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Home , Alsos Mission, Erich Bagge, Henry Tizard, Horst Korsching, Karl Wirtz, Kurt Diebner

The Farm Hall Scientists: The , Britain, and in the New Atomic Age, 1945-46

by Mary A. McPartland

B.A. in History and Spanish, May 2003, Regis University

A Dissertation submitted to

The Faculty of The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

August 31, 2013

Dissertation directed by

Hope M. Harrison Associate Professor of History and International Affairs

The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University certifies that Mary Ann McPartland has passed the Final Examination for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy as of July 23, 2013. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation.

The Farm Hall Scientists: The United States, Britain, and Germany in the New Atomic Age, 1945-46

Mary A. McPartland

Dissertation Research Committee:

Hope M. Harrison, Associate Professor of History and International Affairs, Dissertation Director

James Hershberg, Professor of History and International Affairs, Committee Member

Andrew Zimmerman, Professor of History and International Affairs, Committee Member

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©Copyright 2013 by Mary A. McPartland All rights reserved

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Acknowledgments

Thank you to the many people who have been generous with their knowledge, time, and friendship during the process of researching and writing this dissertation. First and foremost, I thank my adviser, Hope Harrison, for the time she has spent reading, commenting on, and discussing my work, always encouraging me onward. I am very grateful to have had you as my guide on this journey. Feedback from my dissertation committee has also shaped my dissertation for the better. Jim Hershberg has been a great source of research suggestions, critiques, and more research suggestions. Thank you for your enthusiasm and your ability to remember sources. Andrew Zimmerman, Kathy

Olesko, and Michael Dennis have challenged me to think about my dissertation in a bigger picture context. I thank all of my committee members for a spirited discussion at my dissertation defense. It was a great experience.

My experience as a participant in the Nuclear Boot Camp sponsored by the

Woodrow Wilson Center’s Nuclear Proliferation International History Project and Roma

Tre University has connected me to a wonderful of scholars who work on nuclear issues and history. Thank you to my “class” of 2011 – Mara Drogan, Sasha Hoffman,

Sitara Noor, Anna Weichselbraun, Christine Leah, Kristine Bergan, Lodovica Clavarino,

Miles Link, Lucky Asuelime, Rodrigo Mallea, Frédéric Gloriant, Kapil Patil, Oleg

Zhuravlev, and honorary member Carlo Patti – and to those of you who I’ve met from the

2012 and 2012 cohorts for your inspiration, passion, and curiosity about nuclear history.

I hasten to add Flavia Gasbarri, Giordana Pulcini, and Tim McDonnell to that group, of course! And a very big thank you to all of the instructors who taught at the Nuclear Boot

Camp. The example of your scholarship and the generosity of your time shines bright.

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Thank you in particular to Leopoldo Nuti, Marty Sherwin, and David Holloway for finding time to discuss parts of my research.

I am grateful to have had the opportunity to present and discuss my research at a handful of conferences during the writing process. I appreciate how comments from

Peter Westwick, Michael Gordin, and William Glenn Gray have encouraged me to think about my research in new ways. My fellow panelists at the past two Society for

Historians of American Foreign Relations meetings, Mara Drogan, Carlo Patti, and Alex

Wellerstein, set great examples for scholarship and fun.

Thank you to everyone who has helped with my research, especially all of the archivists, librarians, and library and archives staff who have pointed me in the right direction along the way. I am especially grateful to Adam Ganz for discussing his own research about his father’s role at Farm Hall and for putting me in touch with other individuals with connections to Farm Hall. Fritz and Susan Lustig shared afternoon tea and their memories of working for the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre.

Marcial Echenique gave me a tour of his home of many years, Farm Hall, and we discussed the history of the house.

Thank you to George Washington University’s History Department for many years of financial and intellectual support. Thank you in particular to Michael Weeks, who keeps the whole ship sailing in the right direction.

My work has been shaped for the better by comments from my History

Department’s writing group. Thank you all for your feedback. Outside of the writing group, Elizabeth Charles, Sara Berndt, Bell Clement, and Julia Sittmann have provided critiques, suggestions, and encouragement as necessary. I thank them, as well as Andrea

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O’Brien, Janet Kilian, Natalie Deibel, and Tamar Rabinowitz, for their friendship throughout grad school. You make my world (academic and otherwise) a better place.

Finally, thank you to my family for their love and support.

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Abstract

The Farm Hall Scientists: The United States, Britain, and Germany in the New Atomic Age, 1945-46

In late April and early May 1945, members of the ’s foreign intelligence group, the , captured ten German nuclear scientists. The group, which included luminaries such as , , and Max von

Laue, spent their first two months in captivity in France and Belgium, where they were held at American-controlled locations but overseen by a British intelligence officer. In

July 1945, the scientists were brought to Farm Hall, a country house near Cambridge,

England, where their conversations were monitored for the next six months. Farm Hall has previously been written about in relation to debates about German nuclear scientists’ wartime research or as the result of the Alsos Mission. This dissertation examines the

Farm Hall detention in a broader political context.

Using sources from British and American archives, this dissertation demonstrates

Farm Hall’s connection to three key issues to which American and British officials devoted considerable attention: domestic and international control of nuclear science; the occupation of Germany; and the shifting geopolitics of the immediate postwar period, which soon became the Cold War. Farm Hall was important because these officials – especially in the Manhattan Project – treated it that way. When they selected which scientists to detain, American and British suspicions and fears about French nuclear research and socialist leanings were at least as important as their interest in investigating

German research. After the bombing of Japan, British officials advocated repatriating the group but ongoing objections from Manhattan Project officials delayed the scientists’

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return to Germany until January 1946. Fears about the and France affected decisions about the scientists’ repatriation, as did concerns about how nuclear science could be controlled in occupied Germany. The US and Britain aimed to prevent the scientists from working for other countries, especially Germany, France, and the Soviet

Union.

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgments...... iv

Abstract ...... vii

List of Figures ...... x

List of Abbreviations ...... xi

Introduction ...... 1

Chapter 1: Alsos Investigations in France and Germany, and Operation Harborage, August 1944-May 1945 ...... 26

Chapter 2: The German Scientists’ Detention in France and Belgium, May-June 1945...... 58

Chapter 3: Detention at Farm Hall, July-September 1945 ...... 99

Chapter 4: Decisions to End the Farm Hall Detention, October-December 1945 ...... 147

Chapter 5: The Farm Hall Scientists’ Return to Germany, 1946 ...... 189

Conclusion ...... 240

Bibliography ...... 256

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List of Figures

Figure 1. House at Le Vésinet…………………………………..…………...... …....69

Figure 2. Farm Hall…………………………………..…………...... ……………..103

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List of Abbreviations

ACAE: Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy

BAOR: of the

CFM: Council of Foreign Ministers

CSDIC: Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre

FIAT: Field Information Agency, Technical

JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff

NDRC: National Defense Research Committee

OSRD: Office of Scientific Research and Development

TA:

SHAEF: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces

USFET: United States Forces, European Theater

Abbreviations in Footnotes

CAC: Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, University of Cambridge, UK

CHAD: The Papers of Sir

RVJO: The Papers of

IWML: , , UK

Private Papers of B Bonsey

NACP: National Archives at College Park, MD, USA

ACS, G-2: Assistant Chief of Staff, Army Intelligence

MED: Manhattan Engineer District

RG: Record Group

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RS: Royal Society Archives, London, UK

PB: Papers of Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett

TNA: The National Archives of the , Kew, UK

AB: United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority

AMSSO: Special Signals Office

CAB: Cabinet Office

FO: Foreign Office

JSM: Joint Staff Mission (in Washington)

PREM: Prime Minister’s Office

PRO: Public Record Office

WO: War Office

UBSC: University of Bristol Special Collections, UK

FRANK: Papers and correspondence of Sir Frederick Charles Frank, 1911-1998

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Introduction

This dissertation examines the secret detention of ten German nuclear scientists by the United States and United Kingdom at the end of World War II. The Manhattan

Project’s foreign intelligence group, the Alsos Mission, captured the scientists in late

April and early May 1945 in order to control and keep secret their knowledge about nuclear science and prevent other countries from gaining their expertise. At the beginning of July, the scientists were brought to Farm Hall, a country house near

Cambridge, England, where they were held in secret for the next six months. British intelligence officials bugged the house prior to the group’s arrival and wrote periodic reports about the scientists’ monitored conversations that were sent to Manhattan Project and other British officials. The British returned the scientists to Germany in January

1946, although they remained under the supervision of British occupation authorities immediately after their repatriation.

The German scientists’ detention at Farm Hall was tied to three key issues to which American and British officials devoted considerable attention: the control of nuclear science domestically and internationally, the occupation of Germany, and continued cooperation with their wartime Allies. The Farm Hall detention had the potential to negatively affect these issues if it was not handled suitably. Manhattan

Project officials wanted to implement an international system of control for atomic research information. Keeping the scientists at Farm Hall ultimately proved unworkable, and American and British officials had to work out what to do with the group in relation to broader geopolitical concerns.

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There were many questions about handling the scientists and the postwar situation in 1945. How would atomic weapons affect geopolitics and future wars? Could nuclear weapons research be controlled? Were nuclear scientists, such as those detained at Farm

Hall, inherently dangerous because of their scientific knowledge? Similarly, were

German nuclear scientists a special threat, either because of their potential to create nuclear weapons in Germany or because they might work for other countries if faced with prohibitions on their research during the occupation of Germany? How could Germany be controlled so that it no longer proved a threat to Europe or the world? Finally, how could the wartime alliance be preserved, now that the countries were no longer united by their shared desire to defeat Germany? How would secret efforts such as the Manhattan

Project and Farm Hall affect the US and UK’s relationship with the Soviet Union and

France? Uncertainty about these issues created fear and suspicion on all sides.

One of the main goals of the Allied occupation of Germany was to reshape the country and prevent it from being a future military threat. The possible proliferation of nuclear research in Germany presented a very specific danger, which the British and

Americans decided to deal with bilaterally. The Americans and British captured and detained these German scientists without the knowledge or consultation of their French and Soviet Allies. As a result, Farm Hall had the potential to complicate these postwar relationships. The secrecy about Farm Hall contradicted American and British claims to acting in ways in which their allies could have confidence, especially regarding Germany.

The four Allies were simultaneously partners and competitors in how they managed – or extracted – German resources. Vis-à-vis decisions about Farm Hall, this dissertation will show that France proved even more problematic than the Soviet Union

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due to its proximity to the scientists and their research institutes, along with American

(and, to some extent, British) fears about French scientists and politicians. The British- led decision to bring France into the postwar occupation of Germany created difficulties in that French officials often had different priorities than the Big Three. It was useful to

Britain to have France involved as a postwar power, since Britain feared that the US would again withdraw from Europe after the war. However, France’s participation made coming to agreements about how to occupy Germany more difficult. Even after releasing the German scientists from Farm Hall, Britain and the US kept information about the

Farm Hall detention from the French and Soviets. They considered it important to keep the detention a secret because their allies would likely not agree that they had done nothing wrong in detaining these German scientists.

Two related themes run through American and British decision-making about the

Farm Hall scientists: control and uncertainty. American and British officials worked to control and contain nuclear weapons research and Germany – while simultaneously working to keep secret their efforts at nuclear control – and to some extent their plans for controlling science in Germany, from their Soviet and French allies. Uncertain about their prospects for success, they feared what could happen if their allies learned about the detained scientists at Farm Hall.

The story of how British and American officials dealt with the Farm Hall scientists provides an interesting contrast to the emphasis on taking scientific and technical research from Germany for the benefit of its occupiers. This group of scientists was simultaneously important and unimportant: from a scientific standpoint, neither the

US nor the UK needed them. However, neither country wanted these scientists to work

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on behalf of other countries’ efforts to build nuclear weapons, especially Germany,

France, and the Soviet Union. Manhattan Project officials considered bringing the Farm

Hall scientists to the US at a few points during their detention at Farm Hall, but these proposals were motivated by ensuring that the scientists could not work on behalf of other countries, not adding to US research. Thus, the scientists could be conceived of as intellectual reparations,1 but in the sense of denying to other countries them rather than making positive use of them.

The research for this dissertation in British and American archives demonstrates that British and American officials spent months debating when, where, and how the

Farm Hall scientists could be released. A key question was how dangerous these scientists were. British and American officials raised concerns about how these scientists would fit into – or potentially thwart – British and American efforts to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons research, prevent Germany from again becoming a military threat, and maintain their wartime alliances. British officials were inclined to end the Farm Hall detention quickly, so they could focus on these other issues, while American officials more typically advocated delaying a decision about Farm Hall until the broader questions which affected the detention had been addressed. These differing priorities proved a hurdle to making decisions about how and when to end the scientists’ detention, and extended the scientists’ detention in England by months.

Having obtained grudging American assent, the British returned the scientists to

Germany in early January 1946, after the group had been detained for exactly six months in England. Immediately after the group’s repatriation, British occupation officials

1 John Gimbel, Science, Technology, and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), vii.

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provided special supervision of the scientists. Occupation authorities simultaneously worked to begin handling the group in accordance with the occupation laws to control

German science rather than treating them separately. This transition took a few months to effect. During 1946, American and British officials remained concerned about whether the scientists would prove a security risk in Germany by going to work for other countries, either willingly or unwillingly. British and American officials also continued to worry that France or the Soviet Union would learn about the scientists’ detention.

The next few pages will provide context about the wartime events and concerns that led to the detention of the German scientists at Farm Hall. The sections that follow will address the contribution of this dissertation to existing historiography, the sources for this project, and an outline of the chapters comprising this dissertation.

Historical Background

In 1939 and 1940, nuclear scientists realized that the construction of nuclear weapons might be possible during World War II. In Britain, scientists began research efforts on this topic under the in 1940. The committee’s 1941 report predicted that bombs could be built during World War II and advocated collaborating with the US to build such weapons. British efforts were soon reorganized under the name Tube Alloys. In the United States, Hungarian refugee physicists Leo

Szilard and convinced Albert Einstein to write a letter to President

Franklin D. Roosevelt warning about the dangers of uranium bombs. The Uranium

Committee set up by Roosevelt and chaired by Lyman Briggs did little to move research forward, however, and British and American efforts to set up shared research were fitful.

The US Army of Engineers assumed responsibility for American nuclear weapons

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research in June 1942. Three months later, Leslie R. Groves was appointed to oversee what was code named the Manhattan Engineer District. Under Groves’ leadership, the

Manhattan Project quickly eclipsed British research. British and American officials had different opinions about how the two countries should share the technological and scientific fruits of this research. The US made a much greater financial investment in the

Manhattan Project than British officials had been able to give Tube Alloys scientists, but

British research had been crucial in demonstrating that uranium bombs were possible and

British scientists worked on the Manhattan Project throughout the war.2

The two countries drew up the in August 1943 to formalize their cooperation on nuclear weapons research. Britain was the junior partner. Some

British scientists worked directly on the Manhattan Project, while others worked on the adjunct British project in . In September 1944, President Roosevelt and Prime

Minister joined forces in the secret Hyde Park Aide-Memoire, which planned for greater sharing of nuclear science and technology after the war. However, strange though it may seem, the report was misfiled and remained unknown to

Roosevelt’s advisers. With his death in April 1945, it was forgotten by American officials, despite British protests that such a document existed. By the time that the

German scientists were captured in late spring 1945, future British and American cooperation on nuclear research issues remained uncertain for many reasons (and not just because of the disappearance of the Hyde Park Aide-Memoire). The first bomb had yet to be successfully tested and the postwar implications of such a weapon – if it were indeed usable – remained unknown. British officials had much to gain in terms of

2 Cynthia Kelly, ed., The Manhattan Project: The Birth of the Atomic Bomb in the Words of Its Creators, Eyewitnesses, and Historians (New York: Black Dog & Levanthal Publishers, 2007), 38-44, 51-55.

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technical information by continuing such collaboration and governed their actions accordingly. Their actions during Farm Hall detention were an example of the priority

British officials put on ongoing cooperation.

The US and UK carried out their own intelligence investigations about nuclear research in other countries, especially Germany. A key impetus for both Tube Alloys and

Manhattan Project research was the fear that eminent German scientists would create nuclear weapons for use during the war. British and American officials reached different conclusions about the likelihood that German scientists had a serious wartime program.

By late 1941, a key British scientist could find no evidence that the German scientists who would be likely to work on nuclear weapons research were in fact doing so.3 British

Tube Alloys and intelligence authorities remained circumspect about the possibility that

German scientists might undertake such research and continued their intelligence investigations throughout the war. By fall 1944, they remained confident that German scientists had not undertaken a serious effort to build nuclear weapons.

In contrast, Manhattan Project Director remained adamant that

German atomic research should be assumed to be a threat until he received positive and complete information to the contrary. Although the British participated in the capture and detention of the Farm Hall scientists, their differing assessments about the danger posed by German research were later evident in discussions about how to treat the Farm

Hall scientists. The first chapter of this dissertation picks up the story in late summer

1944, when the Alsos Mission began to investigate German scientists directly in France and Germany. Alsos Mission personnel had scrutinized Germany’s wartime nuclear

3 James Chadwick, “Report on German Publications,” Nov. 21, 1941, The National Archives of the United Kingdom (henceforth TNA): Public Record Office (henceforth PRO) AB 3/10.

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research via investigations in Italy in 1943 but it was not until the end of 1944 that Alsos personnel came into direct contact with German scientists in France and then Germany.

The remaining chapters trace the Farm Hall scientists’ capture in late spring 1945, their subsequent detention and move to England in early July 1946, and return to Germany in

1946.

Historiography

The research presented here relates to three main topics: the early atomic era, including the Manhattan Project and the Alsos Mission; the postwar occupation of

Germany; and the shifting geopolitics of the postwar years, which eventually became the

Cold War. This section will first address scholarship that directly discusses the Farm

Hall detention and will then discuss the historiography of each of the other three areas in turn.

Following years of advocacy by scholars, the British government declassified the

Farm Hall reports in 1992.4 The US archives soon followed suit with its copy of the

Farm Hall reports. These reports were comprised of translated (and often summarized) excerpts from the scientists’ conversations at Farm Hall. The scientists were monitored by personnel from the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre (whose techniques will be discussed in Chapter 3). Only a few sections were reported in both

English translation and German original. The officer who authored the reports selected the excerpts to give a general idea what the scientists were discussing at Farm Hall,

4 British records are typically made public after thirty years, unless their release would cause “damage to the country’s image, national security, or foreign relations.” In a December 20, 1991 letter to the Lord Chancellor, Lord Mackay, members of the Royal Society and British Academy argued that the existence of the Farm Hall reports was well established and that none of the four surviving Farm Hall detainees – or German President Richard von Weizsäcker, the brother of detainee Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker – objected to the reports’ release. Letter reproduced in Charles Frank, ed., : The Farm Hall Transcripts (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 14-15.

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especially on topics that were of special interest to their American and British captors

(science, politics, attitudes towards future cooperation or collaboration with other countries). Sir Charles Frank, a noted British physicist who visited the German scientists at Farm Hall in November 1945, edited the reports and provided an introductory note for his 1993 book. Physicist and historian expanded upon this effort in 1996 by publishing the Farm Hall reports with extensive annotations to make the group’s scientific conversations comprehensible to readers not trained in and to support his argument that, during the war, the German scientists – especially Heisenberg – did not correctly understand the physics that underlay the construction of nuclear bombs.5

Neither work addresses how American and British officials perceived the Farm

Hall detention in terms of long-term efforts to exert control over atomic science, occupied

Germany, or the continuation of the wartime alliances. As will be discussed in the source note below, this dissertation makes use not only of the Farm Hall reports but also British and American sources that document how British and American officials wrote about the scientists, their detention, and what might be done with the group in the future. These sources reinforce that Farm Hall was simultaneously important and unimportant: the

German scientists’ detention was a small issue when compared with the other tasks that faced British and American officials, but these officials remained concerned about the ill

5 Frank, Operation Epsilon; Jeremy Bernstein, ed., Hitler’s Uranium Club: The Secret Recordings at Farm Hall, 2d ed. (New York: Copernicus Books, 2001). The Farm Hall reports have been translated into French and retranslated into German: Charles Frank and Vincent Fleury, eds., Opération Epsilon: Les transcriptions de Farm Hall (Paris: Flammarion, 1993); Dieter Hoffmann, ed., Operation Epsilon: Die Farm-Hall Protokolle oder, Die Angst der Alliierten vor den deutschen Atombombe (: Rowohlt, 1993).

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effects that Farm Hall might have on these other matters. Farm Hall was important because these officials – especially in the Manhattan Project – treated it that way.

Farm Hall is part of the story about the development of the atomic age. Works about the Manhattan Project typically address the Alsos Mission.6 Farm Hall is often discussed as a result of the Alsos Mission but it has not been analyzed in light of its connection to larger issues, as will be done in this dissertation. The section of the present dissertation that is best covered in the historiography is the account of Operation

Harborage, the Alsos Mission’s operation that captured most of the Farm Hall scientists.

The first chapter of this dissertation covers some familiar ground on this topic. However, the analysis made in this dissertation of the efforts to capture the German scientists is new: fears about France were as much, and sometimes more, important in the decision to detain the particular collection of scientists at Farm Hall than the effort to learn more about German nuclear scientists’ wartime research. Concerns about French nuclear scientists have been mentioned in other works, such as those by Leslie Groves and

Jeffrey Richelson. Using primary sources from Manhattan Project and Alsos personnel, this dissertation contends that fears about France were even more paramount than

Richelson argues based on secondary works. Groves’ perspective is valuable because his opinions guided the Alsos Mission’s goals. It is important to see these concerns about

6 Jim Baggott, The First War of Physics: The Secret History of the Atom Bomb, 1939-1940 (New York: Pegasus Books, 2010); Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin, American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer (New York: Vintage Books, 2006); Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962); Gregg Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI, rev. ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000); James G. Hershberg, James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993); Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, The New World, 1939-1946, vol. 1 of A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962); Kelly, The Manhattan Project; Robert S. Norris, Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, the Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man (South Royalton, VT: Steerforth Press, 2002); Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986); Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from to Iran and North Korea (New York: Norton, 2006).

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French in documents written by members of the Alsos Mission at the time – as is evident in this dissertation – because they were ultimately the ones to make the decisions about detaining the German scientists.

Two leaders of the Alsos Mission wrote books about their efforts to investigate

German nuclear research.7 , whose book remains the better known text, was a physicist and the scientific director of the Alsos Mission. His argument that

German scientists failed to build a bomb due to administrative incompetence and a lack of scientific comprehension inaugurated a historical debate that became the main way in which Farm Hall has been considered. Scientists and historians have differed on whether

German scientists did not build an atomic bomb out of deliberate choice or because they lacked the scientific knowledge to do so, and about whether their wartime research was focused on peaceful ends (nuclear power) or bellicose aims (nuclear weaponry).

Goudsmit inaugurated this debate with a 1946 article in the Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists and then his 1947 book about Alsos. Werner Heisenberg, of the Farm Hall group, responded to Goudsmit’s claims in journal articles in 1946 and 1947, arguing that the German scientists’ knowledge during the war was much better than Goudsmit claimed. Goudsmit defended his position in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in

1947.8 These debates continued sporadically during the next four decades in a number of articles and books, mainly by individuals directly who had connections to the German

7 Samuel A. Goudsmit, Alsos (1947; repr., Woodbury, NY: American Institute of Physics, 1996); Boris T. Pash, The Alsos Mission (New York: Award House, 1969). 8 S.A. Goudsmit, “How Germany Lost the Race,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 1, no. 7 (March 15, 1946): 4-5; Goudsmit, Alsos; Werner Heisenberg, “Über die Arbeiten zur technischen Ausnutzung der Atomkernenergie in Deutschland,” Die Naturwissenschaften 33 (1946): 325-329; Werner Heisenberg, “Research in Germany on the Technical Application of Atomic Energy,” 160 (1947): 211-215; Samuel A. Goudsmit, “Heisenberg on the German Nuclear Power Project,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 3 (1947): 343.

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scientists or the Alsos Mission.9 A key exception was historian Mark Walker. His 1989 book, German National Socialism and the Quest for Nuclear Power examined how

German scientists operated in the gray area of both supporting and opposing aspects of

National Socialism, while maintaining their careers in the interest of “apolitical” science and the glory of the German state.10 His section about Farm Hall focused on the scientists’ reactions to Hiroshima, an event which greatly challenged their perceptions about their work.

Following the declassification of the Farm Hall reports in 1992, many articles and books used these reports (which had long been known to exist: Leslie Groves had quoted from them in his 1962 book, Now It Can Be Told) as part of renewed efforts to analyze

German wartime nuclear research.11 This dissertation does not add to that debate, as it a

9 Alan D. Beyerchen, Scientists under Hitler: Politics and the Physics Community in the Third Reich (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); David C. Cassidy, Uncertainty: The Life and Science of Werner Heisenberg (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1992); Otto Hahn, My Life: The Autobiography of a Scientist, translated by Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970); Elisabeth Heisenberg, Inner Exile: Recollections of a Life with Werner Heisenberg (Boston: Birkhäuser, 1984); Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Beyond: Encounters and Conversations, translated by Arnold J. Pomerans (New York: Harper, 1967); Robert Jungk, Brighter Than a Thousand Suns: A Personal History of the Atomic Scientists, translated by James Cleugh (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1958); Waldemar Kaempffert, “Nazis Spurned Idea of an Atomic Bomb,” , December 29, 1948; , “Die Kriegstätigkeit der deutschen Physiker,” Physikalische Blätter 3 (1947): 424-425; , “Alsos: The Story of German Scientists,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 3 (1947): 354, 365. 10 Mark Walker, “Heisenberg, Goudsmit and the German Atomic Bomb,” Physics Today 43, no. 1 (January 1990): 52-60; Mark Walker, German National Socialism and the Quest for Nuclear Power, 1939- 1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 11 Jeremy Bernstein, “The Farm Hall Transcripts: The German Scientists and the Bomb,” The New York Review of Books 39, no. 49 (August 1992): 47-53; Jeremy Bernstein, “Revelations from Farm Hall,” Science 259, no. 5103 (March 26, 1993): 1923-1926; Jeremy Bernstein and David Cassidy. “Bomb Apologetics: Farm Hall, 1995,” Physics Today 48, no. 8 (August 1995): 32-36; Richard H. Beyler, “Reine” Wissenschaft und personelle “Säuberungen”: Die Kaiser-Wilhelm/Max-Planck-Gesellschaft 1933 und 1945 (Berlin: Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften, 2004); Cathryn Carson, Heisenberg in the Atomic Age: Science and the Public Sphere (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute, 2010); David C. Cassidy, “Germany and the Bomb: New Evidence,” Scientific American 268 (February 1993): 120; David C. Cassidy, Beyond Uncertainty: Heisenberg, Quantum Physics, and the Bomb (New York: Bellevue Literary Press, 2008); John Cornwell, Hitler’s Scientists: Science, War and the Devil’s Pact (New York: Viking, 2003); Michael Frayn, (New York: Anchor Books, 2000); Per F. Dahl, Heavy Water and the Wartime Race for Nuclear Energy (Philadelphia: Institute of Physics Publishing, 1999); Michael Frayn and David Burke, The Copenhagen Papers: An Intrigue (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001); Susanne Heim, Carola Sachse, and Mark Walker, The

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well-worn route and the research for this work in British and American files does not bring a new interpretation to light. The story of Farm Hall is important because it shows the complex intersection of concerns about nuclear weapons and their proliferation, how

Germany could be reshaped so that it did not pose a future military threat, and the shifting geopolitics of the immediate postwar period.

With the exception of works about the history of Tube Alloys, Farm Hall has not been written about in histories of other national nuclear programs that began during or shortly after World War II.12 The story of the Farm Hall told in this dissertation does not change these histories but reinforces how quickly the competition for nuclear science

under National Socialism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Irving Klotz, “ at Farm Hall Knew Little of A-Bombs,” Physics Today 46 (October 1993): 11; Arnold Kramish, “Powers on Heisenberg: Embellishments on the Lesart,” American Scientist 81 (1993): 479-480; David Lindley, Uncertainty: Einstein, Heisenberg, Bohr, and the Struggle for the Soul of Science (New York: Doubleday, 2007); Jonothan L. Logan, Helmut Rechenberg, Max Dresden, and A. van der Ziel. “Heisenberg, Goudsmit and the German ‘A-Bomb’ [letters to the editor],” Physics Today 44, no. 5 (May 1991): 13, 15, 90-96; Jonothan L. Logan, and . “Heisenberg and the Bomb,” Nature 362 (March 1993): 117; Armand Lucas, “Revisiting Farm Hall,” Europhysics News 38, no. 4 (2007): 25; Kristie Macrakis, Surviving the Swastika: Scientific Research in Nazi Germany (New York: , 1993); Otto Gerhard Oexle, Hahn, Heisenberg und die anderen: Anmerkungen zu ‘Kopenhagen,’ ‘Farm Hall’ und ‘Göttingen’ (Berlin: Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften, 2003); Helmut Rechenberg, Farm-Hall-Berichte: Die abgehörten Gespräche der 1945/46 in England internierten deutschen Atomwissenschaftler: Ein Kommentar (Stuttgart: S. Hirzel, 1994); Thomas Powers, Heisenberg’s War: The Secret History of the German Bomb (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1993); Helmut Rechenberg, Die langerwarteten Farm-Hall-Berichte: Sensation oder “Alter Schnee”? (Munich: Max- Planck-Institut für Physik, Werner-Heisenberg-Institut, 1993); Monika Renneberg and Mark Walker, eds., Science, Technology, and National Socialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Paul Lawrence Rose, “Did Heisenberg Misconceive A-Bomb?” Physics Today 45, no. 2 (February 1992): 126; Paul Lawrence Rose, Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic Bomb Project: A Study in German Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Margit Szöllösi-Janze, ed., Science in the Third Reich. German Historical Perspective Series, edited by Gerhard A. Ritter and Anthony J. Nicholls (Oxford: Berg, 2001); Mark Walker, Nazi Science: Myth, Truth and the German Atomic Bomb (New York: Plenum Press, 1995); Mark Walker, “Otto Hahn: Responsibility and Repression.” Physics in Perspective 8, no. 2 (2006): 116-163. 12 Ronald Clark, The Birth of the Bomb: The Untold Story of Britain’s Part in the Weapon That Changed the World (London: Phoenix House, 1961); Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945 (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1964); Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945-1952 (London: Macmillan, 1974); Ferenc Morton Szasz, British Scientists and the Manhattan Project: The Los Alamos Years (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992); Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009); Spencer Weart, Scientists in Power (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979); David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-56 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

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resources – be it uranium, heavy water, or the scientists who knew how to make use of these materials – emerged in this new era. Margaret Gowing’s 1964 work on Tube

Alloys mentioned the Farm Hall detention indirectly (and not by name) but did not discuss it.13

The historiography about the Allied occupation of Germany informs this dissertation.14 All four occupiers sought to reshape German politically, militarily, and economically to prevent it from becoming a future threat, while also promoting their own political, military, and economic interests. The research for this thesis about Farm Hall confirms previous arguments that Britain was the first of the four occupiers to decide to rebuild its occupation zone into a self-supporting zone, although American support was instrumental in making this happen.15 Within weeks after Hiroshima and Nagasaki,

British officials argued in favor of returning the Farm Hall scientists to Germany and allowing them to eventually resume their research careers (albeit not in applied nuclear science). American officials took longer to convince that this was the best course of action. Manhattan Project officials began to advocate the rebuilding of laboratories for

13 Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 368. 14 Richard Bessel, Germany 1945: From War to Peace (New York: HarperCollins, 2009); Anne Deighton, ed., Britain and the First Cold War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990); Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace: Britain, the of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); John Farquharson, “‘The Essential Decision’: Britain and the Partition of Germany 1945-9,” German History 9, no. 1 (February 1991): 23-45; Josef Foschepoth, “British Interests in the Division of Germany after the Second World War,” Journal of Contemporary History 21, no. 3 (1986): 391-411; John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968); Patricia Meehan, A Strange Enemy People: Germans under the British, 1945-1950 (London: Peter Owen Publishers, 2001); Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1995); W.R. Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle over Germany (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1999); Ian D. Turner, Reconstruction in Post-War Germany: British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones, 1945-1955 (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1989); D.C. Watt, Britain Looks to Germany: A Study of British Opinion and Policy towards Germany since 1945 (London: Oswald Woolf, 1965); Roy F. Willis, The French in Germany, 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962). 15 Deighton, Impossible Peace; Farquharson, “Essential Decision”; Eisenberg, Drawing the Line.

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the Farm Hall scientists only after the scientists were repatriated in January 1946, at which point finding employment for the scientists became the least objectionable option available.

The area of occupation historiography to which this dissertation about Farm Hall most closely relates is that about science in occupied Germany. Historians have written about two main topics within this field: the first is about efforts by each of the four occupiers to take reparations from Germany.16 American efforts to exploit German rocket scientists are well-known.17 John Gimbel’s argument about intellectual reparations is important for this thesis because it shows how British and American officials colluded to remove valuable scientists and technicians from Germany as reparations while arguing against Soviet demands for $10 billion in German reparations. American and British officials quickly decided that they did not want to keep the Farm Hall scientists, but they also did not want other countries to have the opportunity to make use of the scientists’ expertise.

The second area in which science has been considered is in work which traces the redevelopment of scientific research under Allied control during the occupation.18 The

16 Gimbel, Science, Technology, and Reparations; David Cassidy, “Controlling German Science, I: U.S. and Allied Forces in Germany, 1945-1947,” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 24, no. 2 (1994): 197-235; David Cassidy, “Controlling German Science, II: Bizonal Occupation and the Struggle over West German Science Policy, 1946-1949,” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 26, no. 2 (1996): 197-239; Matthias Judt and Burghard Ciesla, eds., Technology Transfer out of Germany after 1945 (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1996); Paul Maddrell, Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945–1961 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 17 Tom Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Hunt for the Nazi Scientists (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987); Linda Hunt, Secret Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists and Project Paperclip, 1945 to 1990 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991); Clarence G. Lasby, Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War (New York: Atheneum, 1971); Michel Bar-Zohar, The Hunt for German Scientists, translated by Len Orizen (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1967). 18 Alan D. Beyerchen, “German Scientists and Research Institutions in Allied Occupation Policy,” History of Education Quarterly 22, no. 3 (Autumn 1982): 289-299; Klaus Hentschel, The Mental Aftermath: The Mentality of German Physicists, 1945-1949 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Jürgen Kiko and Ulrich Schmidt-Rohr, Max-Planck-Institut für Kernphysik (Munich: Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, 1984); John

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time period covered in this dissertation does not follow the Farm Hall scientists through the resumption of their careers. However, this thesis shows how control of the scientists at the end of World War II began to transition into efforts to allow the resumption of scientific research in Germany. The treatment of the Farm Hall scientists was eventually subsumed into Allied Control Authority rules about scientific research during the occupation. During the first few months that the scientists were back in Germany,

Manhattan Project and British officials provided the scientists with special supervision and treatment in an attempt to keep these scientists under British control and prevent them from traveling to the French or Soviet occupation zones (or France or the Soviet

Union). The treatment of the Farm Hall scientists shows the uncertainty about how the

German occupation should be conducted and what policies would best reshape Germany, as well as the ongoing effort to deny these scientists to French or Soviet research programs.

The final area of historiography which informs this dissertation is the changing geopolitics of the postwar period. During this period, wartime alliances began to change into what we now recognize as the Cold War.19 At the time of the scientists’ capture by

Alsos Mission personnel, the US, Britain, and the Soviet Union shared a workable

Krige, American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006); Otto Gerhard Oexle, The British Roots of the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft (London: German Historical Institute London, 1995); Ruth Lewin Sime, Otto Hahn und die Max-Planck- Gesellschaft: Zwischen Vergangenheit und Erinnerung (Berlin: Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften, 2004); Walker, German National Socialism. 19 Michael Dobbs, Six Months in 1945: FDR, Stalin, Churchill, and Truman – From World War to Cold War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012); Jonathan Fenby, Alliance: The Inside Story of How Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill Won One War and Began Another (San Francisco: MacAdam Cage, 2006); Ralph B. Levering et al, Debating the Origins of the Cold War: American and Russian Perspectives (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001); Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1992, 7th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Clarendon Press, 1997); Arnold A. Offner, Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002); Tony Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History 24, no. 4 (Fall 2000): 567-591.

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collaboration. France had been introduced to the alliance as an occupier in spring 1945.

The influence of France is the most surprising in this dissertation and was one of the most important factors in the German scientists’ extended confinement. The Alsos Mission’s purpose was to investigate German scientists’ wartime atomic research; however, the denial of nuclear research information to France was the key factor in deciding which scientists to detain. Other German atomic scientists who were equally or more important than some of the Farm Hall scientists were allowed to stay at their institutes in Germany because these institutes fell within the future American or British occupation zones in

Germany.

By mid-1946, increasing Cold War tensions had emerged, although the alliance still held. This dissertation about Farm Hall demonstrates that increasing concerns in

1945 and 1946 about Soviet intentions in Germany and ongoing concerns about France’s intentions and political reliability had an important effect on the American and British officials treatment of the Farm Hall scientists. As will be demonstrated, the United

States’ relationship with or perception of the UK, the Soviet Union, and France significantly affected the Farm Hall detention.

Britain and America were the closest of the wartime Allies, both in terms of their military plans in Europe and their secret collaboration on the Manhattan Project and its related intelligence efforts.20 Indeed, the detention of the German scientists at Farm Hall was made possible by British-American cooperation. British officials were involved with

Operation Harborage and a British officer was tasked with overseeing the scientists from

20 Robert M. Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); Robert M. Hathaway, Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations since World War II (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1990); William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds., The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

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the time they were removed from Germany. The story of Farm Hall both reinforces and complicates our understanding of how the British-American alliance functioned at the end of World War II and the beginning of the nuclear era. Britain was the junior partner in Anglo-American cooperation on nuclear weapons research and development. Farm

Hall reinforces that conclusion but also shows that the British had agency with regard to

Farm Hall because they had physical custody of the scientists.

British officials were less concerned about German nuclear research, both during the war and after it, but joined their American counterparts in the effort to detain the scientists. Officials in both countries, however, shared concerns about how the Farm Hall detention might have negative repercussions for them. British officials pushed to repatriate the group quickly in September 1945 because keeping the scientists’ research secret was no longer necessary. The scientists’ increasingly dour outlooks after months in detention boded ill for British officials, who feared that members of the group might mount an escape or even commit suicide out of depression.

British officials continued to negotiate about Farm Hall and try to reach agreeable compromises with their American counterparts. It was in Britain’s interest to continue whatever cooperation in nuclear research that it could and to keep the US involved in

Europe after the war. Even with physical custody of the scientists at Farm Hall (and oversight once the men were returned to Germany), British officials did not make unilateral decisions about the group. As mentioned above, Britain led the way in seeking to rebuild its occupation zone in Germany, such as in seeking to reestablish scientific research. However, Britain still needed American support to most effectively implement its plans. Over the course of 1946, American officials adopted the British view that it

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was more practical to manage scientific research in Germany than to prohibit it. British and American collaboration on the German occupation strengthened throughout 1946, leading to fusion of their two zones into Bizonia on January 1, 1947.

The story of Farm Hall adds to works about British wartime intelligence.21 Farm

Hall was connected to a wartime intelligence program, the Combined Services Detailed

Interrogation Centre, that used secret monitoring to gain intelligence from captured

German and Italian prisoners of war. The fact that the Farm Hall scientists were eavesdropped on is not new to this story but how it came under the jurisdiction of this program is.

The scientists’ detention at Farm Hall occurred against the background of the transformation of the Soviet Union from a wartime ally to a Cold War competitor of the

US and Britain.22 This thesis does not change this interpretation but reinforces arguments about this gradual transition in 1945 and 1946. The countries were still allies who continued to work together, such as at meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Difficulties in negotiations about reparations from Germany became key sticking points in these meetings. British and American efforts to keep Farm Hall a secret were partly to avoid publicizing how Britain and the US had “looted” this group of scientists. American officials were also concerned throughout this period with keeping information about nuclear weapons research from the Soviet Union. Farm Hall was a unique example of that effort.

21 Keith Jeffrey, The Secret History of MI6 (New York: Penguin Press, 2010); R.V. Jones, Most Secret War: British Scientific Intelligence, 1939-1945 (London: Penguin Books, 1978, reissue 2009); R.V. Jones, Reflections on Intelligence (London: Heinemann, 1989). 22 Naimark, Russians in Germany; Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).

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British and American negotiations about the Farm Hall group’s repatriation involved discussions about how the Soviets might kidnap or lure (with offers of better wages, laboratories, and working conditions) German scientists to the Soviet Union.

During the scientists’ confinement at Farm Hall, British and American officials became increasingly concerned about Soviet actions, partly because of reports about other

German scientists being taken to the USSR and partly because of difficulties that emerged during high-level political negotiations, such as the September Council of

Foreign Ministers meeting in London.

Competition, concern, and annoyance with France played a major role in shaping the scientists’ capture, their Farm Hall detention, and their eventual repatriation. One of the most important additions to the Farm Hall story is how suspicions and fears about

French nuclear research and politics led to Operation Harborage and, thus, the capture of most of the Farm Hall scientists.23 France was a frequent topic in discussions by British and American officials about how, when, and where the scientists could be repatriated in

Germany.

Manhattan Project officials’ distrust of France resulted in part from American officials’ distrust of French politicians, especially , and in part from concerns about French nuclear scientists, particularly Frédéric Joliot-Curie. Leslie

Groves distrusted French nuclear scientists because they had not agreed to withhold publication of their research in 1939 and 1940, as American and British scientists had done. Groves was also concerned about Joliot-Curie’s socialist politics and that France would share information with the Soviet Union or would create its own nuclear weapons

23 Eisenberg, Drawing the Line; Fenby, Alliance; Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy; Groves, Now It Can Be Told; Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin; Walker, German National Socialism; Willis, French in Germany.

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program. Some scientists who had worked in Joliot-Curie’s laboratory escaped to Britain just before the fall of France to Germany and later worked on the British part of the

Manhattan Project in Montreal. Groves considered it a grave security breach that Britain allowed these scientists to return to France after having gained some knowledge (albeit slight) about the Manhattan Project.

In late 1944, Britain convinced the Soviet Union and US to allow an occupation zone (carved out of the British and American occupation zones) in Germany for France.

The Big Three officially agreed on this course of action at the in

February 1945. During the scientists’ detention at Farm Hall, British and American officials had ongoing political difficulties with France, primarily in negotiations about

Germany. It was not until the Berlin Blockade in 1948-49 that France finally joined the

British and Americans in policy toward Germany, moving away from more vindictive policies toward Germany.

As with their fear about the Soviet Union, British and American officials were concerned that France would entice German scientists to work for France with promises of better wages and laboratories than they were receiving in the British and American occupation zones. This was especially a concern because the majority of the Farm Hall scientists had most recently worked at research institutes in the French occupation zone, which meant that the possibility that the Farm Hall scientists might work for France seemed even greater.

Sources

This dissertation is based on primary sources from American and British archives.

The US National Archives and Records Administration’s files on the Manhattan Project

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(Record Group 77) were especially useful. Materials from Leslie Groves’ papers (Record

Group 200), the Records of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Record

Group 227), and Records of the Army Staff (Record Group 319) were also used. Henry

Stimson’s diary was accessed via microfilm (created from documents held by the Yale

University Library) at the Library of Congress. Samuel Goudsmit’s papers are available the Library & Archives at the American Institute of Physics. The British sources are drawn primarily from the British National Archives at Kew, Sir James

Chadwick’s and R.V. Jones’ respective papers (Churchill Archives Centre at Churchill

College, University of Cambridge), Sir Charles Frank’s papers (Special Collections at the

University of Bristol Library), Sir Henry Dale’s papers (Royal Society Archives), and

Bruce Bonsey’s papers (Imperial War Museum Archives in London).

Three interviews conducted by the author in England have been useful for this dissertation. Adam Ganz discussed his father’s role as a listener at Farm Hall. Fritz and

Susan Lustig shared their recollections about their service with the Combined Services

Detailed Interrogation Centre. Marcial Echenique gave the author a tour of Farm Hall, his home for nearly forty years.24

Dissertation Structure

This dissertation comprises five substantive chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 1 covers the period from late summer 1944 through early May 1945. During this time, the

Manhattan Project’s Alsos Mission investigated German nuclear scientists in Germany.

In early April 1945, Manhattan Project officials began planning Operation Harborage, which led to the capture of most of the future Farm Hall scientists by the end of the

24 Research at the Archives of Society in Berlin are not cited in this dissertation but research there was useful to the author in framing this topic. Sources from that archive will likely prove useful as this project continues in the future.

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month. Based on how this operation was planned and executed, this thesis argues that

Manhattan Project officials placed as much, if not greater, priority on keeping German nuclear scientists out of French control than investigating German nuclear scientists’ wartime research. This chapter covers material that other historians have addressed but this material is key to understanding how the scientists’ detention at Farm Hall originated.

Chapter 2 examines the first two months of the German scientists’ detention in

May and June 1945. Manhattan Project and British intelligence officials encountered numerous difficulties in finding suitable locations in France and Belgium to house the scientists. The Americans and British prioritized keeping the scientists in secret and treating them well. They did not declare the scientists as prisoners of war, which would have meant publicizing the reasons why American and British officials were interested in these particular individuals. Manhattan Project officials initially resisted the British proposal to move the scientists to a more secure location in England because such a move meant giving up some of their control over the scientists. The security situation in France and Belgium eventually proved challenging enough that Manhattan Project officials agreed to this course of action.

Chapter 3 encompasses July through September 1945. The ten German scientists were moved to Farm Hall on July 3, 1945. The chapter begins with an explanation of the

Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre, whose personnel and technology were used to secretly monitor the German scientists’ conversations at Farm Hall. Until they heard the news about the bombing of Japan on August 6, the scientists assumed that they were being held until they could talk about their wartime research with British

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colleagues. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, British officials soon began to advocate releasing the scientists back to Germany, since it was no longer necessary to keep their research secret. American officials strongly resisted this proposal, arguing that the security situation in Germany was unsuitable. At the end of September, Leslie Groves finally agreed to the British plans to remove the Farm Hall scientists from England.

Chapter 4 examines the final three months of 1945, October through December.

British officials proved unable to repatriate the Farm Hall scientists as quickly as they wanted because British occupation authorities in Germany would not agree to assume responsibility for the group. This occasioned new debates between British and American officials about the conditions under which the scientists could be released. British officials tried to plan for future German research and allowed a few of the scientists to meet with British colleagues. In December, British officials worked out a plan to repatriate the scientists shortly after the turn of the New Year. Manhattan Project officials continued to object to this plan but did not block it.

Chapter 5 studies developments in 1946. The ten scientists were sent back to the

British occupation zone on January 3, 1946. British occupation officials supervised them immediately after their repatriation but tried to restrain the scientists via general occupation policies about scientific research rather than granting them special treatment.

American and British officials remained concerned about potential negative effects for their governments because of Farm Hall and took efforts to keep the detention a secret.

An unexpected challenge to this secrecy emerged from the Alsos Mission’s scientific director, Samuel Goudsmit, who wanted to publish an article about the scientists’ detention.

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The conclusion ties together the details of British and American policies toward the Farm Hall detainees with broader wartime and postwar policies to nuclear technology, Germany, and international relations.

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Chapter 1: Alsos Investigations in France and Germany, and Operation Harborage, August 1944-May 1945

As the foreign intelligence arm of the Manhattan Project, Alsos Mission personnel investigated German nuclear science from 1943 on, first in Italy, then in France, and finally in Germany, following the capture of territory by the western Allied armed forces.

The mission’s investigations in France after D-Day were the first opportunity to interrogate French scientists who had worked with some German nuclear scientists during the war and then the German scientists themselves.

In late November 1944, as American and British troops moved across France and into Germany, the Manhattan Project’s Alsos Mission launched its efforts to directly investigate German nuclear scientists and their wartime research. Over the next six months, Alsos personnel scrutinized numerous research institutes in Germany, interrogated German atomic scientists, and read their wartime research reports. Alsos investigators reached the welcome conclusion that German scientists had not undertaken significant nuclear weapons research and, in fact, their research had progressed little beyond laboratory experiments and certainly not into the realm of industrial production that nuclear weapons would have required.

The Alsos Mission’s actions, however, demonstrated that gaining a complete picture of German nuclear research was only part of their task. Denying information about German research to France and the Soviet Union was a key unstated goal of the

Alsos Mission that sometimes trumped the effort to thoroughly investigate German nuclear researchers. In late April and early May 1945, Alsos personnel, along with

British Tube Alloys and intelligence officials, captured ten German nuclear scientists.

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This group was moved first to France, then Belgium, and finally England, where they were detained at Farm Hall for six months. The detained scientists included luminaries such as nuclear physicists and Nobel Prize winners Werner Heisenberg and Max von

Laue, and chemist Otto Hahn, who discovered fission in 1938. The group also included younger scientists, such as nuclear physicists and , who were previously unknown to Manhattan Project and Tube Alloys officials. The other five scientists, nuclear physcists , , Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, and , and physical chemist , ranked somewhere in between in terms of their prestige, at least to Alsos investigators. The Alsos Mission’s efforts to detain most of these particular scientists were motivated by ensuring that France did not gain control of them.

