self-determination of Non-Self-Governing Territories – sovereignty over natural resources (peremptory norm/jus cogens) (Clark, 2007: 52).

3.3.3.2. International Law and Natural Resources, the Hans Corell Opinion

In October of 2001209, the Moroccan company ONAREP (Office National de Recherches et d’Exploitations petrolières) signed two separate contracts with US-based Kerr-McGee and French-based Total (at the time TotalFinalElf) for oil reconnaissance and evaluation activities for potential hydrocarbons in areas offshore Western Sahara (Boujdour and Dakhla). In effect, these one-year licenses authorized these companies to analyze seismic data in order to make a preliminary evaluation of the geology of the area (Fisera, 2004: 48). If they wanted to convert the license into a petroleum agreement for oil exploration and exploitation in cooperation with ONAREP at the end of the

209 Raphaël Fisera (2004) argues that the deal was timed to coincide and influence the 2001 Baker Plan. See the details of the 2001 Framework Agreement below. 315 reconnaissance permit, they would have that option (48)210. Although the transnational corporations Kerr-McGee and Total signed the contracts with ONAREP, they outsourced the task of the physical collection of the seismic data in the offshore area of Boujdour and Dakhla to Norwegian exploration company TGS Nopec and the second phase of seismic exploration to a Dutch company Fugro N.V. in cooperation with its UK-based subsidiary Fugro S1 Limited/Svitzer and Robertson Research International (50-51). In 2004, Wessex exploration initiated a comprehensive technical analysis of the El-Ayoun Basin for the further exploration of hydrocarbon in this underexplored area (51). In preemption of international criticism, Moroccan Energy of Mines Minister Boutaleb declared that there was no problem because exploration of the basin did not constitute a legal violation: “It’s simply our country and His Majesty the King is committed to developing Morocco, so there is no question or illegal aspects to exploration and development there” (Fisera, 2004: 48; author quoted Boutaleb from Upstream Online, April 29, 2004). In November of 2001, however, the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly requested the opinion of the United Nations Legal Counsel regarding: “the legality in the context of international law, including relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, and agreements concerning Western Sahara of actions allegedly taken by the Moroccan authorities consisting in the offering and signing of contracts with foreign companies for the exploration of mineral resources in Western Sahara” (United Nations Security Council, 2002: 1). In February of 2002, Under-Secretary for Legal Affairs Hans Corell released his opinion on this question. In this opinion, Corell first reaffirms the status of Western Sahara as a Non-Self- Governing Territory and confirms that it should be treated with respects to Article 73e of the Charter of the United Nations (see Chapter One). Accordingly, he assesses the

210 Fisera argues that transnational corporations (TNCs) can directly affect the welfare and the self- determination of peoples, while the means to enforce corporate accountability are limited and poorly adapted to present global realities. Among the companies that have taken an interest in potential hydrocarbons in Western Sahara are Gulf Oil, WB Grace, Texaco and Standard Oil. In the mid-sixties, U.S. companies Pan Americano Hispano Oil, Caltex, Gulf Oil and Philips began onshore exploration of the desert resources of Western Sahara (the results of which have been kept secret) (Fisera, 2004: 47). Two U.S. companies found significant gas deposits south of Smara in the late sixties. In 1978, Morocco awarded Philips Oil and BP offshore blocks, which were later abandoned due to the outbreak of hostilities with the Frente POLISARIO. In 1981, Shell also abandoned an oil project with Morocco (47). 316 principles of international law governing mineral resources within the legal parameters of Non-Self-Governing Territories. Corell determines that Spain was technically the administering power and that the Madrid Accords (Agreements) did not transfer sovereignty over the territory, nor did it confer upon any of the signatories the status of an administering power. This is due to the fact that under UN procedure, Spain cannot unilaterally transfer Western Sahara to another party. However, he also acknowledges that Spain terminated its presence in Western Sahara and relinquished its responsibilities over the territory on February 26, 1976. In an attempt to bridge this gap between the factual and the actual, Corell notes that from the time that Mauritania left the war, Morocco administered the territory alone and yet is not listed as administering power of the territory in the United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories. He then completely shifts gears, and with the magic words “Notwithstanding the foregoing” proceeds to focus on Western Sahara’s status as a Non-Self-Governing Territory to justify going ahead and analyzing “the powers and responsibilities of an administering Power in matters of mineral resource activities in such a Territory” (United Nations Security Council, 2002: 2). In spite of the fact that Morocco is not the administering power, but in light of Morocco’s control of the territory, Corell decided to approach the original question as if Morocco were a “de facto administering power or an administrative power” (Chapaux, 2007: 223). The designation of administering power is of utmost relevance because it determines the party responsible for the people of the Non-Self-Governing Territory and any activities carried out in the territory, particularly the exploitation of natural resources (Fisera, 2004: 33). Corell could have used an analogy to South Africa in Namibia (Section D, paragraph 19 of his opinion) to support the conclusion that the contracts were illegal per se because Morocco lacks administering power in Western Sahara and hence lacks the authority to contract (United Nations Security Council, 1970). Because the UN condemned (albeit lightly) the Moroccan invasion of Western Sahara, Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (addressing South Africa in Namibia) is quite relevant and analogous. However, because United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions only ‘deplored’ the Green March and invoked Article VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) instead of Article VII of the United Nations Charter (Action with Respect to

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Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression), Corell is able to avoid this linear reasoning and disregard all Security Council resolutions on Spanish/Western Sahara as part of a political process “not relevant to the legal regime applicable to mineral resource activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories” (United Nations Security Council, 2002: 4). Vincent Chapaux explains that, in essence, Corell created an entire new legal category that would allow him to address Morocco within the confines of a Non-Self- Governing Territory in international law (224). The concept of de facto administering power does not exist in current international law (223). In fact, the International Status of South-West Africa Advisory Opinion (1950) supports the view that when a state is not recognized as an administering power by the United Nations, its presence is prima facie illegal (Chapaux, 2007: 223; International Court of Justice Reports, 1950: 133). For this reason, Chapaux argues that it is more accurate to designate Morocco as an occupying power (Chapaux, 2007: 223). Furthermore, as is evident by the cases of Namibia, Palestine and East Timor, it is possible to simultaneously be a Non-Self-Governing Territory and an occupied territory, a duality that has not necessitated the creation of a new designation of de facto administering power for the South African, Israeli and Indonesian occupiers (223, 225). By refusing to name Morocco an occupying power, Corell avoids having to apply the norms that guide humanitarian law and the laws of occupation as well (see also Brus, 2007: 207). Evidently, for the purposes of his analysis and conclusion, Corell treats Morocco as an administrative authority with the power to contract without giving any explanation for why. In essence, Corell validates the contracts without fully explaining how Morocco became the proper administering party, but as if Morocco is the proper power. Although Corell practices avoidance, he cannot avoid falling victim to his own logic. Under Article 73e, an administering power is required to report annually, and yet Morocco has never reported as such. An administering authority cannot fail in its obligations and still claim to act in this capacity in relation to the territory (International Court of Justice Reports, 1950). In this regard, Corell notes the failure to report, but does not take it to its logical conclusion. Morocco has not been acting as ‘de facto’ administering authority. It has only been taking rights without fulfilling obligations of an

318 administering authority. Corell completely begs the question of why, if Morocco is not an administering power, the contracts are not illegal per se. Along this reasoning, how can Morocco enter into binding contracts in the first place? It appears as if once Corell determined that they were not adverse to the interests of the people, he could argue (or ensure) that the contracts were valid. It is as if Corell inversely argues his point. He begins with the desired result and argues to end up there so that the result-oriented conclusion steers his argument, one that is not fully supported by his cited authorities and is rather poorly reasoned. In conclusion, Corell finds that resource exploitation activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories are compatible with the obligations of the Charter and the administering power (“in conformity with the General Assembly resolutions and the principle of ‘permanent sovereignty over natural resources’ enshrined therein”) when conducted “for the benefit of the peoples of those Territories on their behalf or in consultation with their representatives” (United Nations Security Council, 2002: 6). Furthermore, in a somewhat perplexing disclaimer, he qualifies this statement with the following: “while the specific contracts which are the subject of the Security Council’s request are not in themselves illegal, if further exploration and exploitation activities were to proceed in disregard of the interests and wishes of the people of Western Sahara, they would be in violation of the principles on international law applicable to mineral resource activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories” (United Nations Security Council, 2002: 6). Even though this outcome-oriented (Realpolitik) opinion did not have an immediate effect (Brus, 2007: 214), particularly with regard to any concrete endorsement of the Security Council, it has had ramifications on the actions of the European Union/Community and has prompted a critical discussion on the relationship of international law (peremptory norms), transnational corporations (non- recognition) and the rights of Non-Self-Governing/occupied peoples to their natural resources. In addition, it demonstrates the functioning of Realpolitik in legal argumentation.

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3.3.3.3. The Corporate Dimension and Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens)

The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement between the Kingdom of Morocco and the European Union aims to “promote economic, social, cultural and financial cooperation” (European Union, 2005). The agreement bears no reference to Western Sahara or a provision excluding Western Sahara from potential economic agreements. Additionally, Morocco’s bilateral agreements and trading relations with the European Union do not exclude Western Sahara (Koury, 2007: 178)211. For example, the 2005 Fisheries Partnership agreement between the European Community (EC) and Morocco contains a provision that explicitly states that “fishing activities covered by this agreement shall be subject to the laws and regulations in force in Morocco, thereby encompassing the waters of the Western Sahara” (178). The agreement ensures reduced or no tariffs for particular products, but establishes no exclusionary clause nor direct reference to the disputed area of Western Sahara. Morocco claims Western Sahara as one of its provinces. It can therefore only be assumed that Rabat intends to further exploit and explore the natural resources of the region. Seventy-five percent of Moroccan exports are destined for the European Union. Among its major exports are phosphates (and their by- products) and sea products, two significant natural resources in Western Sahara (189). Morocco also issued fishing licenses for European vessels, authorizing them to operate in the waters of Western Sahara (Chapaux, 2007: 218). As mentioned above, the European Union’s interest proximity to the conflict has directly affected the decolonization process for Western Sahara and the right of the Sahrawi people to exercise their right to self-determination. Furthermore, and as established in Chapter One, peremptory norms like self-determination and non- recognition (the duty to not recognize unlawful situations created by, for example, acts of aggression or the denial of the right to exercise self-determination) should steer state behavior and by extension the activities of transnational corporations. It is the obligation

211 Koury argues that “the exploitation or plundering of marine and other natural resources of colonial and non-self-governing territories by foreign economic interests” directly violates this substantive right to sovereignty over natural resources (Koury, 2007: 172). Furthermore, Koury views Morocco as an occupying power even though the United Nations has not officially recognized Morocco as such. From this angle, Morocco is also prohibited from exploiting the natural resources of the territory for commercial purposes to meet its domestic needs or boost its economy (174). 320 of third states to enact policies of non-recognition. If they fail to do so, bilateral agreements with the European Community or other states “can function as a means by which Morocco consolidates its claim to sovereignty over the Western Sahara” (Koury, 2007: 188). However, states and transnational corporations have discovered loopholes to sidestep these clear guidelines of international law. This relatively new corporate dimension to conflict needs to be understood in the context of a quickly globalizing world. I will address the specific implications of globalization in Chapter Four. With regards to natural resources, any contract that violates international law legitimizes Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara; inadvertently funds illegal Moroccan settlers in the territory; and undeniably contributes to the prolongation of the conflict and the stalemating of conflict transformation possibilities (Wilson, 2007: 262). Since traditional methods of diplomacy have failed, Morocco has shifted its strategy for control of Western Sahara. Through its commercial and economic relationships, Morocco is trying to gain international de facto recognition of its annexation of the territory (Fisera, 2004: 63). With respects to Sahrawi fishery reserves, Morocco has also signed contracts with the Russian Federation and Dutch-based Pelagic Freezer-trawler Association (Fisera, 2004: 43). In fact, Morocco does utilize bilateral agreements with states and regional blocs like the European Union as a calculated means to consolidate sovereignty over Western Sahara. It is clear that the international norm of non-recognition of Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara is endangered as the interest proximity of states and organizations increases and as competition intensifies cutthroat behavior in the global markets. Even though the European Court has determined that the member states of the European Union (and as a unit itself) must respect international law and comply with the rules of customary international law (Koury, 2007: 195), member states continue to walk a fine line between what is acceptable and unacceptable behavior. For example, in response to international criticism over the Fisheries Agreement, European Parliament used Corell’s ‘de facto administering power’ argument to justify the decision that Morocco had the right to exploit the natural resources of Western Sahara as long as this exploitation was carried out in the interests and wishes of the people of the territory (Chapaux, 2007: 223).

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In light of unregulated and widespread abuse of international law, international advocacy groups have become essential for creating international pressure for perpetrators/violators of international law and for tightening the extent of its application. The Frente POLISARIO has also responded creatively to Morocco’s new tactics.

3.3.3.4. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources

Afifa Karmous (2001) contends that the five sub-principles of the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources have been slowly eroding. They are: the Non-Self-Governing Territory and its natural resources may not be alienated to the benefit of the occupying power; abusive exploitation or plundering of natural resources which are the propriety of Non-Self-Governing peoples is contrary to international law; the administering power must ensure the well-being of the Non-Self-Governing peoples and their rights over their natural resources; the State has the obligation to sanction its citizens and legal persons of its nationality which act in contradiction with the interests of Non-Self-Governing peoples; and foreign economic investments must be realized in collaboration with the Non-Self-Governing people and according to their interests (cited in and translated by Fisera, 2004: 38212). What recourse do Non-Self-Governing peoples have to ensure their inalienable right to natural resources inscribed in international law? The Frente POLISARIO reacted to Moroccan bilateral agreements with companies, states and regions by signing its own contract, a counter-deal with Australian based company Fusion Oil (Fisera, 2004: 52). On May 27, 2002, the two parties signed an agreement for Fusion to evaluate the petroleum potential and oil and gas prospects in the entire offshore area of Western Sahara (53). In 2003, Fusion signed a deal with Premier Oil, a United Kingdom-based company, adding another “corporate ally” to the self-determination of the Sahrawi people (53). A small independent oil and gas exploration company, Fusion has become one of the leading players in Northwest Africa (53). This involvement is of particular relevance to the corporate dimension of the conflict. Fusion has publicly taken interest in the Sahrawi struggle, fusing the geopolitical with political struggle, and has adopted the legal and historical perspective of the Sahrawi

212 I slightly modified Fisera’s translation. 322 conflict: “if, as we fully expect, there is a just resolution that allows the Saharawi people to administer their own territory, then there is an opportunity for us to explore a whole new province and we will have delivered a game changing opportunity for our shareholders” (Fisera, 2004: 56-57; also cited in Beckman, 2003)213. Obviously, since the contract covers the same area as Morocco’s, the signatories of each are placed in direct competition with one another. Ironically, neither holder of the contract is in an ideal situation. Morocco is still the occupying power and the SADR is a state in exile. In addition to the Frente POLISARIO’s creative countermove and in response to the lack of international media coverage of the conflict, transnational advocacy networks in coalition with Sahrawi civil society work towards bringing attention to the conflict214. In the case of Western Sahara, Information and Communication Technology has provided the necessary technological framework for mounting an international resource watch network for the safeguarding of valuable resources like fish, phosphates and potential oil in the territory of Western Sahara. As argued above, contracts with foreign companies to exploit resources such as phosphates and fish and to explore for oil in Western Sahara undermine peremptory norms (Brus, 2007; Chapaux, 2007; Hagen, 2007; Hannikainen, 2007; Koury, 2007; Wilson, 2007). However, where states fall short of this commitment to the norms of international law, advocacy groups and campaigns sound the call for transnational pressure campaigns. Foreign companies operating under Moroccan concession like Total (French), Wessex Exploration (UK), Suitzer (Dutch), Robertson Research International (Wales), TGS Nopec (Norway) and Kerr-McGee (U.S.), have become targets of international protest campaigns (White, 2007: 46). Such campaigns have proven to be very successful and all of the above have ended their operations in Western Sahara, with Kerr-McGee holding out the longest. When the Kerr-McGee (KMG) Corporation215 began offshore oil exploration in the waters of Western Sahara, Western Sahara Resource Watch (WSRW) mounted a

213 In December of 2003, British-based Sterling Energy Plc. mounted a hostile takeover of Fusion. As of February 11, 2004, Fusion has been a subsidiary of Sterling. 214 I have adapted the following information on transnational advocacy networks from my part of a collaborative article; see Section III: “Cruzar las Fronteras: la Sociedad Civil Saharaui y las Organizaciones Internacionales de Solidaridad” (Omar et al., 2009: 31-42) 215 KMG is a United States company that was acquired by Anadarko Petroleum Company in 2006. 323 campaign against the illegal activity216. WSRW works towards preserving the natural resources of Western Sahara “for the usage of its people, in as much as their sovereignty over those resources is a right” (Wilson, 2007: 250). The organization is an international non-governmental coalition of organizations and individuals that engages with both Sahrawi civil society in Western Sahara and the Frente POLISARIO. Their objectives are multifaceted but focus on three main areas of advocacy: legal, economic and collection and documentation of information. In essence, they strive to safeguard the sovereignty of the Sahrawi people over the natural resources of the territory; to end the exploitation of natural resources that fund Moroccan occupation; to prevent foreign companies from exploring and exploiting these same resources; to take legal action against companies, governments and multinational organizations seeking to exploit the territory; to collect information and documentation regarding such abuses; and to establish a network of local, national and international organizations working to accomplish the aforementioned goals (251). These methods proved successful in the fight against Kerr-McGee. By applying direct and indirect pressure on KMG’s executives and stockholders in conjunction with local pressure from churches in Oklahoma State, KMG renounced its offshore drilling project due to “business reasons” (252). In reality, international pressure caused some shareholders to discontinue their financial commitment to KMG based on ethical concerns for the appropriate handling of the resources in the disputed area. The Norwegian Support Committee for Western Sahara (NSCWS), a membership organization founded in 1993, distributes information on the Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara and emphasizes the need to stop foreign companies working alongside Moroccan authorities from exploiting resources in the occupied territories. However, despite these labors, around three million tons of phosphates are exported annually from El-Ayoun to North America, South America, Eastern and Western Europe and Asia (Hagen, 2007: 271). The importing companies include big multinationals and private investors from countries like the Netherlands (271). NSCWS is committed to forming alliances with other non-governmental organizations, political parties, trade unions,

216 For a full account of the activities of Kerr-McGee concerning their exploration/exploitation of Western Sahara see Wilson, 2007: 252-259. 324 research communities and governments in order to prevent such interactions. International attention to the conflict helps prevent blatant abuses of international law and norms and challenges Morocco’s seemingly impudent attitude towards them.

3.3.4. Interest Proximity and Realpolitik Discourse

Economic, geopolitical, cultural, linguistic interests (all of which increase interest proximity of actors) are interlinked in parallel fashion with direct goals (more unidimensional aims) and with the creation and function of the hegemonic capitalist free market system. When U.S. State Department Director of Policy George Kennan outlined U.S. foreign policy in 1948, he was announcing the new rule of law for international relations and the hegemonic Realpolitik discourse system – the ideas, policies and actions necessary to sustain, maintain, propagate, strengthen and grow it:

“Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity [unequal distribution of resources between countries]…To do so, we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming…We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford today the luxury of altruism and world- benefaction. We should dispense with the aspiration to ‘be liked’ or to be regarded as the repository of a high-minded international altruism…We should cease to talk about vague and…unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better” (Kennan, 1948: 524-525).

This message, perceived in Cold War binary ideology and contingent upon institutional and political factors (see Boswell, 1999: 272), provides insight into the machinations of the system within which it was produced. The goal of Realpolitik discourse is not just to spread its messages through language, culture and ‘genius’ in order to achieve political and cultural assimilation (see Bush, 2006: 203), rather the system of Realpolitik discourse (the people behind the system, in the system as well as the system itself) seeks to naturalize its ideas, policies and actions and delegitimize alternative interpretive horizons. Strategies related to ideas, policies and actions working in function of a greater system (beliefs, ideologies, knowledges, régimes of truth) produce concrete results like

325 oil contracts and reconnaissance and billion dollar deals and political power. Simultaneously, they create, produce and maintain the system as well as function in support of the system in such a way that is self-perpetuating and self-sustaining. In our Western Sahara context, these strategies include crude attempts at ‘recolonizing’ valuable resources in North Africa, particularly oil (Bush, 2006: 203), and integrating these economic, (geo)political, cultural and military goals into, ironically (when considering the statement above), altruistic language of cooperation and mutual benefit. For example, during a conference on terrorism sponsored by the United States and the African Union (AU), Ambassador-at-large for Counterterrorism Henry Crumpton issued the following call to action:

“We envision a multi-faceted, multi-year strategy aimed at defeating terrorist organisations by helping to strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities, by enhancing and institutionalising cooperation between your security forces and ours and most importantly, by promoting economic development, good governance, education, liberal institutions and democracy. Through broad policy success we discredit terrorist ideology and deny them the recruits they need, while providing these erstwhile recruits opportunity and hope” (Zoubir, 2006: 11).

This statement ignores the more complicated roots of terrorism, like the U.S. preference for undemocratic ‘moderate regimes’ (Hemmer, 2007: 56), but it clearly prioritizes a military-economic relationship, which it claims will set the stage for positive development. In fact, the co-opted message of cooperation and mutual benefit serves to promote the end goals of a hegemonic capitalist system. The decolonization process for Western Sahara has been swept into the interest- proximity realm of this agenda. As detailed above, the more than questionable role of the United States and France and also the less substantial, but nevertheless important roles of Spain, the European Union, other states and transnational companies have negatively impacted the process of conflict transformation for Western Sahara. In fact, their economic, (geo)political, cultural, linguistic, social and military interests have unequivocally contributed to the stalemated diplomatic situation for Western Sahara and have directly, if not intentionally, undermined the peremptory norms of the Sahrawi people – their right to self-determination and the natural resources of the territory. The

326 final section of this chapter looks at the history of the conflict through a discussion of the failed referendum plans since 1991. It does so by specifically addressing the Peace Process through theoretical and practical understandings of mediation. This analytical process requires acknowledging the overlap between actors in conflict (primary, shadow- primary, secondary and others) and third-party mediators of conflict.

3.4. Third-Party Mediation: Peace Plans for Western Sahara

3.4.1. Mediation

“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere” (Martin Luther King Jr.; cited in Carson, 1998: 189).

I began this chapter by suggesting that a shift in interpretive horizon is necessary for conflict analysis in general and with specific regard to the conflict context of Western Sahara. By shifting our interpretive horizons, we are in fact attempting to step outside of the essentialized and normalized discourses of the hegemonic globalized capitalist system, which inform our ways of understanding and approaching international conflict today, i.e. ‘realist’ and balance of power approaches to conflict. The very language of the dominant (and consented to) system is embedded in our approaches to conflict. Therefore, if we do not question the very analytical coordinates of our approaches to conflict prevention, hot conflict and diplomatic stalemates, we will fail to introduce equitable, just and lasting solutions for conflict transformation. Thus far, I have recounted the actual events of the hot conflict period of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict; I have attempted to shift our interpretive horizons with regards to conflict mapping in general and Western Sahara specifically by reconceptualizing how we designate who’s who in conflict; and I have examined the extent of involvement and impact of key actors in the conflict utilizing these new categories for conflict mapping. When talking about mediation and the Peace Plan for Western Sahara (the whole of attempts at carrying out the process of self-determination for the Sahrawi people from the 1991 ceasefire until today), we are able to see the overlap between the actors of a conflict (primary, secondary and other) and third-party intervention. In fact, the very

327 secondary and other actors in a conflict may also be in opportune positions for third-party intervention or may even vie for such positions in order to more effectively influence the conflict outcome. Although at times lacking distinction, it is important to differentiate between the actors involved in conflict and the actors participating in third-party intervention. In this conflict analysis of Western Sahara, however, I am concerned with secondary and other actor involvement as third-party interveners. Conflict transformation strategies suggest that third-party intervention is necessary when the parties to a conflict cannot open up the political space to approach their apparently irreconcilable differences in new and creative ways (Bloomfield et al., 2003b: 63). Third-party intervention is especially effective in protracted conflicts (Bercovitch, 1997; 2005). It can take the form of arbitration (an intermediary listens to all sides of a case and makes a decision) or negotiation (the primary actors directly engage); however, for this particular analysis, I will concentrate on mediation. Like all conflict concepts, mediation has been defined in different and yet relatively complimentary ways. Christopher Mitchell explains that mediation is an “intermediary activity…undertaken by a third party with the primary intention of achieving some compromise settlement of issues at stake between the parties, or at least ending disruptive conflict behavior” (1981: 97; also cited in Bercovitch, 2005: 106). Jay Folberg and Alison Taylor conceptualize mediation as a process, one in which the participants, with the assistance of a neutral person or persons, “systematically isolate disputed issues in order to develop options, consider alternatives, and reach a consensual settlement that will accommodate their needs” (1984: 7; also cited in Bercovitch, 2005: 106-107). Christopher W. Moore defines mediation as “an extension and elaboration of the negotiation process that involves the intervention of an acceptable, impartial, and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision making power to assist contending parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement” (1996: 6; also cited in Bercovitch, 2005: 106). Bercovitch builds upon the definitions of Mitchell, Folberg and Taylor and Moore and refers to mediation as “a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties’ own negotiations, in which those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider (whether an individual, an organization, a group, or a state) to change their perceptions or behavior,

328 and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law” (Bercovitch, 1997: 130; 2005: 107). Finally, Ronald J. Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly qualify mediation at the international level as “interventions by credible and competent intermediaries who assist the parties in working toward a negotiated settlement on substantive issues through persuasion, the control of information, the suggestion of alternatives, and, in some cases, the application of leverage” (Fisher and Keashly, 1991: 30). The points of commonality of each definition reside in one premise: the intervention of a third-party in order to facilitate a settlement(s)/change(s) (consensual and voluntary) of some kind (of issues, of disruptive behavior, of perceptions). Although mediation can be used in multiple conflict settings from the interpersonal to intergroup conflicts, this study is concerned with mediation at the international level and regarding the peaceful transformation of interstate/intrastate/decolonization conflicts. Bercovitch states that mediation has been widely regarded as “the most common form of peaceful intervention in international conflicts” (2005: 106). In this environment, states, their representatives and international organizations carry out mediation (Bercovitch, 1997: 141). This can also be called a Track I approach to conflict mediation. Track I refers to top leaders/leadership, the United Nations, international and regional organizations and governments and international financial institutions. Track II (international NGOs, churches, academics, private businesses, etc.) and Track III (grassroots) approaches to conflict are absolutely integral to a holistic view of mediation and third-party intervention. However, I have chosen to focus on official forms of mediation versus non-official (Track II) and indigenous (Track III) because Track I mediation and third-party intervention have had the most bearing on the case of Western Sahara and because Realpolitik discourses most heavily affect our official understandings of conflict analysis, including mediation217. Although insider/outsider evaluations of mediation (Lederach, 1995; Wehr and Lederach, 1996) are essential to a broader and deeper understanding of mediation and third-party intervention, I wish to draw our attention to the United Nations’ role in conflict generally and in the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict specifically.

217 See Ramsbotham et al. for an in-depth discussion of Track I, II and III mediation and third-party intervention (2005: 26; 167-168). 329

Bercovitch argues that mediation is particularly appropriate when “(a) a conflict is long, drawn out, or complex; (b) the parties’ own conflict-management efforts have reached an impasse; (c) neither party is prepared to countenance further costs or loss of life; and (d) both parties are prepared to cooperate, tacitly or openly, to break their stalemate” (Bercovitch, 1997: 133). Mediation efforts can improve confidence and trust between primary actors. Mediators have the capacity to set agendas, clarify issues, formulate agreements, facilitate meetings and reduce tension. Furthermore, through the exploration of the interests of the parties, mediation can lead to “unrealized possibilities” and, as stated above, can “open up new political space” (Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 168). Contrary to Moore’s assertion, mediators may strive for or at least uphold the pretenses of striving for impartiality and neutrality; however, these concepts are relative and marked by degrees. There is no such thing as ‘pure’ impartiality or neutrality. If we recall the model of third-party intervention of Encarnacion et al. that we adapted for conflict mapping in Part Two of this chapter, we can see the importance of the abovementioned overlap between actors to conflict and mediators in conflict. The very actors that are identified in the process of conflict mapping may also participate in facilitating the mediation process218. In this regard, the interest proximity of mediators must also be considered when looking at our understandings and theoretical conceptualizations of mediation. More powerful states often take advantage of opportunities for mediation in order to safeguard, secure and advance their interests (Bercovitch, 1997: 142). However, these interventions represent much more than geopolitical power moves. They demonstrate the very structuration of the hegemonic system in which mediation takes place and is inscribed. It is too simplistic of an analysis to present mediation as “the intertwining of interests, resources, and positions” in order to influence conflict outcomes (Bercovitch, 1997: 149; see also Zartman and Touval, 1996: 428-429). In fact, such a

218 As Encarnacion et al. point out, embedded parties within the core parties have the potential to move out of an embedded position in the conflict to a position where third-party/mediator involvement is possible. These would include, for example, political parties that may disagree with the official position of the state or may be more flexible than the state. For example, in the case of Western Sahara, the Moroccan political party, the Democratic Path (Annahjaddimocrati), has been sympathetic to the Sahrawi cause. This group’s openness to the Frente POLISARIO’s demands for self-determination, a position that diverges from the official line of the Moroccan state, places them in a unique position whereby they could participate in a mediating capacity in the dispute. However, although I recognize the mobility of actor-involvement in mediation and the fact that this subject merits further review, I particularly focus on the role of secondary actors and other actors as mediators in conflict. 330 representation fits very well into Realpolitik discourses. Of course, geopolitical and power politics motivations for participation in the processes of mediation cannot be ignored; however, the ultimate purpose of mediation is not to help one of the participants to win (Zartman and Touval, 1996: 427), but to create the political space that opens up possibilities for positive conflict transformation. In order to do so, we must not only explore such alternatives for particular conflicts. We must also deconstruct certain aspects of how mediation is understood. Mediation perceived through a power politics foreign policy lens is our point of departure. It is the dominant discourse. Even mediation conceived of as a positive conflict transformation tool responds to and cannot escape the pervasiveness of Realpolitik in practice and in theoretical discussions on the subject of mediation. Since 1945, the United States has been the most active mediator of international conflicts (Zartman and Touval, 2000: 447). Analyses of ‘self-interested’ approaches to mediation recognize the motives of state actors to extend and increase their influence via third-party intervention (446-447). In this regard, it has been argued that mediators can allow themselves some latitude in their degree of partiality and can be granted some leeway in expressing their preference for a desired outcome (451). The problem with the ‘matter of factness’ of this statement does not only reside in the essentialized acceptance of real politics dominance models, but also in the expanse and reach of such statements into justified conflict resolution practices. Just because something exists, in this case mediation for the purposes of social, political and economic ascendancy, does not mean that it should be propagated nor naturalized. Furthermore, it is only within this real politics construct that the following ethical dilemmas make any sense and could present an ethical dilemma for that matter. The first dilemma proposed by Zartman and Touval is whether conflict mediators should give priority to a cease-fire or to postpone the settlement of the conflict for a later time or, in other words, whether they should choose between order and justice (459). The second dilemma that may face mediators is whether to facilitate “an attainable settlement” which violates international norms or to stay the conflict storm until options surface that are “consistent” with the principles and norms of international law (459). Although Zartman and Touval note that settlements which are inconsistent with established international

331 norms and principles undermine their very validity, thereby weakening their effectiveness on international conduct (459), they fail to make the connection regarding how their very representative language of mediation and mediation strategies creates the norms and regulations of how mediation behavior (what is acceptable) can be translated and executed. The power politics they talk about in relation to the purpose and possibilities of mediation reflect, reinforce, create and recreate the very models of state-to-state domination. They are inseparable and reciprocal. Additionally, it is within this real politics construct and discourse that the role of the UN as mediator can be unclear, uncertain, constrained and undermined – in our case, how its role in the decolonization of Western Sahara and the Peace Process is unclear, uncertain, constrained and undermined. Besides the fact that the United Nations failed to invoke Article VII of the United Nations Charter (“Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”) when Morocco invaded and occupied Western Sahara, it has also fallen short of its obligations regarding the mediation process for the conflict of Western Sahara. Although I aim to address the mediation inadequacies particular to the case of Western Sahara, this specific case informs more general understandings of the factors that impede and/or adversely affect the role of the United Nations as a mediator in conflict. The United Nations was obligated by international law to intervene in the dispute between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO. The act of mediation by the UN implicates the Secretary General’s “Good Offices” (the Secretary-General and his representatives)219. In keeping with the principles of the UN Charter, UN mediation efforts involve the use of all available political skills and tools for the peaceful transformation of conflict. As a third-party intervener accepted by the primary actors in the conflict, the UN may intervene in the preventative, hot conflict and stalemated stages of conflict. Concerning Western Sahara, the United Nations has a mediation mandate to resolve the dispute. This means that the parties to the conflict accept the mediating capacity of the United Nations. The Secretary-General, or his envoys, meet with and listen to all of the parties to the conflict; consult with them to explore all possible avenues for conflict transformation; and suggest or even organize plans for the peaceful resolution

219 For a thorough discussion on mediation and the United Nations see Nita Yawanarajah, 2003. 332 of the conflict. Unless the Security Council takes action to enforce a plan or agreement, a UN mediated outcome is non-binding. Therefore, the successful implementation of a peace plan, other than one mandated by the Security Council, ultimately relies upon the commitment of the parties to such a plan (Yawanarajah, 2003). While it is true that outside mediators and third-party interveners can be “catalysts for peacemaking,” “essential for contributing to issue transformations” and necessary for the transformation of protracted conflict (Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 167-168), it is also true that they have contributed to the protracted nature of conflict. In this regard, Crocker et al. ask the following question: “What is the relationship between intractability and mediator involvement – that is, when does third-party peacemaking reduce conflict and increase the prospects of a negotiated settlement, and when does it aggravate conflict, thereby adding to its ‘intractability’?” (Crocker et al., 2005: 24). I would like to ask a revised version of this question and direct it toward the UN as mediator/peacemaker. What are the interest-proximity-coordinates – social, (geo)political and economic – that increase the prospects of a negotiated settlement, and when do they impede the conflict transformation process and add to the protracted nature of conflict? However, I look to Realpolitik discourses to answer this question and not only to the surface intertwining of interests, resources and positions. In short, I am asking how Realpolitik conflict discourse affects not only the efficacy of the United Nations as a mediating body, but also the political will of the United Nations in the peaceful transformation of conflicts220. The following breakdown of the various peace plans for Western Sahara sheds light on how the Peace Process has been carried out in function of real politics rather than international norms and/or a commitment to the peaceful transformation of the conflict. I will first provide a brief overview of the specific plans, followed by a general analysis of the Peace Process.

