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Nuclear Iran.Indd CHAPTER 4 THE PROSPECTS FOR REGIME CHANGE IN IRAN S. Rob Sobhani The people are very dissatisfi ed, and they are right to be so, and I swear to God that the society is on the brink of explosion. If this discontent increases, as is the case, the regime will be threatened. Ayatollah Ebrahim Amini Assembly of Experts (Power to Appoint Supreme Leader) 2002 Introduction. The question before us today is: What are the prospects of Iran’s revolutionary government giving way to reform or overthrow over the next 10-20 years? Furthermore, and more importantly for the United States, what groups and forces within Iran are opposed to the current revolutionary government and/or its efforts to develop nuclear power and long-range strategic weapons systems? The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that Iran’s revolutionary government can be overthrown within 2 years should the United States adopt a more robust policy of empowering the Iranian people to change the regime in Tehran. A regime change in Iran would put an immediate end to Iran’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and instead focus the efforts of the new secular government on the domestic priority of pulling Iran out of its current Third World status. Equally important, the demise of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the hands of the Iranian people would send a very powerful message to the rest of the Muslim world that Islam, as a form of governance, has failed. The failure of political Islam would be a victory for the United States and our war against Islamic fundamentalism. The end result of a more robust policy on Iran would allow 61 President Bush to look the American people in the eyes and state the following: “On September 11, 2001, an arc of tyranny and dictatorship stretched from Afghanistan through Iran into Iraq. Today, an arc of freedom rules in Kabul, Tehran, and Baghdad. And the world is a safer and better place as are the peoples of Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq.” Iran: Challenge and Opportunity. Militant Islam is today’s engine of international terror. Islamist schools breed a new militant generation, Islamist sermons mobilize opinion against the free world, Islamist ideology legitimizes recourse to terror and Islamist “charities” bankroll the global network of terror. While most Muslim states are aware of this threat to the world and their own stability, there is one that is actually governed by Islamists: The Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore, the principal component of the war against terrorism should be the war against militant Islam, which over the last 20 decades has been inspired, nurtured, and funded by the Islamic Government of Iran. The demise of the clerical regime in Iran would go a long way in “draining the swamp” of militancy and radicalism in the broader Muslim world with enormous geopolitical consequences for U.S. national security interests. Therefore, the permanent success of this campaign rests on a regime change in Iran. In short, the United States faces two immediate timelines: one, the mullahs’ access to a nuclear bomb, and the other, institutionalization of democracy through a regime change. The fundamental goal of U.S. foreign policy should be the acceleration of the regime change timeline. In many respects, the people of Iran face a similar set of timelines. The choices facing Iran over the next 10-20 years are simple: a country relegated to permanent Third World status with a nuclear bomb or an advanced, modern, secular country at peace with itself and its neighbors. The geopolitical interests of the United States coincide with the interests of a majority of Iranians: a fundamental change in the nature of the regime in Tehran. The overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran is good for America and good for the Iranian people. Therefore, 62 Washington’s strategy should be to support those forces inside and outside Iran which share America’s political, economic, military, and geopolitical vision for the region. Towards this end, the United States must continue to isolate the clerical regime and encourage the growing spirit of rebellion among the repressed Iranians. Assumptions. 1. Unwilling to pursue serious dialogue on normalizing relations with Washington, Tehran’s foreign policy goal instead is to defeat the U.S.-led sanctions policy and to only engage the U.S. private sector (American energy companies, in particular). For this purpose, the apologists for the clerical regime have established well-funded “nonprofi t” entities within the United States to soften Washington’s tough stance against the clerical establishment. 2. Led by the 50 million youth, the demand for reform in Iran created President Khatami in 1997. In fact, the reform movement was created by the mass demand for change. However, his inability to deliver has broadened the mass discontent and accelerated the implosion of the clerical regime. The historic election of 1997 was a clear signal to the clerical establishment that Iranians want the freedom to live and prosper without “divine intervention,” and that they want an end to their country’s international isolation. 