The investigation and capture of the German scientists in Württemberg, which was conducted under the name Operation Harborage, demonstrates the priority that

Manhattan Project officials put on controlling information about nuclear research. In

Operation Harborage (and the Alsos Mission more broadly), this was part of an effort to place limits on the information that French nuclear scientists could gain. Manhattan

Project Director Leslie Groves distrusted French nuclear scientists, especially physicist

Frédéric Joliot-Curie. French scientists had not participated in the effort by American and British scientists to restrict the publishing of research early in the war. Joliot-Curie’s politics were also leftist, which led to Groves’ suspicions that he would share information about German research with Soviet physicists. Although the

US, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union were allies, the US and Britain worked to keep nuclear weapons research secret. The four countries would soon encounter difficulties in

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reaching agreements about how to control Germany during the occupation. The Allies would win the war in Europe before long, but many questions remained about how to prevent Germany from posing a future military threat. Controlling science and technology was one part of this effort.

British Tube Alloys and intelligence officials participated in Operation

Harborage. Their intelligence investigations during the war had indicated that German scientists were likely not developing nuclear weapons. It was in British interest to know for sure and to support their American ally in these efforts. Britain was the junior partner in Manhattan Project research but it played a key role in efforts to locate (and control) stocks of materials important to nuclear research, such as uranium and heavy water

(which was also part of the Alsos Mission).

This chapter covers the Alsos investigations of Paris and in August and November-December 1944 respectively, subsequent investigations in Germany in early spring 1945, and the planning and executive of Operation Harborage. The capture of the scientists who would later be brought to Farm Hall revealed Manhattan Project efforts to control information about nuclear research internationally, especially vis-à-vis

Germany, France, and the Soviet Union.

…

By late 1944, Manhattan Project officials had gained some idea about the scope of

German nuclear research via Alsos investigations in Italy and France and other intelligence work led by Maj. Horace K. (Tony) Calvert, who headed the Manhattan

Project’s office in London. However, they had yet to directly interrogate German scientists and examine their laboratories. In spring 1944, the Manhattan Project had

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received reliable information connecting eminent physicist and Nobel Prize winner

Werner Heisenberg – and, thus, the main German scientists involved in theoretical nuclear research – to the town of , in the southwestern German state of

Württemberg. That summer, Calvert placed the area under aerial surveillance.

Manhattan Project officials had a brief scare in the fall, when the aerial photos revealed a great deal of construction, which they were concerned could be for nuclear weapons facilities. They soon learned that this was not the case but their reaction demonstrated their fears about secret German nuclear research.25

Alsos personnel located their top French target, Frédéric Joliot-Curie, in Paris in

August 1944. Some German scientists had worked in his laboratory after Germany defeated and occupied France. Joliot-Curie did not have any indication that the German scientists’ wartime research was leading to the development of nuclear weapons in the short term, but Manhattan Project officials wanted direct proof of this. Samuel

Goudsmit, the Alsos Mission’s scientific director, interrogated the French scientist on

August 28 and 30. A week later, Joliot-Curie was taken to London for an interview by five other British officials – Wallace Akers and of Tube Alloys, Reginald

V. Jones of the Air Ministry (where he was assistant director of scientific intelligence), physicists Sir Charles Frank and James Chadwick, and Lt. Cdr. Eric Welsh of MI6 – plus

Tony Calvert of the Manhattan Project’s London office. In both Paris and London,

Joliot-Curie said that his own work had been separate from the Germans’. Many of the

German scientists he named as having visited his Collège de France laboratory during the

25 H.K. Calvert, memorandum to Hon. John G. Winant, Nov. 27, 1944; Liaison with State Department; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, Record Group 77 (henceforth RG 77); National Archives at College Park, MD (henceforth NACP). Groves, Now It Can Be Told, 216-218.

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war were already known to British intelligence officials. Information that Kurt Diebner, who Joliot thought was connected to the German army, had “interrogated [Joliot-Curie] at length” and was likely an important administrator was new, however.26

Alsos personnel then began plans to investigate the , which had been staffed with German professors during the war, after French troops recaptured the city in late November 1944. It was there in late November and early

December that the Alsos Mission was first able to establish a direct account of German wartime nuclear science through research documents. This was the first significant contact that Alsos officials made with German atomic scientists and the paper trail created through their wartime work. Goudsmit reported that “based on direct evidence from documents,” there was “[n]o evidence…of any uranium work on a production

[industrial] scale.” Due to the “lack of secrecy” in written correspondence, he and other

Alsos investigators were able to put together a rough outline of how nuclear research was organized in Germany. The information gained from this investigation was instrumental in setting the Alsos agenda for early 1945, which culminated in the Operation Harborage investigations of the Hechingen area.27

26 S.A. Goudsmit, “Interview with ‘F.J.’, Paris, Tuesday, 28 August 1944” and “Second Interview with ‘J’, Paris, 30 August 1944,” Aug. 31, 1944; M.W. Perrin, “Interviews with Professor F. Joliot, London, September 5th and 7th, 1944,” n.d. (but after Sept. 7, 1944); #26 Intelligence Reports (Germany); Harrison- Bundy Files Relating to the Development of the Atomic Bomb, 1942-1946 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1108, roll 2); RG 77; NACP. “Section 4-2: Paris Operations” in “Foreign Intelligence Supplement No. 1 to Manhattan District History: Book I – General: Volume 14 – Intelligence & Security,” Nov. 8, 1948; “Manhattan District History,” 1942-46; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project; RG 77; NACP. 27 Goudsmit, Alsos, 68-71. S.A. Goudsmit and F.A.C. Wardenburg, re: “TA – Strasbourg Mission,” Dec. 8, 1944. Goudsmit sent this report to Richard C. Tolman, the vice chairman of the National Defense Research Council, on December 8. Tolman forwarded Goudsmit’s report, as well as translations of the documents Goudsmit had included to , the director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, on December 15. Bush-Conant File Relating to the Development of the Atomic Bomb, 1940-45 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1392, roll 1); Records of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, RG 227; NACP. “Section 4-2: Paris Operations” and “Section 4-3: Strasbourg Operation” in “Foreign Intelligence Supplement No. 1 to Manhattan District History: Book I – General:

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The Alsos investigators detained four German nuclear scientists at the University of Strasbourg: , Friedrich Weygand, Hugo Neuert, and Werner

Maurer. Samuel Goudsmit, the Alsos Mission’s scientific director, later wrote that he had detained the scientists because they were “unreliable informants” yet hoped to later get better information about German research from them. As such, he sent the scientists to the US headquarters near Paris “to turn them over to the proper authorities for internment.” However, denying the German scientists to France was also a factor.

France regained control of Strasbourg after the war, which meant that French scientists would have access to these German scientists and their papers and thus, information about Germany’s wartime nuclear research. Manhattan Project officials wanted to prevent this from occurring.28

Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, who was later taken to Farm Hall, was on the list of scientists that Alsos hoped to locate in Strasbourg. While the Alsos team did not find him there, the information that they gained about his whereabouts further cemented their focus on the Hechingen area. Von Weizsäcker’s secretary told the Alsos investigators that he had gone to work with Heisenberg in Hechingen in September 1944. Other documents found at the University of Strasbourg and at von Weizsäcker’s house pointed to the high priority for Alsos to investigate Hechingen.29

Volume 14 – Intelligence & Security,” Nov. 8, 1948; “Manhattan District History,” 1942-46; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project; RG 77; NACP. 28 Goudsmit, Alsos, 71-73. “Section 4-3: Strasbourg Operation” in “Foreign Intelligence Supplement No. 1 to Manhattan District History: Book I – General: Volume 14 – Intelligence & Security,” Nov. 8, 1948; “Manhattan District History,” 1942-46; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project; RG 77; NACP. The four scientists were soon brought to a detention center in the US, where they were held until late 1945 and early 1946. 29 “Section 4-3: Strasbourg Operation” in “Foreign Intelligence Supplement No. 1 to Manhattan District History: Book I – General: Volume 14 – Intelligence & Security,” Nov. 8, 1948; “Manhattan District History,” 1942-46; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project; RG 77; NACP. S.A. Goudsmit, “Interrogation of Mrs. Anna Haas, 3 December 1944, Strassburg,” Dec. 16, 1944; 32.23-1

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By the end of January 1945, Manhattan Project staff had analyzed the documents taken from Strasbourg. This analysis provided greater detail about the scope of German nuclear research and further strengthened the focus on the town of Hechingen in

Württemberg. Manhattan Project officials interpreted this information in two contradictory ways, sometimes emphasizing relief that German research did not appear to be a direct threat in terms of weapons and sometimes stressing that the German scientists had undertaken research that might pose a military threat in the future. One of Groves’ staff who worked on intelligence issues, Maj. Francis J. Smith, highlighted some of the most important details that had emerged from the Strasbourg investigation in a report about the “Strasbourg Summary” that Alsos personnel had assembled based on their investigations there. Smith wrote that the documentary evidence that Alsos personnel had gathered “proved that the enemy has considerable knowledge of atomic power and is expending a great effort to bring it to use.” As proof of this, he noted that there were:

a. 122 scientists most of whom have long been eminent in the nuclear field and who now are leaders and directors of groups working on the project which indicates that there are many more hundreds of scientists of lesser light engaged as assistants to those men, b. 19 firms manufacturing material for the project, c. 11 universities doing research work and experimentation for the project, [and] d. 35 cities and towns at which the work is being done.

Documents from Strasbourg indicated that German scientists were working on nuclear power research, not necessarily weapons, although the line between these areas of research was blurred. As such, Smith warned that German research should still be considered dangerous. Based on the lists of scientists assembled from Strasbourg documents, Berlin and Hechingen were the areas of greatest concern, the former as the

Germany – Research – Tech Papers (Dec. 44-Dec. 45); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944- 46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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site of a graphite pile and two for enriching uranium, and the latter as the center of the study of theoretical nuclear physics.30

In comparison to the Manhattan Project, 122 German scientists was a paltry number.31 However, Smith’s analysis corresponded to Groves’ paranoia about a potential

German nuclear weapons program, despite the fact that the threat had already been deemed low. Groves’ approach meant that no stone would go unturned in his quest to investigate German atomic research and every effort would be made to keep secret whatever information was found through these investigations. Smith’s report was consistent with the culture in Groves’ office: all information about atomic science, whether or not in the United States, needed to be controlled and compartmentalized.

At the time that Smith prepared this report, both Manhattan Project and Tube

Alloys officials recognized that an investigation of the research sites in Berlin – the graphite pile and two cyclotrons – would be impossible, at least for the moment, since these targets were located in an area that Soviet troops would reach first. Manhattan

Project officials were loath to share any information about nuclear science with the

Soviets, so bringing the Soviets in as partners on such an investigation was not an option.

Conversely, an investigation of the targets in Württemberg was possible, since this

German state was to become part of the future American occupation zone. As such, by the end of January 1945, Hechingen was at the top of the American list of possible nuclear research sites in Germany.32

30 Francis J. Smith memorandum to L.R. Groves, Feb. 3, 1945; 32.60-2 Germany – Summary Reports (1945-1946); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 31 Over 125,000 individuals – not all of them scientists, of course – worked on the Manhattan Project. Kelly, The Manhattan Project, ix. 32 “Combined Development Trust: Mintues of First and Second Ordinary Meetings of London Group,” Jan. 23 and 30, 1945, TNA: PRO AB 1/661; “Monthly Intelligence Summary: January 1945;” 202.3-1

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The feasibility of investigating German nuclear research in Württemberg was negatively affected by decisions made at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. By the time that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US President Franklin D.

Roosevelt met at Malta just before the Yalta Conference, Churchill had convinced the

American leader to give part of the United States’ occupation zone to France (and Britain would do the same). Stalin agreed to this change. The Soviet leader also agreed to allow

France to join the Allied Control Council, which was to oversee the occupation of

Germany.33

Although British and American officials had decided to offer France an occupation zone in Germany, they did not invite Charles de Gaulle to the Yalta

Conference, much to his dismay. Roosevelt’s adviser Harry Hopkins later commented that the meeting at Yalta had been necessary in part to address France’s future role in

Europe (which he deemed “irritating”), so France had not been invited to attend the conference.34

The decision to create a French occupation zone had important consequences for the Alsos Mission’s investigations in southwestern Germany.35 The four Württemberg towns (Hechingen, Haigerloch, Tailfingen, and Bisingen) that had been identified by this

Combined Intelligence Reports; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 33 Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin, 14; Fenby, Alliance, 357-358. 34 Willis, The French in Germany, 8. 35 Allotting France an occupation zone proved an annoyance in the larger political sphere and not simply the Alsos investigations. The European Advisory Commission reached its agreement on the zonal boundaries on May 2, 1945. The agreement was not finalized for over two months, however, mainly because of de Gaulle’s dissatisfaction with the zone assigned to his country. When French troops began their advance into Germany in late March, de Gaulle wanted them to take as much German territory as possible, with the expectation that France could increase its occupation zone if it held additional terrain when the war ended. He was eventually disabused of this idea and finally ordered French troops to draw back to the zone assigned to them at the end of June. French troops had to withdraw from sections of north Baden and north Württemberg. They ignored an order from the local US Army commander to withdraw, only doing so after Eisenhower threatened to withhold military supplies from France. Willis, The French in Germany, 16-19.

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time as important locations of German nuclear research were located in what was now to become the French zone. The possibility of investigating these towns now became less certain, which Leslie Groves deemed “a major problem.” As was the case with the

Soviets, Manhattan Project officials did not want to share any information about

American nuclear research with the French, including the intelligence investigations in

Germany that the Alsos Mission was conducting.36

These concerns about the French were already brewing. At the end of December

1944, Secretary of War Henry Stimson had alerted that Roosevelt British officials had allowed several French scientists who worked on the Canadian section of the Manhattan

Project to return to France. Due to this visit and Joliot-Curie’s Communist Party membership, Stimson assumed that “[t]he French were suddenly in a position to let

Russia in on” the Manhattan Project. Stimson and Groves, who had accompanied him to see Roosevelt, argued that the Manhattan Project’s “secrets should be kept from France.”

Roosevelt agreed. However, the return of the scientists from Canada to France might open up the US and Britain up to nuclear blackmail: Joliot-Curie, if not de Gaulle, could threaten to reveal the existence of the Manhattan Project to the Soviets if their demands

(such as for direct participation in the Manhattan Project) were not met.37

Groves’ fears that French nuclear scientists posed a danger to Manhattan Project security were further fuelled in late February 1945. Calvert wrote that Joliot-Curie had visited London in February to speak with Sir John Anderson, the Chancellor of the

Exchequer and who oversaw the Tube Alloys program within the Cabinet. At the time that Calvert wrote to Groves, Calvert had not yet received details about this meeting, but

36 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, 233. 37 Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and Its Legacies, 3rd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 132, 135.

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reported that “nothing of an alarming nature” had occurred. Groves later sharply disagreed with this assessment. He thought that Joliot-Curie was attempting to carry out what amounted to nuclear blackmail. In Groves’ telling, the French scientist “made it clear to Sir John that, while France had no immediate desire to press the issue, if she were not eventually admitted to full collaboration with the United States and Britain in the project, she would have to turn to Russia.” To Groves, such a threat would have made it even more crucial that information about nuclear research – whether American or

German – needed to be kept from the French. Whether French scientists intended to build their own nuclear weapons, or to pass information along to their Soviet colleagues, they should have as little access to information as possible from other researchers.

Groves’ efforts to compartmentalize as much nuclear research information as possible – in America, Germany, and, to the extent possible, Britain – were, thus, redoubled.38

The remarks that Joliot-Curie and his wife, Irène Joliot-Curie, made at a dinner hosted by Calvert shortly thereafter also buttressed Manhattan Project opinion that Joliot-

Curie could not be trusted. Mr. Joliot-Curie apparently “emphasized that, ‘although he is a Communist, he is not a Russian Communist’” and said that he had “been re-elected

President of The National Front.” The former assurance would hardly have been a comfort to Manhattan Project officials, given global ambitions of communist revolutionaries, and since they likely did not recognize such a distinction between French communism and Soviet communism (or, if they did, find the French version much

38 “Monthly Intelligence Summary: February 1945;” 202.3-1 Combined Intelligence Reports; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, 228. The British interpretation of Joliot-Curie’s visit with Sir John Anderson was much less dire, although Margaret Gowing later wrote that, while “Joliot was ‘apparently quite happy’ when he left Anderson…Sir John remained very worried about the French.” Anderson had promised, however, “that Britain recognised France’s interest [in and contribution to nuclear research] and would do her best to see that she was fairly treated.” Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 345.

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better). While the National Front was a resistance movement, it had been founded by

French Communist Party members. In the same conversation, Joliot-Curie mentioned that he had been to Russia three times before the war began, and both Joliot-Curies advocated a postwar federation of European states, views which would have belied the pair’s disavowal of Russian connections and dangerous communism to Manhattan Project officials who were already skeptical about French nuclear scientists.

Groves’ officers were troubled by Joliot-Curie’s comment that French scientists had attempted to investigate German research at Strasbourg, but that the Americans had gotten there first. Joliot-Curie knew that Fleischmann and Maurer had been detained, although he did not know where.39 His repeatedly expressed hope that the United States and France would work together on scientific research after the war may also have alarmed his Manhattan Project audience, as it showed that Joliot-Curie was interested in

American atomic research and, thus, might be trying to find out more about it.

As a result of these renewed (and previous) concerns about French nuclear research, Manhattan Project officials in London set up an office in Paris in order to gain information about the research that French atomic scientists were conducting. Manhattan

Project officials asked Michael Perrin of the Tube Alloys project and officials at the

American Embassy at Paris to track the movements of key French scientists, including

Joliot-Curie. Perrin was tasked with keeping track of any French scientists who applied for visas to the United Kingdom or countries within the British empire. Calvert asked the

Paris office to survey the transportation routes from France to the Soviet Union, “with a view to checking on any movement of French scientists to the latter country.”

39 Ironically, it is likely that Fleischmann and Maurer, along with Weygand and Neuert, were in American custody in France at this time, prior to their detention in the United States.

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Manhattan Project officials also remained suspicious about their British counterparts. A February intelligence summary raised the possibility that the British were attempting to break American codes. British officials had asked Calvert to send verbatim notes from Tube Alloys Intelligence Committee meetings to Washington, rather than the paraphrased and condensed versions he typically sent. Calvert acknowledged that there could have been aboveboard reasons for such a request but warned that “cable traffic in and out of England is monitored, that several members of the British T A group…are high up in British Intelligence, and the possibility of breaking our code is ever present on their minds.” He recommended using as many code words as possible in future cables to forestall this possibility. This highlighted the latent suspicion that

Manhattan Project officials had about their British partners, a suspicion which was evident throughout the history of Farm Hall.40

By the end of February 1945, Manhattan Project personnel were moving forward with plans to investigate the Hechingen area, which was not yet under Allied military control. They reached out to American military leaders and British intelligence personnel in order to gain approval for the proposed mission. As was Groves’ wont, as few persons as possible were informed about the Manhattan Project’s wish for such an investigation, let alone the specific plans for it. The War Department’s imprimatur for his proposed operation smoothed the way with the commanding officers in Europe, which was important because Groves’ representatives in that effort, especially Maj. and Col. John Lansdale, were typically able to give the officials they spoke with only a

40 “Monthly Intelligence Summary: February 1945;” 202.3-1 Combined Intelligence Reports; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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vague idea of what the Manhattan District was looking for, due to secrecy about the

Manhattan Project’s research.

A month later, Manhattan Project officials had two impetuses to speed up their plans. The first reason was supplied by the Alsos investigations in in mid-

March, just before the city was captured by Allied troops. Alsos personnel interrogated two important German nuclear physicists, and .

Neither Bothe nor Gentner provided information that their interrogators did not already know, which was a good thing: it showed that Alsos investigators were well-informed about the German project and were on the right track with their target list. The scientists’ interrogations reinforced the picture of a relatively bare-bones German research effort.

Bothe estimated (or claimed) that less than thirty scientists were engaged seriously in nuclear research, in contrast to the list of 122 scientists that Manhattan Project officials had created based on the documents found at Strasbourg.41 The colleagues Bothe and

Gentner named as important to German nuclear research already appeared on Alsos lists.42

Bothe and Gentner named three towns in Württemberg as the locations of the most important German nuclear research: Werner Heisenberg and Max von Laue were in

Hechingen, Otto Hahn was in Tailfingen, and an experimental pile had been constructed in Haigerloch. Furman thought the information gained from Bothe and Gentner about the

Württemberg research was fairly reliable, as the scientists had had contact with the group

41 Bothe did not name anyone from Kurt Diebner’s research group, which was separate from the group headed by Heisenberg. 42 “Section 4-4: Heidelberg Operation” in “Foreign Intelligence Supplement No. 1 to Manhattan District History: Book I – General: Volume 14 – Intelligence & Security,” Nov. 8, 1948; “Manhattan District History,” 1942-46; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project; RG 77; NACP. Francis J. Smith memorandum to L.R. Groves, Feb. 3, 1945; 32.60-2 Germany – Summary Reports (1945- 1946); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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at Hechingen just ten days prior. Importantly, Bothe and Gentner knew of no plans to evacuate the Hechingen area scientists. An investigation in Hechingen could, thus, potentially yield excellent information, so long as it was conducted in the very near future and did not draw the attention of Gestapo authorities who could order the scientists out of the area or the destruction of documents, as had occurred at Heidelberg.43

The second reason was that, by late March, it became clear to Manhattan Project officials that French troops would move into southwestern Germany, likely within a month. This knowledge, combined with ongoing concern about the political and scientific risks posed by French nuclear scientists, hastened the process of planning

Operation Harborage. Lansdale echoed Calvert’s February report about Joliot-Curie’s visit to London when he wrote that:

In view of the early activities of the French in the nuclear physics field and their early liaison with the British on this subject, coupled with the apparent untrustworthiness and bad associations of many of the French personnel interested in this field, it appeared essential that action be taken to move British or American troops into this area long enough to capture the personnel involved, take their documents, and obliterate their installations.

The first part of his comment related to French interest in German nuclear research (as evidenced by their effort to investigate the Germans’ research at the

University of Strasbourg) and the certainty that French scientists would investigate the

43 Furman wrote that Gestapo orders to destroy documents seemed “to be current and can be expected in any other locality and almost all scientific work seems to be classified whether it is directly connected with war work or not. It is a necessity to have a classification in order to get priority for materials.” Excerpt of report “Interrogation of Bothe and Gentner at Heidelberg by Alsos,” Apr. 4, 1945; 32.60-2 Germany – Summary Reports (1945-1946); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. “Section 4-3: Strasbourg Operation” in “Foreign Intelligence Supplement No. 1 to Manhattan District History: Book I – General: Volume 14 – Intelligence & Security,” Nov. 8, 1948; “Manhattan District History,” 1942-46; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project; RG 77; NACP. F.A.C. Wardenburg and T.R. Hogness, “Report on Interrogation of Professor Walther Bothe,” Apr. 4, 1945; and T.R. Hogness and F.A.C. Wardenburg, “Report of Dr. Wolfgang Gentner,” Apr. 5, 1945; 32.22- 1 Germany – Research – TA (1943-June 1946); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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Germans’ Württemberg-based research. The “early liaison” with the British was the employment of key French scientists on British nuclear research following those scientists’ escape from France in 1940, which gave the French scientists access to British

– and American – research that otherwise would have been kept secret from them. More importantly, the “apparent untrustworthiness” and “bad associations” to which Lansdale referred were Frédéric Joliot-Curie’s communism and his Russian contacts, both of which

Joliot-Curie had mentioned to Calvert in London in February. Despite these concerns that it would be better for the Manhattan Project to prevent French nuclear scientists from investigating the Germans’ Württemberg institutes, Lansdale conceded that it appeared

“politically impossible to keep the French permanently out of the area.”44

At the beginning of April, Groves met with Army Chief of Staff George C.

Marshall and Secretary of War Stimson to discuss the options for investigating German nuclear research in Württemberg. Stimson noted that the issue presented “quite a problem,” especially because the research was “in the part of Germany which is going to be under French occupation.”45 Stimson thought that convincing the State Department to change the proposed occupation zone boundaries, in order to retain jurisdiction over the

German nuclear research institutes in Württemberg, was a lost cause. Once they decided that this avenue of redress was unavailable, the three officials began making plans to attempt a preemptive investigation of the four Württemberg towns before French troops

44 John Lansdale, draft of “Operation Harborage,” Jul. 10, 1946; #7B War Department: Special Operations: Operation Harborage; Correspondence (‘Top Secret’) of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1109, roll 2); Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 45 Entries for Apr. 4-5, 1945, Diaries of Henry Lewis Stimson, microfilm roll 9, Library of Congress. Stimson soon became chair of the . Minutes from the committee’s meetings from May 9 through July 19 indicate that the committee did not discuss the Alsos Mission. #100 Interim Committee – Minutes of Meetings; Harrison-Bundy Files Relating to the Development of the Atomic Bomb, 1942-1946 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1108, roll 8); RG 77; NACP.

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arrived in the area. Groves emphasized that preventing the French (and, indirectly, the

Soviets) from learning about German wartime nuclear research was a key priority:

According to the plan, American troops would have to get into and hold the area long enough for us to capture the people we wanted, question them, seize and remove their records, and obliterate all remaining facilities, for my recent experiences with Joliot had convinced me that nothing that might be of interest to the Russians should ever be allowed to fall into French hands.46

One of Marshall’s staff suggested that Groves ask for an official code word from the War Department’s Operations Division, likely so as not to inadvertently choose a name already in use (or on the official list to be assigned). Groves made this request with his usual obfuscation about his purpose, and the Operations Division hedged about assigning a code word “without knowing the nature of the mission.” However, it soon relented, given Marshall and Stimson’s support for Groves’ mysterious mission.

Operation Harborage now had a name. The next task was to make specific plans for the investigation with army commanders in Europe.47

Before that could happen, though, Groves had to navigate one further layer of military bureaucracy in Washington. The Chief of Army Intelligence, Gen. George V.

Strong, called Groves the day after Groves had met with Marshall and Stimson to ask what Groves and Marshall were going to tell Secretary of State Edward J. Stettinius, Jr. about their proposed investigation in Württemberg. Based on the memorandum for his files that Groves wrote, the answer appeared to be nothing. Informing the Secretary of

State would have been necessary if the Americans wanted to negotiate with the French

46 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, 234. 47 Groves to Pierce, re: “Code Word,” Apr. 5, 1945; Groves to ACS (Operations Division), Apr. 5, 1945; William A. Walker (Operations Division) to L.R. Groves, re: “Assignment of Code Word (Harborage),” Apr. 6, 1945; #7B War Department: Special Operations: Operation Harborage; Correspondence (‘Top Secret’) of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1109, roll 2); Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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about the scientists in their future zone; however, it appears that Groves, Marshall, and

Stimson did not want to follow that route. American officials – including President

Roosevelt – had become more amenable to developing French power in late 1944 and early 1945. Leaving Stettinius out of the loop suggests that Marshall and Stimson knew that he would not be pleased with the plans to swoop into the Hechingen area, especially given the effort the State Department had expended in improving the Franco-American relationship.

In his telephone conversation with Groves, Strong raised the possibility of giving the French a different region to occupy, which would allow the Americans to have a better opportunity to investigate – not to mention keep to themselves – the scientists and research facilities in the Hechingen area. This had, in fact, been Groves’ previous solution to the problem, but he told Strong that he was satisfied with the Secretary of

War’s decision. One reason for Groves’ apparent coolness about changing the French occupation zone was likely that he did not want to call additional attention to southwestern Württemberg by denying it to the French just before they were set to occupy it. Keeping nuclear research secret remained the overriding priority, even within the American bureaucracy.48

Col. John Lansdale, one of Groves’ key staff members who worked on intelligence issues, arrived in Paris on April 8 to arrange plans with British and American military leaders to “secure and deal with the targets” in the Hechingen area. He encountered resistance about the practicalities of such an operation but military officials

48 Groves, memorandum for the files re: conversation with Gen. Strong, Apr. 7, 1945; #7B War Department: Special Operations: Operation Harborage; Correspondence (‘Top Secret’) of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1109, roll 2); Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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gave the request serious consideration since it had the approval of the Army Chief of

Staff. Lansdale was careful to emphasize that the War Department considered this investigation highly important but was not requiring British and American military forces to carry it out. This caveat was likely attached for practical reasons, given that these troops had more important tasks (namely defeating Germany) to carry out. Manhattan

Project officials also hoped to prevent undue attention being drawn to Groves’ hoped-for operation.

Lansdale brought with him to Paris a Manhattan Project report to justify the need for Operation Harborage. In contrast to the analysis of the Alsos Mission’s investigations in Strasbourg, this report emphasized that German scientists known to be working in or near Hechingen and Tailfingen were conducting research that could “ultimately result in a successful uranium machine and possibly later in an atomic bomb.” An operation “to occupy the region as soon as possible” was desired, as was an effort to reach “the important targets suddenly, thus evading destruction of important evidence by the enemy.” This claims were exaggerated. The German scientists’ research technically could be applied to nuclear weapons but Alsos personnel had already gained information that this was unlikely to be the case.49

Lansdale presented this information to the chief of staff and intelligence section at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF, the headquarters of

Allied forces in northwestern Europe, then located at Versailles), as well as leaders of the

Sixth Army Group, which would need to provide support troops for the mission. They

49 R.R. Furman to Francis J. Smith, re “Transmittal of Summary – Württemberg Area,” Apr. 14, 1945 (including attachment to ACS, G-2, Sixth Army Group, “Humbug Operation,” Apr. 9, 1945); 32.60-2 Germany – Summary Reports (1945-1946); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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raised questions about the military and political risks that such an investigation would create. It was not entirely clear how many German troops were still in Württemberg and, thus, what kind of military resistance an investigation would encounter. The military leaders “pointed out the difficulties and risk of the proposed operation, particularly with reference to the French,” even while agreeing that the Manhattan Project’s information clearly indicated the presence of research activities in the area.”50

German military resistance was not necessarily a daunting obstacle but the political risk of conducting a secret investigation in territory that would come under

French control around the same time was. Furthermore, the Sixth Army Group was already in need of reinforcements and had other offensive and defensive actions to carry out. Because the Chief of Staff interpreted the intelligence presented by Lansdale as indicating that the German research in that area posed no imminent danger, he did not want to recommend this investigation to the Supreme Commander.

Another option remained, one which demonstrated the priority that Manhattan

Project officials put on denying information about German research to France: the towns could be bombed. When Lansdale confirmed this suggestion with the Manhattan Project, the reply he received emphasized the point that the discretion to carry out an operation was with the Supreme Commander. However, nothing in this reply indicated that Groves

50 “Section 4-12: Haigerloch, Hechingen, Bisingen, and Tailfingen Operations” in “Foreign Intelligence Supplement No. 1 to Manhattan District History: Book I – General: Volume 14 – Intelligence & Security,” Nov. 8, 1948; “Manhattan District History,” 1942-46; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project; RG 77; NACP. John Lansdale, draft of “Operation Harborage,” Jul. 10, 1946; #7B War Department: Special Operations: Operation Harborage; Correspondence (‘Top Secret’) of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1109, roll 2); Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. These troops would need to be supplied to Gen. Devers. Pash had met with Devers, the commander of the Sixth Army Group, in February to discuss a possible Alsos operation in Württemberg. R.R. Furman to L.R. Groves, re: “Hechingen Area,” Feb. 27, 1945; 32.60-2 Germany – Summary Reports (1945-1946); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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opposed a bombing mission against the German scientists’ Württemberg institutes. Plans for such a raid thus moved forward. The officers agreed that “in all events [they must] attempt destruction from the air and also if possible get on the ground before (a) the

Allied Control Commission [which included the Soviets] took charge and (b) before the

French moved into the area.” Denying scientific information to the French was more important than an Alsos investigation of those targets, especially since Alsos personnel already had a good idea about the scope of German nuclear research.

Only a few days later, the plans for a bombing raid were scrapped in favor of returning to the initial proposal to take the four towns in Württemberg via ground operations. A new tactical situation had emerged in northern Germany. As a result,

Eisenhower had “approved Harborage to fit in with other operations….in the southern

German area.” The timing of the operation would “depend on the tactical situation and advance of the French Army.” The operation was projected to occur within two weeks.51

In the midst of this planning process, President Roosevelt died on April 12 and was succeeded by Harry S. Truman. Truman did not receive a full briefing about the

Manhattan Project until April 25. Alsos Mission plans had not been made with

Roosevelt’s involvement, and they continued moving forward once Truman took office.52

While Manhattan Project officials were developing the plans for Operation

Harborage during April 1945, the Alsos Mission continued to investigate other targets in

Germany. In mid-April, Alsos personnel entered Stadtilm, where they hoped to find Kurt

Diebner and his Reich Research Council () institute. Alsos

51 John Lansdale, draft of “Operation Harborage,” Jul. 10, 1946; #7B War Department: Special Operations: Operation Harborage; Correspondence (‘Top Secret’) of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1109, roll 2); Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 52 Norris, Racing for the Bomb, 375-376.

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investigators instead learned that Diebner had been ordered by Gestapo officials out of

Stadtilm the previous weekend and had taken with him fourteen of the twenty-three members of his institute, along with secret documents, materials, and equipment.

Diebner apparently thought it useless to flee but had little choice. The group was reportedly heading to . Other than the information about Diebner’s whereabouts, and yet another confirmation that Hechingen, Haigerloch, and Celle (where physical chemist Paul Harteck’s institute was located) were important locations for nuclear research, the scientists at Stadtilm offered the Alsos Mission no new information.53

Shortly thereafter, Samuel Goudsmit, the Alsos Mission’s scientific director, and

Maj. Bob Furman, who oversaw the Alsos Mission within Groves’ office, located two other important German nuclear physicists, Fritz Houtermans and , in

Göttingen. Once again, interrogations of these two men reinforced the conclusions about

Germany’s wartime nuclear research that Alsos personnel had already reached. In northern Germany, a separate team of Alsos investigators were surprised to find Paul

Harteck’s -centrifuge laboratory in Celle under British guard. Harteck, however, was not to be found, having returned to . The documents that Alsos personnel found at Harteck’s laboratory once again indicated that German atomic research was “on a very small scale, purely laboratory work, but within view [of] possible large scale developments in the distant future.” Like other the Alsos reports written this spring, this analysis played down the risk that German nuclear research was on the verge of large-

53 Alsos to Groves and Smith, re: “Conclusions Reached from Stadtilm,” Apr. 17, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. .

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scale developments, in contrast to the worst-case-scenario analyses that had come from the Manhattan Project prior to these investigations.54

Operation Harborage began earlier than anticipated, on April 22, because French troops had moved into Württemberg faster than American and British officers had expected. American troops and Alsos personnel quickly moved into the area and were soon joined by four key British Tube Alloys and intelligence officials: Sir Charles

Hambro and David Gattiker of the Combined Development Trust, Michael Perrin of

Tube Alloys, and Lt. Cdr. Eric Welsh of MI6.55

Haigerloch was the first town that they investigated. The investigators found an exponential pile, a key step in creating a nuclear chain reaction, in a cave-like space in a cliff. Furman and some of the Alsos Mission’s combat engineers dismantled and photographed the pile before destroying its outer shell with hand grenades. The investigators found around one-and-a-half tons each of heavy water and uranium, which they dug up and loaded onto trucks for removal to Paris. The principle of denial is evident in the handling of the nuclear pile in Haigerloch. The removal of uranium and heavy water from the site fit with the Alsos Mission’s task to gain a complete picture of

German nuclear science, part of which involved accounting for known supplies of uranium and heavy water. Moreover, these supplies could be used by British and

American scientists, so their removal (as what could be considered war booty) made

54 “Ultra-centrifuge Installation in Celle,” Apr. 21, 1945; 32.24-1 Germany – Research – Res. Inst & Other Facilities; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 55 John Lansdale, draft of “Operation Harborage,” Jul. 10, 1946; #7B War Department: Special Operations: Operation Harborage; Correspondence (‘Top Secret’) of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1109, roll 2); Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. “Section 4-12: Haigerloch, Hechingen, Bisingen, and Tailfingen Operations” in “Foreign Intelligence Supplement No. 1 to Manhattan District History: Book I – General: Volume 14 – Intelligence & Security,” Nov. 8, 1948; “Manhattan District History,” 1942-46; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project; RG 77; NACP.

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sense. However, the destruction of the pile’s shell and the entrance to the cave that housed it could chiefly be explained as an effort to deny knowledge of German research to the French. Destroying the pile also precluded the use of the facility by the German scientists who might try to continue research there.56

Alsos personnel took control of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics in

Hechingen as well as the town of Bisingen two days later. The investigation in

Hechingen proved fruitful, and all but one of the scientists whom Alsos personnel expected to be found there were quickly located. Werner Heisenberg, the institute’s leader, was the lone exception, having left a week earlier to be with his family in Urfeld am Walchensee, Oberbayern. The main scientist of interest in Bisingen was Swiss physicist Walter Dällenbach, whom Alsos reports had indicated was possibly at work on a super (how that differed from a regular cyclotron was unclear) and was, thus, of concern. However, the Alsos investigators learned that he had left for Switzerland five months earlier. Alsos personnel interrogated Dällenbach’s assistant, but this interrogation and the technical data found indicated to Alsos that the Bisingen research was not an integral part of the German nuclear research program.57

Alsos’ combat battalion secured their final target, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for

Chemistry in Tailfingen, the next day. Lansdale accounted for all of the personnel

56 John Lansdale, draft of “Operation Harborage,” Jul. 10, 1946; #7B War Department: Special Operations: Operation Harborage; Correspondence (‘Top Secret’) of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1109, roll 2); Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Lansdale to Groves, May 5, 1945; 32.60-2 Germany – Summary Reports (1945-1946); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 57 John Lansdale, draft of “Operation Harborage,” Jul. 10, 1946; #7B War Department: Special Operations: Operation Harborage; Correspondence (‘Top Secret’) of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1109, roll 2); Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. It also does not appear that Alsos tried to track down Walter Dällenbach in Switzerland. If he had been in Bisingen at the time that Alsos personnel arrived, it seems likely that he would have been included in the future Farm Hall group.

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expected to be there in Otto Hahn’s institute. Alsos investigators described Hahn as

“very cordial and cooperative.” From him, they learned that institute had three separate groups, led respectively by Hahn, Josef Mattauch, and Erbacher. Mattauch and Erbacher were interrogated about their work and showed the Alsos investigators through their laboratories.58

On April 26, the day after the last of the four towns had been secured, Alsos officials cabled Washington officials about their operation’s success. In a cable that went out under Eisenhower’s name from SHAEF, the Alsos Mission reported to Groves,

Marshall, and Stimson that:

The Special ALSOS Mission headed by Boris Pash [the military commander of the entire Alsos Mission], working with the T Force of the 6th Army Group have hit the jackpot in the Hechingen area, and have secured personnel, information, and materiel exceeding their wildest expectations. Full details will be reported later through the usual secret channels, but we now unquestionably have everything and none of this information has leaked out.59

The Alsos Mission’s main task – to gain a complete picture of German nuclear research – was hinted at in this statement. So was the mission’s aim to keep its investigations secret from anyone else possible, especially the French and Soviets.

Marshall, Stimson, and Groves were likely pleased to know that no unnecessary

American or British personnel had found out about the investigation in Württemberg and that the investigation had been conducted without French interference.

58 C.A. Baumann, “Visit to KWI fur Chemie, Tailfingen,” May 7, 1945; 32.24-2 Germany: Research – Res. Inst. & Other Facilities (May 45-Dec. 46); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 59 Eisenhower to Marshall and Secretary of War, Apr. 26, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Groves received a special call to inform him that this cable had arrived. April 26, 1945 office diary entry; Jan. 1, 1945-Dec. 31, 1946; Diaries, 1940-48; Papers of Gen. Leslie R. Groves; National Archives Gift Collection, RG 200; NACP.

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That same day, Calvert wrote to Groves and Smith about the success of Operation

Harborage, although in less effusive terms than the cable that went to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. The Alsos Mission had captured all important personnel, except for Heisenberg and Diebner. Alsos personnel were in the process of tracing the

Germans’ supplies of heavy water and uranium, and dismantling the equipment they had found. Some of the German scientists would be removed from the area as soon as possible, although Calvert did not yet know where the scientists would be taken.60

Later that same day, Calvert sent Groves and Smith a more detailed message:

Lansdale thought that Alsos had obtained a complete set of documents from Hahn but was not sure that all other copies had been destroyed. This was an issue because of the desire to keep this information from the French, who would soon take over control of

Hahn’s institute in Tailfingen. Calvert reported that four scientists, Otto Hahn, Max von

Laue, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, and Karl Wirtz, would be taken to Heidelberg the next day. From there, they would be taken to a location near the SHAEF headquarters in

Paris for further interrogation.61

With all four towns secured in just four days, the Alsos investigators turned their attention to interrogating the scientists whom they had found. On April 26, Lansdale,

Welsh, and Perrin interrogated von Weizsäcker, Wirtz, and von Laue in Hechingen.

Lansdale reported that Wirtz and Weizsäcker were reticent to discuss their research with the Alsos personnel, insisting that the details of the project should be discussed by

60 Calvert did not clarify that Diebner was absent from his institute at Stadtilm, not Hechingen. Calvert to Smith (#43553), Apr. 26, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 61 Calvert to Smith (#43561), Apr. 26, 1946; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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Heisenberg with top-ranking American physicists. Thus, as with the scientists at

Strasbourg, part of the reason for detaining these scientists was the terseness of their answers. Wirtz and von Weizsäcker had been recognized as important scientists in the

Strasbourg Summary, so their detention also reflected the priority of preventing knowledgeable German scientists from helping the French (or the Soviets). Hahn, the discoverer of fission, and von Laue, a Nobel laureate, were both detained more on the basis of their eminence than their wartime research but also to deny their expertise to the

French.62

By the time that they headed for Heidelberg the next day, Alsos personnel had decided to detain three additional scientists: Erich Bagge, Horst Korsching, and Josef

Mattauch. Neither Bagge nor Korsching had been included on most of the lists of important German scientists that the Americans and British had drawn up during the preceding months and years. However, Alsos personnel were curious about their respective isotope separation experiments in progress at the time that Alsos troops arrived in Hechingen. Josef Mattauch was a leader within Hahn’s institute but Alsos personnel offered no comment in their reports about the reason for his detention. However, they soon changed their minds about detaining him, as Mattauch was not part of the group that was brought on to France from Heidelberg.63

62 John Lansdale, draft of “Operation Harborage,” Jul. 10, 1946; #7B War Department: Special Operations: Operation Harborage; Correspondence (‘Top Secret’) of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1109, roll 2); Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Goudsmit, Alsos, 104-105 63 Korsching’s unfamiliarity to the Alsos investigators was partly evident in varying spellings of his name. Lansdale’s 1946 report listed him as “Corsching”; other reports often dropped the ‘c’ from his last name. The 1945 iteration of Lansdale’s report, like Goudsmit’s book, did not list Korsching or Bagge by name at all. (To be fair, ’s last name was also often misspelled although his research was known to British and American scientists.) Korsching’s name did not appear on the Strasbourg Summary. Bagge had been included on the list of 122 scientists drawn from the documents found at Strasbourg, but this was one of the only two lists that Bagge’s name appeared on that spring. While he had studied with Werner

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The selection of these seven scientists meant that at least seventeen scientists whom Alsos personnel had described as “important” in the same reports about Operation

Harborage were left at their institutes. Alsos investigators operated on a limited timetable, as French troops began to enter these towns while they were still there.

Lansdale later wrote that these troops did not interfere with the Alsos investigation, in his view because both American and French Moroccan troops were in very small numbers, and both groups were concerned about the potential that German troops remained in the areas surrounding these towns. Given that “these towns…were all in valleys and only approachable through relatively narrow defiles,” neither side wanted to call attention to their presence by starting a fight.64 However, the presence of French troops meant that

Alsos personnel had to quickly choose which German scientists to detain.

After the decisions had been made about which scientists to take into custody,

Lansdale returned to SHAEF headquarters at Rheims. He and the SHAEF intelligence officers who had been involved in planning Operation Harborage, arranged for German scientists to be held in a house in Rheims beginning on May 2. The group would later be moved to a house in Spa, Belgium. Sir Charles Hambro, the British intelligence officer and Manhattan Project liaison who had accompanied Lansdale to Rheims, agreed to provide a “keeper” for the scientists, while SHAEF would supply the housekeeping.

Heisenberg, and was working with him at the end of the war, Bagge was relatively young and at the beginning of his career. At Stadtilm, another German scientist had mentioned Bagge’s new work on isotope separation, noting that Bagge was having some success with enriching uranium hexafluoride, which Manhattan Project officials would have wanted to know more about. Francis J. Smith memorandum to L.R. Groves, Feb. 3, 1945; 32.60-2 Germany – Summary Reports (1945-1946); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Per Goudsmit, von Weizsäcker was perplexed by the decision to detain Bagge and Korsching, apparently thinking “that the young fellows were not important enough to be interned.” Goudsmit, Alsos, 104. 64 John Lansdale, draft of “Operation Harborage,” Jul. 10, 1946; #7B War Department: Special Operations: Operation Harborage; Correspondence (‘Top Secret’) of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1109, roll 2); Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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The next day, Furman reiterated to Groves and Smith that the operation at

Hechingen had been successful and that “[a]ll previous impressions [had been] confirmed.” Once again, the list of scientists that he included was incomplete. Furman wrote that important personnel, including von Weizsäcker, Hahn, von Laue, Wirtz, and

Bagge, had been secured, but did not mention Korsching. He explained Bagge’s inclusion on this list by noting that he was experimenting with a “lock separation device,” a description that would presumably have clarified his importance to those in the

Manhattan Project office reading this cable.

While Operation Harborage had been deemed a success, and plans were already being made to detain the scientists taken, the Alsos Mission’s investigations were not yet complete. On April 30, Alsos personnel formed two teams in Bavaria, with the goal of finding Werner Heisenberg, Kurt Diebner, and Walther Gerlach. One Alsos team found

Gerlach at the University of Munich’s physics laboratory the next day. They interviewed him and examined the records found in his laboratory. From Gerlach, the Alsos personnel learned that Diebner was likely at Schöngeising, around twenty miles west of

Munich. After they located him, the Alsos team took Diebner, along with some of the documents and uranium that the Gestapo had had him take with him from Stadtilm, back to Munich. The next day, May 3, Alsos personnel transported both scientists to

Heidelberg. The other Alsos group reached Urfeld, where they expected to find

Heisenberg, on May 2. They found Heisenberg the next day, and began the nearly 250- mile trip to Heidelberg the day after that. Interrogations of the three scientists about their wartime work “failed to produce any new positive information of interest to the

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Manhattan Project,” but once again strengthened and confirmed previous conclusions.

However, all three scientists remained in Alsos custody.65

On May 5, an Alsos team in northern Germany entered Hamburg to find Paul

Harteck. Hamburg had by then fallen into Allied hands, and the Alsos investigators found Harteck under British guard, a fact which was not mentioned in Manhattan Project histories of Alsos. Harteck was apparently quite cooperative, detailing even the letter that he had sent to the Army Ordinance Office (Heereswaffenamt) in April 1939 about the military potential of nuclear physics. He also provided Alsos personnel with information about his work on the production of heavy water and use of centrifuges for isotope separation.66

…

Between April 23 and May 5, 1945, Alsos personnel detained ten members of the future Farm Hall group. Six of the men were found in Hechingen and Tailfingen, in

Württemberg; three in Bavaria; and one in Hamburg. The Alsos Mission interrogated twenty-eight other German scientists, some of whose work was actually more important to German wartime nuclear research than those who were detained. These other twenty- eight scientists, however, worked in cities over which American or British forces would

65 “Section 4-13: Urfeld and Munich Operations” in “Foreign Intelligence Supplement No. 1 to Manhattan District History: Book I – General: Volume 14 – Intelligence & Security,” Nov. 8, 1948; “Manhattan District History,” 1942-46; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project; RG 77; NACP. 66 “Section 4-14: Hamburg Operation” in “Foreign Intelligence Supplement No. 1 to Manhattan District History: Book I – General: Volume 14 – Intelligence & Security,” Nov. 8, 1948; “Manhattan District History,” 1942-46; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project; RG 77; NACP. Prior to Harteck’s capture, Goudsmit wrote to the Alsos headquarters in Paris with an analysis of Harteck’s files found at Celle. Goudsmit thought that the files gave “a complete and absolutely up-to-date picture of heavy water in Germany.” S.A. Goudsmit, “Harteck’s Heavy Water Files (Found at Celle),” May 2, 1945; 32.22-1 Germany – Research – TA (1943-June 1946); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944- 46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. The T Force’s official history described only two of their 106 targets in Hamburg; Harteck was one of those two. “History of ‘T’ Force Activities in 21 Army Group: Appendix E: Comments on ‘T’ Force Activities in Second British Army,” Feb. 25, 1946, TNA: PRO FO 1031/49.

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soon have military jurisdiction. This meant that their research institutes could be kept under American and British supervision or control.67

A Manhattan Project account about the “German Situation,” written after

Operation Harborage had concluded, discussed the necessity of scrutinizing German wartime atomic research. The report ended with an affirmation that the future international danger posed by atomic research in Germany had been largely but not completely removed:

It is believed that for the present the means for Germans, or anyone working in Germany, to continue work in the Tube Alloy field have been removed. It is not believed that there is any information or equipment remaining in that portion of Germany to be occupied by France which can give any clear picture of German work. However, various assistants to the principal scientists remain, and extensive interrogation would give any interested party considerable information. Means to ascertain the complete picture of the work in Germany did exist in that area under Russian control. The extent to which it remains is unknown.68

The emphasis on how information about the German program had been denied to

France and the Soviet Union speaks to the key motivations for Operation Harborage.