220 For an enlightening study of the political will of the United Nations in the question of Western Sahara see the doctoral dissertation of Limam El Jalil Aali, Las Naciones Unidas y la cuestión del Sáhara Occidental: una visión crítica de una descolonización inacabada, 2009. 333

3.4.2. The Peace Process

3.4.2.1. Settlement Plan

On June 18, 1990, Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar submitted a two-part report concerning the situation of Western Sahara to the Security Council (United Nations Report of the Secretary-General, 1990). The plan contained the full text of the settlement proposals, which had been facilitated by the United Nations and the OAU on August 30, 1988 (see Security Council Resolution 621, 1988), and outlined an implementation of these proposals. The ultimate goal of the plan was to organize221:

“a just and definitive solution to the question of Western Sahara in conformity with General Assembly resolution 1514(XV) by means of a cease-fire and the holding of a referendum without military or administrative constraints to enable the people of Western Sahara, in the exercise of their right to self-determination, to choose between independence and integration with Morocco” (United Nations Report of the Secretary-General, 1990).

Part One (the Settlement Proposals) detailed the necessary steps to accomplish the ceasefire and referendum that had been agreed upon in principle by Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO. In order, it stipulated the role of the Security Council; the mandate and functions of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General; the details of the ceasefire; the procedure for the census of the Sahrawi population; and the specifics to the organization and execution of the referendum. The report specifically requested the Security Council to adopt a resolution that would grant the Secretary-General the right to appoint a Special Representative in consultation with the Chairman of the OAU and with the consent of the parties. It was also charged with making the necessary arrangements for an Observer Group. Once determined, the position of Special Representative of the Secretary-General would have sole and exclusive authority over all of the matters related to the referendum, its organization and conduct. In turn, a support group made up of

221 I have chosen to speak of the Settlement Plan and subsequent plans in the past tense in order to highlight the historical progression of the Peace Plan. Technically, however, the Settlement Plan has never been officially declared null and void. In fact, the Frente POLISARIO still upholds the Settlement Plan as the preferred solution to the conflict. 334 civilian, military and security units would be made available to the Special Representative. Regarding the execution of a successful ceasefire, the report called upon the parties to the conflict to scrupulously abide by its rules and regulations and to end all acts of hostility. Furthermore, the Secretary-General in consultation with the current Chairman of the OAU would set and declare the date of the ceasefire. Once established, the Secretary-General would send the date, time and procedures of the ceasefire to the parties. At this time, the parties were required to halt all military operations, including troop movements and reinforcements and acts of violence or intimidation. On the one hand, the plan obligated Morocco to phase reduction of troops in Western Sahara so the referendum could be carried out without military constraints. On the other hand, it requested the Frente POLISARIO to relinquish control of its troops to the supervision of the UN Observer Group in conjunction with general principles of peacekeeping operations. The identification commission was made responsible for reviewing and updating the 1974 census of the Sahrawi people. All Sahrawis aged eighteen years and older counted in the 1974 census would have the right to vote in the referendum. The Sahrawi identification committee would carefully review the census taken in the Territory by Spanish authorities, update it and calculate the real growth of the Sahrawi population in the period between the date of the above census and the date of the organization of the referendum, taking into account births and deaths and movements of the Sahrawi population. In addition, the Special Representative would have the power to designate the places for a census of Sahrawi refugees living outside the Territory. The commission would then determine the number of Sahrawis living in the territory of Western Sahara and the number of Sahrawi refugees and non-residents qualified to participate in the referendum. Under the guidance of a population expert, the commission would submit a report to the Special Representative and consult tribal chiefs. The plan called for guarantees of a free and equitable referendum so that all Sahrawi refugees identified to vote could do so without restriction and without running the risk of detention, intimidation or imprisonment. These guarantees included complete freedom of speech and freedom of movement of the press. As such, the referendum

335 would be carried out freely and democratically and via secret ballot voting. According to the plan, both parties would abide by the results of the referendum. Part Two reiterated the Secretary-General’s implementation plan for giving effect to the settlement proposals, taking into consideration the developments since the agreement in principle by the parties of the 1988 settlement proposals (United Nations Report of the Secretary-General, 1990). However, it also further detailed the main elements of the implementation plan. Important additions included a timetable for the referendum to be carried out twenty-four weeks after the ceasefire and the results proclaimed in seventy-two hours. The Special Representative would have the authority to determine whether circumstances required any alteration in these deadlines. The Special Representative would be assisted in his tasks and by an integrated group of United Nations civilians, military and civil police personnel called MINURSO (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara). In this broadening of scope of the settlement proposals, the Special Representative would head and direct this peacekeeping force. Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO had already accepted the premise that the United Nations held sole and exclusive responsibility for the organization of the referendum. In sum, the UN was responsible for the identification and registration of those eligible to vote; for the establishment of the conditions and modalities for a referendum campaign that safeguarded freedom of speech, assembly, movement and the press; and for ensuring voting conduct so that all eligible voters could participate without interference or intimidation and by secret ballot. Security Council Resolution 658 of June 27, 1990 gave the seal of approval for the settlement plan described above. On April 19, 1991, the Secretary-General submitted a report containing the detailed proposals regarding the composition, strength and timetable of MINURSO and estimated that its overall cost would amount to two hundred million dollars (United Nations Report of the Secretary-General, 1991). The Secretary-General stressed four conditions for MINURSO to be effective and successful: full support of the Security Council at all times; full cooperation of the parties, with specific regard for the comprehensive cessation of all hostile acts; full cooperation of neighboring countries, namely Algeria and Mauritania; and the full and timely handover of the necessary

336 financial resources by the Member states. On April 29, 1991, Security Council Resolution 690 proposed a ceasefire for September 6, 1991. By December of 1991, Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar reported that it would be impossible to carry out a number of the tasks that were to be completed before the ceasefire came into effect. Despite the parties’ acceptance of the Settlement Plan, there remained substantial areas of disagreement. Due to the complexity of the identification process, the Secretary-General suggested an adjustment of the timetable. The delay would allow the mission to establish the voter list and reconcile the interpretations of the plans of the respective parties. The identification of voters for the referendum did not get under way until August of 1994. In 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali replaced Javier Pérez de Cuéllar as UN Secretary-General222. Frente POLISARIO leader, Mohamed Abdelaziz expressed his deep concern for the process of the referendum and rejected Morocco’s claims to opening voter eligibility standards beyond the Spanish 1974 census. That same year the new Secretary-General announced that since September 1991, “92 of 102 cease-fire violations were committed by Morocco” (Pazzanita, 2006: xxxv). By 1993, Boutros-Ghali proposed three alternatives to the stalemated referendum process, which included a threat to end MINURSO’s mandate in the region. Finally, by August of 1994, the MINURSO mission began the identification of voters for the referendum. Multiple factors road-blocked the Settlement Plan. Voter identity recognition and testimony to voter authenticity (meeting of 5 criteria for voter identification previously determined by the United Nations and agreed upon by both parties to the conflict) depended on the sheikhs (tribal leaders) on both sides of the conflict (Theofilopoulou, 2006: 4). One of the main reasons for the interruption to the voter identification process was the unavailability of sheikhs or party representatives for identification (4). At this time, the Frente POLISARIO feared that Morocco would successfully weight the voter identity process in its favor without meeting the agreed upon terms. Furthermore, because the United Nations had consistently failed to carry out the decolonization process for Western Sahara, the Frente POLISARIO also worried that a strong Moroccan lobby could push through votes with no objection from the

222 It should be recalled here that upon Cuéllar ‘s departure from the UN, he capitulated to Moroccan demands and unilaterally approved an expansion of voter eligibility (see 3.1.2.2. of this chapter). 337 organization. If we recall Kissinger’s comments on utilizing the United Nations to secure a pro-Moroccan outcome, these fears were not unfounded. Furthermore, the Frente POLISARIO questioned the integrity and transparency of the identification process due to the fact that some MINURSO members had leaked some of the voter lists to Morocco. Previous experience with the United Nations and the influential outside secondary powers, the United States and France, made the Frente POLISARIO question the legitimacy of the voter identification process. By December of 1995, Boutros-Ghali admitted that he had hoped that the identification would be completed, but that he did not expect the referendum to take place “due to irreconcilable positions of the two parties” (4-5). Boutros-Ghali believed, however, that after the completion of the identification process, the United Nations could pressure the primary actors to begin direct negotiations. Unfortunately, the voter identification process came to a virtual halt in November of that year (Pazzanita, 2006: xxxvii). In response and as a show of cooperation in the referendum process, the Frente POLISARIO released 186 Moroccan prisoners. In January of 1996, Boutros-Ghali announced that he was available to facilitate direct talks between the primary actors. Later that year in a report to the Security Council, he reiterated that it had proven impossible to resume voter identification. At that time, 60,000 eligible voters had been determined. The voter identification process remained suspended through the changeover of Secretary-General to Kofi Annan in January of 1997.

3.4.2.2. Houston Accords

By the time Kofi Annan took the position of Secretary-General, the voter identification process and Settlement Plan in general were completely deadlocked. On April 2, 1997, Annan appointed former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III as Personal Envoy to the territory. Some assessments of the decision to appoint the high- level U.S. envoy have attested to the fact that the United States had not advocated for either side and was therefore trusted by both parties – a perfect fit to the stalemated

338 situation223. Others have suggested that UN engagement, in this case a high profile appointment, could “rescue forgotten conflict” (Crocker et al., 2004: 66). Analyses of the appointment along these lines are inadequate at best. As a shadow-primary actor in the conflict, the United States has always favored Morocco, and U.S. political and economic interests have always steered U.S. foreign policy on Western Sahara. In this regard, it is not, as it has been claimed (Crocker et al., 2004: 61), the lack of recognition of major states or grouping of major states to become engaged in the peacemaking process. They tend to be involved in various, intricate and covert ways. The only reason that the Frente POLISARIO did not challenge the appointment of James Baker directly correlated with his high profile position and weight in international relations. The Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict had been shelved, eclipsed by other problems facing the United Nations. By agreeing to Baker’s appointment as Special Envoy, the Frente POLISARIO secured a position at the international diplomatic table. Secretary-General Kofi Annan charged Baker with undertaking a three-fold assessment of the conflict situation: to assess the likelihood of implementation of the settlement plan in its present form; to examine whether any adjustments (accepted by the parties) would improve the possibility of its implementation in the near future; and, if not, to recommend other avenues for resolving the conflict (United Nations Report of the Secretary-General, 1997: 5). In his exploratory mission in late April of 1997, Baker concluded that neither Morocco nor the Frente POLISARIO wished to pursue any political solution other than the implementation of the Settlement Plan. Therefore, Baker recommended that the only way to address the roadblocks in the implementation of the plan was to initiate direct talks between the parties under the auspices of the United Nations. Baker’s role in the direct talks was to make suggestions and to facilitate the work of the parties, including proposals for bridging differences to try and eliminate points of impasse. He could not impose solutions or veto agreements reached by the parties. Before the direct talks were initiated, Baker gathered the parties in London and established the

223 “It was decided that a high-level U.S. envoy would be the most suitable mediator because the United States had not been advocating on behalf of either side and was therefore trusted by both” (Theofilopoulou, 2006: 6).

339 ground rules. In sum, Baker addressed the major elements for pre-negotiation, like agreeing on the basic rules and procedures; methods of representation and participation in the process; preconditions for negotiations and barriers to dialogue; venue and location; broad principles regarding outcomes; and timeframes (Bloomfield et al., 2003b: 69). He also paved the way for facilitating the negotiations aimed at breaking the major deadlocks to the Settlement Plan. Round one began in Lisbon on June 23 as a private meeting rather than an international conference. The discussions opened by addressing the primary issue and roadblock to the implementation of the Settlement Plan, voter identification. Second round talks were held in London on July 19 and 20. Here, the parties reached a written and initialed agreement on issues related to the identification of prospective voters and preparations for the return of refugees, particularly with regards to the reduction and confinement of Moroccan forces during the transitional period. Third round talks took place on August 29 and 30 in Lisbon. Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO continued the discussion of troop confinement and issues related to the release of prisoners of war and Sahrawi political prisoners and detainees. At this time, Baker proposed a code of conduct for the referendum campaign, which had been envisaged in the Settlement Plan, but had been ignored in the referendum process until his arrival. The fourth and final round of talks took place in Houston, Texas at the James Baker Institute for Public Policy from September 14-16, 1997. The meeting opened by reestablishing the basic principles essential to the UN referendum as it was originally conceived: the parties would not use harassment, intimidation or fraud leading up to the referendum; full freedom of speech and assembly would be granted to the people in the territory; both parties would have free access to the news media in order to convey their positions to the authenticated electorate; all political prisoners and prisoners of war would be released and all repressive laws repealed (Pazzanita, 2006: 205). By the meeting’s end, Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO had agreed upon a code of conduct for the referendum campaign; the scope of authority of the UN during the transitional period; and a set of practical measures for the resumption of the identification process. Although the parties did not specifically address differences on voter eligibility, they did accept a provision for uncounted votes. They would be “convoked only once in order to put some

340 sort of upper limit on the number of time-consuming appeals that the Identification Commission would entertain” (205). In sum, the direct talks produced agreement on the following outstanding issues: the identification of prospective voters in the referendum; preparatory work of the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) for the repatriation of Sahrawi refugees; the code of conduct governing the parties during the referendum campaign; and troop confinement, prisoners of war and Sahrawi political detainees. In Annan’s report to the Security Council, he concluded that through goodwill and a spirit of cooperation, the main contentious issues that had impeded the implemenation of the plan had been satisfactorily addressed (United Nations Report of the Secretary-General, 1997: 6). Furthermore, as a direct result of these proceedings, the necessary conditions were created for MINURSO to fully implement the Settlement Plan, starting with the resumption of the identification process and ending with its completion (6). Annan stated: “Ultimately, it is only the genuine commitment of the parties to the settlement plan and the agreements reached in the direct talks that will determine whether it is possible to fulfill the objectives of the plan” (6). Although the above statement is to some extent true, it simplifies the decolonization process for Western Sahara and disproportionately lays the responsibility for conflict transformation on the primary actors of the conflict. In the final analysis of the Peace Process for Western Sahara below, I will reengage the use of language in the representation of the respective peace plans. However, for now, it is important to highlight that at this time Annan favored the Settlement Plan and the deployment of MINURSO at full strength. At the close of his observations and recommendations, he promised to provide the Security Council with a detailed plan regarding the timetable and financial implications for holding the referendum of self-determination and fulfillment of the United Nations objectives in Western Sahara (7). The immediate effect of the meeting was the renewed voter registration process that had been stalled for some time. However, disagreements almost immediately ensued over tribal eligibility. Moroccan contestations brought the voter identification process once again to a near halt. By 1998, the Security Council had

341 extended the mandate of MINURSO, but the process of voter identification for the referendum remained at a deadlock.

3.4.2.3. Framework Agreement

In response to the delay in voter identification, Annan requested an assessment of the referendum process and options for its continuance. He was presented with the following four possibilities: (a) retain the settlement plan and move ahead with its implementation; (b) put the plan aside and seek a ‘third solution’; (c) seek a ‘third solution’ while keeping the plan; (d) disengage until the time is ‘ripe’ (Theofilopoulou, 2006: 6). In a report to the Security Council of the United Nations on October 25, 2000, Annan intimated that the United Nations was looking for a new exit strategy in the peace processes between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO led by Baker, one that required a Moroccan devolution of governmental authority of a genuine and substantial nature and in keeping with international norms (United Nations Report of the Secretary-General, 2000). At this time, none of the main provisions of the Settlement Plan had been fully implemented, other than the ceasefire of September 6, 1991. According to Annan this was because of “fundamental differences between the parties over its interpretation” (United Nations Report of the Secretary-General, 2001: 4) and the inability of the UN to implement any measures that would carry the process forward in the absence of full cooperation of both parties. In his 2001 report to the Security Council, Annan reiterated that the establishment of the electorate body had been “the most contentious issue and one of the main reasons for the successive deadlocks in the work of MINURSO” (4). With respect to voter eligibility, the Frente POLISARIO continued to maintain that under the Settlement Plan only the 74,000 counted in the 1974 Spanish census qualified to take part in the referendum, whereas Morocco claimed that thousands of additional members of Sahrawi tribes were equally qualified to vote. Morocco’s potential voter list included those who were in the Territory at the time of the census but were not counted; those who fled to Morocco in previous years; and those from regions that were formerly part of the Territory, but were expelled by Spain to Morocco in the 1950s and 1960s and therefore

342 settled in southern Morocco. By 1999, MINURSO completed the identification process; however, it then received a total of 131,038 appeals. Although, Annan’s report did not specify the origin of these appeals, Morocco submitted the majority of them. He did comment that the appeals process could become even lengthier and more cumbersome and contentious than the identification process itself. Outside of these problems, other key issues remained unresolved: the release of prisoners of war and of Sahrawi political detainees; the fulfillment of security conditions for the Sahrawi returnees eligible to vote and their immediate families; possible problems related to the implementation of the code of conduct for the referendum campaign, particularly the role of the existing Moroccan security forces; and the lack of an enforcement mechanism for the results of the referendum (5). Annan contributed the lack of full cooperation to the “winner-take-all” nature of the referendum called for under the Settlement Plan (5), despite the fact that this formula was officially accepted by the two parties and sanctioned by the Security Council as a solution to the decolonization conflict. Annan’s argument, therefore, does not seem to hold water, although it has been taken up by many analysts and propagated by Morocco to justify its disengagement from the referendum process. He also recounted that every time the United Nations proposed a technical solution to bridge the parties’ interpretive differences of particular provisions, a new set of difficulties would arise which required another round of protracted consultations (7). Whereas the Frente POLISARIO expressed the belief that the remaining obstacles could be overcome, Morocco argued that the difficulties of the implementation of the plan were insurmountable. In response to this stalemate, Baker reminded the parties that there were many ways to achieve self-determination: war/revolution, elections or a compromise agreement. Both Baker and Annan advocated an exploration of the latter route without abandoning the Settlement Plan. In effect, however, Annan held and expressed serious doubts about the viability of the referendum as conceptualized in the Settlement Plan (8)224.

224 Annan’s exact words in this regard read as follows: “[T]he timetable for the implementation of the plan has been revised several times, with the referendum date moving further into the future each time, so that it is in serious doubt that it will ever be within reach” (United Nations Report of the Secretary-General, 2001: 8). 343

Annan’s 2001 report marked a severe shift in both discourse and course of action of the United Nations regarding Western Sahara. The Settlement Plan directly corresponded to the decolonization process and Resolution 1514(XV). Annan argued that this process had become a zero-sum game that produced a winner and a loser and therefore extremely high stakes (8). This position had the effect of essentially uprooting Western Sahara from its decolonization context and replanting it in a ‘modernized’ conceptualization of autonomy, a popular go-to compromise for conflict transformation today. Chapter One of this study thoroughly explored the concept of autonomy; Chapter Four utilizes the works of Agamben to create a theoretical and practical break in our understandings of the concept of zero-sum. At this point, it is important to note the dramatic change in both strategy and responsibility of the United Nations. Annan’s choice of words was both fatalistic and calculated. He blamed the parties for their non- cooperation and defended the work and actions of the United Nations. He explained that it was the UN’s belief in continued engagement and its commitment to the process of finding solutions to a consensual implementation of the plan that “erred on the side of unfounded optimism” (9). Ultimately, Baker and Annan concluded that it was unlikely that the Settlement Plan could be implemented in its present form in a way that would result in an early, durable and agreed upon resolution of the dispute over Western Sahara (9). Baker was charged with the responsibility of drafting an alternative peace plan, which fell outside of the context of the Settlement Plan. A viable alternative, the Framework Agreement supposedly offered the necessary compromise for the winner-take-all stalemate. Under the Framework Proposal, the population of Western Sahara would have the right to elect their executive, legislative and judicial bodies and would have exclusive competence over local governmental administration, territorial budget and taxation, law enforcement, internal security, social welfare, culture, education, commerce, transportation, agriculture, mining, fisheries and industry, environmental policy, housing and urban development, water and electricity, roads and other basic infrastructure (11). The plan stated that through these bodies the Sahrawi people would govern on local matters within the territory (Shelley, 2001: 148). These included controlling supply of water and electricity, cultural affairs, housing, transportation, roads, territorial budget, etc.

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The Kingdom of Morocco, by contrast, would have exclusive competence over foreign relations (international agreements and conventions), national security and external defense (determination of borders, maritime, aerial or terrestrial and their protection), all matters relating to the production, sale, ownership or use of weapons/explosives and the preservation of the territorial integrity against secessionist attempts from within or without the territory (10). Critics of the plan suggested that this excerpt was meant specifically for the Frente POLISARIO even though the group was not mentioned in the document (Shelley, 2001: 148-149). Additionally, Morocco would retain the flag, currency, customs, postal and telecommunications systems within Western Sahara and the right to appoint representatives to serve in these functions. The referendum would then be held within five years of this autonomous arrangement in order to determine the final status of the territory. Although the Framework Agreement was to be considered as an alternative to the Settlement, not as a replacement, Annan ordered the Settlement Plan to be put on hold and for the MINURSO Identification Commission to suspend its activities (10). In essence, Annan and Baker advocated for autonomy for Western Sahara under the overall sovereignty of Morocco. As expected, the plan generated heavy criticism from both the Frente POLISARIO and Algeria, and yet Morocco approved it full heartedly. The plan actually emboldened Morocco, and Mohamed VI went so far as to rule out a UN sponsored referendum in the “Saharan provinces” (Pazzanita, 2006: 138). The Frente POLISARIO and Algeria argued that the plan could not be adopted because it fell outside of the original 1990-91 plans and did not include the right of self-determination for the Sahrawi people. In essence, the plan offered a slightly modified version of integration with Morocco. Furthermore, it threw to the way side all previous work regarding voter registration for the UN sponsored referendum. Baker later admitted that part of the plan originated in Morocco. The U.S. administration under George W. Bush and French president Jacque Chirac favored the Baker plan. In contrast, the Russian Federation and Spanish government led by José María Aznar may have been instrumental in stopping the United Nations from implementing Baker’s plan (140). The Council did not vote on the plan, but extended the MINURSO mandate until November 30, 2001 and urged Baker and Annan to continue their efforts concerning Western Sahara.

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3.4.2.4. Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara

In late 2002, Baker presented a revised version of his Framework Agreement Proposal. The main clarifying clause was the “devolution” of Morocco’s authority in Western Sahara, with a provision for a future referendum to decide the future of the colony (Pazzanita, 2006: 332). The plan began with a complete summary of the UN attempts for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. It still referred to the population as Western Sahara, but added that Rabat would be able to protect the territory from secessionist attempts provided “that the right to preserve territorial integrity shall not authorize any action whatsoever that would prevent, suppress, or stifle peaceful public debate, discourse, or campaign activity, particularly during any election or referendum period” (United Nations Report of the Secretary-General, 2003: 15). The plan more closely defined the role of the legislative and judicial branches with special consideration of human rights guarantees and gave the court to declare any law passed by the legislature null and void. The self-determination vote would be held four, but no later than five years after the establishment of the transitional government. Furthermore, the United Nations would determine voter eligibility and the organized referendum without appeal from the two parties. In contrast to the first Baker plan, the second clarified and laid out many more responsibilities for Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO and stressed the continued involvement of the international community. Morocco did not reject the plan outright, but did not approve of the additions to the plan or the referencing of the 1990-91-plebiscite blueprint. The Frente POLISARIO also expressed significant concern over the new plan and stressed its strong commitment to the original Settlement Plan. The Frente POLISARIO rightfully feared Moroccan repression, especially considering the approval of continued Moroccan military presence within the 4-5 year period of transition. In UN Resolution 1485 of May 30 and Resolution 1495 of July 31, the Security Council continued to strongly support the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy as well as the Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara as an optimum political solution. However, the Council conditioned its implementation on the acceptance of the two parties and urged them to come to some kind of compromise.

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In his 2003 report, Annan stated that the “peace plan provides for a fair and balanced approach towards a political solution to the question of Western Sahara, providing each side some, but not all, of what it wants” (United Nations Report of the Secretary-General, 2003: 10). In response to the revised plan, Morocco mainly objected to one of the ballot choices of the referendum to determine the final status of Western Sahara, independence. As Annan so aptly acknowledged, “It is difficult to envision a political solution that…provides for self-determination but that nevertheless precludes the possibility of independence as one of the several ballot questions” (10). This incongruence of logic is a major flaw in Morocco’s argument. How can Morocco support the concept of self-government or autonomy as an expression of self-determination without providing the possibility for independence? Morocco explained that according to General Assembly Resolution 1541(XV), “the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitutes modes of implementing the right of self- determination by that people” (22-23). As such, this opening for an expression of self- determination rendered the referendum as originally envisaged “lapsed” (21). The problem with this argumentation is that it omits the main idea of self-determination – choice. The purpose of self-determination is to provide the Sahrawi people with the right to freely and democratically choose one of the following options, independence, association, integration or any other political status. The Frente POLISARIO’s response stressed the illegal occupation of Morocco. In the section of the 2003 text that addresses the assessment of progress and problems, Annan erroneously referred to Morocco as the administrative power (7). As the Frente POLISARIO pointed out, Morocco is an occupying power and has never been recognized by the international community as having sovereignty over Western Sahara, a fact confirmed by the peace plan aimed to decide the final status of the territory (37). The Frente POLISARIO also used its response as an opportunity to highlight Moroccan delays and tactics, including the submission of two additional lists (76,000 and 45,000 additional voters) in July of 1991; the organization of 170,000 Moroccans to ascend upon the Identification Commission in Western Sahara in September of 1991; the submission of another contingent of 50,000 Moroccans to the commission in January of 1998; and the lodging of 131,000 appeals in February of 2000. The United Nations response to

347 these stall tactics was to capitulate to them. Following the onslaught of 170,000 Moroccans, the United Nations revised the identification criteria, which had already been established. The entry of 50,000 Moroccans successfully called into question the identification modalities agreed upon and accepted under the Houston agreements and convinced the Secretary-General to draft five additional protocols relating to appeals in May of 1999. Finally, the UN publication of the list of identified voters (86,424 persons) in December of 1999 was followed by the submission and acceptance of the 131,000 appeals concerning cases that had already been considered and rejected by the Identification Commission (41). Despite these well-founded concerns, the Frente POLISARIO provisionally accepted the Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara in the middle of 2003. The provisional acceptance was surprising because, in theory, the plan gave Morocco two important advances: “the legal title of administrator of the territory in the first instance, followed by a toned-down referendum in which the settler entitled to vote would outnumber the native inhabitants of the Western Sahara” (San Martín, 2004: 654). The significance of the capitulations lies in pure numbers. Understanding this, Morocco has infused the population of Western Sahara with settlers. Settler infusion is a strategy of occupation whereby a government systematically transfers its own citizens into a territory inhabited by a distinct people. A Moroccan settler in Western Sahara receives tax breaks and subsidized goods and services (higher pay for employed and economic aid for the unemployed) (Shelley, 2004: 55; also Messari, 2001: 55). Part of the settler infusion strategies of governments is to give their citizens incentives, usually economic, to relocate (Kolodner, 2002: 313). Governments utilize settler infusion as a cost-effective and uncontroversial method of invading a territory and eliminating its inhabitants, without being subjected to international scrutiny (314). Morocco has actively tried to shift the demographic composition of Western Sahara and impact voter eligibility through settler infusion policies. In addition, it has also initiated a program of ‘Moroccanization’ of the population of Western Sahara (Payne, 1993: 140). Spanish may not be taught in the occupied territory; it is forbidden to speak the Sahrawi dialect, Hassaniya; and students are forced to wear Moroccan-style

348 clothing instead of their traditional dress (daraa for men and melhafah for women) (140). Settler infusion infringes on a people’s right to self-determination and violates the UN Charter and Article 49 of the Geneva Convention (1949), which asserts that the occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies (Clark, 2007: 56). Compared to military invasion, it is a slow process (one or two generations); however, it is effective. Morocco’s settler infusion policy has directly affected the referendum process for Western Sahara. Baker’s proposal, for example, includes ‘residents’ (Moroccan settlers) on the revised voter list. Adding settlers to the existing UN voter list shifted the vote in Morocco’s favor by restructuring the voting pool; 45% (86,000) of the voters would be native Sahrawis and 55% (103,000) would be non-native Sahrawis or settlers (654). The very negative impact of settler infusion makes the Frente POLISARIO’s acceptance of the plan incredible. It is speculated that the Frente POLISARIO banked on Morocco’s rejection of the plan and was probably under considerable Algerian pressure to make some kind of concession. Why then would Morocco eventually reject the plan? Morocco could no longer determine for sure if a referendum vote, even including the settler vote, would result in favor of integration. As a result of “the high levels of corruption of Moroccan administration, the lack of democracy, accountability and transparency, the limited freedom of speech, association and press, the continuous violations of human rights in the territory, as well as the growing discontent with the new Moroccan monarch, Mohamed VI, and his failed promises to promote a definitive process of modernization and democratization,” the Moroccan settler just might vote for a democratic, socialist Sahrawi state that offers more possibility and political, economic and social advancement (San Martín, 2004: 655). The unforeseen move on the part of the Frente POLISARIO worked in its favor because it undeniably became the more flexible party, whereas Morocco appeared to be extreme and uncompromising (Pazzanita, 2006: 337). In spite of the considerable concessions made by the Frente POLISARIO, but due to Morocco’s refusal to cooperate, the United Nations shelved the Baker autonomy- referendum compromise indefinitely. In 2007, Morocco introduced the “2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan.” We analyzed this plan in full in Chapter One (section 1.4.5.). In this

349 newest plan, Morocco continues to press for a political solution to the problem that respects its territorial sovereignty, but basically denies the Sahrawi people the right to a free, fair, democratic and genuine expression of self-determination.

3.4.3. Discourse Analysis of the Peace Process

As explored in Chapter One and as will be revisited in Chapter Four, the United Nations currently favors direct negotiations between the Frente POLISARIO and Morocco and a political solution to the conflict. In fact, this public stance allows the United Nations to distance itself from the conflict and basically renounce an active intermediary role. How has the United Nations, the most potent international mediating body, been neutralized and rendered ineffective in this seemingly straightforward decolonization case? From the onset of the voter identification process in 1991, Morocco impeded the process. According to former Deputy Chairman Frank Ruddy, Morocco tampered with voter identification, confiscated voter cards, tapped MINURSO local and international phone lines, regularly interfered with mail and searched MINURSO personnel on a regular basis (Ruddy, 2005: 45). In his assessment, Morocco had free reign on MINURSO facilities and on manipulating and deeply influencing the self-determination referendum process. He states on record:

“What I described in Western Sahara was not some personal insight. Morocco’s abuse of the people of Western Sahara and its manipulation of the U.N. mission in Western Sahara was open and notorious. The U.N. mission was a laughing stock at diplomatic cocktail parties in Rabat. The U.S. Station Chief in Rabat asked me during the 4th of July festivities whether the Moroccans had bought off the head of our mission or was he just that blankety blank weak. The mission’s abandonment of a free and fair referendum was common knowledge to all the peacekeeping soldiers assigned to the mission as well as to the U.N. staff. That is the reason Chris Hedges of The New York Times had no trouble exposing the referendum for the sham it was in his March 1995 article. Similarly, in that same year, Human Rights Watch was able to publish a damning 40- page report on the Moroccan-dominated referendum” (Ruddy, 2005: 46).

