A Case Study of Western Sahara, Africa's Last Colony

A Case Study of Western Sahara, Africa's Last Colony

Cátedra UNESCO de Filosofía para la Paz Programa Oficial de Postgrado en Estudios Internacionales en Paz, Conflictos y Desarrollo The Functioning of Realpolitik in Protracted Conflict and the Transformative Capacity of Self-Determination: A Case Study of Western Sahara, Africa’s Last Colony Tesis Doctoral Defendida por: Jennifer M. Murphy Dirigida por: Dr. Vicent Martínez Guzmán Dr. Sidi M. Omar Castellón, 2010 Table of Contents Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................... Resumen de la Tesis Doctoral.......................................................................................... 1 Definitions of Important Terms..................................................................................... 33 Introduction..................................................................................................................... 43 Chapter One: Third-Way Politics for Western Sahara: Self-Determination versus Autonomy ........................................................................................................................ 65 Introduction: Beginning at the ‘End’ ............................................................................ 65 1.1. Decolonization....................................................................................................... 70 1.1.1. Defining Decolonization................................................................................. 70 1.1.2. Colonization Over and Done With?: Post-Colonial/ Postcolonial Studies..... 72 1.1.3. Formal Decolonization Today: Open Cases of Non-Self-Governing Territories ................................................................................................................................... 77 1.2. Self-Determination................................................................................................. 79 1.2.1. Preliminary Thoughts on Self-Determination................................................. 79 1.2.2. Self-Determination: from Principle to Right in International Law................. 82 1.2.2.1. Post World War II........................................................................................ 84 1.2.3. Key United Nations General Assembly Resolutions: 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV), Delineating Self-Determination...................................................................... 85 1.2.3.1. Who Constitutes a People? .......................................................................... 90 1.2.3.2. Where Does Western Sahara Fall? .............................................................. 91 1.2.4. Impediments to Decolonization and Self-Determination ............................... 94 1.2.4.1. The United States......................................................................................... 94 1.2.4.2. France........................................................................................................... 98 1.2.4.3. U.S. – French Competition ........................................................................ 103 1.3. Peremptory Norms............................................................................................... 105 1.3.1. The Concept of Jus Cogens .......................................................................... 105 1.3.2. Use of Force: Acts of Aggression................................................................. 108 1.3.3. Jus Cogens, the Use of Force and the Specific Case of Western Sahara...... 111 1.4. Autonomy ............................................................................................................ 114 1.4.1. Prelude to Autonomy: A Dangerous Precedent............................................ 114 1.4.2. The Frente POLISARIO Plan ....................................................................... 116 1.4.3. The Third Way: Autonomy........................................................................... 117 1.4.4. Introduction to Earned Sovereignty.............................................................. 124 1.4.4.1. Outlining Earned Sovereignty.................................................................... 125 1.4.5. The 2007 Moroccan Autonomy Plan............................................................ 129 1.4.5.1. The Plan ..................................................................................................... 131 1.4.5.2. Responses to the Moroccan Autonomy Plan ............................................. 134 1.4.5.3. Beyond International Law: Practical Concerns for Autonomy.................. 136 1.4.5.4. U.S. Voices Hailing ‘Third-Way’ Autonomy............................................ 141 1.4.5.5. Unlikely ‘Supporters’: For and Against the Referendum.......................... 144 Conclusions................................................................................................................. 154 Chapter Two: Early History and Conflict Build-Up, Lost Opportunities for Conflict Prevention...................................................................................................................... 157 Introduction................................................................................................................. 157 2.1. Conflict Prevention .............................................................................................. 160 2.1.1. Protracted Conflicts ...................................................................................... 160 2.1.2. Navigating Conflict Prevention .................................................................... 163 2.2. Western Sahara’s Early History........................................................................... 174 2.2.1. Western Sahara ............................................................................................. 174 2.2.2. The Berlin Conference, 1884-1885............................................................... 177 2.2.3. Spanish Colonization of Western Sahara...................................................... 178 2.2.4. French Intervention....................................................................................... 180 2.2.5. Phosphate Discovery..................................................................................... 183 2.3. Decolonization ..................................................................................................... 184 2.3.1. Moroccan, Mauritanian and Algerian Independence.................................... 184 2.3.2. The United Nations and UN Resolution 1514 (XV)..................................... 187 2.3.3. Greater Morocco and Mauritanian Claims ................................................... 189 2.3.4. The Army of Liberation (Conseil National de la Résistance) ...................... 192 2.3.5. Call for Spanish Decolonization of Western Sahara, Changes in a Nomadic Society..................................................................................................................... 193 2.3.6. Moroccan and Mauritanian Positions ........................................................... 194 2.3.7. Spanish Sahrawi Djemaa .............................................................................. 196 2.3.8. Roots of a Nationalist Movement ................................................................. 197 2.3.9. The Frente POLISARIO and Other Competing Movements........................ 203 2.3.10. Spain’s Western Sahara Policy in 1974 and Morocco’s Reaction.............. 208 2.4. Systemic Failure and Conflict Prevention Sabotage............................................ 212 2.4.1. Taking the Western Sahara Issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)212 2.4.2. UN Visiting Mission to Western Sahara....................................................... 218 2.4.3. The Announcement of the ICJ Opinion and Morocco’s Green March......... 223 2.4.4. Green March – November 6, 1975 ............................................................... 227 2.4.5. Early November: Conflict Prevention Sabotage........................................... 231 2.4.6. Madrid Accords – November 14, 1975......................................................... 235 Conclusions: Failure to Prevent Conflict.................................................................... 236 Chapter Three: Prefiguring a New Interpretive Horizon for Conflict Analysis: Reconfiguring Conflict Actor-Mapping and Mediation............................................ 239 Introduction................................................................................................................. 239 3.1. Alternative Analytical Interpretive Horizons for Conflict Analysis and Mapping ..................................................................................................................................... 242 3.1.1. Clarifying the Approach ............................................................................... 242 3.1.1.1. Normalized Approaches to Conflict .......................................................... 248 3.1.1.2. Realpolitik in Conflict Analysis................................................................. 251 3.1.2. Hot Conflict .................................................................................................. 253 3.1.2.1. Sahrawi Nationalism Set in Stone.............................................................. 253 3.1.2.2. Aftermath of the Madrid Accords.............................................................. 254 3.1.2.3. 1976 – War, Fighting Fire with Fire .........................................................

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