Alsos personnel had been unable to investigate German nuclear research institutes in

Berlin but had otherwise made a thorough accounting of German nuclear scientists and their institutes. Finding out what German scientists knew and were doing (and ascertaining what, if any, danger this posed to the US and Britain) was of primary importance. However, denying this information to other countries – even Allies – was a close second on the list. In French-controlled areas, such as Strasbourg and

67 “Section 4-17: Overall Results and Termination of Western and Central European Investigations” in “Foreign Intelligence Supplement No. 1 to Manhattan District History: Book I – General: Volume 14 – Intelligence & Security,” Nov. 8, 1948; “Manhattan District History,” 1942-46; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project; RG 77; NACP. 68 “Summary: German Situation,” n.d.; #7F War Department: Special Operations: Alsos Mission – Germany; Correspondence (‘Top Secret’) of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942-1946 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1109, roll 2); Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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Württemberg, the principle of denial trumped the priority of gaining a complete picture of

German research. Alsos personnel, in the author’s estimation, had done a good job in removing key information (in the form of scientists, documents, and research equipment) from the future French zone. The author cautioned, however, that French scientists could still acquire a fair amount of information about Germany’s wartime research by interviewing those left at the German institutes. Little else could be done at this point about France or the Soviet Union finding sources about German atomic research in their occupation zones. Manhattan Project and Tube Alloys officials would, however, continued to prioritize denying the detained German scientists and their expertise to

France and the Soviet Union throughout the scientists’ detention and after their eventual repatriation.

What would happen to the detained scientists in the immediate or long term was also yet unknown. Germany surrendered on May 8, which meant that postwar considerations became even more important in deciding what to do with these scientists.

The next chapter will discuss the challenges that soon emerged in finding suitable locations to house these scientists. These difficulties ultimately led British officials to propose bringing the group to Farm Hall.

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Chapter 2: The German Scientists’ Detention in France and Belgium, May-June 1945

During May and June 1945, Manhattan Project intelligence officials faced numerous difficulties in finding suitable locations to house the German atomic scientists whom they had detained. During these two months, British and American officials shuttled the scientists among four locations in France and Belgium. The principles of secrecy and control had guided the scientists’ capture and continued to guide their detention, albeit in different ways. The Americans intended to keep the group in secret for many months, until at least fall. They wanted to hold the scientists in good conditions, which reflected a few goals: to preserve these scientists’ willingness to work with the United States, to keep them willing to share information about their research, and to make the scientists less likely to share information or collaborate with other countries (especially France and the Soviet Union) if future opportunities to do so arose.

The option of bringing the group to the US was rejected at this time, and may never have been seriously considered.

The challenges that Manhattan Project officials faced in May and June 1945, both in Europe and in the US, made achieving these intelligence goals difficult. The war in

Europe ended on May 7 with Germany’s unconditional surrender. Conditions in Europe were grim. Millions of people, both soldiers and civilians, were dead and wounded, and many cities had been destroyed. There were millions of displaced persons from Germany and its neighboring states, and the Allies also held many thousands of prisoners of war.

Germany’s economy was in shambles, its transportation system nearly paralyzed, and a food crisis was developing. The Allies intended to denazify and demilitarize Germany,

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but how these efforts would be carried out was yet unknown. How the four Allied occupiers would work together after the war remained to be seen.

The war in Asia, of course, was not yet over and considerable military and political resources remained devoted to that effort. A key, although still highly secret, part of that effort was the Manhattan Project. By May 1945, the project was heading into final stretch of developing and testing an atomic bomb. Preparations of the test site at Alamogordo, New Mexico had begun in late spring and Manhattan project scientists had successfully carried out experiments to assemble the future bomb’s critical mass of uranium. Plans to use an atomic weapon against Japan had been ongoing since

December 1944; at the end of April 1945, the Target Committee began drawing up specific plans for the bomb’s use. In May, the bombing group which had been designated to deploy an atomic bomb moved to the Marianas Islands, its base for such an attack.69

It was during this busy time, with the chaotic postwar situation in Germany and the feverish rush to complete and test an atomic bomb, that Manhattan Project and Tube

Alloys officials had to make their first substantive decisions about what to do with the

German scientists whom the Alsos Mission had captured in late April and early May.

The initial American intentions for the detention, which involved keeping the group in strict secrecy and relatively comfortable conditions, were quickly challenged by the realities of the postwar situation in Europe and the Manhattan Project’s priority of producing an atomic bomb.

69 Kelly, The Manhattan Project, 305, 317, 319-321, 323-326; Rhodes, Making of the Atomic Bomb, 613- 614.

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Eventually, the British officer who oversaw the group, Maj. Tom Rittner, suggested bringing the scientists to Farm Hall in England. From an American perspective, Farm Hall was not the ideal location to house the scientists, since moving them there required relinquishing primary control of the group. These American concerns have not been examined as part of the history of Farm Hall. Eventually, this alternative ultimately proved better than the other options available in May and June

1945. Manhattan Project officials had intended to keep the German scientists under their control, partly to gain any useful knowledge that the Germans had about atomic science and partly to deny their knowledge – whether or not it proved useful to the Manhattan

Project – to other countries, mainly France and the Soviet Union but also to some extent to Britain. However, moving to the scientists to England allowed American officials to continue keeping these scientists (and their research) as secret as possible. The ongoing secrecy and control of the scientists, even if under primarily British supervision, meant that Manhattan Project officials could take more time to make decisions about the scientists’ futures. Given the more pressing concerns of Manhattan Project officials in

May and June 1945, buying more time for long-term plans became the best option.

…

On May 1, Maj. T.H. (Tom) Rittner received orders from Lt. Cdr. Eric Welsh of

MI6 to travel to Rheims, France. Rittner was an officer with the Combined Services

Detailed Interrogation Centre (CSDIC), a British wartime intelligence bureau. He was to supervise a group of German scientists, whom he was supposed to treat as guests. Rittner

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was told that the group would later be visited by “a number of distinguished British and

American scientists” but until then absolutely no one was to contact them.70

Robert Furman of the Manhattan Project arrived in Rheims the next day with six

“guests”: Otto Hahn, Max von Laue, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Karl Wirtz, Erich

Bagge, and Horst Korsching, who had been removed from their institutes in Hechingen and Tailfingen by Alsos personnel on April 27. By the time the group settled in at 75

Rue Gambetta, it was already clear that it would be possible neither to keep the scientists in Rheims for long nor to move them to Spa, Belgium, as had been intended. Rittner spoke to Welsh and Maj. Tony Calvert, who headed the Manhattan Project’s London office, the next day and was told that the group would instead soon be moved to a chateau near Versailles.71

Rittner reported that the German scientists “were friendly and settled down well.”

He gave them access to the house and part of its garden in exchange for their promise not to leave those areas. Within a few days, however, the men became restive, especially because of their concern about their families. To assuage the scientists’ fears, Rittner arranged permission for the group to write letters to their families. He censored the

70 CSDIC’s role in the German scientists’ detention will be explained in more detail at the beginning of the next chapter. “The Story of M.I.19,” n.d., TNA: PRO WO 208/4970; Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 65. For ease of citation, I have quoted the Farm Hall reports as reprinted in Jeremy Bernstein’s book rather than the copies held by American and British National Archives. Unless otherwise noted, a citation of Bernstein refers to these primary source documents. I will indicate when I draw on Bernstein’s annotations or analysis. 71 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 65-66. Bernstein incorrectly describes Calvert as “a member of the Alsos Mission’s scientist team.” Calvert did provide intelligence information to the Alsos mission, but it was through his role as Groves’ Manhattan Project representative in London. As of April 30, the day before Rittner received his orders to supervise the scientists, British officials indicated that the six scientists were going to be supervised in Belgium by MI6 officers, which did not come to pass but showed the level of MI6 involvement that was considered, beyond Eric Welsh’s participation. A.R. Rawlinson, “Future of C.S.D.I.C.: Since writing foregoing…,” Apr. 30, 1945, TNA: PRO WO 208/3451.

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letters before passing them to the assistant chief of staff for intelligence at SHAEF (they were never actually delivered).72

The same day that he arrived with the scientists in Rheims, Maj. Bob Furman,

Groves’ officer who oversaw the Alsos Mission, cabled Groves’ office with some additional information that he had learned from the German scientists on their journey from Heidelberg. The scientists had told Furman that an underground laboratory in

Berlin (presumably at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics in Dahlem) was the most extensive of their research facilities and the equipment and documents there would provide a full picture of the German program. Alsos investigators already knew about the Berlin laboratory and Furman wrote that no investigation was planned, although someone from Calvert’s London office might “be assigned to cover [the] target as an incidental interest,” if conditions allowed it. His effort to pass along this information, even though it was of low intelligence value, demonstrates how the Manhattan Project’s foreign intelligence officers continued to investigate Germany’s atomic research program even after they had learned that the program was not a direct threat to the US. Soviet troops could inspect the German institutes in Dahlem which might conceivably create a threat to the US and Britain if the German scientists’ research proved useful to Soviet scientists, so Manhattan Project intelligence officers still needed to monitor all German research facilities.73

72 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 66. 73 The scientists likely offered this information as a way to prove the ‘good’ research they had done during the war. They might also have been aware of the possibility that Soviet troops would investigate this facility, although it is not possible to tell from this source. Furman to Smith, May 2, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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Furman was still in Rheims on May 4 when he again cabled Groves’ office to ask what plans were being made to continue investigating the captured scientists. Furman thought that the documents taken from the Germans’ institutes, some of which Col. John

Lansdale had recently brought to Washington, would be the most useful way in gaining a sense of the technical elements of the German program. He asked whether Richard

Tolman was going to visit to the scientists.74 Furman considered such a visit unnecessary from an intelligence standpoint. However, if Groves or anyone else in the US was considering the future employment of these scientists, a visit by Tolman in the near future could be useful.75

Furman’s question about Tolman raises the possibility that American officials contemplated employing the detained German scientists. However, this cable is the only apparent mention of this option in spring 1945. If American officials had been serious about employing any or all of these scientists in the US, the scientists’ temporary detention in France would have been the time to arrange their move to North America.

The Manhattan Project, however, had no immediate use for these scientists in terms of their expertise and, even if it had, the Germans could not have been brought to work on the Manhattan Project without a major change to its security rules. The absence of efforts to employ the scientists in the US demonstrated that the main motivation for the detention was to deny the scientists and their knowledge to other countries.

The prospect of bringing the scientists to America, even if quickly dismissed, also demonstrates the haphazard way in which the scientists’ detention was begun. Even

74 Tolman was a distinguished physicist and chemist, and served as vice chairman of the National Defense Research Committee and as an adviser to Leslie Groves. Norris, Racing for the Bomb, 14, 237, 320. 75 Furman to Smith, May 4, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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those closely involved with the events, like Furman, were not entirely sure what the detention’s long-term purpose was (or, perhaps, knew that various options were under consideration, although had not yet been decided).

Furman’s cable also raised the question of how much of the scientific intelligence gleaned from Germany was to be shared with the British. At a recent joint atomic intelligence meeting in London, British officials had asked to review the documents collected by the Alsos Mission in Germany before these papers were sent on to the US.

Up to that point, Alsos reports had been shared with the British only as summaries but

Lansdale (who had attended the meeting) saw no harm in sharing this additional information. Lansdale’s advice demonstrates the limits that were placed on sharing information about the Alsos investigations with the British. This accorded with Groves’ attempt to control all information gained about the German project, although this control could not be complete, given British-American cooperation on a number of atomic- related efforts. This tension between Manhattan Project officials’ desire for help from the

British on intelligence work, while also being reluctant – if not refusing – to reciprocate fully with the information gained, was an ongoing issue during the detention of the

German scientists.76

After spending just five days at Rheims, the Germans were taken to the Chateau du Chesnay near Versailles on May 7, the same day of the German surrender ended

World War II in Europe. SHAEF’s assistant chief of staff for intelligence had recently formed a camp near Paris called Dustbin (in which Chateau du Chesnay was located) for the detention of individuals wanted for scientific interrogation. Rittner found the

76 Furman to Smith, May 4, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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conditions at this location “most unsatisfactory” because “there was great danger of undesirable contacts being made with the professors.” The level of comfort for the scientists was too low, with only camp beds for furniture and rations.

Rittner spoke with Welsh and Furman about his concerns the next day, and Furman promised to try to arrange to move the scientists back to Rheims.77

Rittner wrote that the scientists initially accepted the comparatively poor conditions at the Chateau du Chesnay “with as good a grace as possible” but within a few days were restive (a description that Rittner used repeatedly throughout the Farm Hall reports) and “highly indignant at being treated as ‘war criminals.’” To lighten their moods, Rittner took the scientists in small groups to see the gardens and palace at

Versailles, but even that effort proved a security problem when a guard at the Hall of

Mirrors asked to see the group’s identity cards. Rittner quickly left rather than reveal his charges’ identities.

Rittner’s efforts to mollify the scientists reflected his effort to treat them as guests

(albeit involuntary ones) while maintaining a high level of secrecy around their detention.

The scientists had promised Rittner not to leave the grounds where they were held. If they became overly dissatisfied with their treatment, it seems that in both Rheims and

Dustbin the scientists had the opportunity to make their predicament known to others, if they so chose.78 The scientists’ detention needed to be kept a secret so as not to call

77 Rittner noted that he managed to contact both Welsh and Furman despite “the general holiday atmosphere at SHAEF and in London consequent upon the declaration of VE day.” Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 66-67. Furman to Smith, May 5, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45- Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. SHAEF’s 12th Army Group ran Dustbin and a related camp, Ashcan, which was for political interrogation. E.J. King-Salter to Lawrence, “Future Policy Regarding Interrogation Centres,” Jun. 20, 1945, TNA: PRO WO 208/3451. 78 Whether they could have contacted anyone who could (or would) have done anything about their detention is unknown but possible. Rittner wrote that a scientific adviser to SHAEF had recognized Max

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attention to why American and British authorities were interested in these particular individuals and their research.

The security situation at Dustbin concerned Rittner more than the scientists’ feelings about their accommodations. Other British and American officials detained and interrogated other German scientists in the same house, so keeping the identity of his charges a secret proved difficult. A few days after he and the group had arrived at

Dustbin, Rittner wrote that it had become clear that Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower’s order that “no preferential treatment was to be given to any German national” was the main cause of the housing difficulties. American and British officials hoped to work around this order, which required keeping the detention a secret from American military officials.79

While the Rittner supervised the scientists at the Chateau du Chesnay, Furman worked to find better housing for the group. Like Rittner, Furman was frustrated by the difficulty of finding suitable accommodations for the detained scientists. He had deemed the house at Rheims “perfect” in terms of both security and comfort. However, the change in SHAEF policy meant that no prisoners would receive any special attention, which is exactly what Manhattan Project officials wanted to give to the scientists.80

In his search for a better location to house the captured scientists, Furman attempted to balance the Manhattan Project’s overarching security concerns and desire for complete secrecy of atomic science with the specific security issues that existed in

von Laue outside of the chateau at Dustbin but Rittner had cut their conversation short. Around the same time, the scientists asked Rittner to contact French physicist Frédéric Joliot-Curie, so that he could help them, but Rittner refused to do so. Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 67. 79 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 67. 80 Furman to Smith and Lansdale, May 11, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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Europe. One security risk came from other Americans. While not widely known, the scientists’ detention was not entirely a secret among British and American officials at

SHAEF, which was likely a key reason why Groves had initially tried to avoid involving

SHAEF officials in the planning of Operation Harborage. Some SHAEF officials had already asked to interview von Laue. Furman had been able to prevent such an interview from taking place but noted that it would be difficult to “prohibit everyone from seeing these individuals,” even though this was in the Manhattan Project’s security interest.

Moving the scientists to a location that provided fewer opportunities for SHAEF officers to have access to the scientists was, thus, a high priority.

British officials posed another security risk to the Manhattan Project’s effort to control all atomic information. Furman hoped that Rittner could be replaced with an

Alsos officer, Lt. Jack Ditesheim, who had training as a German linguist and in intelligence. Furman requested that Ditesheim be transferred to Calvert’s London office as soon as possible to take over this duty. Since Manhattan Project officials intended to allow no questioning by outsiders, Rittner could then be assigned to an intelligence task more important than overseeing the six scientists. However, Rittner could not simply be asked to step aside, since he reported to Eric Welsh at MI6. Furman hoped that Sir

Charles Hambro, who was on friendly terms with both Groves and British atomic officials in his role as a British intelligence officer and liaison to the Manhattan Project, could be asked to relay this request to Welsh.

In addition to overly-interested individuals, both British and American, the conditions in postwar Europe complicated Furman’s search for housing. Another intelligence officer had suggested moving the group to Sweden “or some other secluded

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spot” because of the difficulties of keeping “such prominent people inconspicuously isolated.” Furman agreed with this suggestion in principle, since finding someplace isolated would forestall “potential difficulties in the future.” However, it does not appear that Sweden ever received serious consideration as a location to house the scientists.

Furman rejected the possibility that the scientists could be moved to an isolated location in America or England on the grounds that such a move posed disadvantages “beyond his ability to explain.” Furman’s audience in the Manhattan Project’s Washington office would have understood what these disadvantages were. They likely included the political or security risks that these scientists might pose, as well as the opposition that might arise if these recent enemies were brought to England or America. Furman’s conclusion was, thus, that the group needed to be kept in Europe, in secret, and a suitable place to accomplish both of those goals needed to be found as soon as possible.81

As a result of Furman’s efforts, Rittner received word on in mid-May that he and his detainees would be able to move out of the Chateau du Chesnay. They could not move back to Rheims but instead could make temporary use of a house in Le Vésinet, a few miles north of Versailles. That night, he and the scientists made the short drive to their new provisional lodgings.82

81 Furman to Smith and Lansdale, May 11, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Background on Ditesheim: W.M. Adams to B.T. Pash, Feb. 13, 1945; Alsos Material; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 82 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 67.

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Fig. 1. Furman sent this photo to the Manhattan Project’s Washington office on June 8. He described it as “the temporary establishment for our guests at Les Vincennes, outside of Paris.” It is likely that this photo should have been labeled Le Vésinet, where the scientists were held from May 11 to June 4.83

Just before the group moved to their newest temporary home, Alsos officers brought Werner Heisenberg and Kurt Diebner to join them. Heisenberg and Diebner had been interrogated in Heidelberg after they were brought there from Bavaria on May 3.

One day later, Furman brought Paul Harteck to join the group. After his capture in Hamburg, first by a British T Force and then Alsos personnel, Goudsmit had interrogated Harteck in Paris. Goudsmit’s report about his interview with Harteck

83 R.R. Furman to John Lansdale Jr. and Francis J. Smith, Jun. 8, 1945; 202.2 London Office: Combined Intell Disc; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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reflected a reason to keep the scientists in relatively comfortable confinement: the possibility that American scientists might be able to make use of the Germans’ research, either in the short or long term. Goudsmit was impressed both with the work that

Harteck had done and his cooperation, writing that Harteck “talks very freely and is glad to discuss his work with anyone interested. Among those we have contacted, he is probably the one who is most likely to have some interesting information on important details connected with the problem [i.e. atomic research] and is certainly willing to discuss them.” Goudsmit emphasized Harteck’s connection to – and, presumably, his friendliness toward – Britain by noting that Harteck had spent a year in Cambridge with eminent physicist and chemist Ernest Rutherford. Goudsmit recommended that Harteck be treated in such a way “that he will not change his attitude.”84

At Le Vésinet, Rittner reported that the nine professors “were delighted with their new surroundings and the old atmosphere of cordiality quickly returned.” The men busied themselves with repairing the plumbing and electric lights in the house. Rittner was pleased with the new accommodations but knew that they were only available for a short time. The day after arriving in Le Vésinet, Rittner suggested to his London headquarters that “efforts be made to bring the party to England as it was obvious that it would not be possible to arrange accommodation on the Continent suitable for carrying out my mission.” This mid-May request was evidently the first time that the suggestion to move the scientists to England was made.85

84 S.A. Goudsmit, “Interrogation of Harteck on May 11, 1945,” May 11, 1945; 32.22-1 Germany – Research – TA (1943-June 1946); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 85 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 68.

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A few new issues arose regarding the scientists’ morale, which affected their willingness to remain complicit in their detention. Furman had inadvertently mentioned that French colonial troops were still occupying Hechingen and Tailfingen. This news

“caused consternation among the professors, who had been told that American troops would be taking over.” As a result, Heisenberg asked permission to write to his “friend”

Goudsmit to ask for news of the scientists’ families. Goudsmit’s eventual reply calmed the scientists. Rittner had received permission from Michael Perrin, a key leader of the

British Tube Alloys project, for this letter to be sent. If Rittner had asked Furman or someone else from Groves’ office, it was likely that this request would have been turned down, given the Americans’ attempt to keep these scientists in complete secrecy. The fact that Rittner had asked Perrin for this permission, and not a Manhattan Project official, was probably one of the reasons that American officials wanted to replace

Rittner with an American officer. This difference in opinion between British and

American atomic officials about the level of secrecy necessary was an ongoing point of contention throughout the scientists’ detention.86

Meanwhile, Furman had learned that French physicist Frédéric Joliot-Curie was leading a scientific investigation of Stuttgart and Karlsruhe, near Hechingen. Furman thought that Joliot-Curie had “no idea what [the] Hechingen area is worth” but was

“trying to find out about [the] German [research] effort.” These French investigations retrospectively justified the Alsos Mission’s efforts to spirit key nuclear scientists and

86 This appears to have been a lie, since Hechingen and Tailfingen were in the French zone of occupation. This falsehood was perhaps used to assuage the scientists’ fears about leaving their families in Hechingen and Tailfingen. Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 68. Warner memorandum (attached to Heisenberg’s letter to Goudsmit, May 13, 1945); 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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their papers out of southwestern Württemberg. French scientists were understandably interested in German research for some of the same reasons that the Americans were: to see what the Germans had done and see if they might make use of this research for their own country. Neither Alsos officials nor American troops had the authority to keep

French investigators out of the Württemberg towns in which the German institutes were located, but they had succeeded in denying some information about the Germans’ wartime research to the French. Manhattan Project officials could not prevent these

French investigations but they continued to monitor French nuclear scientists as best as they could.87

Manhattan Project actions in Germany could not be kept completely secret from the French. On May 16, Furman asked his colleagues in Washington and London about how much of the Alsos Mission’s operation in Württemberg could be acknowledged to

French intelligence and scientific officials. By then, he was fairly certain that Joliot-

Curie was investigating German atomic research in Hechingen.88 A French scientific liaison officer had recently asked Goudsmit if he had seen Heisenberg. Goudsmit had lied that he had not, even though he thought that the French probably knew about the

Alsos operation in Hechingen and the removal of the six German scientists. Furman wanted to know what Alsos personnel and other Manhattan Project intelligence officials should say in the future “if asked directly by French authorities” about the detained

87 Furman to Lansdale and Smith, May 13, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 88 Furman was correct. Based on a letter that German scientist Fritz Bopp wrote to the administrators of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society in Göttingen on June 3, French investigators had arrived in Hechingen on May 10. Translation of Fritz Bopp to the Administration of the KWG, Göttingen, Jun. 3, 1945; 32.24-2 Germany: Research – Res. Inst. & Other Facilities (May 45-Dec. 46); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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German scientists. Furman suggested acknowledging that the Americans had captured the German scientists and scientific documents, since the French had probably discovered that anyway by this time.89

It seems surprising for Furman to have given this recommendation, which does not appear to have been carried out. His suggestion disregarded Groves’ overriding concern with controlling information about nuclear research. Furman may have made this recommendation based on the realities of the situation in France and the French zone of Germany. The scientists’ detention was known among their colleagues left behind in

Hechingen and Tailfingen, which meant that the French investigators and scientists who arrived in those towns would learn about their research. Furman may have seen the

French scientists as less of a threat than other personnel in Groves’ office or he may have hoped to forge a better relationship with the French officials by not futilely attempting to deny the Americans’ investigations in Württemberg.

Another possibility is that Furman was swayed by Samuel Goudsmit’s opinion on the subject. A week earlier, Goudsmit finished a report about nuclear security, in which he argued that “[t]he attempt to keep German TA activities secret is bound to be without success.” Too many German scientists knew about the nuclear research and too many of the reports about the most important aspects of the research were still in Germany.

Personnel and laboratories were located throughout Germany, with the “best laboratories” in Berlin and the Hechingen area, which would be respectively “covered by

Russian and French intelligence.” Furthermore, it would be impossible to maintain the wartime security of the Manhattan Project after the war, since scientists who worked on

89 Furman to Lansdale and Smith, May 16, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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the project would “be dispersed all over the USA as well as over parts of Europe.” As such, Manhattan Project officials needed to be realistic about the future possibilities for controlling information about nuclear science. Despite Furman’s efforts, knowledge of – let alone access to – the detained German scientists would continue to be denied to the

French by Manhattan Project officials.90

Paradoxically, the Manhattan Project’s policy about whether its own officials and scientists could question the German scientists was opaque, since compartmentalization of knowledge within the Manhattan Project remained in force. In mid-May, Calvert asked his Washington colleagues whether any “eminent American scientists or English scientists from the State[s]” would be sent to interview the detained Germans, which presumably meant British or American scientists at work on the Manhattan Project.

Personnel in Calvert’s London office were interested in interviewing the scientists, especially Diebner, about what they knew about the research underway in the US and

Britain. However, Calvert recommended that the German scientists be questioned about their scientific and technical knowledge before posing questions about their knowledge of

American and British research, probably to avoid tipping off the German scientists about the scale of American and British work.91

Calvert’s request to interview the detained scientists contrasted with concurrent correspondence by Furman, which suggested that his (and the Manhattan Project’s) overriding concern was to detain the scientists in secret, not to interrogate them further.

90 S.A. Goudsmit memorandum re: “TA Security,” May 10, 1945; 32.7002: Germany – Alsos Mission – Administrative Matters (1940-1945); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 91 Calvert to Lansdale, May 14, 1945; and Davis to Smith, May 22, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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Manhattan Project officials had numerous issues to deal with in May 1945, not least of which was the climactic phase of the development of the atomic bomb.

Although Calvert’s question about high-level scientific visitors from the US went unanswered, the German scientists did have a couple of visitors in mid-May from the

Tube Alloys and Manhattan Projects. Lansdale and Hambro had arrived in Washington on May 3 with documents from Hechingen, Tailfingen, and Harteck’s institute in Celle.

The questions posed to the scientists likely arose during British and American officials’ analyses of these documents. David Gattiker, a member of the Tube Alloys project who had observed Operation Harborage, came to ask Harteck and Wirtz about “the whereabouts of certain apparatus” on behalf of Michael Perrin of the Tube Alloys project.92 Furman sent Ditesheim to ask Harteck additional questions about the separation apparatus that he had been using at his Celle laboratory. Rittner was present during these interviews and noted that Harteck and Wirtz had been cooperative.

Questions like these would have reinforced the scientists’ interpretation of their detention as an opportunity for British and American scientists to learn from their research, which they assumed superior to whatever the British and Americans had done during the war.

Rittner described his nine detainees as fairly content with their lives at Le Vésinet.

The men spent their time on work and exercise. They had access to the house’s garden and Rittner had provided them with books, technical journals, and games. Twice a week, the scientists held colloquia.93

On May 20, just over a week after Rittner had asked his headquarters to consider bringing the scientists to England, he received word that officials in London had passed

92 Gattiker was a high-ranking member of the Tube Alloys project. He also served on the Combined Development Trust. Norris, Racing for the Bomb, 299, 304. 93 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 68-69.

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along that request to their counterparts in Washington. Rittner, however, was to proceed as if he knew nothing about these negotiations. Accordingly, he went ahead with plans to inspect a new site in Belgium that Furman had found. It is not clear whether Furman was informed about the negotiations to move the scientists to England, although he probably he would have been. His Manhattan Project colleagues would have wanted to know if his impressions about the unsuitability of the accommodations in France were in accord with

Rittner’s.94

Furman remained concerned not only with the specific details of the German scientists’ detention but also how that detention fit into broader Manhattan Project plans.

In addition to the immediate problems created by the end of the war in Germany and the investigation of German research by multiple countries, the detention of the German scientists was part of the Manhattan Project’s long-range intelligence efforts. By late

May, Furman was apprehensive about the impact that the looming end of the Alsos

Mission would have on the Manhattan Project’s ability to remain informed about atomic science in Europe in the coming years. Furman anticipated closing the Manhattan

Project’s Paris office, which had been set up after Alsos personnel entered France in

August 1944, by June 1. Staff there had already sent most of the German documents they had collected to Calvert’s London office or Washington.

Furman advocated for an ongoing role for Alsos in Europe. It appeared likely that the Alsos Mission would be scaled down significantly, if not ended, after it finished its

German investigations. Furman hoped that some personnel and facilities could remain on call, since it was otherwise difficult to find qualified people and supplies to quickly conduct investigations. His concern with this issue speaks to the awareness among some

94 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 69.

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Manhattan Project officials about the long-term nature of their intelligence-gathering work, as well as the long-term implications of the topic they were investigating. The atomic bomb had yet to be tested but Manhattan Project officials were already convinced that nuclear weapons research would be a topic about which they would need to gain intelligence for years to come.

Boris Pash, the military head of Alsos, had recently told SHAEF officials that the

Alsos Mission’s investigations were complete and was headed to Washington with the same message. Furman thought, however, that some American commanders in Europe agreed with him that the job for which Alsos had been created was in no way over.

Additional scientists, research equipment, and reports needed to be investigated and analyzed. Furman and his team tried to collect whatever documents they could, but it remained “impossible to keep other agencies from finding out about the German effort.”

He still wanted to be more open with the French about the detention of the scientists from

Hechingen and Tailfingen but had not gained permission to do so. Furman’s concerns demonstrate the Manhattan Project’s efforts to protect its intelligence gathering efforts from many sets of prying eyes, American, French, and, although not mentioned here,

Soviet and British. These interrelated concerns meant that keeping the German scientists’ detention a secret remained necessary since too many unknowns remained about where future threats would emerge.

In addition to his concerns about the overall direction in which Alsos was headed,

Furman had to deal with the specific problems that emerged because of the detention of the German scientists. By late May, Ditesheim, whom Furman had previously suggested could supervise the German scientists, was instead scheduled to return to Washington.

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Furman now hoped to assign Lt. Marinus G. Toepel of Alsos to supervise the German scientists. Furman’s request to Washington was urgent: “Please wire me immediately on him as I need him now.” Because of Pash’s report to SHAEF officials that the Alsos

Mission was close to finishing its tasks, Furman could not get Toepel assigned to this new task without intervention from higher-ranking officials. Ironically, the Manhattan

Project’s efforts to keep its intelligence work secret from most SHAEF officials meant that they sometimes encountered difficulties in trying to carry out their work. Another

Alsos agent, Oates, was covering for Toepel as best as he could, but Furman deemed

Toepel as better suited for the role. Toepel was fluent in German and had participated in

Operation Harborage, so he was more familiar with the scientists and the reasons for their detention. Furman added, “If you wish, we will look for someone else to avoid difficulties but we know Toepel is briefed and able. I believe he is the best solution.”

Whether Toepel’s assignment could be arranged was yet unclear.

The German scientists’ detention created hassles for Furman because the restrictive rules about the treatment of prisoners of war – which the Manhattan Project did not declare the scientists as – and other captured Germans put him in a delicate situation. He wrote:

I have tried not to make any arrangements that can later be questioned. This appears to be done now since General Groves dropped his interest in comforts for these people. I am trying to do [sic] these people as well as I can while still remaining well within the covering directives. I expect to take up with Perrin, in London when I see him this week, plans for keeping these Germans busy. Plenty of reading material will be given them. Plenty of paper and pencils will be made available. Ideas from Washington are invited.95

95 Bob Furman to Jack Lansdale, May 22, 1945; 202.2 London Office: Combined Intell Disc; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Oates worked at Manhattan Project’s London office between fall 1944 and fall 1945, participating in some Alsos work as well as doing work at

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Detaining the scientists under better conditions than were specified by US military rules could potentially backfire if the Manhattan Project got into trouble for doing so. The effort to supply the Germans with reading and writing supplies also shows that these officials assumed that this detention would continue for some time. If the plan had been to release the scientists quickly, less attention could have been paid to keeping them from being bored. At this point, the German scientists presumed that their detention was a temporary measure, designed to last only until high-level British and American scientists could question them about their assumed-to-be-superior wartime research.

Letting the Germans work on theoretical science while in captivity helped maintain this idea, which made keeping the men in confinement easier. However, an extended detention created the risk that it would be discovered by other American officials.

Groves’ apparent new disinterest in the comfort of the scientists added a new level of difficulty to Furman’s efforts to keep the scientists content. Groves’ change in opinion may have reflected an awareness that asking SHAEF officials for permission to use better accommodations for the group could backfire by drawing attention to the scientists’ detention. By this point, the scientific intelligence gained by the Alsos

Mission showed that these scientists were not as dangerous or valuable, from a scientific standpoint, to the US as had previously been thought. However, Furman thought that their knowledge could still prove dangerous if they fell under other countries’ control.

the Manhattan Project’s temporary Paris office. W.L. Warner to Langguth, re: “Former Personnel and Their Duties in This Office,” Aug. 29, 1946; Personnel; General Correspondence, 1944-1947; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Liaison Office; RG 77; NACP. The information about Toepel’s first name and training is from: W.M. Adams to B.T. Pash, Feb. 13, 1945; Alsos Material; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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This meant that the scientists could not yet be released, even if Groves assigned a lower priority to them than he had during Operation Harborage.

In spite of his previous recommendation that American officials assume full control of the German scientists’ detention, which would cut the British out of the equation, Furman kept one of the directors of the Tube Alloys project, Michael Perrin, updated about the detained scientists. Furman had hoped to travel to England to meet with Perrin in late May but he had been delayed by making new arrangements to house the scientists. Furman had finally received authorization from SHAEF to move the scientists to a new location in Belgium and was occupied with the “the staff work necessary to provide for the men, transportation, and maintenance of the establishment.”

He told Perrin that the new location would not be quite as comfortable but was still acceptable:

The most important change in previous instructions has been the removal of the requirements for any luxuries or comforts not normally accorded to prisoners of war. However, I feel that all concerned wish to do as well by the group as we can. Accordingly, while working within the limitations of existing directives, I have made every effort to make them as comfortable as conditions allow. They will be treated as prisoners of war of general officer class and will be located in a good house in the country in pleasant surroundings but with no extra facilities.

Furman also told Perrin that he was arranging for an American officer to join

Rittner. He hoped this change would result in a better division of the burden of supervising the German scientists. Rittner would remain in charge of “internal affairs” and the American officer would take over “external affairs,” such as relations with the

American command. The two officers would be able to cover for each other, allowing each one to take time off. Furman did not mention to Perrin the other motivation for bringing an American officer to supervise the group: to maintain better American control

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over the German scientists.96 Based on Furman’s phrasing, it appears that question of replacing Rittner with an American officer had never been posed to the British or had been rebuffed.

Furman closed his cable to Perrin by asking for “any suggestions or criticisms you may have.” He especially wanted Perrin’s “views of the proper employment or occupation of these people during their indefinite detention period.” This remark was the first written comment by a member of the Manhattan Project about how long the scientists’ confinement might last. An open-ended detention delayed the decision about what to do with the scientists and gave Manhattan Project officials time for a more suitable situation to develop, since no workable option then existed to return the scientists back to Germany or to bring them to the US or Britain.97

Furman and Rittner flew to Belgium at the end of May to inspect the new site that

Furman had found, the Chateau de Facqueval near Huy (about fifty miles southeast of

Brussels). Furman’s correspondence with Perrin made it seem that moving the scientists to the chateau was settled but Rittner found the location unsuitable for security reasons.

He thought that too many civilians worked on the estate, the owner of the chateau (who protested that his property was being improperly requisitioned) was a potential risk, and the US Army intelligence officer in charge of the area insisted that the scientists “would have to be [held] strictly in accordance with General Eisenhower’s order regarding [the] treatment of enemy nationals.” The intelligence officer proposed that the scientists could

96 Furman had addressed this issue in his May 11 cable to Groves’ office. Furman to Smith and Lansdale, May 11, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 97 R.R. Furman to M.W. Perrin, May 23, 1945; Alsos Material; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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stay in the chateau’s attics and the American guard troops in the bedrooms, a suggestion to which Rittner would not agree.98

After he returned to Le Vésinet from Belgium, Rittner received continued pressure to vacate the house so that other military staff could make use of it. He returned to Huy a few days later with Welsh, who agreed that the location was unsuitable. Welsh,

Rittner, and Calvert met at Furman’s Paris office on June 1 to discuss the options for the detained scientists. Welsh reiterated that the Chateau de Facqueval was unsuitable and stated that British authorities “were trying to get sanction to take the party to England where suitable accommodation was available.” The four officers agreed to try to keep the group at Le Vésinet until this had been decided. Two days later, however, Furman received orders from SHAEF that the group had to vacate Le Vésinet immediately.

As a result, on June 4 Rittner and the scientists drove eleven hours to the Belgian chateau that he had previously deemed unsuitable. One of the officers in Calvert’s

London office assumed temporary command of the American guard troops at the chateau, with Alsos agent Oates as an assistant. The Americans pointed out to Rittner that

“American troops would object to any signs of fraternization” and that he “would not be allowed to provide any extra food or comfort for the professors.” Rittner later wrote that he did manage to contravene these rules “with the connivance of the American officer in charge, but without the knowledge of the American GIs.”

However, Rittner could no longer live alongside the scientists, as he had done previously. Rittner reported that the scientists “had no alternative but to accept the position but they were getting to the end of their tether.” He tried “to reassure them and keep them reasonably happy” by explaining some of the issues that had arisen and

98 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 69.

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assuring the men that they would still get to speak with British and American colleagues, and that their families were being provided for. The German scientists continued with some of their routine from France, exercising in the garden and reading, and making use of the piano and radio that Rittner found for them.99

While he managed to placate the scientists, Rittner worried about numerous individuals who might inadvertently compromise the detention: American guard troops, the Belgians who worked as household help, and the local American commander all posed threats in his view. The area commander, Lt. Col. Watkins, “insisted upon the establishment being run as an American Military Station” and “wanted the Stars and

Stripes flown from a flag staff in the grounds.” Rittner vetoed the latter suggestion but had no say over the chateau’s designation as Special Detention Center, Area No. 5,

Channel Base Section. This title had to appear on correspondence and requisitions.

Rittner thought that this requirement “drew attention to the nature of the establishment” and might lead to Swiss or Red Cross representatives asking to visit the chateau.100

The threat that Manhattan Project officials saw in Red Cross visits, which would result from designating the scientists as prisoners of war, demonstrates the high degree of secrecy which the Manhattan Project deemed necessary. They did not want to mistreat the scientists; to the contrary, they intended to provide better conditions for the Germans than they would have received in a normal POW camp. Better treatment of the scientists could help enhance the odds of their future cooperation, whether that meant sharing research information with the US or keeping this information from other countries.

Manhattan Project officials took pains to avoid referring to the German scientists as

99 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 70-71. 100 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 72.

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prisoners of war, hence the use of the euphemistic term “guests.”101 If the Red Cross added these scientists to its official list of prisoners of war, questions might be raised about why these particular scientists were of interest, since they appeared to pose no more danger than most other German scientists. Such inquiries could lead to unwanted speculation about what the Army officers who had detained the scientists were up to.

The Manhattan Project was not public knowledge and keeping it that way was critically important, especially since the final preparations for the first atomic bomb test were underway.

By June 9, Furman had taken stock of what the scientists’ detention had accomplished thus far and looked ahead to how it fit into American and British plans to control science during their occupation of Germany. Unlike Rittner, Furman did not seem concerned about security issues at the Chateau de Facqueval, which he described as

“a normal detention center run by the theater,” albeit one in which “special emphasis” was placed upon security. The level of comfort – and rations – available to the group was not as high as Rittner had previously been able to arrange but the accommodations and treatment remained much better than what were provided to ordinary prisoners of war.

Furman anticipated an extended detention for the scientists, with a “special security period” followed by a long-term plan to govern the scientists’ whereabouts and activities. A plan about the scientists’ future might not be implemented for a while but

Furman advised that such a plan – and a plan for the special security period – needed to be devised soon. Furman had attended a recent Combined Intelligence Committee

101 Two exceptions, which help prove the rule: John Lansdale’s history of Operation Harborage referred to the scientists from Hechingen and Tailfingen as prisoners of war right after their capture, and Robert Furman’s May 23 cable to Michael Perrin said that, in Belgium, the scientists would “be treated as prisoners of war of general officer class” by being accommodated “in a good house in the country in pleasant surroundings but with no extra facilities.”

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meeting in London. The committee’s discussions touched on future control options for the scientists and revealed differences of opinion between British and American officials on that subject.

Committee members agreed that “these Germans cannot be eventually shot or indefinitely detained. It is not likely that anyone will agree to do it. It is not a solution to the problem.” Even if a suggestion to simply shoot the scientists had been made facetiously, the macabre comment spoke to the hassle that the scientists’ detention (and their research) had caused. It was clear to American and British intelligence officials that the scientists could not be released or disappear into American or British custody for good, but those proscriptions closed off only two of many possible scenarios. That brought the intelligence committee to the question of what to do with the scientists in the immediate and long term.

The British and American members of the committee had different views about this quandary. Furman reported that the British committee members wanted to continue the group’s temporary detention in Belgium with “ample food, reduction of guards, and the cancelling of any standard measures which might convince the scientists that they are being held as ordinary prisoners of war.” Such measures would allow time for Groves’ office to consider the British proposition to move the scientists to England. The British argued that such a move would avoid “the theater directives covering the care of detained personnel” that had hampered Rittner’s ability to treat the scientists more like involuntary guests than prisoners of war. More importantly, in England the group could be supervised by a new atomic intelligence agency under the auspices of MI6.

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The American committee members were cool to this idea. In contrast to the

British proposal, the Americans suggested that the group could “be continued in their present location provided special instructions be given to the theatre,” such as to arrange better food for the scientists. If the security of the chateau became compromised, the scientists could be moved elsewhere – but not necessarily to England. The American committee members were more willing than their British counterparts to plan on detaining the scientists for an extended period. The British agreed that conditions did not yet exist under which the scientists could be released but desired not only better conditions to house and supervise the scientists, but also to create a situation in which the group could be repatriated.

For Furman, resolving these differences of opinion came down to establishing a

“framework for controlling science in Germany” which would allow for the scientists to be set (relatively) free. He thought that the British would be more willing to accept a prolonged detention for the scientists if their American colleagues were actively working to create such a framework.

Concern about the Soviets’ future actions regarding science, especially but not just atomic, was a prime motivation for American officials to formulate policies for their section of Germany. Furman cautioned that “[t]hought must be put into the initial actions taken, since initial measures must be counted on as having important influence over what can be done later. The whole policy of control may be indefinite and confused as long as

Russia cannot be counted on to initiate similar controls. Regardless of what the Russians do, the matter must be considered.” In Furman’s opinion, the measures to control

German science that were under discussion by American officials in Washington and

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SHAEF had no bearing on the German scientists’ current detention, other than to necessitate it.

There were several options for the treatment of German science as a whole.

Furman rejected the idea that German scientific and technical research could be ignored, warning that “scientists and scientific institutions would either continue uncontrolled, deport themselves to neutral or foreign countries, or be deported by the Russians and

French.” Any of these options, especially when it came to atomic science, could be a grave threat to American interests. If German science was not controlled during the occupation, “the [German] government could sponsor dangerous research activities,” which might be “continued in foreign areas where work cannot be controlled and where science cannot be deported should it engage in activities not in the interests of peace.”

France and the Soviet Union were potential rivals, not allies, in the effort to prevent this from happening.

Furman ended his report by returning to the specific issue of the detained German atomic scientists. He asserted that:

We should make a special effort to (a) treat the detained scientists in such a way as to assure us of voluntary cooperation (if it is possible to get it) should they be returned to their institutions and their normal research activities; (b) compile immediately all facts concerning nuclear physics, physicists, German research institutions, wartime research in nuclear physics, minor and major; and (c) create an administrative group of qualified personnel who could sponsor and facilitate American and British scientific inspection of TA research in Germany.102

Furman’s comment reflected the short-, medium-, and long-term purposes of detaining the ten scientists. In the short term, the men needed to be treated in a manner that would leave them disposed to cooperate with their American and British custodians

102 Furman, “Present Status of Group of Detained Scientists,” Jun. 9, 1945; 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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in the future. The British solution was to move the scientists to England; the American solution was to get them better rations in Belgium. American and British officials needed to gain as much information as possible about German nuclear research to be able to figure out how to prevent or control such research in the future. The detained scientists could prove useful in helping to provide such information, if their cooperation could be maintained (or gained) by good treatment. Furman’s suggestion that an Anglo-American inspection team be formed implied that German scientific research would likely be allowed to resume and would, thus, need to be closely supervised by occupation authorities.

The same day that Furman finished his report about these broader issues, Rittner wrote about a new problem that had emerged among the detainees. Diebner had become very worried about his family in Thuringia after reading a newspaper article that the

Soviet zone of occupation would soon be extended and pleaded for his wife and son to be moved into the British or American zone. Rittner’s initial reaction to this idea was unenthusiastic. However, after Heisenberg told him “that Mrs. Diebner had worked with her husband and knew about all his work and that of the others and thought it would be unfortunate if she fell into Russian hands,” Rittner asked officials in London if Diebner’s family could be moved. A few days later, Rittner received word that American forces had moved the family to Bavaria. Diebner was apparently so grateful that he asked to go to church. Rittner’s apparent initial indifference to Diebner’s concern shows that even he, who tried to keep the scientists reasonably comfortable and happy during their confinement, was not willing to dispatch British or American intelligence troops solely to keep Diebner’s family out of Soviet control or to keep Diebner from being distressed.

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The effort to move this family instead demonstrates the high degree of concern about

Germans who knew about nuclear research falling into Soviet hands.

On June 10, while waiting for word about Diebner’s family, Rittner’s new co- supervisor, Toepel, arrived at the Chateau de Facqueval, two and a half weeks after

Furman had requested his presence there. Toepel’s presence helped the Manhattan

Project retain control over the scientists and have better information about their dispositions during their detention and, thus, their possible future cooperation with the

US. Since Toepel had been taken part in Operation Harborage, the scientists who had been taken from Hechingen and Tailfingen recognized him. Rittner was grateful for

Toepel’s assistance, later commenting that Toepel “handled a difficult situation very well indeed, cooperating in every way and turning a blind eye to my fraternization while maintaining his position as O.C. [Officer in Command] of the troops.”103

In London, British officials renewed their efforts to bring the scientists to

England. Calvert relayed a message from Sir Charles Hambro, a high-ranking British intelligence official and member of the Combined Development Trust, to Groves.

Hambro insisted that the detention in Belgium could no longer proceed in its current manner. Rittner would “have to be removed” from his supervisory duties to comply with

Eisenhower’s order about the treatment of German prisoners of war. Hambro considered such a change detrimental to “our security interests,” which suggested that he shared

Groves’ concern about keeping atomic research confidential by keeping the scientists’ detention secret.

Hambro understood Groves’ position to be that the “guests should be looked after by our people under SHAEF and not allowed to see any outsiders, military or otherwise,

103 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 72. Bernstein provides the explanation for “O.C.”

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until autumn or later when their case should be reconsidered.” In contrast to Furman’s earlier comment about an “indefinite” detention, this is the first mention of a possible duration for the scientists’ detention (or at least how long it would be before the detention would be reconsidered).

In order to both avoid the strictures of Eisenhower’s order and conform to

Groves’ timeline for the detention, Hambro suggested that the scientists be moved to

England, where British authorities had the “perfect place of detention away from any chance of prying eyes.” Based on correspondence in May and June, it appears that this option had possibly already been proposed to Groves by his officers who were based in

France and Britain. In directly advocating this course of action to Groves, Hambro advised that the scientists would remain under military control in England and no one,

“political or otherwise,” would discover the detention. Instead of ordinary camp guards, the scientists would be supervised by trained intelligence agents. Sir John Anderson, the chancellor and cabinet official in charge of nuclear research, concurred that bringing the scientists to England was a good course of action. If Groves agreed to move the scientists, British officials would handle the transportation arrangements to get the group to England. In spite of Eisenhower’s order, Rittner would remain with the scientists as a liaison to the military guard until Groves replied to Hambro’s offer.104

Calvert concurred with this plan. Better security was available at the proposed

English location, and being able to make use of CSDIC (Combined Services Detailed

Interrogation Centre) services could be “extremely important” for the “long range intelligence aspect” of the scientists’ detention. Calvert’s comment reflected that

104 Hambro (via Calvert) to Groves, Jun. 12, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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controlling knowledge about atomic science was a long-term issue. As Furman had already written, American officials needed to think ahead about how the information that could be gained from these scientists might be useful, for better controlling atomic science in general and these scientists in particular.

While British and American officials waited for Groves’ decision, the detainees increased in number a final time. On June 14, Walther Gerlach, a well-regarded physicist and high-ranking administrator for German nuclear research, was brought to join the group. Gerlach had been captured in Bavaria at the same time as Diebner and Heisenberg at the beginning of May, and Goudsmit had interrogated the three scientists shortly after their arrival in Heidelberg shortly thereafter. Diebner and Heisenberg had been brought to group just before the scientists were moved to Le Vésinet on May 11. What happened to Gerlach – or even where he was – until he was brought to the Chateau de Facqueval is unclear but he was seems to have been interviewed by other American officials in Paris or Rheims.105

However, Gerlach was not the only additional scientist that Manhattan Project intelligence officials had considered adding to the group. During May, Manhattan

Project intelligence officials gradually refined their knowledge of German atomic research as they analyzed the documents they had captured. On May 5, just a few days after the first six members of the group were brought to Rheims, Furman wrote that he had re-interviewed physicist Fritz Houtermans, who he had first interrogated on April 17 in Göttingen. In spite of the new interview, Houtermans was not added to the detained group. At the end of May, Furman requested that Walther Bothe, who an Alsos team had

105 Furman (?), list of key German nuclear scientists, Jun. 8, 1945; 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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interrogated in Heidelberg in mid-March, be detained “with the others presently held” as it was now understood that Bothe was a principal figure in the German research program.