On the flip side, Morocco makes contrary claims:

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“It must be recalled, from the outset, Morocco has unceasingly sought a peaceful resolution to the dispute relating to Western Sahara within the framework of international legality. Accordingly, co-operation with MINURSO has been exemplary, and it has been provided with all the facilities for and means of accomplishing its responsibilities in the best of conditions. Since the cease-fire came into effect on 6 September 1991, peace has been maintained in the region and its inhabitants go about their daily business normally. Morocco recognizes the value of the considerable efforts by MINURSO to maintain peace in the Maghreb region” (United Nations Report of the Secretary-General, 2003: 21).

As early as 1977, the validity and genuineness of such Moroccan claims were challenged even from within one of its greatest supporters, the United States Government: “The Moroccans try to buttress their case by legal arguments, but the simple fact is that they annexed the territory by force” (National Security Council, 1977: 2; statement by William B. Quandt to Zbigniew Brzezinski). Deliberate Moroccan misrepresentations and mistruths should be of utmost concern and insult to the United Nations. How then do we reconcile the organization’s impotence in front of these offenses? It cannot be denied that Morocco has intentionally stalled the UN Peace Process since its inception in 1991. However, outside of Morocco’s adept political maneuvering and skill, these spoiler tactics have born fruit because of dominant Realpolitik discourse, propagated misconceptions and disproportionate comparability regarding the actions of the parties in the Peace Process. Through discourse, various and interrelated myths have been concretized and reproduced. In this schema, the following statements appear to have validity: “Over the years since the territory’s contested decolonization by Spain in 1975, neither the United States nor France, the most important external powers in Maghrebi politics, has been prepared to make the fate of the Sahrawis the defining touchstone of its relations with Algeria and Morocco”; “the key powers have been reluctant to let the Saharan conflict dominate regional politics” (Crocker et al., 2004: 33; 34). In fact, both the United States and France have openly and silently supported Morocco in its quest for internationally recognized control of Western Sahara, disregarding the wishes and stipulations of Algeria on the Western Sahara issue while maintaining economic and geopolitical ties.

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Furthermore, these key powers have allowed the question of Western Sahara to dominate regional politics and their self-interest. In this regard, we could approach analysis of the Peace Process in the following way:

“[T]raditional processes of power bargaining and mediation are themselves an additional reason for conflicts to be protracted…[and they] lead to temporary settlements without tackling the underlying issues…Related to this are the dangers associated with peacekeeping forces. In the absence of parallel analytical and facilitated processes of conflict resolution, peace keeping tends to institutionalize conflict, to make it part of the way of life, making any resolution all the more difficult” (Burton, 1986: 52).

I would add that within the dominant Realpolitik discourse, it is difficult to distinguish what appears to be alternative forms of mediation or positive mediation techniques like ideas such as a fair playing field, cooperation, confidence-building, etc. from their working in function of real and power politics. For example, Morocco’s complete disregard for a Peace Process that does not guarantee its ultimate sovereignty over Western Sahara can also be portrayed as a persistent difference in interpretation between the parties with regard to the implementation of the plan. This propagated misconception is one trumpeted by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan and Erik Jensen, the head of MINURSO from 1994-1998. Jensen has stated on record that the referendum as called for in the Settlement Plan is not going to happen because Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO “agreed to irreconcilable interpretations as to who should vote” (Jensen, 2005a: 51). The fact that the Settlement Plan was adopted with “so basic a flaw to the principal architects” may be due to their belief that “a politically realistic compromise would be negotiated, and the negotiated compromise endorsed in a referendum, thus completing the process of self- determination” (Jensen, 2005b: 13). He has also explained that at the time that he was acting head of MINURSO his conviction was to get both parties “engaged in a process that would help build confidence and improve prospects for a negotiated compromise” (Jensen, 2005a: 52). It is interesting that the head of a decolonization case with very specific specifications of process was above all concerned with confidence-building and a negotiated compromise. In fact, his analytical evaluation of the conflict of the situation

352 and of the role of mediation in general is working in function of a greater agenda, one that assimilates the very language, policies and actions that should work to undermine this agenda and towards equitable conflict transformation. Instead, the Peace Process has been stalemated since the ceasefire of 1991 and the Frente POLISARIO has conceded all it possibly can, other than its right to self-determination. In essence, the Peace Process has only produced a negative peace, the absence of war (Barash and Webel, 2002: 6). A positive peace as envisioned by Johan Galtung, however, requires more than addressing underlying structural violence (Galtung, 1996; cited in Barash and Webel, 2002: 6). It must also address the dominant structural discourse of Realpolitik.

Conclusions

In order to enhance our understanding of conflict analysis, this chapter has focused on the importance of conflict mapping, particularly the mapping of actors; the extent of secondary actor/shadow-primary actor involvement (as well as other involvement); mediation; and the Peace Process for Western Sahara. This critical review has revealed that the participation of hegemon states as shadow-primary actors in interstate conflicts raises the risk of conflict stagnation and/or conditions of negative peace stalemate. With regards to Western Sahara, the involvement of the United States and France as secondary actors/shadow-primary actors – in other words when they have a high interest proximity to the conflict – has increased the probability for the compromised and stalemated conflict situation. Furthermore, as U.S. or French interest proximity to the conflict has increased, the conflict has become more entrenched in diplomatic no-man’s-land. Similarly, as explored in Chapter Two, the participation of hegemon states as secondary actors in pre-conflict situations, where there is a raised potential for conflict between two or more primary actors, actually decreases the possibility for conflict prevention. Our exploration of the geopolitical and militaristic relevance of Western Sahara, its physical geography and its connection to Realpolitik discourses, has revealed the role and negative impact of powerful nations on conflict situations and Western Sahara in particular.

353

It is common knowledge in international relations that the present ‘world order’ is a direct result of the outcome of the Second World War and a reorganization of the world by the ‘winners’. So, one may still be tempted to ask, why study the obvious? As we have demonstrated, it is the passive acceptance of the post-World War II power dynamics (the way things are) that has directly affected and often times has impaired the assessment of pre-conflict and conflict situations. The very accepted notion that hegemon states are by nature constantly engaged in a power struggle for dominance conceals the magnitude of their influence on conflict situations. Their direct, indirect or clandestine actions or involvement in pre-conflict and conflict situations directly correlate to their interest proximity. When these actions are predicated upon an ‘end justifies the means’ or ‘by any means necessary’ dogma, the process of conflict prevention and transformation is seriously compromised. The last part of this chapter reviewed the many failed plans aimed at the peaceful transformation of the conflict. It is evident that the egalitarian principles of the United Nations are in direct odds with the hegemonic structure of the international organization. This inherent contradiction has direct and severe consequences for intractable conflicts and conflict transformation, especially when taking into consideration the limited power the international organ has for enforcing the very principles on which it was founded. Martin Luther King rightly observes: “There comes a time when the cup of endurance runs over” (Carson, 1998: 192). After 34 years since the Moroccan invasion into Western Sahara, the first sixteen of those full out war and the latter eighteen a diplomatic stalemate, the patience of the Sahrawi people is quite frankly, amazing. This situation, however, cannot be sustained indefinitely. The over 250,000 refugees in the Algerian desert can only live on international aid for so long. The educated youth, with very little possibility for professional advancement, no country and refugee status, will stay subdued for only so long. The strong organization and cohesion of the Frente POLISARIO has effectively united the people and its leaders behind a non-violent diplomatic approach to the standstill, particularly in the occupied territories. However, this situation can only last for so long. The international community has a responsibility to address this regionally destabilizing and, for now, latent conflict.

354

The ultimate goals of conflict analysis, mapping and mediation are to aid in positive conflict transformation. As has been purported throughout this work, by thoroughly analyzing the insides and outs of a conflict at hand, for example through close examination of the history of the parties, the root causes, issue relevancy for each actor, power, resources and relationships, etc., hidden, latent or possibilities for the desired goal of conflict transformation become more apparent. Realpolitik discourses, ideas, policies and actions, mythologized to the point of accepted reality, create and produce inequality. When injustice permeates not only the conflict cycle in its complex stages, which can be cyclical, reciprocal, overlapping and retrogressive in nature, it also impedes and retards the process and mechanisms essential for conflict resolution at the international level. Many interrelated and layered factors contribute to the failure of conflict transformation. However, Realpolitik approaches to global affairs constitute world views that accept and even propagate the proliferation of arms and nuclear weapons, aggression, expansionism and destruction of the human species and the planet upon which we depend. They also incorporate and co-opt ‘radical’ ideas that may appear to be positive, i.e. the neoliberalization of the Green Movement. Conflict analysis that “ignores the demands of justice and the realities of power” only strengthens the Realpolitik agenda. As we explored in Chapter One there are two diverging views for the peace process for Western Sahara, autonomy and self-determination. The first citation below by Jensen represents the former and the second by Bouteflika the latter.

“I am convinced that in the interest of all, a negotiated political settlement involving a genuine degree of regional autonomy for Western Sahara, which would be subject to referendum, offers the most credible solution” (Jensen, 2005a: 53).

“Maybe it would have been easy to take the principle of self-determination as a starting point” (Memorandum of Conversation, 1975c: 8).

The ‘negotiable’ and ‘middle-way’ concept of autonomy, proposed by Jensen, has gained significant ground over Bouteflika’s idea of self-determination for the people of Western Sahara. As suggested in the beginning of this chapter, if we do not question the very analytical coordinates of our approaches to conflict prevention, hot conflict and

355 diplomatic stalemates, we will fail to introduce equitable, just and lasting solutions for conflict transformation. If we fail to do this and the cup of endurance runs over, we are paving the way for renewed violence between Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO. Furthermore, at the beginning of this chapter, I suggested a shift in interpretive horizon in conflict analysis (mapping and mediation), one that does not work in function of domination models and self-interested power politics. As we explored in Chapter One, if we support autonomy (‘third-way politics’) for Western Sahara, we are allowing mediation to work in function of real politics. Our alternative interpretive horizon, on the contrary, takes the concept of self-determination and the theoretical perspective of Giorgio Agamben as a starting point. This redirection of the Peace Process is not merely a return to the agreed upon terms and conditions of the UN brokered 1991 ceasefire and referendum, it is a reconceptualization of self-determination that challenges Realpolitik régimes of truths.

356

Chapter Four: Self-Determination as Conflict Transformation

Introduction

Thus far, I have been concerned with the functioning of Realpolitik on the production, dissemination and normalization of régimes of truth (and the rules by which they have been established). I have looked particularly at how these truths have affected the conflict situation, conflict analyses and strategies for peaceful conflict transformation in the different phases of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict. These phases include: the early history and build-up to the conflict, which in fact represented both the failure of conflict prevention and the completion of the formal decolonization process for Western Sahara; the hot conflict from 1975-1991; the ceasefire of 1991 to the present and the ensuing diplomatic stalemate and failed plans for Western Sahara during this time period; and the current push for political negotiations in the form of the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy plan for Western Sahara. Starting from Chapter Two, this conflict genealogy moves in a chronological order of events. However, I decided to ‘begin’ this study at the ‘end’ so to speak because the topic of autonomy opens up analytical spaces in which to explore key concepts that are integral to understanding and conceptualizing the conflict situation. In turn, these concepts broaden the analytical lens with which to approach the earlier stages of the conflict. Furthermore, like the events leading up to the 1975 Moroccan and Mauritanian invasion of the territory of Western Sahara, the international community finds itself in 2010 in a similar position to be able to transform a hostile situation before it again erupts into hot conflict. Chapters Two and Three utilize important concepts of conflict analysis, conflict prevention, conflict mapping and mediation, but insist that traditional methods for conflict prevention, conflict mapping and mediation fall short of ‘deep’ structural analyses if the functioning of real politics is left out of the picture. These two middle chapters demonstrate that Realpolitik discourses (ideas, policies and action) bear heavily on the very functioning and occurrences that make up the Western Sahara conflict

357 situation. Realpolitik discourses and approaches to the conflict of the United States, France and Spain have played a determining role in all stages of the conflict; have added to its protracted-nature; and have even sabotaged attempts at peaceful conflict transformation that respect the essential and necessary exercise of self-determination. Analysis of the multiple functions of Realpolitik in each phase of the conflict helps to clarify how what seemed like a straightforward decolonization case in 1975 is now a stalemated protracted conflict of 34 years. In this last chapter, I will in fact ‘end’ at the ‘beginning,’ with a theoretical, philosophical and practical discussion of self-determination within the context of globalized capital, i.e. neoliberal globalization. The expression of self-determination lies at the heart of this decolonization conflict and as such represents our beginning and our end. In this way, the first and last chapters of this study are complementary, like bookends to a genealogical exploration of Africa’s last Non-Self-Governing Territory. Whereas Chapter One explored the concept of self-determination from principle to peremptory norm in international law and questions the viability of a Moroccan offer of autonomy (considering the many black holes in the proposal), Chapter Four relies on Giorgio Agamben’s theoretical understandings of the ‘state of exception,’ ‘the people,’ the ‘nation-state’ and the ‘refugee’ in order to further probe self-determination and autonomy. It may appear as if I am departing from my proposal to explore Realpolitik in conflict analyses, strategies and practice. In fact, I let Realpolitik discourses lead me to broader neoliberal globalization discourses that in turn direct me towards a conflict transformative understanding of self-determination. Up to this point, the exploration of Realpolitik discourses and its functioning, production and legitimization (its genealogy per se) tells part of this story and helps us understand how autonomy has been accepted and disseminated as the real political solution to the conflict; how the decolonization process failed for Western Sahara; and how it has remained stalemated ever since the 1991 ceasefire. However, I would like to take this final chapter beyond the very real dichotomy presented by Zoubir, Zunes, Mundy, San Martín, Omar and many others – between international legality and international reality. A critical analysis of the suspension of the juridical-political realm, of the ‘legal’ half of our Janus-faced concept of autonomy and conflict transformation,

358 accomplishes two very necessary and yet distinct tasks. It deepens our understanding of the conflict situation and by extension our toolbox for approaching and strategizing conflict transformation, and it allows us to think beyond the here and now and to formalize alternative forms of political representation. This chapter is separated into four parts. Part One, “Autonomy for Western Sahara: Third-way Solution or Zero-Sum State of Exception,” employs Agamben’s theoretical foundations of the state of exception in order to uncover how autonomy has gained prominence in the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict as the only viable political solution to the conflict. My particular concern is what are (and were) the juridical- political coordinates that in effect have suspended international law and order in this conflict. Furthermore, how has autonomy been normalized and championed as a mechanism for conflict transformation, while an independence-inclusive expression of self-determination has been branded a zero sum stalemate? After sketching the preliminary theoretical base for how autonomy actually pertains to the realm of the state of exception (the normalized transgression and suspension of international law), I suggest a return to the concept of self-determination, not as a singular event, but as process. By moving full circle and returning to the concept of self-determination, we conquer two things at once: we challenge the normalized state of exception for the case of Western Sahara, while also highlighting important analytical processes for other self- determination conflicts, and we are able to see how self-determination offers tensional- potential conflict transformation for the case of Western Sahara and other self- determination conflicts. This requires a survey of the broader self-determination debate. Part Two, “The Multidimensionality of Self-Determination: Diverse Conceptions of Self-Determination,” makes up this survey. It explores self-determination in the post- colonial era, while also recognizing its construction in the UN Charter and the decolonization era. I have divided the contemporary self-determination debate into three categories: self-determination as colonial continuity, self-determination as reformative concept and self-determination as struggle. Contrary to others, I argue that a broad understanding of self-determination, one that may even include independence as an option, opens up the debate for self-determination conflicts rather than closing it off. In fact, this conceptualization is so useful because it is negotiable. This study rejects the

359 most positivist understanding of self-determination as a one time only decolonization event. For self-determination to function as a useful and negotiable concept for conflict transformation in self-determination conflict cases, it cannot be rigidly positivist or absolutist. Such positions are counterproductive, exclusive and ill-equipped to address the demands of the people behind self-determination struggles. This process requires labor- intensive conflict analysis. Furthermore, I propose that a multifaceted approach to self- determination itself presupposes a multifaceted approach to conflict analysis. Because my proposal is controversial for some, it is also necessary to look carefully at counter- arguments that reject an independence-inclusive process of self-determination for Western Sahara. Three general and interrelated themes mark these interpretations for why self-determination that offers independence is a non-starter: the western-centric bias of self-determination; identity (national identity); and the ‘people’. Part Three, “Self-Determination and the Neoliberal Project,” and Part Four, “Thinking Within and Beyond Self-Determination: The Quest of the ‘People’ for Self- Determination in the Nation-State System,” call for a rethinking of these contentious realms from slightly different angles: the western-centric bias of self-determination within a neoliberal context; identity and, more specifically, national identity in terms of its relation to territory and the order of nation-states; and the people from the vantage point of the refugee. Part Three utilizes Walter Benjamin’s (1968) economic component of the state of exception in order to rethink the western-centric bias of self-determination from within the ideological coordinates of the neoliberal project/neoliberal globalization. This involves linking the state of exception – the normalization of the suspension of international law – to economic processes. Therefore, we juxtapose globalization processes and neoliberal globalization processes in order to expose how these processes have naturalized the state of exception for Western Sahara and how the concept of self- determination can create a ‘real state of emergency’ that counteracts the structural frameworks that facilitate and naturalize the suspension of international law. I argue that if we are to be able to recognize and understand the complicity and conformity in the naturalized suspension/transgression of international law, we must seek to better understand the integral components that propagate and sustain its suspension/transgression. Furthermore, while I contend that self-determination is a useful

360 medium for the peaceful transformation of self-determination conflicts, I also acknowledge that many minefields surround and are constitutive of the concept. Still, it is the key to the 34-year stalemate of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict. In Part Four, I aim to think within and beyond self-determination as it relates to national identity, the nation-state and the refugee. This requires introducing key ideas like the nation, the nation-state and the people. I use Agamben’s conceptualization of the ‘people’ as a theoretical springboard from which to explore the intimate and convoluted relationship between self-determination and the nation-state. In doing so, I reveal the inherent contradictions and paradoxes in the concept of self-determination – its capacity to liberate and to seize. At the same time, I seek to problematize the nation-state, while simultaneously working within its present albeit changing form. Arguments that do not hold room for the complexities of self-determination as it relates to the nation-state actually foreclose the opportunity to theorize alternate political structures. I stand with those who problematize the state of the nation-state and those that contend it is the here and now of institutional political organization. By having a foot in both camps, we are able to query into the structural deficiencies of the international political system, a system that eliminates political adversaries and entire categories of citizens (or refugees) who cannot be incorporated into this very system (Agamben, 2005: 2).

4.1. Autonomy for Western Sahara: Third-way Solution or Zero-Sum State of Exception?

4.1.1. Reconfiguring Zero-Sum: The State of Exception

In conflict studies, zero-sum conflict processes have been conceptualized as the positioning of the conflicting parties in direct opposition to one another, where one party gains and the other party loses. As such, zero-sum positioning equates to ‘win-lose’ outcomes. Therefore, the task of conflict transformation is: “[to help] parties who perceive their situation as zero-sum (Self’s gain is Other’s loss) to reperceive it as a non- zero-sum conflict (in which both may gain or both may lose), and then to assist parties to move in the positive sum direction” (Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 15). Within this more classical understanding of conflict ‘resolution,’ the goal is to move the conflict parties

361 away from their hardened positions and towards compromise, or win-win scenarios. In the conflict context of the Frente POLISARIO and Morocco, this would mean moving the Frente POLISARIO away from its fixed position on self-determination and possible independence and Morocco from its annexionist stance on Western Sahara. The win-win situation appears to be autonomy for Western Sahara within the sovereign state of Morocco. Of course, as has been established in this study, this final analysis is quite problematic due to the fact that it sidelines international norms and standards. Inbuilt in this ‘third way’ political solution of autonomy is the very suspension of international law. One may even say that autonomy possesses its degrees of legal suspension, for example, five years of autonomy at the end of which a referendum with the option of independence is held, as in the Baker Plan II, or autonomy without self- determination (without the possibility of independence), as in the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan. Nonetheless, international legality is held at bay and international illegality brought to the center of the negotiating table. How has this state of suspension, which has gained international acceptance and promotion, become the ‘rule’? Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s (1997; 1998; 2005) conception of a ‘state of exception’ is of particular importance here and allows us to probe into this legal suspension and how we have moved so far away from the international legality of the Settlement Plan of 1991. Agamben’s concept of a ‘state of exception’ is not new per se, but rather builds upon and works from the ideas of multiple thinkers and from a politico-philosophical perspective. Two highly important influences on his thought are an unlikely pairing, Carl Schmitt and Walter Benjamin. Schmitt, a controversial figure with strong ties to Nazism, defines the sovereign as “he who decides on the state of exception” (Schmitt, 1985; cited in Agamben, 2005:1). Accepting the assumption that law requires a ‘normal’ situation for its application, the sovereign regulates the normal, while simultaneously distinguishing a normal situation from an exceptional one. As such, the sovereign is the entity that decides upon the exception and whether or not a particular situation classifies as normal or exceptional and whether or not law applies or is suspended. Benjamin, who ultimately

362 took his own life225 in order to avoid being captured by the Nazis, argues that the “tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’…is not the exception but the rule” (Benjamin, 1968: 257). He explains that the reason that Fascism even had a chance to flourish as it did was because of the very fact that its opponents approached it as a “historical norm,” a conception of history that avoids complicity and conformism (257, 258). Benjamin connects this complicity and conformism to both political tactics and economic views. This link between complicit conformity and action (or inaction) and the political and economic adds another dimension to the juridical sphere and its suspension – state of exception/ state of emergency – that I will return to in Part Three of this chapter. I will first develop Agamben’s fusion of these two standpoints and their relation to Western Sahara and autonomy, followed by a detailed account of contemporary discourses on self-determination. When we juxtapose the two positions, the ‘state of exception’ and the ‘state of emergency,’ we realize that there is a very wide conceptual gap – what Agamben denominates an opposition between a “real and fictitious state of exception” (Agamben, 2005: 3). In the following excerpt, Agamben synthesizes the ideas of both, taking the vocabulary of the first and the conceptual foundation of the second and problematizes the political-juridical disjuncture of the state of exception:

“…if exceptional measures are the result of periods of political crisis and, as such, must be understood on political and not juridico-constitutional grounds…then they find themselves in the paradoxical position of being juridical measures that cannot be understood in legal terms, and the state of exception appears as the legal form of what cannot have legal form. On the other hand, if the law employs the exception – that is the suspension of law itself – as its original means of referring to and encompassing life, then a theory of the state of exception is the preliminary condition for any definition of the relation that binds and, at the same time, abandons the living being to law” (Agamben, 2005: 1).

For Agamben the state of exception is not merely the result of political crisis as in the former argumentation. On the contrary, he supports the latter understanding, concluding that the state of exception is “a suspension of the juridical order

225 The exact details of Benjamin’s death are unclear and so there is some speculation that he may not have taken his own life. 363 itself…[that]…defines law’s threshold or limit concept” (Agamben, 2005: 4). Additionally, and key to our linking this concept to the conflict situation of Western Sahara, the suspension of the juridical order becomes a technique of government rather than an exceptional measure responding to exceptional circumstances (Agamben, 2005: 2, 6-7). It becomes the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics with a tendency to be converted into a lasting practice of government (2, 7). Furthermore, one of the anomalies of the state of exception is the very fact that “in the state of exception, it is impossible to distinguish transgression of the law from execution of the law” (Agamben, 1998: 57; emphases mine). This “no-man’s-land between public law and political fact” – in our context between peremptory norms and political reality – reveals both the “emptiness of law” (the juridical order) and the powerful influence of the exception (Agamben, 2005: 1, 6). The state of exception, according to Agamben, identifies this apparent paradox between the law and its emptiness: “life under a law that is in force without signifying resembles life in the state of exception” (Agamben, 1998: 52). When the law is in force without significance, it closely resembles what Jean-Luc Nancy calls the law of abandonment (Nancy, 1993). The law of abandonment “requires that the law be applied through its withdrawal” (44). According to Agamben, this means that the law is in force without significance and that political fact and law are indistinguishable (Agamben, 1998: 58, 28). Therefore, pivotal to locating the state of exception is locating the very insignificance of the law, the parallel workings of its application and withdrawal. In locating the state of exception, however, it becomes apparent that this juridical state is not all that exceptional. In fact, through the very suspension of the juridical order – its non- functioning functioning – and through the blurring of the juridical and the political, the state of exception becomes the rule. Within this state of exception, now the rule, a law in force without significance does not mean that the law has been neutralized and therefore bears no significance. It is the very emptiness of the law which leaves the abandoned vulnerable, not only to the suspension of the law, but also to its transgression. When the law is at once suspended and transgressed in function of the interests of governments, the “tradition of the oppressed” teaches us the dangerous depths to which the state of exception can take us (Benjamin, 1968: 257).

364

Although Agamben proposes that the state of exception “appears as the threshold of indeterminacy between democracy and absolutism,” he is sure to recognize that it has emerged from the “democratic-revolutionary tradition and not the absolutist one” (Agamben, 2005: 3, 5). Because of the very fact that the state of exception serves to protect democracy and freedom, it is grounded in discourses of “absolute necessity and temporariness,” the absolute necessity and temporality of the very suspensions of these democratic-revolutionary traditions (9). To reiterate, the state of exception (emptiness of law) becomes a “technique of government,” a dominant one in contemporary politics and the “constitutive paradigm of the juridical order,” or lack thereof (2, 6, 7). As a normal technique of government, the state of exception (the suspension of the norm) is realized in the name of security and in the name of democracy and freedom (14). Despite claims to the contrary, the state of exception is carried out as if included in the juridical order and by “creating a zone of indistinction in which fact and law coincide” (26). In fact, claims of necessity legitimize the very transgression of the law within the state of exception (24). The state of exception, therefore, is not a temporary exception to the law in outstanding circumstances, but rather “a complex strategy of inscribing the state of exception within the law,” of inscribing a “space devoid of law” (35, 50)226. As such, Agamben refutes theories that try to place the state of exception in law as well as those that couch it in terms of necessity, defense and/or indirect juridical application (50-51). In the breakdown or absence of norms that characterizes this space devoid of law, the state of exception functions as a “fundamental political structure” that begins to establish the rule, the new political and juridical order (Agamben, 1998: 20). The ultimate paradox of the state of exception lies in the following statement: “it is impossible to distinguish transgression of the law from execution of the law, such that what violates a rule and what conforms to it coincide without any remainder” (Agamben, 1998: 57). In this state, the exception “ceases to be referred to as an external and provisional state of factual danger and comes to be confused with juridical rule itself” (Agamben, 1998: 168; emphasis in original).

226 To illustrate this phenomenon, Agamben provides a diagram of the “juridically empty” space of the state of exception (Agamben, 1998: 38). 365

As if to ward off criticisms of esoteric philosophizing and in order to demonstrate the potentiality of the state of exception, Agamben puts his theory to use by deconstructing the materialization of the state of exception par excellence – the concentration camps. In reference to the camps, but not confined to them, Agamben explains that the “camp is the space which is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule” (Agamben, 1997: 108; emphasis mine)227. Agamben stretches us to think of the camp not as a historical fact or an anomaly belonging to the past, but as the hidden matrix and nomos (law) of the political space in which we live today. By approaching the camp in this way, he probes into the juridical-political associations and conditions that allow for the ‘exceptional’ to take place. He fuses dislocation and localization to explain this new paradigm of zero differentiation between the state of exception and the ‘rule’ (the camp): “To an order without localization (the state of exception, in which law is suspended) there now corresponds a localization without order (the camp as permanent space of exception)” (114). Therefore, the political system ceases to provide juridical order in a determinate space because at the center of this very system can be found a “dislocating localization,” the camp, which suspends and overcomes juridical-political relations outside of the state of exception. The physical structure of the camp is indicative of how the law functions in such spaces. The law is bifurcated into two indistinguishable modes of existence, quaestio iuris and quaestio facti. It is therefore representative of a hybrid law, whereby fact passes into law and law into fact (Agamben, 1997: 110) or, as in our case, whereby political reality passes into international law and international law into political reality. In this way, we can see how the physical camp is the space that opens up when the state of exception becomes the rule, when fact and law are no longer discernible and where “the norm becomes indistinguishable from the exception” (109). This is the camp in the concrete. Agamben challenges us to identify these spaces, the physical and concrete structures that we can see and recognize as such in their present day metamorphoses, without prejudice to the gradation of atrocities committed there, i.e. Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp and the Western Saharan refugee camps/occupied territories.

227 Agamben’s, “The Camp as the ‘Nomos’ of the Modern” can also be found in Homo Sacer Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 1998, pp. 166-180. 366

It is more difficult to perceive of the ‘camp’ in the abstract, where it does not appear to be, i.e. autonomy for Western Sahara. However, identifying the physical materializations and localities of the state of exception sheds light on other possible manifestations of the metaphysical camp. We can see how the United States-led ‘Global War on Terror’ (fact/political crisis) has created the perfect conditions for the permanent suspension of domestic and international juridical orders (law/political crisis), thereby creating Guantánamo, secret detention centers, Abu Ghraib,228etc. Such creations normalize the state of exception and the atrocities that can be committed in the suspension and transgression of the law229. It is less apparent, however, to identify the state of exception in the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan for Western Sahara. This is where the abstract concept of the ‘camp’ is crucial. For in the abstract concept of the camp, it is possible to inquire into not only the construction of the state of exception, but also the interplay between the ‘facts’ of this state, i.e. for public security sake, and the law, the new juridical-political coordinates, which in fact fall outside of ordinary law or international law. In this space where the norm becomes the exception and the exception the norm, where both are indistinguishable, it is possible to understand the ‘third-way’ solution for Western Sahara. This relocation of the juridical-political order falls securely in line with real politics discourses that help create, produce and normalize states of exception. In fact, Realpolitik discourses help frame and legitimize the ‘facts’ by which states of exception become both necessary and the perpetual norm. Within this context, autonomy is not a solution to the ‘zero-sum’ deadlock; rather, in the words of Agamben, it is “the site of a sovereign political decision that operates in the absolute indifference of fact and law” (Agamben, 1997: 111). In the case of Western Sahara, autonomy is indifferent to fact and law, but is not the only ‘space’ that has been opened up by the exceptional becoming the norm.