3. Despite offi cial denunciations, a reservoir of goodwill toward America exist among a majority of Iranians. The people of Iran would welcome America’s principled, transparent and vocal support of the movement for democracy and rule-of-law in their country. Therefore, U.S. policy should not be held hostage to the history of U.S.-Iranian relations and events surrounding 1953. As far as a majority of freedom-loving Iranians are concerned, 1953 is history. Washington must overcome this ingrained psychological barrier, created in large measure by U.S. and Iranian academics of the left and self-loathing businessmen and journalists dependent upon Iranian visas and access (see section on U.S.-Iranian ties). 63 4. Irrespective of who is President of Iran, the Islamic Republic’s constitution specifi cally rejects popular sovereignty and puts ultimate power in the hands of the Supreme Leader, un-elected by the people and answerable only to “Allah.” 5. The popular overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran will send a very powerful message to the entire Muslim world—Islam does not solve the socio-economic problems that are at their root internal: poverty and corruption, suppression, absence of democracy, and economic opportunity. Public Opinion in Iran. In August of 2002, the Tarrance Group conducted a poll of public opinion in Tehran. This research project― the fi rst of its kind―was designed to fulfi ll two main objectives: a) provide a broad assessment of the social, economic, and political landscape of Iran; and b) determine whether or not Iranians believe in a fundamental change of the political system in Iran. The fi ndings from this survey validate stories that have recently been reported by international news agencies about a growing level of dissatisfaction within Iran towards the current regime. One fi nding in particular best summarizes the current mood in Iran: 63 percent of respondents believe that freedom and economic opportunity can only come as a result of “a fundamental change” in Iran’s system of government. Agreement with this viewpoint exceeds 50 percent among every major demographic group and is highest among those who rely on satellite television and the internet for information about issues facing Iran (72 percent and 75 percent respectively). Along the same line, 71 percent of respondents indicate that they would support a national referendum that allows the people of Iran to decide what system of government is best for the country. Once again, this is something that transcends all demographic categories. The mounting frustration within Iran’s citizenry can partially be attributed to the facts that only one-in-three respondents (33 percent) feel that Khatami has delivered on his campaign promises, and there is little expectation that things will change during his remaining 3 years in offi ce. While 29 percent of respondents say 64 Khatami is capable of bringing reform, a plurality (41 percent) of Iranians believe that it is time for a new approach. The maximum support the regime gets is between 15 to 19 percent. The cross tabs indicate that this level of support is from respondents whose families have clerical ties. In what comes as a rejection of the regime’s 23 years of hostility against the exiled Iranian community, 72 percent of those surveyed would welcome the involvement of Iranians living abroad in helping to rebuild their homeland. Moreover, just one-in-four respondents (25 percent) are of the opinion that history will judge the “founder of modern Iran” unfavorably; a fi nding that essentially means that the Pahlavi era is well regarded by many despite the regime’s attempt to convince people otherwise. In conclusion, the majority of Iranians living in Tehran want to see fundamental changes in the way their country is governed. People feel that the clerics have gone too far and overstepped their traditional role, and that the country would be better served if they were not directly in charge of the government. Part of the solution―as supported by a decisive majority of survey respondents―is to hold a “free, fair, and transparent national referendum,” allowing the people of Iran to select the system of government that they desire. History of U.S.-Iranian Relations. Much of the policymaking community in Washington has held back from making aggressive policy recommendations towards the clerical regime. This is the result of a complete misreading of the broad outlines of our country’s relations with Iran. The United States has nothing to apologize for concerning its relations with Iran. In fact, America’s timely interventions preserved Iran’s territorial integrity and prevented that country from falling behind the “Iron Curtain.” President Bush should begin his assessment of U.S.-Iranian policy with an objective look at the history of relations between Washington and Tehran.
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