This request, however, did not come to fruition.106

Furman’s reinterrogation of Houtermans and call for Bothe to be detained reflected the complicated situation that the Alsos team faced in Germany and the somewhat unsystematic way in which the group of detained scientists was selected. The reports that Alsos personnel wrote during their investigations in Germany often took the scientists’ statements during interrogations at face value, which may explain why they reevaluated Bothe’s importance once they had had the chance to analyze German scientific documents they had found.

As with Houtermans and Bothe, Manhattan Project intelligence officials revised their view of Gerlach during May and early June. In a May 11 report, Goudsmit had written that Gerlach “was merely in administrative charge of the nuclear physics project.

He had a superficial knowledge of the status of the project but knew little of the technical details.” This characterization was not correct. Over the next month, as Gerlach’s papers were examined, Alsos investigators reassessed how much they thought Gerlach knew.107

At the Chateau de Facqueval, Rittner wrote that the group was “delighted to see their old colleague.” However, the pleasure (and distraction) of having Gerlach join the group was short-lived. The next day, Rittner wrote that “the professors were again

106 R.R. Furman to Chief of the Mission [Pash], May 29, 1945; 202.2 London Office: Combined Intell Disc; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 107 Van Voorst (via Calvert) to Smith, May 25, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. R.R. Furman to Francis J. Smith, re: “Transmittal of TA Documents,” May 30, 1945, and S.A. Goudsmit, “Interrogation of Heisenberg, Diebner, and Gerlach,” May 11, 1945; 32.12-2 Germany: Personnel (Jan. 45 – Dec. 45); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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becoming very, very restive and they hinted to me that the time might soon come when they would take desperate measures to let the world know of their situation.”

Rittner talked with Heisenberg, whom he deemed “the most sensible” of the group, about the reasons for the scientists’ unhappiness. As before, their main worry was their families. At this point, the scientists assumed that they were being detained until they could offer their assumed-to-be-superior knowledge to their British and American counterparts and Heisenberg remarked that the scientists were fearful of how they might be judged based on the papers at their institutes. Heisenberg asked to discuss “the whole matter with British and American scientists in order to acquaint them with their latest theories and work out a scheme for future cooperation.”

Even as they protested their detention, Heisenberg and Harteck suggested another scientist who should join their group. They described Karl-Friedrich Bonhoeffer of

Leipzig as “an active anti-Nazi who had worked with them.” They thought it “unwise to let him fall into Russian hands.” Rittner passed this information along to his headquarters but nothing came of it.

Finally, on June 15, over a month after he had first proposed moving the scientists to England, Rittner received word from Welsh that “permission had been given for the professors to be brought to England.” Welsh requested that Rittner fly to England as soon as possible to inspect the intended detention spot, Farm Hall.108

It is not clear how Groves decided on this course of action between June 12 (when

Hambro sent his cable to Washington) and June 15, only that he did. Sending the scientists to Farm Hall was not likely his top choice, given that the location meant that the British would assume an increased role in the group’s detention (and, thus, in

108 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 72-73.

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decisions about the scientists’ futures). However, given the other options available – to treat the scientists as actual prisoners of war (and lose both goodwill and secrecy) or to risk that the scientists’ detention in Belgium might be compromised – Farm Hall was clearly the better option. Furman had indicated on June 9 that Manhattan Project officials were not yet ready to end the scientists’ detention. Moving the group to Farm Hall was the most promising way to continue confining them under the conditions (secret and reasonably comfortable) that had been intended at the outset. Moreover, the opportunity to gain additional intelligence from the scientists via observation by personnel from the intelligence-gathering CSDIC (which will be explained at the beginning of the next chapter) was useful.

Rittner soon joined Welsh at Farm Hall, which was close to Cambridge. CSDIC personnel were already preparing for the German scientists’ arrival by installing microphones in the house and arranging for staff to run the installation. Captain P.L.C.

(Patrick) Brodie of CSDIC came onboard as the administrative officer for Farm Hall, and continued to work on the arrangements for the scientists’ arrival after Rittner left England on June 26. Brodie would later play a key role in supervising the German scientists.109

Before he left England, Rittner wrote a note to Groves about the justifications for moving the scientists to England. The majority of the information in this message later appeared nearly verbatim in Rittner’s preamble to the Farm Hall reports: the scientists were restive and wanted to talk with British or American scientists about their work, the chateau in Belgium had been designated a Special Detention Centre (which might attract

Red Cross attention), and general security was bad (due to guard troops mixing with local civilians and local speculation about the identity of the scientists). Calvert had mixed

109 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 73-74.

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thoughts about the safety issues raised by Rittner. He agreed that the security risks at the

Belgian chateau would “be largely erased by bringing the guests to England.” However, he did not think that the situation was as bad as Rittner claimed.110

As with Furman’s earlier report about Combined Intelligence Committee deliberations, Calvert’s comment shows that American officials were less intent than their British counterparts to bring the ten scientists to England, at least on the basis of security. Given their concern with security, it would have been logical for the Americans to welcome a more secure location to detain the German scientists. However, Calvert’s ambivalence about the security advantages that Farm Hall offered over the Chateau de

Facqueval demonstrated a different security concern: although the scientists would remain under official joint British-American auspices in England, American officials had to relinquish some control by acceding to such a move. The American intent to gain, not lose, control over the scientists was evident in earlier discussions about replacing Rittner with an American officer, and then assigning Toepel as a co-supervisor. Manhattan

Project officials vacillated about whether the location in England was so much better as to be worth losing some of their control over the detainees. Ultimately, the fact that the desired conditions in Belgium did not exist (and would not exist anytime soon) helped lead to this decision to move the scientists to Farm Hall.

From a British perspective, moving the scientists to England was useful for several reasons. First, it made Rittner’s supervisory task much easier, since he no longer had to deal with the competing demands of Manhattan Project officials, American Army

110 George B. Davis to F.J. Smith, re: “Message from Major Rittner,” Jun. 21, 1945; 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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intelligence officers, SHAEF rules about the treatment of German prisoners, and the undesirable locations that were available to house the group in France and Belgium.

Second, it allowed British atomic intelligence officials to assume a more direct role in decisions about these scientists. British officials disagreed with how the Manhattan

Project controlled intelligence information, as evident in their previous efforts to gain better access to Alsos reports. At the end of May, one British atomic intelligence official commented about the “not-too-happy compromise between the US system of limiting full knowledge to one or two officers skilled in Military Intelligence, and the UK system of frank discussions between a small, but adequate, number of people having different special qualifications.” Moving the scientists to England meant that the British would be able to carry out better-informed discussions about the scientists and their research, rather than waiting for American analysis of the German research.111

Rittner wrote that the scientists “received the news about the impending move to

England with mixed feelings. On the one hand they looked on it as a step forward in that they expected to meet their British colleagues, but on the other hand England seemed much further from home than Belgium.” Rittner departed for England on June 30, leaving the scientists under Toepel’s supervision. Toepel accompanied the group to the

Liège airport on July 3, where he entrusted the scientists to Alsos agent Oates, whom

Rittner had designated to accompany them to England. The group then flew to

Tempsford airfield in Bedfordshire, England and were then taken by car twelve miles north to Farm Hall, at the western edge of the small town of Godmanchester.112

…

111 J.F. Jackson letter to R.S. Sayers, May 24, 1945, TNA: PRO AB 1/588. 112 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 74.

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When he finished his account of the events of May and June in mid-July, Rittner characterized the scientists’ detention up to July 3 as “successful” since “(1) The professors have been detained for over ten weeks without any unauthorized person becoming aware of their identity or place of detention, and, (2) They have, with considerable difficulty, been kept in a good frame of mind.” Over the course of May and

June, Manhattan Project officials, especially Leslie Groves, gradually recognized that the difficulties they faced in finding a secret and semi-permanent location to house the

German scientists in France or Belgium were not going to lessen. Their prime motivations to capture the scientists in April had been to keep the German scientists’ nuclear research secret and to deny this knowledge, whatever it was, to other countries.

Groves’ decision to allow the British to move the scientists to England partly contradicted these goals, by allowing British intelligence officials to assume greater control over the scientists. However, this decision ultimately became necessary to keep the scientists’ detention and, thus, research secret, which was the Manhattan Project’s overriding concern.113

During these two months, American officials remained concerned about Soviet and French investigations of German atomic research. These investigations retrospectively justified detaining the ten scientists in April and May (plus the four scientists in Strasbourg in November). The American reluctance to give British officials greater control over the group of detainees by moving them to England demonstrated that the Manhattan Project’s efforts to deny German nuclear scientists’ expertise applied even to Britain. However, no suitable conditions existed yet in Germany to even consider returning them there, especially because the Manhattan Project intended to keep the

113 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 74.

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scientists under their control during the final months of its secret work to build atomic weapons.

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Chapter 3: Detention at Farm Hall, July-September 1945

The summer of 1945 marked the dawning of the nuclear era and the end of World

War II. The Manhattan Project tested the first nuclear bomb on July 16, and the United

States attacked Hiroshima and Nagasaki with nuclear bombs on August 6 and 9, respectively. Japan’s surrender on August 15 ended World War II in Asia. However, while the existence of nuclear weapons became quite public, Manhattan Project officials continued to keep the German scientists’ detention as secret as possible. Just a few weeks after the bombing of Japan, this insistence on persistent secrecy began to lead to conflicts with British Tube Alloys and intelligence officials, who argued that the German scientists’ detention was no longer necessary. These disagreements evidenced the different assumptions that British and American officials brought to the atomic era.

Although the war was already over in Europe, the Allied powers remained busy there. They began the occupation of Germany in May. The Allies faced challenges there not only because of the destruction that had been wrought during the war but also because of tensions and disagreements among themselves. Negotiations among Josef

Stalin, Harry S. Truman, and Winston Churchill (who was soon replaced by Clement

Attlee) about postwar planning took place at Potsdam from July 17 through August 2 and at the first Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) in London from September 11 to October

2. In the United Kingdom, national elections ended Winston Churchill’s Conservative

Party-led government on July 26. US officials waited to see whether Clement Attlee’s new Labour Party government would change British policies.

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The German scientists whom Manhattan Project and British intelligence officials had detained since late April were flown to England on at the beginning of July. During the first month a half that the scientists were detained at Farm Hall, British and American officials gave little consideration to their eventual release. The scientists’ conversations were monitored throughout this time, however, and British and American officials studied the Farm Hall reports during their eventual discussions about what to do with the group. The scientists had been captured with the goals to keep atomic science secret during the Manhattan Project’s final efforts to assemble, test, and then deploy nuclear bombs and to deny the scientists’ expertise to France and the Soviet Union. British officials, who had long been less concerned about the threat posed by German atomic research, had participated in the detention because of the Manhattan Project’s overriding concern with security. After the bombing of Japan, however, British atomic intelligence officials reasoned that the scientists’ continued detention served no useful purpose and, in fact, could be detrimental. They proposed repatriating the men in the near future.

However, while the British had physical custody of the scientists, Manhattan

Project officials had the final say in what would happen to the group. These American officials were reluctant to let the scientists go, as they saw more danger in the scientists’ freedom than in their confinement. The scientists might work on behalf of continued

German militarism or for other countries, especially France or the Soviet Union. During

September, proposals traveled back and forth between atomic officials in London and

Washington, DC. The ongoing American rebuffing of British proposals to end the scientists’ detention at Farm Hall had the effect not only of extending the scientists’ time

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in England but also creating time for the seeming consensus of opinion among British officials to erode.

At the end of September, there seemed to be an end in sight, despite the ongoing differences of opinion among British and American officials. They reached a tentative agreement for the British to move the scientists to Bonn (in the British occupation zone) on an interim basis, and then continue to work out a long-term arrangement for the group.

This plan was a compromise: the British got the scientists out of the UK but the group would not yet be completely free, a condition upon which Manhattan Project officials insisted.

The differences of opinion between (and among) British and American officials reveal the complexity of the issues facing them. The question of letting the German scientists go – or not – had many layers. How dangerous was nuclear science, and especially nuclear scientists? How dangerous were Germans, nuclear scientists in particular? How would British and American wartime cooperation, especially on nuclear matters, continue? How could nuclear science and technology be controlled, if at all?

How much of a threat were other countries (especially the Soviet Union and France) to these international atomic control efforts? The ways in which these questions, and the many discussions that were held about them, were tied to the Farm Hall detention has not yet been told as part of the Farm Hall story. The correspondence between British and

American officials in the summer of 1945 shows how Farm Hall was wrapped up with the larger issues that British and American officials faced in the new, post-World War II, atomic era.

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British and American officials consulted the Farm Hall reports for answers about how these scientists fit into the broader questions at hand. The reports’ content, however, often proved a mirror for what officials on both sides already assumed – that the scientists were dangerous (or not), that the Germans were Nazi sympathizers (or not), that they could be trusted (or not). The Farm Hall reports indicate that, from July through

September 1945, the scientists’ hopes about their release went up, especially after visits by two British scientists, and then crashed back down when they received no sign that they would be released soon (or ever). Low morale – to the point that British officials thought that some of the scientists might attempt suicide – was a key reason why that the some British officials advocated their prompt release.

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Fig. 2. Photo of Farm Hall, c. 1945.114

When the ten scientists arrived in England on July 3, they were brought to Farm

Hall, a country house near the small town of Godmanchester, which was about fifteen miles northwest of Cambridge. British officials had chosen the house for several reasons: first, the location, about fifteen miles northwest of Cambridge, afforded more privacy than the Chateau de Facqueval in Belgium. The property was surrounded by a high stone wall and offered the scientists ample room to be outside in the large garden. Second, the

114 “Photographs of Farm Hall and the Guests Detained There” (sent as Appendix to Farm Hall Report 4), Aug. 11, 1945; UK – Farm Hall; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Mexico-U.S.; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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house had already been in use during the war by intelligence services. The Secret

Intelligence Service had used the house for the counterintelligence and espionage personnel that it parachuted behind enemy lines in France. By summer 1945, the SIS’s efforts were no longer required, so atomic intelligence personnel were able to make use of the house.115

The third advantage of Farm Hall was the involvement of Combined Services

Detailed Interrogation Centre (CSDIC) personnel and equipment. CSDIC had been formed in October 1939 to gain intelligence from prisoners of war captured by the British armed services. The organization was tasked with gaining intelligence from prisoners of war as well as developing “technical aids” such as listening apparatus and stool pigeons.

It operated three large interrogation centers near London, as well as mobile units in war zones. Between 1939 and 1944, more than 8,000 German and Italian prisoners of war passed through the three CSDIC facilities in Britain. CSDIC was winding down its operations in summer 1945, so some of its listening personnel were reassigned to work at

Farm Hall. While the Farm Hall “guests” were not declared prisoners of war, the techniques used by CSDIC personnel suited the aims of British and American atomic intelligence officials. Manhattan Project officials were already familiar with CSDIC’s work: Maj. Tony Calvert, who led the Manhattan Project’s London office, had visited

CSDIC facilities in the spring of 1944 and Maj. Tom Rittner of CSDIC had been

“loaned” to supervise the scientists since May 1.116

115 Bruce Bonsey letter to R.V. Jones, Mar. 18, 1978, Churchill Archives Centre (henceforth CAC), Churchill College, University of Cambridge, RVJO B.322; Bruce Bonsey, “Top Secret Interlude,” 1976, Imperial War Museum, London (henceforth IWML), Private Papers of Wing Commander B. Bonsey. 116 A.R. Rawlinson memorandum re: composition and output of CSDIC, Feb. 4, 1945; and Notes on “Future of C.S.D.I.C.(U.K.),” Apr. 20-30, 1945, TNA: PRO WO 208/3451. A.R. Rawlinson, M.I.19 War Diary, Mar.-Apr. 1944 and May-Jun. 1945, TNA: PRO WO 165/41. Fritz and Susan Lustig, interview by the author, August 3, 2010, Reading, UK.. CSDIC also operated mobile units in the theaters of war.

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Once it was selected to house the German scientists, the house at Farm Hall, like other CSDIC facilities, was wired with hidden microphones. During the scientists’ normal waking hours, CSDIC personnel monitored these microphones from a neighbor’s outbuilding and recorded conversations that were deemed important on shellacked metal discs.117 From there, the conversation excerpts were transcribed and translated. The assumption behind this technique was that whomever was being listened to – whether military prisoners of war or civilian German scientists – would be more honest in

“private” conversations with one another than in interrogations with their captors. The

CSDIC personnel who listened to and transcribed the conversations at Farm Hall were native German speakers. Many of them had come to Britain from Germany and Austria as refugees shortly before war broke out. German refugees had not been not allowed to join the Intelligence Corps in the early years of the war (in fact, all male refugees were interned on the Isle of Man in 1940) but by 1943 the high demand for German speakers in CSDIC necessitated a change in its rules.118

British atomic and intelligence officials assembled translated excerpts of the scientists’ conversations that they deemed most important into reports every couple of weeks. The Farm Hall reports have sometimes misleading been referred to as transcripts.119 Some conversations among the German scientists were quoted but the majority of the reports contained English translations and summaries, not the original

German transcriptions. A few conversations, such as when the scientists had American

117 The exception to this schedule occurred on August 6, when the listeners manned their posts well into the night to record the scientists’ reactions to news reports about the bombing of Hiroshima. Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 115. 118 A.R. Rawlinson note re: changes to CSDIC personnel recruitment, Jul. 22, 1943, TNA: PRO WO 208/3546; A.R. Rawlinson, M.I.19 War Diary: “Employment of Aliens in C.S.D.I.C.-U.K.,” Feb. 1945, TNA: PRO WO 165/41; Lustig, interview. 119 Frank, Operation Epsilon, 12.

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or British visitors, were held in English. The translations of the German conversations were likely made in part by CSDIC translators and in part by atomic intelligence officials.120 The original shellacked discs would have been destroyed, as was the protocol for all CSDIC discs.121

The Farm Hall reports were signed by one of two CSDIC officers. Maj. Tom

Rittner had overseen the scientists since the first six of them were brought to Rheims in early May, and Capt. Patrick Brodie assumed co-supervisory duties once the scientists were brought to Farm Hall. Michael Perrin, who helped direct the Tube Alloys program, also had a hand in selecting material for the reports.

The reports typically covered around two weeks of material but were written more frequently when the Farm Hall overseers had particular conversations that they wanted to highlight. Twenty three reports, plus a preamble and six appendices, were written in all.

Due to the secrecy surrounding the scientists’ detention, Perrin and one of the officers in

Calvert’s London office agreed that copies of the reports would not be sent to the

120 At CSDIC’s “normal” interrogation centers, members of the listening corps transcribed conversations and then passed the transcripts to other CSDIC personnel in charge of translations. However, the technical nature of the scientists’ conversations at Farm Hall almost certainly required scientific officials to review translations that CSDIC personnel made. A note about the appendix to Farm Hall Report 9 (which covered September 16-23, 1945) indicated that the appendix was translated in London, since “adequate facilities for translation were not available at Farm Hall.” The appendix was a technical conversation between Harteck and Hahn, so it is likely that it needed to be double-checked by someone with relevant scientific training. There is no direct indication of this, but it is probable that the same treatment was accorded to Heisenberg’s August 14 lecture about bomb physics. That lecture, unlike the conversation appended to Farm Hall Report 9, occurred early on in the period covered by Farm Hall Report 5 (August 8-22, 1945), so it is likely that there was adequate time to translate it before the final report was prepared. Harteck and Hahn’s conversation occurred on the final day covered by Farm Hall Report 9, which was likely why it was not included in the body of the report. Lustig, interview; Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 249. 121 At the beginning of September, Manhattan Project officials asked for and received clarification about the original phrase that one of the scientists had used in a conversation in late July, which demonstrated that the transcripts were not destroyed immediately after being translated. The transcripts were destroyed at some point later. Calvert to Smith, re: “Farm Hall, ‘Epsilon’ Report No. 2 – Re Goudsmit,” Sept. 1, 1945; UK – Farm Hall; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Mexico-U.S.; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. James Doust letter to Catherine Jestinsky, Dec. 2, 1944; A.R. Rawlinson letter to Donald McMillan, Dec. 14, 1944; Donald McMillan letter to A.R. Rawlinson, Dec. 31, 1944, TNA: PRO WO 208/3554.

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Manhattan Project’s Washington office though its London office, although that office would receive a copy of each report. Instead, Lt. Cdr. Eric Welsh of MI6 was to personally deliver the reports to Groves. This plan was soon changed, however: Farm

Hall report 2, which Rittner signed on August 1, was sent to Groves via the Manhattan

Project’s London office. Given Welsh’s many commitments, serving as courier for the reports from Farm Hall likely quickly became impractical.122

The distribution of the Farm Hall reports revealed the varied agencies that had an interest in knowing what happened to the detained scientists. By Farm Hall report 7

(which covered September 7-13), seven copies were distributed. The Manhattan

Project’s London office received copies number one and two, with copy number one addressed to Groves. The other five copies went to British recipients: physicist Patrick

Blackett (who was part of an atomic advisory committee), Michael Perrin (of Tube

Alloys), the Government Code and Cypher School, Welsh (of MI6), and Rittner

(CSDIC). Rittner was dropped from the distribution list as of the next report.123 At the end of September, British physicist (and head of the British scientists who worked on the

Manhattan Project) Sir James Chadwick began to receive copy number eight of the reports (he had previously had access to the reports only through Groves’ office in

Washington, which he had protested). When Chadwick returned to England in late

122 Copy of cable from Perrin to Welsh, Jul. 24, 1945; 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 123 Farm Hall Report 7 was the first report signed by Brodie instead of Rittner. Rittner apparently left Farm Hall before that report was completed because of illness. Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 233. It seems likely that the reports Rittner received were destined for his agency’s (CSDIC) files, although it is not clear why they would have needed to receive reports if Rittner (or Brodie) was the one to create them.

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October, he became the recipient of copy number three of the reports instead of

Blackett.124

When they arrived at Farm Hall, the ten scientists once again promised Rittner that they would not try to escape. He rewarded them with free access to the house and its garden, and arranged for good rations for the scientists. The first Fall Hall report indicated that Werner Heisenberg and Kurt Diebner had a conversation just a few days after their arrival in England about whether the house might be bugged. Diebner apparently asked, “I wonder whether there are microphones installed here?” Heisenberg replied, “Microphones installed? (Laughing.) Oh no, they’re not as cute as all that. I don’t think they know the real Gestapo methods; they’re a bit old fashioned in that respect.” British and American officials took this exchange as proof that the scientists were unaware that they were being monitored and, thus, were being honest in their conversations with one another.125

During the first month that the German scientists were held at Farm Hall, little happened to challenge the scientists’ interpretation of their detention. They were unhappy about their confinement but assumed that they would soon be able to talk about their wartime work with British or American colleagues. While they periodically discussed mounting an escape to alert their Cambridge colleagues about their whereabouts, they did not make plans to do so. Rittner noted that the men grew

124 In early September, Chadwick complained to Welsh about receiving the Farm Hall reports indirectly through the Americans, which later led to him being added to the distribution list. James Chadwick (JSM Washington) to Eric Welsh thru Denis Rickett (AMSSO), Sept. 7, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/335. Michael Perrin and Eric Welsh to T.H. Rittner, Operation Epsilon Report 10, Oct. 3, 1945, TNA: PRO WO 208/5019. Receipt of Material, signed by James Chadwick for Farm Hall Reports 1-4, Sept. 7, 1945; 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 125 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 77-78.

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increasingly restive as time went on, partly out of frustration at being kept in the proverbial dark about what was to happen to them and partly out of concern for their families in Germany. The scientists pondered what their future options would be for carrying out research and discussed which countries they would consider working for, if all research was forbidden in Germany. They also spent time thinking about their work and held biweekly lectures on topics that Rittner found unthreatening.126

During the month of July, communication among British and American officials about the Farm Hall scientists was nearly nonexistent, with the exception of the reports that Rittner wrote about Farm Hall, the correspondence about how those reports would be delivered to American officials, and a question from Manhattan Project officials in

Washington about Max von Laue’s and Erich Bagge’s captured papers. All atomic officials in the know were focused on the Trinity test on July 16 and on the plans to bomb

Japan in early August.127

Rittner did his best to keep up the scientists’ spirits, despite the fact that he could not give them what they wanted most: news about when they would be released. As in

Belgium, he provided the group with a radio, newspapers, and other reading material to occupy their time. One thing he did not provide was negative news from outside Farm

Hall. In late summer, an American military intelligence offer received a letter for Otto

Hahn from Lisa Meitner, the noted physicist and former member of Hahn’s research team that had discovered fission, in Sweden. The letter criticized Hahn “for his failure to

126 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 77-105. 127 George B. Davis to Francis J. Smith, re: “Transmittal of Reports on Supervision of Guests,” Jul. 1, 1945; and Francis J. Smith to George B. Davis, re: “Guests’ letters to their families,” Jul. 25, 1945; 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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oppose the Nazi regime.” Rittner did not deliver the letter, because he feared that “it would have such a psychological effect on Hahn as to create a difficult problem in connection with detaining him.”128

As he had done in France and Belgium, Rittner tried to assuage the scientists’ agitation by allowing them to write to their families. In his third report from Farm Hall,

Rittner reported that he received permission from Michael Perrin of the Tube Alloys program at the beginning of August for the scientists to send letters to their families.

Rittner’s account, however, did not reveal the conflict that his request for correspondence created. In late July, Perrin had received firm instructions from Eric Welsh of MI6 that

“no outside contacts whatsoever” would be allowed for the scientists, given the recent

“political upheaval” that had just occurred in England. Perrin’s response argued that he

“had no reason to expect there will be any change in policy here or complications” because of the change in British government. He asked for clarification about whether

Groves had “categorically refused permission” for the scientists to send letters or if

Welsh had been more concerned with addressing general policy than specific questions about the scientists, and stressed that Rittner considered the concession of communication with the outside world a key way to could keep the scientists from taking “drastic action” about their detention. Welsh finally got permission from Groves for the scientists to write to their families on July 31. In the letters that they composed shortly thereafter, the scientists tried to hint to their families that they were in England, but Rittner required

128 “Monthly Intelligence Summary: July and August 1945;” 202.3-1 Combined Intelligence Reports; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Smith to Groves, Aug. 18, 1945 (including attachment “Notes to Aid in Discussion with Dr. Vannevar Bush Concerning the Captured German Scientists”); 202.2 London Office: Combined Intell Disc; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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them to rewrite their correspondence without the offending sentences. The secrecy of their detention was to remain in place, even as they were allowed this small link to the outside world.129

The newspapers and radio at Farm Hall also allowed the scientists some information about what was going on beyond the walls of the house. On August 2, the group heard news about the end of the Potsdam conference and was distressed to learn that some of Germany’s eastern provinces would become part of . The news on

August 6 was even more upsetting. Rittner wrote that the group was “completely staggered” by the news reports about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. After their initial disbelief, Rittner described the group’s reaction as “horror that we should have used this invention for destruction.” Farm Hall report 4 covered conversations from just

August 6 and 7. The scientists were indignant about press reports suggesting that they had tried to build such a weapon, so they wrote a memorandum arguing that their work focused on theoretical questions, not weapons development.130

The report about August 6 and 7 was the most detailed report during the scientists’ detention. British and American readers examined it closely for evidence about what the Germans knew about the subject, how far their research had progressed, and what their reactions indicated about how far they would go to continue their research after their detention. Readers were not sympathetic to the German scientists’ shock at the news. Chadwick deemed the scientists’ remarks “interesting and amusing” and Field

129 Copies of Welsh to Perrin, Jul. 27, 1945; Perrin to Welsh, Jul. 30, 1945; Welsh to Perrin, Jul. 31, 1945; 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 107. 130 Bernstein argues that this memorandum was disingenuous. Curiously, the Farm Hall reports contain no information about the scientists’ reactions to the bombing of Hiroshima. Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 110, 115-150.

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Marshal Henry Maitland Wilson, the chief of the British Staff Mission in Washington and a representative to the Combined Policy Committee, concurred that “some of them have set their achievements at a pretty high value, which seems hardly justified.”131

The report also included brief character sketches and photographs of the scientists, so that British and American officials could be more familiar with the

“speakers” in the excerpted conversations. These descriptions may have been helpful as an introduction to the scientists but they also narrowed how each man’s comments and motives would be interpreted. The better-known scientists generally received more favorable reviews. Hahn was deemed “the most friendly” and “full of common sense,” which fit with the conversation excerpts in which he was included. Heisenberg was characterized “friendly and helpful” and “genuinely anxious to cooperate with the British and American scientists,” despite the fact that this latter comment was not entirely borne out by his remarks about wanting to rebuild German science, even if it meant cooperating with the Soviets. Karl Wirtz, in contrast, was deemed a “clever egoist” who could not be trusted and Horst Korsching a “complete enigma,” despite the fact that he was hardly silent while at Farm Hall.

During the two weeks after the bombing of Japan, the detained scientists discussed how they thought that Manhattan Project scientists had managed to build atomic weapons, which they had assumed would be impossible during the war.

Heisenberg gave a lecture on bomb physics on August 14, by which time he had worked out a much clearer understanding on the physics than he had demonstrated on (and

131 James Chadwick letter to Henry Maitland Wilson, Sept. 7, 1945; and Henry Maitland Wilson to James Chadwick, Sept. 8, 1945, CAC, CHAD IV/12/2.

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before) August 6. This lecture was of high importance to those reading the Farm Hall reports, and Heisenberg’s lecture was reproduced in both English and German.132

Once they recognized that they were not being detained to share their supposedly superior knowledge with their British and American counterparts, the scientists’ conversations also turned to the question of whether each man would be interested in working for – not simply with – British and American physicists, if they were asked to do so. Their opinions were mixed. Some preferred to return to Germany, even if it meant having their research severely curtailed; others put a higher priority on continuing their physics work, even if that meant working for Britain or the US. The British and

American officials who read the Farm Hall reports tried to use these conversations to gauge whether it was safe to return the scientists to Germany or if they would continue their research at all costs – be it flouting occupation rules about scientific research or going to work for another country. Both sides found evidence in the scientists’ conversations to support their points of view.133

The realization that their research had been bested by the American project also led the scientists to conclude that the end of their detention was near since neither their knowledge nor the effort to keep their research secret was required any longer. American officials, however, were not yet ready to address the possibility of repatriating the group, so they continued with efforts to keep the scientists as content as possible during their detention. When Welsh relayed permission from Groves at the end of July for the scientists to write to their families, he also included Groves’ instruction that a “suitable scientist” should visit Farm Hall to “allay any suspicions” that the scientists had about

132 Bernstein argues that it was only during this August 14 lecture that Heisenberg finally worked out the correct physics for an atomic bomb. Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 169-185, 191-207. 133 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 153-157.

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their detention. The order demonstrated that Groves had no intention of releasing the

Germans soon, since he thought that further efforts needed to be made to placate them.

Chadwick, who served as a scientific adviser to the Manhattan Project during the war, suggested Sir Charles Darwin for this role. This visit, which Welsh suggested take place in the immediate future, did not occur until August 18.134

Sir Charles Galton Darwin, the grandson of naturalist Charles Darwin, was a respected British physicist. His visit to Farm Hall was partly a social call, designed to calm the German scientists’ fears that they were to be locked away indefinitely while not making them any promises about when they would be released. Rittner noted that the scientists were “delighted” to see him, although the conversations quoted in the report demonstrated a fairly formal conversation. Darwin’s visit fulfilled the promise made to the scientists at the time of their detention in Hechingen and Tailfingen that they would be allowed to discuss their wartime work with British and American colleagues.

The other purpose of Darwin’s visit was to elicit additional information about the

German nuclear program and the German scientists’ intentions for work after the war.

The responses that Darwin got on this subject did not differ greatly from what Rittner had learned from the scientists directly and the CSDIC listeners had gathered via surveillance.

The fact that Darwin had been asked to pose such questions shows the importance which those overseeing Farm Hall attached to these issues.

It is not clear whether Darwin knew that Farm Hall was bugged. Welsh had instructed that “full use” of the hidden microphones should be made during Darwin’s visit but that Darwin should not be made aware of this fact. In his annotations to the

134 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 153. Copy of Welsh to Perrin, Jul. 31, 1945; 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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Farm Hall reports, Jeremy Bernstein surmises that Darwin did know about the hidden listening devices, although he notes that the Farm Hall reports do not make this clear.

Given the questions that Darwin asked during his one-day visit, he certainly had been briefed before his visit to Farm Hall. Another noted British physicist, , visited Farm Hall in early September and was informed in advance about the listening scheme. However, the policy may have been changed by then. Both Darwin and

Blackett were appointed to a new British atomic advisory committee just before Darwin visited Farm Hall. By the time that Blackett visited Farm Hall in early September, both of them had learned more about Farm Hall via their participation on this committee.135

Darwin’s visit elicited some direct statements from the group that were useful to the officials considering (or resisting) the scientists’ repatriation. However, British and

American officials found what they wanted in these conversations. In favor of the scientists’ return to Germany: the scientists recognized that their future scientific lives would be curtailed, which in some form they were prepared to accept. Most wanted to rebuild German science but were not insistent that that effort had to include nuclear research. Most of the scientists were prepared to work with the US or the Britain, although they preferred to work on behalf of German science. On the other hand, if conditions in Germany became too desperate (which seemed like a definite possibility), they might go to work for the Soviet Union. It was up to British and American officials to figure out a way to make sure that they did not happen, either by giving the scientists no opportunity to work with the Soviets (such as through continued confinement) or by creating a satisfactory research life in Germany. What would be possible remained to be

135 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 153, 185; Rowan letter to Patrick Blackett, Aug. 17, 1945, Royal Society Archives (henceforth RS), PB D184.

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seen, both in terms of the conditions in Germany and the policies to be worked out by

British and American officials.136

After the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, some of the tensions inherent in the British-American cooperation in the Manhattan Project became more apparent.

British officials did not think that the American about the Manhattan

Project made British scientists’ important role in the Manhattan Project clear enough and hurried to create a public statement to append to the report. Their next task was to create an advisory committee to address future nuclear research in Britain. On August 15,

Denis Rickett, secretary to Sir John Anderson, wrote to Roger Makins, who was stationed in Washington as part of the Joint Staff Mission.137 Rickett informed Makins about the formation and purpose of the new Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy (ACAE) under

Anderson’s chairmanship. Under Winston Churchill’s government, Anderson had served as the Chancellor of the Exchequer and overseen the Tube Alloys program for the

Cabinet. As part of this latter role, he had approved bringing the detained German scientists to Farm Hall. Various government officials and scientists whose bailiwicks touched on issues that would be affected by the development of nuclear power or weapons had been invited to join the ACAE. Rickett served as the secretary for the new committee.138

136 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 185-189. 137 Makins handled issues relating to atomic research while in Washington. He later served as UK ambassador to Washington and after that chairman of the UK Atomic Energy Authority. Lorna Arnold and Mark Smith, Britain, Australia, and the Bomb: The Nuclear Tests and Their Aftermath (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 9. 138 Denis Rickett (AMSSO) telegram to Roger Makins (JSM Washington) re: draft Scientific Statement, Aug. 7, 1945; Denis Rickett (AMSSO) telegram to Roger Makins (JSM Washington), Aug. 15, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/340. Some British and Canadian scientists who worked on atomic research in Montreal strongly protested Anderson’s chairmanship since he was “one of the leading members of the cabinet which has just been rejected by the whole nation.” They also held him accountable for “early mistakes of policy” for atomic research in Britain. Scientists’ memorandum to Patrick Blackett, Aug. 30, 1945, RS, PB D185.

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Since Britain did not yet have a full-scale nuclear weapons program, the ACAE’s most important task was to advise Prime Minister Clement Attlee about “the implications of the use of atomic energy” for both military and industrial purposes. The second part of the committee’s mission was to “put forward proposals for the international treatment of the subject.” In forming this committee, the new prime minister recognized that atomic energy raised issues affecting not just defense and foreign relations, but also technological and economic development.139 All of these factors would have to be weighed in order to reach a decision about whether Britain should proceed with a full- scale program of its own, whether for energy or weapons purposes (or both), and how it should address atomic control domestically and internationally. The topic was of lower priority, but advising the British government about what to do with the scientists held at

Farm Hall was soon added to the committee’s list of questions to address.140

At the committee’s first meeting on August 21, members discussed how to address the questions that they were charged with investigating. One of their conclusions was that they needed advice about what their American counterparts thought. Rickett contacted Makins and Chadwick in Washington to ask for their interpretations about the developing American international policies toward atomic research. Based on President

Harry S Truman’s statements after the bombing of Japan, ACAE members were concerned that “Americans may overrate the possibilities of maintaining [the] secrecy” of nuclear research. Despite their different assumptions about atomic security, British

Lord Cherwell’s private secretary, E.J.S. Clarke, became joint secretary of the ACAE in mid-November. Denis Rickett (Cabinet Offices) telegram to Roger Makins (JSM Washington), Nov. 22, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341. 139 This was evident in the government offices that had representatives on the committee: Imperial General Staff, Air Staff, Treasury, Foreign Office, Dominions Office, Ministry of Supply, Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, and Tube Alloys. The Royal Society was also represented. Draft minutes of ACAE meeting, Dec. 7, 1945, CAC, CHAD I/15/3. 140 Rowan letter to Patrick Blackett, Aug. 17, 1945, RS, PB D184.

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officials wanted to continue the military, scientific, and governmental Anglo-American cooperation that had been achieved during the war. The questions posed by the ACAE demonstrated both a desire to coordinate Britain’s international policy with America and a realization that the Americans’ policies might be unduly restrictive and unrealistic.

These issues recurred throughout the fall of 1945, in discussions both about general atomic policies and the specific issues at Farm Hall. The tenor of the committee’s first meeting indicated that ACAE members were disinclined to accept what they deemed overblown American fears about German atomic research, even if they were not willing to start a row over this difference in opinion. This boded drawn-out discussions about how to resolve the scientists’ detention at Farm Hall, since many key British officials were unconvinced that the German scientists’ knowledge represented a grave threat or that it could be completely contained.141

In Washington, American officials followed the new Attlee government with interest, looking for but finding little sign of change in foreign and bilateral policies.142

They noted the formation of the ACAE. In Groves’ office, Maj. Francis J. Smith and

Maj. Amos E. Britt handled most of the correspondence about Farm Hall. On the same day that Darwin visited Farm Hall, Smith sent Groves a memorandum to use in an upcoming discussion about the Farm Hall scientists with Dr. Vannevar Bush, who headed

141 Denis Rickett telegram to Roger Makins, Aug. 21, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/340; Denis Rickett (AMSSO) to Roger Makins (JSM Washington), Aug. 30, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341; Henry Maitland Wilson letter to Gen. Ismay, Aug. 31, 1945, TNA: PRO PREM 8/120. 142 By early September, the American ambassador in London, John G. Winant, was favorably impressed with how the Labour Party had handled their transition to power in Britain and was pleased that his office’s “prediction that no major changes would be made in foreign policy has materialized. Winant to Secretary of State, Sept. 6, 1945; #27 From: Gr. Brit. – State Dept. – Incoming (8-31-45) thru (10-9-45); Incoming and Outgoing Messages, 1942-45; Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence); Records of the Army Staff, RG 319; NACP.

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the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD).143 The memorandum justified the scientists’ detention on the basis of the overall security of nuclear science and the fear that the scientists would fall into French or Soviet hands. The scientists had been treated well since their capture but were becoming increasingly concerned about their future and the well-being of their families. Smith included the character sketches that had been included in Farm Hall report 4 about the scientists’ reactions to Hiroshima.

The staff in Groves’ office did not yet think that decisions could be made about what to do with the scientists given the uncertainties about Germany’s occupation and the control of nuclear science. Smith’s memorandum suggested three courses of action for when it became appropriate to consider releasing the scientists:

1. Release them from custody and permit them to return to Germany. This would inevitably result in their working either for the Russians or French. Both are desirous of their services and such action would materially enhance their efforts. 2. Move them and their families to America for employment on the American job with the ultimate aim of their becoming citizens. In monitored conversations some of them have indicated they would like to establish citizenship in other countries; most all have acquiesced to either working in England or America. 3. Return them to the Anglo-American Zone in Germany to continue their work under our supervision but without our assistance. We would merely control their work.144

Smith’s list showed that by mid-August, Manhattan Project officials had considered what to do with the detained scientists in the future, even if they did not yet want to make a decision on this topic. The options that Smith presented indicated that the

143 The OSRD oversaw the Manhattan Project and other militarily applicable scientific research during WWII. Bush, its chairman, reported only to President Roosevelt (and, later, Truman). After its establishment in 1941, it superseded (and oversaw) the National Defense Research Committee, which was then chaired by Dr. James Conant. 144 “Monthly Intelligence Summary: July and August 1945;” 202.3-1 Combined Intelligence Reports; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Amos E. Britt, “Notes to Aid in Discussion with Dr. Vannevar Bush Concerning the Captured German Scientists,” n.d. but just before Aug. 18, 1945; 202.2 London Office: Combined Intell Disc; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944- 46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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scientists’ detention could not be continued indefinitely but framed their possible release in a negative light. Option one was clearly off the table. Smith’s argument that the scientists would “inevitably” work for the Soviets or French had little support in the Farm

Hall reports to date, although he was correct that a majority of the scientists would likely return to their institutes in the French occupation zone if left to their own devices.

However, this did not necessarily imply that the scientists would work for the French, given their stated preference to work on behalf of German science.

The second option had a low probability of being carried out. At the beginning of

May, Manhattan Project officials had declined to bring the scientists to the US. They may have reconsidered this decision in August but this course of action was not a priority. Smith’s third suggestion was the most realistic but numerous questions, especially about how the Americans could control the Germans’ research, had to be addressed before this option could be implemented. Smith’s memorandum made clear that American officials did not yet want to address the German scientists’ repatriation.

By presenting Bush with two options that were unsuitable and a third option that raised additional difficult questions, Manhattan Project officials forestalled plans for the group’s repatriation. This “wait and see” attitude proved on ongoing hindrance to British efforts to send the group back to Germany. The scientists’ security could never be completely guaranteed, which meant that the conditions American were waiting for might never materialize.

In contrast to Manhattan Project officials’ disinclination to address how the scientists’ detention at Farm Hall could be brought to a close, by the end of August

British officials advocated returning the scientists to Germany. On August 30, Welsh

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wrote to Anderson about the reasons for the German scientists’ detention and argued that plans should be made soon to repatriate the group. Like American officials, Welsh acknowledged that some restrictions would need to be placed on the scientists. For him, however, these restrictions needed to be figured out, rather than used as obstacles to developing a proposal.

Welsh wrote that group had been kept in secret from late April until after the bombing of Japan because of Groves’ order that “every possible step” be “taken to prevent leakage of information before the first bomb was dropped.” Based on what had been learned about the scientists and their research through CSDIC monitoring and

Darwin’s recent visit to Farm Hall (in addition to prior investigations by British intelligence and Alsos personnel), Welsh argued that the Germans’ scientific knowledge

“lagged far behind current knowledge of the subject,” which meant that they were not a great threat. Their detention did not “serve any useful purpose, and their eventual release does not represent a significant danger.”

Welsh did not advocate returning the men to Germany “as entirely free agents, but that some sort of restriction on their movements and activities must be exercised in order to comply with General Groves’ wish that their services should not become available to the Russians.” He “respectfully suggested” to Anderson “that the early release of these scientists be ventilated by General Groves.” He also asked that Anderson consider whether the scientists’ presence in Britain would be useful. The scientists’ “future should be discussed with other relevant authorities and interlinked with any plans which may have been or are to be made with regard to the future of German science and scientists as a whole.” The first and final items turned out to be the main sticking points for

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repatriating the scientists. American officials resisted British proposals, especially because of the “interlinked” questions about how Germany and atomic science (and

German atomic science) were to be managed.145

The Manhattan Project’s London office obtained a copy of Welsh’s report within a few days and sent Groves a copy. The analysis of Welsh’s report by the Manhattan

Project’s London personnel went into much greater detail than Welsh had about what the scientists had said and done at Farm Hall. Most of the material in this American analysis supported the British case: the detained scientists had been friendly toward their captors, even when their morale fluctuated, and had been shocked by Hiroshima. Some of the scientists’ Nazi Party sympathies or affiliations were a bit opaque but the Farm Hall surveillance provided no great cause for alarm on this subject. The scientists hoped to rebuild German science but most of them would work with the Americans or British if necessary to continue their careers.146

The American report noted Welsh’s suggestion that the scientists be repatriated with restrictions upon where they could live and travel, and the type of research they could conduct. The report raised other possibilities, although its wording discouraged them: the scientists could be brought to work in the US or Britain; could be returned to the British, American, or French zones in Germany and work under light supervision; or could be released to those three zones with no surveillance beyond what would be carried out by occupation forces for all German scientists. It seems odd to have raised these

145 E. Welsh to John Anderson, re: “German T.A. Scientists,” Aug. 30, 1945; 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 146 George B. Davis to Francis J. Smith, re: “German T A Scientists,” Sept. 7, 1945; 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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options here: Welsh had not proposed any of them and, based on Smith’s recent memorandum, they were not options that Manhattan Project officials wanted to pursue.

As with Smith’s memorandum, the introduction of ominous options (which the British had not suggested) into this report seems to have been designed to further delay attempts to release the scientists. By raising additional fears under the guise of thoroughness,

American officials ensured that discussions about the scientists would be prolonged.

While American officials mulled over how they would respond to an official proposal to repatriate the Farm Hall scientists, British officials in London reached out to physicist James Chadwick, who was still working in Washington. At this point in early

September, Tube Alloys Director Wallace Akers wrote to Chadwick that British officials were considering whether to invite any of the scientists held at Farm Hall to work in

Britain. This was part of a broader discussion about bringing German scientists and technicians to work in Britain. Akers, Welsh, and three other key Tube Alloys scientists

– Sir Edward Appleton, Rudolf Peierls, and Francis Simon – thought that Hahn,

Heisenberg, Korsching, and Erich Bagge might be worth inviting to work in the UK. All had demonstrated scientific eminence or promise and had agreeable personalities, with the latter consideration likely based on the secret surveillance of Farm Hall. Two other

German scientists who were not under detention, Fritz Strassmann and Walther Bothe, might also be considered. Akers, Welsh, and the British scientists deemed Max von Laue a special case. While he would not be useful to the Tube Alloys program, he could be appointed to an academic post on the basis of his “outstanding…moral courage” during the Third Reich. Appleton and Simon had some reservations about this option, given von

Laue’s poor English lecturing skills, as well as possible opposition from other academics.

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These British officials differed from their American counterparts in how dangerous they judged the Farm Hall scientists’ knowledge – that is, how valuable their knowledge would be to another country working on atomic weapons. British officials considered the likelihood low that the scientists at Farm Hall would prove “a substantial asset to any other organization working on T.A. in any other country,” although it was possible that the four scientists that Akers named could help “shorten by a small amount” the duration of another country’s nuclear weapons research. Since the likely effect would be so small, this consideration would have little bearing on how – and where – the scientists were released.

Akers wanted to know if Chadwick concurred in this assessment and asked his colleague for a speedy reply, in part “to avoid being forestalled by the Americans.”

British scientists had played a key role in launching what became the Manhattan Project and later felt slighted when American atomic officials denied them an equal partnership in sharing the technological and scientific fruits of that labor. British atomic officials thought that their American counterparts might be creating similar plans to invite key

German scientists to work in the US and wanted to have agreement among themselves before approaching the Americans about any such invitations. Akers and his colleagues recognized that they would need to come to an agreement with American officials before such a plan could go forward but wanted to have a unified negotiating position before they began such conversations.

The second reason that Akers asked his colleagues for a quick response was the

Farm Hall scientists’ increasingly negative attitudes about their indefinite detention.

Akers wrote that “the state of mind of the internees is deteriorating very rapidly and it

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will be difficult to hold them much longer without serious incidents occurring.” Negative publicity about the detention – especially if the scientists managed to gain public attention through an escape – would be bad for the British. It would hinder the possibility of working with these scientists after their detention ended as well as efforts – already in progress – to employ other valuable German scientists and technicians in

Britain.147

This point was reiterated a few days later in another cable from London to British officials in Washington. The Germans’ discussions at Farm Hall had had an impact on their overseers: Heisenberg had told Rittner that he would “withdraw his parole unless some decision is come to regarding his future and that of the rest of the guests,” and

Heisenberg and Korsching had discussed working for the Soviet Union if it offered better living conditions. Korsching had commented that, “if the English expect us not to work for the Russians, then we expect them not to let us starve, but to let us live decently.”

The cable to British officials in Washington warned that Heisenberg might try to “make contact with his British scientific friends” and “get them to raise a stir about their very irregular detention as civilians against whom no charge has been made.” It was quite possible that Heisenberg could do this. The house was not under armed guard, “since this would call public attention to the most irregular position.” Moreover, some of the scientists had become so depressed “that suicides with attendant publicity are certainly possible.” Both factors meant that an end to the scientists’ detention – which, of course, meant figuring out where the men would go next – needed to be arranged soon, and

147 Wallace Akers (via Denis Rickett and AMSSO) telegram to James Chadwick (via Roger Makins and JSM Washington), Sept. 6, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341.

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London officials reiterated their request for a prompt reply from their colleagues in the

US.148

The response that they soon received, however, was not what they wanted.