228 See Jared Sexton and Elizabeth Lee, “Figuring the Prison: Prerequisites of Torture at Abu Ghraib,” 2006. 229 The recently elected Obama administration of the United States has promised to close Guantánamo and secret prisons; appears to condemn harsh interrogation tactics; and has defined waterboarding as torture. However, in February of 2009, Obama signed an executive order approving the continued use of rendition by the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), which may create a reliance on third countries to carry out interrogations and rendition operations. He continues to authorize unmanned aerial vehicle-launched missile strikes (drone strikes) against suspected al-Qa’ida operatives (targets) in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Such policies fall clearly into the juridically blurred lines of the state of exception. 367

4.1.2. The State of Exception and Western Sahara: The Zero-Sum Disconnect and Self-Determination

Utilizing Agamben’s analytical approach to the state of exception (Agamben, 1997: 110) allows us to investigate the juridical procedures and deployments of power by which the Sahrawi people can be deprived of their rights. In fact, the acts committed against them, attempted genocide, occupation, exile, human rights violations, etc., no longer appear to be crimes or acts of aggression. Subsequently, they are framed in terms of a zero-sum stalemate. Furthermore, when we apply Agamben’s inverse form of interrogation to the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict, we cannot just ask how the international community allowed an act of aggression and occupation to take place in 1975, we must dig deeper and ask the following. What were and are the juridical-political structures that were set and are set in place that such events could and can take place? If we take Agamben’s conceptual orientation of the ‘camp’ and apply it in the abstract to the conflict situation of Western Sahara – which we should not forget takes physical form and space in the refugee camps in Algeria, the occupied territories of Western Sahara and the diaspora – we are able to probe into the new juridical-political coordinates of the ‘camp,’ the space where exception and rule blur. This chapter focuses on autonomy as one such materialization of the camp; however, if we look back upon the conflict genealogy of Western Sahara, particularly on Chapters Two and Three of this study, the state of exception takes multiple forms throughout the conflict cycle and constitutes part of Realpolitik discourses. We need only think in terms of Cold War mentalities and binaries. In light of the ‘fact’ of the threat of communism and Soviet expansionism, the ‘free world’ could not allow another Angola on the East flank of the Atlantic Ocean (Western Sahara) nor stand idly by while Spain went the way of Socialist Portugal. We need only think of the 1991 ceasefire and planned referendum and how legitimate self-determination for the Sahrawi people clashed with the emergence of the New World Order (the then recent fall of the Berlin Wall and Communism) and Thatcherism and Reagan-economics, which place geopolitical, military and economic relations above all else. We need only think of the 2001 Declaration of the Global War on Terror to capture the pervasiveness of states of exception throughout the conflict cycle and the manifestations of hybrid law – the

368 suspension and transgression of international laws and norms. Of course, I am simplifying complex and multidimensional processes in order to make my point. Nonetheless, these examples demonstrate how real politics discourses (ideas, policies and actions) produced and continue to produce approaches and ideological positioning in response to ‘states of exception/states of emergency,’ thereby opening up the space of the normalized exception, the camp. In the state of exception law is suspended and Realpolitik discourses legitimate its suspension. Contrary to alternative definitions of the state of exception that represent the discontinuity of the juridical order as constituting an “ambiguous, uncertain, borderline fringe at the intersection of the legal and the political” (Fontana, 1999: 16; cited in Agamben, 2005: 1) or a “point of imbalance between public law and political fact” (Saint-Bonnet, 2001: 28; cited in Agamben, 2005: 1), the state of exception’s exceptional quality does not lie in its atypicality, but in its capacity to become the norm. Within the conflict context of Western Sahara, autonomy does not represent a break in a ‘zero-sum’ stalemate. Autonomy is the manifestation of the juridical-political order suspended and transgressed. It is the abstract camp manifested. From this interesting analytical slant, autonomy no longer appears an adequate solution for the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict. Moreover, and as established in Chapter One, real autonomy is impossible considering the political realities in Morocco (totalitarian State). And yet, it is upheld as the middle way solution to the conflict, as the exit strategy from a zero-sum impasse. We have employed Agamben’s concept of the state of exception in order to better understand this disconnect between international law and political reality. In this case, there is no longer a differentiation between political reality and international law. They are indistinguishable. Therefore, when autonomy is presented as a solution to the conflict, it does not appear to fall outside of the law when in fact it does. Just as it was essential to include in our analytical toolbox the functioning, production and normalization of Realpolitik in order to better understand the structural conditions and contingencies of this particular protracted conflict and conflict prevention, mapping and analysis, problematizing the concept of ‘zero-sum’ deepens and facilitates our discussion of the conflict of Western Sahara.

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As stated above, this zero-sum scenario portrays the Frente POLISARIO and Morocco in a head to head gridlock – self-determination/independence versus territorial integrity/integration (annexation). Presenting the conflict in this way misrepresents the decolonization status of Western Sahara and steers conflict strategizing towards ‘political reality’ and away from formal self-determination and firmly established peremptory norms of international law. As we have seen, autonomy does not break this stalemate, but rather upholds injustice by normalizing the suspension of international law and by celebrating the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan (which excludes the option of independence) as the real and only viable political solution to the protracted conflict of Western Sahara. The normalization of illegality (autonomy as camp) has been realized in the name of compromise. Framing the conflict within these zero-sum parameters only reinforces a real politics agenda within the context of a state of exception, while simultaneously ignoring the legal principle and peremptory norm at the heart of the matter, self-determination.

4.1.3. At the Heart of the Matter: Self-Determination

In effect, the normalization of autonomy as the solution for Western Sahara discredits a broader understanding of self-determination. As we have established, self- determination in the decolonization context clearly stipulates three options: independence, free association or integration. As such, we find self-determination in its political-juridical order in tensional interplay with the state of exception and Realpolitik discourses, which today cannot be delinked from contemporary discourses on self- determination, the core of our polemic. This forces us to rethink the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan as a conflict transformation strategy for Western Sahara and to reevaluate the concept of self-determination. Moving our discussion from autonomy and back to self-determination allows us to reconceptualize our approach to the Western Saharan ‘zero-sum’ stalemate by shifting our frame of reference from the interests of the parties to the political-juridical dimensions of self-determination itself. By doing so, we engage the paradoxical forces, the “di-polarities” (the tensional oppositions) (Agamben, 2004a; Raulff/interview with Agamben), that characterize self-

370 determination and reject the normalized suspension of the law. Furthermore, by reconfiguring the concept of zero-sum in political-juridical terms, we take into account the intricacies of the state of exception and the diverse discourses that influence our understanding of self-determination as a transformative conflict tool. It is within this complex context that self-determination bears upon the very right of the Sahrawi people to express this right. In Chapter One, we developed the concept of self-determination and its evolution from political principle and thought to a right in international law (see also Wilson, 1988: 65-78; 88). In addition, we established that international law affords the formal right of self-determination to the Sahrawi people and that the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara affirmed this right. We also disputed the idea that the ICJ opinion was unclear and created confusion for the decolonization process of Western Sahara. Although it recognized some legal ties, it expressly stated that they did not affect the application of Resolution 1514 (XV). In fact, the confusion lies in the sphere of the political and not the juridical. Therefore, a statement such as, “To recognise the applicability of the right of self-determination and, in the same breath, the existence of legal ties between Western Sahara on the one hand, and Morocco and Mauritania on the other hand, is to throw the bone to the dogs and confuse the procedure of decolonisation” (Okere, 1979: 311), belongs not to the realm of international law, but to that of political application. However, if we play devil’s advocate for a moment, one could criticize such a legally loaded argument. Does a juridical focus and preoccupation with independence as an option for the expression of self-determination weaken the transformative potential of the concept of self-determination by preconditioning a final outcome and setting up a zero-sum standoff? How does one reconcile contemporary discourses on self- determination and alternatives to independence-based claims with the apparent facts of the conflict situation? Indeed, as is evidenced by the status of Western Sahara, one of the sixteen United Nations open decolonization cases, the Sahrawi people retain the right to self-determination. This point cannot be over-emphasized, especially considering the dominant discourses that confuse the issue in ‘political-reality’ régimes of truth and under the guise of autonomy. In Chapters Two and Three, we provided a detailed genealogy of

371 the conflict and explored the impact that Realpolitik discourses, including geo-political, military and economic interest factors as well as neutral third-party action, had on the failure of the decolonization process and on the various stages of the conflict: preventative, hot conflict and diplomatic stalemate. The protracted nature of the conflict has created a self-determination predicament for Western Sahara. The following excerpt sets the stage for why an overview of contemporary approaches and interpretations of the principle of self-determination is of particular interest to a conflict analysis of Western Sahara and to self-determination conflicts more generally.

“The process of decolonization after World War Two left a vast range of disputed territories and arbitrary boundaries in the developing world, leading inevitably to conflict over the adjustment of boundaries and over the legitimacy of states formed during colonization. Post-colonial polities suddenly found themselves in the position of sovereign states, but often with too diverse an ethnic mix to build easily the shared values and identities that might make a functioning nation. More often, their populations consisted of more than one nation, or parts of several. Given the potent impact of the decolonization process upon ethnic antagonisms, it is no surprise to find that ‘ethno-political’ conflicts have been steadily increasing since the ‘winds of change’ in the early 1960s led to independence for former colonial states in Africa, Asia and the Pacific…One example among many is the legacy left in Western Sahara by the departing Spanish in 1975: an artificial frontier between Morocco and ‘Spanish Sahara’ which became the subject of a long dispute between the Moroccan state and the Polisario Front, the army of the Saharawi people. Put simply, their sense of themselves as a community – their ethnic identity – contradicted the arbitrary maplines drawn by the colonizer, and they set about correcting the map as soon as they were free to do so. A difference of identity, combined with a dispute over territory, resulted in violent conflict, which remains unresolved today” (Bloomfield et al., 2003a: 35; emphasis mine).

This passage demonstrates how a decolonization case, which has been internationally tagged as a Non-Self-Governing Territory, can easily be thrown into present day analyses of post-colonial self-determination conflicts, designated above as ‘ethno-political’ conflicts. It shows the rewriting of history and the blending of eras. It also provides a glimpse into the growing complexity of the self-determination principle. As explored throughout this work, Realpolitik discourses, which stress a politically viable solution to

372 the conflict, have diluted and even sidelined international law and the proper proceedings for a Non-Self-Governing Territory. An incomplete decolonization case, Western Sahara also pertains to the ‘post’ colonial order. In order to explore the transformative conflict potential of self-determination, as it pertains to its colonial meaning, it is necessary to evaluate and incorporate contemporary understandings of the concept, rather than merely pushing a clean-cut case of colonial self-determination. However, considering the conflict facts of Western Sahara, one would be tempted to do so. From the colonial understanding of self-determination to present conceptualizations, the concept of self-determination has developed and evolved to meet the changing nature of self-determination claims and ethnic conflicts in a globalized world. Therefore, to simply argue that Western Sahara belongs to the colonial understanding of self-determination is to ignore the passage of time and the fact that the concept is mutable and negotiable rather than static and inflexible. In a post-colonial context, there are groups fighting to broaden the concept beyond a purely colonial interpretation of the right, those heralding territorial integrity above self-determination and others claiming that even the colonial application of self-determination has expired. To understand the challenges that we face regarding self-determination as a conflict transformation tool for this particular conflict as well as others and to challenge the state of exception (autonomy), we must closely examine the self-determination dialectics of today. Let us explore more closely the di-polarities and present-day realities of a concept that offers tensional-potential conflict transformation outside of the state of exception. In doing so, I aim to provide an alternative analysis to the dominant one that upholds autonomy as the only way to break the zero-sum stalemate for Western Sahara. In fact, I question the very structure, preliminary conditions and determinants that influence what is thought to be ‘zero-sum’. At the same time, I offer a multifaceted strategy of how to analytically approach self-determination conflicts in general so as to better meet the challenges and specificities of individual self-determination conflicts. Whereas Chapter One traced the development of the concept of self-determination in international law from principle to right, the following section (Part Two) explores its contemporary and diverse interpretations. I openly engage the self-determination debate.

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4.2. The Multidimensionality of Self-Determination

4.2.1. Diverse Conceptions of Self-Determination

Using World War II as a point of departure, it is possible to identify three distinct and yet related stages of self-determination: self-determination as per the United Nations Charter; self-determination in the decolonization ‘era’; and self-determination outside of the colonial context. Today, the literature on self-determination is predominately concerned with ‘post-colonial’ self-determination. We are immediately reminded of the postcolonial paradigm and the continuities of the colonial order explored in Chapter One. For Western Sahara, this pertains to being ‘stuck’ in the colonial order and for post- colonial nation-states, to those factors, influences and structures that maintain the colonial order (neocolonialism, neoimperialism, neoliberal globalization). In philosophical terms, self-determination is an aporia. This is evident in the very double-nature of the concept, its relation to the colonial and post-colonial orders and its mutability. Self-determination has a “justifying, stabilizing, conserving effect and it has a criticizing, subversive, revolutionising one” (Bibó, 1976: 73; also cited in Knight, 1985: 268). It is both legal230 (invoking international law) and geographical (involving people, sense of place and bounded space) (Knight, 1985: 251). Connor Walker captures the ‘colonial’ multi-tensionality of self-determination:

“There was, however, a unique feature to the African and Asian independence movements. Although they had been conducted in the name of self-determination, they were, in fact, demands for political independence not in accord with ethnic distributions, but along the essentially happenstance231 borders that delimited either the sovereignty or the administrative zones of the former colonial powers…the leaders of these new states, though recent espousers of national self-determination, are now perforce the defenders of multinationalism” (Connor, 1967: 31- 32).

230 According to J.L. Brierly, international law refers to “the body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized states in their relations with one another” (1963: 1). 231 Happenstance is a poor choice of words that does not adequately portray colonial agency – the calculated, deliberate and brutal carving of Africa by colonial powers. However, the point is that the colonial borders did not reflect pre-colonial African reality. 374

In other words, the very voices that call for self-determination, once admitted into the nation-state club, become the very supporters of territorial integrity and suppressors of secessionist movements (affronts against territorial integrity). The very artificiality of the newly dependent states makes ripe the possibility for violent and peaceful protest against such synthetic impositions. Moreover, considering that the formal political processes of self-determination directly relate to the colonial map, the concept of self-determination is immediately imbued with internal and external contradictions. The United Nations Charter names self-determination as a universal right; however, “it is also said to apply only to those people who seek an end to colonial domination within their colonially-derived bounded territories,” thereby maintaining the status quo and denying further application of the right (Knight, 1985: 248). Despite the argument that the right applies in exceptional situations, does it in effect exclude minority groups within already existing states and minority groups within formerly colonized states? Does it even exclude particular decolonization cases? The majority of ‘colonial’ self-determination conflicts have been formally completed, and yet self-determination conflicts continue to present significant challenges to the international system of states. Therefore, is self-determination as colonial morphology inadequate and too narrowly interpreted? This raises the oft-asked question of who is the subject or entity entitled to self- determination. Helen Quane characterizes self-determination as an elusive concept (Quane, 1998: 537). She explains that because there is no clear definition of ‘peoples,’ diverse and at-odds interpretations of self-determination have emerged. Among these include three distinct categories of ‘people’: “the population of a State”; “the population of a colony”; and “groups of individuals linked by a common language, ethnicity or race whether or not they comprise the entire population of a State or colony” (537). Quane ultimately concludes that self-determination applies solely to the second category, colonial peoples. She raises the ongoing debate of who constitutes the people. Michla Pomerance problematizes the subjectivity of self-determination. In an analytical slant somewhat different from Quane, she queries who is the ‘self’ in self- determination; highlights the theoretical and practical difficulties ‘inherent’ in the term; points out the subjective nature of self-determination; and even questions the ‘UN Law of

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Self-Determination’ (Pomerance, 1982). For Pomerance, self-determination is but a double standard and a harbinger of problems related to the ambiguities indicative of its subjectivity. Therefore, she asks:

“[How has the ‘law’ of self-determination] reconciled the conflicting claims to ‘self-determination’ and ‘territorial integrity’; linked the questions of ‘external’ self-determination, ‘internal’ self-determination and representative government; viewed new post-colonial demands for self-determination; and related self-determination to the principles of the non-use of force, sovereign equality, and non-intervention in the affairs of other States?” (13).

Together, Quane and Pomerance hit self-determination’s controversial core. Who has the right to self-determination?; how far does the right extend?; how does international law reconcile the competing claims of self-determination and territorial integrity? Their concerns and conclusions provide a mere glimpse into the ‘messiness’ that surrounds the principle of self-determination in an international context. If we recall from Chapter One, Article One of both the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declare the universality of the right of self-determination: “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (United Nations General Assembly, 1966a; 1966b). Unfortunately, as Hurst Hannum illustrates, this proclamation of the universality of self-determination “does little to define the scope of that right” (Hannum, 2002: 225)232. He continues: “Nevertheless, the reference to ‘all’ peoples and the fact that the article is found in human rights treaties intended to have universal applicability suggest a scope beyond that of decolonization” (225). In fact, the very reason that autonomy without independence can be held up as a politically viable option is closely related to new formulations of self-determination itself. It may be difficult to determine the scope of the right of self-determination outside of its colonial context; however, present self-determination conflicts challenge the classical understanding of self-determination as applying only to colonial peoples.

232 See also Hurst Hannum’s “Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Era,” 1996. 376

Richard Falk points out that the right of self-determination has developed along three distinct overlapping and convoluted lines: morality (considerations of justice), politics (political movements and experience) and law (international juridical order) (2002: 42). He states: “the incorporation of self-determination into international law has consistently lagged behind advocacy based on aspirations and considerations of justice…and political movements” (42). This is an important point. International law on self-determination confined to the formal decolonization process lags behind today’s self- determination political realities – diverse political experiences expressed in moves for more autonomy and/or secession. A common theme among contemporary descriptions of self-determination and self-determination conflicts is recognition of the limits to ‘colonial self-determination’. Nevertheless, the disputable components surrounding the principle, like defining the people and conflicting claims of territorial integrity (sovereignty) and self-determination, complicate the self-determination debate and are used to support both sides of the spectrum – secessionist (subversive and revolutionary movements) and statist (conservation of political structures) interpretations. Because of the multitensionality inherent in the concept of self-determination and due to its legal, geographical (spatial), economic and political implications, I have categorically isolated three general interpretations that have particular bearing on, whether in support of or against, the transformative power of self-determination for Western Sahara and other self- determination conflicts. They are: self-determination as colonial continuity, as a reformative concept and as struggle. Together they make up a good portion of the self- determination debate.

4.2.2. Self-Determination as Colonial Continuity, Reformative Concept and Struggle

4.2.2.1. As Colonial Continuity

In line with postcolonial studies that stress the continuity of colonialism (the misleading ‘post’ in the post-colonial), some point to self-determination not as liberation from colonization, but as a continuation of colonization, as disenfranchisement (Grovogui, 1996; Weller, 2005). Conceived of in this light and reminiscent of our discussion of self-determination in Chapter One, self-determination is but a colonial myth 377 that falsely mediated the end to colonial rule. Siba Grovogui describes self-determination as a tainted right that has been “chained” to the colonized because it “derives from particular conceptions of community and politics that are specific to Western culture,” in particular, a culture both motivated by an “endless quest for material well-being and a reliance on violence to achieve political ends” and consumed by “concerns with rights, property, and political representations” (Grovogui, 1996: 4). Grovogui does not portray self-determination as resistance to and breaking away from colonial control, but as a colonial inheritance. This idea of self-determination as colonial continuity reminds us of Agamben’s warning of the double-sidedness of political events: “the spaces, the liberties, and the rights won by individuals in their conflicts with central powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit but increasing inscription of individuals’ lives within the state order, thus offering a new and more dreadful foundation for the sovereign power from which they wanted to liberate themselves” (Agamben, 1998: 121). Self- determination, per decolonization, provided access to the state order, the colonizer’s order. Like Grovogui, Marc Weller directly addresses the tensions inherent in self- determination. For Weller, the ways in which colonial self-determination have been framed and interpreted reduce self-determination to a concept that limits rather than emancipates, while simultaneously generating a dynamic that sustains conflict. In effect, he argues that the rigidity of the classical doctrine of self-determination disenfranchises in the name of maintaining peace and stability. Self-determination in this light represents both a decisive departure from pre-colonial realities and a concretization of the colonial order. He states:

“While self-determination is an activist right that is intended to overcome the evils of colonialism, it is in fact administered in a way that is consistent with the territorial designs and administrative practices imposed by the colonizers…For the definition of the entity that is entitled to exercise the right of self-determination is in itself a product of colonial administration. Self-determination does not aim to restore ethnic or tribal links among populations that were artificially divided by the colonizers. Instead, the ‘people’ entitled to self-determination are those who happen to live within the colonial boundaries drawn by the colonial powers” (Weller, 2005: 11).

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According to Weller, self-determination legitimizes the artificial lines that were drawn by colonial powers regardless of pre-colonial realities. As such, he questions the scope of application of self-determination, one that: is consistent with the territorial designs and administrative practices imposed by the colonizers; denies “restorative justice”; and is a “one-time-only event” (11, 26). He refers to both East Timor and Western Sahara as examples of colonial disregard to pre-colonial ways of life. Weller’s assumptions regarding the limits to colonial self-determination regarding Western Sahara (and East Timor in its own right) fail to take into consideration the complex early history of Western Sahara and the autonomous Sahrawi tribes that inhabited the ‘Spanish Sahara’. In addition, he completely leapfrogs the Sahrawi colonial period and the resultant nation-building liberation movement that the Frente POLISARIO forged against colonial rule. Colonialism is not merely a disruption to the way things were. Rather, it marks an irrevocable systematized oppression of peoples violently brought into its sphere, be it via direct or indirect, cultural and structural violence, in a way that changed the very landscape of pre-colonial realities as well as the metropole. Indeed, similar arguments as that of Weller and Grovogui ignore the irrevocable impact of colonialism on “pre-colonial cultures” caused by the different modalities of epistemic violence (Spivak, 1988) and the fact that colonialism has never been a one-way process. As Said (1978, 1993), Spivak (1988) and others affirm, the pre-colonial is always in tension with the history of colonialism. It is virtually impossible to speak of pure, uncontaminated cultures both in the former colonies and in the metropoles. This applies to all spheres of life, be they political, cultural, juridical and so on. Resistance to colonial rule took multiple forms. However, in all cases, it reconfigured both the pre-colonial and colonial orders. These complex processes should not be reduced to the drawing and legitimization of artificial lines. Weller’s argument is limited in this regard, yet he correctly points out the continuity of colonial constructions and the shortcomings of the colonial interpretation of self-determination. Weller contends that ‘people,’ understood as colonial peoples, is so narrowly defined that it excludes other struggles for independence outside of the colonial context. Self-determination, therefore, limits or denies choice because it privileges the interest of the state over groups challenging territorial unity (4). In addition, colonial self-

379 determination sabotages alternative solutions to independence-based secession movements like constitutional settlements, which may maintain the unity of a state. Consequently, self-determination movements (opposition groups) revert to armed struggle, violence or sustained conflict in order to uphold and maintain their cause and to oppose territorial integrity claims of the central government. If statehood appears to be the only option for these groups, which fall outside of the colonial doctrine of self- determination, positions become entrenched. Although Weller overlooks national liberation movements – singular and complex responses to colonial domination – he puts forth a provocative argument concerning the link between colonial continuity and protracted conflicts: “Rather than preventing conflict, however, the rule of self-determination has generated a dynamic that sustains conflict. For those who seek to assert their identity are forced into an absolute position” (4). For Weller, self-determination is not only a way to make colonial territorial designs and administrative practices permanent, it is also a zero-sum concept that protracts conflict. On the one hand, the overspill of the colonial doctrine of self-determination into contemporary self-determination conflicts radicalizes secessionist groups. On the other hand, it allows governments to respond with a heavy hand to these demands in the comfort of the “self-determination rule,” which poses no threat to territorial integrity (4). In this contemporary scenario, protracted conflicts ensue. Weller calls for new settlements that do not preclude secession, but rather offer a new relationship between the central states and secessionist units (5). He concludes that constitutional self- determination provides the space for territorial integrity and possible secession in a way that the restrictive doctrine of colonial self-determination rules out by definition. Weller and Grovogui’s critical assessments of self-determination raise important questions as to the binding relationship between self-determination and colonialism. Anti-colonial liberation movements (resistance against colonial domination) cannot be separated from the colonial order because of the very push of these movements for statehood status in adherence to colonial lines (the dominant narrative/construct of the nation-state). In this way, both are correct to point out the continuity of colonialism. Additionally, Weller poses two important questions: who is left outside of the self- determination system, and can complex power-sharing settlements show the way out of

380 what he designates the ‘self-determination trap’? In response to the first, as stated previously, an exclusive colonial interpretation of self-determination is limiting and one- dimensional; however, as will be explored next, it does not go unchallenged. Regarding the second, considering the protracted nature of many self-determination conflicts, to rule out a multitude of conflict transformation approaches, including complex-power-sharing settlements, is myopic. However, to reduce self-determination to colonial continuity, disenfranchisement and zero-sum is to misperceive the reformative potential of the concept.

4.2.2.2. As Reformative Concept

Hurst Hannum explores self-determination as a reformative principle and negotiable abstraction. He explains:

“If self-determination leading to statehood is viewed as an end in itself – i.e. as reflecting a preference for homogenous, independent, often small, ‘nation-states’ – then it is incapable of universal application without massive disruption. It leads to intensified problems of minority rights and border-drawing and runs counter to simultaneous trends towards greater regional economic and political cooperation (if not integration) among states...If, however, self-determination is viewed as a means to an end – that end being a democratic, participatory political and economic system in which the rights of individuals and the identity of minority communities are protected – its continuing validity is more easily perceived” (Hannum, 2002: 243).

Hannum considers self-determination a “viable principle of contemporary international law” (234). At the same time, he highlights two fundamental issues indicative of the concept: defining the peoples entitled to self-determination and clarifying the scope of the right of self-determination (231). These are recurring themes in the self-determination debate. As opposed to Weller, Hannum evaluates a broader meaning of self- determination that is not exclusive to decolonization. He classifies the principle and right of self-determination by era: the Wilsonian (political formation); decolonization (repudiation of colonialism); and human rights (democracy and participation and inclusion in political processes) (244).

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According to Hannum, in the post-colonial human rights era, self-determination generally excludes secession and, for that matter, independence as an option for self- determination. The protection of human rights “combined with the right of effective participation in the political and economic process is the primary contemporary rationale for the exercise of the right of self-determination” (Hannum, 2002: 241). Although internationally accepted human rights norms determine the “standard of legitimacy” in the post-colonial era, rather than any adherence to established norms on self- determination, calls for self-determination from marginalized or minority groups are many times framed in arguments of human rights abuses, oppression and lack of representation and voice (243). Hannum argues that two trigger factors for ethnic conflicts are lack of democracy, denial of participation in political processes and discrimination against or persecution of minorities by the state and its majority population (241). Within this framework, Hannum does not underestimate the usefulness of self- determination. Instead, he contends that the “content” of self-determination, like international law, is constantly evolving to more accurately reflect changing times and political realities (243). This evolution is marked by modifications of terminology. Hannum cites ‘autonomy’ as an example of one such change in terminology. However, he ultimately concludes: “While such new terminology might be clearer, redefining ‘self- determination’ may be more politically acceptable than attempting to bury it” (243)233. As such, Hannum (2006) argues for a renegotiation of self-determination that takes into consideration post-colonial realities and reframes the concept in terms of autonomy and minority rights. This redefinition of self-determination excludes the possibility of unilateral and nonconsensual secession, but recognizes the need for an incorporation of human, minority and indigenous rights (Hannum, 2006: 61). Hannum even suggests that demands for self-determination with independence as a goal, including classic decolonization cases like Kashmir and Western Sahara, lack “theoretical support for independence” (70). Preferred solutions, even for classical decolonization cases, advance ‘less-than’

233 Hannum describes autonomy as the guarantee of the basic survival of language, education, access to government civil service, police and security forces, social services, land and natural resources and representative government (Hannum, 1990: 458). 382 independent status for each. While international law tells a different story for these classical decolonization cases, it is interesting to note a conservative trend against state disintegration alongside a more liberal push for democracy and human rights. In fact, Hannum concludes that this preference for self-determination that excludes independence can be “found in the remarkable developments in minority rights over the past decade” and in “defining the rights of indigenous peoples,” both of which include references to self-determination, but exclude secession (70). In this context, “negotiating self- determination” opens up possibilities and takes on renewed, but conditional meaning (77). But, how does negotiating self-determination make it a transformative concept for self-determination conflicts in light of other findings? Erin Jenne, for example, warns that “ethnic wars over self-determination are much more intense than ethnic wars waged over other issues” (Jenne, 2006: 27; emphasis in original). Indeed, Jenne argues that until national self-determination claims and adequate representation are divorced from territory, the international community will continue to be plagued by bloody and protracted self-determination conflicts, a “never-ending cycle of violence” (Jenne, 2006: 29). These conclusions seem to echo the sentiments of Weller and refute the idea that self-determination can be a transformative tool for such conflicts. Eileen F. Babbitt (2006) asserts that most minority groups see self-determination as synonymous with secession. Furthermore, they view self-determination not only as the “ultimate outcome,” but also as a legal and moral right to which they are entitled (Babbitt, 2006a: 117). What kind of transformation can take place in such extreme and nonnegotiable position taking and ‘all or nothing’ (zero-sum) hard bargaining? Jenne and Babbitt raise legitimate concerns regarding the flammable nature of self-determination secessionist movements and put into crisis claims of its transformative capacities. Here it is important to clear up possible misunderstandings. The transformative potentialities of self-determination do not comprise a comprehensive theoretical understanding of self-determination. Its transformative capacities, on the contrary, lie in the very act of perceiving of self-determination as both a starting point to a process and as a multidimensional and mutable concept of historical and international juridical importance. As Hannum argues, self-determination should be construed of as a means and not an end goal in and of itself.

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Self-determination conflicts are framed in the very context of self-determination. This statement appears axiomatic or even tautological. However, it cannot be understated. The actors in unresolved classic colonial self-determination conflicts as well as post- colonial self-determination conflicts frame their fight – be it an anticolonial liberation movement, a rejection of occupation or internal ethnic rivalry – in terms of their right to self-determination. Responses to such claims, therefore, must take this into consideration. Autonomy fits within the many folds of a broad and deep conceptualization of self- determination. Autonomy is but one answer, one possibility for self-determination conflicts as well as one expression of self-determination. However, groups seeking self- determination do not usually set autonomy as their primary goal. Self-determination as a starting point and historically rooted concept carries more weight and can be adapted to diverse and complex conflict situations. Still, utilizing self-determination as a transformative tool can only be effective if accompanied by international norm setting and establishment of the rules of the game (Babbitt, 2006: 118). If we revisit Hannum’s assessment that a preference for self-determination that excludes independence/secession (for both classical colonial and post-colonial cases) can be found in the development of minority and indigenous rights and formulations of autonomy within existing states, we see a need for norm setting regardless of the final outcomes of self-determination, i.e. expansion of cultural rights, autonomy or independence. Babbitt stresses the need for the international community to spell out the standards with which it determines the legitimacy of self-determination claims and state recognition and how it intends to enforce these norms (Babbitt, 2006: 118). Babbitt recognizes that such norms are susceptible to inconsistent application and subject to the “interests of large international actors,” a theme that has been addressed throughout this study with respect to the failed decolonization of Western Sahara and in this chapter regarding the concept of autonomy more specifically (119). Due to the international community’s inconsistency regarding state recognition, self-determination is “interpreted as synonymous with secession,” instead of as one option among many (128). In response to cries for norm setting, Allen Buchanan (2004, 2006) proposes a middle of the road solution between a unilateral right to secede and state claims to territorial integrity. In the post-colonial age of secession, Buchanan argues that the

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Remedial Right Only Theory (a theory that makes injustice a prerequisite for secession) allows the international community to acknowledge that groups have a valid claim to independence in certain cases, without capitulating to the dangerous rhetoric of national self-determination (Buchanan, 2006: 92). He rejects Primary Right Theories (Ascriptivist/nationalist and Plebiscitary/majoritarian Theories), which accord a more permissive stance on secession, including a unilateral right to secede, but clearly acknowledges a place for independence and secession. He explains that the strength of the Remedial Right Only Theory lies in its incorporation of Primary Right Theories: “The key to this approach is to isolate the unilateral right to secede as a remedial right only and to distinguish it from the legitimate interests that groups may have in forms of intrastate autonomy, while denying that whenever a groups is entitled to some form of self- determination they automatically have the right to full independence” (91-92). Like Hannum, Buchanan contends that a justice-based premise focuses attention where it should be, on human and indigenous rights. A common thread that we can see running through each of these reformative arguments is a move away from independence- based solutions. This reflects the international community’s preference for autonomous agreements over secession. Nevertheless, this does not mean that independence is always ruled out. Buchanan raises an interesting point in this regard. Is there a place for independence movements based on injustice rather than nationalism? Buchanan opens a whole new can of worms regarding how to measure claims of injustice. Notwithstanding, in keeping independence on the table aside alternative options, he maintains a broad and deep understanding of self-determination, which must respond to the particulars and complexities of each self-determination case – thereby making self-determination negotiable. If self-determination is confused with separatism, unilateral secession or independence rather than as a point of reference or, as Rodolfo Stavenhagen offers, as process, its usefulness as a transformative tool is obfuscated (Stavenhagen, 1996: 3). Concordantly, if a positivist norm-setting approach to self-determination dominates responses to self-determination conflicts, the concept imposes limitations rather than options and variations. Therefore, instead of framing self-determination as a mere “technical decision in international law,” it should also be understood as, like other

385 human rights, “an open-ended ongoing process without point of closure” (3-5). Stavenhagen likens limiting self-determination in this way to limiting democracy to one single election. His assessment does not take away from the importance of international law. On the contrary, it strengthens the setting of international norms, principles and rights by asserting that self-determination is not one-dimensional and that it is made up of multiple parts and influenced by complex variables. In the following statement, Richard Falk also points out the importance of maintaining a flexible approach to self- determination:

“The more flexible international law approach that is sensitive to context and trends in official practice gives a more realistic picture of the relevance of law to current discussions of self-determination than does its restrictive counterpart, which purports a clarity and definiteness that seem increasingly out of touch with the ways in which self-determination claims have been validated by diplomatic recognition, UN admissions procedures, and geopolitical priorities” (Falk, 2002: 49).

In response to secessionist motivation theory regarding self-determination, Falk stresses the importance of equitable participation and protection of all peoples and the deepening of democracy to reduce, if not eliminate, such motivations (65). By upholding democracy as a structural deterrent for secession, Falk inadvertently locates our third interpretation of self-determination, self-determination as struggle.

4.2.2.3. As Struggle

Struggles for self-determination can be mounted for independence or in order to gain recognition and representation. In either case, they are struggles for inclusion and reactions against exclusion. Nihal Jayawickrama, for example, calls for a redefining of self-determination that takes into account post-colonial man-made demarcations that do not reflect colonial slashing “across ethnic settlements regardless of cultural affinities” (Jayawickrama, 1996: 363). Accordingly, self-determination as a concept should encompass colonial arbitrariness and the diversity of “peoples” – defined as “numerically small but cohesive ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups in sovereign and independent states” – and should be enforced by a United Nations body in a way that addresses post-

386 colonial independence movements and the subservience of small ethnic groups to dominant groups (371). A redefinition of self-determination must respond to a resurgence of ethnicity, which Jayawickrama notes may be linked to asserting identity in heterogeneous states. In the terminology of Buchanan, this approach amounts to a Primary Right Theory, whereby self-determination is conceived of as a unilateral right. Jayawickrama argues against basing self-determination claims solely on human rights violations. Instead, he contends that when guaranteed as a right for minorities and indigenous persons, regardless of human rights violations, the concept of self-determination encourages coexistence and recognizes the constant state of evolution of human communities. This fact must be reflected in political, social and economic systems. Viewed in this light, self-determination strengthens the human rights regime, but is not subordinate to it. Unlike some Primary Right theorists, he views self-determination as an unconditional right that need not be based on violations of human rights or the viability of a state. Jayawickrama points to the benefits of an international law approach that subordinates territorial integrity to the people’s right to self-determination. He contends that by introducing a fair and just rule of law that supports self-determination for all peoples, the following happens: the primary cause of communal friction between two groups, discrimination, is eliminated; there is no need for groups to resort to terrorism or other forms of violence to assert the right of self-determination; the discussion shifts from rights to conditions of co-existence; small ethnic groups will have to look at the viability of secession in political, social and economic terms; and, dominant groups will have to offer small groups, which possess valuable resources, attractive terms to maintain the unity of the state (363-365). In all cases, co-existence is a voluntary act and self- determination is a continuing right. Essential to his argument is an enforcement agency, like a UN body and high commissioner for self-determination, which ensures legal norms and deters political expediency. This body would keep in check shifting stances on the dynamic concept. Jayawickrama recognizes the continuity of colonialism, the reformative possibilities of self-determination and the struggle at the heart of self-determination

387 movements. His argument that the extension of the right of self-determination to minorities and indigenous groups constitutes a formulation of the terms and conditions of coexistence is contentious, but provocative. Even he acknowledges the difficulties (minefields) of implementing such a system, but insists that self-determination as understood in the human rights regime does not respond effectively to the resurgence of ethnicity. However, most importantly, his focus on self-determination agency – meaning the people that make up the movement and the modes of acting that determine their direction and impact – refocuses the debate from a removed or prescriptive theoretical framework to one that recognizes the struggle of people to be heard and recognized. Buchanan (1997, 1998) questions the practicality of prima facie proponents of self-determination. He points out that thinkers like Harry Beran (1993, 1998), Christopher H. Wellman (1995), Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz (1990, 1999) and Daniel Philpott (1995), proponents of self-determination as a primary right (not absolute), do not provide a clear strategy for incorporating this right into international law234. One could argue that this is the story of self-determination – constant and yet slow transformation from principle to right recognized in international law (see Chapter One). However, Buchanan makes an important observation. Self-determination cannot live in a political, philosophical or legal vacuum. Self-determination theory and practice must consider their overlap as well as the agency behind the principle. Karen Knop (2002) bridges this gap by linking the people’s struggle for self- determination to the political, philosophical and juridical components of the concept. Knop highlights how different groups struggle to be a part of the conversation and norm- setting on sovereign states and international law: “The practice of self-determination thus becomes a struggle for inclusion, not only a people’s struggle to become part of the world

234 Beran (1993, 1998) argues that any group can justify seceding under certain conditions like reaching a substantial majority and possessing the necessary resources to be a viable state; Wellman (1995) argues a similar case to Beran, acknowledging that self-determination is a conditional primary right that depends on a majority opinion and that a new state must be able to provide justice and security without dismembering an existing state in a way that impairs its functioning as a state; Margalit and Raz (1990, 1999) recognize self-determination as a primary right, but one that is not absolute nor unconditional; Philpott (1995) promotes democratic self-determination, criticizes international law for endorsing self-determination while upholding territorial integrity and argues that even though threats and grievance are indeed morally relevant, they are not necessarily a prerequisite for the expression of self-determination; all consider self- determination to be a right. This right can be conditioned and preferably does not lead to secession, but it does not depend upon the violation of other rights in order for it to be applicable as Buchanan et al. argue. 388 of sovereign states, but their struggle to incorporate their own story into international law” (Knop, 2002: 13). Knop identifies three areas of inclusion/exclusion: participation, identity and interpretation. Participation refers to having a voice in the process, a process that includes involvement in the determination of meaning and other means of building, taking into consideration multiple perspectives and the “procedural possibilities to speak” (Knop, 2002: 4). Identity correlates to what is said; therefore, we must consider how international law helps to construct the identity of a group and how it functions as a discourse that shapes the perception of a group (history and entitlements), but which does not necessarily reflect the “self-image of the group or its parts” (4). Interpretation relates to the space that “the interpreter’s theory of law” (the model of law and legal reasoning) opens up or closes off, thereby setting “the limits and terms of the conversation” as well as determining how to speak about the possible meanings of international law (4). This approach to international law and self-determination recognizes the agency of power, those in positions to determine participation, identity and interpretation and to set the inclusionary and exclusionary rules of the game. At the same time, it recognizes the ‘agency of self-determination’ – those struggling to be included and heard in exclusionary western dominant frameworks of the nation-state. It further problematizes a purely positivist and inflexible understanding of international law, while upholding the importance of a legal foundation. Knop explains that the “narrowest” and most “positivist” understanding of self- determination in international law is the one that claims that it begins and ends with decolonization and colonial “peoples” (53-54). Hannum points out that a primary legal approach, which generally assumes a “rational, egalitarian, individualistic structure,” does not adequately address the ascriptive nature of self-determination conflicts because of the very fact that the law is structured in a way that eclipses those attributes (Hannum, 1996: 5). In fact, the peaceful transformation of self-determination conflicts depends in great part on a deeper understanding of the multiple meanings and possible applications of self-determination and on the external components that influence such movements, i.e.

389 ethnic and nationalist principles of self-determination, perceived economic or political discrimination, marginalization and disadvantage and neoliberal modernization235 (7-9). Knop’s focus on inclusion and voice challenges the zero-sum view that self- determination conflicts are struggles for independence pegged against territorial integrity. In fact, and as Jayawickrama attests to, they are about choice and representation in the international system. In recognizing this dynamic, we open up the analytic and practical space where self-determination can be a transformative tool for such conflicts. In this space, the option of independence is neither guaranteed nor precluded.

4.2.2.4. As Transformative Conflict Tool

This study does not deny the colonial continuities of self-determination. Self- determination, as set forth in international law, mediated decolonization and the end to direct colonial rule; however, it did so in a way that conformed to the colonial order and colonial drawn lines and within the western system of states. As a concept, therefore, self-determination is convoluted and complex, controversial and difficult. It is always double and nuanced and never equational. My point here in presenting different takes on self-determination and secession is not to give an exhaustive theoretical and juridical overview of the topic (conceptual and theoretical perspectives, gaps, crossovers and camps), but rather a brief summary to point out its usefulness. To discard the concept or to make sweeping claims as to its deficiencies and limitations, however, is to misgauge its broader potential in a post-colonial era. This requires shifting our perspective (interpretive horizon) from its colonial meaning, without forgetting its importance for Non-Self-Governing Territories, in a way that embraces its reformative capacities and the people at the heart of self-determination conflicts. At the same time, it should be conceived of as process and not a one-time only definitive event. Understood in this light, its transformative potential for self-determination conflicts becomes more readily understood. A multifaceted approach to self-

235 Hannum explains that modernization theories are concerned with “The expansion of modern, technological, homogenous, transnational ‘culture’ and the loosening of traditional family ties” often leading to a “reassertion of minority cultural values with which members of local or regional communities can identify more easily” (Hannum, 1996: 9). 390 determination itself presupposes a multifaceted approach to conflict analysis. Knop’s insight deserves repeating here and should not be overlooked. The practice of self- determination is a struggle to be recognized in international law and the world of sovereign states. Regarding the former, we are focusing on the interrelations among social, political and international legal interpretations of self-determination. As per the latter, we will return to a more in-depth discussion of the nation-state in Part Four of this chapter. We see clearly in the analyses of self-determination as colonial continuity, reform and struggle that multiple factors make up the self-determination debate and influence its development in international law. Within this broader context and conceptualization, self-determination cannot simply be reduced to a zero-sum concept, and it need not be “loaded with dynamite” 236 or a “slippery slope” towards state disintegration (Buchanan, 2004: 331-332). Nor, as discussed at the onset of this chapter, does it need to be a zero-sum concept. Independence, like autonomy, is but one tool, one option, in the wide and deep self-determination toolbox. This statement seems to fall flat when we consider Hannum’s assertion that where “independence is the goal, acceptance of one group’s claim to self-determination necessarily implies the denial of another group’s competing claim of territorial integrity” (Hannum, 2002: 234). At first look, it does appear to be a zero-sum scenario. However, this is where a broad understanding of self-determination, one that may even include independence as an option, opens up the debate rather than closes it off. Contemporary self-determination discussions mark a significant shift away from impenetrable statist claims to territorial integrity and a move towards a broader understanding of self- determination. This is partly because of the violent and protracted nature of self- determination conflicts. It is also due to the fact that decolonization did not put the right to rest. In fact, it provided hope to many ethnic groups, which Hannum points out may more accurately be described as center-periphery, majority-minority, powerful-powerless, who seek recognition in one form or another (Hannum, 1996: 4). It is this hope and desire for self and group expression that makes self-determination powerful and its broad range of expression negotiable.

236 In 1919, U.S. Secretary of State Stanton declared that self-determination was “loaded with dynamite” (Buchanan, 2004: 332). 391

Currently in international law, self-determination is not recognized as a primary right. It is a remedial right, conditioned by extreme forms of oppression and human rights abuses. Self-determination has been co-opted by the human and indigenous rights regimes. This does not illegitimate calls for other forms of its expansion. On the contrary, the transformative potential of self-determination can be seen in the identification of the underlying principles of self-determination that have been accepted by the international community (Hannum, 1996: 506). However, states have been weary to accept secessionist movements and claims to statehood. Instead, they prefer autonomous arrangements and power sharing alternatives. For the purposes of this study, it is not necessary to declare allegiance to a primary right or remedial right perspective, although I lean towards a primary right interpretation despite the controversy that surrounds such a view. It is important, on the other hand, to clarify the transformative potentialities that the principle of self-determination offers potential or protracted self-determination conflicts. This study rejects the most positivist understanding of self-determination as a one time only decolonization event. For self-determination to function as a useful and negotiable concept for conflict transformation in self-determination conflict cases, it cannot be rigidly positivist or absolutist because such positions are counterproductive, exclusive and ill-equipped to address the demands of the people behind self- determination struggles. As Hannum makes clear, accepting as our premise the negotiability of self-determination for self-determination conflicts requires an extensive and multidimensional analysis of such conflicts. This means, as has been done in this study for Western Sahara, fully exploring an array of factors like international law, historical and political contexts, geopolitics and power dynamics (Realpolitik discourses). Such multidimensional and complex analyses rule out cookie cutter categorical responses and “simple answers” and “magical formulae”:

“…neither a purely individualistic human rights approach nor an ethno- territorial self-determination approach will be adequate to address group- based political demands in the twenty-first century. Neither self- determination nor territorial integrity is a trump card that renders other considerations irrelevant, and the goal of those seeking to resolve conflicts peacefully must remain the accommodation of competing or conflicting rights rather than sweeping aside one set of rights in favor of another” (Hannum, 1996: 506).

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A relativist approach need not fall victim to relativism. Of course, general knowledge and commonalities can be used to assess individual self-determination conflicts. Because of the protracted nature of such conflicts, where statehood may be viewed as the only option for some parties, it is beneficial to utilize the concept of self- determination as a creative mediator for the accommodation of competing or conflicting rights. To reiterate, this requires a deep and continued analysis of self-determination conflicts, one that considers contemporary political theories, international law and on-the- ground struggles. As has been argued throughout this study, a case specific conflict analysis must take into account multiple factors and an evaluation of Realpolitik discourses. Self-determination cannot be delinked from international law and conflict analysis and transformation. For example, a purely ‘political’ solution serves only to entrench a conflict in one-dimensional thinking and strategizing. This type of approach provokes violent responses and falls victim to the accommodation of the powerful, to power politics rather than comprehensive solutions. It also reinforces a statist territorial integrity approach to self-determination conflicts, one which hides behind declared threats to national unity and regional stability. In the context of surface level and interest dominated analysis, real struggles do get pegged against the powerful interests of existing states. This is our real zero-sum self-determination imbroglio. Such an approach sabotages multiple and multi-layered exit strategies for self-determination conflicts. The alternative transformative potential of self-determination embraces a process of labor-intensive conflict analysis. Returning to the two camps that recognize the transformative potential of the principle of self-determination, self-determination as primary or remedial right, a common thread runs through these two apparently opposed positions. Independence is not, prima facie, ruled out. Like autonomy, independence is included as a possible solution for self-determination conflicts. Let us now look at three analysts of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict that do exclude independence as an option for Western Sahara and why. More generally, the same arguments used for modern secessionist cases are being applied to Western Sahara in spite of its Non-Self-Governing Territory status.

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4.2.3. Arguments against an Independence-Inclusive Self-Determination Process

Mohamed Daadaoui (2008), Jacques Eric Roussellier (2007) and Nizar Messari (2001) structure their arguments regarding the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict around the fundamental belief that independence should not and need not be an option for this conflict case. Their argumentation and assertions resonate with the current push for a politically viable solution to the conflict that has tried to brand an independence-inclusive expression of self-determination as a zero-sum and politically impracticable solution to the conflict. These views contrast sharply with my own argument that self-determination, including independence as an option, can be an effective transformative conflict tool for self-determination conflicts. Nevertheless, it is important to examine their basis for being critical of self-determination itself and for discarding independence. Three general and interrelated themes mark their interpretations of self-determination: Western liberal roots, the people and identity.

4.2.3.1. Western Liberal Roots

First, both Daadaoui and Roussellier indicate that self-determination has Western liberal roots. Daadaoui asserts that within the western tradition, self-determination is congruent with the Westphalian state system and resides within liberal considerations for individual rights (Daadaoui, 2008: 146-147). This means that self-determination must grapple with considerations of individual freedom and choice, while neglecting the identity of the group as “distinct from the issue of its rights” (147). He problematizes the theory of self-determination and characterizes its discourse as contradictory and confusing (145). In this regard, the same principle pegs territorial integrity against self- determination. It calls for national boundaries to be respected and for the people to determine their own political future. Daadaoui describes the conflict as a fight between historical claims (Morocco) and the right to self-determination (the Frente POLISARIO). In this view, he classifies Morocco’s approach to the conflict as a classical statist (anti- nationalistic) position whereby states are the only legitimate holders of the collective good and the Frente POLISARIO’s approach as a secessionist (nationalistic) position whereby the state is a “catalyst for communal identification of the people” based on strict

394 identity determinants (146-147)237. Contradictorily, Daadaoui argues that allowing peoples to freely determine their political future endangers the international system of sovereign states and creates an environment conducive to power politics and anarchic forces (146). In essence, the very system of states in which the concept of self- determination developed is the very system which self-determination threatens. At the same time, and even more perplexing, he argues that the western principle of self- determination legitimizes colonial structures and fails to acknowledge the pre-colonial realities of the territory of Western Sahara, which constituted a “complex mechanism of governance” and balanced the dichotomy of “paying allegiance to the central power and leading an autonomous lifestyle from within the tribe” (151). For Roussellier, the International Court of Justice has interpreted and defined self- determination in a way that reflects one understanding of state and statehood and disregards other political constructions like hierarchical power structures with a center (source of power) and a periphery (diffused power)238 (Roussellier, 2007: 76). Therefore, it fails to consider the pre-colonial and, in some circumstances, pre-capitalist state, including the Islamic state that “relies on the notion of space, or polis, which has no defined frontiers or borders” (76). In the case of Western Sahara, it also failed to take into consideration a nomadic way of life and complex relations of the people in the territory (76). Roussellier points out that an “inadequate, Western-oriented” bias regarding self-

237 Daadaoui blurs the line between colonial self-determination and what he designates “modern self- determination theory” (2008: 144). He utilizes modern self-determination theory, which focuses on secession, in order to sidestep the fact that Western Sahara is a decolonization/occupation case and not one of secession. This is not the only point in the article where Daadaoui misrepresents the conflict situation. He erroneously states that Algeria and Libya created the Frente POLISARIO; Morocco has always laid claims to sovereignty over Western Sahara (the government supported self-determination for Western Sahara in multiple United Nations resolutions); and Spain ceded administrative control of the territory to Morocco and Mauritania through the Madrid Accords (the international community recognizes Spain as the administering authority of Western Sahara despite its claims to the contrary) (148). The diplomatic transgressions of Morocco are multiple and so getting the facts straight can prove difficult. In 2005, U.S. Senator James Inhoff of Oklahoma aired ten of these transgressions for U.S. public record. He began his list with the fact that Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania called for self-determination of Western Sahara in July of 1973, a fact that contradicts present day Moroccan claims of territorial sovereignty. In fact, it was not until August of 1974 that Morocco rescinded this agreement and its calls for self-determination of Western Sahara (for the full list see Inhoff, 2005: 22-24). In this particular article, factual discrepancies cast a shadow of doubt on the validity of the entire work; nevertheless, Daadaoui’s argument forms part of the dominant discourse on Western Sahara. His message is clear. Self-determination including independence is an unviable option. 238 Roussellier describes such power structures as “pyramid” like, where power is concentrated at the top and diffuses downwards towards the base in such a way that territorial sovereignty is recognized but limited in the outer regions of a particular expanse of territory (Roussellier, 2007: 76). 395 determination for Western Sahara has actually caused clashes of legal and political conceptions of space, borders and power (55) 239. He contends that these clashes are evident in the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara. As such, he problematizes the measures used by the Court to determine sovereignty, namely the ICJ’s quest for evidence of factual and internal exercise of Moroccan authority – what he denominates a major shift in the international community’s approach to determining sovereignty in disputed territories (70) 240. In effect, he argues that international law does not provide an objective standard for determining the effective exercise of sovereignty by a state. Exacerbating this situation, a need for such standards only materializes in the form of counter claims, where a “burden of proof” falls upon the challenging party (59). In light of this fact, the United Nations could have utilized other tools at its disposal, like waving the requirement of a compulsory consultation as in the case of the transference of Ifni from Spain to Morocco in 1969. Rousellier contests that such a solution is not an exception to the rule, but one of a “variety of modalities of the realisation of the self-determination principle” (67). Accordingly, self-determination, understood as the freely expressed will of the peoples, is not universally required. In this regard, Roussellier poses two opposing questions:

“Should decolonisation be understood as a forward-looking process of accepting decolonisation as a historical reality and applying modern international law to dismantle it with a view to bringing a new world order of equality of regime between former colonising states and newly independent states? Or else, should colonisation be undone so that justice could be done and the pre-colonial situation re-created as remedy? (69).

These questions strike at the heart of Roussellier’s main argument. He maintains that the case of Western Sahara merited special treatment because of the fact that the “applicability” of the self-determination principle and the “relevance” of a popular referendum should be consistent with the nomadic way of life and complex social and political structures of the peoples of the territory (76). He explains that the southern

239 Roussellier’s argument parallels Morocco’s own argument put forth to the International Court of Justice. 240 The author argues that the Permanent Court of International Justice of the League of Nations set the precedent that sovereignty be determined by international treaties and domestic law proclaiming control over a territory “irrespective of the modality, nature and extent of actual exercise of sovereignty on that land or territory” (58-59). 396 territories of Morocco, which he likens in social, political and geographic make-up to the territory of Western Sahara, did not receive the same evaluation of Western Sahara because there was no counter claim to southern Morocco241 (62-63). In this view, the difference in approach directly relates to the non-self-governing status of Western Sahara, and the error of the ICJ lies in the fact that it approached an indigenous situation with a western lens. In sum, the approach of the ICJ not only sidelined alternative forms of social and political organization that fall outside of a western perspective; it also precluded alternatives to statehood like earned/shared sovereignty (68). Again, we are reminded here of Weller’s more general critical assessment of colonial self-determination as colonial continuity and disenfranchisement. Roussellier’s reference to indigenous peoples, however, pulls the discussion of self-determination away from a colonial context and places it in its contemporary dialectics. Even though Roussellier alludes to the preservation of nomadic life and the pre-colonial order, he simultaneously invokes the current “unfolding right of indigenous peoples” (55). Roussellier and Daadaoui’s approaches are similar in this regard. Daadoui’s chief argument amounts to three specific deficiencies of self-determination theory: its inability “to account for the negligence of the colonial legacy of the territory, the problem of identity determinants and the difficulty of identifying the indigenous peoples of the territory due to its emphasis on a positivist legal framework” (Daadoui, 2008: 144; emphases mine). Daadaoui utilizes a socially constructivist perspective to focus the topic of indigenousness, which I will return to below. Both conflict analysts stress the fact that conventional interpretations of self-determination are not viewed in light of the decolonization process and are linked to issues of identity and self. This brings us to our second and third overlapping themes, the people and identity.

241 The author refers to the Bled Siba area of Morocco in order to make the parallels between the two territories and the contradictory handling of them – the southern regions constituting Moroccan sovereignty and Western Sahara falling outside of it. Revisit Chapter Two for the early historical overview of the territory, which challenges this simplified understanding of Bled Siba. 397

4.2.3.2. The People and Identity

The slating of the self-determination principle as a western-centric concept ill-fit to address the ‘intricacies’ of the territory of Western Sahara is but one of its stated shortcomings. For some, the subjectivity of the concept and its complex relation to identity and identity formation weaken its applicability because there are no objective methods, besides legally positivist ones, for determining the people. Roussellier and Daadaoui believe that the tribal society defies Western constructs and a positivist approach for establishing voter eligibility for a referendum. Roussellier explains that the unique organization of nomadic life of the indigenous peoples of the Atlantic seaboard of the Sahara defies both the classification of emerging states and Western liberal approaches (Roussellier, 2007: 55). The tribes of Western Sahara were not confined to a fixed territory. In fact, they were constantly on the move due to the scarcity of resources and rainfall and activities such as trading, pastoralism and intertribal conflicts (58). In effect, the nomadic traditions of the Saharan tribes “created a pattern of outward and inward movements that transcended borders” (64)242. According to Sophie Caratini, “The narrative of the Saharan tribes remains a history of ceaseless re-composition of groups and territories” (Caratini, 2003; cited in Roussellier, 2007: 64). In this constantly changing context, what is a Sahrawi identity? First, how can one define the self for the application of the right to self-determination and, second, come up with an accurate voter list? Who has the right to vote in a self-determination referendum? Daadaoui proposes to tackle this problem using a socially constructivist approach with regards to the concept of indigenous peoples and future formulations of self- determination theory. He poses a rethinking of the United Nations’ position on identity and indigenousness that rejects a “rigid and legalistic positivistic framework” and embraces the social construction of actors (Daadaoui, 2008: 144; 154). In Daadaoui’s opinion, a rigid legal framework abides by historical fact and continuity and conceptualizes identity and indigenousness in a restrictive, universal and static way.

242 Roussellier’s argument is somewhat perplexing because, in modern times, the state, whether Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania or Mali, has forcibly integrated nomadic life, or at least has laid claims of integration, into its systems (organization), functions and territoriality. Nomadic peoples have not necessarily maintained their autonomy of the pre-colonial period. In North Africa, multiple nomadic groups have faced state repression and cultural lockdown in areas such as language and education. 398

Understood as such, it appears that international law accounts for a clear system of identifying the status of peoples. In fact, it fails to take into consideration both identity determinants and the complex process of identity development (153). Therefore, where self-determination guarantees the right to self-governance, it does not address identity construction or the criterion for identifying identity. A constructivist approach, on the contrary, “views the concept of indigenousness as the embodiment of process” and recognizes that identities and interests are always in constant flux “in what are termed intersubjective systemic structures” consisting of “shared understandings, expectations, and social knowledge” (153-154). Most importantly, a constructivist approach views identity as a dynamic and evolving concept (not a rigid construct) whereby the relationship between people and society is reciprocal. “People make society and society makes peoples” (154). It is “a continuous process in which claims and practices in numerous specific cases are abstracted in the wider institutions of international society, then made specific again at the moment of application in the political, legal and social processes of particular cases and societies” (Kingsbury, 1998: 415; cited in Daadaoui, 2008: 153-154). Daadaoui cites Benedict Kingsbury’s definition of constructivism in order to advance his argument that the United Nations should relinquish its positivist stance on self-determination and mechanisms used to determine voter eligibility for Western Sahara in light of natural developments of social and identity shifts in the contested territory. He claims that since 1975, Sahrawis have moved northward and have intermingled with other Moroccans, making it difficult to “determine with accuracy the Sahrawi identity” (Daadaoui, 2008: 155). A constructivist approach makes up for this UN oversight243. It recognizes that complex social processes that are in constant flux shape identity formation. Therefore, they “cannot be rigidly determined solely through recourse to historical accounts” – the very measures and basis used by the ICJ and the United Nations to decide whether or not to back the right of self-determination for Western Sahara (155; emphasis mine).

243 The author makes no mention of the influence that Moroccan settlers have had on dramatically changing the landscape of the conflict territory and situation. This is itself a convenient oversight. However, as stated in footnote 237, it is but one of multiple inaccuracies that can be found in this article. He also fails to acknowledge that the Frente POLISARIO has made heavy concessions, albeit under Algerian pressure, on the voter identification process, even accepting five years of autonomy under Moroccan rule followed by a referendum. 399

What I find most interesting about Daadaoui’s article, however, is that in relying heavily on Kingsbury’s constructivist theoretical foundations, the strategic approach and tone of his argument parallel my own analysis regarding the transformative potential of the concept of self-determination. Despite our arrival at very different conclusions, our theoretical assessments originate from a broader and less positivist legal framework and interpretation of self-determination. Kingsbury’s constructivist approach to indigenous peoples is similar to my approach to self-determination; both make a global concept possible, be it ‘indigenous peoples or ‘self-determination,’ “while allowing functional specificity to meet diverse social circumstances and institutional requirements” (1998: 420-421). In addition, Kingsbury calls for a “complex actualization of self- determination” that both considers the interests and aspirations of social collectivities and goes beyond the scope of application of the international law of decolonization (438- 439). This requires relying on “the dynamic processes of negotiation, politics, legal analysis, institutional decision making and social interactions” in order to fit general criteria to the “innumerable nuances of specific cases” (457). I have also argued these points. But, where Daadaoui uses them to forward the argument that self-determination theory and practice fail to address the challenge of identity and identity determinants and the intricate nature of the conflict, I point out the importance of process and deep and specific conflict analysis and an understanding of self-determination that keeps all available options on the table. In fact, I would argue that Daadaoui manipulates the constructivist approach in order to outdate the ‘colonial’ understanding and application of self-determination and to discount any solution that includes independence as an option for Western Sahara. Adaptive, inclusive and open language and discourse on identity and the complexities of identity formation (the changing nature of social and political realities) mask a political agenda that, contradictorily, narrows and restricts these concepts as well as the conflict transformative potential of self-determination. Both Daadaoui and Roussellier claim that a rigid application of the self-determination principle has created the current deadlock. Whereas Roussellier states outright that it is practically impossible to define the ‘self’ in the case of Western Sahara, thereby necessitating alternative interpretations of self- determination (Roussellier, 2007: 76), Daadaoui determines through a more theoretically

400 convoluted lens that strict identity determinants and an overly positivist legal framework do not adequately capture the dynamism of indigenousness and identity. According to these congruent interpretations, decolonization self-determination theory is not applicable to the case of Western Sahara; furthermore, the ambiguity of ‘self’ and identity as it relates to a nomadic lifestyle puts into crisis the relevance of a popular referendum. In direct contrast, Messari approaches the theme of identity from the perspective of the Moroccan government’s nationalist agenda and the importance of Western Sahara in establishing its nationalist discourse. For Messari, it is Moroccan identity that plays the defining role in determining the outcome to the conflict. He asserts that the formulation of Moroccan nationalism relied in large part on the assimilation of Sahrawis and the demonization and rejection of Algerians (Messari, 2001: 48). In this way, Western Sahara is inextricably linked to Moroccan national identity and Moroccan national identity to an institutionally driven organization of self to other. Like Daadaoui, Messari recognizes that identity is mutable and constantly subject to construction and reconstruction. However, he argues that discourse and language, the “antagonisms between inside and outside, and identity and difference,” are the catalysts for this process (51). In the early 1970s, after two failed assassination attempts against King Hassan II, the Moroccan monarchy introduced a nationalist discourse that integrated the Western Sahara issue into its folds. As part of a broad strategy to centralize power, gain popular support enjoyed by his father and marginalize opposition parties to the monarchy, Kind Hassan II launched a narrative of a new Morocco. According to Messari, Hassan utilized a threefold strategy that would not only ensure his survival, but would also strengthen his hold on power. It consisted of: “establishing a historical continuity [disrupted by colonial rule], emphasizing similarities between ‘Moroccans’ from the North and ‘Moroccans’ from the South [cultural continuity], and strengthening the links with Sahrawis through assimilation [occupation and militarization of Western Sahara, the ‘southern provinces’]” (54). Of course, it was forbidden to challenge the newly established nationalist narrative of the king, which effectively silenced competing counter-narratives. Messari maintains that as a result of such an authoritarian nationalist narrative, the legitimacy of the monarch is directly linked to the outcome of Western Sahara. In other words, the stability of the monarchy depends on an outcome that conforms to the

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Moroccan nationalist discourse on Western Sahara. Therefore, for purposes of political expediency, Messari argues for both the maintenance of Western Sahara as part of Morocco and the democratization of the Moroccan political system (47). Messari explains that in order to prevent regional destabilization, self-determination might need “to be expressed in a way different from the traditional claim to independence” (59). Daadaoui seconds this view in the more forceful declaration that “self-determination is second to the stability and security of a particular region” (Daadaoui, 2008: 152). Messari and Daadaoui are not the only ones to warn against the destabilizing potential of Western Sahara. The projections usually mirror Messari’s assessment of the conflict. The argumentation goes as follows. Via a strong anti-colonial campaign and a sustained building of national unity around Western Sahara, the monarchy convinced most Moroccans of the territory’s ‘Moroccaneity’. In the name of national solidarity, the monarchy called for political unanimity and public sacrifice, which entailed a freeze on the democratization process, a lack of access to basic resources and widespread economic hardship, partly a result of high military expenditures (Messari, 2001: 57-58). It is upheld, therefore, that a negative result of the Western Sahara issue could unhinge the legitimacy of the monarchy. This would be made worse by a return of the army, not only because it has to be reincorporated into society, but also because it could pose a threat to the monarchy if organized by opposition parties newly strengthened by a regime weakened by a failure to deliver on a matter of national identity (60). In this regard, their return could increase the chance of a military coup and regional instability. Messari contends that concerns for regional stability and a possible rupture of Moroccan national identity over Western Sahara trump an independence-inclusive expression of self-determination. Instead, he argues for an opening up of the democratic political space in Morocco. By “democratised political space” he means the inclusion of the acceptance of the other in its entirety (as a full subject) and not merely as a derivation of a constructed Moroccan self (47, 58). Under this new democratic construction, the Sahrawi people will be granted full and authentic representation and will be able to “act as full members of that space rather than in line with what Morocco wants them to be” (48). In sum, “democratising Morocco involves democratising its dealings with the

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Western Sahara issue, and keeping the Sahara in Morocco involves increasing democracy in the country” (Messari, 2001: 58). Messari asserts that currently a Moroccan political/ethical space is non-existent because Moroccans are subjects to the monarch rather than citizens of normal status (56). To that end, Messari claims that it does not make sense to distinguish the exclusion of Sahrawis from the Moroccan political/ethical space because such a space is non-existent in Morocco. I beg to differ here. Within Morocco’s political/ethical non-space, the monarchy arguably acts with impunity against any group or individual that challenges its authority; however, as neither subject nor citizen, the Sahrawi people defy classification. In effect, one must ask how the Sahrawi people can be excluded from a system of which they form no part and, paradoxically, very much form a part244. Furthermore, one need only look at the complete occupation and militarization of the territory of Western Sahara and at the methodical movement of Moroccan settlers to Western Sahara to refute the equation of status between Sahrawis and Moroccans. The absence of a political/ethical space in Morocco for Moroccan citizens bears no equivalence to the gross human rights violations, aggressive oppression of Sahrawis and their forced ‘assimilation’. That is to say, rather than being excluded from political systems or assimilated into the national persona, Sahrawis are non-integrants belonging to the state of exception (the normalized suspension of the law). So when Messari explains that the new democratized political space should be a place for inclusion and not exclusion and respectful of a firm ethical component open to difference, alterity and the “acceptance of all others as legitimate selves instead of radical non-selves,” he glosses over the non- citizen, the Sahrawi of occupied or refugee status (61-62). More accurately, his logic is incongruent. The acceptance/inclusion of the Sahrawi ‘other’ as a full subject and member of the political space (democratization) is entirely contingent upon the Moroccan derivation of Sahrawis as belonging to the Moroccan state. This fact cannot be avoided by the acceptance of the ‘other’ because it is directly linked to territorial and nationalist claims. Messari cannot get out from under his own preconditions – full acceptance of the other as defined by the other. If he were to do so, he would leave open the possibility that

244 In Part Four of this chapter, I will use Agamben’s theoretical conceptualization of the people in order to explore the citizen and the non-citizen, the ‘people’ (bare life) and the ‘People’ (political existence) (Agamben, 1997). 403 the inclusion of the acceptance of the ‘other’ as full subject means recognizing that critical to the self of the ‘Sahrawi other’ is the belief in the determination of self. Furthermore, Messari never acknowledges the political non-status of Sahrawis. The democratization and widening of participation in political processes has the potential to address the practice of state exclusion of the Moroccan subject/citizen; however, it fails to account for the Sahrawi non-subject/non-citizen. Despite these theoretical and practical oversights, Messari’s overall objective is clear: “[S]elf-determination should be translated into autonomy rather than independence” (49). Citing the Spanish245 and Yugoslav246 examples as proof of this, Messari makes the case that embracing democratic processes in Morocco simultaneously opens up the political/ethical space for a viable autonomous arrangement for Western Sahara and a peaceful, political solution to the conflict. An autonomous compromise maintains the monarchical system, rhetoric and legitimacy as well as regional stability. On the contrary, a UN-backed referendum should be avoided because it increases the chance for regional instability and could provoke a violent response and massacre, like in the case of East Timor (59). In Chapter One, we raised multiple red flags regarding the viability of genuine autonomy for Western Sahara within the current Moroccan political system. Even if we were to set these aside, Messari’s analysis appears flawed and overly simplistic, especially regarding the assumed compatibility between an autonomous arrangement and full expression of Sahrawi identity. Although I disagree with Messari’s line of argument, he does make interesting connections between political space, citizenship and identity. These intersections will be further explored in Part Four. The point worth noting here is Messari’s particular slant on identity. Daadaoui and Messari

245 Revisit Chapter One for the reasons why multiple scholars have expressed serious reservations for making a comparison between a Spanish and Moroccan democracy (constitutional monarchy). 246 Messari states: “In 2001, the same international community made it clear to the leaders of the same Albanian Kosovars that their claim for independence is totally rejected, and that the satisfaction of the Albanian Kosovar claims to self-determination has to take place under Yugoslavia’s sovereignty” (49). Since the publishing of this article, Yugoslavia ceased to exist by name in 200. Although controversial, the Republic of Kosovo declared independence in 2008. As of April of 2009, Kosovo has been recognized by 57 United Nations members, including the United States and France. Fourteen other countries have pledged to do so. 404 rely on identity in very different ways to promote their arguments; however, they arrive at the same conclusion. Independence is not a viable option for Western Sahara247. Actually, the analysis surrounding the three themes explored above – claims of western biases inherent in self-determination, the problematic concept of peoples (and the misunderstandings around indigenous peoples) and the complex notions of identity (identity formation and determinants) – support the view that self-determination should be implemented in a way that excludes independence. The concerns and questions raised in relation to these issues are valid. How do colonial inheritance and structures influence self-determination theory and practice? Who is a people? How can a people and voter eligibility be determined? What constitutes a rigid and positivist legal framework or application of self-determination? How should regional stability and security influence international law and the types of expressions of self-determination? It is important to grapple with the intricate nuances, controversial landmines and differences of opinion that make up the self-determination debate. However, the transformative potential of self-determination, for Western Sahara and other self-determination conflicts, is weakened when independence is excluded. In order to meet the very real needs of groups seeking self-determination and to prevent violent conflict, an arduous and complete analysis of each conflict situation and a broad, deep and inclusive understanding of self-determination are necessary. International law and state practice do not irresponsibly advertise independence-inclusive self- determination, but neither have they abandoned the concept. I would also argue that there is a more provocative way to analyze the self-determination hot topics presented by Roussellier, Daadaoui and Messari. This implies rethinking: the western-centric bias of self-determination within a neoliberal context; identity in terms of its relation to territory and from the perspective of the order of nation-states; and the people from the vantage point of the refugee.