Wilson, the chief of the British Staff Mission in Washington, was “disturbed” that British officials seemed to be avoiding open cooperation with the Americans. He chastised his colleagues for going against “the policy we have always adopted in dealing with the

Americans, i.e. that T.A. is a joint enterprise in which we acts and share together” and warned that such actions “may prejudice more difficult negotiations in the future.” With regard to the scientists, Chadwick did not “set a high value” on any of the detainees and thought that it would be difficult to find positions for them in the UK. Groves disagreed with the British assessment that the Farm Hall scientists could help other countries only in “small” ways and would not agree to any arrangement that made this help a possibility, which meant that none of them – even the ones that British officials had not wanted to keep – could be released. Wilson requested that he, Chadwick, and Groves “be allowed to work out an equitable distribution, which we can accomplish very quickly.” This cable was the first indication that British opinion about releasing the scientists was not uniform.

British officials in London and Washington, DC had different assessments about the risks and rewards of letting the scientists go.149

Chadwick wrote a cable of his own that was softer in tone the same day. He still argued that “it would be better to act in co-ordination” with the Americans but that that did not prevent British officials “from considering at once whom we would prefer to

148 AMSSO telegram to JSM Washington, Sept. 8, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341; Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 211, 214. 149 Henry Maitland Wilson (JSM Washington) telegram to AMSSO, Sept. 8, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/335.

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have.” He thought that only von Laue, Hahn, Heisenberg, and Paul Harteck were

“acceptable” but only Hahn and Heisenberg were of “special value.” Chadwick knew very little about Bagge or Korsching, two of the younger scientists detained at Farm Hall.

However, he thought that none of the ten men could be assumed to be politically reliable and, thus, could only work on non-secret nuclear research. At that point, there was little incentive to bother with them at all.

Chadwick’s reading of the situation was that it would be difficult for British research facilities “to absorb more than a few” German scientists, so it would “be up to the Americans to take charge of the larger proportion.” He cautioned that British workers might be reluctant to associate with Germans and that assigning the men to academic posts, even in the case of von Laue, was likely to be impossible. As a result, it might be necessary “to consider methods of easing their position in Germany, while preventing their going to Russia.” Chadwick thus tacitly affirmed the idea of returning the scientists to Germany, although his agreement to this possibility was still conditional.150

In mid-September, British and American officials received reports from that reinforced their fears about Soviet attention to scientists in occupied Germany. As with the Farm Hall reports, these reports could be interpreted to mean either that scientists needed to be treated well in occupied Germany so that they did not leave or that valuable scientists needed to be kept under lock and key (perhaps literally, in the case of the Farm

Hall scientists). The first interpretation tended to be more likely among British officials and the second more common among Manhattan Project leaders. British occupation authorities heard that the Soviets were rehabilitating the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes in their

150 James Chadwick (JSM Washington) telegram to Wallace Akers (via Denis Rickett and AMSSO), Sept. 8, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/33.

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territory in Berlin. Occupation officials worried that the revitalization of these institutes could attract “the cream of the German scientists” to the Soviet zone, which would put pressure on the other occupation zones to provide equivalent or better research opportunities or risk losing valuable scientists to the Soviet zone. This fear was one of the main reasons that Manhattan Project officials objected to the Farm Hall scientists’ release.151

On a related note, Samuel Goudsmit, the scientific director of the Alsos Mission, had recently reported that the Soviets had removed almost all the equipment at the Kaiser

Wilhelm Institute for Physics (which was in the American zone of Berlin, which had not yet been occupied by American troops) by the end of July, which could also be a sign that the Soviets were trying to create a research center under their aegis, or were gathering

German scientists to take back to the Soviet Union. Groves’ office also received an

Office of Strategic Services (OSS) report in September that Soviet officials were sending a representative to the French zone to take Hahn back to Berlin. An officer from

Calvert’s London office investigated this claim but none of the individuals whom he interviewed, including Otto Hahn’s family and Josef Mattauch (who was leading the institute in Hahn’s absence), said that they had been approached by the Soviets.152 They knew only of a few Soviet officers in the area, but they were working to repatriate other

Soviets. The French, however, had taken two scientists from Tailfingen to Paris. While there appeared to be no immediate threat of Soviet kidnapping at the scientists’ institutes in the French zone, reports like the one from OSS reflected heightened fears about Soviet

151 A.W. Bechter to CCG(BE) DDG, Research, Sept. 10, 1945, TNA: PRO FO 1012/358. This turned out not to be the case – the mayor of Berlin was behind this effort – but British officials did not learn that until October. E.G. Lewin to DDG, Research, Oct. 5, 1945, TNA: PRO FO 1012/35. 152 Mattauch was one of the original detainees taken from Hechingen and Tailfingen to Heidelberg, although he was not taken on to Rheims with the rest of the group.

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interference if the Farm Hall scientists were returned to their German institutes. French actions were also concerning, since they were trying to make use of the knowledge of the

German scientists who had remained in Hechingen and Tailfingen.153

In response to Wilson’s (the chief of the British Staff Mission in Washington) earlier chastisement about trying to make plans about the detained scientists separately from the Americans, in mid-September British officials offered both an apology for their perceived error and a specific proposal about how to return most of the scientists to

Germany. They hoped to come to an agreement with their colleagues in Washington within a few days. Akers wrote that they had not intended to act separately but that “it seemed necessary to us to agree amongst ourselves on our own policy before we started discussions with the Americans on this subject, or they should approach us.” Blackett and Anderson, both of whom served on the Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy, had been consulted about this new proposal. Anderson agreed that the majority of the group could be returned to Germany “forthwith” since they were of no particular value to

American or British research, would be of little value to other countries, and were unlikely to go to the Soviet Union, even if asked. His third conclusion likely stemmed from his reading of the Farm Hall reports. That left three detainees – von Laue, Hahn, and Heisenberg – to address. The British officials deemed von Laue’s detention a mistake. In contrast to their previous suggestion that von Laue be appointed to an academic position in Britain, they now proposed that he “go back to Germany

153 S.A. Goudsmit to George R. Eckman, Sept. 6, 1945; 32.24-2 Germany: Research – Res. Inst. & Other Facilities (May 45-Dec. 46); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Amos E. Britt to H.K. Calvert, Sept. 8, 1945; Liaison with War Department; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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unconditionally where his known anti-Nazi views might make a valuable contribution.”

Von Laue was past the prime of his scientific career but his perceived anti-fascist views could prove useful in occupied Germany.154

London officials deemed it unlikely that Hahn or Heisenberg would accept an invitation to do applied research in the US or Britain, and were not yet certain whether they wanted to offer either man an academic post. They deemed it unlikely that either scientist would willingly go to the Soviet Union. However, the possibility existed that

Hahn could be kidnapped from the French zone, which the Soviets had recently received permission to visit. (This fear was debunked a week later by the visit by Manhattan

Project personnel.) There was a lower likelihood that such an event could affect

Heisenberg, whose family was in the American zone, but he would also be a potential target. As such, London officials advised that both Hahn and Heisenberg be returned to

Germany as soon as the potential danger of Soviet kidnapping could be mitigated.

Most importantly, Akers argued that “[t]he crux of our problem is to be rid of these detainees.” Officials in London hoped to act by the end of the week because of the threat of escape or suicide at Farm Hall. If the British officials in Washington agreed to this plan, British officials in both London and Washington would broach the subject simultaneously with their American counterparts. The issue of whether other German scientists such as Strassmann or Bothe would be invited to work in the UK would be addressed at a later time.

Once again, British officials in Washington responded by challenging the terms set out by the London colleagues. Wilson, Chadwick, and Groves (who they had

154 Denis Rickett and Wallace Akers (AMSSO) telegram to Roger Makins and James Chadwick, Sept. 11, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341.

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consulted) disagreed that the detained German scientists were of little value to other countries. Based on their readings of the Farm Hall reports, they thought that the scientists “would go almost anywhere they would be given facilities for work and where they and their families would enjoy a more comfortable existence.” The three officials had “little doubt” that most of the group “would eventually go to Russia and that they could appreciably assist progress” on nuclear research. This assessment was not quite correct and was an example of seeing what one wanted to see in the Farm Hall reports.

Some of the scientists had discussed going to work for the Soviet Union or France, but only if conditions in the British or Americans zones became too bleak. Groves was adamant that none of the detained scientists could be brought to work in the US, either on the Manhattan Project or in academic posts.155

Wilson, Chadwick, and Groves’ plan “to ensure reasonable security” involved the forced residence of the scientists in the British zone, preferably at a university such as

Bonn that was as far away as possible from the Soviet occupation zone. The scientists’ families could be brought to join them and the men would be allowed to teach at the university, carry out research, and take part in university life. “Adequate but not lavish means of subsistence” should be provided so that there would “be no great incentive to escape for reasons of hardship.” The scientists would have to get special permission to leave Bonn. Chadwick, Wilson, and Groves anticipated that these precautions would need to remain in place for two to three years. This timeline implied that neither the international control of atomic science nor the situation in Germany would be stable enough to release the scientists for some time to come. This plan reflected Manhattan

155 This was in contrast to concurrent efforts by other American officials to bring and other German rocket scientists to work in the United States.

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Project officials’ (especially Groves’) assumption that atomic scientists were inherently dangerous because of the knowledge that they possessed and that extraordinary controls needed to be placed on them.156

On the surface, this plan seemed to show that Manhattan Project officials

(including Britons such as Chadwick and Wilson) were making efforts to end the scientists’ detention at Farm Hall. However, the plan’s impracticality was yet another delaying tactic. Their plan did not explain how the scientists’ families in the French zone could be moved to a different zone or how British officials would be able to provide the oxymoronic “non-lavish” means of subsistence in a country that was already facing food shortages. It also did not take into account whether facilities in Bonn could accommodate a population influx.

British officials did not send a yet another rebuttal to their colleagues in

Washington. They instead wrote that while they still disagreed with their colleagues’ analysis about the danger that the group posed, they would look into the logistics of moving the scientists’ families out of the French zone. They likely knew that this would be difficult, if not close to impossible, but they still tried to move forward with any plan, even if it was not their preferred option.157

The assumptions that guided British atomic policymakers in London were visible in a mid-September report that physicist Rudolf Peierls wrote for the ACAE. Based on his contacts with British and American scientists at Los Alamos, Peierls argued that the scientific developments which undergirded the creation of the atomic bomb could not be kept secret. Some countries’ industrial capacities could limit their research but this was

156 James Chadwick (JSM Washington) telegram to Denis Rickett and Wallace Akers (AMSSO), TNA: PRO CAB 126/335. 157 AMSSO telegram to JSM Washington, Sept. 15, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341.

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not a result of keeping scientific knowledge secret. He estimated that other nations might be able to develop atomic bombs more quickly if they had full technical information about the Manhattan Project but he argued that such information would only “amount to one or two years and might in fact be even less.” Atomic science could not be put back in a metaphoric box because it had never existed there. Fundamental science could not be successfully restricted although controls on technical information might have some

(albeit limited) influence.158

Toward the end of September, Anderson wrote to Wilson with yet another variation on the plan to repatriate the Farm Hall scientists. Anderson’s cable did not directly reference Wilson’s previous proposal, which would have had the scientists (and their families) housed in a group in the British zone with restrictions on their activities and movements for two to three years. Anderson now agreed that the scientists should return to Germany under some supervision but did not see the necessity of holding them as a group, especially because finding a place that could accommodate all of them would be complicated. This response implied that British officials had looked into moving the entire group to Bonn but that the logistics were not feasible.

Instead, Anderson proposed that the scientists could be moved to a few cities in the British and American occupation zones. Heisenberg and Gerlach could be returned to the American zone, where their families were. Diebner could also be returned to his family in Bavaria, although Anderson noted that he “should be treated as any other citizen with a similar political record.” Harteck could be returned to his university in

Hamburg. Hahn, Wirtz, Bagge, Korsching, and von Weizsäcker could be moved to the

158 Rudolf Peierls, “Some Notes on the Future Implications of the Atomic Bomb [for the ACAE],” Sept. 17, 1945, CAC, CHAD I/15/5.

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British zone, instead of back to their institutes in the French zone. An attempt would be made to move von Weizsäcker’s wife from Switzerland and the other men’s families from the French occupation zone. Only von Laue would be allowed to return to his family in the French zone.

Anderson suggested that only Hahn, Heisenberg, and Wirtz needed to have their movements controlled. If employing them in Bonn became a possibility, they could then be moved there. The rest of the scientists would be subject to the general occupation policies that restricted certain fields of scientific research, of which applied nuclear physics was at the top of the list. However, Anderson argued that these seven scientists were of “too little significance…to justify any further trouble about them.”

Anderson raised two issues that needed to be resolved before this plan could be implemented. The first was what British and American officials would do if it proved impossible to move the scientists’ families out of the French zone and, thus, the scientists were inclined to leave the British zone. Second, British and American officials needed to figure out what they would do if the Soviets asked to visit any of these men. Anderson requested that Wilson “seek American concurrence to the foregoing as soon as possible.”

He hoped that they could proceed with a plan by September 26.159

Groves soon received a cable from his London office about this subject. Based on what he had learned from the surveillance at Farm Hall, Calvert did not favor the most recent British proposal. Calvert reported that the discussions in London about the

“ultimate destination of [the] guests” had reached a “standstill,” since the British were awaiting a reply from Washington before they made further plans.

159 John Anderson telegram to Henry Maitland Wilson, Sept. 20, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341.

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Calvert blamed Blackett for the part of the proposal that he found the least palatable: that the scientists should be returned to various locations in Germany. Blackett thought (at least in Calvert’s view) that the scientists should never have been detained and, thus, that where the scientists were returned mattered less than the fact that they were repatriated. Calvert wrote that “Blackett is taking a strictly scientific viewpoint and ignoring [the] political picture,” which was the heart of the matter for Manhattan Project officials: the Farm Hall scientists could not be judged simply on the basis of their scientific expertise. The development and use of atomic weapons had changed not just the scientific world, but the military and political worlds as well. Calvert suggested that

Groves’ office would find the Farm Hall reports about covered Blackett’s visit to Farm

Hall in early September 8 and 9 useful in thinking about these issues. In Calvert’s view, the most important parts of these reports were:

1. Blackett advises detainees that their detention is not British responsibility but they are merely complying with American orders. 2. Blackett tells detainees that British is junior partner in collaboration with America and the British are not free agents to act. 3. Heisenberg and some of the others desire to work [on] physics on a large scale and would do so in Russia if not possible to do so otherwise [in Germany] as he feels that Russians have a more solicitous attitude toward science than the Anglo Americans. 4. Detainees are making such statements now that if living conditions are not satisfactory in Germany rather than starve they would go to Southworth [the Soviet Union].” 160

The first two points appeared nearly verbatim in the report about Blackett’s visit to Farm Hall.161 Both statements were fairly realistic (and other British officials agreed that the UK was the junior partner to the US in atomic matters162), but Calvert’s inclusion of them seemed designed to portray Blackett negatively. Blackett’s politics were likely

160 Calvert to Groves, Sept. 26, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 161 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 221. 162 Roger Makins, “Relations with the United States [note for the ACAE], Sept. 24, 1945, CAC, CHAD I/15/5.

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too left-leaning for Manhattan Project officials, especially because Blackett was favorably disposed to the USSR.163 The other two statements contained a grain of truth but Calvert took them out of context, thereby playing up fears about the scientists’ potential release. In two long conversations in English with Blackett, Heisenberg said that he hoped to resume research, as did most of the group. Heisenberg said that most of the group, himself included, felt a “duty to stay in Germany” and rebuild its scientific institutions. However, he was prepared for restrictions on atomic research and repeatedly expressed his preference to work in areas of Germany controlled by the British and

Americans, rather than the Soviets or French.164

Calvert’s note took the next part of Heisenberg’s remarks out of context. The

Farm Hall reports contained no statement from Heisenberg (or any of the other scientists held at Farm Hall) about a perception that the Soviet Union was more “solicitous” to science. If – and only if – no research opportunities were available in Germany, or if staying in Germany involved “starving,” he (and the other scientists) would consider working for the Soviet Union. Calvert’s analysis ignored the conditions that Heisenberg attached to this course of action. American officials interpreted Heisenberg’s comments as a form of atomic blackmail, in which the German scientists would threaten to take their knowledge to other countries if they were not treated appropriately in Germany. For this reason, the scientists could not be released, lest they demand provisions that

Manhattan Project officials were not about to make.

163 Just three years later, Blackett became one of the first notable scientists to challenge the idea that the atomic bomb had been necessary to end World War II, writing that “[t]he dropping of the atomic bombs was not so much the last act of the second World War, as the first major operation of the cold diplomatic war with Russia.” P.M.S. Blackett, Fear, War, and the Bomb: Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy (New York: Whittlesey House, 1949). 164 Otto Hahn and Max von Laue reiterated the latter point in separate conversations with Blackett. Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 226-228.

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In London, Anderson waited for Groves’ reply. The ACAE met for the third time on September 27. This was the first time that the Farm Hall detention was addressed officially by the committee, although some members – Anderson, Blackett, Dale,

Appleton, and Chadwick, plus Makins, Akers, Simon, and Peierls, who attended meetings but were not official committee members – had already been involved in discussions about ending the German scientists’ detention. Given the gravity of the other questions that the ACAE addressed it is unsurprising that the committee did not officially address the situation at Farm Hall for over a month. It also seemed unnecessary for them to do so, since British officials initially thought that the detention’s end could be worked out quickly at the beginning of September.

The committee’s notes indicated that the scientists had been brought to England

“in order that they might not be subjected to the somewhat harsh treatment applicable to prisoners of war” but mentioned neither the goal of gaining scientific intelligence and a sense of their politics from the detained Germans, nor the intent to deny their expertise to the French and Soviets. The meeting’s official notes repeated the conclusion that had been reached at the beginning of September and the latest plan offered by Anderson: “No useful purpose would be served by keeping them any longer in [Britain] and it was hoped to obtain within the next day or two the agreement of the American authorities to a proposal that they should return to certain selected towns in the British and American zones of Germany.” Part of the reason that the scientists’ ongoing detention would serve

“no useful purpose” was that the Tube Alloys officials had come to a definite conclusion that they did not want or need any of the scientists’ expertise.165 A week earlier, the

165 This is in contrast to British proposals at the beginning of September to consider inviting a few members of the Farm Hall group to work in Britain, although not necessarily on secret Tube Alloys work.

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ACAE had decided to recommend the establishment of large-scale atomic weapons research in Britain. They did not need any of the detained German scientists to do this.166

The day after the ACAE meeting, Calvert wrote to Washington with the news that

London officials’ opinion about how to repatriate the German scientists was less uniform than it seemed. Calvert had recently met with Michael Perrin and Wallace Akers, who headed the Tube Alloys project. Akers had attended the September 27 ACAE meeting.

Perrin and Akers had originally agreed with Blackett’s suggestion that the Farm Hall group be dispersed but now thought that it was better to keep the scientists in one group in Germany.167 This would allow for better control of the group, which would lower the risk that the scientists could go to work for the Soviet Union or France. Perrin and Akers had come to the conclusion that the scientists were just as critical as uranium and, since the US and Britain were already working to keep uranium out of French and Soviet control, they should treat the scientists’ placement with similar caution. Calvert’s cable gave the personnel in Groves’ office further confirmation that their reticence to repatriate the scientists was justified.

Calvert, Perrin, and Akers also agreed that a decision about the Farm Hall scientists should be delayed until Britain and the US had decided whether to keep atomic power to themselves or to internationalize it. Calvert wrote that the “ultimate destination” of the scientists “blends into [the] policy our governments follow in [the] overall picture.” These recommendations implied that final decisions about the scientists could not be made for some time. Debates about atomic control were just beginning to ramp up in the US (the May-Johnson bills would be introduced in Congress less than a

166 Draft minutes of ACAE meeting, Sept. 27, 1945, CAC, CHAD I/15/3. 167 Once again, Calvert assigned blame to the left-leaning Blackett for the “unsuitable” proposal to disperse the Farm Hall scientists in Germany.

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week later) and there were still many questions about international control. Even among

Manhattan Project officials, what international control would mean – and whether it was desirable or possible – was still unclear.168

However, even having recommended that the Farm Hall scientists should be repatriated (and supervised) as a group, the question of their specific destination was still complicated. Concerns about the Soviet Union were a key factor. Calvert wrote that the

University of Bonn, which had been suggested by Wilson, Chadwick, and Groves because it was far from the Soviet zone, had been largely destroyed. The next best option was the University of Göttingen. However, it was only a short distance from the Soviet occupation zone, which put the location’s security at risk. Calvert thought that

Heidelberg (in the American zone) would be the best option. Perrin and Akers were going to discuss the issues with Makins, who was in London until the next day. This vague recommendation again implied that no decision about the scientists should be made, since the question of a suitable location in Germany had not been adequately investigated.169

Meanwhile, at Farm Hall, the German scientists knew nothing about the specific proposals that were being offered about their release (or continued detention). They did, however, know that such discussions were taking place. When Blackett visited in early

September, he had assured the scientists that “action is going on very energetically at the moment” to decide their future. Blackett’s personal view was that “the majority of you

168 Calvert to Smith, Sept. 28, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Norris, Racing for the Bomb, 455-456. 169 Calvert to Smith, Sept. 28, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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[the scientists] should go back reasonably soon.” Blackett qualified his statements by noting that his advice might not be taken, but the scientists’ spirits were lifted by hearing that he (and other British scientists) advocated reopening universities in Germany, both for teaching and research. Rittner described the scientists as being in “a cheerful and friendly mood” after Blackett’s visit because they expected “an early return to

Germany.”170

From conversations with Blackett, the scientists apparently learned that a conference about their future was to be held on September 20.171 Bernstein assumes that this referred to a session at the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM), which met in

London from September 11 to October 2. He writes that, “[t]he special session did not take place” because meetings that day broke up after the conferees could not come to agreement about peace treaties for Finland and Romania. However, there is no record in conference reports that any subject which would have affected the scientists’ repatriation was scheduled for discussion on September 20, or any other day. Manhattan Project and

Tube Alloys officials would have had to reverse their longstanding policy of secrecy with regard to the Farm Hall scientists in order to add this topic to the CFM’s agenda. Even something more general, like science policy, was not up for discussion at the London

CFM meeting, which dealt primarily with peace treaties and reparations.172

170 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 215-221. 171 In his report, Brodie described this as “a supposed conference on Thursday, 20th of September,” which shows that he was doubtful that such a meeting was scheduled. Bernstein, Hitler's Uranium Club, 236. During his visit, Blackett has promised Heisenberg that he would receive some news about assistance to his family within two weeks; however, their conversation did not mention a conference. Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 226. 172 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 245. “Proceedings of the First Plenary Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers, 11th September to 2nd October, 1945;” Proceedings of 1st Plenary Conference of Council of Foreign Ministers (Printed Copy); Numbered Documents, Sept. 11, 1945-Oct. 2, 1945; World War II Conferences: Council of Foreign Ministers: First Session, London; Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43; NACP. The analysis that the American

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The Farm Hall scientists, however, were convinced that September 20 was the day when they would finally have answers about their future. Despite his skepticism,

Brodie went to London on September 21 at the scientists’ request to find out what had happened. His return “without immediate permission to return everyone to Germany” created a tense situation at Farm Hall. Brodie gained some “breathing space” by telling the scientists that the meeting was still in progress and that a “definite decision was expected shortly.” He did imply that the CFM was discussing the scientists’ future but it seemed that he was simply trying to placate the scientists (and was likely in the dark himself about whether the CFM was considering the scientists’ detention). The dashing of the scientists’ hopes did not bode well for their voluntary future confinement but there was little that Brodie could do to change that.173

On September 28, the reply came from Washington to London: Wilson,

Chadwick, and Groves were “dead against” Anderson’s latest proposal for repatriating the Farm Hall scientists to different cities in the British and American occupation zones.

Chadwick and Groves both placed much higher value on the scientists’ knowledge and ability than did the other British officials involved in this correspondence and found their views about the potential danger posed by the scientists confirmed in the Farm Hall reports.174 Both men asserted that the German scientists’ “value should not only be assessed from their knowledge today but also as to their future value to anyone wishing

Military Attaché in London provided about the CFM provided no indication that the “flop” of the meeting had anything to do with its failure to discuss atomic or scientific policies. He instead focused on the “gloomy impression” that the Soviet Union and the western Allies “have fundamentally different conceptions of [the] nature of [the] peace settlement as [a] whole and [the] future world.” US Military Attaché London England to War Dept, Oct. 4, 1945; #72 From: Gr. Britain – M.A. – Incoming (9-25-45) thru (12-29-45) (3 of 3); Incoming and Outgoing Messages, 1942-45; Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence); RG 319; NACP. 173 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 247. 174 This is closer to the views that Calvert reported that Perrin and Akers held.

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to develop the project.” Groves was particularly concerned about scattering the scientists into various cities, even in the British and American zones, because of the near impossibility of supervising them. Chadwick and Groves again argued that von Laue should be treated like the rest of the group and reiterated their proposal to house the scientists in one German city for the next two years.175

For the third time, officials in Washington had rejected the British proposal. The responses to the British proposals had contained increasingly strong warnings about the potential danger posed by the Farm Hall scientists. British officials had countered these warnings but with little effect. Each side found their views confirmed in what was included in the Farm Hall reports.

The British response to this cable remained to be seen. Since August 30, British officials had argued that the scientists’ further detention did not “serve any useful purpose” and their release did not “represent a significant danger.” They had repeatedly advocated in September for their interpretation of the non-danger posed by the scientists.

However, they saw the “crux of our problem” as being “rid of these detainees.”176

As it turned out, Calvert’s prediction that British officials would go along with whatever decision Groves made, whether they agreed with it or not, was correct. On

October 1, three days after Wilson responded to Anderson’s third proposal, Calvert wrote to Washington with the news that the British had cabled the commander of the British occupation forces, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, to ask “whether he could look

175 Henry Maitland Wilson (JSM Washington) telegram to John Anderson (Cabinet Offices), Sept. 28, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/335. 176 E. Welsh to John Anderson, re: “German T.A. Scientists,” Aug. 30, 1945; 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Denis Rickett and Wallace Akers (AMSSO) telegram to Roger Makins and James Chadwick (AMSSO), Sept. 11, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341.

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after” the scientists if they were moved to Bonn “as a provisional residence.” In Groves’ office, this led to a conversation among Groves, Smith, and Groves’ close aide Col.

William A. Consodine reiterating their insistence that the scientists would have to remain in a single group in the British occupation zone. James Chadwick thought that “they are competent leaders,” which reinforced the contention that the scientists needed to remain under supervision and, thus, not have the opportunity to lead other scientists (possibly astray).177

The same day, Calvert wrote to the intelligence division at the American army’s headquarters in Europe. Calvert reported that Groves “and proper Washington authorities” had decided to return the Farm Hall scientists to Germany “under certain controls and restrictions which have not yet been entirely decided.” The interim decision, however, was to move the scientists (and their families) to Bonn.178 Army officials would likely be called upon to move Heisenberg and Gerlach’s respective families to the

British zone but should wait for communications from Montgomery before they acted.

Calvert’s cable showed that he was fairly certain that the British efforts to gain

Montgomery’s assent to moving the scientists to Bonn would work out, since he was giving American occupation officials advance warning about the impending move.179

177 Calvert to Smith, Oct. 1, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Tuesday, October 2, 1945 office diary entry; Jan. 1, 1945- Dec. 31, 1946; Diaries, 1940-48; Papers of Gen. Leslie R. Groves; National Archives Gift Collection, RG 200; NACP. 178 “Interim” may have meant two to three years. 179 Calvert to Seibert, Oct. 1, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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Groves’ continued insistence that the scientists be closely controlled in Bonn was evident in a note that he prepared in response to Calvert’s cable to US army officials in

Europe. Groves wrote that the “guests”:

1. Must remain in one group. 2. Must be under strict control. 3. Must be in British zone – no other zone. 4. Must be in spot where there is no danger of kidnapping. 5. Chadwick in agreement with above. 6. Most of men could be group leaders, this is the danger180

He had checked off the first four items, presumably because the plan to move the group to Bonn met these conditions. The scientists needed to be kept in a location that would afford neither opportunities to escape nor the chance that they might be kidnapped by other countries, especially the Soviet Union or France. The final point reflected

Groves’ continued concern that these scientists might prove a future threat within

Germany if allowed to return there unsupervised. Their work could still have military applications, even if they had not gotten to that stage of research during the war.

In a cable to Makins in Washington, Rickett indicated that the British were trying to implement Groves’ plan. As of October 6, they had not yet received a reply from

Montgomery. Once they did, they would write an official reply to the course of action that Wilson, Chadwick, and Groves had insisted on on September 28. British officials were “anxious to put into effect as soon as possible some plan to secure the return of the

German scientists to Germany.” As such, it seemed that the scientists’ time at Farm Hall would soon come to an end.181

180 Groves to Calvert (handwritten cable draft), n.d. but attached to Calvert’s Oct. 1 cable to Smith; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 181 Denis Rickett (Cabinet Offices) telegram to Roger Makins (JSM Washington), Oct. 6, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341.

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…

During the first three months that they were held at Farm Hall, the ten German scientists’ perceptions about their detention changed greatly. During July and the first week of August, they assumed that they were waiting to discuss their assumed-to-be- superior wartime research with British and American colleagues. After Hiroshima, they soon realized that their detention had been for reasons of secrecy. The group hoped that they would soon be allowed to return to Germany, since nuclear research was now public knowledge around the world. They recognized that their research on nuclei would likely be curtailed but expected to resume careers in science eventually.

Their assumptions, however, did not correspond with the Manhattan Project officials who had the most say in their detention. Groves and his staff remained concerned that these scientists – and possibly other scientists who had been allowed to stay in Germany – would pose future threats to the US, either by creating nuclear weapons on behalf of Germany or contributing to similar efforts in France or the Soviet

Union, or simply being nationalistic Germans. Control was the top goal of Manhattan

Project officials, although it was yet unclear how such control could be administered in

Germany or around the world. French and Soviet intentions for making use of German scientists were still of great concern. These uncertainties led Manhattan Project officials to argue that the scientists’ detention at Farm Hall needed to continue.

In contrast, British officials remained less concerned that this group of scientists posed an inherent threat because of the combination of their knowledge and German identity, and worried instead that the group’s continued detention in England could have negative repercussions for Britain. British officials were not averse to surveilling the

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scientists – CSDIC monitoring demonstrated that – but saw no benefit in continuing this surveillance indefinitely. These differing British and American assumptions about the danger posed by Germany and nuclear scientists (let alone German nuclear scientists) undergirded the different ways that British and American officials approached the occupation of Germany and nuclear control efforts. Those assumptions remained important as they moved forward with plans to return the Farm Hall scientists to

Germany, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

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Chapter 4: Decisions to End the Farm Hall Detention, October-December 1945

The three months between early October and late December 1945 witnessed significant public political debates in and high-level dialogue between the United States and United Kingdom about nuclear science, postwar cooperation among the Allies, and the occupation of Germany. Questions about these subjects paralleled the questions that were being asked about the Farm Hall scientists and whether it was safe to release them, even if they were kept under continued (but lesser) surveillance. Although Farm Hall was a comparatively small issue, it was tied into a number of more important issues that

British and American officials were in the process of working out and had the potential to cause problems for both countries if it was not handled suitably.

The first of these issues was how to control atomic science. In fall 1945, the US

Congress took up bills to control atomic research domestically. British lawmakers also began to consider similar legislation. The US charted a postwar course for the Manhattan

Project, while Britain made the decision to turn its comparatively modest Tube Alloys program into a full-scale nuclear weapons effort. Officials in both countries considered how the ten scientists held at Farm Hall might fit into their research efforts. The answer ended up being that they would not, that these scientists posed too much of a security risk to be brought into national atomic research programs. That answer raised the question of what these scientists would be allowed to do and where they would be allowed to work in the future, if anywhere.

Both the US and Britain considered how to control atomic science internationally.

President Harry S Truman stated in an address to Congress in early October that the US

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would not share atomic technology, even with its allies, which meant that American officials focused on how to keep their technological and engineering advances secret.182

Truman, British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, and Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie

King met in Washington in mid-November to discuss international control issues. The consideration of domestic and international atomic control affected the group of scientists detained at Farm Hall because of the assumptions about the danger of atomic science and scientists that undergirded these control efforts. Manhattan Project officials were adamant that nuclear scientists on the loose were a danger to American national security.

As a result of their own intelligence investigations, British officials had long been less concerned about Germany’s atomic research and did not see danger in all forms of nuclear research. These competing views were a key reason why negotiations about the

Farm Hall detention dragged out for as long as they did.183

The continuation of negotiations about Farm Hall, however, reflected the commitment by British and American officials to postwar cooperation in atomic affairs, even if they had yet to work out what exactly that would mean. Tube Alloys officials had more incentive than their Manhattan Project counterparts to maintain the interchange of information but both sides had good reasons to continue their wartime relationship. In the fall of 1945, the US and UK began to negotiate a new pact to replace the 1943

Quebec Agreement that governed their wartime cooperation in nuclear research. Farm

Hall was a less pressing issue than a renewal of the Quebec Agreement (as well as many

182 Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on Atomic Energy,” October 3, 1945, The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara, accessed July 20, 2012, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12327. 183 “Control of Atomic Energy: Copy [for ACAE] of a Message to Congress from the President dated 3rd October 1945,” Oct. 15, 1945; and “International Control of Atomic Energy: Statement by the President to a Press Conference on 8th October 1945 [copy for ACAE],” Oct. 19, 1945, CAC, CHAD I/15/5.

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other topics), which was one of the reasons that British and American officials became annoyed that the detention was not quickly ended (the British) or that it could not be considered at a later date (the Americans). However, both sets of officials kept up their efforts to do something about the detention, even if that action was not necessarily what the other side wanted.184

The US and UK also engaged with the development of policies for the occupation of Germany. The disarmament of Germany was a key goal for both Britain and the US.

One aspect of this objective was how each country intended to control scientific and technological research in its occupation zone. The two countries again brought different assumptions to this task. British policymakers thought that the resumption of German scientific research could be “devoted to peaceful ends” that would contribute “to the general welfare of mankind.” Their American counterparts were less optimistic. British officials based their policy toward German science on the assumption that controlling all

German research and technology would not only be impossible but that attempting to do so would create an incentive for secrecy and, therefore, a greater risk that dangerous research would be carried out surreptitiously. The British system of control was instead based on the prohibition of a few particular fields that had direct military applications, the requirement that researchers in a few additional fields that had possible war-related applications obtain licenses to carry out their work and submit to some oversight, and the resumption of research in every other field. The American policy was to shut down all

184 Denis Rickett (Cabinet Offices) telegram to Rogers Makins (JSM Washington), Oct. 12, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341; Roger Makins (JSM Washington) telegram to Denis Rickett (Cabinet Offices), Dec. 5, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/335; Minutes from Joint Meeting with the Intelligence Organization (Combined Development Trust), Oct. 11, 1945, TNA: PRO AB 1/661.

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research and allow each field to resume its activities only after a thorough vetting by US authorities.185

These differing sets of assumptions were evident in negotiations about Farm Hall in fall 1945. British officials did not want to keep the German scientists under continued lock and key, and wanted to end the scientists’ detention so that they could focus their energies on issues that were more pressing. The situation in Germany was challenging: there was a major refugee problem, the economy of the country was in shambles, and there were already major concerns about how to feed the population through the winter.

The British did not want to create ill feelings among the Farm Hall group that might later be turned against Britain or the US. Manhattan Project officials, in contrast, proceeded on the assumption that the scientists detained at Farm Hall were dangerous until proven otherwise and hoped to delay making a decision about the group so that they could work on more important problems. Both sets of officials found evidence in the Farm Hall reports to support their positions, although the American interpretation of the reports sometimes took the scientists’ conversations out of context to exaggerate the Germans’ negative intentions.

An aspect of Farm Hall on which the British and Americans agreed was that the detention must remain secret. For the British, this meant keeping the scientists content enough that they did not attempt to escape from Farm Hall and contact colleagues at nearby the nearby University of Cambridge. Press coverage about the circumstances was unlikely to be kind: complaints could be lodged that the German scientists had been treated badly (because of their detention as civilians) or too well (because of the special

185 EIPS, “Report and Draft Directive on the Control of Fundamental and Applied Research and Development Work in Germany,” Oct. 29, 1945, TNA: PRO FO 1031/17.

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treatment that the group received at Farm Hall). Britain and the US already had plans in place to employ valuable German scientists and engineers, and wanted nothing to occur that might jeopardize those efforts, such as having Farm Hall receive negative publicity.

In addition to concerns about disrupting the recruitment of German scientists and technicians to the US and UK, the mishandling of Farm Hall could have negative repercussions for international relations. In the fall of 1945, Manhattan Project officials remained concerned about French interest in the German nuclear research, although this fear seems to have abated since the German scientists’ capture by Alsos Mission personnel in late April. It was clear that the French had already investigated the German nuclear institutes in the French occupation zone and nothing could be done to change that. France’s vehement anti-Germany stance in postwar Allied meetings proved an ongoing challenge. Neither the British nor the Americans wanted to create further difficulties with the French, which meant that the Farm Hall group’s detention needed to stay quiet. The same was true for relations with the Soviets, about whom British and

American officials expressed more reservations. The difficulties in coming to agreements with the Soviets at the London Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in

September did not portend good future relations.

October 1945 began with the wait for a reply from the commander of the British

Army of the Rhine (BAOR), Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, to the plan for repatriating the Farm Hall scientists to Bonn on a “provisional” basis of two to three years. The plan was a compromise between British and American priorities for the scientists: British officials were anxious to have the detainees returned to Germany, hence the timing of the request. American officials, while finally agreeing to this course

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of action, were less enthusiastic about reintroducing the scientists to Germany, thus the provision that Montgomery arrange supervision for the group.

Montgomery’s negative reply, which came in mid-October, was not what British officials expected. His response meant the debate about the scientists continued among

British and American officials until the end of the year. British officials proceeded under the assumption that the scientists would be repatriated as soon as logistics in Germany permitted it, since Manhattan Project Director Leslie Groves had given his assent once.

Manhattan Project officials – including Groves – did not always to share this presumption and continued to argue against releasing the scientists. Montgomery agreed at the beginning of December to assume responsibility for the scientists in the British occupation zone in Germany. It was another month before suitable arrangements were made and the scientists returned to Germany on January 3, 1946.

…

On October 2, three of the detained scientists had their first opportunity to visit with British scientists outside Farm Hall. Otto Hahn, Werner Heisenberg, and Max von

Laue spent part of the day at the Royal Society in London. This visit had been proposed at the Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy’s (ACAE) September 27 meeting, on the assumption that the scientists would soon be returned to Germany. The restoration of collegial ties had the benefit of not only renewing international scientific collaboration that had been interrupted since 1939 but also staying informed about what German scientists – especially those who had worked on nuclear physics or chemistry – did after the war. Collegiality could equal oversight. The scientists’ visit to the Royal Society also served to buoy their morale and, thus, maintain their cooperation in their detention.

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When the scientists were captured in late April and early May, they had been promised that they would get to discuss their research with British and American scientists. After

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Farm Hall scientists realized that their supposedly superior knowledge was not necessary to their captors, but this October meeting showed that their overseers would honor their promises to the detainees – eventually. The same would eventually prove true about the promises to release them from Farm Hall.186

Physicist and ACAE member Patrick Blackett’s comments at the Royal Society meeting aggravated Manhattan Project officials, as had his comments when he visited

Farm Hall in early September. Blackett told the scientists that American officials had decided to return the group to Germany, just not to the French occupation zone. As a result, Heisenberg wrote a letter to Blackett a few days after the Royal Society visit, arguing that he and other German scientists would need the equipment and institute personnel still in Hechingen and Tailfingen and, thus, that British and American officials would need to undertake negotiations with the French on this subject. Heisenberg suggested that he and one of the other detained scientists travel to Germany to inspect possible sites to rebuild their institutes in the British or American occupation zones.

Neither of these suggestions would be carried out by American officials, who were not pleased about Heisenberg’s initiative in this regard. The Manhattan Project’s Maj. Tony

Calvert continued to use Blackett as a scapegoat, arguing that Blackett’s conversation with the scientists at Farm Hall and “his insistence that they not be detained in England

186 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 261. ACAE members suggested that the German scientists meet with the President of the Royal Society (Sir Henry Dale, who was an ACAE member), Sir , Sir George Thomson, and Sir Lawrence Bragg. With the exception of Dale, all were physicists. Tizard and Thomson were involved in early Maud Committee and Tube Alloys work. The Royal Society Archives (including Henry Dale’s papers) do not have any record of this meeting. ACAE members had approved the visit as long as it took place on an unofficial basis. Draft minutes of ACAE meeting, Sept. 27, 1945, CAC, CHAD I/15/3.

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any longer” (presumably in his role within the ACAE) was “forcing a decision that should not have to be made at this time.”187

Calvert’s comment reflected the American view that the scientists’ detention at

Farm Hall was still necessary. Blackett’s promises indirectly put pressure on Manhattan

Project officials to work out a resolution of Farm Hall sooner than they wanted. Some

Manhattan Project officials advocated throughout autumn 1945 for the scientists’ continued detention (despite Groves’ agreement that the scientists could return to Bonn) and promises to the scientists otherwise only made the situation more uncomfortable for all involved: the scientists’ hopes were unnecessarily raised, and Manhattan Project and

Tube Alloys officials had to devote time to a relatively small (but sticky) issue when more important questions about atomic science loomed large.

At around the same time, Hahn received news about a possible future beyond

Farm Hall. In late July, German physicist and Nobel Prize winner Max Planck had written to Hahn to ask him to accept the presidency of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society

(Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft or KWG), Germany’s premier scientific organization.

Manhattan Project officials received this letter via the Alsos Mission’s scientific director,

Samuel Goudsmit, in the middle of September and passed it on to Hahn shortly thereafter.188

Manhattan Project officials studied the letter before forwarding it to Hahn. What concerned them most was not the message’s content but instead how this correspondence

187 Calvert to Smith, Oct. 6, 1945; and Calvert to Smith, Oct. 12, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 188 Max Planck to Otto Hahn, Jul. 25, 1945; 32.12-2 Germany: Personnel (Jan. 45 – Dec. 45); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Planck’s letter was addressed to Hahn, “z.Zt. im Ausland” (“currently abroad”).

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was transmitted. Goudsmit’s accompanying letter chided American army intelligence forces for being poorly informed about events in Germany, writing that “one gets much more reliable information from the Germans about the whereabouts of other Germans than one gets from [US Army Intelligence].” Goudsmit wrote that the Germans were

“still traveling all over the place and keeping each other informed of all that happens in every little town.” His description likely involved some hyperbole but his point spoke to one of the key problems that British and American officials faced in deciding how to repatriate the scientists: whatever course of action they chose (including further detention in England) was likely to be known in German scientific circles. This could inadvertently provide the Soviets and French with information about the whereabouts of the Farm Hall scientists, wherever (and whenever) they were returned to Germany, or could cause other unwanted publicity about the scientists’ detention, whether the group was at Farm Hall or in Bonn.189

Calvert echoed this point in mid-October when he passed along papers from the provisional head of Hahn’s Tailfingen institute, Josef Mattauch.190 Calvert was surprised by “the comparative ease with which Mattauch and others have been able to drive through Germany, even obtaining from American sources.” Calvert cautioned that this “should obviously be born in mind when arrangements are made to return our guests to Germany, especially if it is desired to maintain any sort of control over their movements and their contacts with others in their field.” German scientists’ ability to travel relatively freely meant that keeping the Farm Hall group isolated in Bonn would be

189 S.A. Goudsmit to H.K. Calvert, Sept. 7, 1945; 32.12-2 Germany: Personnel (Jan. 45 – Dec. 45); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 190 Mattauch had been detained with the scientists in Tailfingen and Hechingen during Operation Harborage but he was not brought to Rheims with the rest of the group.

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nearly impossible. This would complicate the effort to keep the group under British control for the two to three years that Manhattan Project officials had proposed for the scientists’ “provisional” residence in Bonn.191

Hahn’s potential KWG presidency was of special interest to the British, who were already considering how to manage the society in the postwar years. In early October,

British occupation authorities translated a report from a KWG leader who argued the society could play an “outstanding part…in the shaping of future scientific research in

Germany.” He had surveyed the eleven Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes in Berlin-Dahlem, begun efforts to weed out “politically unreliable” German personnel, and started inventories of the various institutes. He proceeded on the assumption that most of the institutes would be allowed to resume research and requested money to pay salaries and other institute costs for the next three months. British authorities were not yet sure that they would carry out this request but kept their options open with regard to reviving the

KWG and considered whether they could proceed on their own or if they had to involve their American counterparts in such a decision.192

Although Groves had assented to return the Farm Hall group to Germany, provided that certain security concerns were addressed, Manhattan Project officers continued to oppose the scientists’ release. From London, Calvert argued that moving the scientists to Germany on a provisional basis invited “escape unless under continuous guard.” The scientists were under light supervision at Farm Hall because they had

191 H.K. Calvert to F.J. Smith, re: “Papers Forwarded from Dr. Mattauch for Dr. Hahn,” Oct. 12, 1945; 32.22-1 Germany – Research – TA (1943-June 1946); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944- 46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 192 Mil Gov (Public Safety), translation of Robert Havemann, “Report on the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute,” Oct. 5, 1945; and Mil Gov 4 (Research) letter to E.G. Lewin, Oct. 22, 1945, TNA: PRO FO 1012/358.

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promised not to leave the premises. However, they would have greater reason to ignore their promise in Germany. At Farm Hall, the scientists had often stated that they would make every effort to return to their families in Germany if British and American officials did not take the effort to reunite them. For the majority of the group, this would mean returning to the French zone, which American officials wanted to prevent. Manhattan

Project officials still hoped to deny aid to French nuclear research (as they had when spiriting the German scientists out of their institutes in late April), especially in the form of valuable German scientists. Calvert advised that attempting to secretly remove the scientists’ families from the French zone could cause “serious entanglements” but he also did not recommend undertaking negotiations with French officials to transfer the families to the British zone. An American request for special treatment of this group of German scientists and their families would not be well-received, nor would the open acknowledgement that the scientists had been “looted” from the French occupation zone.193

While arguing against transferring the scientists to Germany, Calvert also looked ahead to a complication that he thought would arise when the scientists were eventually released from Farm Hall. Calvert worried that “considerable publicity” would arise when the scientists returned to Germany and suggested that British and American officials prepare a joint statement about the Germans’ wartime research, to be released once the scientists were freed from Farm Hall. Such a statement would justify the scientists’ detention on the basis of the danger that their research posed, while simultaneously

193 Calvert to Smith, Oct. 6, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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downplaying the research that the Germans had actually carried out during the war in comparison to the Manhattan Project.

In Groves’ Washington office, Maj. Francis J. Smith, who worked on foreign intelligence issues, responded strongly to Calvert’s caution about how to justify the scientists’ detention. Smith argued that the Manhattan Project had a “just and truthful case” for the detention and needed “only to depend on the truth.” He provided a list of reasons that the scientists’ confinement had been – and continued to be – justified:

a. If you will take the trouble to read the Strassbourg [sic] Summary you will find documentary proof that German scientists contemplated building a bomb. b. These men, no matter what their scientific standing, are enemies and even if they were working on purely scientific matters, these matters had a military significance of utter destruction, far beyond the imagination to picture. c. By their own words, of which you are cognizant, they had done sufficient experimentation and calculations to build a going pile. And the end product of the pile is of such tremendous military import, as can be measured only in the blood [of] soldiers. d. The critical stage of the [Manhattan] Project demanded the action taken. e. The national security demanded it. f. These scientists for all their ardent averring that their solicitude was for pure science only, were nevertheless developing in secret a tremendous killing force, and this under the rule of a monster whom none of these scientists ever had the courage to disavow or forsake or even criticize.194

Smith’s list suggested that he still considered the Farm Hall scientists enemies, although he did not suggest that they should be detained indefinitely. Instead, he suggested that Groves, Michael Perrin of Tube Alloys, and Lt. Cdr. Eric Welsh of MI6 could easily draft a statement that validated the scientists’ detention. His inclusion of

Perrin and Welsh shows that Manhattan Project officials approached the issue of ending the detention as a shared British-American effort, even if Groves’ opinion about the detention carried more weight than that of the British officials involved. Smith foresaw a

194 F.J. Smith to L.R. Groves, re: “Cable re Guests,” Oct. 15, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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problem only if American and British atomic officials failed to write a statement out of fear, because they would then be “left at the mercy of the words and comments of those who are our enemies.” Presumably he meant the Germans, although the French and

Soviets were also “enemies” of the Manhattan Project’s efforts to control atomic science and technology.

The items that Smith listed showed that Manhattan Project officials had developed slightly different justifications for the detention than existed during Operation

Harborage in April. The French were no longer a separate item on this list. By the fall of

1945, Manhattan Project officials were less visibly worried that French nuclear scientists would pass secrets along to Soviet colleagues. France’s proximity to German research sites remained of concern but the Manhattan Project intended to deny nuclear research expertise and technology to all countries. As such, fear about French use of German nuclear science fell under the general category of national security. In contrast to the relief in December 1944 after Alsos Mission’s investigations in Strasbourg had confirmed directly that German atomic research had not been conducted on a scale or with an intensity anywhere near that in the US, and the similar relief in April and May

1945 once all of the major German research centers had been investigated, Smith now played up the danger of the German wartime program.