247 As we explored in Chapter One, the standard interpretation of self-determination in the decolonization context advances that self-determination must be “exercised through free and democratic procedures such as a referendum or plebiscite, which includes the option of independent statehood” (Drew, 2007: 93). UN Document S/2006/249 of April 2006, paragraph 34 calls for a “compromise between international legality and political reality, that would produce, a just and mutually acceptable political solution, which would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara” (95). 405

As I have argued in Part I of this chapter, denying the Sahrawi people their right to self-determination amounts to the suspension and transgression of international law. In this scenario, autonomy (state of exception) represents the normalized state of its suspension. I refute the idea that an independence-inclusive self-determination amounts to a positivist reading and interpretation of the international law of decolonization. However, as acknowledged in Part Two of this chapter, the concept of self-determination does not exist in a decolonization vacuum. Therefore, it has been necessary to problematize the paradoxes that arise in discussions of self-determination and to briefly explore contemporary understandings and conceptualizations of the concept (self- determination as colonial continuity, reform and struggle) in order to highlight both its transformative potential and limitations in the very transformation of self-determination conflicts. This analytical process has also warranted a review of counter-arguments to this posed thesis. These uphold variations of autonomy as politically viable expressions of self-determination, while underscoring the impracticability of an independence- inclusive expression of self-determination. In contrast to these perspectives, Part Three of this chapter further argues the transformative potential of an independence-inclusive concept of self-determination, but returns to the suspension of the juridical order in order to do so. This requires both rethinking the western-centric bias of self-determination from within a neoliberal context and focusing our discussion on the economic components and ‘invisible’ impediments to an independence-inclusive exercise of self-determination for the Sahrawi people.

4.3. Self-Determination and the Neoliberal Project

4.3.1. Benjamin’s Economic Component

In order to comprehend the normalization of the suspension of international law, we must include Benjamin’s economic component, one that implicates the globalized free market system, post-colonial imperialism and geopolitical and militaristic strategies and impetuses. If we return to Benjamin’s understanding of the state of exception (emergency), he calls attention to two realms, the political and economic. In Part One of

406 this chapter, I explored the political and juridical repercussions of the suspension of the juridical order through Agamben’s theoretical formulation of the state of exception. In the case of Western Sahara, this state of exception has materialized as the suspension of peremptory norms and the normalization of real politics, a view of conflict resolution that tests solutions to self-determination conflicts against political reality. In locating the state of exception, we located the insignificance of the law and the blurring of the juridical and political. In this space, the exception becomes the rule and a technique of government in contemporary politics – the constitutive paradigm of the juridical order (Agamben, 2005). This zone of indistinction between fact and law inscribes the state of exception into law. Therefore, the state of exception becomes the fundamental political structure that begins to establish the rule, a new political and juridical order. In order to address this phenomenon, we asked the following question. What were and are the juridical-political structures that were set and are set in place that such events (invasion, occupation, stalemated process of decolonization) could and can take place? This question is incomplete. Benjamin’s second component to political conformism is economic. He claims both are chained to progress. In the name of progress, proponents and opponents of Fascism alike treated it like a historical norm (Benjamin, 1968: 257-258). As a result, conformism (complicity/historical norm) and progress (political tactics/economic views) are indistinguishable. Because progress is viewed as natural, “moving with the current” (258), its proponents fail to put it into check and/or are complicit in the atrocities that it can engender, like Fascism. Benjamin states: “Thinking involves not only the flow of thoughts, but their arrest as well” (Benjamin, 1968: 262). Žižek would argue that this thinking involves questioning the hegemonic ideological coordinates of the naturalized phenomena (Žižek, 2006: 238). In not doing so, we risk the appropriation of ideologies that seem to oppose such forces (hegemonic ideologies) as ‘progress’ and ‘capitalism’ (251-252). To complete our analysis of the state of exception, we must also ask the following. What are the economic-political structures that are set in place to subordinate self-determination (the right to determine political status and freely pursue economic, social and cultural development) to political expediency?

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The interconnections of oppositional complicity (i.e. Fascism as historical norm), political tactics and economic views shed light on the link between modern totalitarianism (the democratic imposition of the state of exception) and global capital (global economic system). Benjamin rightly recognizes that the state of exception is in fact an integral component of progress (global capital) and progress (global capital) an integral component of the state of exception. This economic component warrants further analysis. In this regard, I would argue that it is more productive in today’s globalized environment to subject the concept of self-determination to scrutiny, not based on its western origins per se, but on the incorporation of the principle into the neoliberal globalization narrative – the neoliberal project. By extension, international laws that cannot be integrated into this economic-political system can be regulated by the state of exception, meaning they can be eliminated (or suspended) in order to satisfy political ‘fact’ – danger to the overall functioning of the system. Benjamin focuses on the ontology and logic of progress as it relates to political and economic views: “The concept of the historical progress of mankind cannot be sundered from the concept of its progression through a homogenous, empty time. [Therefore, a] critique of the concept of such a progression must be the basis of any criticism of the concept of progress itself” (Benjamin, 1968: 261). This point of departure is useful for our analysis of the neoliberal project, which is also construed of as a linear natural progression through a homogenous, empty time. Our critique of the neoliberal project as norm/naturalized, therefore, must be the basis of any criticism of the concept of the neoliberal project itself! Our analysis of self-determination within this order must take into consideration both active (Realpolitik discourses) and passive (oppositional complicity) participation. How has self-determination been co-opted or supplanted by the neoliberal project to ensure the overall functioning of the system? How can we create a real state of emergency (257) to improve our position in the struggle against the normalization of the suspension and transgression of the juridical-political order (state of exception)? This different analytical slant on self-determination and its relation to the neoliberal project broadens the self-determination debate and subjects its transformative potential to further review. It also requires, as mentioned above, that we begin our analysis with a brief look at the neoliberal project.

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I do not pretend to provide a detailed account of either the neoliberal project or neoliberal globalization in this next section. I have, rather, focused on key tenets of the neoliberal project and neoliberal globalization so that I can do two things at once: explore both how the neoliberal project and neoliberal globalization (two parts of the same thing) have naturalized the state of exception for Western Sahara, the ‘absolute necessity’ of a political solution to the conflict, namely, autonomy and how self-determination can create a ‘real state of emergency’ that counteracts the structural frameworks that facilitate and naturalize the suspension of international law. In effect, I argue that if we are to be able to recognize and understand the complicity and conformity in the naturalized suspension/transgression of international law, we must seek to better understand the integral components that propagate and sustain its suspension/transgression. I also contend that self-determination, with all of its flaws and minefields, is the transformative tool necessary to break the state of exception status quo and real stalemate of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict.

4.3.2. The Make-up of the Neoliberal Project

Richard Day defines and describes the neoliberal project as:

“a complex web of practices and institutions that have the effect of perpetuating and multiplying various forms of interlocking oppression...These allow ‘populations’ to be divided and managed, and our daily lives to be more intensely immersed in capitalist accumulation and rational-bureaucratic control”248 (Day, 2005: 6)249.

I take Day’s definition as a springboard into the economic aspect of the state of exception and into how the neoliberal project has influenced and facilitated the normalized suspension of international law in the case of Western Sahara, specifically since the ceasefire of 1991. This conceptualization of the neoliberal project immediately implicates the processes of neoliberal globalization. In this regard, Jan Aart Scholte’s distinction

248 Day credits hooks (1984), Collins (1991) and Foucault (1991) for influencing his definition of the neoliberal project. 249 Chapters Two and Three of this thesis thoroughly explored the specifics to the question of Western Sahara, the hegemonic influence of state actors throughout the conflict cycle and the importance of multidimensional and deep conflict analysis. 409 between globalization as a “reconfiguration of social space” and neoliberalism as “a particular – and contestable – policy approach to this trend” is of particular importance (Scholte, 2005a: iii). Today, neoliberal globalization describes policy approaches (ideological touchstones, frames of reference and real politics discourses) that take place within an increasingly interconnected world and reconfigured social space250. Together, Day and Scholte’s definitions open up the analytical space for delving into the interconnections, multidimensionality and significance of the workings of global capital on globalization processes and, in this setting, on self-determination conflicts. What differentiates globalization from neo-liberal globalization?

4.3.2.1. Globalization

If we accept globalization251 on its own as “a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interactions and the exercise of power” (Held, 1999: 16 cited in Lauder et al., 2006: 30; Abdi, 2006: 20), we leave room for dissent regarding the extensity, intensity and impact of these transnational processes. A key element to today’s processes that differentiates them from previous forms of globalization, for example, the “globalized European systems of governance, culture, languages, and presumed racial superiority,” is the interconnectedness of the realms of the political, economic, cultural, educational and technological (Abdi, 2006: 20). In addition, information and military technology, transnational corporations and profit drive all add to the mix, complicating and intensifying the ‘old’ relations of social, political and economic power. The shrinking of distance on a global scale, combined with the relative ease and speed at which Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) disperse information and continue to grow and advance new ideas and technologies, distinguishes the landscape and the framework of modern globalization from the past. Within these rapidly changing landscapes, the concept of globality – “the arena of human action and experience” with particular reference to place, location and domain – is

250 See also Scholte’s Globalization: A Critical Introduction, 2005b. 251 A similar discussion of globalization can also be found in Murphy, 2009. 410 substantial (Scholte, 2005a: 3). Transworld simultaneity and instantaneity force us to reconsider geographical spaces at the local, provincial, national, regional and transborder (transcending territorial boundaries) levels and realms (3-5). The “time-space compression” within territorial geography, like cyberspace, global ecospaces and transworld governance arenas, has pushed our “social relations beyond territorial geography” (5). In this way, modern globalization processes have broken the monopoly of territorialism, and we find ourselves in an age of supraterritoriality – “connections that are relatively delinked from territorial space” (4). These differentiating aspects of modern globalization reinforce global connectivity. Scholte cites the following examples as proof of this interconnectivity: intercontinental missiles, transworld migrants with transborder remittances, satellite communications, facsimiles, Internet, television, transborder production chains, intercontinental retailers, global credit cards and anthropogenic ecological problems (4). Finance, information and communications industries cast a shadow over primary production and traditional manufacture (5). Ultimately, the changing global environment cannot be understood in simplistic territorial schematics. Its complexities and multidimensionalities of time, space, culture, ecology, economics, politics and social arenas challenge the “ontological assumption that social geography is always and only about territorial space” (5). There are multiple forms of globalization. Its reach and impact are not felt symmetrically or uniformly. As such, there are differing opinions regarding its negative or positive or mixed impact – its extensity, intensity and velocity. For example, Ndoye (1997) suggests that in impoverished geographic spaces globally, hegemonic dimensions of culture are transmitted via international media and constitute points of convergence that can be directly linked to identity loss or cultural imperialism. Whereas this may be true in many ‘post’-colonial nation-state experiences, the case of Western Sahara more closely resonates with Tomlinson’s (2000) idea of the possibility for proliferation of cultural identity resulting from the unpredictability of the consequences of globalization. Therefore, “Far from being the fragile flower that globalization tramples, identity is seen…as the upsurging power of local culture that offers (albeit multi-form, disorganized and sometimes politically reactionary) resistance to the centrifugal force of capitalist globalization [and occupation in the case of Western

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Sahara]” (Tomlinson, 2000, 270). However, to better focus our debate and to more clearly grasp Ndoye’s point, it is necessary to add the descriptive ‘neoliberal’ to globalization.

4.3.2.2. Dissecting the Neoliberal in Globalization

The neoliberal globalization252 model is characterized by the “primacy of financial and speculative capital, highly integrated and flexible systems of production of goods and services, the reorganization of the labor process, and increased mobility of transnational circuits of labor” (Lipman, 2007: 39). In this way, capital penetrates the interconnected relations of the political, cultural, technological and educational and adds its own power dynamics to the entire interrelated equation. Neoliberal globalization at its two extremes either promises freedom and democracy through deregulation, privatization, open markets and free trade policies or a homogenized, western, imperialistic “accumulation of dispossession” (Harvey, 2004; cited in Lipman, 2007: 39). Although both positions posit oversimplified outcomes, the former falsely represents the benefits of capitalist accumulation, while the latter more accurately describes the processes of disenfranchisement that a free market neoliberal globalization model unleashes and perpetuates, including unregulated exploitation of labor and natural resources and the decay of democracy. The neoliberal globalization call for deregulation, decentralization, privatization and liberalization and the “complex of values” spanning the economic, political and cultural integrants of society (Ross and Gibson, 2007:1-2) dominate global economic practices at present. While globalized capitalism encourages reductions in spending for social services and privatization of the public sphere, it also seeks to insert itself in areas traditionally belonging to the realm of the state. Whereas the economic processes of neoliberal globalization tend toward the polarization of social structures along the lines of class, race253, nation and gender (Lipman, 2007: 45), they also lean toward the

252 Parts of this section are also adaptations from Murphy, 2009. 253 I utilize Jared Sexton’s conceptualization of race here. He works from “a notion of race as neither a biological index of natural kind nor as an illusion produced in culture…[nor as] a ‘complex of social meanings’…[R]ace does exist, in some sense, as a reliable social indicator of life chances and as a traceable chain of significations, but its political ontology exceeds the terms of sociological investigation and the 412 commodification of knowledge and its production and the reduction of social relations to market functionality. Neoliberal policies have increased the gap between rich and poor, worsened social and economic inequalities on a massive scale and caused social dislocation and impoverishment. French philosopher Lyotard likened these processes to the “mercantilization of knowledge” (Stromquist, 2002: 38, 48). Critical responses to marginalization, exclusion, racism, sexism and the erosion of the public sector and social services are undermined or reduced to expressions of consumer choice. Stromquist concludes, “the mass media are determinant in the emerging forms of individual and collective identities” (Stromquist, 2002: 63). Rather than capitulating to an analysis of education based upon economic essentialism, it is important to recognize the on-going power struggles based on race (color, nationality), gender, age, religion, culture and identity in which social education plays a critical role. The rapid expansion of the neoliberal globalization model and the new depths of global interconnectivity, especially finance capitalism, raise the stakes for organized dissent against ‘natural’ or ‘inevitable’ market forces. As Scholte explains, “In terms of governance, the key trend promoting neoliberal policies has been a shift from a statist to decentred regulation” (Scholte, 2005a: iii). From this neoliberal worldview put into practice, globalization is an “economically driven process” that celebrates and creates the circumstances for uninhibited market forces and ‘free’ operations of supply and demand. In this environment, regulation is limited to facilitating and protecting private ownership, and other “economic rules and institutions” are considered “political interferences” that “undermine market efficiency” (Scholte, 2005a: 1). They should therefore be reduced or completely eliminated. In effect, neoliberalism is the current ruling policy orthodoxy that fails to challenge and, in fact, perpetuates substantial cultural, ecological, economic, political and social harms (11). Neoliberal globalization relies on “economism,” “marketism” and “laissez-faire market economics” through facilitations of privatization, liberalization and deregulation, and it reifies market policies and economics above “other dimensions of social relations” (7).

operations of the symbolic order: it is, to try another phrasing, a ‘division of species’ effected and maintained by the technologies of violence and sexuality that underwrite the social formation, not a discriminatory manipulation of already existing bodily marks” (Sexton, 2008: 11). 413

This is where Benjamin’s problematic of naturalization comes into significant play. Markets are “historically contingent social constructions” (8), and yet neoliberal globalization treats them as the natural progression of progress itself. Deregulation amounts to market efficiency despite the severe consequences for humans and the natural world alike. Liberalization seeks to remove “officially imposed restrictions on movements between countries of goods, services, money and capital” (9). By eliminating “trade barriers, foreign exchange restrictions and controls on flows of direct and portfolio investments” (9), processes of neoliberal globalization also remove social, economic and cultural safeguards of disadvantaged and marginalized peoples. In turn, neoliberal globalization implicates processes of global hegemony. Day’s definition of hegemony is also beneficial to this discussion: “a struggle for dominance, generally limited to the symbolic, geographical, economic and political context of a particular nation-state or group of states, but increasingly occurring at a global level” (Day, 2005: 47). Liberalization also establishes a hegemonic (consented to) system of ‘free trade and policies’ that favor powerful states. Protectionist policies are enforced to maintain their predominance and aggressive interventions are forged in order to have access to deregulated markets. Privatization targets the public space in areas such as health, education and public works systems in the name of capital and efficiency and as a smart response and overhaul to government run programs and institutions that supposedly bear the mark of bureaucratic and regulated inefficiencies. Supporters of neoliberal orthodoxy promote and produce deregulation, liberalization and privatization. Fundamental to the philosophies and ideologies that underlie this market-based triangle is its naturalness. Therefore, anything that may interfere with the ‘natural’ workings of the market or with compromising the efficiency of the market should be dealt with and preferably eliminated. As such, there has been a global attack on labor legislation in order to meet the growing needs of the markets. This translates into the increased exploitation of the worker and the natural environment, the reduction of protective measures of checks and balances and the endangerment of the social contract. The very global financial institutions set up to improve ‘development,’ to protect the most vulnerable and to respond to global issues like poverty, impoverishment, famine, epidemics, natural disasters, corruption, race-ethnic-gender (structural, cultural

414 and direct) violence, etc. – like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank and trade agreements and institutions, like the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) – have become key channels for neoliberal policies. Their assimilation of the tripartite neoliberal foundation (deregulation, liberalization and privatization) represents the “commodification of financial instruments” (Scholte, 2005a: 12). This is not to say that neoliberal policies have caused all of the ills of the world today; however, it is difficult to separate the direct causal effects of these policies from the areas where they have exacerbated preexisting or simmering social discontent and societal marginalization. To add to the list above, this also includes rigid social stratifications, communal tensions, demographic challenges, macroeconomic conditions and interstate and intrastate conflict (11). Although it is not always clear as to the direct influences of neoliberal policies, neoliberal globalization clearly marks a “shift from state interventionism toward market- enabling governance” (Scholte, 2005a: 10). As we have already established, the implications of this shift are grave for the most vulnerable of society on a global scale. In this neoliberal conception of globalization, the ‘free’ movement of global capital determines the extensity, intensity, velocity and impact of globalization processes (transformations in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions). Because the proponents of neoliberal globalization assign “priority to efficiency over equality,” believe markets directly relate to freedom, security and democracy and are “blind to structural inequalities of opportunity and gain in global markets,” social inequalities and uneven distributions amount to the natural play out of the market (laissez-faire Social Darwinism) (11, 13). However, it is argued that, in time, the market reaches those at the bottom of the system through trickle-down processes. Scholte points out that this world view ignores the obvious: “players have come to today’s globalizing economy with unequal – often staggeringly unequal – opportunities to participate [including inequalities of race, class, country, age, religion, gender, urban/rural, etc.], and laissez-faire has tended to direct the gains of free markets disproportionately to those who have started with more resources and power” (13). Furthermore, the supraterritorial nature of neoliberal globalization, beyond shifting power from labor to capital and creating surplus accumulation (supraterritorial capitalism), has

415 moved governance from statist to decentered regulation; knowledge to one-dimensional rationalist constructions (secularist, anthropocentric, scientific and instrumentalist terms); and modern economic science to efficiency and limitless growth models (produced and reproduced through policy think tanks and multiple mediums of communication) (16). It has also transformed social networks to benefit the global managerial class (transborder elite bonds that bring together powerful official, corporate and intellectual circles). Susan George wonders how anyone would embrace these neoliberal trends, considering they subject major social and political decisions to market forces, reduce the role of the State (preferably voluntarily) and give corporations total freedom, while curbing trade unions and taking away (eliminating) protective social institutions (George, 1991: 1). George employs the words of Karl Polanyi to remind us that there is nothing natural about allowing market mechanisms to direct the fate of human beings: “To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment…would result in the demolition of society” (George, 1999: 2; see also Polanyi, 2001: 76). The power of neoliberalism not only lies in its ability to grossly affect the economic, political, social and ecological realms, but also in its capacity to appear to be the “only possible economic and social order available to us” (George, 1999: 3). In effect, neoliberal globalization checkpoints – free trade in goods and services, free circulation of capital and freedom of investment – have been naturalized in such a way that it is difficult to distinguish increasing global interconnectivity (modern globalization processes) from neoliberalism (globalization-by-marketization), a ‘contestable’ policy approach. This naturalization makes neoliberal globalization inseparable from both modern globalization processes and conflict. Indeed, the institutional and structural forces of neoliberal ruling policy orthodoxy have encouraged warfare, particularly through an expansion of private global trade in arms and mercenaries (Scholte, 2005a: 12). War and the military industrial complex (explored in Chapter One) are part and parcel of the neoliberal project. Paul Tiyambe Zeleza concedes that wars in Africa are often “provoked and sustained by ethnic rivalries and polarizations, economic underdevelopment and inequalities, poor governance and elite political instability and manipulations”; however, he explains that these very factors, individually or collectively, “have a history rooted in the political economy of

416 colonialism, postcolonialism, and neo-liberal globalization” (Zeleza, 2008: 15). By examining conflict in terms of its political economy and cultural ecology, Zeleza seeks to examine how political, economic, social and cultural factors cause and sustain conflict and war, both within and between societies (16). For Zeleza, the political and economic are irrevocably linked to conflict and war. Within a political economy perspective infused with neoliberalism, we can better understand, for example, U.S. exceptionalism and unilateralism with regards to the use of force as well as the structural forces for permanent war. The ideology of neoliberal globalization plays out clearly in the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict and manifests itself in many ways: in competition over international access to the natural resources of the territory, like phosphates, fishing and oil (despite the peremptory norms in international law that prohibit such exploitation); in militaristic-economic, linguistic and geopolitical power struggles for foreign regional hegemony between the United States and France; and in inimical power plays for regional domination between Morocco and Algeria. In addition, the search for untapped markets (green areas for privatization) and the scarcity of both oil and fishing sources have brought renewed attention to Western Sahara for international investment. However, the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict is a thorn in regional Maghrebi ‘unity’. As long as the conflict persists, a unified Maghreb and free market system are impossible realizations in the region. If we again return to Agamben’s theoretical breakdown of the state of exception and Benjamin’s economic component, we see where the protection of global markets and market forces (neoliberal doctrine) may influence the very suspension/transgression of the international juridical order and creation of the normalized state of exception. The complex web of practices and institutions that perpetuate and multiply various forms of interlocking oppression (Day, 2005) and the struggles for dominance that take advantage of these very practices play an integral role in pushing a political solution to the conflict in the form of autonomy. As we established in Part One of this chapter, autonomy is a manifestation of the state of exception (the ‘democratic’ imposition of absolute rule). We see that autonomy is also a manifestation of the neoliberal project. As we established in

417

Part Two of this chapter, self-determination can be an effective conflict transformation tool. We see now that self-determination is also a way to force a real state of emergency.

4.3.3. Self-Determination: A Useful Medium for the Conflict Transformation of Self- Determination Conflicts

The prevalence of self-determination conflicts today tells us that post-colonial (let us not forget those cases that do not belong to the ‘post’) and post-Cold War self- determination conflicts constitute a very real international imbroglio. It is difficult to separate the self-determination political realities, i.e. the seventy-nine self-determination movements since the 1950s (a number that excludes the peoples of former European Union colonies) and, as of 2006, the ongoing twenty-six self-determination conflicts (Quinn, 2008: 33), from the political realities constructed by Realpolitik dominant discourses intending to solidify, produce and re-produce the status quo and a neoliberal globalization agenda. However, in order to accomplish deep, multidimensional and multi- variegated conflict analysis and strategizing regarding self-determination conflicts, it is absolutely necessary to subject them to tailored Realpolitik and neoliberal-project economic analysis. Only then is it possible to grasp the impacts of such power matrices on such conflicts. In this guise, each self-determination conflict possesses unique causal, historical, social, political, juridical and economic sets of circumstances. Such an extensive analytical process of each self-determination conflict will shed light on the causal, historical, political, juridical and economic preliminary conditions that contribute to the protracted nature of such conflicts and to the creation of normalized states of exception – the politically sanctified suspension/transgression of the law. In response to the complex nature of such conflicts, I have proposed that the very concept of self-determination itself be the necessary starting point for these types of conflict. In particular, this means bringing all actors and all possible outcomes to the table. As an umbrella concept, a self-determination strategy pulls together multiple and diverse transformative measures such that a multiplicity of options, like independence and autonomy, make up key components of the conflict transformation tool kit. I recognize the constraints and limitations of self-determination, a concept that, as stated above (Grovogui, 1996), equates conceptions of community and politics to Western

418 culture and represents to some degree a colonial inheritance and colonial continuity. Grovogui correctly points out that the decolonization right of self-determination did not free colonial peoples from the cultural, structural and direct violence of the imperial order. For most colonial peoples, it provided direct access to the state order, the colonizer’s order (to which we will return shortly). However, if an analytical process of self-determination is understood as an arduous and yet flexible ongoing process that recognizes the very real struggle for political, economic and cultural expression of groups and peoples, instead of as a one-time only, exclusive and normative event, its transformative capacities are more readily transparent and available. In this construction, there is room for conflict responses that may advance autonomous arrangements or provide for an independence-inclusive referendum. It is erroneous to equate an analytical process of self-determination to separatist, unilateral secession and independence outcomes. An analytical concept of self-determination merely guarantees a process that takes into account factors such as participation, identity and interpretation (Knop, 2002) and works from the understanding that self- determination is a continuing right that, in its openness, promotes the possibility for coexistence (Jayawickrama, 1996) and recognizes context and trends (not always clear and definite) in official practice (Falk, 2002). Theorizing the transformative potential of self-determination is no easy task. The difficulty lies precisely in that the processes of self-determination bleed into one another. They are not neat and simple. They overlap. They are tensional and at times contradict. This is true for nearly anything human. However, in order to make the theoretical transformative potential of self-determination functional, it is necessary to name the minefields that surround the concept.

4.3.3.1. Self-Determination Minefields

There are multiple complicating factors in self-determination conflicts that must be evaluated separately for each particular conflict: historical accounts; economic and geopolitical interests and political alliances; identification of a people and eligible voters for a referendum; passage of time; settler populations; natural resources, etc. However,

419 these obstacles should not be cause to discard a complex and yet responsive and analytically comprehensive approach to self-determination conflicts or reduce the international debate around these complexities to “hackneyed oppositions [like] idealism and realism, law and politics” (Berman, 2002: 109). When we do so for the mere fact of political expediency, we miss opportunities for the peaceful transformation of such conflicts. A perfect example of an oversimplified assessment of the process of self- determination for Western Sahara is evident in the following declaration:

“The referendum planned for Western Sahara resembles a desert mirage. The elusive issue: who is a Sahrawi, who is a Western Saharan, and who should be entitled to vote? Who should be the determining self in the act of self-determination?” (Jensen, 2005b: 13).