Smith’s insistence that the scientists’ detention had been completely warranted indirectly suggested that whatever choices Manhattan Project officials made about ending the detention were similarly justified. He invoked the danger posed by German atomic research to the Manhattan Project and US national security, as well as global security during the war, as reasons for detaining the scientists, which meant that these factors

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would also have been considered in making a decision to release the group or change the mode of their confinement. The scientists still posed some danger, as indicated by

Groves’ insistence that the scientists be confined to (and supervised in) Bonn for an indefinite period, but the threat they posed was no longer so high as to necessitate the challenge of keeping them in Britain or moving them to the US.

From London, Denis Rickett, the ACAE’s secretary, prodded Field Marshal

Montgomery on October 8, writing that it was “important to reach a decision on the future of these men as soon as possible and we should therefore be grateful for an early reply.” Four days later, officials in London received Montgomery’s response: he did not consider it “advisable or practicable” to move the Farm Hall scientists to Bonn.

Montgomery gave three reasons for his decision: first, the group would attract attention, could not be employed as a group in Bonn, and, thus, would grow restless. As a result, the scientists would become likely to evade security measures. Second, it was impossible to guarantee that the scientists would not escape “into other zones or countries” unless they were imprisoned, which he did not intend to do. Third, Bonn was a poor location since it was so close to the French occupation zone. Montgomery may have been concerned specifically by potential French attention to the scientists or generally by the threat that any foreign interest in the group posed. If the group required close surveillance, Montgomery advised that they should remain in England. If not, it might be possible to find employment in the British occupation zone for the scientists on an individual basis, but not as a group. His office had already begun negotiations with

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American authorities about the scientists’ families in the American zone but neither

Heisenberg’s nor Gerlach’s family would be moved yet.195

Montgomery’s refusal to provide supervision for the Farm Hall scientists reflected the complicated situation in Germany. The occupying powers were faced with a major refugee problem, possible starvation and sickness in the German population, a broken economy, and the efforts to denazify and demilitarize the country, as well as working out how to implement the policy directives that came down from London. Montgomery’s response also reflected the view that nuclear scientists might be inherently dangerous, either because of the secret work that they might carry out in Germany or because they might work for other countries. Although this view was not shared by key officials in

London, his caution reflected an understandable hesitation about atomic weapons and how they might be developed, especially while overseeing a country that was an acknowledged scientific power.196

In contrast to Montgomery’s caution about German atomic scientists, Michael

Perrin of Tube Alloys wrote in mid-October that it was clear to British atomic intelligence, even prior to the Allied armies’ entry into Germany, that Germany had no significant atomic research program and that there had been “no likelihood” that

Germany would produce any atomic bombs before the Allies. At the end of November

1944, Perrin and Maj. Robert Furman of the Manhattan Project recommended to Sir John

Anderson and Groves that British and American officials better integrate their atomic intelligence work, which led to combined investigative missions in the spring of 1945

195 Denis Rickett telegram to FM Montgomery, Oct. 8, 1945; and Robertson telegram to Denis Rickett, Oct. 12, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/333. 196 US Military Attaché London England to War Dept, Oct. 26, 1945; #72 From: Gr. Britain – M.A. – Incoming (9-25-45) thru (12-29-45) (2 of 3); Incoming and Outgoing Messages, 1942-45; Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence); RG 319; NACP.

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(and the capture of the Farm Hall group). In Perrin’s view, the recorded conversations and signed statements produced by the ten Germans brought to England “fully confirm[ed] the detailed knowledge which we now have of German T.A. work.” The most important conclusion was that the German scientists had made “no great progress.”

They had recognized the possibility of constructing nuclear bombs but regarded the prospect of doing this during the war as “wildly impracticable.” Surprisingly to Perrin,

German scientists had “extremely little information…about the extent and progress” of

American and British research.

Perrin noted the “wide divergence of views between the Americans and ourselves.” American officials preferred to continue the scientists’ detention, either through further time at Farm Hall or under military guard in Germany, based on the assumption that the scientists’ knowledge could prove a danger and that the situation in

Germany was too perilous to free them. British officials, with the exception of Sir James

Chadwick, saw less danger inherent in the scientists’ knowledge and personal politics, less danger in Germany (or a realization that they could not do anything about that danger), but greater danger in keeping the scientists under continued detention in

England. As such, Perrin recommended that “immediate action” be taken to remove the scientists from the UK, even though Montgomery had rejected the conditions that the

Americans wanted for detaining the scientists in Bonn. The Americans could assume sole control of the scientists, either in the US or Germany, or the British should return the scientists to whence they had come and impose no conditions on them that would not be assigned to comparable individuals.197

197 Michael W. Perrin, “Implications Arising from German Interest in T.A.,” Oct. 15, 1945, RS, PB D189.

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Sir John Anderson soon drafted a cable along these lines to Field Marshal Henry

Maitland Wilson, the chief of the British Staff Mission in Washington. The draft cable included an ultimatum that Groves had a certain number of days (the number was yet to be decided) to act before the British would return the scientists to their previous institutes. The cable that Anderson ultimately sent on October 17 contained a different ultimatum. Anderson’s committee could no longer make useful recommendations about

Farm Hall because its advisory nature gave it no recourse when Washington opposed its proposals. If Groves agreed that the British plan could proceed, it would. If not,

Anderson would advise “that the matter be taken up by the Foreign Office with the State

Department.” This solution meant that decisions about the Farm Hall scientists would potentially move out of the War Department, which might mean that Groves would have less influence over them. The move to have the Foreign Office in Britain weigh in on discussions about Farm Hall was already partly underway, as will be discussed further below.198

When the ACAE met the same day, members had five major topics on their agenda: the domestic control of atomic energy, large scale production, weapons policy, the detained German scientists, and the possibility of inviting Max von Laue to a scientific celebration in England. This was the second of the two ACAE meetings when the scientists at Farm Hall were discussed as part of the official agenda. Anderson repeated the news about Montgomery’s refusal to assume control of the Farm Hall scientists in Bonn under the terms dictated by the Americans and his suggestion that further negotiations on this topic needed to be taken up by the Foreign Office and the

198 Draft cable from John Anderson to Hugh Maitland Wilson, n.d., RS, PB D189; John Anderson (Cabinet Offices) telegram to Lord Halifax and Field Marshal Wilson (JSM Washington), Oct. 17, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341.

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State Department. The Foreign Office representative in attendance, Nevile Butler, was

“invited…to be ready to make representations to the State Department on this subject, should the reply received from Washington be unsatisfactory,” which seemed likely.199

The final agenda item about Max von Laue was a seemingly small issue that nonetheless proved significant enough to be brought to the attention not just of the ACAE but also the Privy Council, Foreign Office, War Office, and Home Office. The complicated route that these discussions took was another example of how Farm Hall posed issues that were bound up in larger policy considerations. At the end of

September, Royal Society President Sir Henry Dale had written to Herbert Morrison, the

Lord President of the Privy Council, to suggest that von Laue be invited to a celebration on November 7 to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the discovery of X-rays by

German physicist Wilhelm Röntgen. Dale wrote that a number of distinguished foreign guests were being invited and the celebration would be incomplete without von Laue, who he described as “one of the outstanding and courageous opponents in Germany of the Nazi system.” Dale did not know that von Laue was being held in England and gave his last known address as Berlin-Zehlendorf. Dale’s letter to Morrison showed how sensitive the topic of German science was after the war. Some British scientists were eager to renew collegial ties but others were wary to extend an olive branch to such recent enemies.200

As a result of Dale’s letter, Morrison’s office wrote to the Department of

Scientific and Industrial Research to confirm what officials there thought about the invitation. Physicist Sir Edward Appleton, who had been involved in British nuclear

199 Draft minutes of ACAE meeting, Oct. 17, 1945, CAC, CHAD I/15/3. 200 Henry Dale letter to Herbert Morrison, Sept. 27, 1945, TNA: PRO FO 800/566.

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research since its early Maud Committee days, agreed with what Dale had written but added confidentially that von Laue was currently detained in the UK (and that Anderson was “aware of all the facts of the case.”) This added a new wrinkle to the question.

Morrison did not know “what the legal position is as regards bringing them [the scientists] here or detaining them against their will.” He was “sympathetic” to Dale’s suggestion but wrote the Foreign Office, Home Office, and War Office to ask for their advice. Morrison was hesitant to do anything to draw attention to why the scientists had been brought to England and why there was a delay in repatriating them.201

One Foreign Office employee argued that Britain should encourage anti-Nazi scientists like von Laue, but his voice was drowned out by the chorus of no’s in the office. One person worried about what British scientists would think about having a

German at the celebration. Another person did not want British scientists to think that they could ask for other Germans to be invited to the UK for “academic fraternization.”

Yet another worried that any action that did not involve repatriating von Laue as soon as possible risked “drawing attention to the muddle that has been made” at Farm Hall. The scientists’ detention was no longer desired by most British officials, had the potential to damage Britain’s foreign relations and occupation efforts, and yet the detention could not be ended easily because of its connection to these factors. The scientists had been detained because of American insistence on atomic secrecy during the final months of the clandestine Manhattan Project. Now British officials struggled to end the detention without alienating their American counterparts, who wanted continued secrecy and

201 C. Joliffe letter to J.A.R. Pimlott, Oct. 2, 1945; and J.A.R. Pimlott minute, n.d. (but between Oct. 2-8, 1945), TNA: PRO FO 800/566. Morrison’s secretary added that “there is something which smacks unpleasantly of certain Continental practices in conjuring a distinguished person out of semi-confinement for appearance on a festive occasion and then returning him behind the curtain of administrative control.” British manners (if not pride) demanded better.

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control of atomic information in general and these individuals in particular, or the detained scientists, whose declining morale might lead to an escape or suicide and, with it, embarrassment for their British overseers.202

Morrison’s office also checked with Nevile Butler of the Foreign Office, who was

Sir Alexander Cadogan’s permanent deputy to the ACAE.203 As a result, Butler raised the issue of von Laue’s potential invitation at the ACAE’s meeting. Dale, who had by then learned that von Laue was detained in England, did not want to invite von Laue if he would have to return to Farm Hall after the celebration. Other committee members suggested that an invitation to a German scientist, even one who was considered an anti-

Nazi, might offend some of the Allied scientists, especially those from France and

Belgium, at the gathering.204

The Foreign Office sent notes about the ACAE’s meeting to Morrison’s office in late October. A month after Dale had proposed extending an invitation to von Laue for the Röntgen celebration, Morrison officially replied that von Laue could not be invited because of “certain difficulties.” These “difficulties” were similar to those that had arisen when the British first proposed repatriating the Farm Hall scientists: British and

American scientists might object to working with these recent enemies (in addition to the certainty that Manhattan Project or Tube Alloys regulations would forbid it) and negative publicity could adversely affect ongoing British and American efforts to recruit valuable

German scientists and technicians. In mid-October, nearly two hundred German

202 Handwritten comments re: von Laue invitation, Oct. 11-12, 1945, TNA: PRO FO 800/566. 203 Cadogan was the Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs. He later served as Britain’s first representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. Clement Attlee (Cabinet Offices) telegram to James Chadwick (JSM Washington), Feb. 25, 1946, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341. 204 Neville Butler minute to Denis Rickett, Oct. 13, 1945; Denis Rickett letter to Neville Butler, Oct. 19, 1945; Neville Butler minute to German. Dept., Oct. 20, 1945, TNA: PRO FO 800/566.

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scientists were soon to arrive for temporary work in Britain. At the same time,

Manhattan Project officials examined a list of three hundred German scientists who were

“to be brought to the US on a temporary stay for exploitation” to ensure that none of the scientists’ named appeared in Manhattan Project files and, thus, might be objectionable on security grounds. Even something as simple as an invitation for von Laue to attend a scientific celebration needed to be vetted against these concerns. Ultimately, British officials came to the conclusion that an invitation posed too much potential embarrassment, both for British officials and von Laue, who would almost certainly have to return to Farm Hall after the celebration, given the pace that negotiations about the

Germans’ repatriation were proceeding with the Americans.205

While the negotiations about von Laue were ongoing, British atomic officials returned to the idea that releasing a statement was necessary to contradict rumors about

Germany’s prowess in nuclear research. Perrin had written in support of such a statement in mid-October. The ACAE’s secretary wrote to Roger Makins at the Joint Staff Mission

(JSM) in Washington with a suggestion that was drawn from Perrin’s analysis. If the rumors about German atomic research were allowed to persist, Germans might believe that Hitler had only narrowly been defeated (thus adding to the myth of his legitimacy).

More worryingly, “already delicate” relations with the USSR and France might “be injured through the belief that important information obtained from investigation on the spot in Germany has been withheld from them, for they might wonder what had become of the apparatus and plant for producing atomic bombs which was so nearly ready to be

205 Herbert Morrison letter to Henry Dale, Oct. 25, 1945, TNA: PRO FO 800/566. Amos E. Britt to Groves, Oct. 22, 1945; 32.12-2 Germany: Personnel (Jan. 45 – Dec. 45); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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brought into action.” Unlike Perrin’s apprehension about statements in the press, this cable expressed concern about an important American document: Chief of Staff George

C. Marshall’s recent report to the Secretary of War about . Marshall’s report implied that Germany had been on the verge of producing atomic weapons during the war. Manhattan Project personnel in London thought that Groves would be interested in correcting the misinformation in Marshall’s report, even if that task would need to be undertaken delicately so as not to directly contradict Marshall.206

Makins replied two days later: Wilson and Groves felt “very strongly that it would not be advisable to try to correct General Marshall on this point, or indeed to take it up with him.” They agreed that the reference to atomic weapons was “perhaps unfortunate” but thought that the passage would attract little attention. Furthermore,

“more harm than good might be done by drawing attention to it either now or later.” This reply was curious: Groves’ typical stance was to insist that misinformation about the atomic bomb be corrected. However, in this case the danger that Germany might have been close to developing atomic weapons reinforced the Manhattan Project’s wartime mission. Groves and Wilson may also have recognized that the Manhattan Engineer

District’s future was yet uncertain, with the postwar structure and control of the project still undecided. The May-Johnson bills had been introduced in Congress at the beginning of October but were not moving quickly through the legislative process. Reinforcement of the Project’s value (even if it was not quite true) would not be corrected.207

206 Michael W. Perrin, “Implications Arising from German Interest in T.A.,” Oct. 15, 1945, RS, PB D189; Denis Rickett (Cabinet Offices) telegram to Roger Makins (JSM Washington), Oct. 24, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341. 207 Roger Makins (JSM Washington) telegram to Denis Rickett (Cabinet Offices), Oct. 26, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/335.

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In late October, Wilson replied with Groves’ negative response to Anderson’s ultimatum. Groves was “very difficult to move on this question” as he was firmly convinced “(a) that all but one or two of the Group would certainly try to go to Russia,

(b) that if they did they would be of the greatest value to the Soviet Government, and (c) that even if they did not go to Russia voluntarily some would almost certainly be kidnapped.” The first point was not borne out by the Farm Hall reports: some of the scientists had discussed working for the Soviets but only as a last resort if the conditions in Germany were so bad that they could not support their research or their families. It was not a first course of action for any member of the group. Point two was questionable and again overestimated the danger posed by these particular scientists. Groves had told

Wilson that, as a group, the Farm Hall scientists “were superior in all-round ability to the group which had started the New Mexico laboratory.” This seems doubtful. Groves’ third point had a grain of truth to it – he mentioned that the Soviets had already kidnapped some scientists in the American zone208 – but this worry again reflected worst- case-scenario assumptions about Germany and these particular individuals.

Groves offered two contradictory suggestions to keep the detainees from being returned to Germany. The first was to declare some (or all) of the Farm Hall scientists to be war criminals. Wilson had refused. Groves’ second proposal was that some or all of the group could be offered employment in the UK. If that was not possible, he would look into whether some of the scientists could be employed in the US. Both suggestions show how intent Groves was to keep the scientists from being returned to Germany, despite his assent to that course of action a month earlier. None of the Farm Hall

208 Some German scientists and engineers had willingly gone to the USSR, although they had not imagined that their tenure there would last years, not weeks or months. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 110; Naimark, Russians in Germany, 209-212.

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scientists had committed war crimes and, if there was any possibility that they had, neither the UK nor the US should consider employing them. Furthermore, the Manhattan

Project had already rejected the possibility of bringing any of these scientists to work in the US in May and again in August.

Wilson recommended that British officials wait a week to give Groves time to look into any heretofore missed opportunities to employ the Farm Hall scientists in the

US. Wilson did not see what would be gained by referring the question of the scientists’ release to the State Department, since that department would consult with the War

Department, which would consult with Groves, bringing the discussion back to its previous point. If Groves could find no alternate employment for the scientists in a week,

Wilson suggested that the British tell Groves “that there are no grounds on which we can legally justify their continued detention (if this is indeed the case) and that we have no alternative to sending them back to the zones in Germany from which they came, in order to join their families.” Wilson, however, thought that the group’s repatriation should be carried out only if occupation forces in Germany received special instructions to prevent the scientists from escaping or traveling to the Soviet zone or to Berlin.209

One of the reasons that Groves was so concerned about keeping the Farm Hall scientists under close supervision if they were returned to Germany was perhaps that he no longer had the same intelligence channels at his disposal as during the war. In fall

1945, Manhattan Project officials were in contact with American occupation forces to try to ensure that any intelligence on nuclear physics research in Germany was sent to the

Manhattan Project and handled with great discretion by occupation personnel. It

209 Henry Maitland Wilson (JSM Washington) telegram to John Anderson (Cabinet Offices), Oct. 26, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/335.

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remained to be seen if the Manhattan Project could rely on these channels of information.

As such, Groves needed to be sure that the Farm Hall scientists were kept in a location that provided British or American officials the opportunity to report on their activities.210

A few days later, Anderson replied to Wilson and Lord Halifax, the British ambassador to the US, about the latest proposal from Washington. Anderson wrote that he and other officials in London “understand Groves’ anxieties but we cannot share his convictions.” Anderson agreed with what Wilson already had told Groves: the scientists could not be treated as war criminals or brought to work in the UK. He was willing to give Groves another week (“but no more”) to look into his options for the scientists and to follow Wilson’s advice that “no useful purpose” would be served by bringing the State

Department into the discussions about Farm Hall.211

A few days after that, Wilson replied with surprising news: after two months of insisting otherwise, Groves had agreed to the British plan to repatriate the Farm Hall scientists to their places of capture. Groves asked to receive advance notice of when

Heisenberg, Gerlach, and Diebner would be returned to the American zone, so that

American officials could make arrangements to handle their arrival. Groves suggested that French physicist Pierre Auger be informed about the six German scientists who would be returned to the French zone “so that French authorities could take whatever

210 John Weckerling, Deputy ACS, G-2, to Clayton Bissell, ACS, G-2, “Collection of Intelligence on Nuclear Physics,” Oct. 25, 1945; 202.2 London Office: Combined Intell Disc; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Smith and Calvert were both involved in this effort. 211 John Anderson (Cabinet Offices) telegram to Lord Halifax and Henry Maitland Wilson (JSM Washington), Nov. 1, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341.

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[security] measures they thought suitable.” Wilson had already told Groves that British officials would make “special arrangements” to look after Harteck in Hamburg.212

In London, Calvert was surprised to learn about Groves’ decision, partly because he learned about it through British officials. Calvert asked, “Am I to follow this policy?” suggesting that he was not sure that Groves had really agreed to send the Farm Hall scientists back to Germany. Calvert’s doubt was well-founded. The immediate answer to his question was yes but the more truthful answer was that Groves was continuing to look into other options for the scientists’ futures, despite his tentative agreement to the

British plan to repatriate the group. On November 6, Groves called James Conant, the chair of the National Defense Research Committee, and Vannevar Bush, the chair of the

Office of Scientific Research and Development, to ask whether it might be possible to find employment for the detained scientists in the US. Conant answered that it might be possible to find posts for the German scientists in industry, such as at Eastman Kodak,

Bell Labs, or RCA, or perhaps at the National Bureau of Standards. Conant thought that

Bush “might be willing to put them in Carnegie Institute.” Bush, however, suggested finding jobs for the scientists in the American occupation zone in Germany. He thought that if the scientists had employment there “and were comfortably taken care of, there would be no problem.” The last part of his comment presumably referred to Manhattan

Project officials’ ongoing concern that the German scientists might pose a future security risk, either by carrying out threatening research on their own or going to work (willingly

212 Henry Maitland Wilson (JSM Washington) telegram to John Anderson (Cabinet Offices), Nov. 5, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/335. Groves had been unable to find employment for any of the scientists in the US.

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or otherwise) for other countries. Groves’ efforts in this respect, however, came to naught.213

By the beginning of November, the ten scientists at Farm Hall had been detained for six months, with four months of that time spent in England. Their morale had deteriorated steadily in October, as the assurances from Blackett about their imminent release proved false. One result of this decline in morale was that the Farm Hall reports were often only a page or two long in October. The scientists had less reason to discuss their past work or speculate about their future, which meant that CSDIC personnel had fewer important conversations to transcribe.

The shorter reports had a second cause: by early November, the scientists suspected that Farm Hall was bugged. On November 2, the scientists received their second (and final) visit at Farm Hall from an English colleague, the physicist Sir Charles

Frank. Frank and Karl Wirtz had been friends before the war and had a long conversation in the garden during Frank’s visit. Wirtz told Frank that the scientists were wary that the house was bugged because they had found some suspicious wires.214

Unlike the long report about Blackett’s visit, Capt. Patrick Brodie provided only a short account of Frank’s visit and did not quote from his conversations with the scientists.

Brodie wrote that “Dr. Frank had long talks with Wirtz…but nothing new was said, at least in the House,” suggesting that he was aware of Wirtz’s intent to circumvent the monitoring system. None of the Farm Hall reports mentioned this issue directly. Maj.

213 Calvert to Britt, Nov. 7, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Tuesday, November 6, 1945 office diary entry; Jan. 1, 1945-Dec. 31, 1946; Diaries, 1940-48; Papers of Gen. Leslie R. Groves; RG 200; NACP. 214 Charles Frank letter to R.S. Pease, Dec. 4, 1991, University of Bristol Special Collections (henceforth UBSC), FRANK D.368; Frank, Operation Epsilon, 3; Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 276.

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Tom Rittner had written in late July that the conversations were selected for inclusion in the Farm Hall reports “to give a fair picture whilst minimizing undue flap.” The scientists’ suspicions about bugging may have fallen into the latter category. The CSDIC monitoring system no longer gathered as much useful information as it had in summer and early fall (however, nor did it need to, based on the repetition in the scientists’ conversations). It seems likely that the Manhattan Project officials in London who visited Farm Hall, such as Calvert, would have been aware that the scientists had become suspicious about being eavesdropped upon but, if so, they did not write about this in their reports to Washington.215

Midway through November, the scientists at Farm Hall read surprising news in the Daily Telegraph: the Royal Swedish Academy had awarded Otto Hahn the 1944

Nobel Prize in Chemistry. Brodie, the British officer at Farm Hall, was just as surprised and hurried to make calls to London to try to confirm the news. The British papers that carried the news of Hahn’s prize made no comment about his whereabouts; the New York

Times suggested that Hahn was in the US. At Farm Hall, the scientists celebrated Hahn’s award a few days later with “songs, speeches, baked meats, and some alcohol.”216

215 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 276. Copy of cable from Perrin to Welsh, Jul. 24, 1945; 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 216 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 283-301 . “Experts on Atoms Win Nobel Prizes,” New York Times, November 16, 1945, 19, accessed August 20, 2012 via Proquest Historical Newspapers. “Nobel Prize,” The Western Daily Press and Bristol Mirror, November 16, 1945, 1; and “German Professor Honoured,” Gloucestershire Echo, November 16, 1945, 1, both accessed May 27, 2013 via the British Newspaper Archive. An article in the journal Nature two weeks later made no comment about Hahn’s possible location. Clipping of “Nobel Prize for Chemistry for 1944: Prof. Otto Hahn,” Nature 156, no. 3970 (December 1, 1945); 32.12-2 Germany: Personnel (Jan. 45 – Dec. 45); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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When Calvert forwarded Farm Hall report 18, which covered the announcement of Hahn’s prize, to Washington a week and a half later, he posed the question of whether

Hahn would be allowed to travel to Stockholm to collect his award on December 10. In conversations with his fellow detainees, Hahn had indicated that he would not remain quiet about Farm Hall if he were allowed to travel to Sweden, which suggested that he should not be allowed to go the Nobel Prize ceremony. Neither British nor American officials seem to have seriously entertained this possibility, although they did raise the question within their bureaucracies. In London, Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin officially decided at the end of November that Hahn would not be allowed to travel to Stockholm.

This was the first apparent instance of Bevin’s involvement in decisions about the Farm

Hall detention. His office had long been informed about the German scientists’ detention, since a member of the Foreign Office sat on the ACAE and von Laue’s possible invitation to the Röntgen celebration had been discussed by Foreign Office staff, but Bevin’s direct involvement was not mentioned until this point.

Calvert’s note indicated that yet another change had been made to plans to end the

Farm Hall group’s detention. Instead of the arrangement to send the scientists back to their previous locations in the French, British, and American zones, which British and

American officials had agreed on at the beginning of November, the British had now asked Montgomery to provide “reasonable security” for the scientists, who would be held temporarily in the British zone as a group.217 Bevin had approved this new iteration.218

217 This was in contrast to the “guarantee of their safekeeping” which Montgomery had previously rejected 218 Calvert to Britt, Nov. 27, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Calvert to Britt, Nov. 30, 1945; 32.12-2 Germany: Personnel (Jan. 45 – Dec. 45); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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This revised proposal suggested that British officials had become more concerned about the security situation in Germany. Even as he had supported repatriating the Farm

Hall scientists at the end of October, Anderson had raised a potential complication. If the scientists were returned to Germany and sent to various locations with little supervision

(as was the British plan at the time), there could be no guarantee that Harteck would be safe from kidnapping by the Soviets at his Hamburg institute, which was in the British zone but was close to Soviet-controlled territory. Montgomery’s troops could be asked to

“shadow” Harteck but, based on Montgomery’s previous assessment of the dangers posed to the scientists’ security in Germany, there could be no guarantee that Harteck would be safe.219

This analysis was the first to betray some hesitation by Anderson to the course of action that he had been advocating since early September. The situation in Germany was chaotic: British officials could not predict with certainty what would happen once

Harteck (or any of the other Farm Hall scientists) were returned to Germany. Each occupying country was free to create its own policies, which did not necessarily parallel one another and, with regard to science and technology, were competing for German resources and personnel (what John Gimbel calls “intellectual reparations”).220 The

British were trying to work out a concurrence of opinion with the Americans, which was proving difficult, and Anderson recognized that the British had no influence over what the French or Soviets would do. The danger of kidnapping was not so high as to justify

Harteck’s (or any of the scientists’) continued confinement, but that may have been a

219 John Anderson (Cabinet Offices) telegram to Lord Halifax and Henry Maitland Wilson (JSM Washington), Nov. 1, 1945, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341. 220 Gimbel, Science, Technology, and Reparations, vii.

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high bar to reach, given British officials’ priority to end the detention at Farm Hall.

However, it was a risk that officials needed to consider.

As a result, the British plan for repatriating the scientists shifted over the course of November to favor the return of the scientists as a group. In addition to concerns about outright Soviet perfidy, British (and American) officials worried that the poor living conditions in Germany could become a security problem if the scientists were left to fend for themselves. Heisenberg’s family was “in bad straits on rations,” to the point that Heisenberg’s wife had traveled from southern Bavaria to to ask for additional rations and for permission to travel to Hechingen in the French zone so that she could withdraw money from her husband’s account there. Calvert met with her in

Frankfurt and told her that US occupation forces would soon provide her with additional rations and sent her around $170 from her husband, which was enough for the time being.

Calvert had consulted with American occupation officials about providing additional rations to both Heisenberg’s and Gerlach’s families. British officials were already concerned about how to feed the people in their occupation zone, especially since Britain still had wartime rationing in place. The Farm Hall scientists had repeatedly said at Farm

Hall that they would consider working for the French or Soviets if they could not eke out a living in the British or American zones. This was yet another reason to opt for a compromise between the original British and American plans to repatriate the scientists: the scientists needed employment to keep them from considering work with other

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countries, but that was not yet possible to arrange, so a temporary location with light supervision appeared necessary.221

At the end of November, Manhattan Project officials in Washington received a set of documents that provided some insight into French nuclear research, plus the efforts to renew German research in the French zone. American officials had no influence over what French scientists did in terms of research but still wanted to be apprised of it, especially when research institutes connected to the Farm Hall group were involved.

Josef Mattauch, the provisional head of Hahn’s institute in Tailfingen, wrote to Hahn about the work that the institute was trying to resume. Manhattan Project officials found some of the details that Mattauch provided interesting: French scientists had removed a neutron generator from Bisingen (one of the cities the Alsos Mission had also investigated as part of Operation Harborage) and Hahn’s Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for

Chemistry was preparing to reactivate a neutron generator of its own, having scavenged parts from around Germany. Groves’ staff recommended leaving the Tailfingen institute alone but checking on its research in the future. They offered no comment about how this might be accomplished, given French control of Tailfingen. This suggestion, however, fit the larger pattern of American priorities for controlling German science at this time: American goals were more ambitious than they could actually accomplish but that did not prevent these sweeping intentions to control all German research from being declared.222

221 Calvert to Britt, Nov. 27, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 222 Hank S. Lowenhaupt to W.R. Shuler, re: “Papers for Hahn from Mattauch, Notes of Interest,” Nov. 30, 1945; 32.22-1 Germany – Research – TA (1943-June 1946); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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Calvert visited Farm Hall in early December along with Lt. William L. Warner, a member of his London office, and Eric Welsh of MI6. This was the first visit to Farm

Hall by British and American officials since Hahn’s Nobel Prize had been announced and the first official confirmation about Hahn’s prize (which Hahn had been asking for since the detainees first read about the prize on November 16). Calvert and Welsh told Hahn that he would not be allowed to travel to Stockholm and instead had the scientist write a letter to the Swedish Academy accepting the award but noting that he could not be present for the upcoming ceremony. Warner’s report about the visit added that Hahn’s letter “was in full compliance with all security measures.” Calvert’s report to

Washington about his visit described the scientists’ morale as high. The Farm Hall reports about the weeks between the announcement of Hahn’s prize and Calvert’s visit, however, showed that the scientists were increasingly frustrated at their detention. A few of the scientists had conversations about the possibility of withdrawing their promise not to escape from Farm Hall. Brodie wrote that the scientists’ “general impatience” and

“querulous[ness]” would likely “lead to another minor crisis within the next week or so,” as had their impatience and querulousness in the past.223

Calvert laconically reported that the “guests” would “be returned in a group to

BAOR [British Army of the Rhine] headquarters about first of year [January 1, 1946] for individual release when feasible and security warrants.” Montgomery had accepted this revised proposal (which Calvert had reported to Washington in late November). The plan

223 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, 303, 311. Calvert to Shuler, Dec. 6, 1945; 32.12-2 Germany: Personnel (Jan. 45 – Dec. 45); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. W.L. Warner to W.R. Shuler, re: “Transmittal of Document,” Dec. 7, 1945; 202.3-2-B Operation Epsilon Reports; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77, NACP.

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retained some aspects that American officials pushed for in September and October: the scientists would be returned to Germany as a group and would stay in Bad Oeynhausen, where the BAOR had its headquarters. This town was solidly in the British zone, far from both the Soviet and French occupation zones. Beyond that, the British point of view had won out: the scientists would be placed in (or returned to) various places of employment, rather than being held as a group. There was no timeline for releasing the scientists individually but British officials were inclined to act as quickly as possible in this regard, rather than wait for the two- to three-year detention as a group that Manhattan

Project officials advocated.

Although decisions about the scientists’ repatriation were moving ahead in

London, personnel in Groves’ office continued to analyze the decision to send the Farm

Hall group back to Germany and to argue against this course of action. Some of Groves’ staff were out of sync with what was happening in London on this subject and reconsidered questions which appeared to have already been decided. At Groves’ request, Col. W.R. Shuler, who handled foreign intelligence issues in Groves’ office, wrote a long memorandum December 19 about the Farm Hall scientists’ potential release.

Why Groves had asked for this assessment is unclear, since he had already given his permission to return the scientists and the British were close to implementing their plans.

Despite the fact that the Manhattan Project’s London office had already indicated that

British officials had definite plans to return the group to Germany in early January,

Shuler strongly opposed this course of action:

It is recommended that it would be to the best interests of this country if as many as possible of these men, particularly the ablest among them (as indicated hereafter), were placed in various institutions and colleges within the United States where they might carry on, with varying degrees of freedom, further

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research to the ultimate benefit of the United States….The advantages are two- fold: a. The United States will benefit directly and immediately from their research work and b. Their work will not be exclusively available to Russia, or…to any resurgent German nationalist group.

Shuler suggested that some American universities were interested in employing

German scientists, in contrast to Groves’ earlier investigation. Groves disagreed with this assessment and handwrote in the margin that “many American institutions are very much opposed to more foreigners on American faculties.” He added: “The British have not been willing to go along with me on retaining [the] guests. Experience with [the] French in Montreal and the well-known difficulty of keeping information safe makes it unwise to try to bring them to U.S. positions.” A handful of French scientists (including Pierre

Auger) had worked on British research in Montreal, which was an adjunct to the

Manhattan Project, during the war. The French scientists had returned to work in France, which for Groves was a major security breach since they had done work that was connected to the Manhattan Project. There was nothing that he could do to prevent their return to France but he could at least try to ensure that other foreign scientists did not have the opportunity to gain knowledge of American nuclear weapons research, only to return to their home countries.

Shuler’s top recommendation contained a paradox: because of the “difficulties inherent in bringing such men” to the US, only those “of the most value or [who] could cause the most harm if not brought here” should be brought to the US. Why the US would want to employ scientists who might pose a danger was not clear. Shuler suggested that the US could maintain a liaison with German universities and institutions to observe “brilliant young Germans” and help them “feel that their best future lies in research laboratories in the United States. Although some of these men might want to

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return to Germany later, the advantages to be gained from their services outweigh the risk of their possible return.” Groves had already dismissed this suggestion, since he did not want to create additional security risks by further educating scientists and then allowing them to take that knowledge to other countries.

Shuler offered two supplementary options. He anticipated that British officials would decline his suggestion to employ the group in the UK, since they had already indicated that they had no positions for the scientists. Shuler considered that it was

“questionable” that some of the detained scientists would work for Britain, although it is not clear why he thought them any more likely to work for the US.

His third and least-desired suggestion was to return the scientists to the British or

American zones of Germany (as was the British plan) and allow them to “pursue such research as will be permitted by the occupation authorities and under such surveillance as the occupation authorities may impose.” Much like Groves had argued throughout

September and October, Shuler thought that this course of action would lead to an offer of work from the Soviets and “many of them will eventually succumb [to such an offer] regardless of their present predilections.” This comment about the scientists’ “present predilections” shows that the Farm Hall reports did indicate to American officials that the

Farm Hall scientists were not inclined to work for the Soviet Union, despite the

Americans’ warnings to the contrary throughout September and October. Unlike previous analyses from Manhattan Project officials, Shuler did not mention fear that the

Farm Hall scientists would work for the French as a motivating factor.

Shuler then offered an individual assessment of each scientist, writing that

“[b]ecause they vary a great deal in political beliefs, personal integrity, and past

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association with the Nazi movement, it is impossible to recommend their disposition en masse” (which is exactly what he had done in his previous four paragraphs). The most remarkable part of his list was the inclusion of five German scientists who were not detained at Farm Hall. At the beginning of his report, he had noted that Groves had asked for recommendations about “the ultimate disposal of those German scientists who, in one fashion or another, are presently in the custody of American and/or British authorities.” The additional names included the four German scientists who had been detained by Alsos personnel in Strasbourg in December: Friedrich Weygand, Hugo

Neuert, Werner Maurer, and Rudolph Fleischmann. Shuler wrote that Weygand, Neuert, and Fleischmann were in a prisoner of war camp in the US; Maurer had also been detained there but was being returned to Germany. The fifth detainee, Hellmuth Hertz, was a soldier and the son of Gustav Hertz, “a well known German physicist now believed to be working for the Russians.” He posed no danger from a scientific standpoint but could possibly provide a source of information about his father and, thus, Soviet nuclear research.224

Shuler attached an additional memorandum from one of his assistants that argued in even stronger terms that the Farm Hall scientists should not be released. While this opinion did not capture Groves’ attention enough to renew protests about the scientists’ repatriation, it showed how strongly some Manhattan Project officials were set against releasing the Farm Hall group, as well as the fears that undergirded this opinion.

224 W.R. Shuler to L.R. Groves, re: “Disposition of German Scientists Presently in American and/or British Custody,” Dec. 19, 1945; 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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The memorandum contended that the Soviet Union, the uncertain situation in

Europe, and the danger of resurgent German nationalism all provided reasons not to send the Farm Hall scientists back to Germany. Even if the scientists did not seek out work in the Soviet Union (which they might), they might inadvertently aid Soviet nuclear research through professional relationships with scientists in the Soviet Union or other countries. The American withdrawal from Europe could create the conditions not only for the Soviets to dominate Europe but also for German nationalism to reemerge. Both of these developments could cause serious problems for the US in terms of its nuclear monopoly, since both the Soviet Union and Germany would likely create their own nuclear weapons. The writer concluded:

For these reasons, I think that, like the bomb, we ought to keep the “Guests” to ourselves until the world situation is at least a little more settled than it is. At any rate, I can’t see the need for any particular rush unless, apart from a possible lack of interest, the “Guests” are really “putting the bead” on us in earnest. I might add that I certainly got the impression from the Epsilon [Farm Hall] reports that these gentlemen were conspiring to make the US squirm. Can it be that they are succeeding?225

The final part of this analysis reflected Manhattan Project officials’ tendency to take the Farm Hall reports out of context and ascribe negative intentions to the Germans that were not necessarily expressed in their conversations. The scientists had discussed how they might get the British or the Americans to support their research by threatening to work for other countries but they almost always raised this option as a second or third resort, if the British and Americans did not provide support for German research. There was no conspiracy against the US.

225 Earl Ryan to Clarke, re: “Disposition of the ‘Guests,’” Dec. 17, 1945; 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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However, the author was correct that the world situation was still unsettled, which provided good reasons not to release the Farm Hall scientists just yet. American and

British plans for domestic and international control of atomic science were not yet worked out, the Allies were still haggling over the terms of the German defeat and occupation, and cooperation among the Allies was at times fraught. The Moscow

Council of Foreign Ministers was then taking place (December 16-26, 1945). The three foreign ministers (France was not a participant) had a more productive meeting than in

September but the lessons of Soviet and French intransigence in September (from the

British and American perspectives) remained.

The day after Shuler delivered his pessimistic analysis, he and Groves received word from Lt. Col. Edgar P. Dean, who had replaced Calvert in the Manhattan Project’s

London office in mid-December, that the Farm Hall scientists would be returned to

Germany on January 3. The British would fly the group to Münster, in northwestern

Germany, where they would be kept as a group until they could “be placed individually or in small units in various universities and institutes.” Warner and Welsh would accompany the group on their flight. The entire group would be kept in the British zone, with some of the scientists likely to be found employment at the , where Harteck’s institute was located. British officials were “not keen” on employing the scientists in Göttingen because of the city’s proximity to the Soviet occupation zone.226

Montgomery’s BAOR office would maintain surveillance of the group.227 Welsh had

226 Code-named the “Ripley area.” Warner spoke fluent German. Calvert to Shuler, Dec. 8, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 227 Dean added that in “the opinion of this office, as a result of questioning, that surveillance will not be unduly vigorous.”

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told Dean that none of the Farm Hall scientists would be allowed to travel to the Soviet

Union or the Soviet zone in Germany, “even if they are invited and are disposed to accept.” The scientists received the news of their impending homecoming as an early

Christmas present on December 23.228

…

Although British and American atomic officials had agreed in principle in late

September to repatriate the Farm Hall scientists, it took three months to work out the details for this move. The length of these negotiations between and among British and

American officials partly reflected the different assumptions that they brought to the task.

The initial obstruction came from Manhattan Project officials but was soon followed by

British occupation officials’ refusal to carry out the plan upon which British and

American officials had agreed. By early November, even British atomic officials had some doubts about their plan to return the scientists to multiple locations in Germany. It took another month for British officials in London and Washington to come to an agreement, and then another month for the British to work out the specific details of the scientists’ return to Germany. Over the course of these months, fear of French intentions was gradually supplanted by fear of Soviet misdeeds. The Soviets had begun removing scientists (along with entire scientific institutes) from Germany in late spring. Conflicts

228 Dean to Shuler, Dec. 20, 1945; and Dean to Shuler, Dec. 29, 1945; Incoming Top Secret and Secret Cables Apr. 45-Dec. 45; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. On Dean replacing Calvert: Calvert to Shuler, Dec. 15, 1945; #72 From: Gr. Brit. – M.A. – Incoming (9-25-45) thru (12-29-45) (1 of 3); Incoming and Outgoing Messages, 1942-45; Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence); RG 319; NACP. This is the only instance that the Manhattan Project’s confidential correspondence between London and Washington, which was sent under the cover of cables from the US Military Attaché in London and the War Department in Washington, appears in the Military Attaché’s files. The Manhattan Project’s London-Washington (and Washington-London) cables were numbered as part of the regular correspondence between the London Military Attaché and the War Department but this correspondence were forwarded directly to the Manhattan Project’s office (in London or Washington). Erich Bagge, Kurt Diebner, and Kenneth Jay, Von der Uranspaltung bis Calder Hall (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1957), 70.

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with the Soviets about German reparations at Potsdam in July and the London Council of

Foreign Ministers in September had reinforced American and British suspicions about the likelihood that the Soviets would want to make use of – by hook and crook, if necessary –

German nuclear science. 1945 ended on a better note, with the comparatively successful

Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers, but British and American officials were increasingly wary of their ally.

The concurrent efforts to figure out big picture policy questions – such as how to control nuclear science domestically and internationally, occupy Germany, and continue cooperation among the wartime Allies – were also partly to blame for the delay in repatriating the Farm Hall group. These issues all required much time and consideration.

The scientists’ detention at Farm Hall was a seemingly small issue in terms of geopolitics, except that it was bound up in these broader policy considerations and had the potential to negatively affect these issues if it was not well handled. Both British and

American officials wanted to bring other German scientists and technicians to work for them, and wanted objections from neither German scientists nor the French and Soviets about these efforts. British officials were generally inclined to end the detention quickly, so that they could focus on other issues, while American officials were more likely to advocate delaying a decision about Farm Hall until broader questions which affected the detention were addressed.

Britain’s approach reflected the reality that it would be involved in German politics and tied to Germany’s economy for years to come, given the two countries’ proximity and the ongoing occupation (of indefinite duration). It remained to be seen whether the US would again retreat from Europe after the world war. As such, British

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officials focused more on pragmatism than idealistic ideas for the German occupation.

They did not have the resources to control all of German science (as the Americans intended to do), so they would focus their efforts on prohibiting key areas of research

(including those related to atomic energy and weaponry) and leave the other fields to resume their work at will. Britain barely had the resources to feed its own population, let alone the Germans and other refugees in its occupation zone, so it worked to restart the

German economy sooner than the US then envisioned. At the same time, British officials worked to maintain their alliance with the US, even when they had policy disagreements.

It was in Britain’s interest to keep America engaged in Europe after the war, from economic, political, and scientific standpoints. Even when British officials disagreed with their American counterparts, as they did for much of late 1945, they kept negotiating.

The scientists’ return to Germany at the beginning of 1946 was not the end of the

Farm Hall story. Soon after the scientists were repatriated, British and American officials wrote a flurry of correspondence about the justifications for the detention. At a few points over the next year, they again examined the security of the scientists, at times when that security appeared threatened. The questions about nuclear science, the German occupation, and postwar alliances did not go away, but instead took new forms.

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Chapter 5: The Farm Hall Scientists’ Return to Germany, 1946

The beginning of 1946 found the wartime Allies faced with numerous questions about their occupation of Germany. The four Allies disagreed about whether to revive the German economy or suppress it. All four countries had already begun to exploit

German science and technology, although they did not openly acknowledge these efforts.

British and American officials became increasingly concerned that the Soviets and

French would use subterfuge to attract valuable German scientists and technicians to their occupation zones. This issue was of special concern because the British returned the

Farm Hall scientists to Germany at the beginning of January.

British and American officials continued to have difficulties in coming to agreement with France during discussions about the occupation of Germany, as France wanted to implement harsher policies toward Germany. They also became increasingly concerned about how they could continue to work with their Soviet ally. ’s

February 9 speech at the Bolshoi Theater made it clear that Soviet officials were still very much motivated by Marxist-Leninist thought and efforts to establish Soviet a security zone (such an in Turkey and Iran).229 Neither of these motivations should have been surprising, but George F. Kennan’s Long Telegram, sent later in February, and Winston

Churchill’s Iron Curtain Speech in early March were signs that British and American officials had increasing doubts about long-term cooperation with their wartime ally, although efforts to work together continued.

Questions about nuclear weapons research began to be addressed internationally during 1946. As was agreed on at the December 1945 Council of Foreign Ministers

229 Vladislav Zubok, interview for American Experience: Race for the Superbomb, PBS, 1999, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/filmmore/reference/interview/zubok3.html.

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meeting in Moscow, the first resolution passed at the inaugural United Nations session in

January created the UN’s Atomic Energy Commission “to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy.” The discussions over this issue later in 1946 were sometimes contentious, especially on the topic of how to control and eliminate nuclear weapons. Over Soviet objections, the American plan passed in December 1946. Britain established its Atomic Energy Research Establishment in January 1946. President Harry

S Truman signed the McMahon Act in August, which brought US nuclear weapons research under civilian control. The act also forbid the sharing of applied nuclear science and technology with any other countries, which ended nominal cooperation with the

British on that subject.

Over the course of 1946, the Farm Hall scientists went from being detained in

England, to returning to Germany in temporary lodgings, to gradually beginning to resume their professional and personal lives in cities of British and American choosing.

The scientists remained the subjects of discussion by British and American officials because of their potential to pose a threat or cause embarrassment to their former captors

(and ongoing supervisors). British and American officials continued their efforts to keep

Farm Hall a secret. Challenges to their secrecy regime came not only from the scientists but also from a former Alsos official. After the Farm Hall scientists were returned to

Germany, American officials adopted their British colleagues’ conclusion that these scientists – as well as other valuable scientists – needed to be kept happy so that they did not “sell” their knowledge to other countries. Over the course of the year, discussions about the former Farm Hall scientists occurred in the context of how to treat all German scientists, not just this particular group. Although the British continued to have custody

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of the scientists, they consulted with their American counterparts about policies toward the group. The British needed to be on good terms with their American counterparts to have any chance of continuing their cooperation in atomic research and the German occupation.

…

On January 3, 1946, exactly six months after their arrival in England, the British flew the ten Farm Hall scientists back to Germany. The plan to house them in Münster had been abandoned due to the lack of suitable facilities, so the group was instead temporarily housed in the village of Alswede.230 British authorities were still looking into where the scientists could be employed and cautioned their American counterparts that suitable employment for the entire group was unlikely to be found in one place.

Once the scientists’ placement had been decided, the British would make arrangements to bring the scientists’ families, including those in the French and American occupation zones of Germany, to join them. Prime Minister Clement Attlee’s office had approved this plan.231

Three weeks later, a group met at the War Cabinet Office in London to discuss the former Farm Hall scientists.232 British Control Commission officials proposed moving seven of the scientists, Otto Hahn, Werner Heisenberg, Max von Laue, Carl Friedrich von

230 This location was changed at the last minute. On January 2, a British cable mentioned that the group would be returned to Lübbecke, a town that was a few miles away from Alswede. 231 Denis Rickett (Cabinet Offices) telegram to Roger Makins (JSM Washington), Jan. 2, 1946, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341. Makins (JSM Washington) to Rickett (Cabinet Offices), Jan. 4, 1946, TNA: PRO CAB 126/335. Dean to Shuler, Jan. 8, 1946; Incoming and Outgoing Cables, Jan. 46-Jul. 15, 1946; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 232This group consisted of Brig. C.F.C. Spedding, who headed the Research Branch (Trade and Industry Division) of the British Control Commission, and his scientific adviser, Dr. Ronald Fraser; Denis Rickett, secretary to Sir John Anderson and the Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy (ACAE); Michael Perrin of Tube Alloys; and Lt. Col. Edgar P. Dean of the Manhattan Project’s London office.

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Weizsäcker, Erich Bagge, Horst Korsching, and Karl Wirtz, to the former Aerodynamics

Research Institute (Aerodynamische Versuchsanstalt, AVA) in Göttingen. This location offered the best facilities to keep most of the group together, as American officials had requested. British officials had previously rejected Göttingen because of its proximity to the Soviet occupation zone. They now argued that no matter where the scientists were located, it would “be impossible to prevent their leaving the British zone if they so desire.” Close guard was impractical and, if they did escape, British authorities “would not be able to get on their trail in time to prevent their crossing the zone frontier.” The move to Göttingen would contribute to British officials’ plan to make Göttingen the

“foremost university” in their occupation zone. Even at this early date, British officials planned to rebuild academic research in their section of Germany.

The AVA in Göttingen was the best possible location for the Farm Hall group because the facilities that it offered would provide the scientists with the greatest incentive to stay in place. It had been a military research facility, so it was surrounded by a barbed wire fence “within which the scientists can live with their families and work.”

They could be allowed freer access to the city when conditions were better. More importantly, the scientists could be kept happy in Göttingen. The AVA had “first-class laboratory accommodation and books, and [the] equipment of [the] Kaiser Wilhelm

Institute for Physical Chemistry are available. It will therefore be possible to start a new

Institute at once.” The scientists would have “more intellectual comradeship here than any other place.” Good living accommodations were available since Göttingen was largely undamaged and had “more amenities than any other town in the British zone.”