These types of concerns are raised in many self-determination conflicts. Various determinants have been proposed to qualify a people; however, where one encounters agreement, one may also find dissention. Defining the people is a complicating factor in self-determination conflicts. However, most would agree that definition of the self “includes subjective and objective components” (Hannum, 2002: 231). Often times, common characteristics such as ethnicity, language, history and religion characterize a group seeking self-determination. Connor emphasizes the subjective element of self- identification with a group and its past, present and destiny, and he calls tangible attributes, like language and religion, non-determinative (Connor, 1967: 30). Robert A. Friedlander defines a people as “a community of individuals bound together by mutual loyalties, an identifiable tradition, and a common cultural awareness, with historic ties to a given territory” (Friedlander, 1977: 335-336; also cited in Hannum, 2002: 231). Hannum concludes, therefore, that the challenge is how to define which groups are relevant to the purposes of the right of self-determination (Hannum, 2002: 231). I would argue, on the contrary, that pushing through all of the possible minefields that make-up the very analytical process of self-determination as a conflict transformation tool is the challenge and a very complex one at times. In addition, utilizing self- determination as a conflict transformation tool will always come to direct head with sweeping and rather shortsighted analysis such as Erik Jensen’s capitulating assessment

420 of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict. Furthermore, zero-sum rationalizing against the transformative potential of self-determination also simplifies complex processes. Just as independence is not the all-encompassing solution for every self-determination conflict, neither is autonomy. There is no one comprehensive solution to these difficult, protracted and bloody conflicts. However, to conclude that a process that includes independence as a possible outcome amounts to zero-sum stalemating is to fail to incorporate the state of exception and the neoliberal project into the analysis. By challenging dominant systems and normalized and naturalized ideological coordinates, it is possible to see how for a historical moment, the analytical process of self- determination breaks the real politics cycle, punctures the neoliberal myth and creates a real state of emergency. This moment is a fleeting one, however. Just as self-determination is not a one- time-definitive event, state sovereignty is also not of a static nature (Barken and Cronin, 2002). It too changes over time with the evolution of human societies and culture and historical, political and economic occurrences. In fact, some would argue (Campbell, 1998) that the insistence and exclusive reliance on state sovereignty (and fixed identity) as the only possible resolution to conflict engenders the very conditions for conflict itself. Others argue that by focusing on territory and statehood, there is a “presumption of state independence” and a foreclosure of other alternatives like autonomy (Roussellier, 2007: 69). In this estimation, self-determination connected to this limited territorial view fails to consider alterity, the fact that the existence of self does not exist without the existence of the other. There are truths to these claims. However, they do not provide absolute truths and are somewhat misrepresentative. If we take into consideration the limitations of territorial and statehood fixations, our discussion should not be about self-determination and whether it is indicative of independence or autonomy, rather it should be about the nation-state order itself. Neither independence nor autonomy needs to be taken off the conflict transformation table of self-determination conflicts in order to reconcile the theoretical gap between territoriality and the expression of self-determination. It is possible to work simultaneously towards two seemingly opposing forces. An analytical conception of self-determination helps us push the envelope of political, economic and cultural expression in a territorial sovereignty based global order. At the same time, this

421 complex and nuanced conceptualization of self-determination pushes the envelope of the nation-state order, putting into crisis the very order it seeks to establish through independence or maintain through autonomy or other intra-state organizational forms. The most recent Security Council resolutions on Western Sahara, which call for a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution to the conflict that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, corroborate the critical role that self- determination must play in the transformation of this conflict. More generally, and of particular importance for Western Sahara, an analytical conception of self-determination leads our discussion beyond the very limits of self-determination and into a discussion of territory and the nation-state order. We have already rethought the western-centric bias of self-determination from within the ideological coordinates of the neoliberal project/neoliberal globalization. The next step is to rethink identity in terms of its relation to territory and from the perspective of the order of nation-states. The final step requires rethinking the people from the vantage point of the refugee. The last section of this chapter aims to do both in order to think within and beyond restrictive and constrictive representations of these concepts.

4.4. Thinking Within and Beyond Self-Determination: The Quest of the ‘People’ for Self-Determination in the Nation-State System

4.4.1. The Nation

“One of the strongest foci for resistance to imperial control in colonial societies has been the idea of ‘nation’” (Ashcroft et al., 1995: 151). The nation (the entire sum of resistance tactics, i.e. national rhetoric and nation-building) served to unite and empower colonial societies in their liberation struggles against imperial domination. Although the idea of the nation has taken on a similar functionality in terms of feeding and sustaining resistance and liberation movements in a predominately post-colonial era, primarily as a result of colonially drawn lines and the resulting inter-ethnic disputes, this discussion mainly focuses on the nation as it developed in its colonial context and with specific regard to Africa and the case of Western Sahara. In this vein, the “constructedness” of nations (152) – calculated responses to and strategies mounted against colonial

422 oppression within the international framework and with the very tools of the oppressors – deserves closer examination. The nation is “the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time” (Anderson, 1983: 3). In our colonial context, it also represents an anti-colonial ‘imagined community’254 sown in resistance. In more general terms, however, some definitions of a ‘nation’ use language, territory, economic life, psychological make-up, shared history and cultural traits as the common denominators to mark its existence and even legitimacy. The ‘national question’ is therefore situated at the point of intersection of politics, technology and social transformation (Hobsbawm, 1997: 5, 10). E.J. Hobsbawm contends: “Nations exist not only as functions of a particular kind of territorial state or the aspiration to establish one…but also in the context of a particular stage of technological and economic development” (Hobsbawm, 1997: 10). It is true in the case of Western Sahara that technology (wide distribution of transistor radios and resource development) and economic development (sedentarization, travel, education, etc.) played a decisive role in creating the necessary environment for planting the seeds of nation-formation (Shelley, 2008; Mayrata, 2001; Hodges, 1983). Additionally, the above-mentioned common attributes (language, territory, economic life, psychological make-up, history, religion and cultural traits) facilitated anti-colonial nation-building. For colonial peoples, however, the nation and nationhood is an incomplete idea without the element of resistance. The “national consciousness” may be last affected by the popular masses (workers, servants, peasants) (Hobsbawm, 1997: 12), but a common experience of resistance to colonial subjugation provided the guiding conditions for an organized affront to colonialism in the name of the nation and nationhood. In effect, a national culture “is the whole body of efforts made by a people in the sphere of thought to describe, justify and praise the action through which that people has created itself and keeps itself in existence” (Fanon, 1963: 188). Unfortunately, national resistance is always double. A retrogression of national purpose, clarity and unity always

254 Benedict Anderson defines an imagined political community as one that is both inherently limited and sovereign: “limited because even the largest of them…has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations”; “sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which the Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm”; and “community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson, 2006: 6-7; emphases in original). 423 accompanies the noble and justified fight sustained by the idea of the nation. Furthermore, the “neo-universalist internationalism” of national liberation movements subsumes them within monocentric European-dominated networks of politics and culture (Ashcroft et al., 1995: 152). Because opposition to colonialism (the building of a nation) takes place within the international structural framework of the state system, the fight against imperial hegemonic control tends to replicate the very conditions that nationalism rises up to combat (Ashcroft et al., 1995: 151) and forecloses alternative forms of political organization. In this regard, the accusation that decolonization was merely a “transfer of power between elites rather than an effort to change existing macropolitical structures or to develop new ones” rings true (Herbst, 2002: 19). Franz Fanon states: “National consciousness, instead of being the all-embracing crystallization of the innermost hopes of the whole people, instead of being the immediate and most obvious result of the mobilisation of the people, will be in any case only an empty shell, a crude and fragile travesty of what it might have been” (Fanon, 1963: 121)255. Because “sovereignty is the legal and cultural signifier of full participation in the international community,” national struggles, even those forged in opposition to colonial domination, will eventually be subordinate to territoriality and the state form (Berman, 2002: 122). The revolutionary promise that the nation rooted in resistance holds is already compromised by the legitimized power of the nation-state. This statement acknowledges the inevitability of colonial inheritance within the structural organization of the nation-state. Therefore, “while redistribution of sovereignty may indeed challenge a particular colonial oppressor, it will not necessarily challenge the tools of his oppression” (Day, 2005: 194). Agamben’s insight regarding the doubleness of decisive political events, in this case decolonization, deserves repeating here: “the spaces, the liberties, and the rights won

255 Saul Newman calls this dichotomy of revolution the discourse of revolution: “There would appear to be something in the very nature of revolutions that perpetuates power, often in new and more authoritarian forms. Thus, the form of power changes, but its place – is structural imperative – remains the same. Therefore, we might say that there are two aspects to the place of power. The first is…the symbolic and structural centrality of power in society. However, this centrality is always instantiated in a second aspect – the perpetuation of power in revolutionary politics. It is as if the place of power is always haunted by an inverse double – the specter of power that is reaffirmed in its very overthrowing” (Newman, 2006: 171; emphasis in original). Recognizing the perpetuation of power in revolutionary politics is an essential exercise for understanding how that which can liberate can also subjugate. 424 by individuals in their conflicts with central powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit but increasing inscription of individuals’ lives within the state order, thus offering a new and more dreadful foundation for the sovereign power from which they wanted to liberate themselves” (Agamben, 1998: 121; also cited in Part Two of this chapter). Logically, there will always be those who are denied access to this order or those who cannot be integrated into this order. Along this analytical grain, sovereignty is “an exclusionary concept rooted in an adversarial and coercive western notion of power” (Alfred, 1999: 59). These territory-oriented movements for liberation built on and within the structural foundations of colonial powers and the colonial world order. The very unifying features and national character of these movements were borrowed from the colonizer in order to bring down the colonial system, only to then reenter into it, albeit in a ‘decolonized’ nation-state form.

4.4.2. The Nation-State

In a relatively short period of time, starting with the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, the nation-state has nearly become the universal mode of political organization across the world, somewhat eclipsing the fact that it is a rather young form of political organization (Herbst, 2002: 15). Furthermore, in spite of the nation-state’s modern origins, it has also become a totalizing and naturalizing mode of political organization. Jeffrey Herbst contends that the ultimate triumph of the nation-state occurred between 1948 and 1963 when the majority of colonized peoples gained their independence by choosing the nation-state “as the vehicle to independence” and as “defined politically and geographically by their former colonizers” (15). We have focused on the nation as engendered in a colonial environment in order to shed analytical light on our specific case study. More generally, however, nation-states are a “complex array of modern institutions involved in governance over a spatially bounded territory” (Johnston et al., 2000: 534). They may or may not have been forged upon the lines of a common history, culture, language, race, etc. or, as illustrated above, in response to colonial or foreign occupation. To be sure, they are creations springing from diverse circumstances and historical periods and, as such, have been variously composed. Nation-state constitution-formation-

425 fortification is always quite singular in process, and yet nation-states employ common strategies for their constitution-formation-fortification. Furthermore, the nation-state is an “ideal type” (Johnston et al., 2000: 535). Rarely do state boundaries correspond with a national community within which all citizens possess an identical culture (535). In effect, these historically differing entities have secured a system of governance and effective mobilization of governmental powers, authority and legitimacy within a specified territorial association. R.J. Johnston et al. stipulate two central components to nation-state formation in this regard: state-building and nation-building (534). State-building entails the territorialization of state power. This requires convincing the citizen (usually through coercive means) to obediently accept the regulation of movements of ideas, goods and peoples across national boundaries and to abide by political decisions made on the citizen’s behalf. In addition, some sort of centralized bureaucracy coordinates and carries out progressively complex functions within a designated territory (534). For the elite leaders of a state to be able to successfully establish the state as institution, they must be able to effectively mobilize resources from a relatively large population and provide economies of scale for political, economic and military activity (Herbst, 2002: 19). Nation-building involves the coordination of state-building (fine-tuning the internal functions of the state), the development of industrial capitalism and the simultaneous creation of the citizen, the homeland (accepted territorial demarcations) and a sense of belonging to a national culture (Johnston et al., 2000: 535). In effect, nation-building and state-building are reciprocal processes that reinforce each other. It is through the discourse of the nation and national education that the idea of the nation within the confines of state borders is sustained and the exercise of sovereignty by the state accepted and believed. Hannum distinguishes the linguistic meaning of ‘nation’ from ‘state’ along the lines of political scientists, as opposed to the interchangeable and indistinct usage of the terms by lawyers, politicians and the general public. A state is “a recognized political entity that exercises the functions of government,” whereas a nation is “a cultural or social grouping with certain shared characteristics” (Hannum, 1996: 3). By differentiating as such, we can be critical of both the essence of the nation (homogenous form) and the

426 structural inequalities and deficiencies of the state256. Hannum also distinguishes ‘nationalism,’ “a phenomenon which implies a demand for political power by an ethnically, linguistically, or otherwise homogenous group,” from ‘statism,’ “a similar demand for political power by a group which defines itself in terms of existing political and or territorial boundaries rather than a more personally based sense of solidarity” (Hannum, 1996: 24). Hannum places the struggle against colonialism within the parameters of statism (1996: 24). Modern-day nationalism would then more accurately describe a tendency towards exclusionary ethnicism versus multicultural coexistence, a notion that we will return to shortly (Hannum, 2002: 240). Although, Sahrawis share common characteristics (despite different tribal affiliations), which in fact facilitated nation-building processes, colonialism set the stage for the fight for statehood and political, economic and cultural control of an arbitrarily drawn colonial territory. In this way, both nationalism (where, in this case, homogeneity is basically a mute point) and statism have played a significant role in the Sahrawi struggle against colonial oppression and now occupation. For many colonial peoples, the stepping-stone between national liberation movements and statehood has been the act of self-determination. If the primary meaning of the nation is political because it equates the ‘people’ and the ‘state’257 (Hobsbawm, 1997: 18), it is also political because it equates the ‘people’ and the ‘citizen’. The nation is a “body of citizens” within the state structure (their political expression); therefore, the element of citizenship and mass participation (choice) is never absent from the nation (18-19). The struggle (resistance), the nation and citizenship are all part of statehood. In this construct, the realization of the nation-state is the realization of the citizen. Hence, self-determination (as part of the process of decolonization) at once provides access to and binds the colonized to the state form. In this sense, the doubleness of self-determination is striking. It is both liberating and enslaving. Furthermore, the relationship between the colonized and the citizen is one of imperial carryover. “What is crucial is that through the creation of a split between the

256 Any use of term state automatically contains within it the diverse ways that states create, produce, maintain and sustain the idea of the nation. 257 Hobsbawm states that the ‘nation’ (a political concept) equated the ‘people’ and the ‘state’ in the nature of the American and French Revolution, a relationship which can be seen in phrases like the ‘nation-state’ and the ‘United Nations’ (Hobsbawm, 1997: 18). 427 individual (who becomes a citizen) and his or her autonomous activity (which becomes subject to state regulation), liberal citizens come to believe that there can be no freedom without the state form” (Day, 2005: 53; emphasis in original). And yet, at the same time, national liberation movements for independent statehood called into question the colonial/colonized relationship – “full citizens” versus “virtual citizens” (deprived of rights of citizenship) – and provided the political course for access to the very full citizenship of the “master race” (Mamdani, 2001: 27). Furthermore, the idea of the citizen (the nation complete) immediately conjures up the idea of the ‘people’. We have already established the people in reference to its colonial sense and the principle and right of self- determination (Chapter One) and the creation and historical roots of a Sahrawi unified national liberation movement (Chapter Two). Now, let us see how the people in the current neo-liberal globalization context, bringing exclusion to its extreme, also makes us rethink the very notion of the nation-state.

4.4.3. The People

Agamben defines modern totalitarianism as: “the establishment, by means of the state of exception, of a legal civil war that allows for the physical elimination not only of political adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated into the political system” (Agamben, 2005: 2; emphasis mine). He explains that this behavior has become common to contemporary states, even democratic ones, and that it appears as a “threshold of indeterminacy between democracy and absolutism” (3). This shared space of democracy and absolutism is directly connected to global capital and processes of neoliberal globalization. Those that cannot be integrated into the political system also fall outside of and/or are disenfranchised by this economic order. Therefore, nationalism as a force of resistance to colonialism and a means of legitimation through the state form becomes a force of submission to the state form and to an understanding of political organization that is “hegemonic and ‘monologic’” (Ashcroft et al., 1995: 152). Agamben’s theoretical conceptualization of the ‘people’ bears particular importance here. He contends that in Western politics, the ‘people’ “is a polar concept

428 that indicates a double movement and a complex relation between two extremes” (Agamben, 1997: 116). As such, the ‘people’ comprises:

“on the one hand, the set of the People as a whole political body, on the other hand, the subject of the people as fragmentary multiplicity of needy and excluded bodies; on the one hand, an inclusion which claims to be total, on the other hand, an exclusion which is clearly hopeless; at one extreme, the total state of integrated and sovereign citizens, at the other, the preserve - court of miracles or camp - of the wretched, the oppressed, and the defeated…[T]he constitution of the human species in a political body passes through a fundamental division…that in the concept of ‘people’ we can easily recognize the categorical pairs which we have seen to define the original political structure: bare life (people) and political existence (People), exclusion and inclusion, zoē and bios. The ‘people’ thus always already carries the fundamental biopolitical fracture within itself. It is that which cannot be included in the whole of which it is a part and which cannot belong to the set in which it is always already included” (Agamben, 1997: 116; emphases mine).

Agamben highlights the contradictions and aporias that the term ‘people’ engenders. The nature and function of the concept of people is always double; therefore, every interpretation of the political meaning of the term ‘people’ must immediately acknowledge the biopolitical fracture inherent in the Western concept of the ‘people,’ the citizen and the non-citizen, the included and the excluded. Otherwise, we fail to capture the essence of a concept that both enfranchises and disenfranchises, that creates the citizen, a legitimized identity in the nation-state, and the non-citizen, an ‘illegal’ or refugee, contained within the confines of the nation-state and simultaneously left outside of the protective guise of the nation-state. Taking into consideration this complex relationship, the commentary that the institutional features of the current international legal system detrimentally elevate states and suppress peoples (Lâm, 2002: 182) only captures part of the political picture. The people immediately indicates the “poor, the disinherited, and the excluded” (Agamben, 1997: 115) and the privileged, the legitimated and the patriot. Dov Ronen insists that in the quest for self-determination the people fight for full sovereign statehood, including control of economic resources, because the state is currently the “only available institutional framework in which the quest for self-

429 determination can be institutionalized” (Ronen, 1979: 105). However, below the quest for statehood, via self-determination, lies a foundation that is not directly connected to the aspiration to statehood or for control of economic resources, but rather an aspiration for the people (the poor, the disinherited, the excluded, the colonized, the occupied) to control their destiny – not to be ruled, dominated or controlled by others and to establish political independence (105). In this light, self-determination is the “disintegrative force within the framework of the modern (nation-)state system” (99). In fact, self-determination (where independence is the chosen expression of self) functions as a liberating force for colonized peoples and as a circumscription into the state system. In a post-colonial context, it challenges the dominance of the nation-state system, whether the ‘permanency’ of existing states or the totalized notion of the nation-state as the default setting for political organization. Nevertheless, because the nation-state is the only available institutional framework in which the quest for self-determination can be institutionalized, it has become the territorial regulator of who really matters in society and the marker for international legitimacy and acceptance. Therefore, the powerful actors in the nation-state basically determine “who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ of power,” and usually through the construction of national narratives and in the name of the people (Babbitt, 2006b: 163). Again, the people are the whole political body and the fragmentary multiplicity of needy and excluded bodies. Self-determination is a disintegrative and liberating force as well as a maintainer and fortifier of the nation-state system. The idea of the people, conceived of in national liberation movements, folds in upon itself and constricts the very revolutionary and break-through historical moment within the state. The people, once liberated (“the sole depository of sovereignty”), are created anew and are transformed into an “embarrassing presence” (Agamben, 1997: 117). This theoretical discussion of the amphibolous nature of the ‘people’ as it relates to self-determination and the nation-state forces the discussion beyond self-determination and promises of finality for self-determination conflicts. The “‘originary’ is a move – like the clutch disengaging to get a stick-shift car moving. The originary is precisely not an origin” (Spivak, 2003: 85). Let us take a concrete example to illustrate this point.

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4.4.3.1. The ‘People’: the Liberated-Oppressed

In a predominately post-colonial era and in an interdependent global (neoliberal) economy, the remaining homogenous territories or characteristics that have traditionally demarcated nationalities (British, French, Spanish, Italian) will become more and more impossible to maintain and may begin to look more and more like the United States, despite the attempts of nation-states to close borders, crack down on ‘illegal’ immigration and preserve the idea of the (xenophobic-)nation, especially Western Europe and, ironically, the United States. This is due to the increased movement of peoples, especially those searching for a ‘better life,’ but should not exclude other displacements of peoples due to famine, natural disasters, unemployment and intrastate, interstate and civil war. Of course, where neoliberal globalization has disproportionately affected (impoverished) certain global populations, for example, sub-Saharan Africa, these movements have steadily increased and have created ‘national security’ issues for destination countries. In response to this upsurge in sub-Saharan mass migration, the European Union and specific countries like Spain and Italy have enacted more stringent immigration laws and stricter immigration control measures. At the same time, Naval and Post Guard vessels have begun to patrol the Mediterranean looking for boats trafficking would-be immigrants. They are aided by spotter aircraft that provide aerial surveillance of the sea and by men equipped with high-powered binoculars stationed at observations posts along the coast (barcelonareporter.com, 2009). North African countries function as intermediate departure points for migrants hoping to get to Western Europe or as a second-best destination option. Libya, for example, which boasts economic opportunity and prowess, has recently attracted waves of immigrants. It serves as both an intermediary jump-off point to Western Europe and as a final destination. Libyans, officials and common people alike, have described this “army” of immigrants as “animals” and “slaves,” outsiders who burden the health care system, spread disease and crime and are above all “illegal” (Slackman, 2009). These migrant citizens/non-citizens are wanted by no one and present a neoliberal globalization model with a complex set of circumstances that alternatively secure a soft power leverage for Qaddafi: “If Libya sent all the migrants home, they would become a burden to poorer

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African nations, which would have to absorb them while losing out on the remittances they send home. At the same time,…Libya has made it plain to European countries, especially Italy, that if Libya chose to look the other way, most of those migrants would leave for European shores” (Slackman, 2009). Similar geopolitical threats have been made by Morocco to Spain. However, the main point here is not to critique the state’s representation of the ‘people’ as bargaining chips or national security threats, although these disturbing and abusive categorizations and portrayals of human beings merit further critical analysis258. The point here is the biopolitical fracture inherent in the people/nation/nation-state, the included and the excluded. Is it possible within the political structure of the nation-state to reconcile the mythical ‘originary’ claims of the people/nation (the reality that the originary is precisely not an origin) and the conceptualization of self-determination as a conflict transformative concept? It must be conceded that what potentially breaks colonialist/occupationist stalemates, simultaneously paves the way for the biopolitical fracture of the nation-state. Libya gained its independence from Italy in 1951. After a revolutionary military coup in 1969, Qaddafi solidified his own type of absolute rule. The biopolitical split of the nation-state is difficult to ignore. It is evident in the evolution of political demarcations, from ‘colonized’ to ‘citizen’ to the ‘illegal’ foreigner. Taking this evolution into consideration, it does not require a stretch of the imagination to envision waves of immigrants knocking on the door of a newly conceived Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic with economic potential and opportunity, coastal land and democratic rule. The inherent doubleness and tensionality that characterize such historical moments, only serve to reinforce that self-determination must be understood as process. If it is not understood as such, it gets caught in an originary fiction. However, when self- determination is not conceived of as a finalized one time only event, then, albeit

258 Heriberto Cairo has commented on how modern sovereignty has been modified through the ‘politicization of life,’ whereby governments utilize state power (even extralegal power) to protect and defend only “politically qualified life” – the included people (2006: 296). Judith Butler’s 2009 book, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?, works off the premise that we are unable to grieve for lives lost if they are not considered lives in the first place. As portrayals of immigrants, political prisoners and refugees in our globalized mediums of communication anesthetize our ability to see life where life is, Butler challenges us to recognize those lives as precarious instead of foregone conclusions. 432 somewhat paradoxically, an expression of independence of the Sahrawi ‘people’ can at once recognize and challenge the biopolitical fission of the construction of the anti- colonial/anti-occupational nation. Such a process acknowledges that the medium for colonized/occupied people to determine their own political, economic and cultural fate is both liberating and enslaving. In rethinking the people, we are actually rethinking self-determination, a concept that provides some sort of legitimized access to the nation-state form. In this regard, what is the relationship of self-determination to the nation-state? Is self-determination inseparable from the nation-state? Does self-determination always have to be either “a recovery of a partial remnant of a sovereignty lost in the past” or “a futural project of a totalizing nation-state”? (Day, 2005: 194). What is the role of the nation-state in today’s rapidly changing global environment? Rethinking self-determination is a political exercise that rejects simple binaries and easy answers and requires further analysis on the complex of competing discourses on the nation-state itself. Because self-determination in its diverse realizations provides some sort of legitimized and recognized access to this order, it is necessary to take a closer look at some of the discourses around the nation-state as they relate to the doubleness of self- determination in an increasingly globalized world. In fact, within the conceptualization of the nation-state, the concepts of the nation, the people and self-determination are circumscribed. It is the ‘people’ (the nation) who through the process of self- determination associate, integrate, become autonomous or gain independence. Regardless of these possible outcomes, which should always be considered continuous in process, they all take place within the construct of the nation-state. Therefore, the people transformed are both the citizen and the non-citizen, and self-determination at once liberates and seizes. The system is always double (Agamben, 2004a; Raulff/interview with Agamben). Thus, it is important to look at oppositions and inconsistencies as “di- polarities” rather than “di-chotomies,” as “tensional” rather than “substantial” (Agamben, 2004a). This means that what may appear to foreclose the concept of self-determination, in fact, allows us to work within and beyond this conflict transformation framework.

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4.4.4. Self-Determination and the Nation-State

The importance of self-determination as a conflict transformation tool stands out clearly when we expose its own limitations, doubleness and di-polarities. Self- determination in its conflict transformative conceptualization highlights the necessity of process versus the quest for a finalized end result, i.e. independence and state recognition. But, that process does not immediately preclude the possibility for a result of independence and state recognition. As Day’s provocative question indicates, to some degree, self-determination as a conflict transformation process gets stuck in the logic and exclusionary structural and institutional frameworks of the nation-state. Short of an anarchical dismissal of the state form, self-determination as process keeps one foot in present-day international realities (international acceptance of the state as the legitimate form of political expression), while simultaneously stepping outside of the confines of the nation-state so as to be able to envision alternative political structures. Because of its inherent links to the state system, self-determination allows us to enter into a complex discussion regarding the very nature of the nation-state that in turn affects our very understanding of self-determination. The rapidly changing nature of the world in terms of economic and political interdependency has sparked a global debate on the present role of the nation-state. These political and structural assessments directly affect the self-determination debate itself. A slightly different slant on our self-determination polemic can be configured as follows: the space where Realpolitik discourses that call for the end of the State and a borderless, free market world (Ohmae, 1995) come head to head with counter-discourses that problematize the nation-state. These counter-discourses themselves vary considerably from those who call for universal human rights and a cosmopolitan global citizenship (cosmopolitanism) within or beyond the nation-state (Held, 1995; Archibugi and Held, 1995; Beck, 2006) to those who problematize the state of the nation-state (Arendt, 1976; Agamben, 1997; Butler and Spivak, 2007). In the specific decolonization context of Western Sahara, these ideologically opposed positions appear to weaken the very international legal principle capable of bringing about real conflict transformation for Western Sahara, self-determination. In

434 fact, as we have explored above, the former jeopardizes the decolonization right because it defends at all costs the market and free movement of capital against anything that may impede its functioning, development and expansion, even if that means supporting a despotic and repressive monarchical ruler, while oppressing a legitimate free and democratic liberation movement. The ways in which the latter positions appear to compromise the process of self-determination for the Sahrawi people are much more nuanced and pertain to the very paradoxes inherent in the self-determination right (explored in detail in this chapter and in Chapter One in relation to postcolonial studies); the continuities of the ‘post’ colonial order; and the dualities and di-polarities inherent in the concepts of ‘nation,’ ‘people’ and the ‘nation-state’. These opposing positions fall on very different sides of the political spectrum, but are connected by a common thread – the ever increasing decreased role of the nation-state. There are also those who challenge (Kennedy, 1993; Schachter, 2002; Hannum, 2002; Scholte, 2005a; Žižek, 2006) what has been denominated the “waning” or “decline” (Schreuer, 1993; Schachter, 2002) of the nation-state. Žižek states that the myth of the diminishing role of the state needs to be debunked. He makes the following observation:

“What we are witnessing today is a shift in its functions: while partially withdrawing from its welfare obligations, the State is strengthening its apparatuses in other domains of social regulation. In order to start a business now, one has to rely on the State to guarantee not only law and order, but the entire infrastructure (access to water and energy, means of transportation, ecological criteria, international regulations, etc.), to an incomparably larger extent than a hundred years ago” (Žižek, 2006: 248).

However, despite the as yet unchallenged prominence of the state, the shrinking significance of state borders due to global capitalism and the mobility of capital and technology coupled by the expansion of global communications networks have to some degree blurred spatial lines and geographic demarcations (Schachter, 2002: 144). Whereas political organization is far from a borderless world, globalization processes have decisively altered the finite nature of state borders and interaction. As a result, most territorial boundaries have become “permeable and changing,” and territorial conceptions

435 of geo-political identity have shifted with the multiplication of centers and the permeability and erosion of borders and territories (Lambert, 2003: 13). As mentioned previously, Hannum (1996; 2002; 2006) recognizes the reformative and adaptive potentiality of post-colonial self-determination, especially in relation to the development of international human rights norms and global interdependency. As opposed to Gregg Lambert, he argues that the post-colonial norm of self-determination in fact operates in the context of an international order in which, paradoxically, the state’s physical boundaries are more secure than at any time in the last four centuries, but where actual state power has been and continues to be substantially reduced (Hannum, 2002: 244). Despite their different takes on territorial boundaries, Lambert and Hannum reach a similar conclusion. State sovereignty has been reduced as a direct result of an increasing global political and economic interdependence, which takes the form of international agreements on trade, human rights, culture and the environment, health and telecommunications. Therefore, authentic political or economic independence is impossible. Hannum does not doubt the continuing vitality of the state; however, he does point to tendencies toward regionalization as altered forms of state political organization. Thomas M. Franck explains that through these closer associations states delegate part of their sovereignty to supranational authorities in order to address global issues (ozone depletion, extreme violation of human rights and threats to international peace, liquidity and trade) (Franck, 2002: 6-7). In light of the complexity and multidimensionality of geography, culture, ecology, economics, politics and social psychology, Scholte declares that the “relative simplicity of a territorialist-statist-nationalist world is fading fast” (Scholte, 2005a: 6). This “irrevocable turn away from statism” (Scholte, 2005a: 16) does not refute the fact, as Žižek is quick to point out, that we still exist in a world of states. In this vein, the state remains for most people the “primary locus of identity” (Kennedy, 1993: 134) in a time where the psychological and legal borders of the state have become increasingly permeable (Hannum, 2002: 242). In fact, the effects of globalization processes, like pervasive global mediums of communication and interdependence in information, trade and finance and easier exchanges (or dominance) of culture and language, have complicated the circumstances

436 under which self-determination movements have arisen (Danspeckgruber, 2002: 3). This means that responses to claims to self-determination must be adjusted (and adjustable) in order to creatively meet the demands of changing international norms. Returning to the norm of self-determination in the post-colonial era, it functions as “both a shield that protects a state (in most cases) from secession and a spear that pierces the governmental veil of sovereignty behind which undemocratic or discriminatory regimes attempt to hide” (Hannum, 2002: 244-245). The duality of self-determination is evident; however, self-determination, as process, addresses the complexities of our time, the paradox of the simultaneous movement of global societies towards “greater centrifugalism and centripetalism – greater divergence and convergence” (Franck, 2002: 7; emphases in original). That said, what sort of challenges or even dangers does self-determination present for self-determination conflicts and conflict transformation of such conflicts when the shield and the spear clash?

4.4.5. Territoriality

If we accept the biopolitical fracture of the ‘people’ and recognize that self- determination provides a medium to statehood or participation in statehood, we are confronted by the fact that this fracture permeates the very concept of self-determination. How do we think outside of a concept, that although useful in terms of bringing about conflict transformation, still functions within the nation-state structure whose monstrous side yields exclusionary ethnicism (motivated by a push for ethnically ‘pure’ states), intolerance, expulsion and genocide (Babbitt, 2006b: 163)? What is the relationship between representations of a political and territorial nature and inflammations of ethnic otherness, hate and violence based on claims of common physical traits, language, blood, land and cultural preservation (Agamben, 1997: 116)? How do we begin to talk about discrimination, oppression, exclusion and state violence and repression, which are so closely tied to the structure of the state and widespread state marginalization in terms of poverty, illiteracy, political control by the state, minority and gender discrimination, etc. (Babbitt, 2006b: 163)?