All of these factors would help protect the scientists from “importunate persuasion” to

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leave Göttingen or the British zone. Bonn, which British officials had suggested in the fall, was now deemed too close to the French zone and, hence, the scientists’ former institutes in Hechingen and Tailfingen. British officials did not want the scientists to be tempted to return to these towns and, thus, come under French jurisdiction. Hamburg, which had been considered in December, had fewer amenities to offer in terms of both research and living, which made it too great a risk that the scientists there would be enticed by Soviet offers.

The three other scientists – Paul Harteck, Walther Gerlach, and Kurt Diebner – would be placed separately. Harteck was “badly needed to return to his chair at

Hamburg,” despite previous concerns about his safety there and although facilities to employ all of the former Farm Hall group did not exist there. British officials intended to revitalize the University of Hamburg. The Control Commission asked that Gerlach come to Bonn as a guest professor. Diebner was labeled an administrator rather than a scientist and, as such, “relatively unimportant.” The officials at the War Cabinet meeting suggested that he might later be arrested because of his Nazi Party connections.233

In relaying this plan to the British embassy in Washington, British officials suggested how to present this proposal to Manhattan Project Director Leslie Groves.

British officials could not “guarantee the safety of these men” but believed that this plan

233 This is not the place to analyze this description of Diebner but it was not entirely correct. The characterization of Diebner as an inferior scientist and a committed Nazi emerged during Farm Hall in large part because of the other detained scientists’ efforts to place blame on him. His Party connections, like many of these scientists, were complicated. He was an able scientist but, because he was not part of Heisenberg’s group, Heisenberg and his colleagues demonized Diebner’s work and his work within the National Socialist bureaucracy. Walker, German National Socialism, 94-95.

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offered the scientists “the maximum practicable protection and the maximum incentive to stay in the British zone.”234

In London, the Manhattan Project’s Lt. Col. Edgar P. Dean agreed that “the

Göttingen proposal is the best of any realistic solution.” Keeping the Farm Hall scientists occupied with work in Germany was the best course of action to keep them from becoming security risks. He wrote that:

From a selfish U.S. and U.K. point of view, the best thing what could happen is for the guests to remain in Germany and resume their own work. Their knowledge of fission is about that of 1939. It would take them a couple of years by their own resources to catch up with what has transpired in the U.S. and U.K. The best guarantee which the U.S. and U.K. governments have that the guests will remain in Germany is, in the last analysis, the willingness of these men to remain in their homeland. Men of their background do not demand a great number of worldly goods. They must, however, have access to laboratory facilities and intellectual comradeship. With these conditions met, they will not be tempted by outside offers. The evidence is copious that German scientists tempted to go to Russia are only tempted because they have no laboratory facilities at home.235

This was one of the first instances in which Manhattan Project officials argued that finding stable employment in Germany for the Farm Hall scientists could be beneficial to the US. Manhattan Project officials had argued throughout the fall that this course of action was dangerous and that the scientists were inherently untrustworthy, so it is unclear what “copious” evidence Dean meant. Once the group was back in Germany,

Manhattan Project staff had to come up with a new best option for keeping tracking of the

234 Denis Rickett (Cabinet Offices) telegram to Roger Makins (JSM Washington), Jan. 25, 1946; and Denis Rickett (Cabinet Offices) telegram to Roger Makins (JSM Washington), Jan. 30, 1946, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341. Dean to Shuler, Jan. 25, 1946; 205.2 Cables Incoming, Top Secret; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 235 Edgar P. Dean to W.R. Shuler, re: “Future Disposition of the Guests,” Jan. 25, 1946; and “Proposals for Disposal of German Scientists,” Jan. 28, 1946; 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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scientists and their research. That option turned out to be employing them in the British occupation zone.

Groves soon agreed to this plan. He, Field Marshal Henry Maitland Wilson (the chief of the British Staff Mission in Washington), and Sir James Chadwick (who had worked on the Manhattan Project and now continued his work with the British Staff

Mission) suggested that two other German nuclear scientists, Walther Bothe and Fritz

Strassmann, could be added to the group at Göttingen. British officials were amenable to this suggestion. Both men were well-regarded scientists and their presence in Göttingen could be beneficial to British efforts to attract and keep German scientists in the British occupation zone.236

Before this decision about where to place the Farm Hall scientists in Germany was reached (or even proposed), British and American officials had dealt with two related problems that they considered more important: drafting a press statement to be issued when the scientists were repatriated and privately researching the legal justifications for the scientists’ detention. The attention given to these issues demonstrated British and

American officials’ shared concern that Farm Hall could have detrimental repercussions for their governments. As discussed in Chapter 4, the mishandling of Farm Hall had the potential to draw negative attention to American and British attempts to control atomic science, exploit Germany for intellectual reparations, and conceal what they were doing from their French and Soviet allies. The Manhattan Project’s Maj. Tony Calvert and

Maj. Francis Smith had corresponded about the justifications for the German scientists’ detention in October. The scientists’ return to Germany represented one of the most

236 Makins (JSM) Washington to Rickett (Cabinet Offices), Jan. 28, 1946, TNA: PRO CAB 126/335. Makins to Groves, Jan. 31, 1946, CAC, CHAD IV/12/2.

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dangerous moments of the detention for British and American officials: when the scientists would have the opportunity to tell their side of the story.

On January 2, the day before the group was flown to Alswede, Denis Rickett sent

Roger Makins a cable about efforts to draft a press statement about the scientists’ detention.237 British officials had already received “one or two enquiries from the press about the whereabouts of individual members of the party.” As a result, they had prepared a statement “to forestall further enquiries of this kind and possible undesirable gossip and publicity.” They intended to release this statement through British military authorities in Germany the day after the scientists’ repatriation, which would allow the statement to be made public while also not giving it (and, thus, the scientists’ detention at

Farm Hall) widespread publicity. Rickett asked for input from his British colleagues in

Washington on the draft statement.

The statement reported that the British government, in cooperation with the US government, had “kept a close watch” on German atomic science and other military- applicable scientific research during the war. A special mission after the invasion of

Germany confirmed what British intelligence had already concluded, that “the Germans had made little or no progress towards the development of atomic energy for military purposes. Their efforts had not advanced beyond the laboratory scale and were, in any case, directed towards the use of atomic energy as a source of power.” Many German scientists had been interrogated and those who had been engaged in atomic research had been brought to the UK for further interrogation. That group had since been returned to

237 Rickett was secretary to Sir John Anderson and the Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy. Makins handled issues relating to atomic research at the British embassy in Washington. He later served as UK ambassador to Washington and after that chairman of the UK Atomic Energy Authority. Lorna Arnold and Mark Smith, Britain, Australia, and the Bomb: The Nuclear Tests and Their Aftermath (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 9.

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Germany, where they would “be allowed to undertake fundamental research in accordance with the scheme for the control of scientific research, which is being administered by the Control Commission in Germany.” Otto Hahn and Werner

Heisenberg were among the group who had been brought to the UK.238

This statement ignored the fact that only a small group of German atomic scientists (not anywhere near all of those who had been engaged in atomic research during the war) had been brought to the UK. Otherwise, it was a fairly accurate (if general) account of the British investigations of German atomic research.

In his initial reply, Makins cautioned that British officials should give their

American counterparts time to vet the statement before it was released, since British officials would want the same consideration if their roles were reversed.239

Groves and Chadwick suggested a couple of revisions. Groves thought that the draft statement would “cause difficulties” for the US but suggested three changes to mitigate those difficulties. The first was to emphasize that Britain and the US “made every effort” to learn about Germany’s wartime scientific research, replacing the statement that Britain and the US had “kept a close watch” on German wartime science.

Groves’ second revision was to delete the statement that the mission to Germany

“confirmed the estimate already formed by our [British] Intelligence Services” about

Germany’s non-progress in developing atomic weaponry and instead assert that “[o]ur latest estimates” indicated this lack of progress. This revision justified the scientists’ detention at Farm Hall by implying that this conclusion was reached only after their confinement. It also eliminated the reference to the British intelligence estimates prior to

238 Rickett (Cabinet Offices) to Makins (JSM Washington), Jan. 2, 1946, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341. 239 Makins (JSM Washington) to Rickett (Cabinet Offices), Jan. 2, 1946, TNA: PRO CAB 126/335.

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the Alsos investigations that German atomic research was not likely an immediate threat.

Groves’ final revision was to add the qualification that the Germans’ wartime atomic research had “in the main” focused on using atomic energy as a power source. This left open the implication that their research could have been militarily applicable and, therefore, was sufficiently dangerous to warrant not only the Alsos investigations (which were not mentioned by name) but also the detention of the German scientists in Britain.

No mention was made of the four scientists who had been detained in the US for an even longer period than their colleagues at Farm Hall.

Chadwick added two further corrections: “some,” not all of, the German scientists who had done wartime atomic research had been brought to the UK. He also noted that these scientists had been engaged in “atomic energy research,” not simply atomic research. This change reinforced Groves’ edit that German research had focused mainly on atomic energy, not weapons, and also clarified that Germany’s program was larger than the group which had been brought to England, again reinforcing the view that

Germany’s wartime research might have proved a danger because of its scope.240

Officials in London agreed to these revisions and planned to release the amended statement on January 8. Three days later, however, they wrote back to Washington that they had not published the announcement. The Deputy Military Governor of the British

Control Commission had objected that the statement “would be embarrassing to him.”

The Foreign Office and British Control Commission officials would be free to use the statement if they received press inquiries or if they felt that its publication would otherwise be useful. However, before this change could be communicated, press reports

240 Chadwick to Groves, Jan. 3, 1946, CAC, CHAD IV/22/2. Makins (JSM Washington) to Rickett (Cabinet Offices), Jan. 4, 1946, TNA: PRO CAB 126/335.

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had already appeared in Washington about the scientists’ detention. Someone there had published (or leaked) the statement that officials in London had hoped to release quietly.241

On January 10, a United Press report appeared in the Washington Post, New York

Times, Los Angeles Times, and London’s Daily Telegraph that Otto Hahn and ten other

German scientists had been in British custody since the previous spring, having been held on a farm forty miles from London. The United Press’ British sources in Washington had said on January 9 that the scientists were being (or perhaps had already been) returned to

Germany, where they would live in the British or American occupation zones and “be subject to the restrictions imposed on all Germans.”242

The Washington Post’s report added the detail that British and American officials

“were confronted with a difficult decision” after capturing Hahn: “Now that they had him they didn’t know what to do with him. They wanted him out of circulation so that he

241 Rickett (Cabinet Offices) to Makins (JSM Washington), Jan. 7, 1946; and Rickett (Cabinet Offices) to Makins (JSM Washington), Jan. 11, 1946, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341. Makins (JSM Washington) to Rickett (Cabinet Offices), Jan. 9, 1946, TNA: PRO CAB 126/335. Roger Makins to L.R. Groves, Jan. 7, 1945; and William A. Consodine to J. Lawton Collins (Director of Information, War Dept), Jan. 8, 1946; #12 Intelligence and Security; Correspondence (‘Top Secret’) of the Manhattan Engineer District, 1942- 1946 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M1109, roll 2); Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Dean had already warned the Manhattan Project’s Washington office on January 9 that the statement would probably not be issued, since the British Deputy Military Governor had objections to it and would only release the statement if ordered to do so by higher authorities in London. Dean to Shuler, Jan. 9, 1946; Incoming and Outgoing Cables, Jan. 46-Jul. 15, 1946; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 242 The description of a “farm forty miles from London” was a misdirection (presumably given by the reporter’s British sources) as to the location and type of lodging at Farm Hall. United Press, “Nobel Prize Winner Kept from Assisting Nazi War Machine,” The Washington Post, January 10, 1946, 5; United Press, “Hahn, Atom-Splitter Was Held in Britain,” The New York Times, January 10, 1946, 20; United Press, “Allied Hold Atom Expert of Reich,” Los Angeles Times, January 10, 1946, 6, all accessed August 20, 2012 via ProQuest Historical Newspapers. United Press, “Reich Atom Savant in British Custody, Washington Hears,” The Daily Telegraph, January 10, 1946; Unlabelled (Daily Digest, Jan.-Jun. 1946); General Correspondence, 1944-1947; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the London (England) Liaison Office; RG 77, NACP. Shuler to Dean, Jan. 12, 1946; Incoming and Outgoing Cables, Jan. 46-Jul. 15, 1946; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944- 46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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couldn’t help the Germans and finally decided that restraint in England was best.” This statement implied that German scientists had been working on threatening atomic research. However, the United Press report also indicated that the group had been treated well during their involuntary stay in England: “the scientists were treated as guests, were occasionally wined and dined, and were permitted even to visit London. But they were closely guarded by British soldiers and watched constantly by British intelligence.” This statement, like the one the British had drafted, emphasized the German scientists’ potential threat to the US and UK, as well as the argument that this threat had been avoided due to the efforts of British and American officials to thoroughly investigate

German atomic scientists and their wartime research. However, unlike the draft British statement, it provided greater publicity to the detention than had been intended. The statement’s claims about the scientists’ treatment were true, to a point. The only occasion when the group was “wined and dined” was the celebration of Hahn’s Nobel Prize. Only three of the scientists – Hahn, Heisenberg, and von Laue – had been allowed to visit the

Royal Society in London. The men were not under constant guard but they were supervised almost constantly by CSDIC intelligence personnel.

A few additional articles about the scientists’ return to Germany appeared over the next few days, most of which were quite short (typically only a paragraph) and mentioned only Hahn by name. None of these articles were inflammatory and there was little other press coverage about the scientists’ detention or release during the first few days after the group was returned to Germany. A key reason for this was that the German scientists’ repatriation was overshadowed by other events. The front page of the January

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10 and 11 newspapers focused on the opening of the United Nations Organization’s first meeting on London, which had its first sessions on January 10.243

The only substantive article about Hahn’s detention had appeared in the New York

Herald Tribune on January 9. Its author got a number of key facts right or uncomfortably close: Hahn had disappeared early in 1945 when American soldiers arrived at his

Tailfingen institute in Württemberg. Other scientists, perhaps Max von Laue and Werner

Heisenberg, had also been taken at the same time. Hahn was later known (by whom, the author did not say) to be in London. After that, the trail went cold, although the author speculated that Hahn was likely in the US. Hahn had occasionally sent letters to his wife but even those betrayed no hint where he was, other than to say that he was living in a comfortable country house where he was well fed and allowed access to the radio and newspapers. The secretary of the Nobel Committee of the Royal Academy of Science thought that Hahn was in the US, as did his wife and family. Other individuals speculated that he was in Belgium, England, or even Germany. Maybe Hahn was at work on the American atomic bomb. While no one in official circles claimed to know Hahn’s whereabouts, the question was often met with the suggestion to ask General Groves.

243 “Latest News: Mystery of German Atom Scientist,” The () Press and Journal, January 10, 1946, 1; “Stop Press,” The (Dundee) Courier and Advertiser, January 11, 1946, 1; “Latest: German Atom Scientist in British Custody,” The Western Daily Press and Bristol Mirror, January 11, 1946, 1; all accessed May 27, 2013 via the British Newspaper Archive. British United Press, “British Hold Atom Scientist,” Stars and Stripes, January 11, 1946; Unlabelled (Daily Digest, Jan.-Jun. 1946); General Correspondence, 1944-1947; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the London (England) Liaison Office; RG 77, NACP. United Press, “Hahn May Go to Britain,” (London) Daily Express, January 14, 1946; Unlabelled; General Correspondence, 1944-1947; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the London (England) Liaison Office; RG 77, NACP.

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Groves “scoffed” at the idea that Hahn would have been allowed to work on the atomic bomb, but the trail of questions kept leading back to him.244

This article, however, appeared a day too early. Later that same day, the United

Press received its report from British sources in Washington that Hahn and ten other scientists had been held in Britain.

In early February, a United Press reporter interviewed Hahn and Heisenberg, as

British and American officials had been concerned would occur once the Farm Hall scientists were returned to Germany. Officials in London and Washington were apprehensive that the scientists would present their wartime work in a way that called into question the need for their long (and perhaps not legally justified) detention.245

In the US, the Los Angeles Times published the interview with Heisenberg and

Hahn on February 3. The article made no mention of the scientists’ detention, noting only that Hahn, Heisenberg, and six colleagues were currently living “in a steam-heated billet provided by the British within 15 minutes of British headquarters.” Hahn and

Heisenberg stated that German scientists had been urged since 1939 by Hitler to conduct research that could lead to atomic bombs because of fears that Britain or the US would produce such a bomb first (and use it against Germany). They had understood how to produce atomic power by 1941 but had been hampered by wartime shortages of materials

244 Stephen White, “Hahn, Atom Scientist, Vanishes in U.S. Custody,” New York Herald Tribune, January 9, 1946; 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 245 Rickett (Cabinet Offices) to Makins (JSM Washington), Feb. 2, 1946, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341. Shuler to Dean, Feb. 2, 1946; Incoming and Outgoing Cables, Jan. 46-Jul. 15, 1946; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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and manpower. They had undertaken no efforts to build atomic weapons, even though they understood how to do so.246

Dean wrote from London a few days later with the welcome news that none of the similar articles carried in the British press had been as damaging as had been feared they might be. No British paper “devoted much space to the subject, a quarter-column being average.” The articles appeared on the front page of most of these papers but were not prominent and did not have large headlines. Dean had learned that the United Press’ reporter had interviewed spoken with the deputy military governor of the British Control

Commission after he had interviewed Hahn and Heisenberg. Because of this conversation, “it was evidently agreed that the article would focus on the return of the scientists to the Reich” rather than the detailed account of German atomic research about which British and American officials had been concerned. All together, the newspaper coverage after the Farm Hall scientists’ return to Germany was less damaging than

British and American officials had worried it might be. The scientists’ claims that their wartime work had been only for peaceful intentions received some attention but there was no outcry about the scientists’ detention.247

At the same time that British and American officials kept track of the press coverage about the Farm Hall group’s repatriation and worked on their own press statement, Manhattan Project officials devoted considerable attention to producing a written justification of the scientists’ detention for their own use. This effort

246 Associated Press, “Hitler Had Atom Secret First, Scientists Say,” Los Angeles Times, February 3, 1946, 6, accessed August 20, 2012 via ProQuest Historical Newspapers. 247 Edgar P. Dean to W.R. Shuler, re: “British News Clippings re the Guests,” Feb. 5, 1946; To: Hdqtrs – Washington (1 Jan. 46 to 30 Jun. 46); General Correspondence, 1944-1947; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the London (England) Liaison Office; RG 77, NACP. The clippings to which he referred were not retained in this folder.

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demonstrated Manhattan Project officials’ concern about criticism of the scientists’ detention, which seemed especially likely to emerge once the scientists returned to

Germany and their time in captivity became known. With only one or two brief exceptions, British and American officials had been careful not to refer to the scientists as prisoners of war, instead using the euphemism “guests” throughout the Farm Hall reports and relating correspondence. Declaring them as prisoners of war would have meant making public their capture in April. Since that did not happen, other justifications for the wartime detention of enemy civilians had to be found.

One week after the scientists were returned to Germany, and one day after the

British press release about the group’s detention was supposed to be published in

Germany, Manhattan Project officials wrote to their London office with Groves’ request for a “report on the legality of the seizure and detention of the guests.” Some British officials had implied to Groves that the scientists’ detention “may have had some illegal aspects.” Groves asked that his officers discuss this issue with Lt. Cdr. Eric Welsh, the

MI6 officer who had assisted with the scientists’ detention since their time in France.

Groves wanted to know whether Welsh thought that the scientists should have been given prisoner of war status and visits from the International Red Cross. He asked that the

British reply cite the “specific laws, treaty, and statute provisions which may have been violated.” He also directed his Manhattan Project officers to “procure copies of [the] then existing theater directives authorizing [the] arrest and detention of civilians such as the guests.”248

248 Shuler to Dean, Jan. 9, 1946; 205.3 Cables Outgoing, Secret and Under; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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Within a week, the London office sent detailed replies about the British analysis of the legality of the scientists’ detention at Farm Hall and the US Army’s theater directives during the war. In Welsh’s view, the legality of the scientists’ detention in

England could not be challenged “inasmuch as legality can be established by invoking

[the] law entitled Royal Prerogative thereby nationals of an enemy country can be appropriately dealt with.” The scientists’ detention in the UK could also be justified by existing British immigration law, “regardless of how the guests may have entered [the]

UK.” Groves was unclear about what this meant and wrote a question mark next to this statement.

Groves also questioned Welsh’s assertion that the International Red Cross would not question the Farm Hall scientists’ detention because the scientists were not “by construction” prisoners of war. This logic was circular and was one of the factors about which Manhattan Project officials were concerned. Welsh asserted that there would be no issue raised about their detention in the UK or on the continent because neither a formal state of peace nor a German government (which would be the most likely entity to protest the scientists’ detention) existed. Even having argued that there was no question about the legality of the Farm Hall detention, Manhattan Project officials in London noted that Welsh was “pursuing the legality question as inconspicuously as possible,” to avoid directly asking the Foreign Office’s legal department about this issue and, thus, broadcasting the scientists’ detention (and potential questions about it).249

From the perspective of the American military governor’s office, the scientists’ detention was justified by Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 1067, the directive to Gen. Dwight

249 Warner to Shuler, Jan. 15, 1946; Incoming and Outgoing Cables, Jan. 46-Jul. 15, 1946; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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D. Eisenhower for the military rule of Germany. JCS 1067 authorized Eisenhower to take “all necessary steps…to guarantee against a third attempt by Germany to conquer the world.” He was ordered to “search out, arrest and hold, pending receipt by you of further instructions as to their disposition – all persons who, if permitted to remain at large, would endanger the accomplishment of your objective.” In the opinion of

Manhattan Project officials, this directive applied to nuclear scientists who might construct a bomb for Germany, either during the war or in the years to come.

The section of JCS 1067 that best justified the German scientists’ detention was the Counter Intelligence Directive for Germany, which called for the indefinite detention of “those German scientists and industrial technologists whose background and prior activities are such that they could conceivably play an important part in the rebirth of the

German war machine.” Manhattan Project officials were therefore justified in detaining the ten scientists because American officials had feared the destruction that a German atomic bomb could have wrought during the war and that such a weapon could inflict in the future. US military directives allowed for the indefinite detention of German scientists and technicians whose work could have future military applications, even if there was “insufficient evidence to warrant trial.”250

Over the next two weeks, a member of Groves’ staff combined these reports from

London and Frankfurt with other material gathered in Washington. On January 29, he produced nine-page report on “The Legality of the Arrest and Detention of Certain

German Scientists by the Allied Powers.” The report’s main argument was that:

250 McNarney to Shuler, Jan. 16, 1946; 205.2 Cables Incoming, Top Secret; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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the arrest of the German nuclear physicists and chemists was in accordance with the directives of the highest Allied authorities and was not in violation of any treaty, or rule of land warfare of the United States, or canon of International Law. It appears that their subsequent detention was in accordance with the policy of the theater commanders and violated no treaty, or canon of international law, or rule of land warfare unless they were entitled to the status of prisoners of war. They were not prisoners of war within the definition of the Hague Regulations or the Geneva convention, although they seem to fall within the definition of the Rules of Land Warfare. The Rules of Land Warfare, in this respect, appear to have been modified by subsequent directives of the highest Allied authorities.

In any event, the scientists were granted all of the rights and privileges of prisoners of war, except communication with neutral authorities, in spite of the fact that it is quite doubtful if they were entitled to prisoner of war status. The refusal to grant them the privilege of communication with the Swiss and the International Red Cross was, at worst, a minor deviation from a rule which probably did not even apply to them and was certainly justified by the “military exigencies” of the situation.

The report provided a relatively factual version of the scientists’ capture and detention, but shaded the truth or omitted information to emphasize the potential danger posed by the German scientists, as other Manhattan Project officials had done in their reports throughout the Farm Hall detention. For example, the author wrote that the scientists who had been detained were “the key figures in the German atomic energy project and the leaders of German nuclear physics.” This was true – to a point. Many other important German scientists who fit these descriptions had been allowed to stay in

Germany. The report made no mention of the effort to deprive the French (or the

Soviets) of these scientists, which had been a key motivation for capturing this particular group of scientists in April and May 1945.

British atomic intelligence agents had concluded in the fall of 1944 that

Germany’s wartime atomic research had not progressed very far and did not pose an immediate threat. This Manhattan Project report ignored those conclusions, arguing instead that it had been of “utmost importance to seize the German laboratories, plants,

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and personnel who were capable of contributing to the manufacture of atomic bombs” to eliminate the threat of possible German nuclear weapons. The report compared (potential but nonexistent) German atomic weapons to V-2 rockets, noting that “the only way to prevent the use of such weapons was to stop them before they were used.”

The report contended that only after Germany had been defeated had it been possible for the Allies (the report’s author here emphasized the shared nature of this effort, even though only one Ally had worked with the US on this task) “to survey accurately the progress which the Germans had made in the application of nuclear physics knowledge to military use.” Disingenuously, the report argued that “[i]t was then found that the German effort, though considerable, had been ‘second rate’ and that the threats of the German propagandists [that Germany was working on a secret new weapon] were but wild distortions of the German scientists’ reports. This, however, was not known with certainty in April 1945.” The author may have been correct that the full scope of the Germans’ wartime research was not known until April 1945, but both the

British and Americans had a very good view of German research well prior to this date.

In addition to British intelligence reports, the Americans had gained an overview of

German wartime research when they captured some German atomic researchers and their papers at the University of Strasbourg in late November 1944. It took until early May to investigate the many scientists and research sites mentioned in the Strasbourg reports, but that effort involved verifying, not learning information for the first time, as this 1946 report implied.

The report’s account of the scientists’ detention included a similar mix of facts and shadings of the truth. It was true that the scientists had been provided with living

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accommodations that were “more than ample” and food that was better than prisoner of war rations, and had eventually been allowed to write to their families. They had not been required to work, had been provided with medical care, and were treated with

“courtesy and consideration.” Some of the scientists’ families “were, at their request, moved from one location to another in Germany.”

However, the report claimed that “[b]eginning in August and September, 1945, after the end of the war with Japan, action was initiated to return them to Germany.”

This was mostly true, but obscured the fact that the British, not Americans, had pushed for this to happen, and that Manhattan Project officials had objected to this course of action and suggested continuing the scientists’ detention indefinitely. The report noted only that “the chaotic conditions of the civilian population in Germany and the importance of these men to the world of science [had meant that] their actual return to

Germany was not consummated until early January, 1946.” Again, this was partly true but not the whole story.

In its legal analysis, the report argued first there was “no question” that the

German scientists’ arrest had been carried out in accordance with orders from Allied military authorities and did not violate the Rules of Land Warfare or

“any applicable treaty of any canon of International Law.”251 The author argued that the scientists did not fit into the “narrow definition” of civilian prisoners of war specified by

Hague and Geneva Convention Rules. However, the US Rules of Land Warfare specified “every person captured or interned by a belligerent power because of the war,”

251 The report’s author cited sections from JCS 1067 and the United States Army Basic Field Manual FM 27-10, plus four British and American analyses of international law. He added that no treaty “between the United Kingdom and Germany or between the United States and Germany which outlawed the seizure, during wartime, by an invading army, of those private citizens of the enemy country who were deemed important to the enemy’s state or useful to the invading army.”

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with certain exceptions, was a prisoner of war and, thus, to be recognized and treated as such. The author argued that JCS 1067, which did not specify that captured enemy civilians should be treated as prisoners of war, superseded these rules because it had been issued more recently and by higher-ranking authorities.

Despite these protestations that the Farm Hall scientists had not been entitled to prisoner of war status, the report’s author argued that the scientists had received treatment at or better than the level required for prisoners of war. As proof that the scientists had been treated well, the author attached a note that Otto Hahn had written to the Manhattan

Project’s Tony Calvert in mid-December 1945 after learning that Calvert was returning to the US from his post in London and would not be likely to visit Farm Hall again. Hahn had written that he regretted that the scientists had not been able to say goodbye to

Calvert in person and thanked Calvert for his “interest and help for our personal well- being” at Farm Hall.252

The creation of this report at the same time as the scientists’ return to Germany showed how concerned Manhattan Project officials were that the scientists’ repatriation would have negative repercussions for them. The report acknowledged that there could be protests about the scientists’ detention, although the author attempted to explain away those objections. If the seizure and detention of the German scientists had been illegal, it could have meant that the ongoing control of the scientists in Germany might also be unwarranted. There was no German government to protest this control, though, so it was likely that little could be done to change it. Manhattan Project officials were concerned,

252 Charles F. Clarke Jr., “The Legality of the Arrest and Detention of Certain German Scientists by the Allied Powers,” Jan. 29, 1946; 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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however, about international opinion. French and Soviet objections might not change

American actions but they could exacerbate ongoing tensions with those Allies over

Germany and atomic issues. Therefore, Manhattan Project officials wanted to be prepared to refute potential criticism about the Alsos Mission’s investigations in

Germany and the Farm Hall detention.

Manhattan Project officials did not discuss the issue of legality of the scientists’ detention in detail after this, although scattered questions about this legality were raised in a few other reports in 1946, which will be discussed below. These questions likely indicated that this January report was not circulated widely among Groves’ staff. It also meant that some Manhattan Project officials continued to doubt that that the scientists’ detention had been conducted within the letter of the law, even if they were inclined to argue that the detention had been justified.

Despite British plans to keep the Farm Hall scientists in their occupation zone,

Manhattan Project officials continued to consider other means to control the scientists.

Their efforts to exert more control over the scientists had not waned. In February, War

Department officials began to plan for the possibility that the US would undertake the

“long-term exploitation” of German scientists with “inducements such as legal status in the United States, possible transfer of families, patent protection, etc.” and that the War

Department might be able to take advantage of such a policy. War Department officials wanted to create a list of scientists “whose indefinite stay in this country appears to be in the national interest.” Groves’ office was one of those asked to contribute to such a list.

Scientists were to be ranked in order of priority in four categories: those who were already known to be of crucial value to the War Department, those who were known to

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have talents and abilities that could benefit industry (with indirect benefits to the armed services), those whose work was less unique but who should nonetheless “be retained for the United States,” and those whose talents had not been directly confirmed but who might be directly or indirectly valuable to the US armed services.253

Manhattan Project officials’ response to the War Department’s request was to propose the creation of a fifth category of German physicists and chemists who “might be of service to scientists in this country in the field of atomic energy.” Groves’ stated rationale for including these scientists was that it was “extremely important that these persons are prevented from giving their services to a potential enemy of the United

States.” The Manhattan Project, however, would not employ any of these men for

“obvious security reasons.” It was likely that “strong opposition” would be “encountered in placing these men in American institutions best fitted to exploit their efforts.”

Nonetheless, it would be “of more value to the national interest of this country if they could be employed here rather than in any other country.”254

Based on the wording of his letter, Groves’ sense of US national interest was based on aiding future nuclear energy (but, of course, not weapons) research, while simultaneously denying this expertise to other countries. The list of scientists that he included, however, showed his continued focus on maintaining control of the scientists whom the Alsos Mission had detained: the fourteen names Groves suggested included the ten scientists who had been held at Farm Hall and three of the scientists who had been

253 John Weckerling, Deputy AC of S, G-2, memorandum for the Commanding General, , Feb. 6, 1946; Liaison with War Department; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 254 L.R. Groves memorandum for the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, Feb. 20, 1946; Liaison with War Department; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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brought from Strasbourg to the US in December 1944.255 Only one scientist on Groves' list, Friedrich Houtermans, had not been detained by Alsos although he had been investigated in Göttingen in April 1945. The inclusion of the Farm Hall scientists’ names

– and not other German scientists who had worked on nuclear research during the war and who were of equal or greater eminence that the scientists Groves listed – suggested

Groves’ concern that these scientists might be particularly inclined to work for other countries because of their detention. This would have been an especially negative aftermath to the Farm Hall detention.

The brief biographical notes included for each scientist placed high value on only a few of the Farm Hall scientists based on their work, warned that many of them might have Nazi sympathies, and deemed only a few of them as interested in working in the US.

These were hardly ringing endorsements of why the War Department should focus on bringing these scientists to work in the US, unless the goal of denying them to other countries was paramount. Thus, even after the Farm Hall (and other detained) scientists had been returned to Germany and plans had been undertaken to move them to suitable research institutions within occupied Germany, Groves still tried to find a way to control their knowledge and deny it to other countries. He had searched for a way to bring the group to the US in late October 1945 before finally agreeing to the British plan to repatriate the group to multiple locations in Germany. Although the War Department did not follow Groves’ suggestions, his efforts to create a new way to control these scientists

255 This list was nearly identical to one that Col. W.R. Shuler, one of Groves’ key foreign intelligence officers, had provided in his December 1945 report to Groves that advocated keeping the Farm Hall scientists in continued custody. W.R. Shuler to L.R. Groves, re: “Disposition of German Scientists Presently in American and/or British Custody,” Dec. 19, 1945; 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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in early 1946 showed his ongoing desire to deny these scientists and their knowledge to other countries, even if that meant employing the scientists in the US.

From London, Dean forwarded reports to Washington about Soviet efforts to contact scientists in Germany, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark in recent months. Two important German theoretical nuclear physicists were known to be in the USSR.

Manhattan Project officials in Europe also followed the establishment of a “French

Manhattan Project,” the High Commissariat for Atomic Energy. These reports provided context for American concerns that scientists and technicians under their jurisdiction might be tempted to join other countries’ research efforts.256

At the beginning of March, a group again met at the War Cabinet Office to discuss how former Farm Hall group was being handled in Germany. As they had decided in late January, most of the scientists would be moved to Göttingen.257 British

Control Commission officials reported that the scientists had done some “hard thinking” about their future careers while in Alswede. Realizing that their knowledge of fission trailed that of scientists in the US and UK by a few years, most had decided to pursue other interests. Gerlach would return to his previous interest in magnetism, Harteck would pursue radiology, and Heisenberg would study cosmic rays. Hahn was yet undecided. At the January meeting at the War Cabinet office, British officials had noted that Hahn was willing to stay in Göttingen but wanted some of his apparatus from his former institute in the French occupation zone. The British officials had noted that such a

256 Dean to Shuler, Jan. 23, 1946; 205.2 Cables Incoming, Top Secret; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Edgar P. Dean to W.R. Shuler, re: “Creation of a French MED,” Jan. 29, 1946; To: Hdqtrs – Washington (1 Jan. 46 to 30 Jun. 46); General Correspondence, 1944-1947; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the London (England) Liaison Office; RG 77, NACP. 257 Hahn and Heisenberg had already been moved to Göttingen in mid-February. The other five scientists followed in mid-March. Bagge, Von der Uranspaltung, 71-72.

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request to the French would “be embarrassing but the problem would arise wherever

Hahn was situated in our zone.”258

At the March meeting, the Control Commission Research Branch’s scientific adviser, Fraser, proposed an unusual way to allow both Heisenberg and Hahn to restart their institutes. He argued that it was necessary to “give Heisenberg a laboratory with every conceivable kind of equipment for his new research activities.” Dean, Rickett, and

Perrin questioned whether this would be dangerous to British and American interests, but

Fraser stood firm. British officials typically supported creating a new laboratory center for these German scientists but the reasons for their hesitation in this instance were not recorded. Heisenberg planned to work on cosmic rays, not nuclei, which meant that his research would not have future military applications and he would be happy to stay in

Germany if he could undertake this new research.

In order for Heisenberg’s new Göttingen institute to acquire supplies from his former institute in Hechingen, Fraser proposed that about a third of Heisenberg’s equipment and personnel in Hechingen could be moved to Göttingen. As a “quid pro quo,” Hahn would be allowed to return to his institute in the French zone and, thus, would come under French jurisdiction. The other officials in attendance strongly objected to this plan, arguing that such a trade would be unacceptable to higher authorities in both London and Washington. Such a “trade” might also embitter British and American public opinion, if it were to become public knowledge. They also disputed whether Heisenberg needed so much equipment and argued that the supplies that he needed could probably be found in the British occupation zone. As a result, the group

258 Denis Rickett (Cabinet Offices) telegram to Roger Makins (JSM Washington), Jan. 25, 1946, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341.

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soundly rejected the possibility that Hahn would be allowed to return permanently to

Tailfingen.

After the meeting, Perrin and Dean discussed the special treatment that the scientists and their families were receiving and their intentions to end such treatment.

Special concessions may have been necessary previously to keep the scientists in good humor (and, thus, from posing security risks) during or immediately after their detention but Perrin and Dean thought that such exceptions were no longer needed. Heisenberg’s and Gerlach’s families in the American occupation zone were still receiving extra rations from US occupation forces, who had recently asked whether this practice should be continued. Dean agreed that if Frau Gerlach and Frau Heisenberg would agree to move to the British zone within the next few weeks, he would ask American occupation officials to provide extra food and fuel rations during their remaining time in the

American occupation zone. He would also help with the zonal clearances necessary to travel. Otherwise, the families would receive no further special treatment. This carrot- and-stick approach aimed to create a situation where the scientists and their families would be accorded the same treatment as any other Germans. The scientists could now be controlled under normal occupation rules. British and American officials felt that they had treated the scientists more than fairly and Perrin, Welsh, and Dean now argued that

“the era of special favors is over.” The scientists had been returned to Germany, their families had been taken care of in the meantime, and now all of them needed to adjust to the new reality of their lives under the occupation. In the future only major matters

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(which did not include laboratory equipment or personnel) should be referred to London and Washington.259

In late March, British occupation authorities again posed the question of “trading” a scientist to the French for items from Heisenberg’s Hechingen institute. This time, however, the request involved Max von Laue. Officials in London remained hesitant to

“barter” a scientist for Heisenberg’s laboratory equipment in the French zone and reiterated their previous suggestion that occupation authorities should find as much of this equipment as possible in the British zone. The British Control Commission replied that officials in London had misunderstood their intentions for von Laue. He was not to be used as a “bargaining point” for Heisenberg’s research equipment. Instead, von

Laue’s return to Hechingen was an acknowledgement that he should not have been detained by American and British authorities since he had not been involved in wartime nuclear research and, thus, that he should not be subject to further restrictions on his location or research. The Control Commission argued that “it would be far better to acknowledge this and get rid of him than to have a discontented scientist on our hands for an indefinite time.”

The British Control Commission attached great importance to establishing a

“healthy German scientific organism” that would facilitate the “moral rehabilitation of

Germany.” As a result, they intended “to do what lies in our power to make German scientists, or at any rate the one we want to encourage, feel that life holds something for

259 Edgar P. Dean to W.R. Shuler, re: “Concluding Matters re the Guests,” Mar. 2, 1946; 202.3-2 London Office: Combined Oper Ger Group; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. McNarney (USFET Main) to Dean, re: “Food and Fuel for Scientists,” Feb. 16, 1946; Incoming Cables; General Correspondence, 1944-1947; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the London (England) Liaison Office; RG 77, NACP.

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them and for those with whom they come into daily contact. As a means to this end and to the minimising of our own difficulties in guidance and control, the fewer sources of dissatisfaction there are the better.” Von Laue had been mystified at his detention at

Farm Hall, since he had not been an active part of Germany’s wartime research. The

Farm Hall reports had often described him as an anti-Nazi, yet another point in his favor.

He should not be punished any further for his misfortune to have been detained at Farm

Hall, and should be allowed to return to the French zone. London officials’ opinion prevailed, however, and von Laue stayed in Göttingen.260

Over the following months, British and American officials continue to approach their handling of the former Farm Hall scientists with the mindset that they should be treated like any other German nuclear scientists in their occupation zones. It worked much of the time, which meant that the Farm Hall scientists were not mentioned in

American or British documents as often as before. Hahn and Heisenberg continued to receive greater attention from occupation authorities because of their eminence but most questions about their daily lives moved out of London and Washington authorities’ daily purview, as was intended. British and American authorities continued to focus on exploiting German science and technology for their countries’ benefit, as well as denying important scientists to other countries.

Even as the attention paid to the former Farm Hall scientists in Germany diminished, Manhattan Project officials faced another challenge to their efforts to keep as much information as possible about the scientists’ detention at Farm Hall a secret, despite the fact that some general information about the detention had been revealed in January and February. This time the challenge came from the scientific director of the Alsos

260 C.F.C Spedding letter to Denis Rickett, Mar. 29, 1946, TNA: PRO FO 942/546.

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Mission, Samuel Goudsmit. In mid-March, he wrote to James Chadwick and Col. W.R.

Shuler, Groves’ chief intelligence officer, that various unfounded rumors were circulating about the detained German scientists, their wartime work, and their treatment in custody.

Goudsmit thought it was time to “release the authentic story of their fate.” Mail service would soon resume with Germany and would likely increase the rumors’ spread.

To resolve the issue he had raised, Goudsmit had written a short article. He suggested that it could be published in the journal Science or Nature, but preferred the

American Review of Scientific Instruments, since it was read only by physicists (who, presumably, were the ones interested in – or spreading – the rumors about which

Goudsmit was worried). Goudsmit asked Shuler and Chadwick for help with furnishing information that would bring the article up to date. He emphasized to Shuler that he did not advocate turning his proposed article into a press release since “this is a matter of interest to physicists only” and asked Chadwick for his help in promoting this article to

Groves.261

Goudsmit had written to the Manhattan Project in January to ask for access to the reports that he had collected during his work with the Alsos Mission, which suggested that he was already planning his counteroffensive (or offensive, as the case might be) against rumors about the Alsos Mission and Farm Hall. Groves’ staff had turned down his request, noting that the reports were War Department property and were not going to be released.262

261 S.A. Goudsmit letter to James Chadwick, Mar. 12, 1946, CAC, CHAD IV/12/2; S.A. Goudmit letter to W.R. Shuler, Mar. 12, 1946; 68.10 – Personnel; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 262 Charles F. Clarke Jr. to S.A. Goudsmit, Jan. 24, 1946; 32.7002: Germany – Alsos Mission – Administrative Matters (1940-1945); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany;

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Intelligence officials in Groves’ office did not react favorably to Goudsmit’s proposal in March. One commented that the rumors were “only in Goudsmit’s mind. I have heard and read of none.” He advocated “against any further reference on the subject if it can be avoided.” The former Farm Hall scientists were now the British commander’s responsibility, so “Goudsmit should now step out of the picture – gracefully.” Another member of Groves’ staff added that he saw the proposal as “a crass attempt of Goudsmit to pick up full publicity.”263

The quick reply to Goudsmit was polite but firm. Manhattan Project officials had not heard any of the rumors that Goudsmit had mentioned and did not believe that any of the incorrect stories that had been circulated during the war were worth worrying about.

More to the point, they believed “that the sooner this whole matter is forgotten the better.” The Manhattan Project was no longer directly involved in the matter of the scientists, except in their role in collecting intelligence on German nuclear physics. They added that “an airing of the subject to which you refer would stir up trouble and result in really serious unfounded criticism of innocent people” and asked Goudsmit to “continue to refrain from publicly discussing the issue.”264

A week later, Shuler wrote again to Goudsmit to return some papers that

Goudsmit had left at his office. He reiterated that “[w]e wish you to know that your interest in this matter is much appreciated” but that Manhattan Project officials did not consider an article appropriate at this time. However, Shuler asked Goudsmit for a copy

Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 263 Notes by David Gattiker and C.F. Clarke, Mar. 14, 1946; 68.10 – Personnel; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 264 W.R. Shuler draft letter to S.A. Goudsmit, Mar. 14, 1946; 68.10 – Personnel; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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of his draft article “so that we will have it on hand in the event that it becomes advantageous to use.”265

Goudsmit met with Chadwick after receiving the negative reply from Groves’ office. He continued to argue that “many American scientists consider that the detention of the German physicists was quite unnecessary, that they were badly treated, that their families were left to starve, and so on.” If this were true, Chadwick considered “the whole procedure…a disgraceful scandal.” Per Goudsmit, many American scientists

“appear to be anxious to give force to their opinions and to show their sympathy for the

German scientists by inviting them to this country [the US] and by offering them good posts in universities.” Neither Tube Alloys or Manhattan Project officials wanted that to happen.

Chadwick was concerned that “[w]e may very easily have similar troubles in

England” and suggested to Rickett that Goudsmit was “right in suggesting that we ought to publish the facts.” Chadwick thought that a British decision to publish Goudsmit’s article could be made independently of Groves. From his post in Washington, it appeared

“that Goudsmit’s proposal would do a great deal of good and would put an end to the ugly rumours which must be circulating in England.”266

By the time that Shuler wrote a second time to Goudsmit and Chadwick began to advocate Goudsmit’s case with British officials in London, Goudsmit had already published an article about the German wartime atomic research, albeit without reference to the scientists’ detention at Farm Hall. This article in the March 15, 1946 issue of the

265 W.R. Shuler letter to S.A. Goudsmit, Mar. 21, 1946; 68.10 – Personnel; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 266 James Chadwick letter to Denis Rickett, Mar. 21, 1946, CAC, CHAD IV/12/2.

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Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists expanded upon the testimony that Goudsmit had given before the Senate’s Special Committee on Atomic Energy on December 6, 1945. At that time, he had stated that the German program “had accomplished nothing,” not having advanced beyond the laboratory stage, and added the dig that “[t]heir scientists simply lacked the vision of our scientists.” He also stated that the US had been as ignorant of the

Germans’ wartime research as the Germans had been of the Manhattan Project until a year ago (thus, until the Strasbourg investigations in November and December 1944 – not after the German scientists were detained in April, as the Manhattan Project claimed in the spring of 1946 to justify the scientists’ detention at Farm Hall). Goudsmit’s March

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists article expanded upon the administrative and scientific reasons that he thought that Germany’s research had paled in comparison to the Anglo-

American effort.267

Manhattan Project officials were favorably impressed with the history that

Goudsmit gave of the German atomic project and recommended that the Bulletin article be saved for future reference. One member of Groves’ staff wrote that Goudsmit had done the Manhattan Project a service “by showing the value of our…organization.” He

267 S. A. Goudsmit, “How Germany Lost the Race,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 1, no. 7 (March 15, 1946): 4-5. Manhattan Project officials received a copy of the article ten days after it was published. John H. Mahoney to William R. Shuler, re: “Foreign Intelligence Information Contained in 15 March 1946 Edition Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,” Mar. 25, 1946; 32.22-1 Germany – Research – TA (1943-June 1946); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. The article is available online through the Niels Bohr Library & Archives of the American Institute of Physics, http://www.aip.org/history/nbl/collections/goudsmit/colls/box43/box43f69.html. Associated Press, “Germans Declared Far Behind on Bomb,” The New York Times, December 7, 1945, 4, accessed August 20, 2012 via ProQuest Historical Newspapers. Makins and Rickett had discussed Goudsmit’s December testimony in their correspondence about a press release in early January. They disagreed about whether Goudsmit had testified on behalf of the War Department or as a private citizen. Denis Rickett (Cabinet Offices) telegram to Roger Makins (JSM Washington), Jan. 3, 1946, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341; Roger Makins (JSM Washington) telegram to Denis Rickett (Cabinet Offices), Jan.3, 1946, TNA: PRO CAB 126/335.

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considered it “utter stupidity to alienate one of the few friends we have among the

Atomic Scientists by calling him to task for this [article].”268

Groves’ staff did not react as favorably to a draft second article that Goudsmit sent to them in April. Without naming the Manhattan Project, the Alsos Mission, or

Farm Hall, Goudsmit’s draft article revealed much more information about the German scientists’ detention at Farm Hall than Manhattan Project officials wanted. Goudsmit began the article by emphasizing that “there are those who still cannot reconcile the fact of Allied wartime achievements in the nuclear field with the legend of German superiority in the sciences” (emphasis Goudsmit’s). In Strasbourg, the investigators had gained “definite proof” of the “German failure to achieve any progress in nuclear research of military significance.” However, investigations had continued since “some

Allied scientists [were] unwilling to believe that German physics had been outdone.”

He named the four scientists who had been taken from Strasbourg and the ten who had been detained at Farm Hall, in addition to other German scientists who had been investigated. The ten scientists captured in Hechingen, Bavaria, and Hamburg had been

“sent to sit out the war in England” and were now back in Germany.

Groves’ staff who commented on the article were not impressed with Goudsmit’s motives for writing it. One wrote that he could not understand Goudsmit’s purpose for writing the piece: “I can’t for the life of me see how this would beat MUD-SLINGERS to the draw. In the first place, WHY should anyone WANT to sling mud? On what ground? Not on any ground that I can see and I don’t see that this letter [short article] would be a rebuttal.” Moreover, Goudsmit had wanted to publicize this “petit histoire”

268 Comments on Goudsmit’s BAS article by Lowenhaupt and Ryan (?), May 11, 1945; 32.22-1 Germany – Research – TA (1943-June 1946); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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for some time and had already been rebuffed. Another member of Groves’ staff speculated that Goudsmit was worried what the German scientists might say about his role in the Alsos Mission: “[I]s Goudsmit afraid that these ‘Guests’ are going to write to

American friends and spill the beans some time? Well…they could do that now.”

If Goudsmit’s article were published, Groves’ staff thought that questions would be raised about why the guests had been “whisked away.” Such questions would lead to the “obvious result” of complicating international relations because “we simply could not be convincing if we said, by way of explanation, that 1) we wanted to know how along on TA the Germans were; or 2) because we feared Germany on the score of A-bombs.”

Since they could not offer “any reasonable explanation, people would be certain to accuse us of only ONE thing – which would be the RIGHT answer – that we were interested in keeping The Guests from going over to other camps.” Thus, even some members of

Groves’ staff recognized that protestations that the scientists had been detained for intelligence purposes had little ground and that geopolitics had been the more important justification for capturing this particular group of German scientists. Furthermore,

“[a]ccording to studies made by this office, the detention of German scientists…[was] not strictly in accordance with the Geneva Convention even though the scientists were very well treated.” No one in Groves’ office wanted to have this issue pursued.