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Besides making for a uni-dimensionally statist international society, this focus can lead to intolerant homogeneity. As Hobsbawm recalls, history teaches us that the result of trying to reduce territorial states to separate ethnic, religious and linguistic populations “was the mass expulsion or extermination of minorities…the murderous reductio ad absurdum of nationalism in its territorial version” (Hobsbawm, 1997: 133), represented par excellence in the Final Solution of Nazism (Agamben, 1997: 117). Political organization based on ethnic, religious or linguistic “sameness” (Hobsbawm, 1997: 186) is every bit a part of the legacy and colonial inheritance of decolonization and national liberation movements. In the very concept of self-determination, we must be able to recognize and confront that these ‘destructive dimensions’ reside alongside the liberating and transformative capability of the concept. They are the ugly, dangerous and real manifestations of a “concept originally conceived as a basis for state formation, for the liberation of oppressed peoples, and for increasing the democratic power of the individual citizen” (Danspeckgruber, 2002: 5). In an interdependent world of states, schismatic movements (tribal, national or ethnic entities) from below challenge the idea of the state as a “multicommunal civil society,” and a growing interdependency also challenges the ability of the state to sufficiently meet “the needs of the third millennium” (Franck, 2002: 6-7). Franck insists that what we are witnessing is not “an irresistible centrifugal trend to a world of rampant tribalist nationalism” nor a “rampant centripetal globalism,” but rather “paradoxical elements of both tendencies” (Franck, 2002: 17). In order to better capture the conflicting trends of globalization, it is necessary to acknowledge both tendencies. However, it is also true that recent trends towards ‘tribalist nationalism’ linked to territory have raised concerns regarding the negative effects of attaching self- determination hopes to territorial claims. In this regard, some advocates suggest we shift the focus from territoriality (arbitrary borders) to non-state participation. Non-state participation could play a constructive role in alleviating self-determination tensions because it dissociates international political power from being tied directly to territory (Babbitt, 2006b: 163). Jenne claims that any program of national self-determination “based on territory” is a recipe for endless cycles of violence (Jenne, 2006: 29; emphasis in original). In this assessment, if the international community recognizes non-state-actors and convinces

438 states to give up their “effective monopoly of power” in the international arena, the appeal of national self-determination may be reduced (29). If we recall, this is similar to Jayawickrama’s argument that creating multiple points of negotiation regarding self- determination increases the possibilities for not only multiple outcomes, but also non- violent ones. Only, Jayawickrama includes independence as one of these options, whereas Jenne advocates for adequate representation of the people divorced from territory and warns against making representation in the international system contingent upon nation-state status. This means seeking self-determination through alternative means other than independence and statehood. The argument for more non-state actor participation, representation and recognition within the state order (anti-territorialism) is a convincing one that calls into question my own take on an independence-inclusive self-determination. However, they are only uni-directionally contradictory. My own conceptualization of self-determination as process with multiple varieties of expression similarly makes room for non-state participation and expressions of self-determination that are not dependent on territory. Recognition of non-state actors is an important step that may open new spaces of political representation and expression of self-determination for groups seeking political autonomy and participation. On the contrary, if we reject independence-inclusive self- determination processes solely for a ‘stable’ and ‘static’ international order, we are not creating alternatives that challenge the state’s domain. We are merely capitulating to that order and to those who can exercise state power. Furthermore, all the components that reinforce deep conflict analysis, including the importance of historical context and international law as affected by Realpolitik discourses, suggest that self-determination conflicts cannot be reduced to territorial claims or historical grievances for that matter. The specifics of each conflict, workings of Realpolitik politics and power, geopolitics, neoliberal globalization, democratization (or lack thereof) and structural inequalities as well as the on the ground realities that define each self-determination conflict, like the emotional desire of the wretched, the oppressed and the defeated for political, economic and cultural representation and international legitimation and control of land (homeland), the environment and natural resources, fly in the face of simplistic anti-territorial expressions of self-determination. Our power analysis of the Western

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Saharan/Moroccan conflict is a case study that has demonstrated why par excellence. An independence-inclusive self-determination process for Western Sahara – which could guarantee the passage from stateless refugee/occupied to official nation-state status (official sovereignty and citizenship) – is not at odds with a critical analysis of the nation- state and ways of thinking beyond its borders, beyond statelessness. Although in paradoxical flux with one another, these positions do not amount to an either-or scenario. They are the collision of human messiness and potentiality for an imaginative rupture, of the creative possibilities found in the very paradoxes, contradictions and tensions of the social and political. Thus far, our analysis of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict situation has been confined to the terrain of the nation-state and Westphalian logic of territorial sovereignty. For the Frente POLISARIO, the idea of liberation through the coming of the nation-state is evident in education practices. These take form through informal subversive activism, oral history and clandestine and open cultural performativity in the occupied territories and operate through public institutions in the refugee camps. The Frente POLISARIO has created a state in exile or a state-like organization within the refugee camps, including preparation of the ‘citizen’ for the future. Such practices anticipate emergence of an ‘official’ nation state from the geographical, political, social, cultural and historical no man’s land of the refugee camps. The SADR has its institutions, citizens, flags, national festivities, bureaucrats and diplomats like any other state. It argues that if it were only permitted to be a “normal state,” it could bring stability to the region, an assurance that plays to the neoliberal push toward regionalization in North Africa (San Martín, 2005: 587). But, does the preparation of the citizen also pave the way for the making of the non-citizen, the foreigner, the alien, the stranger, the immigrant, the refugee, the criminal, the prisoner and/or the outsider (Cadava and Levy, 2003: xvii)? A progressive thinker and practitioner might question whether focusing on the right to statehood is somehow shortsighted or entrenched in systems of systematized inequality, hegemony and exclusion of political organization and representation, even when taking into consideration the 34 years of suffering endured by Africa’s last colony. Embedded in

440 the Sahrawi struggle and resistance – in their statelessness and in their refugee/occupied status – lies this very paradox, between self-determination and the nation-state259. Although I argue that a broad understanding of self-determination better responds to the conflict realities of today’s self-determination conflicts, such an approach, like the anti-territorial one, does not immediately address the biopolitical fracture inherent in the very concept of self-determination. Here is where I believe Žižek’s commentary on debunking the myth of the decline of the nation-state and Agamben’s, Spivak and Butler’s problematization of the nation-state are complementary rather than oppositional.

4.4.6. Extraterritoriality

If we return to our discussion above concerning the political and economic evaluation of the role of the nation-state, we can isolate certain positions: the end of the nation-state; the significant role of the nation-state; the decreasing and changing role of the nation-state; and the nation-state as a dialectical problematic. Of these multiple perspectives, only the latter calls into question the very conceptualization of the nation- state and problematizes the very biopolitical fracture and originary fiction at its core. If we revisit Day’s assessment of the relationship of the citizen to the state and the citizen’s coming to believe that “there can be no freedom without the state form” (Day, 2005: 53; emphasis in original), we see this conclusion for what it truly is, a false totality. Furthermore, his question, although binary in form, takes on renewed importance in thinking beyond the nation-state. Does self-determination always have to be either “a recovery of a partial remnant of a sovereignty lost in the past” or “a futural project of a totalizing nation-state”? (Day, 2005: 194). A critical analysis of the nation-state exposes various contradictions and multi- tensionalities as well as the bipolitical fracture of the ‘people,’ and hence, the nation- state. However, in spite of this, I do not rule out the possibility of independence in our self-determination conflict transformation. While working within an established system, it is possible to simultaneously critique that very system and strive not only to look outside of that model, but also to create alternatives outside of that model. Our critical

259 This analysis can also be found in Murphy, 2009. 441 analysis of the nation-state does not reduce the transformative potential of self- determination. The self-determination concept is rooted in resistance and thus challenges the existing order, and it is rooted in ‘polarities’ and thus is limited in its own right. In fact, in rethinking the notion of the people, we are forced to rethink the notion of nationalism, citizenship, territory and self-determination – all concepts fitting nicely within the political construction of the nation-state. In a globalized world of constantly changing origins, where culture more rapidly reveals its non-static and contingent constitution and where massive migration constantly renews the ‘outsider,’ the ‘foreigner,’ the ‘non-citizen,’ we are forced to question the focus on the nation-state form as the only materialization and realization of resistance movements and self- determination conflicts. In sum, self-determination as it is conceived of currently – even our transformative process of self-determination – is bound within the confines of the nation- state. Therefore, even when an expression of self-determination is reached – independence, integration, association, autonomy – and even if conceptualized as a continuous process that does not end with the realization of one of these, self- determination does not transcend the limited concept of the nation-state. It is the very exclusionary practices and di-polarities of the state system, the citizen and the non- citizen, that shed light on the very structural inequalities of the international system of states. What political organization truly challenges the dominant structures and oppressive nature of the state? Agamben suggests that the refugee is: “the only thinkable figure for the people of our time and the only category in which one may see today…the forms and limits of a coming political community” (Agamben, 2003: 4). It is to the refugee, therefore, that we turn in the final section of this last chapter. We do so in order to free ourselves from the constraints of the nation-state and in order to think of alternatives to this naturalized institution of political organization in such a way that we may eventually imagine a transformative process of self-determination outside of the state form. This requires what could be construed of as a move from a territorial perspective of political organization to an extraterritorial one. However, let it be clear that thinking beyond the nation-state and the limitations of self-determination within this political conception does not rule out the

442 conflict transformative potentiality of the self-determination process within the nation- state. They are not mutually exclusive. The very di-polarity of self-determination allows us to utilize the concept within the present day international system of states, while simultaneously struggling to create more equal articulations of political representation. Furthermore, exploring this shift in interpretive horizon – self-determination as conflict transformation – has allowed us to break through the state of exception (the normalized transgression of international law) and problematize the Realpolitik framing of the concept of zero-sum for Western Sahara. This final section sets the groundwork for future investigation on the relationship between self-determination and alternative forms of political organization – inclusion and exclusion.

4.4.7. The Refugee: Challenging the Dominant Narrative of the Nation-State

Robert J. Beck (2002) promotes the study of refugees and refugee policy. By the very fact that refugees fall between the cracks of the state system, they disrupt a state- centric paradigm. As such, they pose a challenge to conventional ways of thinking about international politics and international law (Beck, 2002: 84). Refugees are: “the society of scarcity beneath our cultures of abundance” (Gans and Jelacic Architecture, 2003: 222). The massive displacement of peoples in our day may be the direct result of internecine conflicts, foreign war, famine or mass unemployment, but ultimately their displacement dates back to patterns of investment of Cold War superpowers (their aid to contested territories) and to the ill-effects of the movement of unbridled capital – de-ruralization, migration, emigration and flight (Gans and Jelacic Architecture, 2003: 222-223). The displaced are always “temporized by the idea of return” (229). In this light, Gans and Jelacic make the following claim: “[T]he idea of the return is a realpolitik solution to halt the erosion of the social as well as the physical fabric of the loss of property rights” (229; emphasis in original). Although I would argue that this conclusion simplifies the diverse circumstances that define the experiences of refugees, the idea of ‘the return’ opens up an interesting analytical space. If the return provides access to the return of the nation-state, the refugee presents no challenge to the very system that

443 produced, produces and reproduces systems of hegemony, inequality, exclusion and expulsion. However, if the figure of the refugee represents not a return to a naturalized system of subjugation but rather a “disquieting element” that shakes the foundation of these systems and breaks through them, we can imagine alternatives to a political organization that presently creates two classes of people, the citizen and the refugee (the wretched, oppressed and defeated) (Agamben, 1998: 131; Agamben, 2003: 8)260. Sahrawi refugees are the most naked of disquieting figures, a refugee in limbo of limbo. They are the colonized, the occupied, the exiled and the refugee261. Giorgio Agamben looks to refugees as the sole category in which it is possible today to perceive “the forms and limits of a coming political community” (Agamben, 2003: 4), one beyond the nation-state. This seems contrary to the Sahrawi struggle for self-determination. As we call for an independence-inclusive expression of self- determination for Sahrawi refugees, their medium of ‘return,’ how can it be that they pose a challenge to present international politics and law? How can they hold, in their suffering, exclusion and statelessness, the possibilities for a coming political community outside of the nation-state, especially when the claim to statehood is the foundation of their nationalist movement? Presently, the only way to restore the rights of the stateless, of the refugee, is through the restoration of national rights – regulating the fiction one might say – in order to reenter into the realm of the ‘real’ or “officially recognized identity” (Arendt, 1976: 287). It is precisely here that the refugee breaks “the continuity between man and citizen, nativity and nationality” and puts in crisis the originary fiction of modern sovereignty262 (Agamben, 1998: 131). “Inasmuch as the refugee, an apparently marginal figure, unhinges the old trinity of state-nation-territory, it deserves instead to be regarded as the central figure of our political history” (Agamben, 2003: 8). Growing numbers can no

260 Agamben writes of the refugee similarly in multiple works. See Agamben, 1995 and 2004b. 261 In an incredible twist, Sahrawis born in the ‘Spanish Sahara’ and who have access to birth certificates and other official documents – proving their colonial status – have an opportunity to apply for Spanish citizenship. Within their colonial subjugation, they are considered ‘Spanish,’ adding yet another layer to their existence of exclusion. Furthermore, if Spanish citizenship is granted to a colonial-born Sahrawi, a Sahrawi refugee of Spanish nationality must apply for an Algerian visa to visit the Sahrawi refugee camps. 262 This same concept is repeated by Agamben more recently, only using slightly different wording: “If the refugee represents such a disquieting element in the order of the nation-state, this is so primarily because, by breaking the identity between the human and the citizen and that between nativity and nationality, it brings the originary fiction of sovereignty to crisis” (Agamben, 2003: 8). 444 longer be represented inside the nation-state. Accordingly, it is to this “radical crisis” and these numbers (“limit-concept”) to which we turn in order to do two things: to reveal and to critique the constructedness of the nation-state trinity, which at once promised and failed to incarnate the rights of man263 (8-9). The nation-state equates citizenship and sovereignty. Hence, within this construct, birth and nation are indistinguishable. Through birth, the nation is born. The sovereign state is not a political construct that represents humans as free and conscious political subjects, but rather, hijacks bare life (simple birth) and selectively and differentially brands the “members of the sovereign” (Agamben, 1998: 128-129). At the same time, those that are effectively stateless are still under the control of state power (Butler and Spivak, 2007: 8). Because the very origin of the nation-state relies on this fiction of birth, citizenship, nation, state and sovereignty, it must declare to protect that which it cannot, the rights of man. It already creates, accepts and needs the refugee. The citizen and the non-citizen exist in and of each other. Therefore, the state’s declaration of the sacred and inalienable rights of man does not represent a breakthrough moment safeguarding human rights, but rather, “the inscription of natural life in the juridico-political order of nation- states” (Agamben, 1998: 127; 133). Birth, nation (belonging) and inalienable rights coincide. The nation-state trinity myth fails to acknowledge, however, a cold truth: people must and always do fall outside of the ‘safety zone’ of the nation-state, even while inscribing the rights of man in it. The political system of the modern nation-state is founded on “the functional nexus between a determinate localization (land) and a determinate order (the State)” and is mediated by “automatic rules for the inscription of life (birth or nation)” (Agamben, 1998: 174-175). Despite the fiction of the citizen’s trinity – land, state (order), birth – and all-inclusive doctrine and declarations meant to glorify its purpose and naturalize and totalize its reach, the nation-state cannot protect that which it creates and depends upon – the other, the immigrant, the refugee. In fact, it is the nation-state that depends upon the state of

263 Agamben owes his discussion of the nation-state and the rights of man to Hannah Arendt and her chapter “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man” from the Origins of Totalitarianism, 1976. In this regard, Agamben’s and my use of the rights of man is in reference to Arendt’s discussion of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, a document written at the end of the eighteenth century (Arendt, 1976: 290-302). It is for this reason alone that I use a term that purports to include women when in fact it fails to adequately recognize half of the world’s population. 445 exception, the disintegration-transgression of domestic and international law. It is the nation-state that creates the camp – “the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule” and the “hybrid of law and fact in which the two terms have become indistinguishable” (Agamben, 1998: 168-169, 170; emphases in original); and it is the nation state that accepts the corrosion of political-juridical categories, the transgression of the rights of man and the inevitability of excluded bodies. It is in this regard, therefore, that the refugee must be considered for what he/she is:

“nothing less than a limit concept that radically calls into question the fundamental categories of the nation-state, from the birth-nation to the man-citizen link, and that thereby makes it possible to clear the way for a long-overdue renewal of categories in the service of a politics in which bare life is no longer separated and excepted, either in the state order or in the figure of human rights” (Agamben, 1998: 134).

Because the refugee punctures the myth of the nation-state by falling outside of its protection, the limit concept of the refugee allows us to think within and outside of the nation-state. Once called into question, it is possible to envision and imagine such things as “post-national forms,” “critical regionalisms”264, “sovereignty as negotiable” (Butler and Spivak, 2007: 41; 77; 109), “supranational restructuring” (Hobsbawm, 1997: 191), “reciprocal extraterroriality” (aterritoriality)265 (Agamben, 2003: 9) and “cities without citizens”266 (Cadava and Levy, 2003).

264 Spivak defines critical regionalism as such: “It goes under and over nationalisms but keeps the abstract structures of something like a state” (Butler and Spivak, 2007: 94). 265 Agamben envisions a world where “instead of two national states separated by uncertain and threatening boundaries, it might be possible to imagine two political communities insisting on the same region and in a condition of exodus from each other – communities that would articulate each other via a series of reciprocal extraterritorialities in which the guiding concept would no longer be the ius (right) of the citizen but rather the refugium (refuge) of the singular” (Agamben, 2003: 9-10). 266 Cadava and Levy argue that any assertion of citizenship “can only take place simultaneously defining the limits and conditions of citizenship – by defining, that is, the non-citizen, the foreigner, the alien, the stranger, the immigrant, the refugee, the criminal, the prisoner, or the outsider – and similarly, that any delineation of the borders of a city must mark what remains with the city but also what is excluded from it…there can be no cities without laws of segregation and exclusion – without borders, barriers, interdictions, displacements, censorships, racisms, and the marginalization and eviction of languages and peoples”; therefore, the phrase ‘citizens without citizens’ “also evokes the violence, the laws of denaturalization, the deprivation of civil rights, the strategies of depopulation, forced deportation, enforced emigration, the refusal of the rights of asylum, the murderous persecutions, massacres, colonizations, exterminations, exiles, and pogroms that so often have punctuated and defined the history of cities” (Cadava and Levy, 2003: xvii). 446

“[T]he nation-state can only reiterate its own basis for legitimation by literally producing the nation that serves as the basis for its legitimation” (Butler and Spivak, 2007: 18; 31). This relationship means that what is at once contained is also dispossessed, such that the production of the nation necessarily implies the production of the abandoned, the displaced, the expelled and various other states of dispossession. What would political organization (and meaning) look like if it did not maintain the biopolitical myth that equates birth (the citizen) and the nation? What would a world look like that is constantly in exodus or refuge (or even sedentary) (Agamben, 2003: 10)? Can envisioning such a world that is so far from present reality actually have positive bearing on today’s divisions of people into qualified and disqualified life, those stripped of status and those accorded status (Butler and Spivak, 2007: 15) based on pure belonging to a community, a state, a nation or a language (Cadava and Levy, 2003: xviii)? And yet, I return to the ultimate paradox of the nation-state as political formation. As Judith Butler warns, if we solely focus on the theoretical apparatus of sovereignty (the people, the nation, the citizen and the nation-state), we risk jeopardizing our conceptual framework by not adequately being able to represent or even capture the lived experience of highly juridified states of dispossession or normalized transgressions of the law (Butler and Spivak, 2007: 41-42). For example, we must recognize the “desire for citizenship” in statelessness (74). Bringing our discussion back to the political reality of Sahrawis and their desire for self-determination, statehood, citizenship and the rights guaranteed by the state, we are confronted with this very risk. It is the performative contradiction that tempers this discordance and espouses a radical politics of change: “To exercise a freedom and to assert an equality precisely in relation to an authority that would preclude both is to show how freedom equality can and must move beyond their positive articulations” (Butler and Spivak, 2007: 66-67). In this analytical light, the Sahrawi call for self-determination is a performative contradiction. Only by relying on, exposing and working on such contradictions is it possible to move toward something new (67), toward alternate political formations, toward something yet to come or even something yet to be imagined, while not losing a connection to the people’s struggle.

447

Conclusions

A Brief Chapter Overview

At the beginning of this study, I proposed to explore how Realpolitik policies have affected conflict approaches to the Western/Saharan Moroccan conflict in its four distinct phases: failure of conflict prevention and decolonization; hot conflict (1975- 1991); ceasefire and diplomatic stalemate and the proposition of ‘third way’ autonomy. In turn, this focus allowed me to examine conflict analysis and transformation strategies more generally. I also hypothesized that when procedures of conflict analysis, including mapping, mediation and conflict transformation strategies in general, are founded in Realpolitik essentialized assumptions, they are in turn rooted in structures of institutional and cultural domination and subordination. Determining the accuracy of this statement required investigating the structures, roles and procedures that influence conflict transformation and the failings of the international legal system, with particular regard for evaluating our assumptions and techniques for assessing protracted conflicts. I also asked how Realpolitik approaches to conflict function and inform conflict theory, practice and policy and how they serve to protect ulterior motives and interests that are deeply entwined with neo-liberalism and capitalist modes of representation and legitimization. In approaching these questions, I queried into the régimes of truth that inform conflict analysis in general and how they are created, produced and reproduced. I did this through a genealogical approach to conflict and with the goal of opening up the analytical space to explore the functions of real politics and the ways Realpolitik approaches to conflict aid hidden agendas and interests. This strategy facilitated an evaluation of how and for what reasons and by what purposes specific modes of operation for conflict transformation have taken precedence over others. Discourse theory allowed us to look at the ways we produce, communicate and accept meaning. We can specifically conclude that the international community failed in the decolonization of

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Western Sahara; however, the ‘how’ of this failure is convoluted and complex and necessitated deep multidimensional and multidisciplinary analysis. Chapter One specifically examined the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan for Western Sahara and whether it was a politically viable solution to the conflict or a Realpolitik solution to the conflict. To work out this diametrically opposed supposition, I explored the more general topics of decolonization, self-determination, peremptory norms and autonomy through a postcolonial studies lens. By doing so, I concluded that the 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan is a real politics solution to the conflict and not the compromise it portends to be. Furthermore, through Realpolitik discourse, this supposed non-zero-sum solution has become accepted, normalized and produced. By exploring the mechanisms of power and how they are invested, utilized, legitimated, naturalized, produced and disseminated, we were able to widen our analytical lenses to include subjugated knowledges, alternative solutions that have been discredited and consumed in real politics mythologies. In effect, when procedures of conflict transformation are founded in Realpolitik assumptions, they are subjected to imperialist interpretations and rooted in structures of institutional domination and subordination characteristic of geopolitical, economic and military approaches to conflict. We therefore established a link between this Realpolitik conflict transformation orientation and the acceptance and propagation of the third-way autonomy approach (without an option of independence for the Sahrawi people), which, although presented as a credible solution to the conflict, completely disregards international peremptory norms and the ‘real’ specifics to the conflict. Chapter Two looked closely at the functioning of Realpolitik discourses in the preventative stage of conflict in general and Western Sahara in particular. A genealogical analysis of the early history, build-up to the conflict and Realpolitik ideas, policies and actions revealed how the process of decolonization failed for Western Sahara. It also deepened our understanding of conflict prevention theory and practice. We determined that Morocco illegally invaded and annexed Western Sahara in spite of consecutive United Nations and Organization of African Unity resolutions that affirmed the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination through a referendum; the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision that reiterated this right; and protests of the non-aligned movement

449 and other African nation, which had depended on self-determination for their own existence. Furthermore, contrary to Moroccan and at one time Mauritanian assertions of historical ties to the territory (rebuked by the ICJ opinion), Western Sahara did not constitute part of Morocco’s territorial integrity. As such, the decolonization process for Western Sahara remains open. In essence, this chapter problematized how dominant structures set neoliberal-imperialist agendas that result in cultural domination and subordination and subjugation of knowledge. Furthermore, intervention of particular actors exacerbated the pre-conflict situation and set up the preliminary conditions necessary for direct violence/hot conflict. Thus, we also recognize that the role of conflict prevention is not only to identify trigger causes of war, but also to problematize dominant structures, which set the rules of the game and actively subjugate and subordinate knowledge(s) as a result of the successful normalization and naturalization of imperialist and ideological agendas. Chapter Three provided a critical review of conflict analysis itself as it pertains to the hot conflict and diplomatic gridlock (Peace Process) stages of the conflict. By probing the concept of actor-mapping and mediation utilizing a Gramscian (how power persists over time) and Foucauldian (how and by what means régimes of truth reproduce dominant structures and specific outcomes) slant, we were able to frame the process in terms of a shift in interpretive horizon. This allowed us to see how Realpolitik discourses designate what is important and how they steer conflict analysis and transformation strategies and policies. Creating an alternative interpretive horizon also required rethinking dominant structures; breaking processes of confirm-structuring; and inquiring into ways of knowing and being in terms of how they function at the systems level. This also meant analyzing the very structures of conflict actor-mapping, the extent of actor involvement and mediation and how we talk about conflict. This analytical process revealed that the participation of shadow-primary actors as well as secondary actors in conflicts raises the risk of conflict stagnation and/or conditions of negative peace stalemate. Their participation directly influenced the Peace Process for Western Sahara. Ultimately, the goals of conflict analysis, mapping and mediation are to aid in positive conflict transformation. Thus, by thoroughly analyzing the insides and outs of a conflict at hand, for example, through close examination of the history of the parties, the root

450 causes, issue relevancy for each actor, power, resources and relationships, possibilities for the desired goal of conflict transformation become more apparent. In the case of Western Sahara, Realpolitik discourses – ideas, policies and actions (accepted reality) – have created and produced inequality. Autonomy, as conceptualized by Morocco, fits this mold. Our final chapter addressed autonomy as the ‘answer’ to a zero-sum stalemate (independence or annexation) and proposed self-determination as our shift in interpretive horizon for the positive transformation of the question of Western Sahara. Chapter Four utilized Agamben’s concept of the state of exception in order to puncture the normalized understanding of zero-sum, particularly regarding Western Sahara. Not only is autonomy as perceived by Morocco unjust, it also belongs to the state of exception. It has become the normalized suspension and transgression of international law. Therefore, through an analysis of Realpolitik discourses, we challenge the ideological coordinates of the neoliberal project as it relates to the naturalized suspension/transgression of international law (peremptory norms). I have argued that, despite its imperfections, self-determination provides the necessary shift in interpretive horizon for Western Sahara and other protracted conflicts. Self-determination provides a beginning to the process of conflict transformation, one that challenges the dominant conflict narrative and offers tensional-potential conflict transformation. As stated in Chapter Four, to conclude that a process that includes independence as a possible outcome amounts to zero-sum stalemating is to fail to incorporate the state of exception and the neoliberal project into the analysis. Furthermore, by challenging dominant systems of normalized and naturalized ideological coordinates, it is possible to see how, for a historical moment, the analytical process of self-determination can break the real politics cycle and puncture neoliberal myths, thereby creating a real state of emergency and a shift in interpretive horizon. However, it must be understood as a continuous process and not a one time only event. Inscribed in statehood (the nation-state, the nation, the people) is the biopolitical fracture of the people (inclusion/exclusion) and the nation (birth and territory). As established above, because of its very links to the state system, self-determination allows us to enter into a complex discussion regarding the very nature of the nation-state. Although seemingly paradoxical, in rethinking identity in terms of its relation to territory and the people from the vantage point of the refugee, it is possible to

451 critique the very political organization that an independent-inclusive self-determination facilitates, the birth of the nation-state. Therefore, conceptualizing and approaching self- determination as process and as conflict transformation allows us to keep one foot in present-day international realities, while simultaneously stepping outside of the confines of the nation-state to envision alternative political structures.

The Imagined

On the one hand, peace and conflict researchers search to create new realities that address global inequality, disease/famine, interstate/intrastate conflict, human trafficking and global warming in order to build “awareness of the suffering that some human beings can inflict upon others and nature itself, and the search for peaceful ways of transforming these human relationships that are alternatives to war, marginalization and exclusion” (Martínez Guzmán, 2005a). On the other hand, peace and conflict researchers have to work with the world before them or against dominant worldviews that govern economics, development, international relations, foreign affairs and relationships between state actors. These views push unlimited growth models and neo-liberal or free market policies for development; competition rather than cooperation; survival of the fittest dogma and ideology; domination; power and real politics instead of common good plurality approaches; irresponsible use of the world’s resources; materialism and big business without workers rights; and bipolar thinking that divides the human species on religious, economic, political and cultural lines. The latter can be a convincing argument with an uncanny ability to eclipse the undercurrents in global society that are trying to feel, see and create new realities built on equity, understanding and acceptance of the other, of ourselves (Martínez Guzmán, 2001, 2005a). Gramsci tells us: “One must speak for a struggle for a new culture, that is, for a new moral life that cannot but be intimately connected to a new intuition of life, until it becomes a new way of feeling and seeing reality” (Gramsci et al., 1985: 98). Lederach describes the moral imagination as “the capacity to imagine something rooted in the challenges of the real world yet capable of giving birth to that which does not yet exist” (Lederach, 2005: 29). Along this vein, it is possible to change our perceptions of time so

452 that our past is before us, that which we can see and explore, and our future is behind us, that which we cannot see, but is enriched by our historical genealogies. As such, a deep past and the horizon of the future are sown together in a multiplicity of possibility (147). Furthermore, it is our genealogies, our modes of ‘story telling’ per se, which inform our ways of problem solving and our approaches to mediation (Lederach, 2005: 135-147). Realpolitik discourse is but one mode of telling the story. Césaire warns us that a “civilization that uses its principles for trickery and deceit is a dying civilization” (Césaire, 2000: 31). In this scenario, “the bourgeoisie is awakened by a terrific boomerang effect: the gestapos are busy, the prisons fill up, the torturers standing around the racks invent, refine, discuss” (Césaire, 2000: 36). In response to these occurrences, which disconcertingly describe many of the strategies of the War on Terror, global immigration policy as well as autocratic regimes (supported by democratic ones), Césaire contends that the aim is not to make “a utopian and sterile attempt to repeat the past,” but rather to “go beyond” and create a new society “with all the productive power of modern times, warm with all the fraternity of olden days” (52). Arendt also comments on the subject of truth and lies as political faculties, whereby truthfulness has never been counted as a political virtue and lies have been regarded as justifiable tools in political dealings (Arendt, 1972: 4-5). She problematizes how little attention has been paid in the traditions of philosophical and political thought to their significance on the nature of action and “our ability to deny in thought and word whatever happens to be the case” (Arendt, 1972: 4-5). Like Lederach, Arendt argues that it would be impossible to create change if we could not “mentally remove ourselves from where we physically are located and imagine that things might as well be different from what they actually are”; however, she also recognizes that the human imagination is the source of lies, such that “the deliberate denial of factual truth – the ability to lie – and the capacity to change facts – the ability to act” cannot be separated from the ability to create change (Arendt, 1972: 5). As Arendt explains, because they owe their existence to the same source, it is absolutely necessary to fully explore the naturalized and essentialized norms of the system. In my view, it is our ability not only to rewrite history to fit into the “political lines” of particular ideological coordinates that is problematic (Arendt, 1972: 7), but also our ability to create, produce and sustain totalitarian Realpolitik discourses

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(‘real politics lines’) and régimes of truth, while subjugating and eliminating (“defactualization”) others (44). As such, our political being is the “faculty of action” (Arendt, 1972: 179) and our imagination the medium for sustaining models of subjugation and domination or for creating (imagining) “alternative orders of being-in- the-world” (of course taking into account the imperfections and messiness of human beings) (Haugaard, 2006b: 63). Although I have summed up some important conclusions that this study has uncovered, the analytical process we have undertaken has been less about locating definitive conclusions and more about opening up the analytical spaces and shifting our conflict perspectives in order to ‘see’ conflict and our specific conflict case from analytical lenses that challenge the very structures of Realpolitik discourses. In order to be able to imagine something new, something different, it is essential to question the production, functioning and manifestation of Realpolitik on conflict analysis, mapping and mediation and ultimately the peaceful transformation of conflict. Mundy (2007) has argued that the United States should take a ‘two-track approach’ to the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict by simultaneously supporting self-determination and Moroccan stability and reforms; and the international NGO community has concluded that the only way out of the impasse is for the Sahrawis to be allowed to vote in a fair and transparent self-determination referendum (Leenders, 1999: 109). Both responses support the view that self-determination offers the necessary process for the peaceful transformation of the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict and other self-determination conflicts as well.

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Avoiding Violent Conflict Again

“A Dream Deferred”

What happens to a dream deferred? Does it dry up like a raisin in the sun? Or fester like a sore – And then run? Does it stink like rotten meat? Or crust and sugar over – Like a syrupy sweet?

Maybe it just sags like a heavy load?

Or does it explode? (Hughes, 1999: 426).

I began this study with a geopolitical snapshot of North Africa. Clearly, the Western Saharan/Moroccan conflict figured into this assessment. Currently, the Frente POLISARIO and the Sahrawis as a collective in their three distinct geographical locations – the occupied territories of Western Sahara, the refugee camps in Algeria and the diaspora – have trusted in the United Nations, the international community and the diplomatic process for the successful decolonization of Western Sahara through a self- determination referendum. As a show of commitment to this process, the Sahrawis of the occupied territories initiated a popular non-violent resistance movement, intifada, in 2005. Peaceful resistance continues to separate the Sahrawi liberation movement from many others that have resorted to violence. However, the above poem compels us to think about how much longer this peaceful response can be maintained. Like Arundhati Roy (Francis, 2004: 150), I believe that another solution is possible, that she is on her way in the form of real self-determination.

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Annexes

Annex I: Map of Western Sahara

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Annex II: Structure of the United Nations

UNITED NATIONS

General Assembly Security Council International Court of Justice

192 members 15 members 15 judges

Elected by the General Assembly and Security Council for a 9 year term

5 Permanent Members 10 Nonpermanent Members China, France, Russian • 2 year term Federation, United Kingdom, United States of America • Veto Power •

500