Drawing attention to the removal of scientists from Germany by American and

British officials could leave the US and UK open to criticism from “so-called righteous and Communist standard bearers – a criticism which we would be asking for.” British and American officials had objected to the Soviet removal of reparations from its occupation zone and did not want to be caught undertaking similar schemes. Both the

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Farm Hall detention and the ongoing remained Top Secret and

Manhattan Project officials intended to keep them that way. The final word in late May was the instruction to “[l]et the paper die in the file.”269

Officials in London soon reached the same conclusion. Rickett agreed with

Chadwick that the British could make their decision about this topic independently of

Groves. However, he was “inclined to think…that we have sufficiently guarded against the possibility of ugly rumors circulating here.” A number of British scientists, especially the members of the Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy and officers of the

Royal Society, “are fully aware of the true facts.” Patrick Blackett had visited Farm Hall and some of the scientists had attended “a small informal meeting” with some Fellows of the Royal Society.270

Chadwick was more generous than Manhattan Project staff in his reply to

Goudsmit, writing that he was not convinced that the “precautions” against rumors in the

UK, which consisted of Darwin and Blackett’s respective visits to Farm Hall, plus the meeting with Fellows of the Royal Society, would prevent the circulation of “any damaging tales or rumours [in England] about the treatment of these Germans.” Officials in London would continue to monitor the situation and asked to see Goudsmit’s article in case it proved useful to publish in the future. However, Goudsmit’s article did not make it out of British files either.271

269 Comments on Goudsmit’s manuscript (“German Nuclear Physicists”) by Mattina, Earl Ryan, Free, May 28-29, 1946; 68.10 – Personnel; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 270 Denis Rickett letter to James Chadwick, Apr. 15, 1946, CAC, CHAD IV/12/2. 271 James Chadwick letter to Samuel Goudsmit, Apr. 23, 1946; Samuel Goudsmit letter to James Chadwick (with attached list of German nuclear physicists and note on “German Nuclear Physicists” Apr. 1946), May 10, 1946, CAC, CHAD IV/12/2. Neither British nor American officials mentioned Sir Charles Frank’s November visit to Farm Hall.

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Goudsmit continued with his own efforts to publicize his argument about German science in late 1946. His low opinion of the German scientists’ wartime research was mentioned in a November Washington Post article. His book, Alsos, was published in

1947. Goudsmit wrote that the group of German scientists had been detained in England, although he did not name Farm Hall. He quoted from the scientists’ reactions to the news of the bombing of Hiroshima, an indication that the scientists’ conversations had been monitored. He concluded his section about Farm Hall with his argument that the German scientists had not understood the difference between a nuclear pile (a self-sustaining reaction) and a nuclear bomb (an explosive reaction) and, thus, that the German scientists were far behind their Allied colleagues.272

By the time Manhattan Project and British officials ended their discussions about

Goudsmit in late May 1946, the former Farm Hall scientists occupied little of their time and attention. (The exception to this rule will be discussed in the last section.) The scientists were still mentioned occasionally in British and American files but these references typically had to do with efforts to implement policies about the broader issues which affected all German scientists. In late May, British occupation officials a prepared short response to a Parliamentary Question about the types of research that Hahn and

Heisenberg were conducting and the conditions that had been imposed on their lives and research in Germany. They reported that the scientists were “doing very little in

Göttingen at all.” The scientists had cramped quarters at the AVA and were trying to sort out their personal affairs and collect personal belongings from other parts of Germany,

272 United Press, “Nazi ‘A-Bomb’ Was a Fluke, Physicist Says,” Washington Post, November 13, 1946, accessed August 20, 2012 via ProQuest Historical Newspapers. Goudsmit, Alsos, 132-139. Heisenberg disputed this argument in his public conversation with Goudsmit during the next few years. See page 11 of the Introduction.

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not doing research. Heisenberg’s family was still in the American occupation zone, although he was trying to make arrangements to bring them to Göttingen. There were still many decisions yet to be made by British officials about the scientists’ future research. British officials had “assumed an obligation to the U.S. authorities to do everything possible (short of putting them under restraint) to keep these men in the

British Zone. This includes finding congenial work for them. It is hoped to settle both these men (and others) permanently at Göttingen….[However, no] facilities or apparatus for any research work” yet existed.273

From February and March 1946 onward, American and British officials paid increasing attention to controlling and exploiting German science within their occupation zones. One reason for this increased attention to getting “intellectual reparations” from

Germany was the deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union. British and American officials were increasingly doubtful about long-term cooperation with their Soviet allies.

As such, they continued efforts to control scientists in their occupation zones.

Although special decisions were made about the Farm Hall scientists upon their return to

Germany, their treatment gradually came in line with how other German scientists were treated. On May 7, the Allied Control Authority Control Council Law No. 25 went into effect. Applied nuclear physics was the first topic on the list of fields that were prohibited. Some American officials acknowledged that there was no definite line between theoretical and applied science, a distinction that might be especially difficult to ascertain for nuclear physics. In addition to the laws that governed their research,

German scientists were limited by more practical concerns: the shortage of laboratory

273 Draft reply for Parliamentary Question for answer on Monday, 20th May, 1946, n.d., TNA: PRO FO 938/3.

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resources, including both locations and equipment, continued to prevent many scientists from resuming their research even after their fields had been approved by Law 25. Most

German universities and Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes had been damaged during the war.

The time it took to find a suitable location for the Farm Hall scientists in the British zone and the subsequent difficulty of assembling laboratories for the scientists at Göttingen were examples of this.274

The complement to efforts to control German science and technology were efforts to investigate and categorize (for both supervision and possible future exploitation)

German scientists and their research. The US Military Government in Germany ran the

Field Information Agency, Technical (FIAT). FIAT’s purpose was “to funnel back to the

US the discoveries of contemporary German research as carried on in the US Zone of

Germany.” The committee was composed of German and American scientists. Walther

Bothe, who had been investigated but not detained by the Alsos Mission in March 1945, was selected to oversee reports about German nuclear physics. His selection based on scientific eminence reaffirmed that the Alsos Mission had been motivated by denial more than learning in selecting which German scientists to detain.275

274 Lyall E. Johnson to R.H. Free, re: “Germany – Control of Scientific Research,” Jun. 25, 1946; To: Hdqtrs – Washington (1 Jan. 46 to 30 Jun. 46); General Correspondence, 1944-1947; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the London (England) Liaison Office; RG 77, NACP. Office of the Deputy Military Governor for Germany, distribution of “Allied Control Authority Control Council Law No. 25: Law on Control of Scientific Research,” 3 May 1946, TNA: PRO FO 1031/17. Edgar P. Dean to R.H. Free, re: “Status of Research in Germany,” Jul. 19, 1946; and Edgar P. Dean to Richard H. Free, re: “Resumption of Research for Atomic Power: Germany,” Aug. 6, 1946; Manhattan Engineer District; General Correspondence, 1944-1947; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Liaison Office; RG 77; NACP. Canfield Hadlock to W.R. Shuler, re: “Status of Nuclear Energy in Situation in Germany,” Sept. 10, 1946; 32.60-2 Germany – Summary Reports (1945-1946); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 275 Dean to Shuler, Mar. 18, 1946; Outgoing Messages from Military Attaché, London, Jan. 1946-Jul. 1947; General Correspondence, 1944-1947; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Liaison Office; RG 77; NACP. Edgar P. Dean to W.R. Shuler, re: “FIAT’s Scientific Committee,” Mar. 23, 1946; To: Hdqtrs – Washington (1 Jan. 46 to 30 Jun. 46); General Correspondence, 1944-1947;

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By mid-April, efforts were underway for FIAT to review physics research conducted in Germany during the past five years. Bothe suggested the major topics that the review should cover. Among the reviewers that he recommended for these fields were four Farm Hall scientists: Heisenberg, von Weizsäcker, Gerlach, and Harteck. This appears to be the first work that these scientists undertook after their return to

Germany.276

The US Military Government and the Manhattan Project’s London office soon came to an agreement that all FIAT reports about sensitive nuclear science topics would be vetted before they were published. The Manhattan Project’s London office would receive copies of the relevant reports as part of their ongoing efforts to collect intelligence about German nuclear research. The Manhattan Project no longer had the intelligence channels in Europe that it had had during the war, so they sought other ways to keep abreast of developments in German research (as well as research by other countries, especially the Soviet Union277). Part of this effort was to monitor what

German scientists were doing in Germany and part of it was to learn about German scientists who had gone to work in other countries. Manhattan Project officials remained especially concerned about German scientists who were working – willingly or otherwise

– in the Soviet Union. They kept track of rumors about German scientists who were in

Argentina as well as an offer for Heisenberg to travel there. In addition, they stayed informed about French atomic research as best they could, especially as their intelligence

Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the London (England) Liaison Office; RG 77, NACP. 276 Ralph M. Osborne (FIAT) to ACS, G-2, European Theater, re: “Scientific Articles in the Field of Physics,” Apr. 17, 1946; 32.22-1 Germany – Research – TA (1943-June 1946); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. 277 See Chapter 2 (“Lightning Strikes: The Soviet Union, 1945-53”) of Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 62- 104.

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sources indicated that German physicist Wolfgang Gentner and other German scientists were working for the French at Tailfingen.278

Throughout all of this, British officials continued to push for ongoing cooperation with their American counterparts on nuclear research and control. Following the

Washington Declaration after President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee, and Canadian

Prime Mackenzie King met in Washington in November 1945, British officials had hoped to continue cooperation in nuclear science affairs with the US and advocated the drafting of an agreement to replace the 1943 Quebec Agreement. American officials were less keen about this relationship, since the British would gain far more from it in terms of scientific and technical knowledge than they would. The Atomic Energy Act of

1946 (also known as the McMahon Act) was signed by President Harry S Truman on

278 Lyall E. Johnson to W.R. Shuler, “Scientific Articles in the Field of Physics – Germany,” Apr. 29, 1946; Richard H. Free to E.P. Dean, re: “Scientific Articles in the Field of Physics – Germany,” May 14, 1946; 32.22-1 Germany – Research – TA (1943-June 1946); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944- 46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Edgar P. Dean to Richard H. Free, re: “Reports of MED Interest from the FIAT Scientific Committee,” Jun. 7, 1946; 32.23-2 Germany: Research – Tech. Papers (1946); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Edgar P. Dean to W.R. Shuler, re: “Report Prepared for General Sibert,” Mar. 21 1946 (including attachment “Present Mission in Germany re Atomic Energy,” Mar. 19, 1946); 32.7002-1 Germany: Alsos Mission – Administrative Matters (1940-1945); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Edgar P. Dean to R.H. Free, re: “Forced Isolation of German Scientists in Russia,” Aug. 6, 1946; Manhattan Engineer District; General Correspondence, 1944-1947; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Liaison Office; RG 77; NACP. US Military Attaché London to War Dept (G-2), Sept. 15, 1946; US Military Attaché Paris (Tate) to War Dept (G-2), Sept. 23, 1946; US Military Attaché Paris (Tate) to War Dept (G-2), Dec. 6, 1946; Incoming and Outgoing Cables, Jan. 46-Jul. 15, 1946; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Edgar P. Dean to Richard H. Free, re: “Political Views of French Scientists,” Jun. 26, 1946; To: Hdqtrs – Washington (1 Jan. 46 to 30 Jun. 46); General Correspondence, 1944-1947; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the London (England) Liaison Office; RG 77, NACP. Extract from “Interim Report for 1st Sept 1946. Survey over Intelligence Aspects of Atomic Energy,” Sept. 1, 1946; 32.60-2 Germany – Summary Reports (1945-1946); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. US Military Attaché Rio de Janeiro to War Dept (G-2), Mar. 18, 1946; Incoming and Outgoing Cables, Jan. 46-Jul. 15, 1946; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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August 1, 1946. This legislation “categorically denied” that Britain would receive “the protection of the bombs and a share in the knowledge” gained via joint wartime atomic research.279 Nonetheless, combined efforts in governing Germany continued, with the two countries moving ahead with plans to combine their occupation zones in early

1947.280

The final substantive issue about the former Farm Hall scientists that occupied

British and American attention in 1946 was whether Hahn would be allowed to travel to

Stockholm to collect his Nobel Prize. Questions about Hahn’s trip were tied to broader issues about how British officials intended to treat scientists within their occupation zone, continued efforts by British officials to coordinate their policy about the former Farm

Hall scientists with Manhattan Project officials, and ongoing concerns about negative publicity. In December 1945, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin’s office had confirmed the decision not to let Hahn travel to Sweden at that time.

British officials resumed their discussion about Hahn’s trip again at the end of

March 1946. Royal Society President Sir Henry Dale wrote to the Lord President of the

Privy Council, Herbert Morrison, to advocate for Hahn’s trip to Stockholm. Staff in the

Control Office for Germany and Austria asked Morrison’s office about this correspondence. The Control Office had hoped that the question of Hahn’s trip would be decided by the new Scientific Advisory Committee for Germany, but the committee’s

279 Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Vol. 1, 49. 280 Clement Attlee (Cabinet Offices) telegram to Lord Halifax and Henry Maitland Wilson (JSM Washington), Mar. 6, 1946, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341; Lord Halifax and Henry Maitland Wilson (JSM Washington) to Clement Attlee (Cabinet Offices), Mar. 8, 1946, TNA: PRO CAB 126/335.

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formation had been delayed. As such, the Control Office planned to make the “necessary arrangements” for Hahn’s trip.281

Morrison’s staff agreed that it would be best to go ahead with plans without waiting for the Scientific Advisory Committee’s formation. They were “certain that all scientists” wanted Hahn to be allowed to collect his prize. However, if anyone

“unexpectedly objected to Hahn going,” Morrison’s staff asked that they be informed before telling Dale. Refusing to allow Hahn to formally receive his prize “would be the sort of thing that might mobilise the scientific world in protest.” This was another way the scientists’ detention at Farm Hall and ongoing supervision in Germany could have negative impacts on the British. British scientists might understand why Hahn had not been allowed to travel to Stockholm while he was in captivity but the refusal for his trip at this point could backfire by rallying British scientists to Hahn’s cause and, thus, in opposition to how German scientists were treated in the British occupation zone.282

At about the same time, Brig. C.F.C. Spedding, of the Control Commission’s

Research Branch, wrote to Rickett to ask for permission for Hahn to visit Frankfurt,

Stockholm, and Tailfingen. Rickett consulted with Perrin and Dean, and replied that

Hahn’s trip to the American zone “on family affairs” was fine. A trip to Stockholm was not assured. Officials in London were not certain that Hahn was required to collect his prize in person. The third request – that Hahn be allowed to make occasion visits to his

Tailfingen institute in the French occupation zone – was the “most difficult.” British and

American officials remained concerned that France would disrupt their efforts to control the Farm Hall scientists and contain their knowledge. As a condition for agreeing to

281 A. Chilcott letter to M.T. Flett, Mar. 25, 1946, TNA: PRO FO 942/546. 282 M.T. Flett letter to Chilcott, Apr. 1, 1946, TNA: PRO FO 942/546.

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repatriate the Farm Hall scientists, American officials had stipulated in November 1945 that the scientists “were to be kept in the British Zone and that everything possible was to be done to prevent them from going outside it.” Rickett wrote that “[n]o great harm” might come of one or two visits to the French zone but British officials did not want to find themselves “in the position where Hahn was constantly coming and going between the two Zones” as it would violate the policy to which the British and Americans had agreed.283

Rickett’s response showed that the policy of denying the Farm Hall scientists to other countries – especially the French – was still very much in force. It had been almost a year since six of the German scientists had been spirited out of the soon-to-be French occupation zone. Rickett was not concerned that “Hahn might take matters into his own hands and go to the French zone,” since Hahn had asked for assurances that he would be allowed to return to Göttingen. That left open the possibility that the French might not allow Hahn to leave their zone or that by continuing to direct the institute in Tailfingen

Hahn would contribute to French research. Manhattan Project and Tube Alloys officials remained concerned about French nuclear research and the political leanings of key

French nuclear scientists. Negotiations with France in the ongoing Council of Foreign

Ministers meetings had also been problematic, which did reinforced American and

British suspicions about French motives vis-à-vis Germany and the Soviet Union.

Spedding’s reply suggested that occasional visits to the French zone, perhaps quarterly, should be granted to Hahn. His scientific adviser, Fraser, would soon be in

London and they could discuss the assumptions that underlay this recommendation. As

283 Denis Rickett to C.F.C. Spedding, Mar. 26, 1946, TNA: PRO FO 942/546. In this cable, Rickett also addressed the proposal that Max von Laue might be “bartered” to the French for Heisenberg’s research apparatus.

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to Stockholm, Heisenberg had told Spedding that Nobel Prize winners needed to collect their awards in person. The Royal Society would be able to verify this.284

On April 15, a meeting was held at the War Cabinet Office to discuss issues related to scientists in the British occupation zone. Spedding’s scientific adviser, Fraser, reported to Rickett, Perrin, Welsh, and Dean. The group discussed several issues but only the question about Hahn was referred to Washington. The group tentatively agreed that Hahn should be allowed to travel to Stockholm to collect his prize in the near future, perhaps in June. One or two British Control Commission officials would accompany him since he would “fly in an official British plane but in reality to act as a security escort.”

In making this decision, the group aimed to treat Hahn fairly while also avoiding negative publicity. They declared:

a. Hahn has won a very great prize. Granted that conditions of security can be met, he should be allowed to go to Stockholm and receive it. b. If he is not allowed to be present and receive his award with the other 1945 Prize winners, embarrassing questions will be asked. Scientists in both the US and UK will note his absence and kick up no little stir. c. If deferment is requested officially in Hahn’s case, scientists will still kick up a fuss. At any rate, the group felt deferment was no solution whatever. Hahn either goes this summer or doesn’t go at all.

Hahn’s Nobel Prize award, not to mention his detention at Farm Hall, were exceptional events that needed to be treated as such.

The group also aimed to begin enforcing the consistent treatment of the former

Farm Hall scientists in terms of the travel regulations. The officials argued that the

Control Commission had been too liberal in granting requests by the former Farm Hall scientists for travel within Germany. When Fraser returned to Germany, he would inform the scientists that they had to abide by the “current travel regulations [which]

284 C.F.C. Spedding letter to Denis Rickett, Mar. 29, 1946, TNA: PRO FO 942/546.

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make it almost impossible for Germans to travel from Zone to Zone.” Any requests otherwise would have to be referred to London. The group at the War Cabinet Office hoped that the simultaneous announcement of this policy and the statement that Hahn could travel to Sweden would “reveal our policy as logical and intelligent.” The scientists were now “ordinary Germans” and would have to abide by current regulations.

However, “where something really important is at stake – [such as] receiving a Nobel

Prize – our policy is liberal.” This was yet another effort to make the scientists’ detention at Farm Hall a non-issue. The scientists had received special treatment after their return to Germany, a tacit acknowledgement that they warranted special consideration after their long involuntary confinement. Such treatment was a form of maintaining control over the group and preventing them from posing a security risk within (or outside) Germany.

However, normal occupation rules were now deemed sufficient to accomplish this task.

Prime Minister Clement Attlee’s office unofficially approved this decision about

Hahn. The group who met at the War Cabinet Office “asked that the case be presented to

General Groves for final decision.” With this request, British officials continued to coordinate their treatment of the former Farm Hall scientists with their Manhattan Project counterparts.285

In early May, Groves’ approved for Hahn’s trip, provided that Hahn was prevented from contacting other scientists, had a continuous security escort, and advance publicity about his trip was avoided. Perrin soon replied that officials in London were wary of imposing restrictions on Hahn’s trip that might offend the Swedes, even though

285 Edgar P. Dean to W.R. Shuler, re: “Proposed Trip of Otto Hahn to Sweden,” Apr. 16, 1946; To: Hdqtrs – Washington (1 Jan. 46 to 30 Jun. 46); General Correspondence, 1944-1947; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the London (England) Liaison Office; RG 77, NACP.

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they agreed that “certain restrictions ought to be imposed on him while there.” This hesitation likely stemmed from Groves’ requirement that Hahn be preventing from meeting with other scientists. From the British perspective, “[t]he whole object of allowing Hahn to attend the ceremony” – to keep him, as well as other British, American, and German scientists happy – “would be defeated if we attempted to impose unreasonable restrictions which could not be enforced in practice.”286

Perrin had learned that it was not entirely necessary for Hahn to collect his prize in person, since the Swedish government would grant a dispensation if asked by the recipient. However, British and American “interests would best be served by allowing him to go as soon as possible so that the matter could be cleared up.” As such, Perrin recommended that Hahn travel to Stockholm as soon as possible. A British officer would accompany him as “counsellor” rather than escort. The trip would be short and Hahn would be discouraged – but not prohibited – from meeting Swedish colleagues, a number of whom would certainly be present for his ceremony.

If Groves would not agree to these revised conditions, Hahn should be told that he could not travel outside the British zone and should instead request a dispensation from the Nobel Committee. Perrin cautioned that this might lead to the Nobel Committee making “representations though the diplomatic channel.” This was precisely the sort of international publicity that officials in London had hoped to avoid. It would reflect poorly on them to prevent Hahn from formally receiving his Nobel Prize, and both

286 Shuler to Dean, May 7, 1946; 205.3 Cables Outgoing, Secret and Under; Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP.

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British and American officials would be called upon to explain their rationale. Groves soon agreed to the revised conditions for Hahn’s journey to Stockholm.287

While the permissions, both British and American, for Hahn to travel to

Stockholm were arranged by the beginning of July, Hahn’s trip did not occur until

December. This delay resulted from bureaucratic complications and questions about occupation policy. The first hurdle was deciding that Hahn could keep his Nobel Prize money, which otherwise should have been confiscated to pay the war debts that Germany owed to Sweden. After that, British occupation authorities had disagreements about the exchange rate for the prize money into Reichsmarks. They eventually decided that Fraser would accompany Hahn and his wife on their trip.288

Groves’ hope that there would be little press coverage about Hahn’s trip to

Stockholm in December was not entirely fulfilled. In early November, a report from

Göttingen said that British military authorities had granted Hahn permission to attend the upcoming Nobel Prize ceremony in Stockholm. Hahn was interviewed a couple of times just prior to his trip, mainly about German scientists’ wartime efforts to build nuclear weapons. Hahn maintained that “the production of atomic bombs had been impossible in

Germany.” This impossibility was the proof that he had not “handed on to the Americans the production secret of the atomic bomb after the surrender as was still frequently alleged” and that “the Nobel Prize had [not] been his Judas’s reward for treason.” When

287 Michael Perrin (Cabinet Offices) telegram to Roger Makins (JSM Washington), May 31, 1946, TNA: PRO CAB 126/341. Roger Makins letter to James Chadwick, Jun. 2, 1946; and James Chadwick (JSM Washington) telegram to Michael Perrin (Cabinet Offices), Jun. 5, 1946, CAC, CHAD IV/12/2. Groves to Dean, Jun. 6, 1946; Incoming Cables; General Correspondence, 1944-1947; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the London (England) Liaison Office; RG 77, NACP. 288 CONFOLK telegram to CONCOMB, Jul. 4, 1946; G.H. Villiers telegram to E.W. Playfair, Aug. 8, 1946; Haviland telegram to Oglander, Oct. 8, 1946; Potter telegram to Haviland, Nov. 16, 1946, TNA: PRO FO 1046/540.

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Hahn and Heisenberg were interviewed in early February, they had stressed that they had not worked to build nuclear weapons during the war but added that they did know how to do so. Hahn now skipped the latter assertion. Public opinion about the use of atomic weapons had become less positive, partly due to the publication of John Hersey’s August

1946 article about the bombing of Hiroshima for The New Yorker. The detained German scientists had also been criticized by some in Germany who thought that they had given atomic science secrets to the British and Americans during their detention. Heisenberg later continued the argument that German scientists had known how to build atomic weapons but chose not to do so.289 Hahn, at least at this time, chose not to wade into those murky waters. His award ceremony in Stockholm on December 10 went smoothly.290 With that, the last major issue that remained from the former Farm Hall scientists’ detention was ended.

…

Over the course of 1946, the Farm Hall scientists’ lives changed greatly. At the beginning of January, they were still in British custody at Farm Hall. Members of the

289 This is the historical (and historiographic) debate discussed in the Introduction to this dissertation. See pages 10-12 in the Introduction for books and articles about this controversy. 290 United Press, “Hahn Now to Get Award: German Atomic Scientist to Go to Stockholm,” The New York Times, November 3, 1946, 48, accessed August 20, 2012 via ProQuest Historical Newspapers. London’s Evening Telegraph also published an article about Hahn’s upcoming trip, although the details that it reported about Hahn’s wartime work and detention, as well as his upcoming trip, were not accurate. “Atom Scientist,” The Evening Telegraph, November 5, 1946, 3, accessed May 27, 2013 via the British Newspaper Archive. R.W. Shaw to L.E. Seeman, re: “Transmittal of Item from Daily Digest of World Broadcasts and Radio Telegraph Services,” Dec. 5, 1946; 32.60-2 Germany – Summary Reports (1945- 1946); Records of the Foreign Intelligence Section, 1944-46: Germany; Records of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the Special Liaison Branch; RG 77; NACP. Robert E. Shaw to L.E. Seeman, re: “Transmittal of Item from Daily Digest of World Broadcasts and Radio Telegraph Services,” Dec. 10, 1946; Unlabelled (Daily Digest, Jul. 1946-Jun. 1947); General Correspondence, 1944- 1947; Records of the Office of the Commanding General, Manhattan Project: Records of the London (England) Liaison Office; RG 77, NACP. Associated Press, “Monarchs Attend Nobel Prize Fetes,” The New York Times, December 11, 1946, 23; Associated Press, “Gustav Gives Nobel Awards to 5 from U.S.,” Washington Post, December 11, 1946, 5; Associated Press, “Nobel Prizes Awarded to Five U.S. Savants,” Los Angeles Times, December 11, 1946, 7, all accessed August 20, 2012 via ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

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group then spent the next one and half to two and half months in the small German town of Alswede in the British zone, where they remained under some British supervision.

Paul Harteck and Kurt Diebner then moved on to Hamburg, Walther Gerlach to Bonn, and the other seven scientists – Werner Heisenberg, Karl Wirtz, Max von Laue, Carl

Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Erich Bagge, and Horst Korsching – were sent to Göttingen.

The scientists’ British and American captors had been quite concerned that the scientists’ return to Germany would bring negative publicity to the Farm Hall detention.

Having the detention made public had the potential to disrupt their efforts to control and exploit other German scientists and technicians, as well as their alliance with France and the Soviet Union. These fears remained largely unrealized. Complications with the

USSR and France continued during 1946, but for reasons other than the German scientists’ detention at Farm Hall. American and British officials remained suspicious of

French and Soviet actions in investigating and making use of German science and technology but there was little that they could do to prevent it, aside from encouraging scientists and technicians in their occupation zones to remain there.

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Conclusion

World affairs changed greatly between late 1944, when the Alsos Mission began its direct interrogations of German nuclear scientists, and late 1946, when British and

American officials allowed Otto Hahn to collect his Nobel Prize in Stockholm a year late.

By the end of that time, the former Farm Hall scientists were no longer deemed the specific threat that they had been seen as in 1945 and early 1946. However, key fears that had motivated American and British officials to capture the German scientists in spring 1945 and detain them at Farm Hall remained: concerns about the political and military implications of the new atomic era, how the occupation of Germany could reshape that country, and whether former wartime allies would help or hinder these efforts. These issues related to the themes of control and uncertainty. What the postwar years would bring in terms of militarily-applicable science, the realignment of power in

Europe, and international geopolitics remained unknown. American and British officials worked to shape and control this new world as best as they could in order to combat the ambiguities and dangers which faced them. The detention of the ten German scientists at

Farm Hall was a product of this attempt to manage these fears and uncertainties.

In April and May 1945, the Alsos Mission captured the ten German scientists who would later be taken to Farm Hall. Alsos personnel were tasked with gaining a complete picture of German nuclear scientists’ wartime research, to be absolutely sure that no

German nuclear weapons program existed. British intelligence officials had already reached the conclusion that no significant German program existed but joined the Alsos

Mission during Operation Harborage as observers to see the main German institutes for theoretical physics. The Alsos Mission operated under strict secrecy, keeping its

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operations concealed from all but a few American and British military leaders in the

European theater of war.

This silence also extended to France and the Soviet Union. The Alsos Mission’s decisions about which German scientists to detain was based in part on the scientists’ eminence but mainly on denying important scientists to the French and, indirectly, the

Soviets. Manhattan Project officials worried that French scientists’ socialist politics, especially those of physicist Frédéric Joliot-Curie, would lead them to share information about German nuclear research with their Soviet colleagues. Alsos Mission personnel had to make a quick decision about which scientists to detain because French troops were beginning to occupy their zone in Württemberg. As a result, the selection was haphazard.

They detained not just the top scientists on their list but also two less prominent scientists and an eminent scientist who had not worked on the wartime nuclear physics project.

The Alsos Mission had investigated many other German nuclear scientists in the preceding six months but had taken only four of them for extended detention outside

Germany. Those four had been working at the University of Strasbourg, which would soon revert to French control. Thus, fears about France gaining German nuclear scientists’ knowledge – possibly for their own benefit and possibly to share with the

Soviets – was the key factor in deciding which German scientists to detain.

Once the Alsos Mission had detained the German scientists, it soon encountered difficulties in finding suitable locations to house them. Bringing the scientists to the US, either for detention or to work, was not an option. The group was held in locations controlled by the American military in France and Belgium and was overseen by a British intelligence officer. Manhattan Project officials tried to replace him with an American

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officer and, thus, keep the German scientists under sole American control. This effort proved unfeasible, as did the effort to find a location in France or Belgium where they scientists could be housed for many months – until at least autumn. Manhattan Project officials ultimately had to compromise in order to keep the scientists under the conditions

(secure, secret, and with a reasonable level of comfort) that they wanted. British officials proposed bringing the scientists to England to continue keeping the scientists in secret and in good conditions, both of which were a great challenge while operating in areas controlled by the American military and, thus, governed by rules about the treatment of

German prisoners of war. All four occupiers of Germany sought to make use of German science and technology for their respective countries’ benefit. There was competition between British and American officials about how to control the captured German nuclear scientists’ knowledge.

The scientists arrived at Farm Hall at the beginning of July 1945 where they were overseen by personnel from a British intelligence agency, the Combined Services

Detailed Interrogation Centre, that had previously focused its efforts on German and

Italian military prisoners of war. Shortly after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,

British officials began to argue that the German scientists’ detention was no longer necessary and could have negative impacts on Britain if it was continued. The scientists’ morale deteriorated the longer they were in captivity and British officials became worried that the scientists would escape to gain attention for their plight or might even commit suicide. Either option would have negative repercussions for British officials, who would have to explain – to the British public, the scientific community, and an international audience – why they had detained this group in secret. Manhattan Project officials, in

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contrast, worried that the situation in Europe and Germany was too unsettled to allow the scientists to be set free: no effective system to control atomic research was yet in place and the occupation of Germany had yet to create a new, stable, non-militaristic Germany.

France and the Soviet Union posed threats to both of these efforts. By the end of

September 1945, Manhattan Project Director Leslie Groves grudgingly agreed to the

British plan to repatriate the scientists on the condition that the group was kept under continued supervision by British occupation troops.

The British effort to get the scientists out of England encountered a setback when the commander of the British occupation forces in the British zone of Germany refused to assume responsibility for the group. Although officials in London were not concerned that these German nuclear scientists posed a threat, the commander was not as sure, especially because he had been asked to maintain close supervision of them. Over the next three months, Manhattan Project officials continued to argue that suitable conditions for releasing the scientists did not yet exist, even though Groves had agreed to this course of action. British officials began to plan for the scientists’ eventual employment, arguing that the scientists would be the least likely to pose future security risks if they were kept at work in Germany. Denying them the opportunity to resume their careers, even on non- nuclear topics, would create incentives to work on other countries’ nuclear research programs or to carry out secret work within Germany.

British officials returned the ten scientists to Germany in early January 1946, exactly six months after the group had arrived in England. The group remained under

British supervision, although to a far lesser degree than at Farm Hall. Immediately after the scientists’ repatriation, American and British officials busied themselves with

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preventing publicity about the scientists’ detention and drawing up legal justifications for keeping the scientists at Farm Hall. These efforts reflected fears that the scientists would publicly protest their detention. Such exposure could cause problems in British and

American relations with France and the Soviet Union, since the scientists’ detention partly contravened Allied efforts to impose uniform policies on Germany, especially regarding acceptable reparations. One unexpected challenge to this secrecy regime came from the Alsos Mission’s scientific director, Samuel Goudsmit, who began his efforts to discredit the work that German scientists had carried out during the war.

The concerns that had motivated the capture of the German scientists in spring

1945 had not dissipated by the end of 1946. However, these fears – about the spread of nuclear science that could lead to the development of nuclear weapons, the difficult task of pacifying and reshaping Germany, and suspicions about wartime allies, part of which would later become manifest in the Cold War – had shifted. When American and British officials captured the ten German scientists in late April and early May 1945, World War

II was still being fought in Europe and Japan. By the end of 1946, Germany and Japan had each been under occupation for well over a year. In April 1945, the Manhattan

Project had been a closely guarded secret. At the end of 1946, after public and

Congressional debate about how to control atomic science in the US, the US government prepared to transfer the Manhattan Project’s functions to a civilian-run Atomic Energy

Commission. Britain established its Atomic Energy Research Authority for both military and civilian atomic energy in January 1946. Anglo-American collaboration on nuclear weapons research, however slight, ended with the signing of the McMahon Act in August

1946 because this legislation forbid the US from sharing this research and technology

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with other countries. Britain and the US continued to bring their occupation policies for

Germany in closer concert, eventually merging their occupation zones into Bizonia in

January 1947. By late 1946, the Cold War with the Soviet Union was becoming a reality.

Even before the first atomic bomb was tested, Manhattan Project officials assumed that atomic weapons would transform international geopolitics. The German scientists’ detention at Farm Hall was an effort to protect a potentially valuable scientific, technical, and military monopoly from would-be competitors for both military and political reasons. The six-month long detention of the German scientists at Farm Hall demonstrated uncertainty about controlling the scientific ideas that undergirded the production of nuclear weapons, as well as the scientists who had such knowledge. Were nuclear scientists inherently dangerous? Manhattan Project officials argued that the answer was likely yes throughout the Farm Hall scientists’ detention. Only after the scientists were returned to Germany in 1946 did Manhattan Project officials begin to acknowledge that the scientists might prove a greater danger if they were prevented from doing above-board scientific work in the future. Occupation policy for Germany outlawed applied nuclear research and Manhattan Project officials eventually conceded that these laws should be enough to prevent these scientists from engaging in research with military applications. Farm Hall was an attempt to impose absolute control over a small group of German scientists. This method proved impractical, both for indefinitely keeping this group of scientists in check and as a possible system of control to apply to other nuclear scientists in the future.

The detention at Farm Hall also served as an attempt to gauge whether individuals who happened to be German might pose a particular threat. Were Germans inherently

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militaristic? Two world wars in less than thirty years suggested that the answer might be yes. British and American officials studied the Farm Hall reports for evidence about whether the detained scientists were intent on rebuilding a remilitarized Germany. The conclusions they reached were mixed. Most of the scientists hoped to rebuild scientific institutes in Germany, although not necessarily for warlike purposes. If German scientists could not simply be locked up, as at Farm Hall, how could they be controlled?

Occupation policies toward Germany were still being developed – and contested – at the time of the Farm Hall scientists’ capture. Continued uncertainty about the effectiveness of these policies was a key reason why Manhattan Project officials argued against the scientists’ release throughout fall 1945. The scientists’ repatriation ultimately hinged on

British insistence that the scientists not be kept in indefinite detention. British officials did not share the American assumption that they could impose absolute control over

Germany or German scientists. As a result, British officials approached the “danger” of

German science differently: they would control the areas of research that could pose the greatest threat but would otherwise allow scientific research to take its typical – and public – course.

British and American policies toward Germany and the Farm Hall scientists’ detention also related to questions about how the US and Britain could make use of

German science and technology for their own benefit. Neither country wanted these particular scientists to work for them, but the group’s detention was conducted against the background of designing programs to employ other valuable German scientists and technicians. Creating such programs necessarily involved creating systems to monitor and control these individuals in Germany, so that their knowledge might later be made

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use of by the US or Britain. The Farm Hall scientists were simultaneously unimportant and important in these efforts to exploit German science and technology for its occupiers’ benefit. Neither the US nor the UK needed these scientists’ expertise, nor could these scientists easily be brought to work in the US or UK. However, British and American officials deemed it important to deny the scientists’ knowledge to other countries, especially France and the Soviet Union. France was problematic because French scientists might reveal nuclear research secrets to the Soviets because of their shared belief in socialism or threaten to reveal this information to the Soviets in order to bully their way into the Manhattan Project.291

The Farm Hall detention was in part a Cold War story, with fears of communism applying to France and not just the Soviet Union. The scientists’ capture was motivated by fears that the French would other gain control of the scientists – concerns that were justified by later French investigations in Württemberg. The scientists’ release was delayed because of the difficulty of finding locations in Germany to house the group where the scientists would neither be tempted to work for the French or Soviets nor be at risk of kidnapping by these countries’ security or scientific personnel. Over the course of the scientists’ detention at Farm Hall, American and British concerns about Soviet transgressions against German scientists gradually overshadowed their fears about the

French. However, difficulties with France persisted. Within just a few years, these fears about the Soviet Union would become recognized as the Cold War. France did not firmly align with British and American policies in Germany until after the Berlin Blockade in

1948-49.

291 Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 132, 135.

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Concerns about international relations with France and the Soviet Union were a key reason why British and American officials had worried about the scientists’ return to

Germany. If the detention became public knowledge, it could draw negative attention to their decision to capture the scientists in spring 1945 and keep them in secret for more than eight months. These fears went largely unrealized, partly because British and

American officials worked hard to prevent publicity about the scientists’ time at Farm

Hall. There turned out to be little danger that a challenge to the scientists’ detention would come from within Germany, since no German government existed and scientific organizations were still in disarray. The scientists did little to publicly challenge their detention at Farm Hall, in part because of rumors that they had given atomic science secrets to American and British officials. However, British and American officials remained wary of how opinion – both among the general public and the scientific community – in the US and Britain might perceive the detention, as well as how French and Soviet officials might challenge Anglo-American actions in secretly investigating and capturing German scientists. They were less concerned about German public opinion, but an outcry among German scientists about the detention could have ripple effects within the British and American scientific communities.

During and after the Farm Hall detention, Manhattan Project officials walked a fine line between emphasizing the potential danger that wartime German atomic research had posed during the war (to justify their actions in secretly investigating and detaining the German scientists) and might pose in the future (to justify their ongoing control efforts), while also downplaying what German atomic scientists had actually accomplished via their wartime research and what they knew about atomic physics,

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chemistry, and technology. Too much emphasis on the danger posed by German research could call into question their decision to allow German scientists to resume their work after the war, even on topics not related to atomic weapons. Too much emphasis on

German scientists’ deficient knowledge about the physics of atomic weapons and their lack of progress on atomic energy production during the war could call into question why it had taken Manhattan Project intelligence investigations so long to realize that fact and why the British and Americans had decided to seize the German scientists and then detain them at Farm Hall for six months.

This dissertation has demonstrated that the Farm Hall detention was tied to broad political and military considerations during the years that marked the end of World War

II, the dawn of the nuclear age, and the beginning of the Cold War. The scientists’ detention had the potential to negatively affect these areas if it was not handled well. As a result, British and American officials treated the detention – and its potential negative repercussions – seriously. The American and British effort to control the German scientists through their detention at Farm Hall was successful in that it kept the scientists and their knowledge under British and American jurisdiction, even after the scientists were repatriated. American and British officials tightly controlled information about the scientists’ detention because they worried that information could cause problems in their international relations. Understanding how British and American officials managed, debated, and interpreted the Farm Hall detention helps us comprehend how these officials perceived the dangers with which they were faced and the options they had for controlling this new, uncertain world.

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The story of the Farm Hall detention, as told in this dissertation, contributes to the historiography of the early atomic era, the postwar occupation of Germany, and the transformation of World War II alliances into the Cold War. Until now, Farm Hall has been written about in two ways: the first is as an outgrowth of the Alsos Mission, the foreign intelligence investigation arm of the Manhattan Project.292 Both of these areas focus on Farm Hall in relation to scientific debates; this dissertation instead ties the Farm

Hall detention to important political issues of the time. Of all the German nuclear scientists whom they interrogated, Alsos personnel took only fourteen scientists out of

Germany for extended detentions. Ten of those men were held at Farm Hall.293 This dissertation shows that this selection prioritized the denial of the Farm Hall scientists

(and the four German scientists who were captured at the University of Strasbourg) to

France as much (if not sometimes more) than investigating German nuclear research.

The Farm Hall detention was, thus, not simply the logical result of the Alsos Mission’s efforts to fully investigate German scientists’ wartime nuclear research but also part of a broader effort by Manhattan Project officials to exert international control over atomic research.

The second area of historiography in which Farm Hall has previously been written about is the decades-long debate about whether German scientists failed to build a bomb because of a lack of knowledge or out of deliberate choice. This dissertation does not engage in that controversy. The Alsos Mission’s scientific director, Samuel Goudsmit, began this written debate with his March 1946 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists article.

Werner Heisenberg protested Goudsmit’s accusations of incompetence and the two

292 Goudsmit, Alsos; Groves, Now It Can Be Told; Norris, Racing for the Bomb; Richelson, Spying on the Bomb. 293 The other four were held in the US.

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scientists exchanged further written words on the subject.294 In the years that followed, these debates continued, primarily by individuals with connections to the Alsos Mission or German nuclear scientists.295

In contrast, this dissertation instead demonstrates Farm Hall’s connection to issues that had broader political resonance at the time. The scientists’ detention at Farm

Hall was not only part of Manhattan Project attempts to exert control over atomic scientists outside of the US, but also an demonstration of the priority of denying information about atomic research to France and the Soviet Union. Questions about whether the Farm Hall scientists were inherently dangerous because of their knowledge, not to mention their German identity, paralleled other questions about how to control and reshape Germany during its occupation. The Farm Hall detention provides another example of the move from wartime alliances into a Cold War dynamic. The British-

American relationship gradually shifted as the US became the stronger power but the two countries remained allies, while the alliance with the Soviet Union gradually unraveled.

France was somewhat of a wild card in this process, and British and American officials approached Farm Hall with the goal of circumventing French challenges to their superiority in atomic affairs.

This dissertation complements existing scholarship about the occupation of

Germany after World War II.296 The Farm Hall detention was part of broader efforts to

294 Goudsmit, “How Germany Lost the Race”; Goudsmit, Alsos; Heisenberg, “Über die Arbeiten zur technischen Ausnutzung der Atomkernenergie in Deutschland”; Heisenberg, “Research in Germany on the Technical Application of Atomic Energy”; Goudsmit, “Heisenberg on the German Nuclear Power Project.” 295 Beyerchen, Scientists under Hitler; Cassidy, Uncertainty; Hahn, My Life; Heisenberg, Inner Exile; Heisenberg, Physics and Beyond; Jungk, Brighter Than a Thousand Suns; Kaempffert, “Nazis Spurned Idea of an Atomic Bomb”; von Laue, “Die Kriegstätigkeit der deutschen Physiker”; Morrison, “Alsos: The Story of German Scientists.” 296 Bessel, Germany 1945; Deighton, Britain and the First Cold War; Deighton, The Impossible Peace; Eisenberg, Drawing the Line; Farquharson, “Essential Decision”; Foschepoth, “British Interests in the

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control and reshape Germany based on the goals of its occupiers. Other scholars have argued that Britain was the first of the occupiers to decide to rebuild its zone in Germany.

This history of Farm Hall reinforces that conclusion. British officials had to secure

American agreement to return the Farm Hall scientists to Germany, as well as to effect their broader economic goals in occupied Germany, but they remained the main source of movement toward these goals.297

This history of Farm Hall also reinforces the conclusions reached by other scholars who have studied the treatment of science in occupied Germany.298 The secrecy with which American and British officials treated Farm Hall – even after the scientists’ detention became nominally public in early 1946 – was part of the competition for

German scientific and technical resources that began before the war in Europe was over.

Neither British nor American officials wanted the Farm Hall detention to receive attention because of the potential that such publicity could disrupt their efforts to exploit other scientists and technicians in their occupation zones, either by making other German scientists unwilling to work for or with them, or by creating tensions among the four occupying powers. The Farm Hall detention fits into the effort to collect “intellectual reparations” from Germany.299

Division of Germany after the Second World War,”; Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany; Meehan, A Strange Enemy People; Naimark, The Russians in Germany; Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin; Turner, Reconstruction in Post-War Germany; Watt, Britain Looks to Germany; Willis, The French in Germany. 297 Deighton, Impossible Peace; Farquharson, “Essential Decision”; Eisenberg, Drawing the Line. 298 Gimbel, Science, Technology, and Reparations; Cassidy, “Controlling German Science, I” and “Controlling German Science II”; Judt and Ciesla, Technology Transfer out of Germany after 1945; Maddrell, Spying on Science. 299 Gimbel, Science, Technology, and Reparations.

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The history of Farm Hall offers a contrast to scholarship about Project Paperclip, the American effort to bring German rocket scientists to work in the US.300 While the US worked to make use of the knowledge of scientists such as Wernher von Braun for

American benefit, the Farm Hall scientists were returned to Germany and eventually allowed to resume careers, albeit on topics other than nuclear science. As such, the Farm

Hall detention was an antecedent to efforts to rebuild scientific research in Germany and reveals how British and American officials approached the issue of the revitalization of science in Germany.301 The British and American debates about the Farm Hall scientists during their detention shows the uncertainty about how the German occupation should be conducted and what policies would best reshape Germany, as well as the ongoing effort to deny these scientists to French or Soviet research programs.

Finally, this dissertation contributes to the history of the early postwar period.302

It complements other works which have analyzed how Britain and the US worked out a new partnership during the transition from World War II allies to Cold War allies.

Britain was the junior partner in this collaboration but still retained influence. This dissertation makes a new contribution in showing how Farm Hall came under the supervision of the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre, a wartime British intelligence organization.303

300 Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy; Hunt, Secret Agenda; Lasby, Project Paperclip; Bar-Zohar, The Hunt for German Scientists. 301 Beyerchen, “German Scientists and Research Institutions in Allied Occupation Policy”; Hentschel, The Mental Aftermath; Kiko and Schmidt-Rohr, Max-Planck-Institut für Kernphysik; Krige, American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe; Oexle, The British Roots of the Max- Planck-Gesellschaft; Sime, Otto Hahn und die Max-Planck-Gesellschaft; Walker, German National Socialism. 302 Dobbs, Six Months in 1945; Fenby, Alliance; LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War; Gaddis, We Now Know; Offner, Another Such Victory; Sherwin, A World Destroyed; Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine.” 303 Jeffrey, The Secret History of MI6; Jones, Most Secret War and Reflections on Intelligence.

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The high level of concern about France during both the Alsos Mission’s investigations in Germany and the Farm Hall detention is one of the most important contributions made by this dissertation. The capture of most of the Farm Hall scientists, and the extended debates about their repatriation, were motivated primarily by fears about French science and politics. Concern about France has been written about in other works but analyzing this factor with regard to the Farm Hall detention further adds to our understanding of the complicated geopolitical relationships during this period of transition.304 American (and British) officials were not concerned simply by Soviet communism, but by French communism (and leftism in general) as well.

Fear about the Soviet Union was, of course, still very much a factor in the capture and detention of the Farm Hall scientists. This dissertation supports other scholars’ analyses of the unraveling of the Soviet-American alliance during 1945 and 1946.305 The secrecy of the Farm Hall detention was partly an effort to subvert the alliance in terms of shared decision-making about Germany and, thus, allow the US and Britain to make their own plans to investigate and exploit German science and technology. The scientists’ detention served to allow American officials to frame discussions about nuclear science on their own terms. However, the secrecy with which Farm Hall was treated was an effort to preserve this alliance, by allowing cooperation on other issues to continue.

After the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the existence of nuclear weapons became known to the entire world. The scientists’ continued detention, however, had no effect on preventing the nuclear arms race that

304 Eisenberg, Drawing the Line; Fenby, Alliance; Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy; Groves, Now It Can Be Told; Richelson, Spying on the Bomb; Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin; Walker, German National Socialism; Willis, French in Germany. 305 Naimark, Russians in Germany; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War.

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soon emerged between the US and the Soviet Union, nor the development of atomic weapons programs in countries such as France and Britain. This competition via nuclear weapons became one of the defining features of the Cold War, with vast amounts of money and resources spent in the quest for nuclear dominance. The ramifications of this arms race – and of the continued tension between scientists and the state with the regard to the control of research – are felt even today, as concerns remain about nuclear proliferation, rogue nuclear states and non-state actors, and the rise of modern nuclear terrorism. Farm Hall is one example of an attempt to close this nuclear ‘Pandora’s box’ in the early years of atomic research. In the short term, the Farm Hall detention was successful as a control measure in that none of the scientists came under French or Soviet control. With regard to long-term efforts to control atomic research, however, the scientists’ detention proved that putting nuclear scientists into custody could not restrain the theoretical physics that undergirded that nuclear weapons research. Scientific knowledge of this – or any kind – had never existed in a box and could not be hidden in one, now as ever.

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